Accepted Manuscript

The neural exploitation hypothesis and its implications for an embodied approach to
language and cognition: Insights from the study of action verbs processing and motor
disorders in Parkinson’s Disease

Vittorio Gallese, Valentina Cuccio

PII: S0010-9452(18)30027-3
DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2018.01.010
Reference: CORTEX 2232

To appear in: Cortex

Received Date: 28 March 2017

Revised Date: 21 September 2017
Accepted Date: 23 January 2018

Please cite this article as: Gallese V, Cuccio V, The neural exploitation hypothesis and its implications
for an embodied approach to language and cognition: Insights from the study of action verbs processing
and motor disorders in Parkinson’s Disease, CORTEX (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2018.01.010.

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The neural exploitation hypothesis and its implications for an embodied approach to language
and cognition: Insights from the study of action verbs processing and motor disorders in
Parkinson’s Disease

Vittorio Gallese1, 2 and Valentina Cuccio3

1
Dept. of Medicine and Surgery, Unit of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Italy.
2
Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, UK.
3 Dept. of Humanities, Social Sciences and Cultural Industries, University of Parma, Italy.

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Abstract

As it is widely known, Parkinson’s disease is clinically characterized by motor disorders

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such as the loss of voluntary movement control, including resting tremor, postural instability, and
bradykinesia (Bocanegra et al., 2015; Helmich, Hallett, Deuschl, Toni, & Bloem, 2012; Liu et al.,
2006; Rosin, Topka, & Dichgans, 1997). In the last years, many empirical studies (e.g. Spadacenta

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et al. 2012; Bocanegra et al. 2015) have also shown that the processing of action verbs is selectively
impaired in patients affected by this neurodegenerative disorder. In the light of these findings, it has
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been suggested that Parkinson disorder can be interpreted within an embodied cognition framework
(e.g., Bocanegra et al. 2015). The central tenet of any embodied approach to language and cognition
is that high order cognitive functions are grounded in the sensory-motor system. With regard to this
point, Gallese (2008) proposed the neural exploitation hypothesis to account for, at the phylogenetic
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level, how key aspects of human language are underpinned by brain mechanisms originally evolved
for sensory-motor integration. Glenberg and Gallese (2011) also applied the neural exploitation
hypothesis to the ontogenetic level. On the basis of these premises, they developed a theory of
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language acquisition according to which, sensory-motor mechanisms provide a neurofunctional

architecture for the acquisition of language, while retaining their original functions as well. The
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neural exploitation hypothesis is here applied to interpret the profile of patients affected by
Parkinson’s disease. It is suggested that action semantic impairments directly tap onto motor
disorders. Finally, a discussion of what theory of language is needed to account for the interactions
between language and movement disorders is presented.
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1. Introduction
Embodied Cognition is a promising field of study and currently one of the most debated approach
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to the study of the human mind, in all its complexity. Embodied Cognition, however, at present, is
far from being a unitary paradigm. It is, instead, a research program within which different accounts
of the classic mind-body problem have been proposed (see Shapiro, 2011 for a review). These
accounts, although differing one from another in many respects, share two aspects: 1) the rejection
of the Computational Theory of Mind (henceforth, CTM; Fodor 1983; Phylyshyn, 1984) that
proposes that cognitive processes are computations on amodal symbol; 2) the proposal that bodies
play a central role in our cognition. According to such proposal, cognitive processes are mainly the
expression of the neural systems controlling the body. These two aspects can undoubtedly be
considered as the marking features of the Embodied Cognition research program.
The discovery of mirror neurons, premotor neurons that are activated both by the execution
of purposeful motor acts and their observation when performed by others (di Pellegrino et al. 1992;
Gallese et al. 1996), marked a major turning point in the fields of Embodiment and Embodied
Cognition, as it revealed a neurophysiological mechanism, to be later on discovered also in the
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human brain, underpinning in a variety of ways the social dimension of embodiment. Indeed, very
early on it was proposed as the mirror mechanism could shed new light on language (Fadiga and
Gallese, 1997; Arbib and Rizzolatti, 1998) and forms of mind reading and mutual understanding
(Gallese and Goldman 1998). Since then, hundreds of studies have shown the involvement of the
sensory-motor system in language and cognition. Data on the mirror mechanism certainly gave
momentum to embodied theories of the human mind, inspiring a growing number of empirical
studies showing that regions of the brain like the sensory-motor system and the insula, by means of
embodied simulation are involved in social cognition, action planning and action understanding,
tool use, emotion recognition, mental imagery, language understanding and even in the experience

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of artworks. Mirror neurons research, thus, strongly supports embodied accounts of the mind,
showing ways in which high-level cognitive functions can be grounded in our bodily interactions
with the world. Indeed, it also provided new ways of investigating neural mechanisms underpinning

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the bodily foundation of language and cognition. To this purpose, Gallese (2008) proposed the
neural exploitation hypothesis, holding that key aspects of human language might be underpinned
by brain mechanisms originally evolved for sensory-motor integration. Successively, Glenberg and

