Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?

Author(s): John Foran

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1, (Mar., 1993), pp. 1-20
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/201977
Accessed: 31/05/2008 09:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org
 Theories of Revolution Revisited:
Toward a Fourth Generation?
JOHN FORAN
University of California

Recent developments in sociological theorizing about revolution are surveyed, cri-

tiqued, and evaluated in termsof an emergingnew paradigm. Thefirst section assesses
the strengths and weaknesses of 1970s theorizing by Tilly, Paige, and Skocpol. A
second section takes up themes of state and crisis from 1980s work deepening this
tradition. A third section identifiesand discusses recent work in new areas critical of
the structuralists,on agency, social structure,and culture. Finally, the shape of a new
paradigm based on conjuncturalmodeling of economic, political, and culturalproc-
esses is suggested with a discussion of Walton and of very recent work by Farhi,
Foran, and Goldstone.

Since the publication of Theda Skocpol's landmark States and Social Revolutions in the
revolutionarily auspicious year 1979, both the literature on the subject and the empirical
range of the phenomenon itself have expanded enormously. To cite only the most dramatic
events, the last dozen years have witnessed social revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua,
watershed political transformations throughout eastern Europe, a valiant attempt at a
movement for democratic change in China, and, in spring 1991, the armed overthrow of
the Marxist government of Ethiopia. Under the impact of these events-particularly in
Iran and Central America-scholars have begun to refine older arguments and to generate
new insights and approaches to the understanding of revolution. The purpose of the present
essay is to map the coordinates of this recent thinking on the subject, and to argue that
the first signs of a new school may be appearing on the intellectual horizon.

THE THIRD GENERATION: BREAKTHROUGHS AND LIMITS

In two influential review essays from the early 1980s, Jack Goldstone (1980, 1982)
attempted to survey the state of the art in the sociology of revolution. He identified three
"generations" of theorists: 1) a "natural history of revolutions" school led by comparative
historians Lyford P. Edwards ([1927] 1972), George Sawyer Pettee (1938), and Crane
Brinton (1938); 2) a second generation of "general theories" of revolution in the 1950s
and 1960s, embodied in the work of modernization and structural functionalist theorists
such as James C. Davies (1962), Neil Smelser (1963), Chalmers Johnson (1966), Samuel
P. Huntington (1968) and Ted Robert Gurr (1970); and 3) in the 1970s, a new generation
of structural models of revolution by Jeffery Paige (1975), Charles Tilly (1978), and
Theda Skocpol (1979), which built on the work of Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) and Eric
Wolf (1969).1 The strengths and weaknesses of the first two generations have been assessed
1 I am aware that this classificationof theories by generationis problematic,and that the best alternativeis to
group the theories by theme or approach.Thus, for example, Goldstone places Tilly in the second generation,
although he belongs among the structuralistsby both period and perspective. There is no place in the schema
for the pioneeringworks of de Tocqueville and Marx, among others. In fact, de Tocqueville anticipatedinsights
of all threegenerations-for example, by showing thatthe FrenchRevolutionwas a "natural"outcome of aspects
of the Old Regime ([1856] 1955, p. 203), by anticipatingDavies and Gurron rising expectations as a cause,
and by anticipatingSkocpol on the outcome of a more strongly centralizedstate. For our purposes, however,

Sociological Theory 11:1 March 1993

2 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
aptly by Goldstone (1980, 1982), Aya (1979), and Zimmermann(1983). The natural
history school developed elaboratedescriptionsof the stages of some of the major social
revolutionsup to their day (often surprisin, y accuratefor later events as well) without a
clear theory of why revolutions occurred or what accounted for their outcomes. The
generaltheories of the 1960s used social psychological and functionalistmodels to address
the "why" question, but were subject to the criticism that their causal variables (relative
deprivation, subsystems disequilibria, and the like) were vague, difficult to observe, or
hard to measure, or were inferredtautologicallyfrom a retrospectivevantage point.
The "thirdgeneration,"in Goldstone's view, representeda significantadvance (this is
so, but not unequivocally, as we shall see). Moore and Wolf were crucial precursorsin
some importantrespects. Both moved to the macrosociologicallevel of comparingnational
cases in which the key variables included class relations, the state, the international
economy, and the spread of capitalism into the countryside. Each avoided a pure struc-
turalism by acknowledging the contingent factors in their respective cases (see Moore
1966, p. 161; Wolf 1969, p. 98), and paid some, if not paramount,attentionto culture
as a contributingcause of rebellion. Also, despite the respectivetitles of their books, each
analyzedthe roles played by urbanas well as peasantsocial forces. Moore's investigation
centered on the relationshipsamong monarchicstates, landed nobilities, and commercial
impulsesin agriculture.Peasantrebellionsoccurredin ChinaandRussia, where agriculture
was not commercializedand peasants retainedtheir social organization.Fascism was the
result in Japanand Germany,where landedclasses commercializedthemselves by keeping
peasants on the land. Moore adduced complex combinations of factors to explain the
outcome of democracy from revolutionarycivil wars in England, France, and the United
States. Moore's classic is ultimately less a study of the causes of revolution than of the
origins of the political systems of democracy, fascism, and communism.
Eric Wolf focused explicitly on the majorsocial revolutionsof the twentiethcenturyup
to the 1960s, framing his six narrativeaccounts somewhat loosely with a collection of
rich theoretical leads. He noted foreign pressures, including wars, as a source of crisis
for the state in Russia and China. The key factor across cases, however, was the impact
of the commercializationof agriculture,as capitalism, coupled with population growth,
dislocated customary social, political, and economic arrangements.States and elites suf-
fered crises of legitimation in these circumstances;"tacticallymobile" middle peasants
reactedto the combinationof pressureandopportunityby rebelling,often enteringreluctant
alliances with disaffected urban radicals. Outcomes varied according to the balance of
armed forces and political organizationsin each case (Wolf 1969, pp. 278-301). Both
Moore and Wolf were sensitive to the historical variationamong their cases and (inter-
estingly, in a decade dominatedby the grand systems of structuralfunctionalism)balked
at generalizing their findings into more formal models.
Paige, Tilly, and Skocpol went further in this direction; in the process they grafted
many of Wolf's and Moore's specific insights onto their models of revolution. Jeffery
Paige (1975) elaborateda formal economic structuralmodel of the possibilities of peasant
unrest (ratherthan of social revolutions per se). The economic organizationof the rural
export sector is the independentvariable:nationalistrevolutions are most likely to occur
on migratory-laborestate systems where landlordsown land individuallyand farmwithout
extensive capital investment,and where the ruralwork force consists of seasonal migratory
wage laborers.Socialist revolutionsare probablein decentralizedsharecroppingeconomies

