Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology (2018)

The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology
Sociocultural psychology is a discipline located at the crossroads between the natural and
social sciences and the humanities. This international overview of the field provides an
antireductionist and comprehensive account of how experience and behavior emerge from
human action with cultural materials in social practices. The outcome is a vision of the
dynamics of sociocultural and personal life in which time and developmental constructive
transformations are crucial.
This second edition provides expanded coverage of how particular cultural artifacts
and social practices shape experience and behavior in the realms of art and aesthetics,
economics, history, religion, and politics. Special attention is also paid to the development
of identity, the self, and personhood throughout the lifespan, while retaining the emphasis
on experience and development as key features of sociocultural psychology.
a l be rto ro s a is a professor of psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,

Spain, where he lectures on the history of psychology and cultural psychology. He has
carried out research and edited books on the developmental psychology of the physically
challenged, notably Psicología de la Ceguera (1993) and El Niño con Parálisis Cerebral
(1993) as well as on the history of psychology, such as his Metodología de la Historia de
la Psicología (1996) and Historical and Theoretical Discourse (1994, co-authored with
Jaan Valsiner). His most recent book, Hacer(se) Ciudadan@s: Una Psicología para la
Democracia (2015, co-authored with Fernanda González), is on the influence of culture
and history in shaping identity and citizenship.
ja a n valsin er is the Niels Bohr Professor of Cultural Psychology at Aalborg Univer-
sity, Denmark. He was the founding editor of the journal Culture & Psychology, and he
has published and edited around 40 books, including The Guided Mind (1998), Culture
in Minds and Societies (2007), and Invitation to Cultural Psychology (2014). He has been
awarded the 1995 Alexander von Humboldt Prize and the 2017 Hans Kilian Prize for his
interdisciplinary work on human development as well as the Senior Fulbright Lecturing
Award in Brazil in 1995–1997. He has been a visiting professor in Brazil, Japan, Aus-
tralia, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
The Cambridge Handbook of
Sociocultural Psychology
Second Edition
Edited by
Alberto Rosa
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Jaan Valsiner
Aalborg University, Denmark
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107157699
DOI: 10.1017/9781316662229

C Cambridge University Press 2018
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Contents
List of Figures page ix

List of Tables xi
Contributors xii
Editors’ Introduction 1
Sociocultural Psychology on the Move 3
a lbe rto ro s a an d ja a n valsin er
Part I Theoretical and Methodological Issues 11

1 The Human Psyche Lives in Semiospheres 13
2 Cultural Psychology as the Science of Sensemaking: A
Semiotic-cultural Framework for Psychology 35
se rgi o s a lvato r e
3 Knowledge and Experience: Interobjectivity, Subjectivity, and Social
Relations 49
go rdon s a m m ut, m a rti n w. bau e r, and sand r a jovc h e lovi tch
4 “Mediationism” in Cognitive and Social Theory 63
alan costall
5 Sociocultural Psychology and Interpersonal Psychoanalysis: The
Semiotic Space in the Consulting Room 78
phi l i p j. ro se n bau m
Part II Action, Objects, Artifacts, and Meaning 101

6 Spirited Psyche Creates Artifacts: Semiotic Dynamics of Experience in
the Shaping of Objects, Agency, and Intentional Worlds 103
a lbe rto ro s a
7 Making Social Objects: The Theory of Social Representation 130
wo l fgan g wagn e r, k at r i n k e l lo, and and u räm m e r
8 Beyond the Distinction between Tool and Sign: Objects and Artifacts
in Human Activity 148
re i jo m iettin en a n d sa m i pa avo la
vi Contents
9 The Sociocultural Study of Creative Action 163

vlad petre gl ăveanu
10 Symbolic Resources and Imagination in the Dynamics of Life 178
tan i a z i tto u n
Part III The Agent Rises a Reflective Self: Education and

Development 205
11 Early Infancy – a Moving World: Embodied Experience and the
Emergence of Thinking 207
s i lvi a e s pañ o l
12 Object Pragmatics: Culture and Communication – the Bases for Early
Cognitive Development 223
c i n t i a ro d r í g u e z, m a r is o l ba s il io, k ari na cárde nas,
sílvia cavalcante, a na m o r en o -n ú ñ e z , pe d ro palaci o s,
a n d n o e m í y u ste
13 Distinguishing Two Processes of Self-reflection 245
a l e x g i l l e s pi e
14 Making Memory: Meaning in Development of the Autobiographical
Self 260
k at h e r i n e n e ls o n
15 Mapping Dialogic Pedagogy: Instrumental and Non-instrumental
Education 274
e u g e n e m at u s ov
16 Development and Education as Crossing Sociocultural Boundaries 302
gi u s e p pi na m a r s ic o
Part IV Institutional Artifacts for Value 317

17 Ownership and Exchange in Children: Implications for Social and
Moral Development 319
g u stavo fa i g e n bau m
18 Possessions and Money beyond Market Economy 333
to shi ya ya m a m oto an d n o b o ru ta kah as h i
Part V Aesthetic and Religious Experiences 349

19 The Sociocultural Constitution of Aesthetic Transcendence 351
mark freeman
20 Sociocultural Science of Religion and Natural Belief 366
jam e s cr e s s w e l l
Contents vii
21 Psyche and Religio Face to Face: Religion, Psychology, and Modern

Subjectivity in the Mirror 380
lu i s m a rtí n e z g u e r r e ro
Part VI Practices and Artifacts for Imagining Identity 397

22 Imaginative Processes and the Making of Collective Realities in
National Allegories 399
lu ca tate o
23 National Identities in the Making and Alternative Pathways of
History Education 424
mario carretero, f lo o r van al ph e n, and cr i sti an par e l lada
24 The Politics of Representing the Past: Symbolic Spaces of Positioning
and Irony 443
brady wagoner , sarah h . awad, and i gnacio brescó de lu na
25 Beyond Historical Guilt: Intergenerational Narratives of Violence
and Reconciliation 458
gi ovan na l e o n e
26 Psytizenship: Sociocultural Mediations in the Historical Shaping of the
Western Citizen 479
jorge castro -t ej er ina a n d jo s é car lo s lor e d o-narci an d i
Part VII Experiences Make the Person 501

27 The Human Experience: A Dialogical Account of Self and Feelings 503
joão salgado and carla cunha
28 Knowing Ourselves: Dances of Social Guidance, Imagination, and
Development by Overcoming Ambivalence 518
seth surgan, au ro ra pfefferkorn, and e m i ly ab b ey
29 Personal History and Historical Selfhood: The Embodied and
Pre-reflective Dimension 538
a l lan k ø st e r an d d i tte al e xan d r a w i n t h e r-l i n d qvi st
30 The Development of a Person: Children’s Experience of Being and
Becoming within the Cultural Life Course 556
pe rn i l l e h v iid a n d ja ko b waag vi l lad s e n
31 The Construction of the Person in the Interethnic Situation: Dialogues
with Indigenous University Students 575
dan i lo s i lva gu i m a r ã e s a n d m a r í l i a a n t u n e s be n e d i to
32 Social Identities, Gender, and Self: Cultural Canalization in
Imagery Societies 597
ana flávia d o amaral m adureira
viii Contents
33 The Experience of Aging: Views from Without and Within 615

d i ete r f e r r i n g
General Conclusion 631

34 An Epistemological Coda: Sociocultural Psychology among
the Sciences 633
Index 652
Figures
3.1 Psychological phenomena in the spaces between the personal–collective and the
private–public dimensions. page 53
6.1 Triadic formalisms accounting for action, semiosis, experience, and realities. 117
6.2 Semiotic structure of the intentional scheme. 119
6.3 Actuation: Semiotic development of intentional action and objects. 120
6.4 Fractal structure of experience and behavior: Development of symbols and
arguments. 122
6.5 Substitutive semioses in the dynamics of sociocultural phenomena and personal
experiences. 125
7.1 An antique and a modern wheelchair. 135
7.2 Choir from Tõstamaa 1865. 140
8.1 Status of the gum disease defined in the care plan. 156
9.1 Decorated eggs at different stages. 166
9.2 The five A’s framework of creativity. 167
10.1 Loop of imagination in a three-dimensional space. 182
10.2 Semiotic prism. 190
10.3 A star-like model. 193
12.1 Triadic interaction at two and four months of age. 227
12.2 Symbolic uses of objects. 230
12.3 Self-regulation with private gestures and protocanonical uses. 232
12.4 Numerical uses of objects. 234
14.1 Bounds of experiential space in an environmental event or encounter. 262
15.1 Diverse and vast terrain of dialogic pedagogy. 277
16.1 In the elevator: regulation of sociocultural, interpersonal, and inner borders. 304
16.2 “School borderscape.” 310
16.3 The school border zone. 310
16.4 The border zone within a school. 311
16.5 School entrance hall as a social membrane. 312
18.1 Expanded mediational structure (EMS). 334
21.1 An eternal obsessive loop. The genealogical relationship between religion and
psychology. 391
22.1 Abstraction and reification. 403
22.2 The Triumph of Henry IV by Peter Paul Rubens. 405
22.3 Changing configurations of distinctions and relationships. 406
22.4 Consequences of War by Peter Paul Rubens. 409
22.5 Italia and Germania by Friedrich Overbeck. 409
22.6 Female personifications of France, Russia, and Britain. 410
x List of Figures
22.7 Demonstration against same-sex marriage in Paris. 411

22.8 Map of Sykes–Picot Agreement. 412
22.9 The imagined land. 413
22.10 Exotic at home and homeness in the exotic. 415
22.11 World War I propaganda posters advocating intervention. 416
22.12 Abstraction/reification in “umbrella revolution.” 418
22.13 Schoolchildren rehearsal for the Empire Games in New South Wales, 1938. 420
23.1 Map of the Iberian Peninsula around 710. Historical map adapted from García de
Cortazar, Atlas de Historia de España. Barcelona: Planeta, 2005. 432
23.2 Map of the Iberian Peninsula around 721. 432
23.5 Student drawing of the Iberian Peninsula around 710. Adapted from Lopez,
Carretero & Rodriguez-Moneo (2015). 433
23.6 Student drawing of the Iberian Peninsula around 721. 433
24.1 Street art on the presidential palace wall in Cairo, June, 2013. 451
24.2 Government poster in Cairo, February 2016. 452
27.1 The three layers of the human mind: first-, second-, and third-person
perspectives. 511
27.2 The triadic structure of a dialogical position. 512
27.3 A dialogical conception of feelings. 513
28.1 The openness of the sign to future meaning. 519
32.1 Social identities as boundary phenomena: from differences to inequalities, from
inequalities to intolerance. 602
34.1 Psyche: dynamic processes arising from a spiral of circular reaction cycles. 634
34.2 Epistemic overlaps in the study of the developmental dynamics of psyche. 636
34.3 Argument: a semiotic sign compiling values arising from action and producing
experiences. 641
34.4 Fields of sense (and culture) arising from experience and influencing behavior. 641
34.5 Crisscrossing boundaries of cultural, institutional, interpersonal, and subjective
fields. 645
Tables
8.1 BIM-related software used in a Finnish construction project in 2011–2012. page 158
33.1 Overview of central concepts, models, and theories on human aging. 619
Contributors
emily abbey is a professor of psychology at Ramapo College of New Jersey, USA. Working
from a developmental orientation and a cultural perspective, she is curious about ambivalence,
the semiotic organization of human lives, and the relationship between poetry and psychology.
s a r a h h . awad is a PhD fellow at the Centre for Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University,
Denmark. She received her MSc degree in social and cultural psychology from the London
School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and her BA degree in mass communication
from the American University in Cairo, Egypt. Her research interests are in the interrelations
between the fields of cultural psychology, communication, and social development. She stud-
ies the process by which individuals develop through times of life ruptures and social change
using signs to create alternative visions of social reality. She looks specifically at images in
the urban space and their influence on identity, collective memory, and power relations within
a society.
m a r i s o l ba s i l i o is a research fellow at the Faculty of Education of the University of Cam-

bridge, UK, working as part of the Centre for Research on Play in Education, Development
and Learning (PEDAL). Her research interest focuses on the interplay between communica-
tion, self-regulation, and play in children’s development.
m a rti n w. baue r is a professor of social psychology and research methodology at the Lon-
don School of Economics and Political Science, UK. A former editor of Public Understanding
of Science, he currently directs the MSc Social & Public Communication program and lectures
regularly in Brazil and China. He investigates science, attitudes, and common sense through
theory and indicator construction using comparative surveys, media monitoring, and qualita-
tive inquiries.
mar ília antunes benedito is concluding her undergraduate studies at the Institute of
Psychology at the University of São Paulo, Brazil. She developed a research project in the
field of cultural psychology about Amerindian identity in the urban context, which involved
interviewing Amerindian undergraduate students.
i g nac i o br e s c ó d e luna is currently working as an associate professor at the Centre
for Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University, Denmark. He received his PhD degree from the
Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, where he worked as an associate professor until
2014. His research interests revolve around collective memory and identity, the teaching of
history, positioning theory, and the narrative mediation of remembering.
k a r i na c á r d e na s , PhD, is a qualified early years teacher and developmental researcher.
She is an assistant professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, in Villarrica. Her
Contributors xiii
research interests concern the early development of communication and pedagogical interac-
tions using material objects in early childhood education.
mar io c arretero is a professor at Autonoma University of Madrid, Spain, and a

researcher at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Argentina. He
has carried out extensive research on history education.
jorg e c astro-tejerina is a professor of the history of psychology at the Universidad
Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED) in Madrid, Spain. His work is oriented toward the
study of the relationship between the history of psychology and sociocultural topics such as
citizenship, professional identities, aesthetics, and cultural theory.
sílvia cavalc ante, PhD, is a researcher of developmental and educational psychology at
the Department of Cogntion, Development and Educational Psychology at the University of
Barcelona, Spain. Her research interest focuses on early childhood development and educa-
tion, especially on number development in young children, from a socio-cognitive approach.
a la n c o sta l l is a professor of theoretical psychology and deputy director of the Cen-

tre for Situated Action and Communication at the University of Portsmouth, UK. His work
explores the implications of a “mutualist approach” to psychology. A serious engagement of
this approach with the sociocultural should (he hopes) be able to counter the nuttiness of
postmodernism.
jam e s (Jim) c r e s s w e l l is a cultural psychologist who is primarily interested in dialog-
icality and how it can enrich our understanding of psychological phenomena. This interest
draws on the aesthetic theory of the Bakhtin Circle and has led him to do community engaged
research with immigrants.
c a r la c u n h a, PhD, is currently an assistant professor at the University Institute of Maia
(ISMAI – Instituto Universitário da Maia), Portugal, where she coordinates the Master in
Clinical and Health Psychology program. Her current research interests are focused on change
processes in psychotherapy, identity transformation, and the dialogical self.
silvia español , PhD, is a researcher at the CONICET (National Council of Scientific and
Technical Research), Argentina. Her area of specialty is the socio-cognitive development in
early infancy. Her work is on the border between cognitive developmental psychology, psy-
chology of music, and the area of human movement.
gustavo faigenbaum graduated from the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and
obtained his PhD in philosophy at the New School University, New York, USA. He is a pro-
fessor at the Universidad Autónoma de Entre Ríos, Argentina. His research focuses on social
development, social cognition, ownership, and exchange.
d i ete r f e r r i n g, until his untimely death in August 2017, was a professor of developmental
psychology and geropsychology at the University of Luxembourg. He was the director of
the Integrative Research Unit on Social and Individual Development (INSIDE). His main
research areas lie within lifespan development and aging, focusing on personal and social
factors contributing to autonomy or dependence in old age.
xiv Contributors
m a r k f r e e m a n is a professor and chair of the Department of Psychology and Distinguished

Professor of Ethics and Society at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts,
USA. He is the winner of the 2010 Theodore R. Sarbin Award in the Society for Theoretical
and Philosophical Psychology.
a l e x g i l l e s pi e is an associate professor in social psychology at the London School of

Economics and Political Science, UK, and co-editor of the Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour. His research focuses on communication, divergences of perspective, misunder-
standings, and listening.
vlad petre g l ăveanu is an associate professor and head of the Department of Psy-
chology and Counseling at Webster University Geneva, Switzerland, director of the Webster
Center for Creativity and Innovation (WCCI), and Associate Professor II at the Center for the
Science of Learning and Technology (SLATE), Bergen University, Norway. He has published
extensively in the cultural psychology of creativity.
danilo s ilva guimarães is a professor at the Institute of Psychology within the Uni-
versity of São Paulo, Brazil. His main focus of research is the process of symbolic elabo-
rations out of tensional boundaries between cultural alterities, psychology, and Amerindian
peoples.
pe r nille hviid is an associate professor at the Department of Psychology at the University
of Copenhagen, Denmark. Her research focuses on developmental processes from a cultural
life course perspective. Her empirical focus is on children’s life and development in institu-
tional practices and on the development of educational and managerial practices aiming at
caring for and educating children.
s a n d r a j ovc h e lov i tc h is a professor of social psychology at the London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science, UK, where she directs the MSc program in social and cultural
psychology. Her research focuses on the sociocultural psychology of representations, pub-
lic spheres, and community development. Her latest research examines human development
under poverty and urban segregation, focusing on trajectories of self and community in the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro.
k at r i n k e l lo holds an MA in history and PhD in media and communications. At the time

of writing the chapter she was a researcher at the Institute of Social Studies, University of
Tartu, Estonia. She currently works at the Estonian Research Council. She is interested in
history of law as well as in social memory, history politics, and social representation theory.
allan k øster is a postdoc fellow at Aalborg University, Denmark. He holds a PhD in
philosophy of psychology and is trained as a clinical specialist in narrative therapy. Themat-
ically, his research centers on the relation between selfhood, embodiment, and narrative in
psychological processes as these are socioculturally embedded.
g iova nna l e one is an associate professor of social psychology at Sapienza University
of Rome, Italy, where she teaches social psychology, communication, political psychology,
and community psychology. Her main research interests include social and collective aspects
of autobiographical memory, ambivalent effects of over-helping as observed in multicultural
Contributors xv
classrooms, and relationships between changes of historical narratives on past intergroup vio-
lence and reconciliation.
j o s é c a r lo s lor e d o-narc iandi is a professor of the Department of Psicología Básica

I at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (National University for Open Educa-
tion) in Madrid, Spain. He currently teaches the history of psychology and epistemology. His
areas of interest are the history of psychology from a genealogical point of view, constructivist
traditions in the social sciences, and technologies of subjectivity.
a na f l á v i a d o a m a r a l m a d u r e i r a has a PhD in psychology from the Universidade de

Brasília, Brazil. She is a professor of psychology at Centro Universitário de Brasília, Brazil,
and does research in psychology and education with a specific interest in the relations between
social identities, diversity, and prejudice.
g i u s e p pina m a r s i c o is an assistant professor of development and educational psychol-

ogy at the University of Salerno (Italy), a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Cultural
Psychology at Aalborg University (Denmark), and a visiting professor at the PhD program in
psychology at the Federal University of Bahia (Brazil).
luis martínez g uerrero has a PhD in psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de

Madrid, Spain. He is an associate professor of medical anthropology at the Universidad Anto-
nio de Nebrija, Spain. His interests include the cultural psychology of religion, the history of
emotions, the technologies of the self, and the genealogy of modern subjectivity.
e u g e n e m atu s ov is a professor in the School of Education at the University of Delaware,

USA. His main interests are in dialogic pedagogy and in studying how to design safe learning
environments for all students.
r e ijo m iettinen is a professor emeritus of adult education at the Faculty of Educational

Sciences of the University of Helsinki, Finland, and works in the Center for Research on
Activity, Development and Learning (CRADLE). His research group studies scientific work,
network collaboration, producer–user interaction, and learning in technological innovations.
ana m oreno-núñez is an assistant professor of developmental psychology at Universidad

de Valladolid, Spain. She received her PhD from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and has
worked as a research fellow at the Singapore National Institute of Education at Nanyang Tech-
nological University, Singapore. Her research focuses on micro-genetic analysis of the role of
adults as a guide in children’s developmental processes and how their actions contribute to
children outcomes at an early age, in both home and school settings.
kat he rine nels on is Distinguished Professor Emerita of Psychology at the Graduate Cen-
ter of the City University of New York, USA. She is a fellow of the American Psychological
Association and the Association for Psychological Science. She is the recipient of awards for
a distinguished research career from the American Psychological Association and the Society
for Research in Child Development and she also received the SRCD Book Award in 2008.
Her research focuses on the development of language, memory, and cognition during the late
infancy and early childhood years.
xvi Contributors
s a m i paavo la is an associate professor at the Faculty of Educational Sciences at the Uni-

versity of Helsinki, Finland, and is affiliated with the Center for Research on Activity, Devel-
opment and Learning (CRADLE). His research focuses on digitization of work and on collab-
orative learning and inquiry.
pe dro palac ios , PhD, is a professor in the Department of Psychology at the Universi-
dad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, Mexico. His research interest is in studying the origin and
development of symbols in infants.
cr ist ian parel lada is a lecturer at the Faculty of Psychology of the University of
La Plata, Argentina, and researcher at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
(FLACSO), Argentina. His research interests are related to history education and national
identity, particularly in relation to how historical maps are represented by both students and
textbooks.
auror a p f e f f e r ko r n is a graduate student at Fordham University in New York, USA. She
is an interdisciplinary social historian, utilizing the study of psychology and literature in her
work. She enjoys studying moments of great social upheaval and change, though specializes
in medieval European history.
a n d u r ä m m e r is a researcher and lecturer of sociology at the University of Tartu, Estonia.
He is interested in the formation of values, diffusion of new ideas, public acceptance of new
technologies, trust in science, and social representation theory.
cint ia rodríguez is a professor of developmental psychology at the Universidad
Autónoma de Madrid, Spain. She worked in the Geneva School in the 1980s, where she devel-
oped a semiotic-pragmatic approach on objects in communicative situations. Her research area
is concerned with early socio-cognitive development in natural contexts.
alb e rto rosa is a professor of psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain,
where he lectures on the history of psychology and cultural psychology. He is interested in the
history of psychology and the semiotics of experience as mediated by cultural artifacts.
ph ilip j. ros e nbaum , PhD, is a clinical psychologist, psychoanalyst, and the director of
the Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) at Haverford College in Pennsylvania,
USA. His interests are in studying the commonalities between contemporary interpersonal
analytic practice and cultural psychology.
j o ã o s a lga d o, PhD, is an assistant professor at the University Institute of Maia (ISMAI –
Instituto Universitário da Maia), Portugal, and the director of the PhD program in clinical
psychology. His work has been mainly devoted to theoretical and empirical research on psy-
chotherapy and on the dialogical perspective, ranging from leading clinical trials to qualitative
micro-analytic studies and theoretical development.
s e rg i o s a lvato r e is a professor of dynamic psychology at the Department of History,

Society and Humanities at the University of Salento, Italy. His scientific interests are the psy-
chodynamic and semiotic theorization of mental phenomena and the methodology of analysis
of psychological processes as field dependent dynamics. He also takes an interest in theory
Contributors xvii
and the analysis of psychological intervention in clinical, scholastic, organizational, and social
fields.
g o r d o n s a m m ut is a senior lecturer in social psychology at the University of Malta. He is

interested in the negotiation and outcomes of diverse perspectives. His work explores social
representations of Arabs and Muslims in Europe and support for dictatorship and democracy
in Libya.
set h surgan is a professor of psychology at Worcester State University, Massachusetts,

USA, where he enjoys both relieving students of their confusions about how psychology con-
structs knowledge and deepening their confusion about the role of culture in psychological
processes.
n o b o ru ta k a h a s h i is a professor of school education at Osaka Kyoiku University, Japan.

His research interest is literacy development in cultural context.
luc a tate o is an associate professor in epistemology and the history of cultural psychology
at the Centre for Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University, Denmark. His research interests are
in the study of imagination as higher psychological function, the epistemology and history of
psychological sciences in order to reflect on the future trends of psychological research, and
related methodological issues.
jaan va ls iner is currently Niels Bohr Professor of Cultural Psychology at Aalborg Uni-
versity, Denmark. He is a cultural psychologist with a consistently developmental axiomatic
base that is brought to the analysis of any psychological or social phenomena.
f lo o r va n a l ph e n is a postdoctoral researcher at Autonoma University, Madrid, Spain.

She studies historical narratives and social identities in a cultural psychological vein with a
particular interest in adolescents, cultural diversity, and human mobility.
jakob wa ag v i l la d s e n is a PhD fellow at the Copenhagen Center of Cultural Life Course

Studies at the Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His main
interest is in early childhood development in educational settings, focusing on subjectivity
and how it emerges, develops, and is preserved in the cultural life course of the individual –
lived and shared with others.
wol f ga n g wag n e r is a professor of psychology at the University of Tartu, Estonia, and

was formerly at Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria. He is interested in the theory and
research in societal psychology, social and cultural knowledge, the popularization of science,
intergroup relationships, racism, and social representation theory.
brady wag oner is Professor of Psychology at Aalborg University, Denmark, and an asso-
ciate editor for the journals Culture & Psychology and Peace & Conflict. He received his PhD
from the University of Cambridge, UK, where he started his line of research on social and
cultural psychology, remembering, social change, and the development of dynamic method-
ologies. His recent books include The Constructive Mind: Bartlett’s Psychology in Recon-
struction (Cambridge University Press, 2017), The Psychology of Imagination (2017) and
xviii Contributors
Handbook of Culture and Memory (2017). He was awarded the Early Career Award by the
American Psychological Association (Division 26).
d i tte al e xa n d r a w i n t h e r-lindqvist, PhD, is an associate professor of developmen-

tal psychology at Aarhus University, Denmark. She is interested in phenomena central to the
development of children and young people from a point of view of lived experience.
tos h iya yam am oto is a director at the Developmental Research Support Center, Shizuoka,
Japan. His research interest is the ontogeny of possession in a sociohistorical context.
n o e m í y u ste , PhD, is an associate professor of developmental psychology at UNIR Uni-
versity. Her research field centers on peer interactions and first symbolic productions in school
contexts.
tania zittoun is a professor at the Institute of Psychology and Education at the University
of Neuchâtel in Switzerland. She is working on the development of a sociocultural psychology
of the life course with a specific focus on the dynamics of transition, imagination, and the role
of institutions. Her current work examines mobile lives as well as aging persons.
Editors’ Introduction
Sociocultural Psychology on
the Move
Alberto Rosa and Jaan Valsiner
The first edition of this Handbook (Valsiner & Verheggen, 2013), others as theoretical volumes
Rosa, 2007) is now ten years old. At the time it aimed at scholars (Valsiner et al., 2016). This
was first published, we mentioned that its publi- has been paralleled by a growing body of books
cation could be taken as a landmark of the con- and journals devoted to publishing theoretical
solidation of a discipline. Looking back now, we and empirical contributions. The social science
can say that we were right, as the notion of cul- arena that utilizes the notion of culture in one
ture is now widely conceived and has been on way or another is experiencing a “booming and
the rise over the last decade (Van Belzen, 2010; buzzing” creativity that may provide new break-
Chirkov, 2016; Chiu & Hong, 2007; Glăveanu, throughs in our understanding of human living in
2016; Sullivan, 2016; Valsiner, 2007, 2014). the tumultuous social world filled with the disap-
Sociocultural psychology is one of the branches pearance of knowledge into the agitation of doc-
of cultural psychology and has as its focus the trines, drone attacks under the aegis of “protec-
socially normative nature of the wider cultural tion,” battles against “terrorism” that feed into
context within which a person relates to the fears and unleash xenophobia, and – last but not
world through specific sets of meaningful actions. least – the globalization of consumption-focused
The focus on meaningfulness of human action – societal ideologies. The waves of social turmoil
through semiosis (making and use of signs) – is are like tsunamis in social media – making social
shared by sociocultural psychology and cultural upheaval a more complex threat than nuclear
psychology. weapons have ever been. The sociocultural per-
During the past decade, sociocultural psychol- spective is likely to dominate the current social
ogy has both consolidated and expanded in many favorite, the “neurosciences,” which, despite their
directions. This is noticeable, first, by the pub- promises to cure disease, cannot alter the social
lication of several handbooks on cultural psy- pathologies of the societies in which people par-
chology – indicating the interest in culture and ticipate. The future is for the social sciences –
social psychology (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007) – given that the societal escalations of the contem-
and, second, by the richness of various streams porary world cross the boundary of calm toler-
in cultural psychologies (Valsiner, 2012). Addi- ance and risk slipping into sectarianism.
tionally, the field’s move toward cultural his-
torical psychology (Yasnitsky, Van der Veer, &
The Birth of the Second Edition
Ferrari, 2014) summarizes perspectives of the
whole field that have developed out of the his- In the present, seemingly never-ending flow of
torical traditions of Lev Vygotsky (Zavershneva academic publications, it is a special honor if a
& Van der Veer, 2017) and Alexander Luria. book appears in new editions – all the more if
Some volumes have been written as textbooks the idea is initiated by someone other than the
aimed at students (Heine, 2008; Voestermans & authors or editors. Cambridge University Press’s
4 alberto rosa and jaan valsiner
suggestion to produce a second edition of the they also show how personal experiences pro-
Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology came as duce individual development and are a source of
somewhat of a surprise – but it was certainly cultural transformation. This makes understand-
timely. The field had grown in the decade since ing (meaning making of subjective experiences)
the first edition, and so have our understandings a key theoretical issue.
of it. We are now in a position to guide further Different disciplines help one another. Semi-
development of the discipline – a task to be taken otics and literary criticism offer explanations not
up both humbly and determinedly. We are creat- only about how sign systems turn into sym-
ing a sculpture out of the clouds, a book that gives bols and utterances but also about how experi-
form to the flow of ever-new ideas – whether ences can be considered signs for orienting action
ingenious, repetitive, or mundane. Our aim is to and canalizing actuations. A semiotic theory of
isolate the ingenious ideas from the many others. human experiences and actions that addresses
We decided on an overhaul of the original how actors understand and perform in situations
idea by introducing a meta-structure of ideas not offers formalisms capable of modeling how per-
yet developed 11 years ago. As a whole, this sonal experience and behavior are linked and
is a completely new volume. True, some of the is instrumental in explaining how social rep-
contributions from 2007 have been preserved in resentations are elaborated, put into use, and
altered form, but our approach to the Handbook transformed.
as a whole is new. It now expands the views on This set of theories images a dynamics of
experience and development that appeared in the sociocultural and personal life in which time and
first edition; at the same time, it shifts its scope developmental constructive transformations are
by paying more attention to how particular cul- crucial. Education and development; mastering
tural artifacts and social practices shape experi- and transforming meditational tools through play,
ence and behavior throughout the lifespan. The imagination, and art; and stabilizing changes
“socio” component of the title points toward the through symbols, discourses, and practices make
volume’s base in cultural objects, while actions it possible to establish aesthetic and ethic sys-
on these provide the focus for the present Hand- tems of values and, with them, shared forms of
book. In the wider field of social sciences, where feeling, knowledge, and social institutions. The
psychology as a discipline is vanishing into the mutual co-construction of psyche and sociocul-
black hole of the neurosciences, this second edi- tural systems shapes particular forms of iden-
tion of the Handbook preserves the sociocul- tity and the self, which, together with cultural
tural aspects of psychology through an interdis- systems of beliefs, produce varieties of personal
ciplinary synthesis. experiences that cannot be ignored when consid-
ering civil and personal governance.
Real Interdisciplinary Synthesis