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Gallese (2011) also applied this hypothesis to the ontogenetic level: they developed a theory of
language acquisition according to which sensory-motor mechanisms provide a neurofunctional
architecture for the acquisition of language, while retaining their original functions as well.
Mirror neurons research has recently been also applied to the study of clinical syndromes

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such as Autism (Gallese et al., 2013), Schizophrenia (Ferri et al., 2014; Gallese and Ferri, 2014) or
Parkinson’s disease (Alegre et al., 2011). Empirical studies have found a disruption of the mirror
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mechanism in patients affected by these pathologies and have, thus, suggested that the cognitive
dysfunctions characterizing these clinical conditions can be partly explained in an embodied
framework. Indeed, as Garcia and Ibáñez (this volume) proposed, “if cognition is naturally
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organized as an interplay of embodied mechanisms, then cognitive deficits can be profitably

reinterpreted as disruptions of embodiment”. However, Garcia and Ibáñez (this volume) continue,
the potentialities of embodied accounts of human cognition are still under-exploited in clinical
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research. In this paper, following Garcia and Ibáñez proposal, language and movement disorders in
Parkinson’s disease (PD, henceforth) will be re-interpreted in the light of the neural exploitation
hypothesis proposed by Gallese (2008).
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In the next section, we first briefly review data on language and motor deficits in PD. We
suggest that some aspects of the PD language deficit can be interpreted as expression of the
movement disorders characterizing this clinical condition. Consequently, aspects of PD linguistic
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deficit, that will be further specified in the next section, are considered as the outcome of a damage
affecting the functionality of brain circuits that in healthy individuals normally display the neural
reuse principle: high-level cognitive functions are grounded in action and perception, by partly
reusing their neural underpinning structures.
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2. Language and movement disorder in Parkinson’s disease

Since James Parkinson made the first description of this condition in his famous Essay on the
Shacking Palsy (1817), movements disorders have been considered as core symptoms of this
neurodegenerative syndrome. Patients affected by PD show resting tremor, bradykinesia, rigidity
and postural instability (Ferreira and Massano, 2017; Samaranch et al., 2010; Fahn, 2003; Postuma
et al., 2015; Liu et al. 2015; Bocanegra et al. 2015) as a result of a deficiency in nigrostriatal
dopamine that leads to the functional impairment of the basal ganglia (Rodriguez-Oroz et al. 2009).
It follows that PD patients lose voluntary control of movements and show great impairments
especially when they need to perform movements in a sequence, including the ability to articulate
language (Ho et al., 1999).
As Friedman et al. (2017) noticed, in the 200 years since James Parkinson identified the
shaking palsy, it is only very recently that “we have come to understand some of what he didn't
know we didn't know” (Friedman et al. 2017, 1). We are now in the process of filling this gap of
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ignorance and this is occurring at an increasing rate. Thus, although PD has been traditionally
described primarily as a motor disorder, it is now widely known that PD also presents with other
behavioural and cognitive deficits. Patients affected by PD show dementia (Hely et al. 2008; Lees et
al., 2009) and other deficits in cognitive domains like attention, working memory, executive
functions and visuospatial abilities (Humphries et al. 2016; Verbaan et al., 2007). Our recent
understanding of the cognitive deficits characterizing PD is largely due to the deeper
comprehension of the basal ganglia’s role in both motor and cognitive processes, including
language (Houk, 2005; Booth et al., 2007; Kotz et al., 2009; see Cardona et al., 2013 for a review).
The anatomic and physiologic features of the basal ganglia–thalamo-cortical circuits, which consist

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of at least five functionally segregated motor and non-motor networks (Alexander et al. 1986;
Castner et al., 2007), suggest that their dysfunction might affect not only motor processes but also
cognitive processes, language included (Castner et al., 2007; Bocanegra et al. 2015).

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As for the linguistic deficits, these are a core symptom of PD (McNamara et al., 2003).
Traditionally, language impairments were considered as motor by-products of the movement
disorder. Indeed, PD patients usually show, very early on, difficulties in language articulation (Ho

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et al., 1999). Motor-based language disturbances such as dysarthria and slowness of speech have
been largely described in patients affected by this neurodegenerative syndrome. More recently,
however, a growing number of empirical studies highlighted that language disturbances in PD have
also cognitive aetiology. PD patients, for example, show a significant reduction of verbal fluency