the characterizationof the third generationas a structuralistbreakthrough,and the ways in which theoristsmore
recently have both extended and critiquedthis approach,make it appropriateto search out common themes in
generationalcohorts. These circumstancesalso permit us to highlight the diversity and originalityof particular
cases.
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 3
where the same kind of farm is worked by share tenants. In contrastto other economic
arrangements(the small holding, the commercializedplantation),these are zero-sum land
tenure systems with built-in potential for violent conflicts and organizationof the work
force; in contrastwith the commercial hacienda, revolt in these situationsis more likely
to lead to permanentchange. Nationalist anticolonial struggles in Algeria, Kenya, and
Angola fit the first pattern;socialist upheavalsin China and Vietnam the second.
Paige's logical schemas are elegant but neither historicallydynamic nor sociologically
holistic, as various critics have pointed out. The state, urbanactors, and the nonexport-
orientedrural sector are bracketedout of the account, which reduces Third World social
structureto a two-class ruralmodel (Disch 1979); agriculturalorganizationis not a given,
but ratherthe product of the world-system, internalpolitics, and other factors (Somers
and Goldfrank 1979). The result is a map of the conditions under which certaintypes of
social movement may occur, rather than a causal account of the origins of particular
revolutions.
CharlesTilly, in various works on collective violence generally(1973, 1975, 1978) has
arguedfor a political as opposed to an economic structuralism:"[T]he factors which hold
up underclose scrutinyare, on the whole, politicalones. The structureof power, alternative
conceptions of justice, the organizationof coercion, the conduct of war, the formationof
coalitions, the legitimacy of the state-these traditionalconcerns of political thought
provide the main guides to the explanation of revolution" (1973, p. 447). His 1978
"contentionmodel" of revolution emphasized the capacity of challengers to state power
to mobilize resources (territory,arms, popular allegiance) into a revolutionarycoalition
strong enough to bring about a revolutionarysituation (in which two sides claim control
of a polity) and ultimately a revolutionaryoutcome (in which the challengerssuccessfully
reimpose governmentalcontrol) (1978, pp. 216-17). The model does not investigate in
much detail the root causes of revolutionaryoutbreaks, either internal or external to
society; ratherit tries to capturethe dynamicsof the process of revolution,once unleashed.
The search for causal patternsof social revolutions was pursued in Theda Skocpol's
path-breakingwork, States and Social Revolutions, the 1979 capstone of third-generation
structuraltheories. Skocpol's model is resolutely structuralin at least two senses: 1) it
argues for the centrality of analyzing relationships (classes with each other, state and
classes, states with each other) and 2) it maintains that revolutions are the product of
"objectively conditioned"crises that are not made or controlled by any single group or
class (thus her polemical agreement with the bold propositionthat "revolutionsare not
made; they come"; (1979, p. 17)). Skocpol also provides the most widely cited recent
definition of a social revolution:"Social revolutionsare rapid, basic transformationsof a
society's state and class structures;and they are accompaniedand in part carriedthrough
by class-based revolts from below" (1979, p. 4). Along the way the book covers a
tremendousamount of ground:Skocpol argues that the state must be taken seriously as
an "autonomousstructure"with interests of its own in societal resources and order that
may lead it to act at cross-purposeswith dominantclasses; that John StuartMill's methods
of agreement and difference can be applied profitablyto comparative-historicalmacro-
analyses of causal regularities;that the findings of her study of the French, Russian, and
Chinese revolutions may not be applied mechanicallyto more recent Third World cases
(the types of state involved are different)but thatthe generalprinciples,includinganalysis
of structuralrelations among states and classes, are centrallyrelevant.
The basic patternemerging from Skocpol's inductive analysis of France, Russia, and
China is one of political crisis arising when old-regime states could not meet external
challenges (economic or military competition) because of internal obstacles in agrarian
and elite relations (inefficiencies in agriculturalproductionand/ortax mechanisms).Fiscal
4 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
crisis was magnified by elite protests and opened the way for peasant rebellions from
below. The rebellions themselves were enabled by the persistenceof communaltraditions
of solidarity in France and Russia, and by Communistorganizingefforts in China, all of
which resultedin breakdownsof the state. Successful social revolutionshad characteristic
outcomes: landed classes lost groundto lower classes and to new state officials; there was
(for a time) more popular participationin the state; the states ultimately were more
centralizedand strongerin relation to society and other states.
These arguments-especially those on the causes of revolutions-have elicited an
enormous amount of commentaryand debate. Skocpol has been criticized for comparing
states in very different historical and power situationsand also, paradoxically,for failing
to generalize beyond her three cases; for elevating the state to the highest level of
explanation (Knight 1986, p. 559, note 386 calls this "statolatry");for emphasizing
structureat the expense of agency or culture(see, among others, Taylor 1989); for failing
to weight properly the contributionof urban forces, or of coalitions generally; for mis-
applicationsof Millian methodology (see Burawoy 1989; Nichols 1986); for inaccuracy
regardingaspects of this or that case (on France, see Goldstone 1984, pp. 709-10). Many
of these criticisms are possible because Skocpol often chooses to make her points by
exaggeratingthem; thus she is aware of the roles played by ideologies, by urbangroups,
and obviously by forces other than the state, but she casts her argumentsin strong terms
to highlight their distinctiveness. Thus she opens the way for the various criticisms, most
of which are therefore justified to some degree. For our purposes here, Skocpol is of
centralimportanceprecisely because States and Social Revolutionsinitiatedthe next round
of theorizing; much of this work seeks to deepen the work of the third generation, and
anotherpartattemptsto corrector revise it in some fashion. This theorizing-all from the
past dozen years-is the subject of the rest of this essay.

DEEPENINGTHE THIRD GENERATION:RECENTWORK ON THE STATEAND

REVOLUTIONARYCRISES
Much research in the 1980s explored precisely what type of state was vulnerable to
revolutions. Robert Dix (1984) made a key distinction in noting that "relatively open"
regimes, or "regimesruled by the militaryacting in its institutionalcapacityand in alliance
with other key elites," have avoided revolutions, whereas "an isolative, corrupt, anti-
national, and repressiveregime, especially a personalisticone" tends to be vulnerable(pp.
437, 442). This view has been seconded ably and refined furtherby Jeff Goodwin and
Theda Skocpol (1989) and by Timothy Wickham-Crowley(1989a, 1989b). The latter
authorsuggests that Che Guevaramay be credited with the thesis that "guerrillasshould
never try to unseat elected governments,"advice thathe ignoredfatally in Bolivia in 1967.
Goodwin and Skocpol point out that closed authoritarianregimes, whether dictatorships
or directly ruled colonies, provide a common enemy for variousclasses because the lower
classes are repressedand the middle classes and elites may be excluded from the halls of
power. Some controversyhas revolved aroundthe termfor such regimes:Goldstone(1982,
1986), following Eisenstadt (1978), proposes "neopatrimonial"to denote the patronage
system behindthe modem facade of such regimes as PorfirianMexico, CubaunderBatista,
the shah's Iran, and Somocista Nicaragua. Matthew Shugart (1989) opts for another
Weberianterm-"sultanistic"-to describe regimes that are narrowerthan the dominant
class, with unprofessional armies. Farideh Farhi (1990) characterizesthe Iranian and
Nicaraguan old regimes as "personalistauthoritarian."Manus Midlarsky and Kenneth
Roberts (1985) propose "autonomouspersonalist"for the vulnerablestates of Batista and
Somoza; they contrastthis type with "instrumentalist" elite-based regimes in El Salvador
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 5
and Guatemala (likely to be challenged, but unsuccessfully) and with the even less
vulnerable "autonomousinstitutional"states of Brazil and Mexico, which can coopt a
wider range of class forces to ensure stability (also see Goldstone 1987, p. 5; Liu 1988).
Another, smaller stream of research has examined the state's claims to legitimation.
Said Amir Arjomand(1988, p. 191) argued that the shah fell from power less because
his army collapsed than because the structureof authoritycrumbled. Goldstone's major
new study of early modem rebellions in Europeand Asia pushes beyond Skocpol's insight
to propose that the state should be consideredautonomous,as an economic, political, and
cultural actor "whose strength (and pace of future development)is affected by the ten-
sions-or lack thereof-between state-sponsoredorthodoxy and alternative ideological
claims" (1991, p. 463). All of the work cited here on the state advances the agenda of
Skocpol's original work on the autonomy of the state, in new empirical and conceptual
directions. Vulnerableregimes now can be pinpointedmore accurately;the only caution
should be against taking an excessively state-centeredapproach, whereby the state is
abstractedfrom the larger structuresin which it is embedded.2Many a particularisticruler
is not overthrown(Chiang Kai-Shek on Taiwan; Kim Il-Sung in North Korea; Mobutu,
among others, in Africa), while others leave the scene in ways that do not qualify as
social revolutions (Stroessner in Paraguay; Pinochet in Chile). Therefore it must be
recognized that this line of researchhas identified an often necessary, but not sufficient,
cause of revolution(a strikingrecent study that identifiesand accountsfor such differences
is Snyder 1992). A pertinentquestion bears furtherinvestigation:under what conditions
are governmentsunable to use force effectively or to retain the allegiance of key groups
in the population?
Another fruitful area of work that builds on the third generation is research on the
externaldimensionof revolutionarycrises and outcomes. Skocpol (1979, pp. 19-23) drew
attentionto the context of internationalcompetitionbetween states and especially to the
effects of warfare;these circumstancesforced early modem Europeanstates to centralize,
create standingarmies, and tax the population. In analyzingthe causality of the outbreak
of social revolutions Skocpol included disadvantagedeconomic positions and military
defeat in war (especially in eighteenth-centuryFrance and in Russia during World War
I). In a more recent article (1988) she discussed the continuingimportanceof international
warfarein the postrevolutionaryperiod:the new states used warfareto controland channel
the revolutionaryenergies of the populace and to centralize their own power in relation
to internalopponents.
Skocpol's argumentson internationalpressureshave been challenged empirically and
modified analyticallyby Goldstone (1991, pp. 20-21), who argues that war per se is not
the key (consider the constant European conflicts of 1688-1714, without revolutions);
more important, rising prices and the size of armies made warfare more expensive.
Moreover,the cases of rebellion in Englandand the Netherlandscontravenethe thesis of
falling behind more advanced competitors. Goldstone seeks to amend structuralismwith
a temporaldimension:"whereSkocpol sees as the sourceof trouble[in France]a backward
economy undone by the cost of wars, I see a backwardtax system (too much a land-based
tax system) undoneby the mountingpopulationand inflationarypressuresof the eighteenth
century. . . . The structuralblockage pointed out by Skocpol thus had its effects in the
context of dynamic forces buffeting the fiscal system" (1991, pp. 250-51; author's
emphasis).
2 McDaniel
(1991) provides a model for how to avoid this error. The book presents an excellent recent
reassessment of the vulnerabilityof autocraticmodernizersin Russia and Iran; it also uncovers the multiple
contradictionsinherentin modernizationfrom above withouttappingthe participatorypotentialof the new classes
createdby the process.
6 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
WalterGoldfrank's(1979) study of the Mexican revolutionshifted the locus of external
crisis for ThirdWorldcases from unduepressureto its opposite-"a tolerantor permissive
world context." Several scenarios may aid revolutionaries:1) when the major outside
power is preoccupied by war or internal problems; 2) when major powers engage in
rivalry, thus negating each other's ability to influence events; or 3) when rebels receive
greateroutside help than does the state. Since Goldfrankwrote this article, the cases of
Iran and Nicaragua have suggested yet another type of permissive world context-the
perceivedremoval of strong supportfor the repressivepracticesof a dictator,compounded
by subsequentpolicy divisions in the core actor.
The precise degree to which external factors influence revolutionarysituations is a
matterof ongoing debate. Wickham-Crowley(1989b, p. 513) considersthem of secondary
importance.In contrast, several of the syntheticperspectivesdiscussed in greaterdetail at
the end of this essay-notably those of Walton (1984), Farhi (1988, 1990), and Foran
(1990)-consider them central, but effective in slightly differingways. Ian Roxborough's
study of exogenous factors in the genesis of Latin American revolutions provides some
perceptive leads, one of which is "to decompose the concept of 'dependency' into a
numberof dimensions, or differenttypes," suggestingpolitical, investment,mono-export,
and financial dependency as operative in different combinations in the cases of the
Mexican, Bolivian, Cuban, and Nicaraguanrevolutions. The result was the emergence of
nationalist movements aimed at regenerating the country in the face of government
acquiescencewith foreign control (Roxborough1989b, pp. 4, 5, 13; also see Roxborough
1989a). These studies highlight the ways in which twentieth-centuryThird World revo-
lutions differ from the agrarian-imperialcases studiedby Skocpol (Chinabelongs to both
groups).