In This Volume
It is through interaction and communication in
particular scenarios, often in conditions of ambi- Sociocultural psychology is a discipline with
guity and ambivalence that challenge the actor blurred limits that intersects with other psycho-
to position himself or herself, that cultural arti- logical subdisciplines, the social sciences, and the
facts (tools, symbols, images, discourses, norms) humanities. It is therefore important to chart the
are put into use and transformed, sometimes network of theories that informs and links its cor-
in a creative way. Not only are these kinds of pus of knowledge. Action, artifact, and meaning
situations occasions for producing novelty but are key concepts with a long history within the
Introduction: Sociocultural Psychology on the Move 5
sociocultural tradition. They have proved to be approaches that take into account how material
useful for explaining the transitions between the and virtual objects are graspable in human action
realm of culture to those of behavior and subjec- and integrated in networks of actants, institutions,
tivity. Several theories, when taken together, can and discourses, and so are able to describe how
provide an integrative image of how such transi- the structure of actions gets transformed and new
tions can happen without falling on any kind of cultural products and novel ways of social inter-
dualism or reductionism. action appear.
Part I is devoted to the theoretical and method- In such a vein, Part II focuses on how human
ological issues that frame the contents of the action in the environment simultaneously pro-
volume. It starts with a parsimonious natural- duces perception and meaning and transforms
ist overview of how the human psyche gets elements of the environment, producing artifacts,
shaped in processes that begin in the bioecolog- social conventions, symbols, and arguments.
ical domain, then produces meaning and mind, Rosa (Chapter 6) examines how the semiotic
and, finally, the spirit of culture. As Rosa and properties of behavior and experience can explain
Valsiner (Chapter 1) explain, human beings are the production of artifacts and conventions and
a cultural species that cannot but live in a semio- the transformation of human agency through
sphere. Such a view leads Salvatore (Chapter 2) social history and ontological development.
to conceive psychology as a science of sensemak- Wagner, Kello, and Rämmer (Chapter 7) focus
ing and to present a semiotic–cultural framework on how social communication produces shared
for human psychology. This has far-reaching con- social objects of many different kinds, rang-
sequences in both the psychological and the epis- ing from concrete material elements to abstract
temological realms. Sammut, Bauer, and Jovche- entities, such as global warming or national
lovitch (Chapter 3) demonstrate that what we take identity. Miettinen and Paavola (Chapter 8)
as objective or subjective cannot be conceived explore artifacts and semiotic tools as intertwined
without taking into account how social com- elements within the changing dynamics of sys-
munication iteratively transforms experience and tems of activity. Glăveanu (Chapter 9) dis-
coordinates social relations. Costall (Chapter 4) cusses how sensemaking and interpretation,
argues that an ecological psychological approach, evaluation and use, and dialogue and perspective
even if social and semiotic, does not need to taking in the dynamics of the relations involv-
resort to a representationist kind of cognitive ing the triad of actor, artifact, and audience can
mediation. The general framework presented in expand the scope of creativity studies. Finally,
Part I prompts Rosenbaum (Chapter 5) to discuss Zittoun (Chapter 10) discusses how imagination
the similarities and differences between cultural and “symbolic resources” are key elements for
psychology and interpersonal psychoanalysis and human development, the shaping of personal life
how the theories can benefit from one another. courses, and also societal changes.
Enactive autopoietic constructivism offers a Part III is devoted to education and develop-
dynamic view of how the co-construction of ment. Español (Chapter 11) presents a convinc-
functional structures in an agent, when acting ing argument about how early motor develop-
within an environment of objects, allows the pro- ment and body awareness develop together in
duction of explanations capable of transitioning early forms of social interaction. It is on the vital-
from the biological to the social realm via the ity forms of movement so developed, that the
mediation of artifacts and sign systems. Eco- child can participate in the social world of con-
logical psychology, actor-network theory, and ventional symbols and arguments. Social interac-
the systems of activity theory are theoretical tion, mediated by objects (toys) in different play
situations, transforms movement and body takes within varieties of relationships between
awareness into conventional cultural uses of children and parents or friends.
objects and early cognitive development. In their Part V shifts the volume’s focus to the study
chapter, Rodríguez et al. (Chapter 12) discuss of aesthetic and religious experiences. Artifacts,
the development of canonical uses of objects rituals, and texts of different kinds are outcomes
that is a pragmatic link for the later acquisition of human action constructing the cultural land-
of cultural concepts. The self is one of these scape. They provide arguments for shaping indi-
concepts. Gillespie (Chapter 13) conceives the vidual experiences, the personal understanding
self as arising from the phenomenological expe- of individual and collective life, and the posi-
rience of self-reflection, when one becomes an tion they take when experiencing events. Free-
object for oneself. As Nelson (Chapter 14) man (Chapter 19) argues that aesthetic transcen-
views it, meaning-making processes simultane- dence cannot be conceived without sociocultural
ously develop different forms of memory and values, beliefs, and ideals incited by particular
self-awareness when the child accumulates expe- local objects. Cresswell (Chapter 20) challenges
riences while participating in different levels the idea of “natural” religion as beliefs emerging
of human culture and related language for- as epiphenomena of cognitive mechanisms and
mats and uses. Development and education are presents an alternative approach that addresses
then inconceivable without being immersed in the givenness of religious belief without predi-
sociocultural dialogues. Matusov (Chapter 15) cating on socioculturally decontextualized mech-
examines the notion of dialogue in education, anisms. Martínez Guerrero (Chapter 21) argues
distinguishing between two kinds of dialogical that while psychology presents religion as a key
pedagogy: instrumental, aiming at making all stu- cultural phenomenon for understanding the orga-
dents arrive at some curricular end points pre- nization of people’s daily experiences through the
set by the teacher and/or the society, and non- use of its symbols, rituals, and discourses, the
instrumental, expecting students to arrive at new reverse can also be said: religion played an impor-
curricular end points that cannot be predicted in tant role in shaping both the contemporary West-
advance. This movement between what already ern individual and the psychological categories
exists in the life of a person and what could come for its description. This is exemplified by exam-
into being in the next moment prompts Marsico ining Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises as
(Chapter 16) to conceive education and develop- a milestone in the configuration of subjectivity
ment as liminal and future oriented, constantly and the government of emotions in the modern
working on the border of the “beyond area,” subject.
moving through the semiotic boundaries between Part VI centers on how cultural resources
social institutions. shape identity, placing particular emphasis on
Part IV elaborates these ideas further by focus- the role historical narratives play in interpret-
ing on how value develops within institutional ing past and current events in conflict man-
settings. Faigenbaum (Chapter 17) presents a agement and in civic life. History and histori-
view on moral development by reviewing the cal narratives are cultural devices that provide
development of ownership, exchange, and reci- information about the activities of a group over
procity in children’s institutional experience. time and also produce aesthetic and moral feel-
In a similar vein, Yamamoto and Takahashi ings toward different groups. Tateo (Chapter 22)
(Chapter 18) explore money as a cultural tool develops a theoretical model of the psychologi-
mediating market and gift exchanges among chil- cal processes that produce abstract and intangi-
dren – examining the cultural meanings money ble concepts, such as “nation,” “love,” “faith,”
or “freedom,” that allow for contact with par- therefore acting as a core element within the
ticular objects in everyday experience, to act dynamics of the human mind for the institution
as allegorical representations of those abstract of the sense of selfhood. Surgan, Pfefferkorn,
concepts. Carretero, Van Alphen, and Parellada and Abbey (Chapter 28) conceive experience as
(Chapter 23) present historical narratives as tools resulting from a future-oriented process based
for scaffolding feelings of collective and personal on overcoming the ambivalence between what is
identity and therefore also as instrumental for known now and what might be the case in the
instilling ethnic and nationalistic ideologies, but next moment. Their chapter focuses on the social
they also argue that history education is an occa- and societal roots of ambivalence and the means
sion for fostering critical reflection on social life, of overcoming ambivalence within the process of
as a defense against ideological indoctrination. constructing meaning when facing the quandaries
Wagoner, Awad, and Brescó (Chapter 24) explore of life.
the social–political dynamics by which the past The construction of the personal realm is a
is represented and used by differently positioned challenge for sociocultural psychology. Køster
people and how alternative interpretations arise and Winther-Lindqvist’s (Chapter 29) contribu-
before the displayed symbolic weaponry to pre- tion centers on the individual dimension of
serve one’s own ideological position. In a similar personal history by distinguishing between the
vein, Leone (Chapter 25) highlights how histori- preverbal, prereflective embodied landscape of
cal accounts can keep conflicts alive, unless their experience (historical selfhood) and personal his-
capability for producing feelings of superiority tory as the broader ontogenetic and existential
and grievance or guilt and vengeance is defused. process through which an individual continu-
This requires building a narrative of reconcilia- ously becomes the person he or she is. This
tion, which often needs to change the aesthetic makes embodiment the point of transfer between
and moral arguments on which the groups and nature and culture, sociogenesis and ontogene-
their members’ identities are conceived – not an sis, and also relevant for the development of indi-
easy task. Part VI concludes with Castro-Tejerina vidual agency. Hviid and Villadsen (Chapter 30)
and Loredo-Narciandi’s (Chapter 26) reflection also claim the importance of taking into account
on the role of psychology in shaping the West- children’s development as persons. They present
ern idea of citizenship – what they term Psytizen- an empirical study on children’s meaning-making
ship. As they view it, postmodernity is forging a processes while in dialogue with cultural ele-
repsychologization of the subject that is necessar- ments in the living spaces where they experience
ily conflictive and plural. events. These self-reflecting experiences, when
Part VII is the final and longest part in the assembled with the workings of imagination on
Handbook. It is devoted to examining a vari- cultural material, can be turned into tools for
ety of personal experiences and the shapes they shaping one’s own actions and, eventually, one’s
take throughout the lifespan. Salgado and Cunha own self by setting a life project.
(Chapter 27) offer a view of human experience The rest of the chapters discuss how adults
as arising from a dialogue between the self and understand their lives and experiences when in
feelings. They approach the experiential mind contentious situations. Guimarães and Benedito
by combining the phenomenological, sociocul- (Chapter 31) present an empirical study on how
tural, and semiotic outlooks. As they present it, indigenous Brazilian university students experi-
the flow of human experience combines first-, ence tensions between the way of life and ethnic–
second-, and third-person perspectives, with cultural values of their communities of origin and
affectivity crossing over these three layers and those of life in the urban context and academic
institution. Madureira (Chapter 32) presents a This is accomplished through carefully consid-
discussion on gender identities as resulting from ering the complexities of methodology (Branco
cultural canalization by rigid semiotic boundaries & Valsiner, 1997; Valsiner, 2017). Methods taken
separating what is perceived as masculine from out of context of the wider methodology cycle do
the feminine. The last chapter is a study on aging, not guarantee meaningful knowledge, as effective
which Ferring (Chapter 33) approaches by com- theories are needed.
bining two points of view: from without and from However, at the same time, sociocultural psy-
within. It starts with a discussion on the differ- chology should avoid attempting to provide def-
ing qualifications that the term aging has received inite and comprehensive accounts of the phe-
in diverse theoretical models and then goes into nomena it studies. Such accounts are necessarily
particular biographic narratives that highlight the partial – they are meaningful from some theo-
importance of life events and adaptive processes retical perspectives and meaningless from oth-
within the family in the subjective construction of ers. For example, the majority of psychological
the self and the life course. The general conclu- data that are statistically analyzed in psychology
sion (Chapter 34) elaborates on a person-centered as solid data may at best be considered “anecdo-
approach in the study of human aging that takes tal” from any sociocultural psychology perspec-
into account how family and culture interact in tive. Why? There is no evidence in statements
shaping life in advancing age. like “men were found to be different from women
at the statistical criterion of conventional (P <
0.05) level” that may be based on large sam-
Conclusion: Directions in
ples. Such evidence fits the gossip columns of
journalists who are watching for socially scan-
Sociocultural psychology is a discipline that dalous findings from psychology, but they do not
deals with change and diversity in social life, in provide new insights into the phenomena under
collective and individual conduct, and in personal study. A careful, in-depth study of a particular
experiences. It is a disciplinary field of knowl- man (or woman) within his (or her) immediate
edge whose theories have to be devised in such a activities context and of the guiding framework of
way as to be able to explain regularities but also the social norm systems of society would provide
account for individual variation. It is a kind of solid evidence. Generalization in psychology is
idiographic science in which the understanding not only possible but also the rule in psychol-
of individual observation is grounded on nomoth- ogy as science (Valsiner, 2015). Consequently,
etic principles able to explain how human action psychology is similar to all other basic sciences
in concrete settings is the result of an agency dis- where a phenomenon under study is unique –
tributed in a system involving biological, social, a comet, a planet, or an asteroid to which the
and cultural elements. human engineering genius might send a land-
Sociocultural psychology is a liminal field of ing robot for the study of its particular qualities.
knowledge crossing the paths of other disciplines. Yet, the evidence of such particulars is of crucial
These disciplines feed the knowledge they pro- importance for our general understanding of our
duce, but this knowledge cannot simply be added universe. Such understanding is abstract and gen-
together in an eclectic mass. No “big data” can eral, and it has potential for contextualizations in
solve basic problems in any science – least of other particular locations.
all in psychology. Sociocultural psychology has Nevertheless, sciences of the human psyche
to keep moving to produce integrative theories transcend the disciplines that deal with physical
to relate new findings from the neighboring dis- and biological objects. A special feature of our
ciplines in order to develop its own research. perspective is the self-reflective nature of human
beings – as it is reflected in sociocultural psy- Valsiner, J. (2007). Culture in Minds and Societies.
chology. We need to keep ourselves aware that New Delhi: Sage.
the discourses it produces are but the transitory Valsiner, J. (Ed.). (2012). The Oxford Handbook of
construction of a kind of interobjective knowl- Culture and Psychology. New York: Oxford
edge resulting from the operation of a dynamic University Press.
Valsiner, J (2014). An Invitation to Cultural
system of distributed agencies. Scientific knowl-
Psychology. London: Sage.
edge is itself a cultural product that results from
Valsiner, J. (2015). Generalization is possible only
human efforts to respond to the quandaries of
from a single case (and from a single instance).
life – if it does not change as the dynamics moves, In B. Wagoner, N. Chaudhary, & P. Hviid (Eds.),
it becomes stagnant and useless both for gen- Integrating Experiences: Body and Mind Moving
eral knowledge and for practical applications in between Contexts (pp. 233–244). Charlotte, NC:
societies. Information Age.
Valsiner, J. (2017). From Methodology to
Methods in Human Psychology. New York:
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Part I
Theoretical and Methodological
Issues
1 The Human Psyche Lives in
Semiospheres
The spider makes operations resembling the operations of the weaver, and the bee creating its waxen
cells disgraces some architects. But from the very beginning, the worst architect differs from the
best bee in that before building the cell of wax, he already has built it in his head. The result, which
is received at the end of the process of work, already exists in the beginning of this process in an
ideal form in a representation of a person. The person does not only change the form given by
nature, but in what is given by nature he, at the same time, realises his conscious purpose, which as
a law determines the way and character of his actions and to which he must subordinate his will.
K. Marx
For several hundred years we humans have been we want to achieve, avoid, or even lead. For this
considering ourselves part of nature, despite dis- purpose we sometimes strain to make ourselves
liking the idea of being subject to a fate beyond healthier or stronger and also cultivate our off-
our control. We believe we are matter – but liv- spring and ourselves to become smarter, wiser,
ing matter. That belief stops us from relating with and, sometimes, kinder and better. And this we
mountains, pebbles on a beach, and water that we do by looking after the bodies, and also in what,
drink. As we move around, we accept that we are for want of a better word, we call the spirit. And
animals. Yet we are not happy to be reduced to then we deny its importance for science – a pas-
dogs, laboratory rats, or even dinosaurs. We are sionate inquiry. Not only are we symbolic and
symbolic animals who are able to imagine what sign-making animals but we are just strange ani-
is currently absent in our immediate environment mals. The self-affirming label we attach to our
and anticipate its potential arrival, but also cre- species – Homo sapiens – requires further inves-
ate meaning for what is and what is not yet. We tigation into the ways that sapiens operate.
undertake risky trips to discover the western route Our aim here will be to present an argument
to India only to end up with the menace of two that may allow us to understand how a living
Americas; we invent various deities only to kill body can be encouraged by the spirit of a cul-
one another in their name. ture so that an animal may eventually turn into a
And on top of all of that, we create the moral being able to conduct himself or herself –
notion of science. We assume the ambivalence in short, how matter, life, and culture can engen-
between ordinary living and reflection about it der the human spirit. Arguably, then, what we will
when putting effort into building sciences that do here is sketch a sort of ontology of psyche –
scrutinize the causes of the events we live with the subject matter of psychology. In so doing,
the intention of exercising some agency on the we certainly will not assume that psyche is any
preparation of possible futures. We are subject kind of permanent entity with substantial features
to the events of nature as the matter we are, but that are innate. Our purpose is purely instrumen-
we also believe we dwell in a world not only of tal: to demarcate the scope of the phenomenon of
matter but also of imagined entities and events human experiences for psychological sciences to
inquiry and, more specifically, those of particular around the three religions of the book, and also
interest for sociocultural psychology. the Scientific Revolution.
Answering this question is not easy. No one has Descartes laid the groundwork of modern
seen, touched, or felt the psyche. But neither has thought, but he did so at the price of break-
anybody touched gravity or weather. All these are ing psyche into halves. Some of its functions
abstract concepts that translate into very concrete were to be explained by the material structure of
manifestations – things fall, and we take umbrel- the organs (lower psychological processes), while
las with us when we see rainclouds. We know that higher psychological processes (language and
we “have psyche” but cannot pinpoint where it reason) resulted from the working of the imma-
is located. It is in every place in our subjective terial res cogitans. This division of psyche has
living – and yet it is nowhere. Psyche seems to hindered psychology for centuries, even if “the
have a ghostly nature, but not very different to discovery of time,” resulting from the Enlight-
that of physis, the subject matter of physics. If enment and the Industrial Revolution (Toulmin
we want to avoid venturing into speculation about & Goodfield, 1965), deeply changed the ideas
what that elusive creature might be, we had bet- about psyche. Yet even now – in the twenty-
ter choose a parsimonious track. What we will first century – the implications of time as irre-
do here for this purpose is, first, look at what the versible, while experienced as if it is not, has not
practitioners of psychology said were the matters reached the conceptual schemes of postbiological
of their interest, then go into elucidating how psy- sciences. This contrast – the reality of the irre-
che and mind can evolve from the world of matter versibility of a lifetime and our depiction of it in
and produce the spirit of culture and how we can time-freed terms – is the work of the psyche.
make it a subject for the scrutiny of science, and, The German idealistic tradition (Leibniz,
finally, put some order in the myriad terms like Wolff, Kant, Herder, Fichte, Hegel, Marx) chose
psyche, mind, or spirit that populate psychologi- to center on the spirit, the vital principle, leav-
cal texts. ing aside any consideration of its material basis.
The spirit was capable of accumulating experi-
ences, producing knowledge and feelings, solv-
1.1 What Is Meant by the Word
ing problems, and conceiving entities beyond
Psyche?
sensorial phenomena. The spirit was then able to
At the beginning, psyche was just a short way develop the capabilities of the mind by produc-
of referring to life. For the ancient Greeks, psy- ing new rules of action for practical reasoning.
che was the vital principle, as anima was for the In so doing, they pointed out something impor-
Romans. Things were either animated or unani- tant: spirit was not something to be found solely
mated, because they had an anima or a psyche. in live matter or in the workings of the mind; it
Plato, as he did with everything else, decided to was also found in social groups, laws, and insti-
give substance to that principle. It was an idea tutions. It could be changed and transformed and
that produced an entity: the soul, which was a was able to shape the fashions of individual psy-
thing that, as all others, was both vital and spir- ches in different parts of the world, not because
itual, embodied and ideal, perishable and tran- they were different in their biological structures,
scendent; an entity that, in addition, had the but because of the differing historical develop-
desire, and capability, for reaching beauty, knowl- ment of societies. From then on, psyche and
edge, and truth. So, Plato created an entity and spirit were no longer synonymous. Spirit became
provided it with contents and desires. Such a both social and individual and was thought to be
conception impregnated the cultures that evolved able to percolate through skins and borders. The
The Human Psyche Lives in Semiospheres 15
consequence was to make consciousness (and the movement in the second half of the nineteenth
unconscious) gain prominence as a central psy- century (Diriwächter, 2004; Jahoda, 1992), the
chological issue. domains of language, religion, and art could not
The theory of evolution naturalized psyche be left aside if the significance of personal expe-
and cast a fresh look on how to conceive its riences of individuals of flesh and blood were to
vital functions. Survival was shown to depend be taken into account. Such significance is some-
on the ability of organisms to act in their envi- thing that impregnates life; it is directly describ-
ronments. Psyche turned into an inherently rela- able and understood, and so it seems not to be
tional, functional entity. Now a new duality was in need of explanation. It suddenly emerges as
to be added to that of mind and body: the organ- in need of explanation when it is an obstacle to
ism, an enclosed space with its own dynamics, the human striving toward some goal. Teleology
and the environment, the world of things beyond seemed, then, indispensable to account for how a
the skin. Behavior was the way of bridging the living person can turn into a person with a biogra-
gap between the inner and the outer realms. phy – embedded within the history of a commu-
Homeostasis, irritability, orientation, and motiva- nity. Hence importance was given to the study of
tion rose, then, as principles for the explanation values and the emphasis on idiographic studies of
of behavior. From that moment on, psyche could individual instances. A first-person approach to
not be conceived as devoid of its biological basis. the study of human lived experiences developed
When the new science of psychology appeared from this way of conceiving psychology.
at the turn of the eighteenth century, hardly any Functional approaches of different kinds
person denied the need to take both approaches shared this exertion with different emphases.
into account (Valsiner, 2012). The challenge to Franz Brentano, following the Aristotelian-
face at that time was scrutinizing how physi- Scholastic tradition, showed the path for a psy-
cal forces turned into subjective phenomena so chology aimed toward studying the ways psyche
that knowledge and will could result from the acts on the world, is affected by these encoun-
workings of the mind. The pioneering work of ters, and ends up producing thinking and knowl-
Herbart and Lotze, as well as Fechner’s psy- edge about the world and ourselves. The Aus-
chophysics, Brentano’s focus on inherent inten- trian and Würzburg schools and the Ganzheit and
tionality, and Wundt’s experimental psychology, gestalt psychologists, influenced by phenomenol-
resulted from this endeavor. Over the nineteenth ogy, followed this path while striving to keep
century, the fight between Naturwissenschaften the holistic outlook coming from German Natur-
and Geisteswissenschaften resulted in the victory philosophie. They upheld a view of psyche as
of the former – yet in a narrow sense. An attempt a complex dynamic totality encompassing, but
was made at the end of the nineteenth century to also differentiating, the subjective realm and the
create what was labeled “objective” science, how environment (Ash, 1995; Diriwächter & Valsiner,
subjective experience rises out of biological pro- 2008).
cesses. These early attempts to create a psychol- American pragmatists developed a different
ogy of the canonical human subject of experience kind of functionalism. Putting the notion of use-
were the beginning of a third-person approach to fulness up as the criterion of truth made it pos-
the study of psychological processes. sible to arrive at the idea that knowledge is local
However, the development of linguistics, lit- and socially constructed. However, the pragmatist
erary studies, and history in the nineteenth cen- scholars could leave us with practically useless
tury left a footprint of a different kind on psy- yet theoretically highly innovative perspectives.
chology. Emphasized by the Völkerpsychologie Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and
George H. Mead took seriously the Aristotelian issues to be discarded or, at best, left as matters
idea that psyche is what those living have that of concern for the humanities.
keeps them alive and away from damage. Psy- All these approaches, despite their discrepan-
che and consciousness (like Aristotle’s entelechy) cies about what psychology could be, offered
were natural functions that showed in the actions valuable contributions for the understanding
of organisms living in their environments. of myriad psychological phenomena and for
So viewed, action (pragma) – what the indi- explaining many psychological processes. But
vidual actually does, overtly or in a hidden man- the image of psyche that resulted was like a kind
ner – came to occupy the central focus for psy- of patchwork. Psychology appeared to be a sort
chological enquiry. Action was conceived as a of kaleidoscope that showed different aspects of
process going on at both sides of (and crossing psyche when turned. Psyche, then, appears to be
over) the borders between organs, organisms, and a creature that can only be conceived as an entity
their environments, searching for an equilibrium manufactured by psychology. Every psychologi-
that, if ever reached, is always shown to be tran- cal approach, therefore, shapes the conception of
sitory and dynamic. Motivation, attention, learn- psyche to fit the different tasks of psychologists
ing, thinking, and their development were then as they carry out their studies.
conceived as matters of interest for a psychol- Sociocultural psychology cannot be an excep-
ogy interested not only in describing the per- tion. If we believe it worthy to state a particu-
formances and abilities of individuals but also lar view of psyche, it is because we think it may
in how these functions develop and their effi- provide a useful framework for better defining
ciency improves. Consequently, these psycholog- the scope of interest, which the phenomena con-
ical processes became naturalized as biological sidered as relevant, and to develop theories for
functions. sociocultural psychology. This is why we believe
Behaviorism took this move one step further. It this instrumental task is worthy, even if its results
kept the functional outlook but added the mecha- are destined to be changed or discarded once they
nistic explanation of British associationism. The no longer serve a purpose.
result was that psyche was reduced to a kind
of Cartesian machinery whose movements could
only be explained by discrete changes in elements 1.2 Setting a Sociocultural
of its entourage, by alterations in its inner bal- Outlook about Psyche
ance, and by a combination of both. The so-called
cognitive revolution expanded the metaphor of Sociocultural psychology is a part of human psy-
the mechanical tinker-toy beyond the observed chology that “deals with psychological phenom-
interchanges between the body and the environ- ena that happen because of the socio-cultural
ment. The mind was then turned into a virtual aspects of human lives in varied social con-
machine for processing information implemented texts” (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007, p. 1) – a field
in strings of symbols and systems of rules for of knowledge with fuzzy limits, made of a
problem solving. This approach reduced thinking family of perspectives resulting from dialogue
to an effect of the syntax of sign systems, making between psychology, social sciences, and the
semiotics for the explanation of processing irrele- humanities (Geisteswissenchaften). Throughout
vant and consciousness a useless epiphenomenon its rather long past, several features emerged:
or, in some versions, a kind of process only pos-
sible to tackle after making ad hoc adjustments. 1 A focus on the study of action and activ-
Teleology and the sense of lived experiences were ity – hence, transcending the limits of defining
psychology as a study of behavior or cognition, the other show qualities that simultaneously per-
or as neuroscience mit and constrain the specific kinds of relation-
2 An emphasis on the instrumental nature of ships they can have, forming altogether a higher-
action and sign mediation of the psyche – with order structural whole. The consequence is that
the result of linking psychology with semiotics any change within the organism–environment
3 A time-inclusive consideration of phenom- system, including the actions of the body, can-
ena – hence, evolutionary, historical, and not be taken to be caused solely by one particular
developmental ideas are at the root of the change in one of the elements but can also be a
sociocultural perspective result of the constraints and possibilities that the
4 An interest in human experiencing and con- interrelations of the elements of the system as a
sciousness – resulting in the primacy of idio- whole offer.
graphic perspectives in generalizing science However, the structural capabilities of the bio-
(Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010) logical structure of human beings are insuffi-
5 A growing attention to the study of discur- cient for explaining how higher psychological
sive/conversational phenomena – with a focus processes – intentional actions oriented toward
on meaning construction through all versions self-constructed goals – appear. The challenge
of sign systems (not only verbal language) is to account for how consciousness arises from
6 Restoration of the primacy of the qualita- encounters within a system encompassing mate-
tive nature of phenomena over their quanti- rial entities. Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) – a
tative aspects and, consequently, the develop- literary scholar who turned to psychology in
ment of qualitative methods and idiographic the 1920s – solved this question by focusing
studies on the creative synthesis that human sign use
makes possible (Valsiner, 2015). While ana-
The sociocultural perspective is a parallel and lyzing the ways in which meaningful affec-
partially overlapping arena of social sciences to tive generalization in the process of encounter-
various versions of cultural psychology (Valsiner, ing a short story or fable becomes possible, he
2009, 2014). The latter takes the social Umwelt of showed how human affect can “jump” out of the
the persons or other social units (groups, commu- immediate experience and flavor human living
nities, ethnic groups, etc.) into account but does (Vygotsky, 1925/1971). Various objects in our
not necessarily analyze these contextual features lives are capable of becoming the means of oper-
in their own terms. The sociocultural approach ating other objects, with the added consequence
includes perspectives from psychology, anthro- of signaling to other organisms how to coordi-
pology, sociology, and history – hence it lives nate their activities in the environment. Com-
up to the wide and loud sociopolitical call for municative action thus appears, and from this a
“interdisciplinarity.” new kind of entity eventually arises: symbols.
Tools and symbols are again transformed through
their recursive use within the social life of a
1.2.1 A Structural-Systemic
group, making another kind of (abstract) entity
Approach
appear: culture. Sociocultural phenomena thus
The psyche is based on the soma – there is no become as indispensable as biological phenom-
subjectivity without the body that is biologically ena in explaining the workings of the human psy-
ready for it. As Aaro Toomela (2015, p. 327) has che. The historical time frame is then added to
put it, “body would be mindless without environ- the evolutionist and developmental approaches of
ment.” It is when both interact that parts of one or functionalism.
Vygotsky took symbols to be indispensable for cal functioning in consciousness, culture, and the
the development of higher psychological func- self.
tions, pointing out that conventional symbols can
only be acquired if individuals are immersed in
a social environment where actions and interac- 1.3 Psyche Arises from Natural
tions are mediated by practices, sign systems, and Life Processes
institutions. Human consciousness is thus con-
ceived as an effect of communication first with 1.3.1 From Biological Processes to
others and then with the self taken as another. Social Behavior
The result is that thinking gets transformed and
deliberation is made possible, opening the way The first task, then, is to examine how psy-
for the subjective realm to arise. Therefore, to chological functions can develop from the bio-
leave consciousness aside would lead us to con- logical structures of living organisms. This is
ceive of humans as zombies devoid of the ability what Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela
to set distant goals and make plans, unable to set (1992) did when they developed a theory of
teleological structures for regulating their behav- enactive cognition that took care in keeping
ior beyond natural teleonomy. within the limits of biological explanations, based
This Vygotskian approach Toomela (2015) on the physical and chemical laws that govern
termed structural-systemic, in accordance the exchanges within organizational structures.
with Bertalanffy’s general systems theory Knowledge, then, is conceived as the effective
(1968/1976) – a theoretical tool developed for actions of living organisms for keeping their exis-
the study of living things and social phenom- tence in their particular environments – the world
ena. Throughout the last decades, systemic they live in.
approaches of many kinds have been developed Living organisms (from a cell or a parame-
in particular fields of knowledge. We believe cium to a Nobel Prize laureate) are continually
that revisiting some of them could be useful and actively doing something, for example, feed-
for the purpose of elaborating an updated con- ing and self-producing, so that their being and
ception of how a sociocultural psyche may doing are indistinguishable. They simultaneously
look for the purposes of current research in the are the producers and the product of their actions.
field. This is what Maturana and Valera called the
We will approach this task parsimoniously. We autopoietic1 character of biological organization,
will start by looking at how natural phenom- which can be summarized as follows:
ena – of the kind studied in the natural sciences –
produce myriad structures that shape hierarchies 1 The components of an autopoietic unit are
of open systems in interaction; we will con- dynamically linked in a network of interactions
tinue by examining how some kinds of individ- (metabolism).
ual systems are able to profit from their inter- 2 Some of these components form a border,
actions with their environments so that they can a limit to this network of transformations: a
behave intelligently; and finally, we will explore membrane (or skin). This membrane is not just
how a new kind of entity – symbols – ensues a product or a limit on the network of interac-
from social communication among sentient and tions but part of it; otherwise, the cell (or body)
emotional entities, forming symbolic systems of as a unit would disappear, and metabolism
communication and causing higher psychologi- would not be possible.
3 Living organisms are characterized by their which the organism is made, there are structural
autopoietic organization. They differ in their couplings between the organism as a whole and
structures, but they are similar in their orga- its environment beyond the skin. This causes
nization. metacellular units to have a peculiar property:
4 Living beings are autonomous units, which first-order autopoiesis is subordinated to second-
means that what happens inside the body fol- order autopoiesis; i.e., the survival of individual
lows the laws derived from the structure of cells is subordinate to the survival of the organ-
internal relations. ism as a whole. This is what an observer calls
adaptation, a process that also shows in ontogen-
Looking within from without: The object esis: the process through which the organism as
and the descriptions of the observer. This a whole develops through autopoietic processes
approach seeks to explain life through the rela- from an original cell.
tionships between structures, but when so doing, Both organism and environment are blind to
it is also necessary to take into account that these each other; i.e., the changes that happen within
structures and their relationships can become each are regulated by the organism’s or envi-
objects for science only when they are turned into ronment’s structure, which also constrains the
objects to be described, explained, and discussed, ways in which it can be affected by external
and this requires an observer who puts them into shocks. This causes these changes to have an iter-
language. This may seem obvious, but it is also ative, dynamic character. The consequence is that
far from trivial; it has far-reaching consequences changes within the organism or the environment
that we will discuss later. cannot be taken as instructive for each other: they
Levels of structural complexity. Living enti- trigger changes but do not act as instructions for
ties are structures of many different kinds with the other party to process. It is the observer who
different levels of complexity. This leads Matu- can say that the structure of the organic system
rana and Varela (1992) to characterize different is what determines its actions and also who spec-
kinds of organization that also increase the com- ifies what configurations of the environment can
plexity of their autopoietic processes. trigger structural changes in the system. And last,
A cell is a first-order autopoietic unit that but not least, behavior is not what the organism
relates with elements of its environment, which does by itself but the description the observer
may include other cells. Their mutual contact makes about the changes that happen in what
causes structural changes in all that depend on he or she delimits as organism and environment
the particular characteristics of the affected struc- when focusing on his or her encounters.
ture (the unit or environment). The result is a What the observer describes as behavior takes
series of successive, mutually consistent struc- new properties in the case of metacellular organ-
tural changes, structural couplings, which will isms with a nervous system. Neurons estab-
keep going for as long as both the autopoietic lish sensorimotor connections and also form
unit and the environment do not disintegrate. An interneuron connections, which cause them to
observer could say that the history of changes work as a closed network of exchanges. This
resulting from these structural couplings is the network causes the nervous system to partic-
evolution of the autopoietic unit. ipate in the operation of an organism as a
Metacellular organisms are second-order mechanism that maintains the structural changes
autopoietic units. In addition to the structural of the body within certain limits. The plastic-
couplings among first-order autopoietic units of ity of the nervous system is in its ability for
constant change in line with changes in the envi- bols and grammar are needed to compose the
ronment. The nervous system (NS), the organism observer’s interpretations but also that they are
to which it belongs, and the environment oper- a result of communicative actions of the kind
ate on each other as selectors of their correspond- referred to in the preceding paragraph. In addi-
ing structural changes and therefore produce new tion, if those descriptions and interpretations are
iterative coupling processes to keep operating, claimed to correspond to real empirical events –
or otherwise disintegrate. This is a process the i.e., to hold true – signs, symbols, meaning, and
observer identifies as learning, since it looks as concepts have to be explicated, as do the pro-
if changes in the NS correspond to changes in cesses that cause them to develop from natural
the environment. These are second-order struc- encounters. Our next move is to examine how this
tural couplings, different from the first-order may be explained.
structural couplings that occur in unicellular
organisms.
1.3.2 Signs Are Internalized
Some multicellular organisms are capable of
Mediators for Interaction
establishing social relations that, among other
things, are necessary for sexual reproduction and The first decades of the twenty-first century
care of the offspring. Social phenomena result have witnessed the production of contributions
when organisms participate in setting up social from psychology, cognitive sciences, and artifi-
groups, which also tend to self-preservation. cial intelligence, which – following the influence
These kinds of interactions among organisms is of neoconnectionism and embodied cognition –
what an observer calls communicative behav- open new vistas, some of which we believe wor-
ior. They are third-order structural couplings thy to take into account for a sociocultural out-
that have novel characteristics. Mutual interfer- look. Of particular interest are the ways in which
ence between organisms does not happen through recursive structural couplings are presented as
direct physical encounters but through a media- situated bottom-up processes capable of produc-
tor: a body movement, a sound, or some kind of ing mental representations in such a way that the
token. Through the eyes of an observer, commu- results are compatible with a Peircean semiotic
nication occurs without physical contact, through outlook.
actions at a distance that act as intermediate Sign, meaning, and knowledge. The first
structures (signs) that are simultaneously a cause issue to address is what is meant by sign and
and a product of this kind of mutual coupling. It meaning. Recent developments in artificial intel-
then becomes vital to address the issue of how ligence and robotics have left aside the structural
signs and symbols can arise from the action of an conception of sign as a fixed entity and mean-
organism in its environment. ing as the relation between a sign and its refer-
Each conceptual system has its limits. Matu- ent. Rather, signs have turned to being conceived
rana and Varela’s (1992) theory of enactive cog- as the “structural couplings between reality and
nition took good care in keeping within the lim- activations of an agent that arises from agent–
its of natural science. But in so doing, they environment interaction” (Vogt, 2002, p. 431),
also acknowledged the need to take into account taking as reality either an object of the world or
the descriptions and interpretations an observer some internal state of the agent. According to this
makes. Without them, intentional interpreta- view, signs are the form of an interactive process,
tions about the organism–environment encoun- i.e., a process that Vogt relates to Peirce’s concep-
ters (adaptation, behavior, learning) could not tion of sign as resulting from a process of semio-
have been produced. It is not only that sym- sis (see Rosa, 2007a). Following this pragmatist
outlook, meaning is then conceived as the func- category of objects are encountered, similar neu-
tional relation between an agent’s bodily experi- ral pattern areas are activated; this causes similar
ence (the form action takes) and its relation with populations of conjunctive neurons to form pat-
the subsequent consequences of action. Thus, terns of statistically correlated features of these
signs and meanings are embodied and situated activations in topographically related areas. The
dynamic processes, encompassing both the agent consequence is that a multimodal representation
and the elements of the environment. The ques- of a category (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) is instanti-
tion then turns to how different kinds of signs ated in a distributed system throughout the brain’s
can evolve from these bodily experiences so that association- and modality-specific areas. Such
concepts can be conceived as developing from a distributed system is a simulator, a transient
these couplings. Furthermore, how would these structure (a functional system) able to reenact
concepts orient future bodily experiences? subsets of neural patterns of activation as spe-
cific simulations tailored to the constraints of
the ongoing situated action. A category, then,
1.4 Psyche and Signs Make
is conceptualized through a learning process in
Intelligent Minds
which conjunctive neurons integrate sensorimo-
From perception to conceptualization. Barsa- tor and introspective features. As situated actions
lou (1999) offers a theory about how particu- proceed forward, addressing other elements in
lar modal perceptual systems are able to cap- the environment, the same process works recur-
ture modality-specific states during perception sively as the stream of actions flows, continuously
and action. According to his view, when a phys- triggering goal-relevant inferences about objects,
ical entity or event is perceived, feature detec- actions, mental states, and the background
tors in the relevant modality-specific areas in the setting.
brain are activated, producing a pattern of activa- Conceptualization, then, is viewed as resulting
tion. Once a pattern becomes active in the brain from the autopoietic organization of the nervous
area, conjunctive neurons in an association area system inserted within a second-order autopoi-
store these features for later use. These associa- etic structure in interaction with its environment
tion areas have an architecture organized in mul- through spiral recursive loops that also could
tiple hierarchical levels – equivalent to Damasio’s be described as circular reactions. Conceptual-
(1989) “convergence zones” – and have the func- ization thus starts with perceptual action and,
tional ability to reenact sensorimotor and other through recursive abductive inferences, turns per-
intraorganismic states. These reenactments most ceptual action into a form of thinking.
frequently are not complete, and may be distorted Abstraction and thinking. Barsalou (2003)
when reactivated, which is no obstacle for some views abstractions as temporary online con-
semblance of the original state to be reinstated. structions derived from a loose set of prop-
Barsalou conceives these processes as underly- erty and relation simulators. Across occasions,
ing mental imagery, which in turn is the basis for both statistical attractors and dynamic variabil-
conceptualization, comprehension, memory, and ity characterize the abstraction process. As a
reasoning. category emerges, the properties and relations
In Barsalou’s (1999, 2003) theory, conceptual- of its members are stored in the respective
ization is a process that results from the opera- simulators and established in memory, increas-
tion of two central complementary constructs – ing the likelihood of reinstating the abstraction
simulators and simulations – that work as later on another occasion. The resulting rep-
follows. When different members of the same resentations abstract the critical properties of
category members and discard irrelevant ones, cessful in signaling to each other in order to
representing just some aspects of category mem- coordinate their actions to reach a common goal.
bers, reenacting partial information and discard- Movements, sounds, or some other kind of struc-
ing details. Abstraction, then, is more of a skill tural change could perform this function, but this
than a structure. The consequence is that sim- would require that the internal state of one agent
ulators produce schematic prototypical repre- be made apparent to another, so that the distur-
sentations. When viewed in this way, a sim- bance in the environment produced by the first
ulator acts as a semiotic engine continuously party could act as a signal for triggering internal
producing simulations of categories resulting processes in the second party.
from indexical and iconic semiotic processes
embodied in online actions (Rosa, 2007a, 2007b).
1.4.1 Conventional Symbols Are a
Nevertheless, the system remains dynamic, such
Product of Communication When
that future abstractions vary widely, each tailored
Acting
to the current situation and to the statistics of
the interpretive system. The recursive operation How such a process starts is key to elucidating
of these processes causes the number of simula- the origins of symbols, the lexicon, and language
tors and simulation to proliferate to identify com- at large. Research coming from artificial intel-
plex relational configurations of environmental ligence robotics offers some interesting results
and organismic states in background events. Con- worthy to be taken into account. Mobile robots
ceptualization, then, has a hierarchical, dynamic, are able to develop from scratch a shared lex-
and systemic nature, allowing some concepts to icon about the objects they can detect in their
become increasingly disengaged from environ- environment: they can give names (produce a
mental entities and increasingly associated with sequence of signals referring) to these objects
mental events. and communicate those names to other parties
The representations produced in this way are (Steels, 1996; Vogt, 2002). Other studies have
more a process than a static structure. They explored how a student robot learns a lexicon
resemble Piaget and Inhelder’s (1966) conception about the environment when imitating the actions
of mental images as the interiorized imitations of of a teacher robot that had the lexicon prepro-
accommodative action that also have the capa- grammed (Billard & Hayes, 1997; Billard &
bility of conceiving the permanence of an object Dautenhahn, 1998) and also the evolution of lex-
when absent from sensorial stimulation – making icon dynamics (Steels & McIntyre, 1999). These
it also possible to discriminate among different studies were carried out applying what Steels
qualities and kinds of objects. This kind of repre- (1996) – inspired by Wittgenstein (1958) – calls
sentation could be taken as quasi-symbolic, since a language game model. This model, in addition
the steady relation with its referent results from to the principle of self-organization – discussed
an individual habit but not from any kind of social in previous paragraphs – includes the principle
convention. of cultural interaction, which means that mecha-
Proper symbols can only exist if (1) someone nisms are designed for exchanging parts of their
takes an environmental object, state, or event to vocabulary with each other while performing a
be another object, state, or event and (2) this joint novel task, and also the principle of indi-
relation is recognized among different agents vidual adaptation, which evaluates the effect of
when acting in the same environment. This can each “speech act” in reinforcing or weakening the
only happen if at least two agents are perform- form-meaning connections that allow the lexicon
ing a task in a shared environment and are suc- to expand (Steels, 1996; Vogt, 2002).
These studies show impressive results. How- more or less dissociated in separate functions:
ever, they are vulnerable to criticisms not (1) evaluation of objects and events, (2) regula-
only because many elements have been prepro- tion of the system, (3) monitoring of the internal
grammed for the sake of simplicity and design state and the organism–environment interaction,
elegance but also because the task agents have and (4) production of body changes that precede
to perform are reduced to reach consistency in motor reactions that an observer may interpret
attributing a name to an object. This causes the as announcing behavioral intentions (Scherer,
semiotic symbols produced to be only referen- 2004).
tially meaningful. Later research is focusing on The coming together of perception and affec-
how robots could use their lexicons to improve tion was already observed back in a nineteenth-
their learned capabilities to sustain their energy century investigation of sensations – elementary
levels so that they remain usable. This is a move units of the psyche – by noticing their tone of
toward the study of artificial life and expands feeling (Gefühlston; Wundt, 1874). The act of
the use of symbols not only into considering perceiving produces signs that organize the alter-
their pragmatic value but also into exploring a ities presented – objects in the environment take
different kind of semantic value: survival and on forms that are co-constructed with the psy-
life meaning (Ziemke & Sharkey, 2001; Vogt, che (Kanizsa, 1979, Metzger, 2006, 2008). The
2002). affective process leads to changes in the inter-
nal state of the organism. For Russell (2003),
core affect is an evaluation of the internal state of
1.5 Psyche’s Feelings Drive the
the agent, resulting from the iteration of previous
Mind toward Reflection
physiological states (tiredness, stress, relaxation,
Perceptual signs refer to objects and events of the etc.) and previous learning (habituation, novelty),
environment, but they do not come alone. Distur- which can be organized into two axes: valence
bances in the environment affect the inner state of (positive/negative) and activation (alert/relaxed).
the organism. These affects are crucial for tuning Core affect also activates attention and the search
the chain of systemic interactions of the diverse for the source of the inner changes felt. Without
autopoietic units of which the organism is made affect, the intentional character of signs and sym-
and of the organism at large with its environ- bols would be devoid of the sense of value needed
ment. But there is more. Affects are also signs for desires and purposes to develop.
of internal states that leave a trace in memory Feelings play the function of general presen-
and can be reinstated later by stimulation. Thus tation for the organization of responses. Feel-
feelings have a representational capability so ings are both the primary physiological reaction
that they can evoke something previously expe- and the semiotic outcome of earlier actuations.
rienced (Bartlett, 1925; for comprehensive cover- They are also signs for the direction of future
age, see Wagoner, 2017). This is crucial for social ones. They result from appraisal processes that
interaction. trigger motivational processes, giving value (life
Emotions are categories that emerge from bod- meaning) to objects, events, agents, and perfor-
ily experiences (of general feelings) that take on mances. Feelings also have the capability of act-
the function of monitoring the internal state of ing as indexical and iconic (formal) signs of one’s
the organism and arouse it for action – something own agency; this makes them one of the elements
that can be pictured as an internal mechanism on which the sense of the self could be developed
for gathering the strength for acting. Emotions (Innis, 2016; Rosa 2007a, 2016). The core of the
coordinate and synchronize components that are self is intentional action.
Intentional communication. Emotions pro- ferent, so that the performance one plays fools
duce motor reactions that can be read as dis- somebody else to act in a way that may open
tal signs of the internal state of the organism the door to do what one really wants to do.
and their readiness to act. Darwin (1872) noted This shows a combination of perspectives, a dis-
that the physical manifestation of emotions could sociation between means and ends, and, more
have an effect on an observer. This does not mean importantly, a distinction between content and
that emotional expressions intend to show – or reference (Sonesson, 2010). But there is also
communicate – an internal mood or state but sim- something else, the beginning of an awareness of
ply that they can make an impression on others. oneself as an agent among others, i.e., an early
What may happen is that another party may have form of individual identity that shows in the capa-
learned how to interpret those signals. Intentional bility to operate in intersubjective situations, in
communication arises when control is achieved which some kind of represented reality is taken as
on the effect that these initially naïve expressions shared. This is tremendously important, because
cause in an audience. It is then when emotional this means that an awareness of the difference
expressions take a communicative function, sig- between experience and reality is emerging and
naling to others a readiness to act (threats, sub- also that what one believes to be real and true
mission, recognition of defeat, etc.) – what can may be neither. This signals the dawn of imag-
be interpreted as a behavioral economy result- ination and also the beginning of the distinction
ing from previous conceptualizations (maximiz- between reality and fiction. The paradox is that
ing gains and minimizing damage). When this the ability to create fictitious experiences, which
happens, it can be said that there is reciprocity opens the door to the possibility of new forms of
of perspectives. experience and knowledge, is born from the capa-
Tactical simulation and deceit are a fur- bility to deceive and lie – something that begs
ther development of intentional communication. true and false to develop as concepts indispens-
Some apes are capable of pretending a false able for social life as well as the ability to distin-
readiness to act in the presence of other members guish between one and the other.
of the pack, with the effect that some others are
misled to act in a way favorable to the intentions
1.6 Psyche Goes Social, Learns
of the deceiver (Byrne & Whiten 1988). This has
to Talk, and Gives Birth to the
been taken as evidence of the existence of a “the-
Self
ory of mind” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), an
ability to represent mental states (intention and When a pattern of motor movements is disso-
purposes) of other parties, which is taken as a ciated from its original pragmatic function of
new kind of ability: metarepresentation (i.e., a operating on an object (unanimated or alive) and
representation capable of rendering a representa- turns to be used for a different purpose, and even
tion). The rudiments of this can be seen in some more, when an object is incorporated into a pat-
apes, but it only develops fully in humans (see tern of actions to be used as a means to oper-
Carruthers & Smith, 1996). ate on another object for some new purpose, an
Deceiving shows a new functional ability: that observer could say that means and ends have been
of changing the function of a particular pattern dissociated and tools have been born. When an
of motor movements, serving, then, a purpose emotional expression (the result of an impres-
different to that of its original function (Rivière sion) – a shout or a pattern of motor movements –
& Sotillo, 1999). Rather than showing what one turns into a sign addressed to somebody else,
feels, one pretends to be feeling something dif- and this second party acts in such a way that an
observer would say it is reinstating the meaning feelings, while stories and myths provide shared
the sign had for the first party, another kind of systems of collective representation that attribute
tool appears: a semiotic instrument, a social sym- causality and responsibility to natural and social
bol born from intentional communication. From events (religio, from religare, “tying together”).
then on, the recursive instrumental use of these The result is that tools, symbols, and practices
meditational means produces a cascade of events shape the beliefs, values, and experiences of
that signals the dawn of culture and humanity. individual members in a fashion particular to a
Gestures and vocal sounds first turn into deic- society. All these elements make up a complex
tics (here, there, I, you), and then into words system of meanings, values, and morals – a ratio-
designating objects and actions. These symbols nality that gets shaped throughout the historical
eventually combine into utterances to convey transformation of a particular society.
commands and describe events. These utterances Thus societies are at once coherent and
have the effect of causing propositional repre- diverse. Their members may share many cultural
sentations (internal speech) to arise from iconic tools, beliefs, and values, but they may also dif-
and indexical forms of mental representation. fer in their positions within the social structure,
Once this happens, reality is not only what is their occupations and interests, and may have fol-
presented to the eyes or the skin but also what lowed varied patterns of upbringing. Not only is
can be heard and imagined through symbols. this diversity a seed for historical change but it
When symbols operate on other symbols, new also sets the groundwork for developing and cul-
meanings arise and, with them, new kinds of tivating new experiences and skills.
entities are produced and added to the reality Higher psychological processes. Sociocul-
of the physical objects that one comes across. tural symbols (sounds, gestures, tokens, or icons)
Now the world also dwells in language; it can are not only material tools that change social life.
be reinstated, or even invented, when talking. They also transform the operations of the mind.
The result is that some forms of knowledge can Symbols can not only refer to perceptual iconic
be wrapped in speech and communicated from representations and to concepts arising from indi-
one generation to another. In short, culture simul- vidual experiences but also make meanings from
taneously changes the environment and provides the experiences of others accessible. In addition,
new resources and constraints for action. propositional representation can improve concep-
Tools and symbols change the environment tualization processes, causing new concepts to
and produce culture and society. Tools multi- appear, as well as create new symbols that are
ply the capability of agents to extract resources able to represent those new meanings, which in
and transform the environment in which they turn can be communicated, expanding the cul-
live. This also leads to changes in group activi- tural reservoir of cognitive tools. Concepts such
ties and structure. Division of labor turns groups as past, future, beyond, time, space, power, true,
into organized societies, at the cost of loos- and false are born from these processes. The con-
ening the bonds among their members. Differ- sequence is that ongoing social dialogues pene-
ent occupations lead to a dispersion of abilities, trate into individual minds, making experiences,
knowledge, interests, and values between various concepts, and knowledge available well beyond
groups (gender, age, or lineage), producing intri- what one particular individual can directly expe-
cate networks of power relations. New kinds of rientially live. Thus, gradually, the real (the struc-
sociocultural practices and tools are then needed tures with which the body couples) becomes
to counteract these centrifugal forces. Music, a subset of the reality represented in sym-
dance, and rituals develop to attune moods and bols. Furthermore, this communication makes
peripheral experiencing – observational learn- fuse into an alloy that transforms mental pro-
ing – the main mechanism of the sharing of envi- cesses and gives birth to higher psychological
ronments; for example, experiencing a panorama processes (Vygotsky, 1986). Attention, imagi-
of the Pyrenees from a distance is a shared par- nation, and memory are then transformed, and
allel experience between participants in a tourist it is no longer necessary for them to be tied
group. to structural couplings between physical struc-
Social knowledge, then, becomes a heritage to tures. Symbols liberate these processes from the
be transferred over generations in similar ways. It tyranny of presence and lead them to dwell
is not the perceivable stimulus in the form of an among the residents in the house of culture
old and shabby family heraldic sign on the wall built by the group through its communicative
of a run-down castle that reminds a young man exchanges. Then it becomes possible to imagine
that he is a member of an aristocratic – even if the absent, to prepare for what may happen, and
by now poor – family. It is the meaning of such a even to plan possible futures.
sign in transferring the social status independent
of local conditions that matters. This can only
1.6.1 The Self: A Character
be done through social practices in which some-
Searching for an Author
body’s utterances direct somebody else’s conduct
on the environment (“I should act as an aristo- The self is one of the imagined entities
crat when I beg for donations!”) at the same time born of communication, language, and culture
that a dialogue between interlocutors develops. (Martin & Gillespie, 2010; Mead, 1934). As such,
The conceptualization and abstraction processes it is a product of conceptualization and abstrac-
triggered in the interacting parties, while tuning tion operating with symbols in social life.
their operations on the environment, make it pos- An individual in a group must coordinate
sible to reinstate social meanings in the minds of her or his actions with others when cooperat-
the participants, leading to a transitory intersub- ing in shared activities; in doing this, the indi-
jectivity. Once verbal communication can direct vidual makes and receives commands, requests,
somebody’s actions in the absence of the referred answers, and complaints. An individual also is a
object, declarative knowledge appears. member of a group (generational, gender, fam-
Social practices of cultural communication ily, or caste) and, as such, is asked to do some
produce further effects on individual psycho- things and prevented from doing others. A person
logical skills. The use of different sign sys- must learn what to do, how, and when, as well as
tems for the transfer of declarative knowledge what not to do, and also who that person is and
forces thinking processes to reshape so that they what is one’s place. In addition, one, like every-
can be reinstated in socially shared chains of thing else in the world, is given a name to which
symbols following conventional rules of com- one must respond. The result is that one receives
munication. This changes both the structure of and adopts social belongings and an individual
thinking processes and their capability for identity.
producing new concepts and knowledge. The Something quite drastic happens then: human
ontopotentiality of symbols (Valsiner, 2002), the agents do more than react to environmental
capacity of symbols to produce new symbols, and contingencies; they turn into actors performing
the recursive capability of language to produce social rituals inserted in sociocultural practices
utterances referring to other utterances cause and activities, and they get involved in conflicts
thinking, sociocultural symbols, and speaking to and social dramas that happen in their group. In
doing so, they perform cultural scripts in varied based (emotions here operate as choice categories
settings, with the effect that their interpretations in terms of Mammen, 2016) self-regulation is
create new meanings. The consequence is that paralleled by the abstraction of sense categories
they also create new contingencies to direct the through processes of pleromatization (Valsiner,
actions of others and themselves and therefore 2014) that create the atmosphere for the here-
produce innovations that may remain for gener- and-now setting. The laughter by him (or her)
ations to come. New scenarios can then be imag- while saying “You seem to want to hit me” can
ined, and new ways to convert them into practical lead to further escalation (including hitting) or
reality can be created – for better or for worse. diffusion of the anger (the other says, “Yes, I want
Actors thus not only interpret the scripts they to kill you” – and both laugh). Human psyche
receive but may also turn into authors of their operates within – and through – hypergeneral-
own lives and transform the cultural instruments ized affective fields (Valsiner, 2014). This nature
they receive – and thereby also sociocultural life. of the psyche indicates that the main modus
operandi of human beings is fuzzy, general, atmo-
spheric relating with others.
1.6.2 Consciousness and
The result is that one can now talk to oneself,
Personhood Arise through
referring events to oneself as if one were another.
Cultural Means
Thinking, then, can turn into argumentative dia-
As we have seen, the self is grounded on identity, logues as one becomes able to debate what hap-
but it goes beyond that. When receiving orders pened and how one feels affected by what hap-
from others, one must also learn to direct one- pened. Now one becomes able to ponder what to
self, so that one is not only disciplined by oth- do, with their pros and cons.
ers but also learns how to discipline oneself. In In sum, symbolic representation transforms
so doing, one begins to conceive of oneself as how thinking proceeds. Now, it does not only
an object among other objects in the world, as work through abstractions coming from percep-
an agent and an actor among others, as some- tion, affections, and emotions; there are also
body one can address and command, even if different systems involved, such as choice and
one also complains, to oneself. When this hap- sense categories (Mammen, 2016). Their mutual
pens, lived events turn into “emotional episodes” feeding-in provides the human being flexibility
(Russell, 2003), making feelings instrumental for to move beyond the here-and-now setting and
the direction of one’s actions and opening the way consider both future possibilities and reconstruc-
for will to arise from motives and desires. tions of the past. The human psyche that operates
Now, what is felt is something that is hap- through signs involves generalization with sub-
pening to me. It is not only that somebody does sequent specification in new encounters with the
or says something disagreeable; it is also that it world (Stjernfeldt, 2014). Semiosis frees human
offends me, it is something that is against what beings to consider the future as well as to gen-
should be, and so “I feel angry,” and so pro- eralize – always from singular encounters with
voked that I cannot avoid feeling that “I am ready the world (Valsiner, 2016). Homo sapiens is a
to hit him or her,” and although my monitoring symbolizing and abstracting animal who dreams
system starts working immediately (“even as I about – and is simultaneously apprehensive of –
am angry, I should stay calm”), my body still the future. This opens the door for imagination
shows my anger, so that the other party might say, to conceive of entities that go beyond what is
“You seem to want to hit me.” All this categories- directly felt but also makes it possible to imagine
oneself (and others) as an entity capable of feel- 1.7 Psyche Blows the Spirit of
ing, suffering or enjoying, thinking, deciding, and Culture into the Mind
acting; and what is more, one gets to acknowl-
edge that one may – and most probably will – The world one believes one lives in is the world
feel proud, regretful, or guilty of what one may one experiences, even if actual behavior hap-
do or refrain from doing. The self, reflection, pens in what an omniscient observer would call
autonoetic consciousness, and moral responsi- “the real world.” Experienced objects, events,
bility appear together in the same package, feelings, desires, duties, regrets, goals, or plans
although not without pain (see Chapter 13, this to reach those goals cannot be communicated,
volume). thought on, and understood without symbols and
Symbolic communication and culture result arguments – and these are creatures borrowed
from human action but also lead to the produc- from the reservoir of cultural resources. But what
tion of humanity. According to the story pre- do we mean by culture?
sented above, higher psychological processes –
which only appear in humans – are unthinkable
1.7.1 Culture: The Spirit of Psyche
without social structures and culture. But cul-
ture should be conjugated in plural. Every human The word culture comes from the Latin verb col-
group developed its own culture over time, which ere, which means “to cultivate” in the agricultural
leads one to assume that not all forms of being sense (Jahoda, 1992). This agricultural metaphor,
human are identical. Each cultural environment implying a taming of nature through intentional
shapes psyches and minds, and the experiences human action, is still very much with us. We
lived, in different fashions. It is as if the spirit of keep saying someone is cultivated as a result of
culture were imbued in the mind of each member training or refinement of mind or taste, a use
of the group, merging with the natural psychic that started to appear in Western Europe from
apparatus (Vygotsky, 1986). Each person, then, is the eighteenth century onward. A related term,
an idiosyncratic unit always in a dynamic tension sometimes used as a synonym for culture, is civ-
with an environment that is not only physical and ilization – a word coming from the Latin cives,
governed by efficient causality but also symbolic meaning “city.” Civilization, pronounced in sin-
and ruled by a semiotic logic, and therefore pop- gular, is sometimes used as the opposite to bar-
ulated with imagined entities that signal possible barism or savagery, making it more or less equiv-
alleys for action. alent to enlightenment. To civilize, then, is “to
Human action cannot be conceived solely as overcome barbarism” and, when applied to indi-
resulting from an agent reacting to an environ- viduals, refers to relieving them of their “natural
ment, from an actor playing a script, or com- savagery” to turn them into citizens. The notion
ing out from an author devising a plot. It is all of culture often marks these processes (Valsiner,
these things at once and more. Human behav- 2014). Sociocultural resources – tools, symbols,
ior is always situated in a moving landscape with rituals, practices, institutions – fuse with the sur-
waves and accidents the reality of which one can rounding landscape making up the Umwelt where
never be sure. That is why human personal expe- human individuals live, turning the world under-
rience cannot be left aside when trying to explain standable and providing senses for the lived expe-
how individual behavior negotiates life. Hence riences and so opening the way for individual
sociocultural psychology cannot leave aside a lives to be taken as meaningful. In sum, a par-
first-person approach when studying psycholog- ticular fashion of humanity gets embodied in the
ical phenomena. members of the group.
reader and the voices included in the text, acting,