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(Obeso et al., 2012) and difficulties in linguistic tasks that involve words definition or metaphor
interpretation (Lewis et al., 1998). Syntax comprehension is also impaired (Bocanegra et al. 2015).
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It has been suggested that, in non-demented patients, deficits in syntactic, semantic and discourse
processing might be dependent on the dysfunction of executive functions and on other cognitive
disturbances accompanying this clinical condition (Angwin et al., 2006; Hochstadt et al., 2006;
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Longworth, Keenan, Barker, Marslen-Wilson, & Tyler, 2005; Cardona et al. 2013; see Bocanegra et
al., 2015 for a discussion).
Following this view, the language deficits diagnosed to PD patients should not be
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interpreted according to the embodied cognition framework: dysfunctions in syntax, semantic and
discourse processing would be uniquely caused by the disruption of high-level cognitive functions.
However, the linguistic profile of PD patients is complex and other empirical results need to be
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discussed. In fact, it has also been found that semantic deficits in PD, both in production and in
comprehension, are much more severe when verbs or nouns have an action-related component
(Humphreis et al., 2016; Cardona et al., 2013; Bocanegra et al. 2015). Fernandino et al. (2013)
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investigated the potential causal role of the sensory-motor systems in language and cognition. To
this purpose, they compared the performance of PD patients with age-matched controls on linguistic
tasks requiring implicit or explicit semantic demands (lexical decision and priming, on the one hand,
and semantic similarity judgment, on the other). Findings from their study showed that action verbs
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processing was selectively impaired in both the experimental conditions (i.e. the implicit and
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explicit tasks) and strongly support an embodied account of language.

Some studies (for example, Herrera et al., 2011) also compared the performances of patients
on- and off- dopamine medication on action-verbs processing. The rationale behind Herrera et al.
(2011) and similar studies is that, since the motor cortex in PD patients is impaired because of a
dopamine degeneration, the presence or absence of a dopamine medication, modulating motor
cortex activity, can differently affect performances in a verbal fluency task. In Herrera et al.’s
(2011) work, this prediction was confirmed by the experimental results. PD patients on medication
produced a greater number of motor verbs with high specific motor content compared to PD
patients off dopamine medication. The authors concluded that “the dopamine network from basal
ganglia to brain motor areas might play a role in retrieving action verbs with specific semantic
representations” (Herrera et al. 2011, 72).
Cardona et al. (2013, 1356) recently reviewed the state of the art of studies on action-related
language processing in Parkinson’s disease and pointed out that “PD patients show deficits in
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action-word naming (Bertella et al. 2002; Cotelli et al. 2007; Peran et al. 2009), action-verb
production (Crescentini et al. 2008; Peran et al. 2003), action-verb identification (Boulenger et al.
2008), and the contextual interaction between action-verb comprehension and motor response
(Ibáñez et al. 2013; Spadacenta et al. 2012)”. In a similar vein, in a more recent review, Birba et al.
(2017) advanced the “disrupted motor grounding hypothesis”. According to the authors’ proposal,
action verbs, motor-language coupling, and syntax deficits in PD can all be traced back to an
embodied account of language, but so far these deficits have not been interpreted in a unitary
framework. Deficits in these three different domains of language, in their proposal, are considered
to be the result of a damage of the fronto-striatal circuits. Fronto-striatal circuits’ activity is

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considered to be involved in the modulation of high-order cognitive processes and, importantly,
motor function (Packard and Knowlton, 2002). Evidence for deficits in each of these domains are
separately presented and interpreted in the Birba et al. (2017) study.

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To further clarify the etiology of this language impairment, Bocanegra et al. (2015)
investigated in non-demented PD patients possible correlations between executive functions
disruption and mild cognitive impairment (MCI), on the one hand, and action-related verbs and

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nouns processing, on the other. Executive functions were assessed through the INECO Frontal
Screening (IFS) battery (Torralva, Roca, Gleichgerrcht, Lopez, & Manes, 2009). As for the
detection of mild cognitive impairment (MCI) the authors carried out a cognitive screening by using
the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) (Nasreddine et al., 2005). Bocanegra et al.’s study

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(2015) confirmed a selective impairment of action semantics in PD, as also been shown in many
other studies (e.g. Spadacenta et al. 2012; Signorini and Volpato, 2006; see Cardona et al. 2013 and
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Birba 2017 for a review). In addition, the study by Bocanegra et al. (2015) showed that the selective
deficit in action-related language processing is not dependent on the disruption of executive
functions or on any other high-level cognitive deficits. Similarly, in a study on words processing in
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PD, Boulanger et al., (2008) found that “the results provide compelling evidence that processing
lexico-semantic information about action words depends on the integrity of the motor system”
(Boulenger et al., 2008, p. 743). This is so because, coherently with the embodied cognition
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approach to language and cognition, the processing of action-related linguistic expressions directly
recruits the sensory-motor system and this recruitment also contributes to the construction of
meaning. Thus, these data seem to suggest that that the deficit in the processing of action-related
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language in PD are dependent on a dysfunction of embodiment resulting from dysfunctional basal

ganglia (Cardona et al. 2013; Bocanegra et al. 2015). Empirical research has shown an involvement
of basal ganglia both in motor control and action generation processes. Furthermore, basal ganglia
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has also been found activated during semantic processing. This suggests that basal ganglia might
contribute to both the sensory-motor grounding of action-semantics and motor processes (see
Bocanegra et al., 2015 and Cardona et al., 2013 for a discussion).
In order to understand the meaning of a word like “cup” we do not simply play a linguistic
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game, which, at best, can specify when to apply a given word as a tag to a given object in the world.
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The meaning of “cup” stems from its use, from what we can do with it, that is, from the multiple
and interrelated possibilities for action it evokes. Indeed, further corroboration of this account
comes from the work of Buccino et al. (2017, this issue). In this paper, the authors demonstrate that
PD patients not only have troubles in processing images of graspable objects, but also nouns
referring to them. Thus, PD patients not only have difficulties when processing action-related verbs
but also nouns referring to graspable objects. This suggests a causal role of the motor deficits
suffered by PD patients in determining their semantic processing deficits.
This account of the action-related language deficit in PD will be further discussed in the next
section. Finally, in section 3, possible implications for a theory of language in an embodied
framework will be discussed.