NEW DIRECTIONS:TOWARD A FOURTHGENERATION?

The 1980s and early 1990s also have witnessed a resurgenceof interestin themes that the
third-generationtheoristshad neglected. These include the somewhatinterrelatedareas of
agency, social structuralconsiderations, and the roles played by culture and ideology in
revolutions. In the rest of this essay I examine new developmentsin these areas. I close
with some attemptsto synthesize these factorswith third-generationtheoriesthat I believe
suggest the outlines of fourth-generationtheorizingabout revolutions.
The vexed issue of agency has entered and exited the theoreticalagenda as times and
fashions change. Marx struck a balance in the often-cited Eighteenth Brumaire: "Men
[sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered,given and transmittedfrom the past"(1977, p. 300). Subsequentgenerations
of theorists,however, have tendedto come down on one side or the otherof this theoretical
divide; voluntaristsstress agency, whereas structuralistsemphasize objective conditions.3
In the naturalhistory school, while Brinton and Pettee made much of ideology, Edwards

3 Lenin and Trotsky retainedmore of Marx's ambiguoussophistication.Lenin emphasizedthe importanceof

both objective and subjective factors in his 1905 essay "The Collapse of the Second International"(1966, pp.
358-59). Trotsky's history of the Russian revolution contains such rich passages as the following: "The most
indubitablefeature of a revolution is the direct interferenceof the masses in historic events. . . . The dynamic
of revolutionaryevents is directly determinedby swift, intense and passionate changes in the psychology of
classes which have alreadyformed themselves before the revolution."On the other hand, "Entirelyexceptional
circumstances,independentof the will of persons or parties, are necessary in order to tear off from discontent
the fetters of conservatism, and bring the masses to insurrection"([1930] 1959, pp. ix-x). The degree to which
Trotsky anticipatesmany of Skocpol's key structuralfactors is likewise striking ([1930] 1959, p. xii; also see
Burawoy 1989).
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 7
foreshadowedSkocpol in arguingthat Russian communism"was not the result of theory;
it was the result of crisis" (Edwards [1927] 1972, p. 203, quoted in Kimmel 1990, p.
48). The psychological reductionismof second-generationtheorists from Gurrto Davies
and Johnson is typically criticized as too purposive; third-generationtheorists such as
Skocpol reacted with resolute (though often misunderstood)structuralismsof their own.
Alongside the deepening of third-generationwork along the lines alreadynoted, agency
has begun to resurface in the concerns of some scholars of the past decade. As Teodor
Shanin remindedus acerbicallyin 1986:

Social scientistsoften miss a centre-pieceof anyrevolutionary struggle-the fervourand

anger that drives revolutionaries and makes them into what they are. Academictraining
and bourgeoisconventiondeadenits appreciation.The "phenomenon" cannotbe easily
"operationalised" into factors, tables and figures. ... At the very centreof revolution
lies an emotionalupheavalof moralindignation,revulsionand fury with the powers-
that-be,such thatone cannotdemuror remainsilent, whateverthe cost. Withinits glow,
for a while, men [sic] surpass themselves, breakingthe shackles of intuitive self-
preservation,convention,day-to-dayconvenience,androutine(1986, pp. 30-31).

Scholars are beginning to approachagency anew from two key vantage points: that of
actors and coalitions, and that of the role played in motivating these actors by ideas,
culture, beliefs, values, and/or ideology. The first of these may be considered under the
theme of social structurebecause it is here that the structuralists'concerns with large-
scale factors such as state and world system intersect paradoxicallywith their critics'
emphasis on who makes the revolutions. Attention to social structurethereforefaces in
two directions, straddlingthe line between structureand agency.
One question has received considerableattention:who, precisely, makes revolutions?
The answer has varied over the differentgenerationsof theory. Marx, despite his reputed
emphasis on urban workers, noted complex alliances of social forces in his historical
studies (see Kimmel 1990, p. 24), as did Lenin ([1902] 1975, p. 111) after him. In the
second generation, Huntington(1968, pp. 277, 308) argued that revolutions require an
alliance between urban intellectuals and peasants, often united around an ideology of
nationalism.Wolf (1969, pp. 289, 296-97) and Moore (1966, p. 479) essentially agreed
with this view, althoughall threeemphasizedthe peasantry.In surveyingthe historiography
on the French revolution, Skocpol (1979, p. 110) concluded: "Peasantrevolts have in
truth attractedless attention from historiansand social theorists than have urban lower-
class actions in revolutions-even for the predominantlyagrariansocieties with which we
are concerned here. . . . peasant revolts have been the crucial insurrectionaryingredient
in virtually all actual (i.e., successful) social revolutions to date, and certainly in the
French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions"(1979, pp. 112-13).4 This statementempha-
sized the swing of the pendulumback in the opposite directionbecause third-generation
theoristssuch as Paige (1975), Migdal (1974), Scott (1976), and Popkin (1979) each had
stressed the causal centralityof peasantrevolts.
One reason why urban groups systematically were overlooked in the 1970s' studies
may have been the dismal record of Latin American urbanguerrillasas contrastedwith
the peasants of Vietnam. Research in the 1980s began to documentand insist on the role
4
Skocpol admitsthat "thedifferenturbanindustrialand class structuresprofoundlyinfluencedthe revolutionary
process and outcomes," but she treats these "as backgroundsagainst which the (for me) more analytically
importantagrarianupheavals and political dynamics played themselves out" (1979, p. 235). Although she thus
acknowledgesurbanforces, they definitelydo not receive the same causal statusas states and peasants;moreover,
all of these "factors"are structuralratherthan agentic in Skocpol's work (that is, she downplaystheir subjective
components).
8 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
of urbanforces in France (Goldstone 1984); in Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua(Gugler 1988);
in 1640 Englandand in Berlin and Vienna in 1848 (Goldstone 1991, p. 135). Ratherthan
alleging the revolutionarycapacity of a single class, however, either across revolutionsor
in particularcases, recent scholarsare strivingto producea more balancedaccount. Robert
Dix (1984), drawing on Tilly (1973), underlinedthe need for coalitions involving urban
as well as ruralforces to overthrowdictatorialstates in ThirdWorld revolutions, notably
in Cuba and Nicaragua. Goodwin (1987) noted the same phenomenonthroughoutCentral
America, and Gould (1987, pp. 204, 364) for the English revolution. The populist nature
of cross-class coalitions has been signaled by Moghadam(1989) and by Foran (1991) on
Iran, in which complex alliances among a range of urbanclasses have been requiredto
fuel revolutionary outbreaks. Such broad alliances seem to have the best chance for
success, but in postrevolutionaryconflicts they tend to fragment into their constituent
elements. Finally, Wickham-Crowley'sseveral studies (1987, 1989a, 1991, 1992) have
wedded resourcemobilizationtheoryto quantitativetechniquesto shed light on the patterns
of success and failure among Latin American guerrillamovements of the last 35 years.
Wickham-Crowleyviews these movements in terms of an alliance between intellectuals
and peasants under certain conditions, including overall degree of social support, type of
regime, and reactions by the United States.
With respect to the class dimension of social structure, then, the questions are as
follows: What classes participatein revolutions, and why? What classes are divided, and
how? Ultimately, what patternsexist across cases, and how may these various coalitions
be characterized?5
Alongside the long-standingconcern with social class, recent scholarshipis just begin-
ning to theorize and study other central dimensions of social structuresuch as gender,
ethnicity, and region. The list of works on the roles of women in particularrevolutionsis
growing, including those of Norma Stoltz Chinchilla(1990) on Nicaragua;JohnettaCole
(1986) on Cuba; Linda Kelly (1987), among others on France;Maxine Molyneux (1985)
on South Yemen; Guity Nashat (1982) and others on Iran;and Judith Stacey (1983) on
China. Most of these studies focus on women after the revolution. Valentine Moghadam
(1990) offers an ambitious comparativesynthesis of the role of women in a numberof
social revolutions. She seeks to incorporategender into the sociology of revolution in
terms of cultural and ideological struggles over the family and sex roles, noting how
gender issues surface recurrentlyduring revolutions to provide revealing insights into
revolutionaries'intentions.
A usefully complementaryapproach,I believe, would be to locate women in the social
structureand to follow the logic of their participationas one would follow any other
group, noting its intersectionwith race and class. Similar work in recoveringthe roles of
various ethnic groups, such as Afro-Cubans in the Cuban revolution and indigenous
peoples in the Mexican revolution, remains to be done. This approachalso awaits com-
parative study, not to mention synthesis with other principles of social stratification.
Regional variationswithin given revolutionshave received somewhatmore attention,with