1.7.2 Cultural Landscapes Are the
then, as an independent intellectual formation
Environment for Human Action
with which one converses. Finally, the text also
Cultures are made of different types of elements acts as a spokesperson, representing a cultural
embodied in structures of many kinds (sounds, context, whether as a metaphor for the whole of a
gestures, tokens, icons, rituals, tools, practices), culture or as a metonymy of some part of it.
either transient (needing to be reenacted every Translations. Texts, to be understandable for
time) or fixed in more or less permanent mate- their users, have to be expressed in a code that
rial structures. This causes the cultural dynam- both producers and receivers employ homoge-
ics of oral and literary societies to be different neously. However, homogeneity is a matter of
(Ong, 1982). Culture is not a term to denote degree and depends on the nature of the code and
only a reservoir of accumulated information but the familiarity users have with it. Multivocal or
focuses on an organized and complex system that complex codes are particularly open to ambigu-
receives, translates, and interprets materials that ities, with the result that the message informa-
take over the function of signs. These dynamics tion could be degraded, but this also opens it to
cause culture to operate as a collective memory new interpretations; consequently, new meanings
and intelligence that are continuously reshaped. can arise, and even the codes themselves could be
Semiotics is the science of signs. An impor- transformed. Semiotic innovation, then, is depen-
tant contribution of the Tartu school of semiotics, dent on the heterogeneity of the communities in
built on the literary scholarship of Juri Lotman contact.
(Sonesson, 1994; see also Kull, 2011), is to trans- Texts are for the guidance of action, which
late the notion of culture into a system of texts means that to be understood, they need to
(“modeling systems”) – a network of hypertexts. be translated from one code to another. This
For them a text is any form of symbolic produc- prompted Lotman (2005) to say that texts are
tion regulated by some kind of grammar. This a meeting place between codes and languages,
means that texts are not to be restricted to inscrip- between producers and consumers, sometimes
tions of natural languages; they are any kind of coming from different times and different macro-
received information kept in whatever code or texts as well as from different cultural traditions.
support medium. Texts are inherently bilingual: it is the existence
Modeling systems, so conceived, are social of a “border” between codes that gives texts their
communication devices that perform their func- semiotic capacity.
tions through various processes. On one hand,
they convey messages that communicate senders
1.7.3 Semiospheres, Border
and recipients – the audience; they also connect
Irregularities, and Semiotics
to a historical tradition, fulfilling functions of col-
lective memory, updating and forgetting some Semiosphere is one of Lotman’s better-known
information, and so continuously enriched with concepts and has given title to a series of volumes
new interpretations. Moreover, a text acts as a (Lotman, 1996, 1998, 2000). The name comes
mediator for the contact of hearer or reader with from an analogy with the concept of biosphere
herself or himself, guiding specific aspects of cul- and refers to the space occupied by a complex
ture and enabling or disabling aspects of her or system of semiotic formations. Outside this semi-
his personal culture and skills. When this hap- otic space, the aforementioned textual functions
pens, the text can exceed the role of mediator would be impossible: i.e., outside this semiotic
to turn into a partner for a dialogue between the space, no meaning is possible. Whatever kind
of otherness that may exist beyond the limits of (displacements of structures between the center
the semiosphere could only reach significance if and the periphery) and the rate of change (nuclear
incorporated into “texts.” In other words, out- changes are slower than peripheral changes).
side the semiosphere, there is only unfathomable In short, it is irregularity that causes the exis-
chaos. tence of borders and therefore produces dialogue
Boundaries. The concept of boundary is cen- and information growth. As Lotman says, with-
tral in Lotman’s culturology. It refers to the fron- out otherness, neither communication nor con-
tier between the semiotic universe and the chaos sciousness could exist. Therefore, the existence
of the unknown, or among various semiospheres, of a plurality of semiotic formations is a pre-
which only become comprehensible through the requisite for the existence of languages, which
exchanges across boundaries. It is at the borders always occur in the plural, as each requires the
where bilingualism, translation, negotiation, and others to exist. Semiospheres, then, are in a con-
conflict happen. It is the existence of borders tinuous process of change, subject to historical
that creates the demand for semiotization, and development. Nevertheless, though describable
also what makes it possible. It is in border areas and explicable, the historical change of cultures
where hybrid phenomena, translations between is not predictable.
codes, and dialogue between texts can generate
new meanings and symbols to colonize the alien
1.8 Conclusion: We Understand
and unknown semiotically.
Our Experiences from the Way
Semiospheres (regardless of which of them we
the Psyche Leads the Self to Live
refer to) are not homogeneous: they also have
internal semiotic irregularities. In the words of The argument here presented has been developed
Lotman (2005, p. 213): following the rules of parsimony. Our aim was
to present a view of what the psyche of socio-
Semiotic space is characterised by the presence cultural psychology may look like. To achieve
of nuclear structures (frequently multiple) and a
this aim, the voice of an observer was always
visibly organised more amorphous semiotic world
needed, not only because descriptions of phe-
gravitating towards the periphery, in which nuclear
nomena and explanations of processes had to
structures are immersed . . . The active interaction
between these levels becomes one of the roots of be produced but also because the argument was
the dynamic processes within the semiosphere. aimed at explaining the kind of psychological
processes the observer needed to put into play to
Irregularity is not independent of the descrip- produce his or her observations, interpretations,
tion of the structure of the semiosphere that an and explanations.
observer may produce at a given time; it varies Psychology is the science in charge of the
depending on the descriptive language that an explanation of experience. This causes it to
observer may use. If he or she borrows the lan- be a reflective science that can benefit from a
guage from what he or she believes to be the core methodological use of reflexivity (Rosa, 2015).
system, the description of the system appears Psychological knowledge is a product of socio-
rigid. On the contrary, if a language coming from cultural life that results from empirical observa-
the periphery is adopted, the system is made to tions of observers who abstract concepts, make
look flexible. Whatever the case, the new texts inferences, and produce descriptive and explana-
that are produced come to occupy a place within tory utterances addressed to an audience. In
the internal borders of the semiosphere, gener- sum, psychological knowledge is an outcome of
ating new changes in both its internal structure the labor of psychologists, who are themselves
human organisms making sense of their experi- shows a shape adapted to each circumstance. Nei-
ences when encountering others by using socio- ther is to be exhausted by any description or
cultural tools and symbols. The psychological explanation. That is why all accounts, including
descriptions and explanations that are produced the one presented here, cannot but be incomplete
should aim to explain how psychological knowl- and transient.
edge can result from the working of the psychol-
ogists’ minds.
Sociocultural psychology aims at describing Note
and explaining how human beings behave and 1 Autopoiesis is a neologism coined by these authors.
make sense of their lives. It is an area of psychol- It comes from the Greek verb poieo, which means
ogy that looks at human beings as persons, not “creation” and is the root of the word poetry.
only as organisms or as information-processing Autopoiesis, then, is the ability of living matter to
devices; that is why it cannot avoid taking indi- transform itself.
vidual experiences, understandings, and purposes
into account. Cultural psychology is to be conju-
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Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problem. Harvard University Press.
Physica D, 42, 335–346.
2 Cultural Psychology as the Science
of Sensemaking: A Semiotic-
cultural Framework for Psychology
Sergio Salvatore
Cultural psychology has been undergoing intense The disaffection with this fragmentation
development over the last three decades. The emerges cyclically among scholars. The prolifer-
recognition that human experience is embedded ation of – at best – middle range theories based on
in the culture has enabled us to approach an the different systems of ontological, epistemolog-
increasing number of psychological and psy- ical, and methodological assumptions hampers
chosocial phenomena with fresh eyes – e.g., the recognition of the metaphysical and prag-
ontogenesis, education, memory, imagina- matic assumptions grounding the theories as well
tion and creativity, life transitions, economic as their interconnections and (in)compatibilities
issues, identity, immigration, communicational (Henriques, 2011). It prevents constraints from
exchange between people as well as social being placed on the proliferation of entities and
groups, work behavior, social development, and of ad hoc explicative devices, in so doing expos-
psychotherapy (for an overview, see Kitayama & ing the theories to the latent influence of common
Cohen, 2007; Matsumoto, 2001; Valsiner, 2012). sense (Salvatore, 2016); and it leaves scholars
These developments call for another step for- unable to put the findings of the many psycholog-
ward: the building of cultural psychology as a ical subdisciplines in mutual communication. At
general theory of psychology, namely, a funda- the level of applicative models, there is a further
mental, unifying framework for psychological critical consequence of the disunity of psycholog-
science as a whole – what gestalt theory, behav- ical science. At this level, psychology appears to
iorism, psychoanalysis, and cognitivism were for be a collection of a huge number of theories each
twentieth-century psychology. of them focused on a specific field of experience
Psychological science is in dire need of find- and/or phenomenon – e.g., bullying, aggressive
ing new grounds on which to restore the sense behavior, community membership, health behav-
of unity of its many lines of investigation. As ior, psychotherapy, organizational commitment,
was already recognized almost a century ago religious fundamentalism, and so forth – stud-
(Heidbreder, 1933), psychologists have embraced ied as if it was a specific, self-contained object
a sort of division of intellectual labor, focusing on endowed with its own way of working, rather than
specific processes and leaving to a remote future reflecting a more general class of processes. Such
the task of building comprehensive models. This a fragmentation weakens the validity of models
has made psychology into a sort of archipelago and undermines the effort to improve their effi-
comprising a myriad of intellectual islands, each cacy and effectiveness. It leaves the knowledge
of them endowed with its own ontology, seman- developed in a specific field segregated within
tics, and aims (Salvatore, 2016). said field, unable to be transferred and therefore
36 serg io salvatore
further interpreted and developed according to namely, a metatheoretical framework providing:

more general conceptual frameworks. (a) an epistemological approach to knowledge
Various efforts have been made to cope with building; (b) the definition of the object of psy-
the fragmented state of the discipline (e.g., Hen- chology; and (c) a description of its basic way of
riques, 2011; Kimble, 1990; Mandler, 2011; functioning.
Valsiner, 2009; Salvatore, 2016). Recently, the
Review of General Psychology (July, 2013)
2.1 Psychology as a Theory-
devoted a special issue to the topic, hosting 19
driven Science: A Call for
contributions that each propose an approach to
Abstractive Generalization
the unification of psychology. Such a number
and variety of contributions is a mark of the This section focuses on the first aspect of the
renewed interest in the integration of psycholog- framework – I will argue for a change to a model-
ical science; yet, it is also the symptom of how ing approach in the discipline. According to this
divided the field is and how hard it is to build a change, cultural psychology has to intentionally
unifying perspective within it. Most efforts (for adopt the concepts as analytical categories, rather
a different approach, based on the conceptual than the concepts having one specific phenomeni-
analysis of the ontological assumption grounding cal referentiality. This means that cultural psy-
current middle-scale models, see Marsh & Boag, chology has to move from an extensional to an
2014) interpret this task in terms of the impor- intensional approach to culture.1
tation of the paradigmatic foundation grounding
other sciences (e.g., physics, evolutionary biol-
2.1.1 Extensional and Intensional
ogy, genetics) – Lickliter and Honeycutt (2013),
Categories
for instance, called for a revised version of the
evolutionary theory as the basis for the unifi- Most of the current approaches within cultural
cation of psychology. Yet such a reductionist psychology can be seen as psychology of cul-
approach has not proved productive (e.g., Green, ture – that is, as a psychological view of the
2015, Stam, 2004). What psychology needs is not culture(s) and its intertwined linkage with men-
a normative frame imposed from the outside of its tal processes. This means that the notion of cul-
language; rather, it has to develop its own frame- ture is intended as a concept endowed with an
work from within – surely taking into account the ontological reference, namely, as a representa-
development of other sciences, but not overlap- tion of something being (or happening) in the
ping them. world. In this respect the current cultural psy-
I believe that this is the mission of the cul- chologies are fully consistent with the extensional
tural psychology of the twenty-first century – to logic grounding mainstream psychology’s cate-
go beyond domain-specific theorizations, in order gories. For example, concepts like “self,” “emo-
to provide psychological science with a unifying tion,” “motivation,” “representation,” “uncon-
general semantics. In so doing, the cultural psy- scious,” and so forth are considered more or
chology will fulfill the ambition of the few pio- less implicitly to refer to corresponding struc-
neers (Boesch, 1991; Smedslund, 1988; Valsiner, tures/mechanisms that have an ontological sub-
2001) that have seen in it something more than stantiality and capacity of producing effects. For
a collection of domain-specific models. In the a critical view of the ontologizing tendency of
following pages, I will attempt to contribute to mainstream psychology, focused on the theory of
this perspective, presenting in brief the cultur- emotion but easily generalizable, see Feldman-
ally informed general theory of psychology – Barrett (2006).
Cultural Psychology as the Science of Sensemaking 37
Such an approach provides important insights, ates the epistemic relation with the world, rather
but it is unable to raise cultural psychology to the than representing it. Needless to say, intensional
status of general theory. This is the case for two logic is not a way of escaping the reality; on
main reasons. First, the general theory is placed the contrary, it is the device for empowering the
at the meta-empirical level: it frames the defini- capacity of understanding it. Owing to the empir-
tion of the phenomena, therefore, it has to come ical emptiness of its categories, an intensional
(logically) before the datum – as its premise. language can enter relations with an infinite set
Accordingly, it is void of empirical content for of phenomena and bring them back to a single,
the very reason that it is the source of such con- basic semantics. Physics’ basic categories, just
tent. An analogy with Kantian categories can be like the categories of any formalized science, are
used to clarify this point. According to the Ger- instances of intensional concepts: super-strings,
man philosopher, categories of space and time quarks, G constant, do not refer to things of the
(as well as quality, quantity, etc.) are not exten- world; they are conceptual tools used for shap-
sional categories, that is, they do not have empir- ing and thus interpreting the world. As these sci-
ical content. They represent not a certain char- ences show, the adoption of intensional concepts
acteristic of the world but the way we shape the does not mean escaping from the issue of subject-
experience of the world; we have empirical expe- ing theories to validation. Rather, the adoption of
rience of reality because of and through such analytic categories means a doubling of the pro-
categories. The same can be said for psycho- cess of validation – on the one hand, any interpre-
logical constructs, once they are approached in tation provided by any analytic category cannot
an intensional, rather than extensional way (i.e., but involve a certain set of empirical statements
as an analytic, modeling category, see Note 1 that can be tested empirically like any extensional
and below). Second, any empirical content cannot concept.2
but be associated with a normative meaning, the
expression of a certain language game. In other
2.1.2 Intensionality and
words, it is embedded within the commonsen-
Abstractive Generalization
sical domain regulating the way people experi-
ence or deal with it; consequently, if the general The view of cultural psychology as general the-
theory had empirical content, it could not avoid ory involves a particular logic of generalization,
being shaped by the normative meaning implied different from the inductive logic grounding con-
in it. And this means that the general theory temporary mainstream psychology. Indeed, meta-
would be the product of the common sense, rather empirical generalization is a matter of abstrac-
than the epistemic place where common sense tive generalization (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010;
is understood (for a discussion of this point, see Salvatore, 2016). The logic of abstractive gen-
Salvatore, 2016, Introduction). eralization is based on the assumption of the
To claim that the general theory of psychol- nature of the field of psychological phenomena
ogy cannot but be meta-empirical is the same as (Salvatore & Tschacher, 2012) (here and hence-
saying that it has to be composed of intensional forth the term “psychological phenomena” is
categories. An intensional category is a concept used just to denote the phenomena that psycholo-
that is defined in terms of the semantic linkages it gists address, without any ontological and essen-
has with other concepts of the language to which tialist implication): the great many phenomena
it belongs – rather than in terms of the referen- of interest to psychology (i.e., memory, percep-
tial bond with the reality. A system of intensional tion, communication, attachment, resilience, psy-
categories, then, is a closed language that medi- chopathology, and so forth) are as many field
instantiations of a very limited set of fundamen- phenomenical domain. In other words, the focus
tal dynamics, whose modeling represents the core on the dynamics does not mean searching for a
aim of psychological science. A dynamics is the causal factor that affects the phenomenon from
inherent organization of a process, namely, of the outside (i.e., efficient cause); rather, it means
a certain phenomenon unfolding over time (see modeling the phenomenon in terms of its inner
below; for a discussion of the organization as constitutive organization (i.e., formal cause; see
the unit of analysis in psychology, see Mandler, below).
2011). Accordingly, the dynamics can be con- In short, according to the intensional view-
sidered as the pattern of temporal relation of point, the issue of making cultural psychology
relations. into a general theory of psychology is to be
Thus, dynamics is an abstract entity, void of seen as a matter of attributing the multiplic-
any inherent empirical content. On the other ity of phenomenical forms investigated by the
hand, is should be clear that such emptiness many psychological subdisciplines to the single
does not equate to the lack of relation with the meta-empirical object that psychology takes as its
world – rather, it consists of the capacity of refer- target.
ring to a potentially infinite set of empirical con- On the other hand, even if it seems very far
tents, as many as the ones which might instan- from mainstream psychology, such an approach
tiate the second-ordered relation mapped by the has a rich, long-standing tradition in twentieth-
dynamics. century psychology. Piaget’s work is paradig-
In short, abstractive generalization is general- matic of such a view. Indeed, the Piagetian the-
ization, because it treats any set of empirical con- ory requires a twofold level of reading. At a first
tents (i.e., any phenomenon – a behavior, an expe- level, the theory of the ontogenesis of mental
rience) as the specimen of a general class (i.e., the structure is a domain-specific theory (i.e., a the-
dynamics); it is abstractive, because this general ory of how the child’s cognitive system emerges
class is an intensional category, namely, a con- and develops). Yet, through such a domain-
ceptual object void of contingent empirical con- specific theory, Piaget pursued his more general
tent (this view entails the notion of abstraction as scientific aim – namely, the modeling of the fun-
pertinentization, as historically defined by Büh- damental cognitive dynamics characterizing liv-
ler, 1934/1990). ing systems as a whole. Again, the notion of
gestalt is an abstract model that has no empir-
ical content and precisely for this reason it has
2.1.3 Conclusive Remarks
been used for understanding several phenomeni-
The abstractive generalization represents a dif- cal domains (e.g., perception, thought, person-
ferent approach from those efforts to build a ality) in a unified way. The same can be said
general theory that are aimed at attributing for the Vygotskian notion of mediation that is
psychological phenomena to alleged causative still used for modeling a plurality of phenom-
mechanisms detected by more basic sciences (in ena (i.e., learning, work activity, rehabilitative
particular biology, see Lickliter & Honeycutt, interventions) in terms of a single basic dynam-
2013; but also physics, see Kimble, 1990). In ics. More recently, enactivism (Baerveldt &
contrast, the abstractive generalization entails an Verheggen, 2012) has provided an interpretation
inherently antireductionist approach. This is the of several psychological phenomena (from per-
case because it sees the dynamics to be modeled ception to social representation) in terms of the
as an inherent quality of the phenomenon, rather abstract notions of organizational closure and
than an external cause belonging to a more basic structural coupling drawn from the model of
autopoietic systems and its further development that elements of the process acquire their value in
(Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela, Thompson, & terms of their relation with the whole process.
Rosch, 1991). It is worth adding that a fully coherent form
of holism implies that it has to concern syn-
2.2 Cultural Psychology as the chronic as well as diachronic relations. This form
Science of Sensemaking of holism has been modeled in terms of tem-
poral nonlocality. Temporal nonlocality leads to
In this section, I will briefly outline three basic overcome the view of process as a sequence of
assumptions and their corollaries defining the distinguishable stages associated via causal link-
ontological and epistemological pillars of the ages: everything happens as the following instant
general theory, namely, the definition of the of what has happened. Life does not recognize
abstract object it addresses. something like a before and an after.
Temporal nonlocality has been studied in the
2.2.1 Assumption 1 – Processual context of quantum physics and chaos theory
Ontology (Atmanspacher & Martin, 2004). However, it is
Scientific objects – that is, the object of psy- fully consistent with the view of sensemaking
chology – are processes unfolding over time as a dynamic gestalt (Valsiner, 2007) as well
(Atmanspacher & Martin, 2004), rather than enti- as the theory of affective semiosis based on the
ties. This view has a strong tradition in psychol- interplay between symbolic and embodied signs
ogy – just to give one example, it grounds James’s (Salvatore & Freda, 2011; Salvatore & Zittoun,
pragmatist and functionalist approach to mind. 2011; see below).
A process is intended here as a pattern of rela-
tions reproduced over time through the continu- 2.2.3 Corollary 1B – Organizational
ous variation of occurrences and conditions. This Closure
means that a process is bivalent – it is inher-
ently transient (i.e., an ongoing change) and at The bivalence of process entails that it has an
the same time it is inherently invariant (i.e., a inherent identity, what Maturana and Varela call
unique pattern reproduced over time). A river organization – “the relations that define a system
provides an image of process – it is always the as a unity, and determine the dynamics of interac-
same because it is always changing. tion and transformations which it may undergo as
Needless to say, this view does not negate the such a unity” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 137).
phenomenological concreteness, the fact that the Accordingly, the process continuously changes
content of the experience has the forms of things its structure – i.e., the way elements interact with
(be they thoughts or pieces of the world), which each other – as the way of enacting its organi-
are constrained by physical, material structures. zation (for a discussion of the relation between
This is the case because of the bivalence of the organization and structure, see Baerveldt &
process: as in the case of the river, concrete con- Verheggen, 2012). And this means that a process
tents are the ongoing emergent output of the pro- is endowed with organizational closure – namely,
cessuality, rather than its causal source. it works within the constraints and in terms of its
own organization.
In what follows, I adopt the term dynamics
2.2.2 Corollary 1A – Holism
to denote the form of such organization that
The definition of the process provided above provides the process with its identity. Accord-
implies that it is a dynamic whole. This means ingly, the dynamics can be seen as the set of
constraints on the selection of the process’ struc- cation of levels of explanation. As to teleologi-
tural transformations. cal causality, the recognition of the immanency
of the dynamics implies that the reproduction of
the organization is not the purpose motivating
2.2.4 Corollary 1C – Immanent
and orienting the process. Rather, the organiza-
Formal Causation
tion is the condition of the selection of the struc-
The definition of the process as endowed with ture. Thus, the process reproduces itself not as the
organizational closure implies the adoption of way of pursuing a purpose, but just because the
the notions of constitutiveness and formal causa- organization is the constraint that “determines
tion. Molecules of water are not something dif- the dynamics of interaction and transformation.”
ferent from the river. The river does not come The organization simply works and in working
after the molecules, as its consequence (efficient the observer is enabled to describe it as being
causation). Rather, molecules are the river, their reproduced over time. To make an analogy, the
dynamic reciprocal linkages (formal causation) reproduction of the process looks like the repro-
is what makes up the river (for a discussion of duction of a language over time – people do not
the interpretation of psychosocial processes in use the language in order to keep it alive. Rather,
terms of constitutiveness, see Heft, 2013). Thus, people speak within the constraint of the lan-
to understand the process means to understand its guage organization (the semantic and syntactic
immanent dynamics, namely, the way its organi- relations which make that language just that lan-
zation constrains its structural changes. guage and not another) and in so doing language
This corollary is particularly relevant in psy- works and can be recognized by the observer as
chology (and generally in the social sciences), reproducing itself over time.
because it enables the post hoc–propter hoc fal- A similar vein can be adopted for highlighting
lacy to be avoided. Indeed, most – if not all – psy- how the immanent formal causation enables
chological phenomena concern relations among the multiplication of levels of explanation to
mental states (feelings, ideas, perceptions) and be avoided. On the one hand, as we said above,
between mental states and behaviors. To consider since it is the immanent form of the process, the
such relations in terms of efficient causal linkages organization may not be seen as a super-ordered
means assuming that there is a transference of frame working in terms of downward causation.
energy between the antecedent (explanans) and On the other hand, the organization is a set of
the subsequent (explanandum) – an assumption constraints, rather than a propositional rule – it
that can hardly be held in the case of mental states determines the structural changes – but it does
(unless they are considered brain states – but in so not in the sense that it prescribes them, but
that case one would cease psychological mod- it “determines” in the sense that it establishes
eling). For a discussion of this point, based on which structural changes are compatible with the
the recognition that the linkages between mental identity of the process. Accordingly, this kind of
states are hermeneutic and linguistic (i.e., the fol- formal causation can be defined as neg-form.
lowing state of mind is a way of interpreting the
previous, rather than the effect of it), we high-
2.2.5 Assumption 2 – Mind is the
light in particular the work of Smedslund (e.g.
Psychological Object
Smedslund, 1995).
A further consideration is worth adding. The This assumption is not self-evident, especially
corollary of immanent formal causation leads in the context of the contemporary psychology
beyond both teleological causality and the reifi- that tends to consider the behavior as its object.
However, while behavior can be defined in accor- ing. First, it reflects the intensional approach dis-
dance to a modelistic, metatheoretical perspec- cussed above – the mind is not intended here as
tive (see Uher, Addessi, & Visalberghi, 2013; see a concept referring to something that is there in
also Uher, 2014), it needs to be included in a the world, but as a theoretical category grounding
more comprehensive framework. The first rea- the definition and the modeling of psychological
son is because the behavior has to be explained, phenomena. Second, and consistently with it, the
both for theoretical and practical purposes; and mind is here intended as a process, rather than
second, and above all, because the definition of an entity, and this makes the category somewhat
behavior cannot but entail a reference to more far from the commonsensical idea of what mind
primitive categories. This is evident in the the- is (if one reviews the definition provided by the
oretical definition of behavior by Uher, Addessi, main dictionaries, “mind” is intended in a tau-
and Visalberghi (2013) – one of the few that have tological and reified way: as an entity endowed
been elaborated within the realm of current psy- with certain properties – faculties – that produce
chology. According to these authors, behavior is as their effect what, according to common sense,
defined as “external activities or externalization are considered mental phenomena, that is, feel-
of living organisms that are functionally medi- ings, thoughts, and so forth). Third, the abstract
ated by environment in the present” (pp. 427– definition of mind puts it logically before the
428). A few lines on, Uher and colleagues important distinctions of inner–outer and mind–
underline that “externality differentiates behav- body because it does not concern the content and
ioral phenomena from psychological phenom- the form of the instantiation of the substitutive
ena, which . . . are entirely internal phenomena” version of the environment. Fourth, it is worth
(p. 428). Thus, the definition of behavior shows noting that the substitution is not absolute, but
that it requires the reference to the more prim- concerns the ongoing current interplay between
itive internal–external dichotomy, in turn entail- environment and living organism – for this rea-
ing (though implicitly) the idea of an inner world, son I have called it “local.” Fifth, even if abstract
namely, the idea of a mind. And this is the same and very generalized, the definition has its bound-
as saying that, in the final analysis, the very con- aries, and this allows psychological phenomena
cept of behavior is part of one more general defi- to be differentiated from other kinds of phenom-
nition that encompasses the idea of mind, that is, ena. Indeed, any living organism enters relations
what is neither behavior nor environment. with the environment not only through the instan-
tiation of a substitutive local version of the lat-
ter – e.g., in the case of a physiological reaction,
2.2.6 Assumption 3 – Mind Is the
the living organism selects a structural change
Process of Decoupling from
that directly modifies the bond with the envi-
Environment
ronment, rather than instantiating a substitutive,
Mind is here intended as the process through decoupling version of it.
which a living organism treats its structural
change as the local substitutive version of the
2.2.7 Assumption 4 – Mind Is
environment with which to relate. Accordingly,
Sensemaking
the mind is the way the living organism decou-
ples from the immanency of the current environ- The metatheoretical definition of the mind
mental states. grounds the chance of modeling it in terms of
This metatheoretical definition has several sensemaking – namely, as an infinite recursive
implications and aspects that are worth highlight- dynamics of semiosis consisting of the infinite
flow of signs through time. A sign is something sign, even when this otherness is enacted by the
that stands for something else, with such a rela- same person that has enacted the previous sign.
tion having to be interpreted by a further sign This is so because interpretation is not a way of
(Peirce, 1897/1932). Thus, a sign does not have stating something that is already contained in the
an inherent content; rather it acquires its value sign (in that case the interpretation would be a
owing to the transition of which it is a part, that task of recognition, namely, a repetition of what is
is, the capacity to refer to “something else” as already given). Needless to say, in many cases the
defined by another sign – and so on, in an infi- interpretation consolidates/validates the previous
nite chain. As I have said elsewhere (Salvatore, local state of the meaning; yet the validation
2016), the meaning is the sign that follows. is possible precisely because it is expressed by
In the framework of assumption 3, the sign a potential otherness – it consists of the local
can be modeled as a living organism’s struc- neutralization of such inherent otherness.
tural change that works as the ongoing inter- In short, sensemaking is an infinite recursive
pretation of the previous chain of signs and in chain of interpretations that is fostered by the
so doing instantiates a version of the environ- inherent potentiality of any interpreting sign to
ment, namely, an interpretation defining – and introduce something new, namely, to move in the
constraining – the domain of the possibilities of other’s direction. Without such a potentiality, no
life. For instance, consider a person who shouts sensemaking would be possible.
“Fire!” A structural change has taken place –
the body modification of which the shout con-
sists – that produces an environmental modifi- 2.3 The Dynamics of
cation (the sound emitted). In so doing a sign Sensemaking
has been enacted and through it a potential local
In this section, I draw nine tenets from the
version of the environment has been instantiated.
assumptions outlined above. Such tenets are
Once a following sign will interpret the previous
intended as a theoretical and methodological
one – e.g., another person hearing the former and
apparatus for building a comprehensive model
thinking “we have to escape from here!,” or just
of the dynamics of sensemaking, intended as the
starting to run – then the previous sign acquires
core purpose of the general theory of psychology.
the semiotic status of the (semiotic) substitutive
version of the environment – substitutive because
the person will select his/her adaptive structural
2.3.1 Tenet 1 – Sensemaking Is a
changes in accordance to it, rather than in accor-
Field Dynamics
dance to the previous environmental state.
Since the meaning is the sign that follows, signs
have no fixed content – they acquire meaning
2.2.8 Assumption 5 – Sensemaking
via the infinite game of referring to something
Is Inherently Dialogical
else. And this is the same as saying that the
As intended here, the notion of dialogicality value of a sign is a function of the field, that
concerns the constitutive role of otherness is, of the position the sign has within the semi-
in sensemaking (Linell, 2009; Salvatore & otic chain of which it is part. The same sign
Gennaro, 2012). Dialogicality, therefore, is can express very different meanings depending
something more and something different from on which other signs it is linked to. This is the
the intersubjective standpoint. The interpreting contingency of human affairs: actions and events
function of the sign that follows entails the fact are acts of meaning whose value and significance
that the following sign is, however, the Other’s lie in the position they have in the dynamics
of sensemaking for which they work (Salvatore 2.3.3 Tenet 3 – The Transition
et al., 2009). among Signs Is the Unit of Analysis
of Sensemaking
2.3.2 Tenet 2 – Meaning Emerges The fact that the value of signs is contingent to
from Sensemaking the semiotic chain makes us consider the transi-
tions – rather than the single sign – as the unit
This is a different formulation of the previous
of the psychological analysis of mind: in order to
tenet. Indeed, the claim that signs do not have
model the dynamics of sensemaking one has to
content and that their meaning is a function of
understand how signs combine with each other
the transitions they establish with each other
through time.
means that sensemaking generates the meaning,
This methodological tenet is widely adopted
rather than the reverse, as common sense dictates.
both in psychoanalysis (Salvatore & Zittoun,
Accordingly, elsewhere (Salvatore, 2016) I have
2011) and in the psychosocial analysis of local
proposed to consider the meaning as the local
cultures as well as psychological analysis of tex-
instant state of the sensemaking, like a still frame
tual data and discourse (Salvatore et al., 2015;
that captures the instant of a movement, stopping
Salvatore & Venuleo, 2013)
it in a picture.
This view is consistent with the pragmatist
conception of meaning as consisting of the effect
2.3.4 Tenet 4 – Transition among
it produces. Moreover, it leads to a revival of
Signs Is a Habit Function
interest in the process of presentification that
was at the center of early twentieth-century The focus on transition raises the issue of how a
psychology (Salvatore, 2012, 2016). Such a pro- sign is selected as the following sign. Consider
cess concerns the micro-genetic constitution of sign s1. According to assumption 5, it may be
experience – the emergence of meaning from the potentially followed by (or, which is the same
ongoing flow of engagement with the world. Re- thing, it may trigger) any other sign: the set of fol-
presenting comes later: only when the experience lowing signs is infinite. However, the fact that a
is presentified in terms of discrete elements can sign follows means that a sort of hierarchy within
it be the target of further mental operations (i.e., the infinite set of potentially following signs is
it can be represented). Thus, the sensemaking active.
is part of the constitution of the experience – The model of transition cannot depend on the
namely, one does not perceive the object as if it reference to higher functions – namely, one can-
were out there and then categorize/interpret it; not treat the combination among signs as a mat-
rather, perceiving is already a process that cre- ter of choice – evaluation, search, and so forth –
ates meaning, in the very fact of foregrounding carried out by an intentional agent. This kind
certain relations among occurrences as opposed of explanation would lead to the homunculus
to the many potential others. For instance, one paradox – one would have to explain how the
does not perceive a piece of paper first and then homunculus’ combination of signs (i.e., the com-
categorize it as a banknote – rather, one sees bination of signs making up the sensemaking pro-
the potentially infinite possibility that that piece cess allowing the homunculus to carry out the
of the world provides (the dynamic object, to selection of the sign) works, and so forth ad
use Peirce’s term) through and in terms of the infinitum. Therefore, I propose to consider this
fact of seeing a banknote. The emergence of hierarchy as a habit function, that is, a func-
the meaning “banknote” is part and parcel of the tion of the history of the previous transitions that
perception. signs have been part of – the higher the relative
frequency with which a certain sign (say A) has a certain frame of sense working as attractor. Yet
been followed by a certain further sign (say B) they are able to cause the new to emerge.
in the past, the greater the probability that when If the transition among signs were a function of
A is enacted, then B will follow (for an analysis a matrix of distribution of probabilities no nov-
of a process of sensemaking within the clinical elty would be possible because each sign would
context based on such an approach, see Salvatore always be followed by the same sign (and such
et al., 2015). a combination would be increasingly stable as a
In the final analysis, this way of seeing the result of the learning valence of the distribution,
combination highlights the embodied roots of that is, the more a certain transition happens, the
sensemaking – the association among signs are greater the probability that it will happen in the
instances of procedural knowledge, reflecting future).
dynamic forms of the body, the ones that corre- The way to overcome such a puzzling issue
spond to the preference to respond to a certain is to assume that the distribution of probability
pattern of body modifications (the modifications among signs is not unidimensional, but multidi-
comprising the perception/production of sign A) mensional, or better, hyperdimensional. In other
with a certain pattern of modifications of this pat- words, it is a distribution of distributions, the
tern of modifications (the modification of the pre- last corresponding to a given matrix of proba-
vious pattern comprising sign B). bility of transitions. Elsewhere (Salvatore, 2016),
I have conceptualized such matrixes in terms of
scenarios, namely, as specific units of experi-
2.3.5 Tenet 5 – Culture as the Field
ence corresponding and sustained by a redundant
Distribution of Probabilities
(micro)domain of life characterized by a some-
The previous tenets lead to an abstract, compu- what stable dynamic network of co-occurring
tational definition of the culture – it is the field signs, and therefore a particular distribution of
distribution of probabilities of transition among the probability. Accordingly, a scenario is an
signs. embodied generalized domain of sense, corre-
In other words, the culture is the matrix of sponding to a mode of activation of the body
asymmetrical preferences that each sign has of associated with a prototypical unit of social life.
combining with other signs. Such matrix does not A scenario, then, works as a field of sense,
reflect any general meaning or any kind of shared namely a peculiar system of preference defining
normative system of values and significances – the local trajectory of signs. Thus, while sign a
as intended here it is just the immanent status of has the highest probability of being followed by
the recursive previous combination among signs; sign b in scenario M, it has the highest probability
a habit – like a path through the woods that is proof being followed by sign c in scenario P.
duced by the accumulation of passages along it,
so that the passages have created the path rather
2.3.7 Tenet 7 – Affective Grounds
than vice versa.
of Sensemaking
Scenarios have a level of generalization and can
2.3.6 Tenet 6 –
overlap and be nested within one another. Some
Hyperdimensionality of the
scenarios have clear-cut boundaries and are
Distribution
associated to specific patterns of social action –
The transitions among signs are often enough e.g., when one is at the restaurant and raises one’s
foreseeable, as if they were actually regulated by hand to attract the attention of the waitress, the
probable following signs are rather limited. Other 2.3.9 Tenet 9 – Bivalence of
scenarios are more generalized – some of them Meaning: SIA and SIP
are very generalized, encompassing the person’s
The centrality of the mechanism of pertinenti-
basic modality of relating with the world. Such
zation in sensemaking leads us to see mean-
a generalized level of sensemaking is possible
ing as composed inherently by two components.
because semiosis, in its basic functioning, is
On the one hand, the meaning is in the sign
inherently affective, adopting the body’s state
that follows and interprets the previous one. On
of activation as the first sign through which the
the other hand, the meaning consists of the sce-
whole relation with the world is interpreted as a
nario according to which the transition is made
single, generalized totality (for a discussion of
possible.
affective semiosis and its unconscious root, see
Elsewhere (Salvatore, 2016; Salvatore &
Salvatore & Freda, 2011; Salvatore & Zittoun,
Venuleo, 2013) I have called the first component
2011).
Significance in Praesentia (SIP) and the second
Significance in Absentia (SIA). Thus, the SIA
2.3.8 Tenet 8 – Sensemaking Works is the pertinentized scenario according to which
Through Ongoing Pertinentization the trajectory of the following sign (the SIP) is
enacted.
Given the hyperdimensionality of the probabil-
It is worth highlighting that the scenario is not
ity of transition, sensemaking requires a mech-
a frame that exists independently from the combi-
anism of pertinentization, that is, of reducing the
nation of signs, working on it in top-down terms.
dimensionality of the distribution of probability
Rather, the scenario is activated and reproduced
that backgrounds the non-pertinent dimensions –
abductively through time (on abduction, see Sal-
and thus foregrounding a limited set of pertinent
vatore & Valsiner, 2010)3 as the most efficient
scenarios. It is only on this condition that the tran-
way of enabling the unfolding of the trajectory
sition to the following sign can be carried out.
of signs. In other words, the SIA is not a latent
In the final analysis, the pertinentization of sce-
meaning that pushes the trajectory of signs from
nario puts a local boundary on the infinite poten-
the outside and in a top-down way. Rather, the
tial associability – interpretability – of the sign,
pertinentization of the scenario (i.e., the SIA) and
enabling it to be interpreted.
the selection of the sign working co-extensively.
It is worth noting that this view of sense-
making as a dynamics of reducing variability
and placing constraints is consistent with sev-
2.4 Conclusion
eral models concerned with learning (Landauer
& Dumais, 1997), communication (Salvatore, In this chapter, I have called for the devel-
Tebaldi, & Potì, 2006/2009), text comprehen- opment of cultural psychology as the general
sion (Kintsch, 1988), and emergence of symbolic theory of psychology for the twenty-first cen-
thought (Bucci, 1997). tury – able to restore the unity of the discipline,
According to this general view, one could con- nowadays fragmented in a Babylon of circum-
clude by recalling a classic Freudian image – scribed and phenomena-triggered theories. I have
sensemaking works like the sculptor who makes argued that such a task requires the shift to a mod-
the form emerge as the result of taking off what elistic, theory driven approach and I have tried
is not pertinent, rather than like the painter that to make a step ahead in that direction by outlin-
produces the form by adding what was not there ing the basic elements of a semiotic and dynamic
before. metatheoretical framework. Such a framework
assumes that psychology is the science of sense- sional and processual approach to culture.
making, the latter being modeled as a field According to this conception, culture is not a
dynamics comprising transition among signs. meta-factor, competing with others in the con-
In conclusion, two implications of such a pro- struction of human events. Rather, it is the
posal are worth highlighting. First, the frame- dynamic gestalt where human events come to life
work implies a processual ontology that enables and develop. It is the immanent form of human
the reification of psychological concepts to be phenomena.
avoided. Thus, what are usually seen as psycho-
logical primitives (individuality, self, emotion, Notes
meaning, culture) can be treated as explananda
of the general theory (i.e., what has to be under- 1 The extension of a concept is the set of instances
stood, rather than what is used to understand). to which it can be applied, whereas the intension
of a concept is the set of criteria defining the posi-
As a result, the semiotic dynamic general the-
tion within the semantic system, namely its rela-
ory may provide a new synthesis of the tradi-
tion with the other concepts. Thus, the extensional
tional dichotomies – subject versus object; indi-
approach is the view that the meaning of a concept
vidual versus social; culture-in-the-mind versus consists of the set of elements of the world referred
mind-in-the-culture; micro versus macro; cogni- to by the category, whereas the intensional approach
tion versus emotion – which hinder its current is the view that the meaning of a concept is given
capacity for development. by the rules defining its position within the seman-
Second, the model of sensemaking outlined tic system. The extensional approach therefore sees
above outlines a way of going beyond the sub- the culture as something which is in the world and,
stantialist interpretation of the notion of culture – for this reason, works as the referential meaning of
as well as others like mind, subject, environ- the corresponding scientific category. In contrast,
ment – that views it as a self-contained entity the intensional approach considers the notion of
“culture” as a concept that does not correspond
affecting the functioning of whatever interacts
to something in the world, being defined theoreti-
with it (e.g., people’s way of thinking, customs,
cally, and as such used for interpreting – rather than
norms, and so forth). According to such a stand-
merely indicating – a certain set of phenomena.
point, typical of cross-cultural studies (Heine, 2 A classic example of this double level of validation
2011; for a criticism, Valsiner, 2007), a social is general relativity (GR), which was accepted by
group has/shares a culture and this culture deter- scientists because it was able both to provide a uni-
mines some of its important qualities – e.g., fied mathematical description of gravity as a geo-
behavior X that is common within the group is metric property of space and time and to explain the
due to the culture of the social group. Despite its empirical phenomenon of the perihelion precession
closeness with common sense, this view is the- of Mercury’s orbit. On the other hand, the role of
oretically untenable. In so far as the culture is empirical validation was limited for a long time –
defined as an entity working on other entities, this indeed, it was only 40 years later that GR was sub-
jected to a systematic program of empirical testing,
raises the issue of what the culture is made of and
once the technological devices became available.
how this “stuff” acts, and through what kind of
3 According to Peirce, abduction is the inference that
material linkages and vectors. As one can easily
reconstructs an event from empirical occurrences,
see, such issues are actually unsolvable and at the the latter being interpreted as the effect of the event,
center of disputes throughout the whole history therefore as the indexical sign of it. Thus, abduc-
of human thought (Valsiner, 2009). tion is aimed at defining the minimal not evident
The framework outlined in this work enables (past or present) phenomenon which, by happening,
such pitfalls to be avoided, providing an inten- makes the occurrences meaningful (i.e., makes them
a sign). In other words, the phenomenon is recon- representation of knowledge. Psychological