3. The neural exploitation hypothesis and neural reuse

Let us now frame action-related language deficits in PD in the light of the neural exploitation
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hypothesis and the notion of reuse (Gallese 2008, 2014; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011). Exaptation
(Gould and Lewontin, 1979) – the shift in the course of evolution of a given trait or mechanism,
which is later on reused to serve new purposes and functions – likely played a key role in the
phylogenesis of human social cognition. By further developing this view, it was hypothesized that
intentionality, the aboutness of our representations is – in the first place – an exapted property of the
action models instantiated by the motor system. The motor system not only houses causative
properties but also content properties (Gallese, 2000, 2003).
The notions of “neural exploitation” and “neural reuse” (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Gallese
2008) have been proposed to refer to the newly acquired commitment of sensory-motor neural

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resources to language and conceptual thought. Sensory-motor systems, originally evolved to guide
our interactions with the world, once functionally decoupled from the common final motor pathway,
by means of inhibitory circuits, and dynamically reconnected with other cortical areas – like, among

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others, the prefrontal regions of the brain, can be put into the service of newly acquired cognitive
skills.
This perspective partly overlaps with Dehaene’s ‘neuronal recycling’ hypothesis (Dehaene,
2005), and even more with Anderson’s hypothesis on ‘neural re-use (Anderson, 2010)1. According

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to this latter hypothesis, a given cognitive function can be subserved by a variety of brain circuits;
the newer in evolutionary term a cognitive function is, the wider is the brain circuit underpinning it.
Language, indeed, fully satisfies this condition.

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The execution of any complex coordinated action makes use of at least two cortical sectors —
the premotor cortex and the motor cortex, linked by reciprocal neural connections. The motor cortex
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mainly controls individual synergies, simple movements like extending and flexing the fingers,
turning the wrist, flexing and extending the elbow, etc. The role of the premotor cortex is more
complex: structuring simple motor behaviors into coordinated motor acts. The premotor cortex must
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thus provide a “phase structure” to actions, specifying the right parameter values in the right phases,
e.g., by activating the appropriate clusters of cortico-spinal neurons in the appropriate temporal
order. This information is conveyed through neural connections by the premotor cortex to specific
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regions of the primary motor cortex. Similarly, as exemplified by the functional mechanism
instantiated by mirror neurons, the same premotor circuits controlling action execution underpin the
embodied simulation of the observed actions of others.
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It has been proposed that there is ”structuring” neuro-functional architecture within the
motor system that can function according to two modes of operation. In the first operation mode,
the motor brain circuits structure action execution and action perception, imitation, and imagination,
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with neural connections to motor effectors and/or other sensory cortical areas. When the action is
executed or imitated, the cortico-spinal pathway is activated, leading to the excitation of muscles
and the ensuing movements. When the action is observed, or imagined, its actual execution is
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1 As argued elsewhere (Gallese 2014), Dehaene’s ‘neuronal recycling’ hypothesis holds that a
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given brain area’s neural specialization for processing a certain type of sensory stimuli can also
instantiate a novel use-dependent functional specialization for different stimuli of the same sensory
modality. Such hypothesis does not make any strong evolutionary claim, as reuse is basically
conceived of only at the ontogenetic level. Novel cultural habits, like writing and reading, have the
potentiality to remodel in use-dependent way a given regional brain function in the course of one
individual’s life by amplifying the set of stimuli belonging to the same sensory domain it can
process. Differently, both Anderson’s and Gallese’s hypotheses do make strong evolutionary claims
as they deal with the phylogenesis of human cognitive functions. More specifically, according to
Gallese (2008, 2014) neural reuse not only enables the cortical motor system to process and
integrate perceptual stimuli, hence instantiating novel cognitive functions, but also sheds new light
on the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of the vicarious experiences characterizing human
intersubjectivity.
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inhibited. The cortical motor network is activated (though, not in all of its components and, likely,
not with the same intensity), but action is not produced, it is only simulated.
In the second mode of operation, the same motor network is decupled from its action
execution/perception functions and can offer its structuring output to non sensory-motor parts of the
brain (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Gallese and Lakoff 2005), among which the dorso-lateral
prefrontal cortex most likely plays a crucial role. When engaged in the second mode of operation,
the neuro-functional architecture of the motor system might contribute to the mastering of the
hierarchical structure of language and thought. According to the neural exploitation hypothesis, the
neural mapping of different hand/mouth goal-related motor acts, the “words” of the premotor

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vocabulary are not only assembled and chained to form intentional “action sentences” (see the
discussion of the MNS and action intentions); they can also be assembled and chained to structure
language sentences and thoughts, thus experientially grounding the linguistic meanings we share
with others (Gallese, 2008)2.