5 Rational choice theorists have made a mark in this area, as one anonymous reviewer has pointed out.
Rationalchoice theory, like the resource mobilizationschool, offers a middle-rangeperspectiveon revolutions,
focused on motivations for action (though it is more all-encompassingthan resourcemobilizationin its objects
of analysis). These theorists address such issues as the role of perceptions and calculations of success, the
reasons why some individuals and groups may participateratherthan others, and the strength of insurgents
versus that of the state. Because this theory is cast at a level of explanationboth more general (social action as
a whole) and yet more specific (why actors rebel ratherthan what causes revolutions)than the work of the third-
and fourth-generationtheoristswho are the subjectof this essay, I omit furtherdiscussion here. Interestedreaders
might consult Calhoun(1991), Coleman (1990, pp. 500-502), Friedmanand Hechter(1988), and the collection
edited by Taylor (1988).
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 9
excellent cases studies by Alan Knight (1986) on Mexico and William Brustein(1986) on
France. Future work must deliver on the promise of paying fuller attentionto ethnicity,
gender, and region as well as class in conceptualizingsocial structureand social change.
A second major new direction in the recent scholarshiphas been taken in culture and
ideology. Again, this is a response to the purely political and economic structuralismsof
the thirdgeneration,especially Skocpol's work. In some sense, this, too is a returnto the
preoccupationsof theorists as early as de Tocqueville ([1856] 1955, p. 6) on the French
Enlightenment,Brinton("thedesertionof the intellectuals"),or the structuralfunctionalists
of the second generation. (There seems to be almost nothing completely new in writings
on revolution!) Empirically, social historians of particularcases, such as George Rude
([1964] 1973 and other works) and ChristopherHill (1965 and other works), had sought
to specify the relative weight of ideas in the French and English revolutions. Third-
generationprecursorsWolf (1969) and Moore (1966) had invoked issues of culture and
legitimation, but without raising them to causal significance. Already in the 1970s Eisen-
stadt(1978) had tried to carve out a theoretical-if abstract-place for the role of "cultural
orientations"in the makingof revolutions(he had heterodoxreligiousmovementsin mind)
and Mostafa Rejai (1973, pp. 33-34) had surveyed the uses of ideology. James Scott
(1976) also offered a unique reply to the structuralists'search for the determinantsof
peasant revolt. In Scott's view, peasants, who live close to the margins of subsistence,
expect a minimumlivelihood from landlordsand a certainamountof justice; violation of
these standardsprovokes resentment, resistance, and sometimes rebellion. Tilly likewise
made suggestive referenceto "culturalrepertoires"of revolution(1978, pp. 151-59, 224-
25). When Goldstone surveyed the field in 1982 (p. 204), however, he placed the role of
ideology on the "frontiersof research"as an underexploredarea for future scholars to
probe.
This promise now is reachingfulfillmentin a numberof ways. In 1985, in an important
early discussion, William Sewell debated with Theda Skocpol about the precise role of
ideas in the Frenchrevolution. States and Social Revolutionshardlyfails to recognize the
role played by ideology (1979, pp. 78, 114-15, 170-71, 187, 329-30 note 23), but
Skocpol insists that ideologies cannot predict or explain outcomes, rules out new values
or goals as relevant to peasant revolts, and believes that ideologies are shaped and
contradictedby structuralsituations and crises. Sewell charges Skocpol with failing to
recognize "the autonomouspower of ideology in the revolutionaryprocess"(1985, p. 58)
and with smuggling in ideas under the rubricof differing "world-historicalcontexts" in
France and Russia. Sewell, invoking the works of Althusser, Foucault, Geertz, and
Raymond Williams, calls for a structural, anonymous, and transpersonalanalysis of
ideology. Such collective human products are capable of transformation;interestingly,
Sewell believes that state, class, and internationalstructuresshould be viewed similarly
as human constructions in Anthony Giddens's dual sense of constrainingand enabling
action. Sewell then applies this frameworkto the Frenchcase, examining the emergence
of contradictoryconceptions about monarchyand sovereignty in the course of the eigh-
teenthcentury.The crisis of 1789 was provokedby state bankruptcy,"[b]utonce the crisis
had begun, ideological contradictionscontributedmightily to the deepening of the crisis
into revolution"(1985, pp. 66-67). Sewell then proceedsto assess the weight of ideology
and war in the making of the Terror,the dynamics of the struggles among competing
ideological variantsin terms of a dialogue based on a common stock of concepts, and the
need to broaden the definition of revolution to encompass the transformationof "the
entiretyof people's social lives" (1985, pp. 71-84).
Skocpol's (1985) reply to Sewell shows that her thinking had developed to include a
more nuanced considerationof the role of ideas in revolution. Notably, she distinguishes
10 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

nicely between long-standing, anonymous, socially diverse cultural idioms employed by

popular groups and the self-consciously elaborated ideologies that politically articulate
actorsfashion from the formerfor specific purposes. These conceptionsthen interactwith
the structuralsituationsdescribed in her earlier work; the central significance still seems
to lie in "struggles over the organizationand uses of state power" (1985, p. 96). This
rethinkingby Skocpol flows from her reflections on the case of Iran, which led her to
recast her definition of social revolutions as "rapid,basic transformationsof a country's
state and class structure,and of its dominantideology";here was one revolutionthat "was
deliberatelyand coherently made" (1982, pp. 265 (emphasis added), 267).
All of this discussion may contain an unansweredquestion: what are the origins of
ideas, beliefs, and desires? As Michael Taylor (1989) argued, again specifically with
Skocpol, social structuremay explain desires and beliefs, but past actions also explain
social structures.Neither individualismnor structuralismis the "ultimate"(only) cause of
social change:"Social changes areproducedby actions;social changesrequirenew actions.
New actions require changed desires and/or beliefs" (1989, p. 121; author's emphasis).
Taylor seems to be arguing that social structureitself must be studied as conditioned in
part by culture, and by reference to intentional actions. Culture, in turn, is socially
constructedand "made"by actors.
Two social theorists who have made conceptualcontributionsto understandingthe role
of culture in social change are Craig Calhoun (1983, 1988) and Carlos Forment (1990).
Calhoun has subtly stressed the intersection between the everyday social practices of
closely knit communities and the ways in which members constantly draw on living,
traditionalcultures, update them to meet new challenges, and engage them to defend
themselves against threatening changes. Such actors thus are viewed as "reactionary
radicals,"enlisting traditionalculturalvalues to wage defensive social struggles. Forment's
work extends the "linguisticturn"in Europeansocial theoryinto the study of revolutionary
politics in colonial Latin America;this work is organizedaroundthe concept of "political
space," the interplay of discourse and power, and the role of cultural representationin
political practices. In the process by bringing the concerns of Foucaultand Skocpol into
mutualcontact it will perhapscreate a quite novel mode of analysis.
Finally, the most recent work of James Scott (1990) provides leads for understanding
the performativeaspects of domination and subordinationin the reproductionof power
and the elaborationof resistance. His analysis of the infrapoliticsof resistance uncovers
a spectrum of activities rooted in shared experiences of domination and issuing in acts
ranging from everyday rituals and interactions (gossip, poaching, aspects of popular
culture) to overt, large-scale rebellions and social explosions. He brilliantlydeploys the
concept of a "hiddentranscript"of culturallyand materiallyconstitutedresistance, to shed
light on this range of oppositional activities, although in the end he stops well short of
explaining the causes of rebellion (or even the precise origins of the hidden transcripts
themselves). Each of these theorists takes useful steps toward creating an independent
causal space for culture and the related but distinct concept of ideology; each provides
clues for integratingthese elements with a broadersociology of revolution.