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SAGE. pp. 7–26). Rome: Firera.
3 Knowledge and Experience:
Interobjectivity, Subjectivity, and
Social Relations
Gordon Sammut, Martin W. Bauer, and Sandra Jovchelovitch
Imagine you are approaching a bus stop on a busy person standing in front of you is doing? And
morning to get a bus to work. Already standing suppose now you are the third person to arrive
by the bus stop is a person who is waiting to do at the scene, with a person clearly occupying the
the same. As the minutes pass, more and more first spot and a second passenger standing loosely
passengers arrive and cluster around the pickup behind, slightly to the right. Bearing in mind that
point waiting for the bus to arrive. Now imagine queuing at a bus stop is spontaneous, would you
that the bus is delayed and that it becomes clear now take up a spot behind the first two in a sin-
to all waiting passengers that not everyone will be gle file, or would you stand adjacent to the second
able to board the next bus. Some will have to wait passenger on the left? And what if you were the
for the subsequent service. In these conditions, fourth to arrive, and found the other three pas-
queuing helps ensure that those who arrived at sengers occupying a triangular space in front of
the bus stop first get to board the service first, and you forming two rows of passengers waiting to
that those who arrived later will be next in line board the bus? Where would you place yourself
for the following service. A queue can be defined now to respect the queue? And what if you were
as an organized or spontaneous arrangement of the fiftieth person to arrive and all you could per-
people awaiting some service. The first person ceive is a mass of people waiting to board the
in the queue is the first person in line to receive next bus with no apparent queuing arrangement
service, with later arrivals occupying subsequent other than the ones arriving before you occupy
spots in a spatial arrangement that ensures the a spatial position closer to the bus stop than you
provision of services in turn on a first-come-first- in no determined order? How would you now get
served basis. Economists consider queuing as one in line?
of the fair alternatives to market allocation of lim- Instances like these occur innumerable times
ited goods; however, queuing requires a moral every day in every town or city around the globe
commitment not to jump the queue (see Sandel, and, most of the time, are hardly newsworthy. In
2012). these situations, human beings commonly orga-
So, imagine you are the second person to arrive nize themselves spontaneously toward achieving
on the spot and that as more passengers awaiting some common purpose. At other times, however,
the service arrive, you spontaneously decide to such spontaneous organization seemingly fails.
take up your spot in the queue. Would you stand When it does, it can precipitate very unpleasant
exactly behind the first person in a single file? Or consequences. How could such a seemingly sim-
would you stand slightly to the right or slightly ple arrangement fail? The Daboma Jack incident
to the left, such that you can perceive what the in Malta (Box 3.1) is illustrative in this regard.
50 go r do n sa m m ut, martin w. bau e r , a nd sand ra jovch e lovitch
Clearly, there are numerous ways by which

Box 3.1 The Daboma Jack a psychological understanding of this incident
Incident (Box 3.1) could unfold, in view of the various
Daboma Jack was a Hungarian citizen of psychological issues that could be examined. One
African descent studying for a Master’s evident issue, however, and one that is commonly
degree in Malta. On July 1, 2015, prepaid bus neglected in psychological inquiry, is the way the
cards were introduced in Malta in an effort to various actors perceived and interpreted the situ-
make the service more efficient for the benefit ation. Locals perceived, what to Mr. Jack was a
of users. The first few days were marked by disorganized aggregate of frustrated commuters
apparent chaos, as bus users and bus drivers as an everyday occurrence, that of a normal and
alike familiarized themselves with the new regular queue at a bus stop (in the Mediter-
service. This resulted in widespread delays in ranean sense of queue). On this occasion, the
services and significant build-ups of queues queue was bigger in size, but no less orderly than
at many bus stops around the island. Daboma any other bus stop queue on any other day. Mr.
Jack arrived at one of these scenes in Val- Jack’s efforts at ordering the queue were inter-
letta hoping, like every other waiting pas- preted as unwarranted interference that could
senger, to board a bus and get on his way. only precipitate disorder, which they did. But
The queue awaiting him seemed like a dis- where on the side of this debate fellow passen-
organized mass of frustrated commuters who gers fell depended on their own implicit under-
pushed and shoved their way to secure a place standing of a queue, and whether this should take
on the service each time a bus pulled up to a linear, triangular or circular spatial arrange-
board passengers. Not knowing exactly how ment. Clearly, there is no “objective” definition
to go about this business given the novelty of of queue that passengers could appeal to in tak-
prepaid cards, Mr. Jack sought to help orga- ing a side, although some understanding of queu-
nize fellow waiting passengers in an orderly ing might get “objectified.” The mass of waiting
queue. To everyone else, this would appear passengers was orderly or disorderly in this case
to be a sensible and laudable act that would depending on which cultural frames of reference
ensure everyone would get their fair chance of apply to define the nature of the present queue. To
boarding a bus. His efforts, however, were met a local, a triangular or circular queue was orderly
with stiff resistance on the part of other com- in a way that Mr. Jack failed to perceive. On the
muters. They claimed that they were already other hand, to an outsider, such as Mr. Jack and
in a queue and that Mr. Jack should simply anyone else who shares his understanding, a tri-
keep his place. The situation quickly degen- angular or circular queue is in fact no queue at
erated and in the fracas that followed, Mr. all, much less an orderly one.
Jack was racially abused, slapped, and spat What the Daboma Jack incident makes clear,
at. Police forces from the Rapid Interven- for the purposes of the present chapter, is that
tion Unit who were called to the scene pro- interpersonal relations actuated between different
ceed to physically pin Mr. Jack down to the subjects are inextricably tied with sociocultural
ground and arrest him, to the claps and cheers frames of reference that lend meaning to partic-
of other passengers. He was subsequently ular perspectives and justify particular courses of
charged with disturbing the public peace but action as opposed to others that could be taken in
the charges against him were dismissed in the circumstances. Psychology often limits itself
court due to lack of evidence. to the investigation of the actual intersubjective
exchanges which occur during these incidences
Knowledge and Experience 51
to explain the turn of events. In this chapter, entific method. By contrast, material phenomena
we argue that a focus on sociocultural frames that exist independently of any perceiving sub-
of reference is a necessary prelude to achieve a ject are placed within the domain of objectivity
genuine understanding of interpersonal relations and verifiable observation. In psychology, rela-
and why these take the shape and form they do. tions between distinct subjectivities have been
Rather than arguing that one definition of a queue framed along the lines of intersubjectivity. This
is necessarily right, and studying the “logic” of refers to the human ability to adopt the perspec-
how some people get it wrong (we might all use tive of the other and to relate with the other on the
this social deficit approach), we postulate, along basis of this understanding (Daanen & Sammut,
with other scholars, that a sociocultural focus is 2012). Intersubjectivity is routinely held to be the
required to understand these events as multiple psychological answer to Cartesian reductionism
realities of action and representation. This helps that enables interaction between otherwise self-
toward understanding how different objectifica- contained subjective entities (Daanen & Sammut,
tions of people, events, and objects prevalent in 2012). In an intersubjective exchange, subjects
our contemporary surroundings go on to shape are able to communicate their mental states to
the nature of our social interactions with oth- one another and in this way avoid or overcome
ers. We argue that the plurality of knowledges discrepancies between the two.
that typifies contemporary public spheres (Jovch- The issue of objectivity in psychology is gen-
elovitch, 2007) brings to the fore a concern with erally relegated to an attribute of social cognition,
how different systems of knowledge interrelate such as a naïve realism bias by which individuals
in the same public sphere to foster interobjectiv- consider their view to be “objective” and others’
ity (Sammut & Moghaddam, 2014). This occurs differing views to be biased (Ross & Ward, 1996).
among culturally diverse subjects and goes on In this case, an implicit social deficit approach to
to structure everyday social relations mediated bias often replaces moral preference with a claim
by the use of social objects. We start by visit- of epistemic authority. Alternatively, objectivity
ing the prevalent distinction between subjectiv- is an attribute of a well-executed study that is
ity and objectivity and proceed to outline nine able to demonstrate a psychological property as
theses concerning the role of interobjectivity and it exists in reality without the interference of the
boundary objects in social relations. We conclude researcher’s own interpretation.
by advancing some principles for psychological This cursory overview of the prevalent mean-
research concerning interobjective architectures ings of subjectivity and objectivity in psychol-
that help to address our propositions. ogy should suffice to highlight some of the
difficulties in the conceptual tools that the disci-
pline has relied on over the years. First, as Daanen
3.1 Subjectivity, Objectivity, and
and Sammut (2012) note, much social interaction
the In-between
is achieved without recourse to intersubjective
The social sciences have long grappled with exchanges that overcome different realities for
the duality of subjectivity and objectivity (see distinct subjects. Second, as Asch (1987) points
Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003). Broadly speaking, out, subjects’ understanding of the world around
psychological activity is routinely placed within them is based on objective rather than subjec-
the domain of subjectivity, that is, phenomena tive criteria. Human beings do not consider the
that are personal and idiosyncratic that are, as world in terms of their innate cognitive processes.
it is argued, not amenable to scientific investiga- They assume that the world they perceive is
tion because introspection is not a verifiable sci- similarly perceived by others, and they structure
their social relations in line with these premises. intersubjective exchanges. Daanen and Sammut
Even with regards to socially constructed phe- (2012) argue that
nomena, human subjects attribute objective cri-
T2: intersubjectivity is better restricted to
teria to these phenomena such that no space is
second-order derivative accounts of human
left for subjective considerations. One cannot,
understanding that instantiate in situations
for instance, subjectively dispute matters such
of rupture, that is, when a discrepancy in
as money, time, crime, or human rights. These
subjective meanings fails routine, practical
and other categories are collectively treated as
interaction.
objective obligations by human subjects. Social
relations are structured accordingly. It is there- In most forms of interaction, however, the mean-
fore clear that, phenomenologically speaking, the ing of objects is immediately apparent to us with-
distinction between what is subjective and what out the need for conscious reflection, due to a
is objective is crude and leaves many relational bedrock of affordances and/or interobjective rep-
forms unaccounted for. Recent work concerning resentations that grant objects the properties that
interobjectivity, to which we now turn, has sought actors effectively perceive from different vantage
to shed further light on these issues (see Sammut, points. I do not need a subjective experience of
Daanen, & Moghaddam, 2013). selling sandwiches to understand that sandwiches
The first thesis to consider is that, as Daanen & can be sold. If I am able to buy a sandwich, I
Sammut (2012) note, simultaneously understand that somebody is able
to sell it, without any need to reconstruct the
T1: routine social interaction does not rely on social world to accommodate diverse subjective
intersubjective exchange. orientations to what one can do with a sandwich.
No readjustment of conduct is demanded due to
Much routine social interaction does not the fact that this social interaction takes place
require the conscious interpretation of the per- within the parameters of the direct recognition of
spective of the other, even when the same social objects, as Asch (1987) noted, as well as the range
object means different things to different peo- of appropriate responses in their regard (Wagner,
ple. For instance, a sandwich may be an object to 2015; Sammut, 2015). According to Daanen and
buy for someone and an object to sell for some- Sammut (2012), the quality of objectivity applies
one else. This transaction, however, does not rou- in routine interactions in as much as it represents
tinely require a conscious exercise of negotiat- knowledge of knowing how to act in everyday life
ing different subjective meanings of the object. (p. 568, italics in original).
Rather, this bedrock is provided by a cultural
T3: The postulation of intersubjectivity and
understanding that sandwiches can be bought
interobjectivity refers to a class of phenom-
and sold and that different individuals can posi-
ena distinguished from those that could be
tion themselves accordingly in social relations.
intrasubjective on the one hand and intra-
The transaction itself of buying/selling a sand-
objective on the other.
wich can be undertaken with little to no interac-
tion at all – buyer takes sandwich from fridge, The duality subjectivity–objectivity has been
places it on counter along with an amount of expanded to include four sets (Harré & Sammut,
cash, seller spontaneously takes cash and hands 2013), namely those that are exclusively subjec-
over receipt, buyer walks out of shop with sand- tive and objective and those that lie in between.
wich and receipt. No negotiation of meaning How can psychology make sense of this termi-
is required in this transaction that is typical of nology and what are the corresponding states?
Harré and Sammut (2013) have argued that these

four combinations map onto Vygotsky’s cycle of
zones of proximal development, which run from
the “private-personal” to the “public-collective.”
In this cycle, idiosyncratic ways of thinking and
acting emerge in the “private-personal” domain,
which, displayed in the public domain constitute
the class of “public-personal” phenomena. In this
domain, individual ways of doing things come
under public scrutiny and are used to advance
public projects. Sometimes, these idiosyncratic
ways of acting go on to become formally insti-
tuted in social life, allowing other individuals to Figure 3.1 Psychological phenomena in the
take up a similar way of doing things in a for- spaces between the personal–collective and the
mal role. At this point, the act transfers to the private–public dimensions.
“public-collective” domain. Finally, individuals
may adopt formal institutional practices in their
be able to participate in collective episodes. We
personal capacity, which they exercise in some
can also see how participating individuals may
private domain. This corresponds to the “private-
not have full access to the totality of such knowl-
collective” state in Vygotsky’s classification. If
edge, which is available to the group as a whole.
we replace subjectivity and objectivity with per-
Individuals require only knowledge of how their
sonal and collective domains, and intra- and inter-
role practices fit the general corpus to be able to
with private and personal domains, the result-
participate in social life.
ing typology serves in understanding a compre-
hensive range of psychological phenomena that
involve both an idiosyncratic class of phenomena
3.2 Object Relations,
as well as cultural practices that grant personal
Interobjectivity, and Social
psychological phenomena social currency.
Representations
This classification facilitates an understanding
of how personal psychological phenomena can The notion of interobjectivity was introduced in
appear in both collective and individual activities psychology by Moghaddam (2003, 2010) in an
and projects (see Figure 3.1). Intersubjective phe- effort to resolve the intersubjectivity dilemma
nomena transpire as personal in their location but concerning the way distinct subjects can claim
collective in their knowability. Conversely, inter- recourse to each other’s subjective states. Accord-
objective phenomena are those that exist only ing to Moghaddam, this issue remains a puz-
in the joint and coordinated interaction between zle only insofar as we adhere to an individual-
members of a group. These refer to coordinated istic focus that locates psychological experience
activities that are public in their location and col- within the self-contained individual. Moghad-
lective in their knowability (e.g., a victory parade dam’s proposal is to postulate a normative system
involving the coordinated activity of particular that preexists individuals, that is,
players and supporters displayed in public and
recognized as a circumscribed activity by oth- T4: interobjective representations span a
ers). In this way, we can see how a shared body diversity of cultural and normative under-
of knowledge is requisite for group members to standings.
According to Moghaddam, individual under- elaborates their meaning, they more specifically
standings arise out of collective understandings. take on meanings for action that are triggered
In other words, interobjectivity is the source of without the need for deliberation, that is, in
intersubjectivity inasmuch as the normative sys- an objective and direct-intentional sense. Costall
tem we are born into is the framework and main (2013) argues, in the same vein, that objects reify
source of our psychological experiences; simi- human intentions and that reification, rather than
larly the body is the scaffold of our perceptions: a fallacy, is effectively a fact of life when it comes
we need eyes and ears to see and hear. to the meaning of objects and the routine prac-
Moghaddam’s notion proposes a background tices in which they partake. According to Costall,
of common-sense meaning that stands as a a chair invites sitting regardless of whether any-
bedrock for social relations among diverse sub- one happens to use it for standing on it. Costall
jects and that is used as a benchmark for apprais- argues that sitting is a chair’s “canonical affor-
ing alternative views. dance” and that this is akin to an objective prop-
erty for the chair. One sits on chairs, regardless
T5: Interobjective understandings are those
of what you or I might actually be doing with
that incorporate diverse objectifications
it. In this way, objects are treated by subjects in
pertaining to different subjects.
terms of objective properties with which they are
Alternative views that are made to fit along- imbued (Asch, 1987), as detailed above. How-
side previously enacted normative frameworks ever, we might note, in many traditions there is
give rise to interobjective representations that are a moral warning attached to an escalation from
assimilated and accommodated into preexisting mere objectification to reification, which in the
common sense. By extension, those that remain Western world we might recognize as the “icono-
discrepant are perceived as nonsensical by encul- clastic impetus” (Bauer, 2015).
turated subjects (often called metaphysical, as in How action is constrained by different objec-
the positivist demarcation of science from non- tifications (objectifications can either invite or
sense, see Kolakowski, 1972). As Sammut, Daa- restrict action, e.g. a no-entry sign) and the
nen, and Sartawi (2010) go on to note, being a role of these objectifications in structuring social
fully enculturated subject effectively means that relations constitutes a specific focus for Latour,
one immediately and nonconsciously knows the whose introduction of interobjectivity in sociol-
meaning assigned to commonplace objects, roles, ogy predates Moghaddam’s in psychology. Latour
and practices without the need for deliberation. (1996) argues that objects mediate human action
While objects around us seem to take on mean- to the extent that objects, just as other human sub-
ing in light of a subject’s intended action – for jects, exercise social forces and are not only part
example, standing up on a chair to change a light- of but also implicated in social reality. This is
bulb – objects also act on us in view of what they attested by the fact that the human–Simian transi-
immediately and nonconsciously represent for us. tion is characterized not only by language capac-
In other words, they act on us in terms of the ity, but also by the accumulation of things, use-
objectification associated with the object itself in ful and useless alike, that is, material culture.
a particular group. What to one subject is a pair Along with subjects, objects are implicated in
of wooden sticks, to another is a set of chopsticks hybrid networks constituted by an association of
that invite consumption of a particular cuisine. “actants” (i.e., humans and things) that do some-
Sammut, Daanen, and Sartawi (2010) argue thing to the environment in which they move
that objects do not merely take on different objec- and exist. In this sense, humans are fundamen-
tifications depending on the social group who tally cyborgs – human-machine constructs, who
have extended their social action to objects and representations require a minimum of two inter-
incorporated them into their interactions. Objects relating subjects concerned with the same object.
thus “act” and give feedback on regulating human The objectification that is elaborated in the course
activity. For instance, a speed bump in the road of interaction serves both subjects, enabling each
ensures drivers slow down to the desired limit, to acquire a particular understanding of the object
which becomes equivalent to the moral obliga- in terms of the specific features that are amenable
tion of “20 miles per hour limit.” However, a traf- to the different projects they themselves pursue.
fic warden standing on the corner could achieve These objectifications can differ from another
the same outcome. Both act on the environment elaborated by distinct subjects who are not vested
by regulating the activity of human drivers. The in the same social representation and who, for
act of “stimulating braking” is achieved by the their own purposeful project, elaborate a differ-
object, rather than by the words and actions of a ent version. Consequently, different social groups
subject. A heavy key holder makes it more likely elaborate a multitude of objectifications of the
that you will deposit the hotel key at the reception same object. The “real” object itself comes
than walk out with it in your pocket. While we to stand as the linking pin between different
might attribute intentionality only to the designer “actual” objects, the social representations of the
of the object; the object has at most open func- object that suit the object relations demands of
tionality. Consequently, Latour claims that social the various groups. This social dynamic produces
inquiry needs to delve into the activity that sub- the real object as the sum total of all actual
jects and objects help to achieve in conjunction. objects. A social representation that can accom-
While Latour and Moghaddam differ in their modate diverse objectifications pertaining to dif-
conceptions of interobjectivity, the two might find ferent sociocultural groups in a way that satisfies
common ground when treating interobjectivity the diversity of object relations required across
as a social representation (Sammut & Howarth, the various groups can be termed interobjective.
2014). Thus, In these instances, particular subjects can inter-
relate with and through the object in meaning-
T6: social representation encompasses dif-
ful ways without detracting meaning or limiting
ferent objectifications in a way that per-
activity for others. This enables both a degree of
mits diverse interobjective relations with the
shared reference and the functional realization of
same object, according to each group’s ver-
diversity. In this sense, it can be suggested that an
sion of the object itself.
interobjective social representation is marked by
Objects inhabit more than one single socio- a state of cognitive polyphasia.
cultural world. This fact requires intersectional
work to create interobjective representations that
3.3 Boundary Objects, Borders,
simultaneously meet the interobjective demands
and Knowledge Encounters
of various sociocultural projects and frames
(Sammut, Daanen, & Sartawi, 2010). Interobjec- The studies reviewed above (Box 3.2) demon-
tive representations allow diverse social groups strate that interobjectivity constructs boundary
to interrelate with the same object in different objects, understood as objects that lie at the inter-
ways and without conflict, according to their par- section of diverse objectifications. A key feature
ticular historical project. This state of social rela- of boundary objects is to unify while separating
tions is neatly captured in Bauer and Gaskell’s (Marsico et al., 2013). The boundary links what is
(2008) wind-rose model of social representa- separated: it is an intrinsic characteristic of bor-
tions. According to Bauer and Gaskell, social ders to distinguish distinct entities while at the
Box 3.2 Interobjectivity in Social Research