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By means of neural reuse different brain areas participate in different functions through their
dynamic functional connectivity with different brain circuits. Hence, neural reuse not only enables

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the cortical motor system to process and integrate perceptual stimuli, but also sheds new light on its
tight relationship with different aspects of the linguistic function.
The hypothesis that the sensory-motor system contributes to the process of meaning
construction, as the neural exploitation hypothesis suggests and as studies on language and

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movement disorders in PD seem to confirm, has been questioned (e.g. Mahon and Caramazza,
2008). As we will see in the next pages, authors embracing disembodied explanations of human
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language and cognition have suggested that linguistic knowledge is abstract and amodal. However,
we believe that disembodied theories of language cannot account for the huge amount of data
currently available on the interactions between language and motor disorders. What kind of theory
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of language is needed to account for such interactions will be discussed in the next section.

4. Theory of language and motor disorders

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As the authors of this paper have recently written (Gallese and Cuccio, 2017), “According to the
[embodied] perspective so far delineated, body, actions, and feelings play a direct role in our
knowledge of others. The question remains open as to whether our propositional representations are
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totally separate from this bodily dimension. Our hypothesis is that they are not. But it remains a fact
that linguistic and bodily cognition afford us diversified modalities of epistemic access to the world,
even though often such modalities contaminate one another and are inevitably interwoven”.
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As these lines clearly suggest, language affords us a specific modality of epistemic access to
the world. We can go a step further along this line of thought: the way we know and even perceive
the world is different before and after we acquire the ability to speak. And, clearly, this modality of
knowledge that relies on language is species-specific. Much of our nature, as human beings, is
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largely dependent on language and on its effects on our cognition. We defined elsewhere this power
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to make us human as the anthropogenic power of language (Gallese and Cuccio, 2017). Thus,
language not only provides us a species-specific modality of epistemic access to the world. It also
interacts with and affects our other cognitive abilities, both phylogenetically (see Deacon 1997) and

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In our account, the reuse hypothesis provides an explanation of how the sensory-motor system
contributes to the functioning of language and other cognitive processes (e.g. concept formation,
social cognition, action planning and understanding, emotion recognition, the fruition of artworks
and mental imagery). We did not apply the neural exploitation hypothesis to also provide a bodily
foundation for executive functions. However, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, the neural
exploitation hypothesis can be extended to account, at least partly, for the functioning of executive
functions too. In fact, thanks to neural reuse our thought might acquire a hierarchical structure that
is likely required for the enactment of executive functions.
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ontogenetically (Shusterman, Lee, Spelke, 2011). Abundant empirical research on children
cognitive and linguistic development carried out in many laboratories all over the world (Bowerman
and Levinson, 2001) and the study of cases, such as those of deaf children of hearing parents (see
Pyers and de Villiers, 2013) or of enfant sauvages (see Pinker, 1994), where the acquisition of
language is significantly delayed or not fully mastered and, as a consequence, social and cognitive
abilities are significantly affected, widely support this hypothesis.
In the light of these premises, we believe that a serious embodied theory of language should
never deny the specificity of language. However, to admit the uniqueness of the faculty of language
does not necessarily equal to claim, as mainstream cognitive science theorists seem to suggest (e.g.

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Mahon and Caramazza, 2008), that sensory-motor information cannot constitutively contribute to
the construction of meaning. Disembodied accounts of language rely on the idea that there are two
systems, the linguistic one, which is abstract and amodal, and the sensory-motor one, grounded in

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modality-specific forms of representation (e.g. Bocanegra et al. 2015; Caramazza et al. 2014; Papeo
and Hochmann, 2012; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Fodor, 1983). According to the same
perspective, these two systems are separate and intrinsically different but they can clearly interact.

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Depending on the authors one refers to, the interactions between them can have functionally
different descriptions. However, in disembodied accounts of language, sensory-motor information
is never considered to play a constitutive role in meaning construction, because the language system
is conceived of as a rigid code where words (lexical entries) and meanings (abstract and amodal

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symbols) are fixedly associated. In these accounts, simulations might have an augmentative role but
they are certainly not considered to be a necessary component of the processing of language.
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It can be interesting to note that the LASS (Language and Situated Simulation) theory
proposed by Barsalou and collaborators (e.g. Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008) for the
processing of concepts, although it is explicitly presented as an embodied approach to cognition and,
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more specifically, as an embodied explanation of the nature of concepts, also acknowledges the
existence of a linguistic system and a sensory-motor simulation system in human cognition. It could,
then, be objected that, if the recognition of the two systems (the linguistic one and the sensory-
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motor one) is the main characteristics to identify disembodied accounts, then Barsalou’s proposal
(e.g. Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008), the author’s explicit intentions notwithstanding,
cannot be considered an embodied theory of concepts. This objection, however, can be easily
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discarded when reading Barsalou’s work (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008). In fact, in
the authors’ view, simulations are not considered to be a side-effect of language processing nor they
merely provide an augmentation of linguistic concepts. They are a constitutive and necessary
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component of concepts. This assumption marks a huge difference between Barsalou’s embodied
account of concepts and disembodied account of human cognition.