DISCERNINGTHE SHAPE OF THE FOURTHGENERATION

We may close this survey of recent writing in the sociology of revolutions with a closer
look at severalworks thatsuggest a new, more syntheticapproach.This approachcombines
the strengthsof the third-generationstructuralistsand their supporterswith some of the
concerns we have just seen expressed by their critics. Although I can discuss only a
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 11
handfulof works in any detail here, others alreadydiscussed also provide hints of a new
synthesis or go some distance in that direction, includingTilly (1978), Goldfrank(1979),
Gould (1987), Goodwin and Skocpol (1989), Wickman-Crowley(1989a and especially
1992, which appearedtoo late for propertreatmenthere), Roxborough(1989a), Moghadam
(1989), and Kimmel (1990). Other useful recent contributionsare made by DeFronzo's
(1991) analysis of six case studies and by Aya's (1990) conceptual ground clearing. As
Jack Goldstone commented in 1989, the dominantmodel in the study of revolutionis no
longer simple class analysis, but a constellation of factors and interactionamong those
factors. The metaphorin this approachto history is no longer that of a locomotive, but
of a kaleidoscope (Goldstone (1989). We now may examine more closely the various
ideas about these factors and interactions.
Much of this work was generated by attempts to come to grips with the changing
realities underlyingtwentieth-centuryrevolutionsin the ThirdWorld. In this regardJohn
Walton's (1984) Reluctant Rebels broke provocative new ground, especially in taking
"nationalrevolts" as his object of analysis-that is, "the entire field of insurrectionary
processes that lie beyond the (inevitably qualitative)bounds of routine politics" (p. 13).
The term thereforeencompasses not only the so-called "greatrevolutions"but also Wal-
ton's case studies-the failed Huk rebellion in the Philippines, the fratricidalcivil war
known as La Violencia in Colombia, and the anticolonialMau Mau uprising in British
Kenya, all dating from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. Walton classifies these together
with other revolutions because he argues that first, their causes are similar, and second,
the great revolutions resulted in less transformationthan is usually thought.
To build his own theory, Waltondrawson aspects of four approaches(all from the third
generation):the peasant revolt thesis of Scott, Moore, and Wolf; Wallersteinianworld-
system theory; Tilly's conflict theory; and state-centeredapproaches.Walton, however,
goes well beyond these approachesto create a new synthesis, based largely on his deep
knowledge of the sociology of development. The elements include "(1) the context of
uneven development;(2) the conditions of protest mobilization;(3) modernizationcrises
and coalitions; and (4) the role of the state" (1984, p. 161). The analysis itself is richer
than this list, for it includes consideration of culture and political consciousness:
"[E]conomic grievances cannot be separatedfrom the culturalforms in which they are
experienced and understood, nor from the political forms in which they are expressed.
Economic grievances were necessary conditions, but their mobilizing potential was only
realized in the sufficient condition of political organizationrooted in culturaltraditions"
(pp. 29-30). In particular,"culturalnationalismwas a key contributorto each national
revolt"(p. 155). Anotherintriguingpatternthat emerges from the case studies is the crisis
caused by a combination of absolute economic deteriorationand a sharppolitical crack-
down on movements that had been making legal gains.
The results varied in each case: rebellion never advancedvery far in the Philippinesin
the Huk period; it was intermediatein Colombia, with a revolutionarysituationin some
regions but no coalescence of forces; it was most advancedin Kenya. In examining who
made revolutions, Walton calls for careful analysis of coalitions. He finds support for
Wolf's thesis on the middle peasantry and follows Hobsbawm in identifying an urban
equivalent (not the most marginal population, but artisans, petty traders, lower civil
servants, and labor leaders; 1984, pp. 16, 151). The outcomes followed the patternof
outbreaknoted above, with minimal displacementof elites in the Philippines, transfor-
mationof the political system but not of the class structurein Colombia, and the hastening
of independencein Kenya. Walton focuses more on the state than on society in charac-
terizing outcomes: Kenya is a postcolonial state, Colombiaan associated-dependentstate,
12 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
the Philippines neocolonial. He closes with the astute prediction (for 1984) that in the
Philippines, "[T]he political situation is precarious, and it invites a new mass revolt
(beyond continuing guerrilla activities) or at least, a coup that could buy time for the
initiationof real reforms"(p. 177).
Walton's overall accomplishmentin this book is certain, althoughvarious criticisms of
the particularscan be advanced. The thesis that revolts and revolutions are similar in
causality and trajectory is provocative, but it collapses the successes and the failures
without providing more than hints of how to distinguishthem. Waltoncan perhapsclaim
plausibly that the Mexican revolution went no fartherthan the Mau Mau revolt, but the
argumentworks less well in comparingthe limited consequences of revolts in the Phil-
ippines and Colombia with thoroughgoingstructuraltransformationsin Cuba, China, and
even Nicaragua. Among the unexamined hints that might explain such variation is the
observationthat in his cases, elite groups left the coalitions, thus weakening them before
they could come to power. Also, althoughWaltondeserves credit for linking ThirdWorld
revolutionsto the process of uneven development,this concept needs furtherspecification.
The negative consequences-inflation, control by landlords, commercializationof agri-
culture, and urbanmigrationand crowding-are well documented,but less so the devel-
opmentalgains in terms of industrialization,rising gross nationalproductand trade, which
are captured better by Cardoso and Faletto's (1979) notion of dependent development.
The challenge is to specify more precisely exactly what processes in the changing societies
of the Third World touch off revolutions. Finally, the incorporationof culture into the
model is a good beginning, but much more work is needed in this area, both theoretically
and empirically:examining distinct political culturesamong and across groups, discerning
the impact of culture at the various stages of the movement, using it to explain both
successes and limits, and so on. These criticisms duly noted, ReluctantRebels achieves
an admirabletheoreticalsynthesis and representsa pioneeringattemptto link ThirdWorld
conditions to Third World cases of national revolt.
Farideh Farhi's study of the Nicaraguan and Iranianrevolutions, States and Urban-
Based Revolutions (1990; also see 1988), works along lines broadly similar to Walton's.
Building on Skocpol's discussion of state autonomy,Farhilooks at "the changing balance
of class forces occasioned by uneven development of capitalism on a world scale" and
introduces a "broaderunderstandingof ideology" (1990, pp. 9-10). In both Iran and
Nicaragua, internal crises coincided with a permissive world context that activated a
multiclass "negative" coalition to overthrow and transformthe state. Farhi approaches
outcomes nicely by focusing on "thepolitical strugglesto controland maintainstate power
within the constraintsimposed, and the opportunitiesafforded, by the existing economic,
political, and ideological structures,and internationalcontext, and the class relations of
the revolution itself" (pp. 110-11).
In additionto this empiricalfocus on the two most recentThirdWorldsocial revolutions,
Farhigoes beyond Waltonin workingout an approachto ideology in revolutions.Drawing
on Calhoun(1983), GoranTherbom(1980), and Gramsci(1971), she writes that "cultural
practices, orientations,meaning systems, and social outlooks"(1988, p. 249) play a role.
Ideology is not "a system of ideas";ratherit is a "socialprocess"involving "knowledgeable
actors" which invokes larger cultural systems rather than "consciously held political
beliefs":"successfulideological mobilizationalways managesto fuse andcondense several
ideological discourses into a single major theme, usually expressed in a single slogan"
(1990, p. 84). From feminist liberation theology (Welch 1985) Farhi appropriatesthe
intriguingnotion of "dangerous"memoriesof conflictandexclusion-past suffering, actual
or imagined instances of resistanceand change (Shi'i imageryin Iran, Sandino's rebellion
in Nicaragua). She also analyzes perceptively the legitimationclaims of the old regimes
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 13
and contradictionsinherent in these (the shah's godlike creator image also made him
responsiblefor Iran's problems;Somoza's brandingof all opponentsas communistsgave
the term communista positive valuation).
Farhi is less strong than Walton in analyzing Third World social structure."Uneven
development"is never defined or theorized;indeed, Farhidownplayseconomic and social
effects of peripheraldevelopment because these are found in "almost all peripheralfor-
mations"in favor of a focus on the state, which she holds primarilyresponsible for the
process of class formation (1988, p. 234; 1990, pp. 26, 68, 130-31). As a result we
obtain no clear picture of urbanor ruralsocial structurein Nicaragua(1990, pp. 40-41).
Iraniansocial structureis conceptualizedalmost entirelyas a process of urbanizationrather
than accordingto its own ongoing historicaldynamics (1990, p. 68); Farhifocuses on the
middle classes, which she calls the "prominent"classes, at the expense of otherkey actors
such as the Iranianworking class and the lower classes generally. Overrelianceon the
state as the critical variable at the expense of social structureis dangerouseven on its
own terms because, as we have seen, such states do not always fall. Even if they do so
(eventually), explanationof the timing is a problem.
A second areaopen to some criticismis Farhi'sgenerallyexcellent discussion of culture.
The case studies focus on religion ratherthan on nationalismor populism. Particularlyin
Iran, Farhiviews religion as an undifferentiatedIslam. She leaves out of the accountboth
the secular ideologies and the organizationsthat helped overthrowthe shah and some of
the radical socialist and liberal strands within the Islamic movement (perhaps reading
backwardsfrom the fundamentalistclerical outcome). Her analysis of Nicaraguacontains
a "fusion"of Sandinismo and liberationtheology, which similarly overlooks the hetero-
geneous use of differentideologies to mobilize differentsectors. As with Walton'sachieve-
ment, however, these criticisms should not obscure the conceptualadvances and the neat
comparativeanalysis of Farhi's work.
Some of these weaknesses are addressedin my own recent(1990) theoryof the outbreak
of Third World social revolutions, a comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and El
Salvador.Drawingon earlierwork on developmentand social change in Iran(Foran 1988;
also see Foran 1993), the 1990 essay tries to elaboratea more general theory, testing it
against revolutionarysuccesses in Iran and Nicaragua,and against stalemated"failure"in
El Salvador.This model takes ThirdWorld social structureas a startingpoint, conceived
as a complex productof internaland externaldynamics. When preexistingsocial structures
are shaped over time by the economic, political, and military pressures exerted by the
core powers of the world system, the result (in many but not all Third World countries)
is an accumulationprocess that may be called one of dependentdevelopment (Cardoso
and Faletto 1979); essentially this is a process of growth within limits. That is, the gains
in gross national product, industrial capacity, and trade typically are accompanied by
negative consequencesfor a broadrange of classes, includingthe unemployment,inflation,
food imports, poor health, and inadequateeducationalfacilities noted by Walton (1984).
Reproductionof such a system often requiresa repressive state to guaranteeorder in a
changing social setting in which much of the populationis suffering;personalist, exclu-
sionary military dictatorships, as identified by Dix and others, are especially vulnerable
to revolutionarymovements from below.
Takingthis synthesis of perspectiveswithin the sociology of developmentas a structural
starting point found in some Third World nations, I hypothesize that three additional
conditions are likely to lead to the outbreakof a revolution. The first of these is termed
"politicalculturesof opposition":as far-reachingsocioeconomic change engulfs a society,
various sectors of the population"live" this change and interpretit in light of the cultural
and value orientationsthey find ready to hand, including ideas of nationalism,socialism,
14 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

