G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR.

, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing
Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position
shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their
offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.,
who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,
filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the aforequoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These
must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are
not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective
posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so
that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be
based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes
treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and
Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does
not comply with the second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third
requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as
the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the
classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Applying the four requisites to the instant case,
the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the
challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy,
or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed
at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger
that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil
servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot
be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that
the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the
same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post. With the
fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently
when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in
the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire
election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger
of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy
would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position
aspired for. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the
purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.