A study by Wagner et al. (2012) demonstrated such interobjective representations concerning the
Muslim veil in Indonesia, a Muslim majority country, and India, a Muslim minority country. The
authors found that representations of the veil in Indonesia centered around practical uses such as
convenience, fashion, and modesty. There was little reference to the significance of religion in wear-
ing this garment among Muslim women in Indonesia. By contrast, Muslim women’s representations
of the veil in India centered around cultural identity and religiosity. For these women, the veil was
an instrument to challenge stereotypes and discrimination. This account of the veil demonstrates
that the very same object has different meanings and different functional uses for different subjects
depending on the sociocultural context in which they are embedded. It further demonstrates that
while Muslim women are typically lumped together as a homogeneous group by outside observers –
that is, Muslims – their accounts of adopting the garment differ in line with their status in society.
The veil confers specific functions in both these settings that are different from one another and
that contrast with prevailing Western conceptions of the garment as a religious symbol alone. These
different objectifications are linked by the veil itself – an interobjective and polyphasic garment
that stands at the boundary of diverse objectifications and that serves the relational demands of the
different groups simultaneously.
Another study that demonstrates interobjective relational practices is the street-art study reported
by Sammut, Daanen, and Sartawi (2010). The study involved an inquiry into diverse relational prac-
tices observed during the Cans Festival in London in 2008. The festival was organized by notorious
graffiti artist, Banksy, in a road tunnel under London Waterloo Station, where various pieces by
Banksy and other popular street artists were put up on display. The festival attracted numerous vis-
itors over the time that the artworks were displayed. The authors report that discernible relational
differences were observed by different groups visiting the street “gallery.” Tourist-types flocked to
the festival to see a Banksy and document the moment with a picture, mostly of themselves stand-
ing alongside the artworks. Museum-types, on the other hand, stood at some distance to admire the
artworks and took their time to take the various pieces in. While there was no formal organiza-
tion in the tunnel, such as ushers to direct visitors or stanchions to keep visitors at a safe distance,
museum-types regulated their conduct according to norms typical of art galleries or formal muse-
ums. Street-types, on the other hand, adopted different forms of conduct that would have been in
violation of typical museum norms. They interacted with the artworks, climbing on installations to
pose for pictures or even adding their own amateur-graffiti to the walls.
While the conduct of some seemingly violated the prescriptions of others, no incidence of conflict
was observed. Rather, visitors seemingly understood that street art allowed for relational practices
that did not apply, or were purposely in contravention, to norms that regulate conduct with regards
to other art forms. This, in itself, was understood by visitors to be part of the phenomenon of street
art. The diversity of interactions it generated was in itself a crucial attractor. Visitors appreciated
that the popularity of street art in general, and the Cans Festival in particular, was due to the fact
that it appealed to a wide diversity of subjects who were all equally drawn to this art form for their
own reasons. The interobjective representation of street art enabled visitors to accept that the Cans
Festival had fulfilled its purpose by appealing to a diverse audience. Rather than becoming irate at
others who interacted with the artworks in different ways, visitors expressed satisfaction at the fact
that street art had such broad appeal and that it could draw interest from others who would typically
have been expected to be unconcerned with artistic works of this or any kind. Visitors regarded the
diversity of interactions as a strength of street art over other forms.
same time uniting them in some form of interre- (2015) example of food production provides an
lation. Identity is gained in relation and demarca- illustrative case of these dynamics. Representa-
tion. As noted in the Muslim veil study, distinct tions of food as organic and sustainable may
objectifications of the garment enable women to coexist in the same public sphere alongside other
use it for different purposes and the justifications representations of food as genetically modified
underpinning one objectification provide no basis and industrially produced. These representations
for the other. To the outside observer, however, compete in the same public sphere to determine
both objectifications refer to a common entity the reality of food production. The food avail-
that identifies those who wear it as women of a able for us to eat is the outcome of the behav-
certain kind – i.e., Muslims. The various objec- ior of actors who sustain and propagate different
tifications demarcate different users – those who notions of what we all should eat.
wear the veil as an accessory as opposed to those This example illustrates the genesis of states
who wear it as an identity marker – depending on of cognitive polyphasia, in which different repre-
the sociocultural context in which the activity of sentations of the same object coexist in the same
wearing the veil is carried out, that is, majority or public sphere and/or the same individual (Jovch-
minority situation. The interobjective representa- elovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2015). Plurality of
tion of the veil as a Muslim garment, constituted representations, however, does not mean that all
by the totality of meanings in both objectifica- representations are accepted and granted equal
tions, classifies distinct users together. It serves to value. As Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernández
ascribe a distinct property to the veil that marks (2015) argue,
everyone who wears it regardless of context. The
T8: some representations are more valid than
veil is a Muslim veil. Wearers are identifiable as
others due to the fact that they resonate
Muslims when they wear the veil. The property
with, are better aligned with local customs,
ascribed pertains to all users and is not contin-
or because they are held by more powerful
gent on the perceiving subject. It is understood
actors.
to be a characteristic feature of the veil itself,
in other words an objective feature which serves In these encounters, proponents of different
Muslim women to structure their social relations objectifications rarely meet in symmetrical terms.
through the veil in diverse sociocultural contexts In clashes between representations, the objec-
(majority and minority). Interobjective represen- tifications proposed by less powerful others
tations, such as the one pertaining to the Muslim are labeled as ignorant or otherwise deficient
veil, enable the emergence of a whole out of the (Sammut & Sartawi, 2012; Sammut, Bezzina, &
interplay of various parts (Marsico et al., 2013). Sartawi, 2015). The differences between com-
However, not every distinct set of objectifica- peting representations can be resolved in many
tions is resolved interobjectively. At times, ways, including the use of force and vio-
lence, or by appeal to a jointly recognized
T7: distinct objectifications come together in
authority (Bauer, 2015; Jovchelovitch & Priego-
conflicting or adversarial relations. Interob-
Hernández, 2015). Were different parties to
jective demands imposed by one objectifica-
meet on equal terms, a process of normaliza-
tion may negate the possibility of meeting a
tion would ensue through deliberation and com-
different set of demands prescribed by a dif-
promise (Bauer, 2015). In asymmetrical con-
ferent version.
ditions, the knowledge of the nondominant
In these instances, representations that coexist minority group stands at best to be accommo-
may go on to clash in the public sphere. Bauer’s dated into the prevailing view, shifting it slightly
in its favor. At worst, it is assimilated into the T9: The making and breaking of objectifica-
mainstream requiring compliance and confor- tions and reifications is as relevant in under-
mity (Sammut & Bauer, 2011). standing the psychological life of sociocul-
Aside from being the subject of diverse objec- tural subjects as the making and breaking of
tifications, artifacts themselves may be impli- social norms.
cated in the exercise of social influence. Asch
(1987) notes that social interaction produces To return to our previous example, a wall may
two outcomes, that is, social facts and techni- be an object to keep trespassers at bay, but to
cal artifacts. Social influence may be achieved a graffiti artist a wall is one big blank canvas.
through artifacts by fait accompli (Sammut & Different people in different sociocultural con-
Bauer, 2011; Bauer, 2015), relying on the nor- texts produce different objectifications that serve
mative power of facts that what is ought to be to structure social life and establish social order.
(Bauer, 2015). Objects are thus strong enforcers As Jovchelovitch (2007) notes, mapping out these
in themselves. Erecting a wall to manage com- differences is a central concern to sociocultural
munity relations represents a sociotechnical solu- approaches to cognition. These require both an
tion to framing community life. Artifacts are understanding of social norms as well as human
thus components of infrastructures that require conduct in terms of restrictions imposed by
the physiological and psychological adjustment material-technical artifacts that are constructed to
of users. They are legitimate or illegitimate forms achieve particular purposes that particular groups
of achieving a social purpose and require rea- seek to implement (Asch 1987; Bauer, 2015).
soned consistency with a community’s aims. In
this way, artifacts constrain in a double sense –
3.4 Interobjective Architecture
they enable as well as inhibit social interactions.
The construction of the Berlin Wall inhibited rou- Sensitivity to interobjective issues can serve
tine relations between Western and Eastern Ger- sociocultural psychologists to develop a fuller
mans for many years. The destruction of the wall understanding of the complexity of human con-
in 1989 enabled relations to ensue. At the same duct. To this end, a review of how the notion of
time, erecting the wall enabled a separatist form interobjectivity has been treated in architecture
of social relations that, for a time, served mutual to investigate its effects in everyday life can be
interests. Moreover, the destruction of the wall helpful.
inhibited separatist distinctions between Western Kärrholm (2014) argues that theories of archi-
and Eastern Germans. Every social construction tecture require a focus on interobjectivity due to
is thus accompanied by a social destruction of the fact that the subject of study requires a com-
an objectification that fails. Sociocultural con- plex understanding in terms of human and non-
texts, therefore, are not independent variables for human subjects, objects, and other entities that
human cognition. Rather, they provide a constitu- among them comprise networks of activity that
tive foundation for human activity (Jovchelovitch are the focus of architectural designs. We argue
& Priego-Hernández, 2015). that these various entities are also pertinent with
Factual norms and things both facilitate and regards to understanding the psychological life of
constrain human conduct. Human subjects may subjects. Kärrholm goes on to argue that interob-
be required to conform. But they also have the jectivity concerns enable a focus on three types of
ability to challenge some state of affairs by cre- effects pertinent to architecture, that is, (i) cross-
ating new objectifications that suit different rela- roads effects, (ii) stitching effects, and (iii) radi-
tional demands. ance effects. And in a similar vein, we argue that
all three are pertinent to sociocultural psycholog- ties are formed and linked together. Although
ical inquiry. psychology typically adopts an exclusive focus
According to Kärrholm (2014), interobjectiv- on relations among human subjects, interobjec-
ity facilitates the understanding of crossroads tivity guided inquiry can serve to spell out how
effects. These refer to objectifications that act the various entities are linked and how particular
at cultural crossroads and have a similar impact forms of conduct may be achieved through the
in different contexts. Interobjectivity guided linking up of distinct entities that include non-
research thus serves to investigate how different human subjects or material artifacts. In this way,
configurations can have equal effects on move- sociocultural enquiry is able to furnish an account
ment across different cultures. The use of config- of the various positions human subjects occupy in
urations of roads, for instance, serves to under- diverse networks and provide an understanding of
stand how the same effect could be achieved how that positioning is sustained through socio-
across different cultures by implementing differ- cultural contingencies. For instance, it is hard to
ent configurations that are consistent with local understand the various uprisings in Arab coun-
practices. This highlights a further point, that tries in recent years (otherwise known as the
the effect of a configuration may not be simi- Arab Spring) without an understanding of tech-
larly achieved in another setting in a similar way. nological developments such as social media. In
This is not due to the objective characteristics a different sociocultural setting or a different his-
of the configuration alone. The outcome depends torical epoch that did not include smartphones
on the relations achieved by the configuration and Internet connectivity, the various uprisings
that are contingent on local practices. Sensitivity may likely not have precipitated the effects they
to sociocultural features in architectural designs actually did. According to Kärrholm, a focus on
ensures that material configurations are tailored stitching effects implies that entities, including
to the environment in which these configurations human subjects, can be known by tracing the rela-
are required to perform. A solution achieved for tions in which they partake, that is, by investigat-
one group may be best achieved using a dif- ing their actor roles in different networks.
ferent configuration in another group. Alterna- Finally, interobjectivity guided research also
tively, a configuration may resolve an issue for enables a focus on radiance effects. These refer
one group but compound it for another. The out- to aspects of the object that may be obscure at
come depends on normative, sociocultural pre- first glance but that can emerge under inquiry by
scriptions that precipitate different forms of con- distinguishing what an object does as opposed
duct and, therefore, different relational forms to what an object is. The identity of an object
with the object itself. Sociocultural psychology, emerges in tracing its stabilization over time
we contend, is in a position to spell out the psy- through the proliferation of new relations. Every
chological component of these various relations. new relation in which an object is implicated
A second focus outlined by Kärrholm (2014) could generate new actor roles, but this produc-
is in terms of a relational ontology that investi- tion of roles also serves to define similarities
gates stitching effects. According to Kärrholm, across the various interpretations of the object.
all that can be known about a thing is the totality The more an object is put to the test in different
of the activity it performs in its different relations. situations, the more its effects are stabilized.
In other words, objects can be known in terms These three foci of interobjectivity guided
of their actor roles in various networks of activ- research serve to highlight diverse aspects of
ity. Interobjectivity facilitates an understanding human activity with which sociocultural psy-
of how heterogeneous networks of diverse enti- chology is fundamentally concerned. Taking the
example of a wall again, a focus on crossroads 3.5 Conclusions

effects could spell out different meanings of an
object for different social groups. One can there- The study of the effects of artifacts and archi-
fore understand how an object erected to pre- tecture is a minority concern among social sci-
vent trespassing could also serve as a canvas entists, who more typically focus on cognitive
for graffiti. Both circumscriptions are associ- activity alone or on social norms and cultural pre-
ated with psychological activity such as safety scriptions. Social psychologists are often rolled
and well-being. Looking at stitching effects, one in to make things happen and advise the inno-
can gain an understanding of how the wall fea- vation process as “acceptance providers” after
tures in productions involving a multitude of the fact. The genesis and materiality of socially
actors. Walls may serve to put in place a bar- constructed environments seems to be a lesser
rier that keeps out motor vehicles, for instance, concern to psychologists seeking to explain how
but enables access to human subjects through the mind processes information that justifies a
a gate or a turnstile, erected at a particular preferred and pre-given behavioral outcome. We
location for a particular purpose. The boundary argued that this exercise misses a critical point –
that serves to inhibit certain relational arrange- that the world we navigate is made up of mate-
ments serves, conversely, to facilitate some oth- rial objects which meet us in the course of our
ers, as detailed above. Lastly, looking at radi- everyday social relations and which impede or
ance effects, the changing nature of walls serves facilitate particular courses of action. The func-
to identify their canonical affordance (Costall, tioning, coming, and going of artifacts require
2013) of a boundary marker in view of the rela- the same psychological sensitivity as the func-
tional demands imposed by the sociocultural con- tioning of mind and behavior. In this chapter, we
text in which they materialize. An agricultural have proposed nine theses for how to understand
rubble wall serves to mark out territory. It is interobjectivity as central for the study of social
designed in such a way to restrict access from action and social relations. We hope to have pro-
one territory to another. However, by virtue of its vided sufficiently adequate conceptual tools to
design, a rubble wall allows water to seep through help sociocultural psychologists come to terms
to avoid the destruction of produce by excessive with the broad diversity of human conduct in its
water in heavy rain. It also minimizes soil ero- various manifestations and in the diversified cul-
sion as soil is prevented from being carried away tural settings in which it occurs worldwide.
from the field with excessive water. On the other
hand, a glass wall in a modern office serves to References
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Cambridge University Press.
4 “Mediationism” in Cognitive and
Social Theory
Alan Costall
Mediationism extends across two contrasting The considerable attraction of mediationism

approaches to theory in psychology. First, the has long been that it seems to provide solutions
dominant tradition of individualistic, cognitive to a whole range of problems at the heart of
theory, and, then, the still too loyal “opposition” the Western intellectual tradition. The trouble is
consisting of various alternative approaches seek- that we have become so enchanted by media-
ing “to ground activity previously seen as indi- tionism that we seldom bother to look closely
vidual, mental, and nonsocial as situated, collec- at the many different problems that it claims to
tive, and historically specific” (Bowker & Star, solve. These problems should, on reflection, no
2000, p. 288). These approaches, despite their longer be so compelling as they once seemed.
important differences, are largely agreed on one So the “answer,” then, might not be to try to
thing: we do not, and could not, have “direct” solve them, but “to get over them” (Dewey, 1910,
contact with our surroundings. Something or p. 19).
other is always getting in our way: internal rules
and mental representations, schemas, or proto-
types, in the case of standard cognitive theory, 4.1 Mediationism in
or else discourse or social representations, for Mainstream Cognitive Theory
example, in the case of the opposition. And once Within cognitive psychology, mediationism has
mediation in general is viewed as an all-pervasive primarily taken the form of representationalism:
epistemological barrier, even the well-intentioned the appeal to internal rules and representations
efforts of adults in helping children discover as a necessary and sufficient basis for explana-
the meanings of things and in scaffolding their tion within human psychology. Representational-
actions can only seem like intrusive ways of pre- ism is widely regarded as the means by which
venting those innocent victims from finding out modern psychology finally broke free from the
what things are really like. yoke of behaviorism. Yet, as Fodor (1981, p. 140)
Mediation in various forms is widespread, has noted, “insofar as the representational theory
including the new representational practices of mind is the content of the computer metaphor,
based around computers which despite being the computer metaphor predates the computer by
our own practices keep being attributed, within about three hundred years.”
cognitive theory, to the computers themselves. “Cognition” has long been defined in terms of
Any proper approach to human psychology will representation (e.g., Leeper, 1951; Tomasello &
clearly have to take mediation in its various Call, 1997, p. 10). What is (relatively) new is that,
forms into account. The problem with which I since the 1980s, psychology as a whole has come
am concerned is mediationism, making a fetish in effect to be defined as the study of cognition:
of mediation, where the various forms of medi-
ation become abstracted from their concrete Put plainly, psychology – including developmental
circumstances. psychology – has been redefined as the study of
64 alan costall
cognition. Friendship has become social cognition, psychologists” with their bizarre fixation on the
affect is seen as a form of problem-solving, Pleistocene period.
newborn perception is subsumed under a set of Then there is the very curious status of repre-
transforming rules, and psychoanalysis is reread as sentationalism as a scientific theory. Modern rep-
a variant of information processing. Cognition, the resentationalists are, understandably, very keen to
feeble infant of the late Fifties and early Sixties,
invoke scientific evidence in their support. But,
has become an apparently insatiable giant. (Kessen,
in the very process of invoking objective, sci-
1981, p. 168)
entific evidence in the cause of representational-
ism, they keep sawing through the branches on
Unfortunately, there are some fundamental prob- which they claim to be sitting. Here, for example,
lems with representationalism. Most of these is Richard Gregory unwittingly engaged in such
were identified many years before the advent of tree surgery:
modern cognitive psychology. These problems
have not gone away (see, for example, Bick- it used to be thought that perceptions, by vision and
hard & Terveen, 1995; Harnad, 1990; Janlert, touch and so on, can give direct knowledge of
objective reality . . . But, largely through the
1987; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Shaw, 2003; Still
physiological study of the senses over the last two
& Costall, 1991a). One serious problem concerns
hundred years, this has become ever more difficult
how we can intelligently apply rules and repre- to defend . . . ultimately we cannot know directly
sentations to actual situations. How do we decide what is illusion, any more than truth – for we
when these rules and representations are appro- cannot step outside perception to compare
priate to the circumstances at hand? The temp- experience with objective reality. (Gregory 1989,
tation, for the inveterate representationalist, is p. 94)
to invoke yet another level of representations to
At one moment, we are supposed to be per-
deal with this problem of situated action, but this
fectly capable of finding out scientifically what
merely defers this particular problem. Ultimately,
things are really like (as when we engage in
there has to be something beyond representation
the physiological study of the senses), and, at
to get us out of this regress.
the next moment, the objective evidence thus
Another problem concerns the origins of rep-
gained is then supposed to convince us that we
resentations, and how they come to have mean-
have been trapped all along within a “worldless
ing, and “map” onto the world. In traditional per-
consciousness:”
ceptual theory, for example, a profound gulf is
assumed to exist between perceiver and world, This worldless consciousness might be compared
and internal representations are then invoked to a room without windows which is hung with
to bridge the gap. But although these repre- innumerable and continually changing pictures.
sentations are then claimed to derive from the Apparently, the self is assumed to live locked up in
“past experience” either of the individual or the this room and to ponder whether “beyond” there is
species, no coherent explanation is ever provided perhaps a “world.” Is there such a consciousness, a
consciousness epistemologically prior to, i.e., more
about how this past experience could possibly
immediately accessible than, the world? (Duncker,
escape the severe limitations deemed to apply to
1947, p. 530)
the present. As far as I am aware, no cognitivist
theorist has ever claimed that there was once a Until now, cognitive psychologists have mainly
Golden Age when we all knew exactly what was dealt with such problems in the following
going on – not even modern day “evolutionary unsatisfactory ways:
“Mediationism” in Cognitive and Social Theory 65
1 Handwaving: insist that the problems will ulti- 4.2 Representationalism in