religion, and other cultural forms rooted in their society. From these orientationsthey
forge a range of political cultures of opposition and resistanceto the repressive state and
its foreign backers, which contributein importantways to the capacity to organize social
movements. Finally, the timing of revolution is determinedby the emergence of a crisis
with two basic features: an internal economic downswing (a discernible worsening of
economic conditions beyond the "normal"problems encounteredin most of the Third
World most of the time) and, simultaneously,a "world-systemicopening" (analogous to
Goldfrank's"permissiveworld context"), a letup of externalcontrols in the core power(s)
that creates a momentaryopening for insurgency.
The model hypothesizes that if all of these conditionsare met, a revolutionaryoutbreak
will occur, in which a multiclass coalition of aggrieved social forces will emerge to carry
out a revolutionaryproject. Such a broadcoalition will prove to have the best chances for
attaining state power. Once this power is achieved, however, the coalition is likely to
fragmentas the constituentclasses begin to struggle among themselves over the shape of
the new order.
I then test this theory against the cases of Iran and Nicaragua, which broadly confirm
it: in both countries, social structurewas affected and diversifiedby dependentdevelop-
ment in the 1960s and 1970s under the repressive regimes of the shah and of Somoza.
Those leaders sought to control the elite, weakening it in Iran and alienating it in
Nicaragua. In each case, multiple political cultures of opposition arose: in Iran, several
strands of Islam as well as secular nationalist, socialist, and guerrilla movements; in
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas' synthesis of nationalism and social justice alongside the
liberationtheology base communities. Finally, crises arose in 1977-1978: the oil boom
came to an end in Iran, and the political economy of Nicaraguanever recoveredfrom the
devastation and corruptionsurroundingthe 1972 earthquake.The human rights foreign
policy of the Carteradministrationsent mixed signals to each regime, emboldened the
opposition, and proved unwilling or unable to intervenemilitarilyonce revolutions were
under way.
This patterncontrastspoint by point with the situation in El Salvador, where a more
powerful coffee elite was allied with institutional(not personalist)army rule in a more
classic exploitativepact;the political culturewas more Marxist,anti-imperialist,and class-
oriented(a situationnot likely to mobilize as broada coalition of social forces); economic
conditions were deplorablebut painfully "normal"in the 1970s; and the uprisings of the
1980s led by the FarabundoMartfNational LiberationFront(FMLN) had to contend with
massive interventionby the Reagan administration.The result was not a successful social
revolution but a civil war locked in military stalemate (and resolved by a negotiated
compromisein 1991-1992).
This model is subject to a number of furtherquestions. In precisely what ways does
dependentdevelopment lead to revolution, and why has it not done so in South Korea or
Brazil? How does political culturebecome effective? What interveningvariables(such as
organization or resources) are necessary to carry it? Is an economic downturnalways
found before revolution? This last question raises the issue of generalizability:can the
model be applied to other Third World social revolutions (Cuba, Mexico, China), to
anticolonialstrugglesin Algeria, Zimbabwe,Angola, and Mozambique,or to otherfailures
and reversals such as Chile under Allende or Grenada?Although these and other issues
need empirical and conceptual work, this synthesis may representa fruitful direction for
future study.
A final, and quite different, new approachis found in Jack Goldstone's (1991) Revo-
lution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Goldstone's object of analysis is the
"state breakdown"-a severe political crisis entailing a constellation of state, elite, and
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 15
popularproblems that may result in reform, rebellion, revolution, coup, or civil war. He
offers a conjuncturalmodel of revolutionemploying economic, political, and ideological
factors:

In thistheory,revolutionis likelyto occuronly whena societysimultaneously experiences

threekindsof difficulties:(1) a statefinancialcrisis, broughton by a growingimbalance
betweenthe revenuesa governmentcan securelyraise and the obligationsand tasks it
faces; (2) severe elite divisions, includingboth alienationfrom the state and intra-elite
conflicts,broughton by increasinginsecurityandcompetitionfor elite positions;and (3)
a high potentialfor mobilizingpopulargroups, broughton by rising grievances(e.g.,
regardinghigh rentsor low wages) and social patternsthatassist or predisposepopular
groupsto action(e.g., largenumbersof youthin thepopulation,increasinglyautonomous
ruralvillages, growing concentrationsof workersin weakly administeredcities). The
conjunctionof these threeconditionsgenerallyproducesa fourthdifficulty:an increase
in the salienceof heterodoxculturaland religiousideas;heterodoxgroupsthen provide
both leadershipand an organizationalfocus for oppositionto the state(1991, pp. xxiii-
xxiv, author'semphasis).