Finally, we assume that simulations represent deep conceptual information, unlike linguistic representations, which we
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view as more superficial. Specifically, we assume that conceptual content about properties and relations resides in
simulations .. We further assume that basic symbolic processes such as predication, conceptual combination, and
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recursion, result from operations on simulations .. Barsalou (1999, 2003a, 2005a) describes how simulation mechanisms
can implement symbolic operations. Barsalou (2008b ), reviews relevant evidence. We assume that linguistic forms are
not capable of implementing these operations in the absence of simulations .. Attempting to perform symbolic
operations on linguistic forms alone would be like manipulating symbols in an unfamiliar language, with no true
comprehension (Searle 1980). Because simulations provide the meanings of linguistic forms, they are required for
implementing symbolic operations. As we will see later; human participants cannot perform the symbolic operation of
predication on linguistic forms alone (Solomon and Barsalou 2004).(Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson 2008, 251).

In a similar vein, in the present paper, we propose that purely linguistic knowledge, that we
certainly have, is not sufficient to understand and define linguistic meaning. Embodied Simulations
constitutively contribute to meaning construction in ways that will be further specified in this
section.
Mainstream disembodied accounts of language do not do justice to the role that our bodily
dimension plays in the construction of meaning. The contaminations between language and body,
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we believe, are bi-directional and research on language deficits in patients affected by movement
disorders seem to confirm it (see the previous sections of this paper). As an alternative to the
traditional disembodied approaches to language, we propose that meanings are more than abstract
and amodal symbols fixedly associated to words and that lexical entries cannot be considered per se
as the bearers of meaning. To make this point clearer we rely on Vyvyan Evans’s distinction
between lexical concepts and meaning (Evans, 2006; see also Cuccio et al., 2014). As Evans says
(2006, 491), “[…] there is a basic distinction between lexical concepts and meaning. While lexical
concepts constitute the semantic units conventionally associated with linguistic forms, and form an
integral part of a language user’s individual mental grammar, meaning is a property of situated

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usage-events, rather than words. That is, meaning is not a function of language per se, but arises
from language use”. In this account, meaning is more complex, richer and different in nature, than a
lexical entry conceptually stored as an abstract and amodal symbol. Meaning is always the product

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of a contextually-based process. Lexical entries are just cues that prompts us to activate our
background, encyclopaedic knowledge. The latter does not solely consist of abstract and amodal
information. Sensory-motor knowledge, emotions, feelings, habits are part of our background

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knowledge too. In fact, as Evans (2006, 492; see also Paolucci, 2010) continues “[…] words serve
as points of access to larger-scale encyclopaedic knowledge structures, which are potentially vast in
scope […]. On this view, words provide access to what I will refer to as a semantic potential, with
different sorts of knowledge being potentially activated” (italics added).

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The knowledge of language, thus, according to Evans (2006, 501-502) presupposes and
includes, as its constitutive parts, both lexical concepts and encyclopaedic knowledge structures, the
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latter referred to as cognitive models. Lexical concepts and cognitive models all together, in his
view, constitute the level of lexical representations. Lexical representations, hence, have both a
linguistic and a non linguistic nature. In fact, lexical concepts, on the one hand, are purely
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linguistically encoded concepts that can be thought of as the access routes to cognitive models.
They provide a perspective through which we activate contextually relevant cognitive models to
construct the meaning of an utterance. Cognitive models, on the other hand, are non linguistically
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knowledge structures, multi-modal in their nature. Importantly, embodied simulations are among
the multi-modal knowledge structures constituting cognitive models. Thus, through the mechanism
of simulation, sensory-motor information also concurs to lexical representations formation and to
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the process of meaning construction. Meaning can, thus, be defined as the result of cognitive
operations3 on both lexical concepts and cognitive models and it cannot be reduced to only one step
or single component of this process. Furthermore, this process is always grounded in the context of
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utterance: words have meaning only because they are part of an utterance that has been uttered in a
specific context, at a specific time and by specific people with peculiar background knowledge.
Meaning is a property to be ascribed to utterances and not to single words (Evans 2006, 527).
Thus, following Evans (2006), lexical concepts, although being a necessary step, are
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certainly not sufficient to understand the whole process that leads to the construction of meaning. A
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long tradition in the field of the Pragmatics of language has extensively discussed this point
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Recanati, 2004). Some examples will help us to clarify our argument.
As John Searle has highlighted (1980, 221), the verb “to cut”, in the following sentences, has very
different meanings:

1. Bill cut the grass

2. Sally cut the cake

To make sense of the meanings of “cut” in these two sentences we need to rely on our knowledge of,
and experience with, cakes and lawns. Only on the basis of this knowledge we can disambiguate the
meaning of the verb “cut”. More striking examples can be found in figurative language. The Italian
3
According to Evans (2006), the cognitive operations involved in the process of meaning construction are selection and
fusion. See Evans’s paper for a more detailed discussion of this topic.
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
ambiguous idiomatic expression “tagliare la corda” (to cut the rope) means “to literally cut a rope”
(a hand action) when it is literally used, while it means “to run away” (a foot-leg action) when it is
idiomatically used (see Cuccio et al. 2014). The meaning of the verb “to cut” in these two examples
depends on the co-text (the proposition and larger text in which the verb is embedded), on the
context of utterance, in its broader sense, and on the relevant cognitive models, i.e. the speakers’
background encyclopaedic knowledge that is relevant in that context and it is consequentially
activated. Meanings, as these examples suggest, are not fixed entities. They result from a process
that takes on the spot, is contextually determined and always entails the retrieval of our
encyclopaedic knowledge. The latter consists of different sorts of knowledge, and also contains

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sensory-motor information as its integral part. Meaning is nothing less that this and, in this view, it
also has, very often, depending on the context, a sensory-motor content. When contextual factors
lead to the activation of sensory-motor information this has a constitutive role in meaning

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construction, too.
Obviously, it is important to notice that to admit the role of sensory-motor information in
meaning construction does not amount to also claim that sensory-motor information is sufficient to

SC
explain the process of meaning construction, both in adult competent speakers and in children in the
process of mastering their mother-tongue. We propose an embodied approach to language where
sensory-motor information also concurs to meaning construction. However, we have never claimed,
and will never do, that sensory-motor information is sufficient to explain language acquisition and

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language use. That notwithstanding, supporters of disembodied accounts of language often attribute
to supporters of embodied accounts of language the idea that sensory-motor representations can be
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sufficient to explain how we learn action-related language or how we use it. This is explicitly stated,
for example, in a recent review of studies on brain-damaged patients and infants that focused on
action and language (Papeo and Hochmann, 2012). As these authors say (Papeo and Hochmann
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2012, 1222), “These [reviewed] results demonstrate that sensory-motor information is insufficient to
fully account for the complexity of verb learning” (italic added).
In the account we propose, sensory-motor information cannot be sufficient to explain the
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process of acquisition of action-related language. To acquire the ability to speak is a highly complex
process to which also concur other abstract constructions such as goals and causality and, most of
all, our socio-cognitive abilities. However, sensory-motor information has a role too in this process,
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as discussed by Glenberg and Gallese (2011). Similarly, sensory-motor information has a role also
in our language use, as adult competent speakers. Thus, as our proposal suggests, embodied theories
of language should acknowledge the specificity of language while, at the same time, also claim that
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sensory-motor information plays a constitutive role in meaning construction. Indeed, sensory-motor

information concurs to the formation of lexical representations that are, then, recruited as part of the
fluid process that leads us to the construction of meaning.
All these considerations point to a basic fact that needs to be further stressed: although we
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do have knowledge that is specifically linguistically encoded (i.e., lexical concepts), and in virtue of
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which we acquire species-specific abilities, lexical representations also include as their constituents
non-linguistic knowledge structures. These latter are integral part of meaning, too. And embodied
simulations, as non-linguistic knowledge structure, are also a part of the process that leads to
meaning construction. Thus, although we consider that to deny the specificity of language, and the
effects it has on human cognition, is a mistake, at the same time, we also believe that it is a mistake
to reduce meaning only to linguistically encoded knowledge
In our view, linguistic meanings are not fixed and stable units encoded in a specific
linguistic format. On the contrary, they are dynamic entities which are the product of a situated and
contextualized process to which both lexical concepts and cognitive models contribute. Lexical
concepts, the purely linguistic aspect of language, are certainly a necessary but not sufficient
element to the unfolding of the process of meaning construction. Their role is to function as access
routes to cognitive models. The latter, that are multi-modal and non linguistic knowledge structures,
fundamentally and necessarily contribute to linguistic meaning construction, too. Simulation
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
routines are components of cognitive models. This set of definitions allow us to redesign the
embodied view of language in such a way that simulation routines, as components of cognitive
models, when they are recruited by the situated and contextualized process of meaning construction,
are an integral part of linguistic meaning. And the latter is the pertinent level of analysis to
understand how language really works. Lexical entries and lexical concepts are certainly not enough.
Accounts that posit that language is a separate and autonomous system, that constitutively rely only
on linguistic encoded knowledge, do not do justice to the complexity of the process of meaning
construction.
However, in proposing our embodied account of language, we must also acknowledge that

PT
many empirical studies have suggested that simulation routines may not be always necessary for the
comprehension of action-related language. Papeo and Hochmann (2012), for instance, offered a
review of empirical findings that support a weaker account of the embodiment of language.