mately be solved, and hence are not really fun- Social Cognitive Psychology
damental problems at all (e.g., Johnson-Laird,
1988, p. 34). Two of the most influential current approaches
2 Passing the buck: acknowledge that the prob- within social psychology are frank extensions of
lems are indeed fundamental, but so funda- individualistic cognitive theory to the interper-
mental that they are evidently “metaphysical” sonal realm, and so it is hardly surprising that
and hence a problem for the philosophers, representationalism figures centrally in both. This
rather than the concern of serious, no- is certainly true of the “theory of mind” approach
nonsense, scientists. (ToMism), which has been remarkably influential
3 The Jerry Fodor option: keep a reasonably over the last thirty years, and assumes an explicit
straight face and present the very strange dualism between what we can directly observe
implications of representationalism as exciting about other people and their feelings, beliefs, and
new discoveries (as in the Gregory example, intentions. Such mental states are supposed to
above), rather than the reductio ad absurdum exist beyond the reach of “observation,” however,
they might otherwise be taken to be. this is not widely regarded as a special problem
for psychology, since many other more reputable
Representationalism is now mainly identified sciences are also mainly concerned with infer-
with mainstream cognitive psychology and even ring hidden structures (such as genes, atoms, etc.)
within that field there is a growing, if still very from empirical evidence (e.g., Harré, 2002). But
limited, recognition of its problems, and the need if psychology can claim to be in good company as
to move on. a science of the hidden, then we need to be very
Of course, mainstream cognitive psychology is clear about the unusual extent of the concealment
not the only game in town. A wide range of alter- of its supposedly hidden subject.
native approaches now challenge the decontextu- The problem of inferring mental structures is
alized, individualistic approaches of mainstream usually framed in terms of the “poverty” of the
cognitive research and theory, and these have stimulus, the underspecification of mental struc-
come to emphasize, instead, the importance of ture by any possible observations of behavior. So,
the social and cultural. For such approaches, the according to the dualistic premises of ToM, the
foundational problems of cognitive science can stimulus is not just impoverished, it is bankrupt.
seem remote, even quaint. But just as the cele- There could be no logical relation between what
brated overthrow of behaviorism led to a remark- we can observe about another person and their
ably long bout of complacency among the cogni- intentions and feelings. The consequences are
tive psychologists, those of us claiming to have stark for any empirical science of psychology,
moved safely beyond cognitivism need to reflect and, of course, for our everyday dealings with
on what we too might have unwittingly retained. other people. As Hammond and Keat (1991) have
Representationalism is deeply ingrained put it, if we are really faced with a dualism of
within the Western tradition, and linked to a body and mind, then “no deductively valid infer-
wide range of long-standing and half-forgotten ence can be made from statements about one such
agendas. It is these agendas that are the real ‘part’ of a person to statements about the other. In
problem, and so we need to be clear what they particular, one cannot validly infer, on the basis
involve if we are not to find ourselves returning of knowledge of a body, any conclusion about a
to some form or other of mediationism. mind” (p. 205).
66 alan costall
Proponents of ToM talk coyly about “mind- rary critics were well aware, not only was the con-
reading” (see Costall, Leudar, & Reddy, 2006). ception of psychology as the study of behavior
And, on the assumptions of ToMism, it would be widely accepted before Watson tried to cause a
truly a miracle that we can ever tell what other stir, but also Watson was committed to exactly the
people are thinking or feeling, or, indeed, know same psychophysical dualism that had led some
that they have any kind of mental life at all. As (but not all) of the “introspectionists” to sup-
Alan Leslie (1987, p. 422), one of the main propose that introspection could be the only proper
ponents of ToMism, has put it: “It is hard to see method for the study of mind:
how perceptual evidence could force an adult, let
alone a young child, to invent the idea of unob- Embedded in the very core of the behaviorist’s
doctrine is the Platonic distinction between mind
servable mental states.” This “hard” task of read-
and matter; and behaviorism, like Plato, regards
ing other people’s minds is claimed to be solu-
the one term as real and the other as illusory. Its
ble, nevertheless, in a perfectly non-mysterious, very case against dualism is stated in terms of
naturalistic way, thanks to the existence of spe- that distinction and is made by the classical
cial representational capacities or modules which metaphysical procedure of reducing the one term
are supposed to fill the gap between the observ- to the other. This metaphysical distinction, rather
able and the unobservable. Yet, as with similar than empirical evidence, is the basis on which
applications of the representationalist approach behaviorism accepts or rejects data for scientific
in perceptual theory, the postulated gap these rep- consideration and on which it forms conceptions
resentations are supposed to bridge is so great for dealing with them . . . Behaviorism has adopted
there is absolutely no way the knowledge embod- a metaphysics to end metaphysics. (Heidbreder,
ied in the representations could derive from either 1933, pp. 267–268)
individual past experience or even that favorite Watson, who had been a student of John Dewey,
deus ex machina of recent psychological the- claimed he never understood what Dewey was
ory, “evolution” (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1995, talking about. But Dewey, in contrast, was
p. xvii). Not even natural selection could dif- quickly onto Watson’s case:
ferentiate between differences that, according to
these ToMists, are deemed to make absolutely no To conceive behavior exclusively in terms of the
difference (for an extensive criticism of theory changes going on within an organism physically
of mind, see Leudar & Costall, 2004a; Leudar & separate in space from other organisms is to
Costall, 2009). continue the conception of mind which Professor
One of the basic problems here is that cog- Perry has well termed “subcutaneous.” This
conception is appropriate to the theory of existence
nitive psychology, despite its rhetoric of revo-
of a field or stream of consciousness that is private
lution, has retained the Watsonian, objectivized
by its very nature; it is the essence of such a theory.
conception of behavior as antithetical, rather than (Dewey, 1914/1977, p. 445)
logically connected, to the mental (see Costall,
2006a; Costall, 2013; Leudar & Costall, 2004b). In addition to retaining this objectivized con-
As Harvey Carr rightly insisted, the term “objec- ception of behavior, cognitive psychology also
tivism” was more appropriate than “behaviorism” continues to formulate its basic task of expla-
to describe Watsonian psychology, since, what nation in terms of the classical behaviorist for-
was really distinctive about this position was “not mula of “stimulus and response.” Much of
a distinction of subject matter (behavior) but the modern cognitive theory is, therefore, not an
objective view from which it is studied” (Carr, alternative to stimulus-response psychology, but
1915, p. 309). As many of Watson’s contempo- just the most recent elaboration of that scheme:
an attempt, as in neo-behaviorism, to fill the However, reading is not a “response” but an intel-
gap: to provide explanations of “what is going ligent activity, and the so-called “retinal sensa-
on” between stimulus and response. People are tion” is itself an outcome of that activity, not its
supposed to be passively stimulated by events starting point. Stimulus-response accounts – of
in their surroundings, and only then to become either the behaviorist or cognitivist kinds – start
active – and then only subcutaneously – in inter- at completely the wrong end!
preting what it all might mean on the basis Another problem for which representational-
of stored mental representations. This commit- ism has long seemed the obvious solution con-
ment to the stimulus-response formula is blatant, cerns our susceptibility to errors and illusions.
though hardly noticed, throughout the modern The standard line within psychological theory
cognitivist literature: has been to conclude, on the basis that we (or,
more precisely, non-psychologists) sometimes get
At the individual level, social cognition is the
things “wrong,” that “just-plain-folks” are episte-
mental “filter” through which objective events and
mological dupes. Thus, according to the “social
experiences are subjectively represented and
cognition” approach, we can only know about
remembered. It is a basic premise of the “cognitive
revolution” in psychology that individuals do not other people in a necessarily indirect and gen-
respond directly to stimuli from the external erally hazardous way, given the limited and
environment but to their perceptions and cognitive ambiguous evidence:
interpretations of those stimuli. (Brewer &
Hewstone, 2004, p. xi) Judgments of such internal states as emotions,
personality traits, and attitudes are often extremely
In fact, this commitment to stimulus-response difficult. The person’s internal state cannot be
psychology is extensive not just in mainstream observed directly – it must be inferred from
cognitive psychology, but in social-cultural psy- whatever cues are available. (Taylor, Peplau, &
Sears, 1994, p. 51; emphasis added)
chology as well. For example, Brian Schiffer, in
his book on the Material Life of Human Beings, The problem of limited available information
also insists that we should go beyond the early (“the poverty of the stimulus”) is compounded by
behaviorists by constructing models “for eluci- the existence of a host of selective biases in judg-
dating the knowledge and cognitive processes ing other people (Smith & MacKie, 2000, p. 85).
that connect stimulus and response” (Schiffer, Curiously, however, the psychologists commit-
1999, p. 8, emphasis added). And, Rom Harré ted to this “error paradigm” (as Funder, 1995,
(2002, p. 104), an influential critic of mainstream has characterized it) clearly regard themselves
psychology and exponent of discursive psychol- as somehow immune from these epistemological
ogy (and who surely does know better), has given limitations, and as perfectly well placed to assess
the following example of word recognition to the hopeless inaccuracies of “other people” in
explain how we should theorize more generally their attempts to make sense of other “other peo-
within psychology: ple.” How else could they conclude that other
Instead of the behaviorist pattern: people, namely non-psychologists, or just-plain-
Stimulus (retinal sensation) → Response folk, are wrong?
(perception of word) we must have Representationalism has always seemed the
Observable stimulus (retinal sensation) together obvious way to explain such errors, but there is a
with unobservable Cognitive process (“knowledge snag – and it is a big one. Although its readiness
utilization”) → Observable response (recognition to explain illusion has always seemed one of its
of word) most conspicuous strengths, representationalism
68 alan costall
is too effective. It cannot account for our failures this world and the physical world remained a
to err! mystery. (Mead, 1938, p. 359)
the representative theory of knowledge . . . satisfied The dualism of mind and matter (including the
the craving for a real and reliable world . . . by body) certainly protected the claim of the new
sequestering all error and untruth in a place apart, science to explain everything, but it was also
the “subjective” world. It is remarkable that this congenial to already long established patterns of
view has been found attractive and serviceable
thought. The assumption that we are not part of
notwithstanding the fact that at the same time it
nature has its origins in classical Greek philoso-
provides that all that any person can experience or
phy and Christian theology.
know is his own subjective world – the very
stronghold of error. Of course it avails nothing that Now, clearly, human beings pose an increas-
there is somewhere a real and true realm if it is for ingly dangerous threat to the continued existence
ever and completely shut out from the “subjective.” of life on earth, but this is precisely because we
(Holt, 1914, p. 259; see also Gibson, 1950, p. 159; are part of this world, even though we keep acting
Holt et al., 1912, p. 4) as if we were not. Our presence, however, is not
necessarily always malign, whereas the assump-
The “problem of illusion,” reappears in a more tion that we do not really belong in this world can
general and fundamental way within the West- be. When, for example, the Yellowstone National
ern intellectual tradition. For, according to the Park was established in 1864, in an attempt to
ontology of modern physical science, the very preserve that region in a state of “nature,” the
world as we experience and “dwell” in it must Native Americans who had been living there for
itself be regarded as one grand illusion. Within thousands of years were either removed or else
classical physical science, “nature” came to be confined in reservations. Yet the presence of those
defined according to the limits of its method- people and their sustainable practices of hunting
ologies (mechanism, atomism, quantification), to and use of fire were an important component of
sustain the claim that the new science could the very “nature” that the authorities had been
explain everything. And everything else – the so- trying to conserve (Hirsch, 2000; Cronon, 1996;
called secondary and tertiary qualities (sensory Stevens, 1997).
and aesthetic qualities and also meaning) – was Until this point, I have been presenting the var-
relegated to an alternative, shadowy existence ious problems behind mediationism in the form
beyond nature, the realm of representation: of a list, and it is already getting long. But this
is what is so tricky about mediationism: there
In general, the connections between the are so many underlying problems that we easily
experiencing individual and the things lose track of what, exactly, they are, and hence
experienced – conceived in their physical reality – whether they are really the kinds of problems
were reduced to a passive conditioning of states of that we should still be taking seriously. So let us
consciousness by a mechanical nature. Into such a
engage in some interim stocktaking. Long after
mind was carried . . . whatever in nature could not
the supposed demise of stimulus-response behav-
be stated in terms of matter in motion . . . The result
iorism, does it really make sense to be framing
of this was to force upon the mind the presentation
of the world of actual experience with all its the problem of psychology in terms of explain-
characters, except, perhaps, the so-called primary ing what “goes on” between the stimulus and
characters of things. Mind had, therefore, a response? Should we really be framing our the-
representational world that was supposed to answer ories in terms of a Watsonian, objectivized con-
to the physical world, and the connection between cept of “behavior”? Is it reasonable to be taking
the long-rejected ontology of mechanistic physics This approach to knowledge as “viewing from the
as a serious starting point for understanding the outside” is further encouraged by the fallacy of
place of mind in – or out – of nature? After all, intellectualism, the assumption that true knowing
physical theory went through a whole series of is theoretical (episteme) not practical (techne),
radical transformations throughout the late nine- and that it is detached not engaged (Toulmin,
teenth and twentieth centuries, and no longer 1976, p. 69; see also Falmagne, 1995; Ryle,
needs to eject mind from nature, and thereby “set 1999). To a remarkable extent, cognitive theory
up” psychology as, in effect, the science of the continues either to identify knowing with highly
“unscientific.” As the philosopher, Arthur Bent- specific and derivative practices of abstraction,
ley, nicely put it: such as classification, computation, calculation,
or logical inference, or else assimilates every-
Since the “mental” as we have known it in the past thing else to their terms, as in the claim that per-
was a squeeze-out from Newtonian space, the ceiving is nothing but a process of unconscious
physicist may be asked to ponder how it can still inference. Here is a recent example of this com-
remain a squeeze-out when the space out of which
mitment to the priority of abstraction that comes,
it was squeezed is no longer there to squeeze it out.
remarkably enough, from a book specifically con-
(Bentley, 1938, p. 165)
cerned with “grounding cognition”:
There are, however, yet further influential sources
Our ability to interact appropriately with objects
of mediationism, and they are intimately inter- depends on the capacity, fundamental for human
connected. The first of these is “the spectator the- beings, for categorizing objects and storing
ory of knowledge” which treats the knower as information about them, thus forming concepts,
essentially an observer rather than an agent. This and on the capacity to associate concepts with
visual metaphor of knowing posits an aloof God’s names. (Borghi, 2005, p. 8)
eye view outside the system to be known:
The primacy given to abstraction is most blatant
The theory of knowing is modeled after what was in modern psychological theory in the form of
supposed to take place in the act of vision. The theory of mind, and related “theory” approaches,
object refracts light and is seen; it makes a where we are all supposed to be living on the
difference to the eye and to the person having an basis of theorizing almost all of the time. Yet
optical apparatus, but none to the thing seen. The the very experience of theorizing itself has the
real object is the object so fixed in its regal strange effect of seeming to remove us from the
aloofness that it is a king to any beholding mind world and from other people:
that may gaze upon it. A spectator theory of
knowledge is the inevitable outcome. (Dewey, When we think, we shut ourselves within the
1969, p. 23) circles of our own ideas and establish, as it were, a
methodological solipsism. We behave as though we
This spectator theory of knowledge, in turn, leads were “pure subjects,” observers only, unimplicated
to a conception of knowing as representation or in the dynamic relatedness of real existence.
correspondence: (MacMurray, 1961, pp. 20–21)
If the knower, however defined, is set over against The still dominant computer metaphor of cog-
the world to be known, knowing consists in nitive theory continues to be widely regarded
possessing a transcript, more or less accurate but as a serious challenge to dualism since “brain
otiose, of real things . . . Knowing is viewing from and mind are bound together as computer
the outside. (Dewey, 1917, pp. 58–59) and program,” or hardware and software
70 alan costall
(Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 23, emphasis added). ingly surpasses Descartes’s own inconsistent and
But the metaphor proves to constitute a perverse (relatively) nuanced version of dualism (Nadler,
kind of reaction and a strange kind of bond. The 1997).
computer metaphor is an awesome condensation
(in the Freudian sense) of most of the impor-
tant problems behind mediationism. First of 4.3 Déjà Vu All Over Again
all, knowledge and meaning are identified with Mainstream psychological theory, even in rela-
representation. And then the computer metaphor, tion to so-called social psychology, has remained
far from being anti-dualistic, implies not only the resolutely individualistic, not just in focusing on
antithesis of mind and matter, since the software the individual person, but also in regarding the
is separable from any hardware, but also the social as derivative, an “overlay” on our funda-
antithesis of meaning and materiality, since mental, human nature. Within the confines of
meaning is located solely within the software such approaches, mediationism has thrived on
as self-enclosed symbols. This is precisely why a “double dualism” – an epistemological dual-
cognitivism has been claimed – with complacent ism of knower and known and a psychophysi-
approval – as “a science of structure and function cal dualism which “conceives empirical reality to
divorced from material substance” (Pylyshyn, fall asunder into a world of mind and a world of
1986, p. 68). matter mutually exclusive and utterly antithetic”
Furthermore, psychologists have been so (Lovejoy, 1929, p. 3).
enthralled by the software or program aspect of Many decades before the rise of modern cog-
the computer metaphor, that they have hardly nitivism, there was a wide reaction against this
bothered to spell out what precisely the hard- dualistic scheme, along with the representative
ware is supposed to represent, not least, whether theory of knowledge to which it gave rise:
it refers to the mind, the brain, or the body. Either
way, this hardware is no more than a stimulus- The supposition, so long accepted as
response – input–output – interface. Certainly, unchallengeable, that all apprehension of objective
some theorists have invoked aspects of the hard- reality is mediated through subjective existents,
ware as part of the computer metaphor, such as that “ideas” forever interpose themselves between
the central processing unit, memory stores, and the knower and the objects which he would know,
buffers. Yet it is John von Neuman’s ideal of has become repellent and incredible to many of our
a computer as a “general purpose machine” – contemporaries; and the cleavage of the universe
into two realms having almost no attributes in
a machine whose function is completely uncon-
common, the divorce between experience and
strained by the hardware – that formally under-
nature, the isolation of the mental from the physical
pins the supposed separability of software and order has seemed . . . to be unendurable in itself and
hardware. In fact, Neumann did not himself the source of numerous artificial problems and
hold with the computer analogy (see Freeman & gratuitous difficulties. (Lovejoy, 1929, pp. 3–4)
Nunez, 2001)!
However, according to the ideal of the com- This revolt against dualism was well motivated by
puter as a general purpose machine, the hard- important developments within science itself, not
ware (as mind, brain, or body) can have no just the new physics but also Darwinian theory
explanatory relevance at all (see Costall, 1991, with its emphasis on the naturalistic origins of the
2013). The computer metaphor, as it continues human mind (Dewey, 1910). Yet, as far as modern
to underpin modern cognitivism, does not “bind” cognitive theory is concerned, all this might never
us to the world or to our bodies. It breathtak- have happened.
But what about those alternative non- So, what about the more recent writings in
individualist approaches that put the emphasis on the broad area of sociocultural psychology? Well,
the “situated, collective and historically specific” to a very large extent, we find either socialized
(Bowker & Star, 2000, p. 288)? Vygotsky has, reformulations of the traditional, individualistic
of course, been an important historical influence dualisms, or derivative dualisms, most impor-
on many of these alternative approaches, yet his tantly those between nature, on the one hand, and
own contrast between the cultural and biological culture, or else, history, on the other.
lines of human development, and the way his First of all, there is wide agreement among the
developmental scheme prioritizes “intraper- “opposition” about the importance of representa-
sonal” and abstract modes of thought are hardly tion, and the need to understand representation in
unproblematic (Still & Costall, 1991b; Wertsch, a nonindividualistic way, and with this I have no
1996). And James Gibson, for whom the material objection. However, the general line would seem
conditions of shared experience and knowledge to be that we should go further, and, as in tradi-
was an important concern (see Heft, 2001), tional theory, take representation to be primary:
and whose concepts such as “affordance” and
Where discursive and cultural psychology come
“proprioception” provide important resources
together is in the recognition given to the primacy
for a non-dualistic psychology (Costall, 2006b),
of representation (discourse, mediation, etc.), and
unwittingly set a number of awkward traps. its location in situated social practices rather than
One of these was his failure to foreground our abstracted mental models. (Edwards, 1995, p. 63)
activity within and on the world. His approach
remained largely within the schema of knowl- But what, then, do these representations re-
edge as perception (the spectator theory of present? Just further representations? Once
knowledge). According to Edward Reed, Gib- again, we find ourselves in “the room without
son’s radical move was to shift the focus from a windows” with just pictures on the walls. Thus,
passive perceiver, to “the active self observing as in some versions of social constructivism (see
its surroundings” (Reed, 1988, p. 201; emphasis Danziger, 1997), a realm of the “socially con-
added). But this is not a sufficiently radical move. structed” interposes itself between us and nature,
Exploratory activity does not, in itself, change and through which we cannot reach the world
things. Indeed, Gibson’s account of affordances itself:
(i.e., the meanings of things for our possible
It is not that constructivists deny the existence of
actions) is itself framed in terms of observation, external reality, it is just that there is no way of
since, according to Gibson, the central claim of knowing whether what is perceived and understood
the theory of affordances is that “the ‘values’ and is an accurate reflection of that reality. (Marshall,
‘meanings’ in the environment can be directly 1996, p. 30)
perceived ” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127; emphasis
added). Even Gibson’s concept of “direct percep- The long-standing dualism of materiality and
tion” is problematic because it became defined, meaning also reappears in a social guise, where
by contrast, with so many diverse senses of “indi- meaning is not necessarily confined to individual
rect or mediated,” including “socially mediated,” mental representations, but to a separate domain
that it is hardly applicable to human perception of the symbolic:
at all (Costall, 1988, 1990). Despite his many we must not confuse the material world, where
profound contributions, Gibson’s “direct percep- things and people exist, and the symbolic practices
tionism” is thus a counterpart, rather than a real and processes through which representation,
alternative, to mediationism. meaning and language operate. Constructivists do
72 alan costall
not deny the existence of the material world. Culture emerges from nature as the symbolic
However, it is not the material world which conveys representation of the latter. (Ellen, 1996, p. 31)
meaning: it is the language system or whatever
system we are using to represent our concepts. It How do the sociocultural avant- garde keep back-
is social actors who use the conceptual systems ing themselves into these theoretical corners?
of their culture and the linguistic and other The fact that there is such a close “recapitula-
representational systems to construct meaning, to tion” of the state of individualistic psychology
make the world meaningful and to communicate suggests that we have not entirely avoided many
about that world meaningfully to others. (Hall, of the problems that have always constrained and
1997b, p. 25) distorted traditional psychology. Indeed, much of
the good rhetorical effect of social constructivism
Even researchers studying “material culture”
has itself depended on a traditional notion of
generally take a similar line, downplaying the
nature – of the natural – as fixed, universal, and
importance of materiality in favor of a separate
unaffected by us. Furthermore, much of the nut-
realm of what is, in effect “immaterial culture”
tiness of postmodernism would seem to reflect
(cf. Costall, 1995; Hutchby, 2001; Ingold 2000;
its failure, maybe refusal, to “get over” the mod-
Thomas, 1999). To a remarkable extent, the con-
ernist scheme it claims to have undermined (see
cept of “culture” is now widely identified with
Shalin, 1993).
representation and the symbolic. Here, for exam-
These problems are compounded by others
ple, is Clifford Geertz’s well-known definition of
more specific to the sociocultural approaches.
culture:
The first of these is a kind of methodologism
A historically transmitted pattern of meaning where the limitation of a research method comes
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited (as was the case in classical physical science)
conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means to define the limits of the object of study. Early
of which men communicate, perpetuate, and anthropology was of necessity “a science of
develop their knowledge about attitudes towards words” (Mead, 1975, p. 5) since there were
life. (Geertz, 1975, p. 89) no means of effectively recording gestures and
actions, and indeed many of the traditional prac-
But the basic point is repeated throughout the tices under study were matters only of recall, hav-
literature: ing been suppressed by the missionaries within
whose train the anthropologists tended to fol-
what does representation have to do with “culture”:
low. Yet, many current researchers restrict their
what is the connection between them? To put it
simply, culture is about “shared meanings.” Now,
attention to texts and transcriptions of speech,
language is the privileged medium in which we and although this, in itself, is clearly a matter
“make sense” of things, in which meaning is of choice, they often also come close to imply-
produced and exchanged. Meanings can only be ing that the only things we ever do are with
shared through our common access to language. So words. And they can prove remarkably evasive
language is central to meaning and culture and has when challenged on this point. Here, for exam-
always been regarded as the key repository of ple, is Michael Billig’s defense of the discourse
cultural values and meanings. (Hall, 1997a, p. 1) analysts’ emphasis on talk, based on a deft pre-
varication between an inclusive and a disjunctive
to explain culture is to answer the following
meaning of “action”:
question: why are some representations more
successful in a human population, more “catching.” Discursive psychologists might be suspected of
(Sperber, 1996, p. 58) only taking words into account and not actions.
However, that is not so, for the criticism assumes ences have abstracted for themselves a “material
that in social behavior there is a clear distinction world” set apart from human concerns, while the
between words and action. This is contested by social sciences, in their turn, have constructed
“speech-act theory,” which is a philosophical “a world of actors devoid of things” (Joerges,
position underlying much work of conversation 1988, p. 220). Interdisciplinary efforts to bridge
analysis . . . According to speech-act theory, making
this divide, such as the “environmental sciences,”
an utterance is itself an action; also many actions
have hardly thrived. They have either fractured
are performed through utterances . . . It is easy to
along the old divide or else retreated to the safety
exaggerate the difference between words and
actions, as if the latter were more “real” than the of “hard science” (see Kwa, 1987).
former. (Billig, 1997, pp. 46–47)
A further source of trouble concerns the deli- 4.4 Getting Over Mediationism
cate balance between, on the one hand, demon- There are remarkably many different ways of
strating the importance of the specific sociohis- talking ourselves into mediationism. Taking note
torical conditions, and, on the other, going too of those different ways, as I have tried to do in
far, and rendering the subjects of our studies so this chapter, is just a first step toward getting over
alien they no longer seem to count as “one of mediationism. At the beginning of the twenty-
us.” An emphasis on differences between peo- first century, the problems behind mediationism
ple can appear sinister not just on the basis of really ought no longer to appear quite so vital or
“race” but also their cultural practices, as became urgent as they once did. Paradoxically, it might
the case for the Vygotsky-inspired expedition to also help to set the clock back in psychological
study the “primitive” mentality of Uzbek peas- theory, to well before both modern cognitivism
ants (see Joravsky, 1989, p. 364). Eventually, and postmodernism, and return to the remarkable
some residue is identified which is claimed to writings of figures such as John Dewey, George
be immune from “the effects of culture,” such as Herbert Mead, and even William James, and their
the lower mental functions or the irrational (see emphasis on the mutuality, rather than the duality,
Connelly & Costall, 2000). But, as Shweder and of mind and world (Costall, 2004):
Sullivan (1990, pp. 407–408) have pointed out,
the basic cognitivist schema of structure and con- traditional theories have separated life from nature,
tent has also been highly influential, where cul- mind from organic life, and thereby created
tural influences are supposed to be restricted to mysteries . . . Those who talk most of the organism,
the contents of a biologically fixed structure: the physiologists and psychologists, are often just those
central processing mechanism. Although this cer- who display least sense of the intimate, delicate and
tainly manages to draw a bottom line, and ensure subtle interdependence of all organic structures and
processes with one another . . . To see the organism
some kind of ultimate unity for humankind, it is at
in nature . . . is the answer to the problems which
the considerable cost of a retreat once again into
haunt philosophy And when thus seen they will be
the dualisms of culture versus nature, and culture
seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box but as
versus biology. events are in history, in a moving, growing never
Finally, the dualisms of matter and mind and finished process. (Dewey, 1958, pp. 278, 295)
of biology and culture are institutionalized in
the very structure of modern academic disci- My purpose in this chapter has emphatically not
plines. On the one hand, there are the natural been to deny or minimize the importance of var-
and the engineering sciences and, on the other, ious kinds of mediation in human existence. I
the human or social sciences. The natural sci- am not trying to argue for some kind of “direct”
74 alan costall
theory either of immaculate perception or even Billig, M. (1997). Discursive, rhetorical, and
action. What I have been trying to challenge is ideological messages. In C. McGarty & S. A.
the appeals to mediation as a way of bridging the Haslam (Eds.), The Message of Social
very big gaps that we assume are supposed to Psychology: Perspectives on Mind in Society
separate us from the world, when, paradoxically, (pp. 36–53). Oxford: Blackwell.
Borghi, A. M. (2005). Object concepts and action. In
mediation, invoked in this way, just makes mat-
D. Pecher & R. A. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding
ters worse. It always gets in the way. It is these
Cognition: The Role of Perception and Action in
very gaps, opened up by dualistic thinking, that
Memory, Language, and Thinking (pp. 8–34).
are the problem. Whereas mediationism, given Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
its dualistic premises, can only regard mediation Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (2000). Sorting Things
as an impenetrable barrier between ourselves and Out: Classification and Its Consequences.
the world, we need to remember that our social Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
practices of mediation are, for better or worse, Brewer, M. & Hewstone, M. (2004). Introduction. In
taking place in the world, and actually changing it M. Brewer & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Social
by “constitut[ing] objects not constituted before” Cognition (pp. xi–xii). Oxford: Blackwell.
(Mead, 1934, p. 78). Carr, H. A. (1915). Review of J. B. Watson (1914).
Mediationism obscures the very conditions of Behavior: an introduction to comparative
psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 12, 308–312.
possibility for social mediation. If we are going
Connelly, J. & Costall, A. (2000). R. G. Collingwood
to make sense of mediation, how it originates and
and the idea of an historical psychology. Theory
is sustained, we will need to find a place in our
& Psychology, 10, 147–170.
theories for the existence of both meaning and Costall, A. (1988). A closer look at direct perception.
mediation before and beyond the realm of rep- In A. Gellatly, D. Rogers, & J. A. Sloboda (Eds.),
resentations and symbols, and take their materi- Cognition and Social Worlds (pp. 10–21).
ality much more seriously. Psychological theory Oxford: Clarendon Press.
needs to become worldly and move beyond the Costall, A. (1990). Picture perception as “indirect”
antitheses of nature and history, and of material- perception. In K. Landwehr (Ed.), Ecological
ity and meaning (Costall, 1995; Costall & Dreier, Perception Research, Visual Communication and
2006). We are, in the end, part of what nature has Aesthetics (pp. 15–22). New York: Springer.
become. Costall, A. (1991). Graceful degradation: Cognitivism
and the metaphors of the computer. In A. Still. &
A. Costall (Eds.), Against Cognitivism
Acknowledgments (pp. 151–170). London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
Costall, A. (1995). Socializing affordances. Theory
I am very grateful to Ivan Leudar, Patrick
and Psychology, 5, 467–481.
Renault, Ann Richards, Cintia Rodriguez, and Costall, A. (2004). From Darwin to Watson (and
the editors of this Handbook for their helpful cognitivism) and back again: The principle of
comments. animal-environment mutuality. Behavior &
Philosophy, 32, 179–195.
Costall, A. (2006a). “Introspectionism” and the
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5 Sociocultural Psychology and
Interpersonal Psychoanalysis: The
Semiotic Space in the Consulting
Room
Philip J. Rosenbaum
baum, 2015a; Levenson, 2002). More recently,