What caused such a conjuncturein the early modem period? "[T]he broad-basedimpact
that sustained population growth (or decline) had on economic, social, and political
institutions of agrarian-bureaucratic states" (p. xxiv). The model thus is designated a
demographic/structural form of analysis.
Goldstone asks the following empirical questions: why was there widespread state
breakdownin the mid-nineteenthand mid-nineteenthcenturies, with stability from 1660
to 1760, and why was this so both in western Europe and in Asia, but with different
outcomes? He traces causes to "a single basic process. . . . The main trend was that
populationgrowth, in the context of relatively inflexible economic and social structures,
led to changes in prices, shifts in resources, and increasing social demands with which
agrarian-bureaucratic states could not successfully cope" (1991, p. 459; author'sempha-
sis). Thus fiscal crisis, elite conflicts, rising popularunrest, and critical ideologies came
togetherto produce state breakdowns.The differences in outcomes, are traced largely to
the radicalpressuresof transformativeideologies in Franceand England, contrastedwith
the lack of culturalinnovationin China and the Ottomanempire. Along the way this rich
and provocative study advances numerousother ideas: observationson urbanactors and
the state's culturalautonomy, which we have noted already,new quantifiablemeasuresof
structuralproblems (called "the mass mobilization concept" and "the political stress
indicator"),insights on social structureas "near-fractal"(a geological metaphorconnoting
the layered structureof institutions), and the search for "robustprocesses in history,"
among many others.
Goldstone recognizes some of the limits of the study: it explains why crisis was likely
in given places and times ratherthan how particulargroups were mobilized in each case;
it is a model applicableto the agrariansocieties of the early modem world, when population
growth was a more independentforce than in the twentieth century, even in the Third
World (1991, pp. 468-71). Although Goldstone states explicitly that this is not a one-
sidedly demographiccausal model, it could be more reflexive in investigatingthe interplay
of population and social structure.Moreover, in the Japanesecase, he argues that popu-
lation stability rather than growth led to crises, thus raising the question of whether
population is a key factor at all (pp. 468; also see p. 26). Goldstone attempts rather
successfully to add a dynamic, temporaldimension to third-generationstructuralism,but
still does not combine structurewith agency to any great degree.
16 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
Another major area of contention hinges on Goldstone's extensive reflections on the
properrole of culturalfactors in the study of revolution(1991, pp. 415-55). His analysis
is organized according to phases of state breakdown. In the prerevolutionaryperiod,
criticisms of injustice and calls for restoring traditionalbalances make up ideologies of
"rectification."In the course of the struggle, elites make use of folk conceptions to forge
ideologies of "transformation" with a broad appeal aroundsuch themes as redistribution,
rectification, and, most effectively, nationalism. Goldstone claims that ideology plays its
greatestrole in the outcomes of revolutions, and indeed that it is the single most important
factor in explaining the problem at hand-the difference between revolutionarypolitical
reconstruction in France, England, and Japan and the conservative outcomes in the
Ottomanempire, Spain, and seventeenth-centuryChina. High levels of "ideological ten-
sions" (challenging monarchy to the core) left England and France poised for dynamic
evolution after their state breakdowns;the absence of such tension, linked to a cyclical
ratherthanan eschatologicalview of history,is said by Goldstoneto accountfor subsequent
stagnation in the Chinese and Ottoman cases. Here Goldstone seems to go too far: by
privileging culture in the reconstructionperiod, he misses the role of materialfactors in
explaining divergent outcomes. Conversely, he downplays the contributionof culture in
the prerevolutionaryperiod. Nor does he explain why culture assumed different shapes
among his cases.
Although Goldstone thus corrects partiallyfor a Eurocentricbias by documentingthat
the East did not possess the changeless, ahistoricalessence sometimesposited by a previous
generation of scholars, one is reminded of modernizationtheory by the imputationof
culturealone as the explanationfor outcomes and by some of the languageused to describe
the process ("dynamic"versus "stagnationist,""traditional,""conforming"versus "inno-
vative," and so on). Goldstone seems to believe that culturepreventedChina, Spain, and
the Ottomansfrom meeting the challenge of world capitalism;this argumentdownplays
military, political, and economic power considerations.Finally, he attributesthe rise of
the West to the happy marriage of democracy and capitalism, and offers this as a
prescriptionfor today's Third World as opposed to the authoritarianoutcomes of revolu-
tion. These controversialclaims aside, Revolutionand Rebellion in the Modern Worldis
a storehouseof bold conjecturesfor fourth-generationtheoriststo disproveor substantiate.

CONCLUSIONS
Over the last dozen years, the deepeningof the concernsof the structuralistthirdgeneration
of the 1970s has yielded clearer insights into the natureof vulnerablestates and crises.
Social theorists' new preoccupationswith culture have spilled fruitfully into the area of
social change. Social structurehas begun to be assessed from a variety of new angles that
promise fresh insight. Against this backdrophas emerged the profile of a new approach
that uses conjuncturalmodels involving economy, polity, and culture, seeking to explain
coalitional dynamics and the logic of outcomes with a new flexibility. The convergence
around conjuncturalmodels by diverse writers from various theoretical orientations is
significantin several respects: social theorists are reaching increasinglyfor models more
complex and more multicausalthan the often one-sided argumentsof opposing camps and
the pendulumswings of intellectualfashion;the new dataproducedby recentrevolutionary
social processes are forcing a reproblematizingof the relationsof structureand agency as
explanatoryprinciples; and in the sociology of revolutions, at least, the way forwardfor
theory seems to be careful comparativework on diverse cases, conductedwith awareness
of currenttheoreticalcontroversies.In this respect, theories of revolutionand conjunctural
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 17

models of revolution become inseparable:history infuses theory, and the models arrived
at throughinductive case study provide new theoreticalleads.6
In the presentessay I have tried to identify some of the themes that are likely to shape
the next roundof studies. There remain significanttheoreticaldifficulties in consolidating
the emergent fourth generation:a simple additive model of "factors"will not amount to
an integratedtheory of revolutions, even if previously neglected areas such as cultureand
agency are returnedto the forefront. Nor are the currentmultiple debates about particular
causes settled fully by any means. The whole domain of culture, for example, must be
explored, more deeply; we must sort out the interrelationshipsamong discourse, political
culture, ideology, and motivation, an enormous field for future students of revolution.
How will these contributions shape overall theories about the causes, processes, and
outcomes of revolution?This questionraises an even more profoundchallenge, with which
the researchersof the 1990s and beyond must grapple as they continue to try to account
for our changing social world, past and future.

REFERENCES
Arjomand, Said Amir. 1988. The Turbanfor the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Aya, Rod. 1979. "Theoriesof Revolution Reconsidered:ContrastingModels of Collective Violence." Theory
and Society 8(1): 39-99.
- . 1990. Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence: Studies in Concept, Theory, and Method.
Amsterdam.Het Spinhuis.
Brinton, Crane. 1938. The Anatomyof Revolution. New York: Vintage.
Brustein, William. 1986. "Regional Social Orders in France and the French Revolution." Pp. 145-61 in
ComparativeSocial Research, Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Burawoy, Michael. 1989. "Two Methods in Search of Science: Skocpol versus Trotsky."Theory and Society
18(6): 759-805.
Calhoun, Craig Jackson. 1983. "The Radicalism of Tradition:CommunityStrengthor VenerableDisguise and
BorrowedLanguage?"AmericanJournal of Sociology 88(5): 886-914.
- --. 1988. "The Radicalism of Traditionand the Question of Class Struggle." Pp. 129-75 in Rationality
and Revolution, edited by Michael Taylor. Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.
- --. 1991. "TheProblemof Identityin Collective Action." Pp. 51-75 in Micro-MacroLinkagesin Sociology,
edited by Joan Huber. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Cardoso, FernandoHenriqueand Enzo Faletto. 1979. Dependencyand Developmentin LatinAmerica. Berkeley:
University of CaliforniaPress.
Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz. 1990. "RevolutionaryPopularFeminism in Nicaragua:ArticulatingClass, Gender,
and National Sovereignty."Gender and Society 4(3): 370-97.
Cole, Johnetta. 1986. "Women in Cuba: The Revolution within the Revolution." Pp. 307-17 in Revolutions:
Theoretical, Comparative,and Historical Studies, edited by Jack A. Goldstone. San Diego: Harcourt,Brace
and Jovanovich.
Coleman, James S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press.
Davies, James C. 1962. "Towarda Theory of Revolution."AmericanSociological Review 27: 5-19.
DeFronzo, James. 1991. Revolutionsand RevolutionaryMovements.Boulder:Westview.
Disch, Arne. 1979. "Peasantsand Revolts (a Discussion of Jeffery M. Paige's AgrarianRevolution)."Theory
and Society 7 (January-May):243-52.
Dix, RobertH. 1984. "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail." Polity 16(3): 423-46.
Edwards, Lyford. (1927) 1972. The Natural History of Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Eisenstadt, S. N. 1978. Revolutionand the Transformationof Societies: A ComparativeStudyof Civilizations.
New York: Free Press.
Farhi, Farideh. 1988. "State Disintegrationand Urban-BasedRevolutionaryCrises: A ComparativeAnalysis of
Iran and Nicaragua."ComparativePolitical Studies 21(2): 231-56.