RI
[…] a number of studies suggest that the mapping of an action-word meaning onto a corresponding motor program is
not automatic, but relies on factors such as the task demand (Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009; Tomasino, Werner,
Weiss, & Fink, 2007; Tomasino, Fink, Sparing, Dafotakis, & Weiss, 2008; Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010), or

SC
the overall sentential context in which an action word is encountered (Papeo, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, & Rumiati, 2011;
Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009; Rüschemeyer, Brass, & Friederici, 2007). For instance, it has been observed
that task contexts driving participants’ attention toward the motor meaning of the word (e.g., judging the semantic
relation of a word with a bodily action) activate early motor structures (i.e., left M1) more consistently than tasks in

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which the access to meaning is less explicit or only incidental (e.g., counting the number of syllables in a verb; Papeo et
al., 2009). Modulation of neural activity according to task demands (lexical decision vs. explicit imagery on verbs) has
AN
been reported also in higher order motor regions, such as the premotor cortex (Willems, Toni, Hagoort, & Casasanto,
2010). Thus, while there is little doubt that the conceptual processing of actions can encompass sensorimotor regions;
researchers have raised the question as to whether this activity is automatic for understanding. (Papeo and Hochmann
2012, 1224).
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On the basis of these findings, it could be hypothesized that simulations are not always recruited
during language understanding. Hence, in this view, they might only play an augmentative role in
language comprehension, not being necessary for this process. On the contrary, we suggest that the
D

distinction proposed by Evans (2006) between lexical concepts, as purely linguistic concepts, and
meaning, as the result of a process that operates on both lexical concepts and cognitive models, can
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be used to show the fundamental role of simulations in language comprehension and it can function
as a criterion to make sense of these contrasting data on language and action in patients affected by
motor disorders, like PD. In fact, as Papeo and Hochmann (2012) suggest, in some case patients
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with brain damages affecting the motor areas are able to produce and comprehend action-related
language. However, a meta-analysis should be carried out in the light of Evans’s (2006) distinction.
In some studies, for example, according to the experimental tasks patients could have just been
required to access lexical concepts and not to perform the much more complex task to access the
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meaning of an action-related sentence. In the latter case, the inability to access sensory-motor
information, due to brain damage, could have affected the linguistic performance, while it can
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plausibly be hypothesized that this might not be the case for experimental tasks that only require
access to lexical concepts. In this theoretical framework, we can, thus, more easily account for
findings on language deficits in PD which have demonstrated an effect of task. Indeed, language
deficits in PD are more severe when tasks require deeper semantic processing (e.g. semantic
associations vs. lexical decision). Task dependency, in such cases, does not suggest that embodied
simulation is not necessary for the comprehension of language. It only suggests that its recruitment
depends on a contextualized and situated process of meaning construction and takes place according
to the neural exploitation hypothesis presented in the previous section. Thus, if we adopt Evans’s
(2006) distinction, contrasting data can be accounted for without any need to opt for a weaker
conception of the embodied account of language. Sensory-motor representations, as all the other
components that contribute to meaning construction, are recruited when this is required by the
contextual situation, including task demands of the studies.
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
5. Conclusions
Studies on language and movement disorders in PD are a burgeoning field of study which might
open new avenues for the understanding of this neurodegenerative disorder and, as a consequence,
for the development of tools for early diagnosis and more effective treatments of this pathology.
Besides this, currently, data on language deficits and movement disorders in PD also offer us the
possibility to reflect on crucial topics like the nature of the faculty of language and the human mind.
Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have long debated about what language is and how
it works and different and contrasting explanations have been proposed. Studies on language
impairments in PD seem to support an embodied account of language and cognition. Language

PT
seems to be grounded in action and perception systems, as it is predicted by the neural exploitation
hypothesis (see section 3 of this paper). Thus, dysfunctions in action and perception systems might
result in linguistic deficits, as it is the case in PD.

RI
However, it is still under discussion which theory of meaning is needed to account for this.
In fact, while disembodied theories of language are clearly not compatible with these empirical
findings, embodied theories have not yet adopted fully satisfying conceptions of what meaning is

SC
and have been highly criticized. In this sense, the literature on language and motor disorders further
forces us to revisit our conception of what lexical representations are and how sensory-motor
information can contribute to them. This paper is meant to be a little step in this direction. We
proposed an account of language where lexical concepts, the only purely linguistic components, are

U
certainly not sufficient for the construction of meaning. Meaning construction is a situated and
contextualized dynamic process to which both lexical components and cognitive models necessarily
AN
contribute. Linguistic meaning cannot be reduced to only one component, the disembodied one, of
this process. Meaning is intrinsically multi-modal.
Although previous works (for instance, Birba et al. 2017) have already proposed embodied
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accounts to explain some aspects of the language deficit in PD, contrasting results are still found in
the literature, with empirical findings not always clearly supporting the hypothesis of the
embodiment of language. The present paper aimed to add to this discussion a more refined
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definition of linguistic meaning, based on Evans’(2006) distinction. This definition allowed us to

make sense of contrasting empirical data and, consequently, to provide arguments in favour of an
embodied foundation of language. To the best of our knowledge, no one in the current discussion of
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language deficit in PD has taken into account such fine-grained theoretical framework for the
definition of meaning.
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Acknowledgments
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This work was supported by the PRIN grant on Perception, Performativity and the Cognitive
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Sciences and by a grant by Chiesi Foundation to Vittorio Gallese.

Although both authors discussed and designed the article together, sections 3 was written by
Vittorio Gallese, while sections 1, 2, 4 and 5 were written by Valentina Cuccio.

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