6
I would like to acknowledge the advice of two anonymousreviewers and my colleague Thomas Wilson in
trying to clarify the points addressedin this paragraphand the next.
18 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
. 1990. States and Urban-BasedRevolutions:Iran and Nicaragua. Urbana:University of Illinois Press.
Foran, John. 1988. "Social Structureand Social Change in Iran from 1500 to 1979." Doctoral dissertation,
Departmentof Sociology, University of California, Berkeley.
. 1990. "A Theory of Third World Social Revolutions: Iran, Nicaragua and El Salvador Compared."
Paperpresentedat the meetings of the InternationalSociological Association, Madrid.
. 1991. "The Strengthsand Weaknessesof Iran'sPopulistAlliance:A Class Analysis of the Constitutional
Revolution of 1905-1911." Theory and Society 20(6): 795-823.
.1993. Fragile Resistance: Social Transformationin Iran from 1500 to the Revolution. Boulder:
Westview.
Forment, Carlos A. 1990. "The Formationof Political Society in Spanish America: The Mexican Case, 1700
to 1830." Doctoral dissertation,Departmentof Sociology, HarvardUniversity.
Friedman,Debra and Michael Hechter. 1988. "TheContributionof RationalChoice Theoryto Macrosociological
Research."Sociological Theory 6(): 201-18.
Goldfrank, Walter L. 1979. "Theories of Revolution and Revolution without Theory: The Case of Mexico."
Theoryand Society 7(1): 135-65.
Goldstone, Jack A. 1980. "Theoriesof Revolution:The Third Generation."WorldPolitics 32(3): 425-53.
. 1982. "The Comparativeand Historical Study of Revolutions."Annual Review of Sociology 8: 187-
207.
.1984. "Reinterpretingthe French Revolution: A Discussion of FranqoisFuret, Interpretingthe French
Revolution."Theoryand Society 13: 697-713.
. 1986. "Revolutions and Superpowers."Pp. 38-48 in Superpowersand Revolution, edited by J. R.
Adelman. New York: Praeger.
1987. "States and Revolutions:A Review." States and Social StructuresNewsletter 5: 4-8.
1989. Verbal comments made at the Section on Political Sociology, "Rethinkingthe Social Causes and
Consequencesof Revolution," at meetings of the AmericanSociological Association, San Francisco.
. 1991. Revolutionand Rebellion in the Early Modern World.Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
Goodwin, Jeff. 1987. "RevolutionaryMovementsin CentralAmerica:A ComparativeAnalysis." Workingpaper,
HarvardUniversity Departmentof Sociology, Centerfor Researchon Politics and Social Organization.
Goodwin, Jeff and Theda Skocpol. 1989. "ExplainingRevolutions in the ContemporaryThirdWorld."Politics
and Society 17(4): 489-509.
Gould, Mark. 1987. Revolution in the Development of Capitalism: The Coming of the English Revolution.
Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks. New York:InternationalPress.
Gugler, Josef. 1988. "The Urban Characterof ContemporaryRevolutions."Pp. 399-412 in The Urbanization
of the Third World, edited by Josef Gugler. Oxford:Oxford University Press.
Gurr,Ted Robert. 1970. WhyMen Rebel. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press.
Hill, Christopher.1965. Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution. Oxford:Clarendon.
Huntington,Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1966. RevolutionaryChange. Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press.
Kelly, Linda. 1987. Womenof the French Revolution. London:Hamish Hamilton.
Kimmel, Michael S. 1990. Revolution:A Sociological Interpretation.Philadelphia:Temple University Press.
Knight, Alan. 1986. The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1: Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants. Lincoln: University
of NebraskaPress.
Lenin, V. I. 1966. The Lenin Reader: The OutstandingWorksof V. I. Lenin, edited by Stefan T. Possony.
Chicago: Regnery.
. (1902) 1975. "WhatIs to Be Done?" Pp. 12-114 in The LeninAnthology,edited by RobertC. Tucker.
New York: Norton.
Liu, Michael Tien-Lung. 1988. "Statesand UrbanRevolutions:Explainingthe RevolutionaryOutcomes in Iran
and Poland." Theory and Society 17(2): 179-209.
Marx, Karl. 1977. Selected Writings, edited by David McLellan. Oxford:Oxford University Press.
McDaniel, Tim. 1991. Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Midlarsky,Manus I. and Kenneth Roberts. 1985. "Class, State, and Revolution in CentralAmerica."Journal
of ConflictResolution 29(2): 163-93.
Migdal, Joel S. 1974. Peasants, Politics, and Revolution:Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the
Third World. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press.
Moghadam,Valentine M. 1989. "PopulistRevolution and the Islamic State in Iran."Pp. 147-63 in Revolution
in the WorldSystem, edited by TerryBoswell. Greenwich, CT: Greenwood.
. 1990. "RevolutionEn-gendered:Notes on 'The Woman Question' in Revolutions."Paperpresentedat
the meeting of the InternationalSociological Association, Madrid.
THEORIESOF REVOLUTIONREVISITED 19
Molyneux, Maxine. 1985. "Legal Reform and Socialist Revolution in Democratic Yemen: Women and the
Family."InternationalJournal of the Sociology of Law 13(2): 147-72.
Moore, Barrington,Jr. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorshipand Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making
of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon.
Nashat, Guity, ed. 1982. Womenand Revolutionin Iran. Boulder:Westview.
Nichols, Elizabeth. 1986. "Skocpol on Revolution: ComparativeAnalysis vs. Historical Conjuncture."Com-
parative Social Research 9: 163-86.
Paige, Jeffrey M. 1975. Agrarian Revolution:Social Movementsand ExportAgriculturein the Underdeveloped
World.New York: Free Press.
Pettee, George S. 1937. The Process of Revolution. New York:Harperand Row.
Popkin, Samuel. 1979. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Berkeley:
University of CaliforniaPress.
Rejai, Mostafa. 1973. The Strategy of Political Revolution. New York:Doubleday.
Roxborough, Ian. 1989a. "Theories of Revolution: The Evidence from Latin America." London School of
Economics Quarterly3(2): 99-121.
- -. 1989b. "Exogenous Factors in the Genesis of Revolutions in Latin America." Paper presentedat the
meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, Miami.
Rude, George. (1964) 1973. RevolutionaryEurope 1783-1815. London:Fontana.
Scott, James C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant. New Haven: Yale University Press.
. 1990. Dominationand the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sewell, William H., Jr. 1985. "Ideologies and Social Revolutions:Reflectionson the FrenchCase." Journal of
ModernHistory 57(1): 57-85.
Shanin,Teodor. 1986. TheRoots of Otherness:Russia's Turnof the Century.Vol. 2: Russia, 1905-07: Revolution
as a Momentof Truth. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shugart,Matthew Soberg. 1989. "Patternsof Revolution."Theoryand Society 18(2): 249-71.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions:A ComparativeAnalysis of France, Russia, and China.
Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.
- --. 1982. "RentierState and Shi'a Islam in the IranianRevolution"(includingcommentsby Nikki Keddie,
Eqbal Ahmad, and WalterGoldfrank).Theory and Society 11(3): 265-303.
- --. 1985. "CulturalIdioms and Political Ideologies in the RevolutionaryReconstructionof State Power: A
Rejoinderto Sewell." Journal of ModernHistory 57(1): 86-96.
- --. 1988. "Social Revolutions and Mass MilitaryMobilization."WorldPolitics 40(2): 147-68.
Smelser, Neil. 1963. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York:Free Press.
Snyder,Richard.1992. "ExplainingTransitionsfrom NeopatrimonialDictatorships."ComparativePolitics 24(4):
370-99.
Somers, MargaretR. and Walter L. Goldfrank. 1979. "The Limits of Agronomic Determinism:A Critiqueof
Paige's Agrarian Revolution."ComparativeStudies in Society and History 21(3): 443-58.
Stacey, Judith. 1983. Patriarchy and Socialist Revolutionin China. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
Taylor, Michael, ed. 1988. Rationalityand Revolution. Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.
- --. 1989. "Structure,Cultureand Action in the Explanationof Social Change."Politics and Society 17(2):
115-62.
Therborn,Goran. 1980. The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology. London:New Left Books.
Tilly, Charles. 1973. "Does ModernizationBreed Revolution?"ComparativePolitics 5(3): 425-47.
- --. 1975. "Revolutionsand Collective Violence." Pp. 483-556 in Handbookof Political Science, Vol. 3,
Macropolitical Theory, edited by Fred I. Greensteinand Nelson W. Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- --. 1978. From Mobilizationto Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
cle Tocqueville, Alexis. (1856) 1955. The Old Regime and the French Revolution,translatedby StuartGilbert.
GardenCity, NY: Doubleday.
Trotsky,Leon. (1930) 1959. The Russian Revolution:The Overthrowof Tzarismand the Triumphof the Soviets,
selected and edited by F. W. Dupree. GardenCity, NY: Doubleday.
Walton, John. 1984. ReluctantRebels: ComparativeStudies of Revolutionand Underdevelopment.New York:
Columbia University Press.
Welch, S. H. 1985. Communitiesof Resistance and Solidarity:A Feminist Theology of Liberation. New York:
Orbis Books.
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1987. "The Rise (and Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Movements in Latin
America." Sociological Forum 2(3): 473-99.
- . 1989a. "Winners,Losers, and Also-Rans:Towarda ComparativeSociology of LatinAmericanGuerrilla
Movements."Pp. 132-81 in Power and Popular Protest: LatinAmericanSocial Movements,edited by Susan
Eckstein. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
20 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
. 1989b. "UnderstandingFailed Revolution in El Salvador:A ComparativeAnalysis of Regime Types
and Social Structures."Political and Society 17(4): 511-37.
. 1991. "The Peasantry and Insurgency in Latin America, 1956-1988: A Boolean Approach." Paper
presentedat the meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington,DC.
. 1992. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America:A ComparativeStudy of Insurgencies and Regimes
since 1956. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press.
Wolf, Eric R. 1969. Peasant Warsof the TwentiethCentury.New York:HarperColophon.
Zimmermann,Ekkart. 1983. Political Violence, Crises, and Revolution:Theoriesand Research. Boston: Hall.