5.1 Introduction: Shared Origins interpersonal psychoanalysis has achieved some
There have been any number of theories aimed prominence as a central contributor (along with
at understanding what transpires in the consult- British object relations) to the currently in vogue
ing room between therapist and patient. These relational psychoanalysis (Harris, 2011; Stern,
have ranged from Freud’s aspirations of mak- 2013).
ing the unconscious conscious, to the more Notably, and not surprisingly, given its over-
structured approaches of cognitive therapy that lapping influences, interpersonal psychoanalysis
involve changing maladaptive belief patterns. also shares quite a bit with cultural psychol-
My personal training has been in interpersonal ogy. For example, interpersonal psychoanalysis
psychoanalysis. sees the individual as a social being, always in
Historically, interpersonal psychoanalysis is a important relationships (not just limited to the
less known branch of psychoanalysis, originat- mother) that shape their growth and develop-
ing during the 1930s and 1940s in the United ment. Furthermore, interpersonal psychoanalysis
States as a conglomeration of the works of Harry considers the self as multiple and thus provides
Stack Sullivan (1953a, 1953b), Eric Fromm an alternative to essentialist views of the self.
(1941, 1951, 1956), Freda Fromm-Reichmann Indeed, as early as 1950, Harry Stack Sullivan
(1950), and Clara Thompson (1950/2003) (see controversially declared that the self is an illu-
also Stern et al., 1995 for a good overview of sion, by which he meant that there is no aspect
key figures and papers). Drawing heavily from of the self, which is untouched by relationships
the work of the American pragmatists, espe- (Rosenbaum, 2015a). In other words, there is no
cially George Herbert Mead (1967) and William essential self that exists outside of relationships.
James (1890/1950), as well as a wide range of While, at the time, this was a source of criti-
influences, including the linguist Edward Sapir cism and derision – interpersonal psychoanaly-
(Sullivan, 1953a), the psychiatry of William sis has often been accused of being a “social sci-
Alanson White (Sullivan, 1953a), and the biology ence” and a branch of social psychology – recent
of Kurt Goldstein (Fromm-Reichmann, 1950), developments have touted the multiplicity of
interpersonal psychoanalysis provided a needed self (Bromberg, 1996, 1998; Stern, 2009, 2015;
alternative to the Freudian and ego psychoanaly- Hermans, 2001; Hermans & Kempen, 1993) and
sis, which, especially in the United States, were the constitutive role of culture in shaping and
the dominant forms of psychoanalysis (Rosen- guiding individual experiences.
Sociocultural Psychology and Interpersonal Psychoanalysis 79
These similarities are perhaps why I felt most constructive areas of dialogue, which will help
comfortable studying interpersonal psychoanaly- each field develop in new and productive ways.
sis given my early education as a cultural psy- This is in part because of their similarities that
chologist. Indeed, I have often been surprised at can be seen in their methodological approaches
the lack of dialogue between cultural psychol- as both are interested in the micro-genetic or
ogy and interpersonal psychoanalysis, as, to me, moment-to-moment study of psychological pro-
they make sense as complementary partners in cesses as a method toward understanding what
thought (Stern, 2009). Not only do they share happens in real time.
similar forefathers, as it is likely that Sullivan With this in mind, my goal in this chapter is to
was not just influenced by Mead, but also the bring these schools of thinking into greater dia-
works of Charles S. Peirce (Rosenbaum, 2015b), logue with each other. I will begin by describing
but also philosophical and theoretical traditions. interpersonal psychoanalysis, particularly focus-
For instance, as I will elaborate below, interper- ing on the works of important historical and con-
sonal psychoanalysis reflects a decidedly prag- temporary clinicians. I will then shift my focus
matic mindset, particularly as it relates to the to discussing the ways in which sociocultural
importance of semiotic mediation (Rosenbaum, psychology may understand similar phenomena
2015a, 2016). Moreover, I would argue that both and how using the broader top down lens can
interpersonal psychoanalysis and sociocultural benefit practitioners in the consulting room. In
psychology are interested in understanding simi- order to allow for the fullest sense of dialogue,
lar phenomena, namely, how people make mean- I will pay particular attention to meaning mak-
ing and construct experience. Finally, they are ing as understood by each school, including areas
also both field theories. of agreement, disagreement, and needing more
Where they differ is in the lens they take to discussion.
explore this and the goals or targets of explo-
ration. Interpersonal psychoanalysis focuses
5.2 The Interpersonal School
primarily on the individual and therapeutic dyad
and then occasionally extracts to the broader While, as stated above, interpersonal psycho-
social context, with an aim on helping one analysis began with a convergence of thinkers,
(though sometimes both) party live their lives the work of Harry Stack Sullivan stands out as
differently. In contrast, sociocultural psychology the most systematic and comprehensive study of
often starts at the level of the social and moves interpersonal conduct. For Sullivan (1938/1995,
downward to the individual, with an interest in 1953a, 1953b) our proficiency as sign users, par-
explicating a wider array of day-to-day processes. ticularly our ability to make meaning of and to
Moreover, as interpersonal psychoanalysis has an understand the sign usage of others while also
interest in psychopathology, or what goes wrong making ourselves clear and proficient communi-
in individual relationships and meaning making, cators, was of central importance.
and in alleviating suffering from psychopathol- He was, notably, an early adopter of field the-
ogy, its emphasis is often on clinical technique ory. Sullivan acknowledged Kurt Lewin’s work
and intervention. Alternatively, as sociocultural (Sullivan, 1953b; Stern, 2013) and while he did
psychology is more broadly interested in the not explicitly work with Lewin’s language, the
impact of culture on daily living and not a psy- ideas of field theory are implicit throughout
chotherapy, there is greater room for the study his writing. Thus, Sullivan discussed the inter-
of novelty, creativity, and a wider range of study. personal field considering it to be the range
However, I view these differences as potentially of thoughts and interpretations available to the
80 philip j. ro se n bau m
patient and therapist at any given point in time. thoughts are most often found in schizophren-
The field supports the quality of meanings that ics who are unable to communicate; though
are available to be made by an individual. developmentally, they may also map onto very
young babies and children for whom the world
is felt more as impression than organized
5.2.1 Sullivan’s Three Different
experience.
Modes of Meaning Making
Parataxic experiencing: Prototaxic thinking
Sullivan considered the interpersonal field as “a gives way to what Sullivan termed parataxic
continuous, inevitable social aspect of human liv- thinking; which while also private, is a more
ing . . . an omnipresent, concrete, empirical real- organized and social way of thinking. In parataxic
ity, a sociological and psychological fact that per- thinking, the individual has often begun to order
meates and helps to constitute every moment the world and their experiences, but does so in
of every human being’s life” (cited in Stern, overly simplistic terms (black and white), with-
2013, p. 489). Individuals cannot exist outside out attention to detail, or necessarily facts (data).
of the field, which for Sullivan was patterned Thus, like prototaxic thinking, parataxic thought
and shaped by our earliest interpersonal interac- has not been “consensually validated,” but unlike
tions and cultural experiences and leads to recur- prototaxic thinking can potentially become the
rent ways of thinking, feeling, and relating. Thus, subject of dialogue and discussion.
Sullivan (1953a) states, “The human being Syntaxic experiencing: Thinking subjected to
requires the world of culture, cannot live and “consensual validation,” the acknowledgment of
be human except in communal existence with it. others, leads to the development of the most
The world of culture, is however, clearly mani- advanced way of thinking and being, known
fest only in human behavior and thought. Other as “syntaxic.” Consensually validated ideas are
people are, therefore an indispensable part of the largely symbolic, having become known through
environment of the human organism” (p. 38). relating to someone else. Thinking in a “syn-
Human development requires mediating cul- taxic” fashion allows for the self to make more
tures, environments, and other people, and for appropriate meanings of situations and experi-
Sullivan leads to three types or modes of thinking ence and thus clears up the distorted thinking and
(1953a, 1953b). These progress from the most behavior that Sullivan felt was at the heart of most
disordered to normative and range in terms of pathology. Interestingly, while seeing things more
clarity, organization, degree of privacy, how com- clearly may alleviate distress and discomfort it
municable they are, and so forth. While all indi- often involves dealing with the source of anxiety,
viduals retain and engage in these different styles though hopefully with a greater range of freedom
of thinking throughout their lives (i.e., they move and choice.
in and out of them at different times and contexts)
they can also loosely map onto different develop-
5.2.2 Systems of Defense
mental periods (Rosenbaum, 2015b).
Prototaxic experiencing: The first level of Notably, Sullivan considered the use of both
thinking Sullivan termed “prototaxic.” Here, prototaxic and parataxic thought as a defense,
thinking is not goal directed or in many senses which arose from our need to protect ourselves
even comprised of thoughts at all, but is more from negative appraisals of others, which would
chaotic, unlinked, and unclear. It is almost hurt our self-esteem (1950, 1953b). He described
like private unorganized impressions, feelings, the “self-system” as the part of the self, which
impulses, and so forth. Diagnostically, prototaxic is always reaching out from our experience
(consciously or not) to keep anxiety at a mini- they anticipate anxiety relates to the strength of
mum and our self-esteem as high as possible. the distortion, with prototaxic distortions being
This means that the relationships we have as stronger than parataxic. Notably, this is a dif-
children impacts our later ability to relate through ferent type of unconscious than the Freudian
shaping the field of possible interactions between drive-based model of the unconscious, acting on
those that raise anxiety and those that lower anx- the very selection of details from which to base
iety. Since individuals are comfortable (less anx- meaning and experience.
ious) with what they know and find predictable, For example, Lauren, a young female patient
they may act in ways that prevent them from is convinced that she is not good at anything
achieving happiness and satisfaction; but instead and believes no one likes her. Despite plenty of
help them feel secure. For instance, Sullivan evidence to the contrary, including being a 4.0
(1953a) writes: “And so the unhappy child who student and involved with a number of success-
grows up without love will have a self dynamism, ful clubs and activities, she feels insecure, and
which shows great capacity for finding fault with has low self-esteem. In this case, Sullivan, would
others and by the same token, with himself” through the use of what he termed the detailed
(p. 22). inquiry (1953c), a way of interviewing patients,
While finding fault with others and oneself attempt to both determine the historical and cur-
may not lead to satisfaction, it does (re)create rent veracity of her claims (i.e., what are the facts
a sense of security through predictable relation- as it were) and also open up the parts of her story
ships. The extent to which we as individuals are that she is not attending too, presumably because
able to recognize patterns and then think and feel they cause too much anxiety.
about them will shape the fields of our potential Thus, while the facts may be that Lauren is
experience. For Sullivan, there is a double mech- quite an excellent student with a number of
anism of action here. First, we may “selectively friends, it is also true that she does not feel or
inattend” to the aspects of others that cause us see it this way. Why not? Here, there are any
anxiety. Thus, the unhappy child would likely not number of possible scenarios that we can imag-
pay attention to the behaviors of others that they ine. For instance, Lauren’s parents may have seen
do not find fault with, as these could threaten her success as a way of her separating from them,
their sense of security. Simultaneously, we may an idea which they found threatening, prevent-
also inattend to the parts of ourselves that arouse ing them from validating her accomplishments.
anxiety in others and so the critical child may not Alternatively, perhaps her parents only valued her
necessarily even realize how they are affecting success when she did a perfect job, implying that
others. In this form of “parataxic thinking” the anything less than perfect is not good enough.
individual’s thoughts have not been consensually Or, finally, maybe Lauren’s parents secretly felt
validated and so are generalized, private, and dis- threatened by Lauren’s success and so competed
torted (Rosenbaum, 2015b; Sullivan, 1953b). In with her.
this regard, the field of meanings narrows consid- In all of these instances, her relationships to
erably as other areas of possible meaning making her parents and their relationship to her (and
are strongly blocked off. her success) are important and help constitute
Thus, we might say that Sullivan developed her own experience. They structure the field of
a theory of how individuals unconsciously pro- available meanings – especially when Lauren
tect themselves from constructing meaning out is a young child and may lack other fields to
of their experiences if they anticipate that it draw from (such as friends, or alternative cul-
will cause them anxiety. The degree to which tural scripts). Without access to a wider array of
symbolic resources (see Chapter 10, this volume) Unlike in the first example, where meaning
Lauren may struggle to bridge the gaps between is made of experience and generalized into the
her own experiences and her parents responses, organizer of “bad”; in these two examples defen-
thus shaping the meaning she attaches to them. sive processes prevent the construction of mean-
Consider the first example where success is a ing at all. Lauren, for instance, might not be able
form of separation. This may be very threaten- to articulate much about her experience, resort-
ing to her parents who, although wanting her to ing to saying “I don’t know” and in fact mean-
succeed, also want her to remain close to them. ing it. The prospective anxiety associated with
As such, they may unintentionally communicate not being perfect is so great that Lauren can-
that while being successful is good, separating not recognize herself in the experience to create
is bad. In eliciting negative reactions from her meaning.
parents, when positive ones are expected, Lauren Whatever the case, for Sullivan, Lauren, like
may come to feel confused about being success- all of us, suffers from a distorted view of herself
ful and feel that she is not good enough at mak- and the important people in her life. Further com-
ing her parents happy. She may develop an idea plicating the picture is that Sullivan was sensitive
of being successful and liked as “bad,” with this to the adaptive aspect of these defensive postures.
part of herself becoming labeled the “bad me” For Lauren, feeling not good enough may also
(Sullivan, 1953a, 1953b). Indeed, she may even have been a source of motivation, a futile attempt
think that her success is bad because it causes dis- at proving her worth that was doomed to defeat.
tance and a negative reaction. For Sullivan, until
she can develop a more accurate idea about what
5.2.3 In the Consulting Room
being successful means (and have new experi-
ences around this as well) it may be hard for her We might say that Sullivan felt that patients were
to feel good about herself. not fully semiotically competent. They failed to
Notably, Lauren herself may not be aware that either adequately interpret the world or commu-
she attaches this value judgment to success. The nicate about their inner experiences within the
anxiety around exploring this “bad me” keeps world, or some combination of both. In the con-
her experience confused and distorted (parataxic sulting room, he would work to demonstrate to
as it were) and prevents Lauren from formulat- the patient their patterns of conduct. Working in
ing other possible meanings or even interpret- what has been termed the “here and now” by
ing the situation more accurately – that is, my focusing on the way they relate to others in their
parents appreciate my success but are also upset lives (or himself) he would connect to the “there
by it. and then.” Doing so demonstrates to patients the
Even more problematic may be the second or ways their conduct is meant to protect their self-
third scenarios. Here, we can imagine that Lau- esteem. As people become less bent on protecting
ren’s parents in only validating and acknowledg- themselves from the aspects of their personalities
ing Lauren when she has been perfect, or in not they’ve learned are bad or even not to be consid-
acknowledging their own competition with her, ered, they develop greater semiotic capacities to
may create a type of experience where Lauren has more accurately interpret reality, and thus resolve
not felt that her good self has been seen. In Sulli- pathology.
van’s thinking (1953a, 1953b), this creates a type Working to establish data points was essen-
of “not-me” experience, where the patient disso- tial for Sullivan (1938/1995). Like his pragmatic
ciates themselves from any recognition of their forefathers he was wary of too much metathe-
accomplishments. ory. He would try to avoid conjecture, instead
sticking with the data, which could include the not particularly interested in dreams, fantasy, and
patient’s history, collaborative history, and also imagination, but is overly constrained to inter-
how they interacted with him (Sullivan, 1953c). preting situations in particularly normative fash-
Clarity into their situation through the use of ions. It does not emphasize novelty, multiplicity,
data was thus an important goal of the consulting or creativity. Luckily, some of the more recent
room. The therapist was a “participant observer,” interpersonal psychoanalysts have further devel-
both involved in the patient’s life and also outside oped Sullivan’s theory.
it. Through their participation they would become
aware of the areas of distortion and through their
5.3 Recent Contributors
distance, they could offer expert commentary on
the patient’s “problems in living.”
5.3.1 Edgar Levenson
In this regard, Sullivan was very much a
thinker of his times, believing in an objective Since Sullivan’s somewhat premature death in
reality and that it was knowable, even while 1949 the field of interpersonal psychoanaly-
acknowledging the inevitability of participation sis has continued to develop. One of the most
(Rosenbaum, 2015a). The therapist (or gener- prominent interpersonal thinkers is Edgar Lev-
ally psychiatrist, in his terms) was expert in enson who further elaborated Sullivan’s semiotic
both aspects of participating and observing. In ideas. In his early and seminal work, Levenson
this regard, Sullivan, while describing different (1979/2005, 1983/2005) utilized structuralism
modes of experience, was not a constructionist to make a series of important contributions to
interested in how meaning was made. Thus, while Sullivan’s work.
his thinking is decidedly oriented toward the field First, for Levenson, since language itself is
the patient inhabits, it was with the bent of resolv- structured semiotically, to speak with someone is
ing distorted thinking. also to act with them. As a result, he does not
While distortions problematically limit the think the therapist could be an objective observer,
field of possibilities they are also inevitable. In but is always a subjective participant with the
emphasizing how distortions result from anxi- patient (1989). This idea has certain important
ety about the way we are seen, Sullivan provides ramifications. It minimizes the importance of the
an important contribution to the way individu- analyst focusing on “acting out” or the ways
als make meaning. Notably, meaning making pro- patients may act out feelings about the therapy
cesses are always shaped by our past experiences and therapist outside of the room while enhanc-
which we are bringing into our current context. ing the importance of what happens within the
We are motivated by the unconscious desire to room. Given the nature of the consulting room,
appear in ways we find favorable to ourselves where the patient does most of the talking, the
(whatever those might be) and others. The mean- relationship is slanted. As the patient’s language
ings we make about ourselves may then shape is given priority, Levenson feels that the analyst
and influence future meanings in a feed forward is constantly being impinged on by the possi-
system (Valsiner, 2007). bilities of transformation (1979/2005, 1991). In
Of course, having said this, Sullivan was not other words, the patient’s language structures the
interested in elaborating theory, but instead help- analytic space in an attempt to transform the ther-
ing patients. Thus, he saw himself in the role of apist, pulling them to act in certain familiar ways
expert asserting which meanings were right and similar to how others act with them. The ther-
wrong (or at the very least, better and worse). apist then enacts certain roles that other people
In this regard, his theory of meaning making is may have played with the patient or currently play
with the patient. This continues the shift of focus and even the end of treatment) and in fact being
to their “here and now” in order to, in Levenson’s rejecting of her. Although the therapist could
words, figure out “what is going on around here” resist this transformation, the patient’s uncon-
(Levenson, 2003). scious interpersonal dynamics would inevitably
In considering language as semiotic, Levenson win out, until the therapist found themselves in
(1983/2005) is aware that the patient’s language some way rejecting the patient.
always carries with it all of its past associations Notably, this could not necessarily be pre-
and relations, which are brought to bear on the dicted. While the therapist may be aware of these
therapist who is in fact a new person. For Leven- qualities of Lauren’s parents, until they them-
son (2003) this semiotic component enables the selves enact it with the patient, they do not quite
therapist to visualize what they are being told know it in a consensually validated way. In other
almost as if watching a movie or play unfold words, since the therapist and patient have not
(Levenson, 1982). One role of the therapist is to experienced these qualities together they are in
then try and spot what is missing; the holes in the many respects unknown to each other. These
Swiss cheese of the narrative and inquire into enactments, as they have been labeled, are not
these areas. Levenson postulates that this is where only ways of intimately understanding known
the patient’s anxiety about their bad and not- past dynamics, but also a way of experiencing
me selves resides and so they have glanced over with the patient how they are in current relation-
important aspects of the story. Inquiry in turn cre- ships as well (Levenson, 1991).
ates a vector, if you will, within the therapeu- Levenson considers enactments as ubiquitous
tic field where the therapist becomes pulled into and unavoidable. We are always in some ways
acting in ways familiar to the patient. While the enacting something with our patients. This is
interactions with the patient could be understood because we share similar language at the cul-
as historical, for Levenson this would remove the tural and structural level, or, as he observes, to
power from them, as they are also transpiring talk with someone is also to act with them. Thus,
within the therapeutic room (Levenson, 1989). our actions always reverberate and are echoes of
Returning to Lauren who was discussed ear- previous interactions – the source of enactments.
lier, Levenson might argue that she would uncon- These occur at varying levels of awareness. Just
sciously, but inevitably, attempt to draw the ther- to be aware of a particular enactment, even to
apist into acting in a number of important roles. work around it, does not resolve the potential
For instance, she may cast the therapist as some- for enactments, but means that something else is
one to whom she is looking for approval and already being enacted. For Levenson then, these
then dismiss the therapist when they offer sup- occur at higher levels of abstraction (1982, 1991).
port. Similarly, Lauren may act like she wants In this regard, Levenson does not consider enact-
the therapist to solve her problems and then in ments to result solely from distortions on the part
turn reject their attempts at doing so. For Lev- of the patient, but instead involve real aspects of
enson, working with the patient to understand the therapist and the therapeutic dyad (Levenson,
what this form of interpersonal conduct is about 1991).
is an important part of treatment. Perhaps, Lauren For example, a patient and I are talking about
does not trust the therapist but is afraid of say- his relationship to dominant women. He prefers
ing this. In this way she could possibly communi- to be submissive, often giving himself over to
cate her distrust of the therapist, suspecting them their will and needs. We postulate in one par-
of hidden motives (i.e., not really wanting her to ticularly meaningful session that his submission
be successful since that would mean separation is a way of maintaining a relationship, but also
creating important space from his intrusive and case the therapist may be able to comment on
controlling mother. As the session ends, I instruct aspects of the experience that the patient had not
him to set reminders for future sessions as he thought of or considered; whereas in the latter
has a tendency to forget, thus reenacting the very they are not able to at first.
dynamic we had been discussing! For instance, a patient talking about his expe-
In this regard, unlike for Sullivan whose goal riences could not understand why his friends
was to clear up distorted thinking in all its seemed happy at a difficulty he was having. I
forms, Levenson considers the therapeutic task wondered whether they had been envious of the
as becoming more aware of the process of enact- patient’s earlier successes. When I asked this the
ments, from which we can never step outside of, patient responded that he had not considered this,
but hopefully instill a greater range of freedom but it made sense to him. In this case, I was able
and choice in our daily lives. to see something that he had not. We talked about
why this may have been and noted that competi-
tion was a part of the patient’s life with which he
5.3.2 Donnel Stern
was uncomfortable. An older sibling, the patient
Levenson’s work on enactments has been said that he often felt like he had to be supportive
expanded by more contemporary interpersonal of his younger siblings and there was not much
analysts, most notably Donnel Stern and Philip room in his family for the times that he felt angry
Bromberg. Stern (2003, 2009, 2015) has focused or annoyed with them.
his attention on what he calls unformulated expe- In strong dissociation, both the therapist and
riences. He considers these to be similar to Sul- the patient are unable to formulate experience.
livan’s parataxic distortions thinking of them as Note that this has considerable overlap with
parts of the patient’s experiences that are dis- Levenson’s idea of enactment. For Stern, the only
sociated. Influenced by hermeneutic philosophy, way to realize that something has been dissoci-
especially that of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Stern ated from the therapeutic field is for an enact-
argues that patients are unable to construct or for- ment to occur (2004). Here, the therapist has a
mulate their experience in order to know it and sense of what Stern calls chaffing, a feeling that
learn from it (2003). something is not right. This hard to pin down
For Stern (2003), dissociation differs from and identify feeling may occur at any time, but
repression in that when something is repressed especially when something does not quite make
it is metaphorically pushed outside, down, and sense or add up. In these cases, both parties have
away from consciousness, but when something is dissociated something important. Moreover, he
dissociated it never existed in consciousness to be argues that the therapeutic field does not have the
repressed. Interestingly, Stern’s theory is notably required qualities of relatedness (more on this in a
and explicitly a field theory (2009, 2015). The moment) to allow either party to venture into the
patient cannot formulate experience because the space required to understand what is occurring.
necessary conditions within the field to construct For example, in a recent case presentation
meaning are not present. where I talked about a patient who was in an
Dissociation comes in both a weak and strong abusive and unsatisfactory relationship, it was
sense (Stern, 2003). In weak dissociation the pointed out to me that I did not ask what possible
patient may have never considered a certain pos- benefit or satisfaction the patient could have been
sibility; whereas in strong dissociation, some- receiving as a result of being in that relationship.
thing, often trauma, interferes with the patient’s The discussant postulated that we were involved
ability to formulate experience. In the former in an enactment where both she and I were
dissociating as a result of the roles we felt forced pist’s past and present. Thus, the ability of both
to play (Mark, 2016, personal communication). parties to formulate is constantly being brought
For me, the pressure of the field was to provide into existence and also threatened by the pres-
advice and I entered into the role of “rescuer,” ence of the other and the way they are relating.
wanting to get the patient out of a bad situation. This quality ebbs and flows not only between ses-
For her, it was important to present herself as in sions but also during sessions as well. In some
need of help (expert advice), keeping the more cases, the field may be overly constricted, such as
vulnerable and angry parts of herself outside of when the therapist is being forced to play a par-
the room. ticular role (and also of course can identify with
In another case, a patient had been talking that role). For the therapist, one of the impor-
about a relationship that was frustrating her for tant goals of therapy is allowing for greater rela-
some time. In discussing it with me I did not quite tional freedom, whereby both patient and ther-
understand what was causing her distress and to apist can adopt different roles and perspectives.
be as upset with her partner as she was. It was What makes exploring this possible is the collab-
only after they broke up that I had the feeling of oration between patient and therapist.
chaffing that Stern alludes to and realized that we
had not been talking about sex. As it turns out,
5.3.3 Phillip Bromberg
the patient was unfulfilled by her partner. How-
ever, the shame of talking about sex meant that Greater freedom allows both parties to adopt
she did not bring it up with me. So strong was and explore their different selves and self-states.
her feeling of shame that I did not even think of When discussing self-states, the work of Phillip
inquiring until months later. Learning about their Bromberg is particularly important. Bromberg
problematic sex life shed a whole new light on the (1998, 2006, 2011) details both clinically and
content of what we had been talking about allow- theoretically how people are composed of differ-
ing us to understand better what had transpired. ent self-states. These can be thought of as differ-
In this respect we could say that the dissocia- ent forms of consciousness or self-organization
tion occurred between us as a result of the fact to which we have greater or lesser access. Draw-
that our field of relatedness did not allow us to ing heavily from trauma theory (2003) and object
even imagine or be curious about what was hap- relations theory (1998), Bromberg postulates that
pening in the bedroom. Stern notes that shame people become stuck when they are unable to
can often have this effect. It essentially creates “stand in-between the spaces” of these self-states.
taboo zones within the field where the patient Thus, someone whose experience is that of a
cannot go. These can be so strong as to prevent victim, aggressor, eating disordered individual,
the therapist from going there as well. overachiever, and so forth may struggle to adopt
Stern (2015) considers the quality of related- and inhabit other possible selves. For Bromberg
ness between patient and therapist as the essen- (1998), our different self-states can also achieve
tial aspect of the field. Both parties contribute a type of “self-truth,” which is a narrative that
to the field and so neither can stand outside of establishes boundaries around the characteris-
it. In this manner, Stern’s work further extends tics each state contains (i.e., cognitive, affective,
the work of Levenson by more explicitly con- physiological, self, self-other, and so forth).
sidering how the mutually created field between For example, a young man I work with talks
patient and therapist (referred to by others as about his identity as a survivor of sexual assault.
the “third”) involves contributions from both the At the time of the assault, however, he reports
patient’s past and present and also their thera- freezing and being unable to defend himself from
the stronger older male aggressor. This was a affective states of the patient (Bromberg, 2011).
traumatic and destabilizing experience for him. Bromberg seeks to help the patient expand and
In response, later in life he has become an advo- elaborate on their feeling states in order to help
cate for other survivors of assault, constantly them expand their field of awareness. In the
looking to stand up for them in ways that he felt detailed inquiry of affective states Bromberg
unable to stand up for himself. However, in sit- looks for dissociation, particularly around painful
uations where he feels even slightly anxious or feelings not tolerable within one given self-state
threatened his traumatized self emerges and takes (2006, 2011). In lessening the dissociative pull,
over, preventing him from acting to protect him- he hopes that patients can learn to effectively hold
self through common-sense actions that are read- more than one self-state, moving them from the
ily available to him. We both marvel at the pres- realm of having to act in a particular way to hav-
ence of these two separate selves that he cannot ing a choice or range of possible actions.
seem to integrate. Notably, certain self-states cannot be held
We can again see the overlap with Sullivan’s because they are seen as intolerable or threat-
crucial idea of distortion. For Bromberg, other ening to the dominant self. Much like Stern,
selves are not only inaccessible, but in more Bromberg (1998) does not consider selves as
extreme cases, we can say in Donnel Sterns lan- repressed due to conflict, but rather not brought
guage, strongly dissociated. Notably, this is often into existence in order for conflict and repres-
the result of some form of interpersonal trauma sion to ensue. As patient’s become better able
that makes identifying with different aspects to tolerate and express different selves, conflict
of self and other impossible (Bromberg, 2003, between the ideas, wishes, goals, motivations,
2006). As a result, the person is stuck within and so forth of these selves may in fact emerge
a particular mode and pattern of relating. They and become repressed. These could then be the
bring this mode of being into the consulting target of interpretative efforts and pointing out
room. Since other selves have been dissociated the defensive forces that may be at work to keep
the therapist though alert to these possibilities them repressed.
cannot access them and stumbles along with the
patient the best they can (Bromberg, 2000). Sim-
5.4 Some Important
ilar to Stern, in order for the patient to begin to
Considerations
learn to find a new place to stand or even recog-
nize themselves in different contexts, the thera- These recent contributors have signaled a shift
pist has to be able to imagine the patient differ- from focusing primarily on the content of
ently (Bromberg, 2003, 2011). However, this is the patient’s experience, what they say, to the
tricky, since if the therapist does not acknowledge study of ongoing psychic process. Today’s ther-
and recognize the patient’s current self-state they apists are more interested in how the patient
are unable to help them find new ones. goes about being themselves, which includes
Whereas Stern pays particular attention to making meaning out of experience, regulating
the quality of relatedness between therapist and their emotional world and interpersonal reac-
patient from moment to moment, Bromberg is tions (Beebe & Lachmann, 1998, 2003). Ther-
more interested in the affective feel of the patient apists are especially attuned to how these pro-
(though there is a lot of overlap between the two). cesses play out in the consulting room. Here,
He has elaborated Sullivan’s detailed inquiry the therapist shifts from becoming solely the
from a focus on establishing what actually tran- interpreter of the patient’s experience to a co-
spired in the patient’s history to tracking the participant and co-constructor of meaning (Aron,
1991, 2001; Beebe & Lachmann, 1998, 2003; intrapsychic as standing in relation to interpsy-
Benjamin, 1988, 1998; Boston Change Group, chic phenomena only adds richness and com-
2007; Bromberg, 2011; Stern 2009, 2015; Butler, plexity through considering the ways that moti-
1990; Cushman, 1995; Greenberg & Mitchell, vations, defenses, desires, and so forth may exist
1983; Hoffman, 1991; Mitchell, 1988, 1997). The in multiple, paradoxical, and contentious ways.
therapist also invites the patient to participate The second set of questions to consider con-
in constructing their own experience, recogniz- cerns the idea that anything goes for interper-
ing that the subjectivity of the therapist plays sonal psychoanalysts (Greenberg, 2001). Since
a crucial role in shaping the interpersonal field most interpersonal therapists consider realities
(Hoffman, 1983; Ehrenberg, 1992). Mind and like selves as plural and multiple they are often
selves are seen as emerging from within the inter- accused of being relativists. However, this is
personal process, rather than existing indepen- not the case. Stern (2004, 2015) and Bromberg
dently waiting to be discovered and understood (2011), for instance, both makes it clear that
from outside of the field (Stern, 2015). reality is always constrained by a host of social
There are two important questions of interper- and personal factors and considerations. Context
sonal psychoanalysis ideas to briefly respond to and normative standards determine the extent to
before moving forward. First, what happens to which meanings can be made (Bruner, 1990).
the patient’s internal world, the intrapsychic of Straying outside of these, while often a place
phantasy, dream, unconscious motivation, and so of creative expressions, may also, if gone too
forth? While critics (Mills, 2011; Eagle, 2003) far, represent psychotic processes or at the very
have argued that the patient’s mind becomes least prevent one’s meaning and intention from
obscured from an interpersonal and relational being known and appreciated (Marková, 2003a).
perspective, this is not the case at all. Indeed, So while there are many possible realities and
if anything, the internal world of the patient areas of exploration and meaning, they also exist
becomes richer and more elaborate. Although it within the range of what can be consensually
may seemingly lack the drama of the Freudian validated.
or Kleinian landscape (to mention a few), the It may be that the complaint of anything goes
intrapsychic can instead be more fruitfully con- has more to do with clinical technique, how the
sidered as reflecting the ongoing relationships therapist or analyst do therapy and analysis. By
between self-other. now, it should be clear that the techniques in
The therapist still remains primarily interested interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis differ
in the patient’s hopes and dreads, fears and wishes considerably from what has historically been con-
(Mitchell, 1995), but acknowledges that these sidered the techniques of “classical,” “Freudian,”
can only be known and experienced within an or “Ego” psychoanalysis. Much as the move from
interpersonal context. To speak of an aspect of classical to contemporary theory and practice has
a patient’s internal world already requires an been seen as going from “one person to two per-
acknowledgment of the external world. In this sons”; technique has followed (Hoffman, 1983).
respect, they are mutually constitutive, much like However, again, changes in technique do not
Valsiner (2007) has described with personal cul- mean that anything goes. Boundaries, discipline,
ture always being constituted within the broader and common sense still are quite important as
societal context. This adds an important dimen- are typical ways of working, as well as the focus
sion to understanding these domains, which may being on the patient’s life as opposed to the ther-
be better thought of as private and public, respec- apists (Tublin, 2011). In fact, it is the discipline
tively. From my perspective, considering the on the part of the therapist, whether this revolves
around the detailed inquiry (Sullivan, 1953a), (Lehman, 2014). Considering some of the ways
listening for “holes in the narrative” (Levenson, that individual conduct is always grounded and
1982), or establishing an intimate quality of relat- constituted by larger sociocultural factors pro-
edness (Stern, 2015) that creates and ensures the vides an important complement to what tran-
potential for therapy to take and for patients to get spires within the consulting room. In other words,
better. Thus, as we return our attention to the con- locating therapy within broader social contexts
sulting room it should be clear that while there are is important for understanding what transpires
many ways of working, it would be misleading to within the consulting room and how it may be
say that any of them go. mutative.
In this regard, from a sociocultural perspec-
tive, therapy shares similarities and differences
5.5 Sociocultural Psychology
with other socially informed locale and experi-
and the Semiotic Space in the
ences, such as places of prayer, doctor’s offices,
Therapeutic Field
restaurants, shopping malls, sporting events, and
From the contemporary viewpoint of therapy, the so forth, where public and private selves meet
actual relationship between therapist and patient (Bruner, 1990; Valsiner, 2009). The consulting
is mutative (Levenson, 1979/2005, 1982). It is a space does not offer just any type of relationship,
laboratory for understanding and experiencing – but, more specifically, a highly regulated one
often in real time – the ongoing psychological replete with unique constructions, ideas, goals,
processes used by the patient to relate to them- processes, boundaries, and so forth (Baranger &
selves and others in the world. It is, I think, fair to Baranger, 1961/2008; Abbey, 2007; Rosenbaum,
say that these ongoing psychological processes of 2016). Indeed, like with other – perhaps all – reg-
relating to self and other are decidedly semiotic ulated social experiences, how individuals navi-
as are the ways of talking about them (Levenson, gate, or get through them, in order to make mean-
1979/2005, 1983/2005; Sullivan, 1953a, 1953b; ing, is an important component for their own
Stern, 2003, 2009, 2015; Cushman, 1995). They well-being.
are thus also cultural (Valsiner, 2007), playing The similarities and differences between these
an important role in constituting the individual social situations and therapy are in fact important
self (Heft, 2012), and developmental. Talking, for the therapeutic process to take hold. Patients
interacting, feeling, exploring all have in com- often come into therapy as a result of problems
mon the ongoing usage and interpretation of in navigating these other environments, such as
signs to inform how experience is understood and work or family life, and struggle to see the ways
meaning is made. Furthermore, they occur within that they may in fact trap themselves. And as
interpersonal and intrapersonal fields (Valsiner, stated above, that these processes often inevitably
2007). While this is of course the case for all talk play out between therapist and patient speaks to
therapies, as is hopefully clear from the section the structural and semiotic components of mean-
above, interpersonal psychoanalysis is unique in ing making.
its conceptualization and realization of the field In considering meaning-making processes
as a semiotic and therapeutic space.1 as field phenomena, sociocultural psychology
Notably, as stated earlier, whereas interper- extends field theory to all domains of psycho-
sonal psychoanalysis focuses on the individ- logical phenomena (Salvatore, 2016; see also
ual and expands upwards, sociocultural psychol- Chapter 2, this volume). In this regard, the
ogy, instead, focuses on the cultural and social psychopathology of distorted meaning mak-
and works downwards toward the individual ing and interpersonal relationships described in
the previous section are but one psychological more aware of the boundaries guiding our con-
phenomenon among many that sociocultural psy- duct. Moreover, we may become aware of how
chology studies. Indeed, through paying atten- permeable or not a boundary is. A phone ringing
tion to culture and context, sociocultural psychol- during a movie may be a distraction, but is easily
ogy may not necessarily see the processes above navigated by walking out of the theatre to take it.
as distorted or pathological, but may instead see In contrast, talking on the phone during the movie
them as reflections of different aspects of cul- quickly draws the ire of other movie watchers and
ture. Moreover, while interpersonal psychoanal- becomes highly discouraged.
ysis has its writing on other phenomena (creativ- Within the therapeutic setting, boundaries may
ity, group process, and so forth), its history is one come in a number of forms and have a variety
that is decidedly practical and focused on helping of effects. The physical layout and structure of
alleviate individual suffering. For sure, this is a the room, i.e., who sits where, what the space
noble cause, but a cultural perspective is needed looks like, the gender, race, ethnicity of patient
to help more fully understand how mind and psy- and therapist, and so forth may from the begin-
chology work as it pertains to both pathological ning of a treatment create the sense of shared
and nonpathological processes. culture or difference that can facilitate particu-
Cultural psychology, while not necessarily a lar types of relationships. Indeed, cultural bound-
unified field, has identified a number of impor- aries are already at play even before therapist and
tant aspects of intentional meaning-making pro- patient meet in person or talk on the phone. How
cesses. These include the importance of cultural the patient understands therapy, or how the practi-
boundaries, both physical and psychological, a tioner advertises about therapy, may create atmo-
host of regulating processes, the centrality of lan- spheres of openness and curiosity, a more medi-
guage, and the importance of context. cal and sterile environment, and a host of options
in between.
How boundaries are understood and inter-
5.5.1 Field Theories: Boundaries
preted then in turn create areas where patients
and Regulatory Processes
and therapists can travel to easily or with more
Culturally informed boundaries delineate the difficulty. For instance, certain topics, such as
spaces within fields where an individual (or ther- sex, self-harm, negative feelings, and so forth,
apeutic dyad in our case) can travel. Boundaries may be seen as taboo (Arcoverde, Amazonas, &
can be physical, including the objects and tools de Lima, 2016) and thus have strong boundaries
in the material world, but also psychological or around them that are not particularly permeable.
some combination of the two. Boundaries guide Other topics, such as marriage, job satisfaction,
meaning-making processes, they both facilitate and friendships, may be more accepted and open
the construction of meanings in certain direc- to exploration. Much like Sullivan differentiated
tions while also limiting them in others. This dual different aspects of one’s self (good, bad, not-me),
action of directing both through guidance and society canalizes experiencing and meaning mak-
constraint delineates psychic and physical space ing into particular zones that are more or less free
where individuals are able to travel. (Valsiner, 2007).
Most of the time, these processes operate The common difficulty of a patient “going
seamlessly in the background, a product of cul- there,” i.e., to a vulnerable or sensitive topic, may
tural assimilation and internalization, but much have less to do with intrapsychic resistance and
like the sound of a phone going off in the movie defense mechanisms and instead reflect an inter-
theatre pulls us out of watching the movie, there nalized sense that one simply does not talk about
are a number of experiences that may make us certain topics. This may result from defenses
and forces at the societal level. For instance, 5.5.2 The Role of Language
the recent crisis of Flint Michigan, where offi-
cials failed to properly apply corrosive inhibitors Notably, while interpersonal psychoanalysis has
to a new water source (the Flint River) leading become increasingly sensitive to these mutually
to demonstrable levels of lead in the drinking regulative processes, sociocultural psychology
water, but did not act on it for some time (despite offers the possibility for an even closer look at
being told it was a serious problem), demon- how these meanings and interpretations develop
strates how societal conflict around blame, expec- and serve to guide future meaning making
tation, and responsibility interfere with what was (Valsiner, 2007; see also Chapter 2, this volume).
and is needed to be done to effectively deal with Through the micro-genetic method of break-
devastating problems. While this might reflect ing meaning-making processes down moment-
the “darker” or more “destructive” impulses, by-moment, sociocultural psychology helps elab-
instincts, and aspects of the self found in the orate the way that fields are organized, elaborated,
writings of Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein, and deconstructed.
it also highlights the impact of very real social Not surprisingly, language plays an important
factors. role as signifiers that help organize and encode
Defensive structures may also have been experiences as well as create and modify them
learned and internalized from the more local cul- (Valsiner, 2006; Brinkmann, 2014, 2016). As we
tures of an individual’s home life. A patient who move from lower levels of abstraction to higher
has seen their parent deal with adverse situa- ones (Salvatore, 2016) language itself moves
tions, such as working multiple jobs just to get from being vague and ambiguous, possibly cap-
by, and not heard them complain (even if they do turing multiple meanings, to being more specific.
so with other adults), may quickly internalize the This narrowing may serve a communicative and
value of struggling through silence without com- useful function of helping to encapsulate expe-
plaint. For some, this even becomes transformed rience in such a way that can be useful. Inter-
into (and often is) a source of pride and strength. estingly, patients often express appreciation at
However, the rigidity of the boundary may then having their ideas summarized or reflected back
in turn prevent the individual from reaching out to them. While this may be due to a feeling of
when it is appropriate (and needed) to ask for having been heard and understood, I think it is
help. also because the therapist does more than reflect
This also speaks to how boundaries regu- as a mirror, but instead reorganizes the thoughts
late individuals’ experience by guiding their in a more cohesive fashion than initially said.
meaning-making process. Asking for help In hearing a different and often more organized
becomes a sign of weakness and not being able version of what they have already said, patients
to handle one’s business, even perhaps a sense of (and therapists) begin to focus on certain sig-
letting someone else down. This in turn guides nifiers at the exclusion of others. Notably, it is
how the individual interacts and structures their not uncommon for this to become abstract again
own interpersonal experiences. An individual requiring this process to continue on as the field
who sees asking for help as a weakness may expands.
surround themselves by people who need their The movement here in some ways echoes Lev-
help, so as to be strong for others. Or, they enson’s (1983/2005) thinking on what transpires
may construct their own boundaries about not in therapy. For Levenson, experience moves from
wanting to “burden” or “upset” others with their the immediate context to the past and then returns
own needs as they are “strong” and can take on to the present. This almost involves a washing
the problems of others. of signifiers, by which current language takes
us back and then returns in new and different as a way of categorizing experience. While what
ways. Peirce has in mind differs from the intersubjec-
While psychoanalysts have paid attention to tivity theorists, it does speak to the importance of
language since Freud talked about screen mem- being able to move within the field as the quality
ories, slips, jokes, and so forth and Lacan opined and felt nature of our experience change. More-
that the unconscious is structured like language, over, it reiterates the semiotic aspect of relating. It
cultural psychology helps answer Levenson’s is through language and our interpretation of lan-
(1979) quip that “It’s all very well to claim (from guage that self–other negotiate their relationship
the structuralist viewpoint, correctly) that the around power, authority, responsibility, agency,
unconscious is structured like a language. But and so forth – the very topics of therapy and
how does one talk with it” (p. 273). Specifically, living.
sociocultural psychology pays attention to the This means that in the consulting room, the
structuring of experience, which includes what is deconstruction and micro-analyses of the ther-
culturally available to the individual. apeutic process and the ongoing semiotic com-
Here, the work on intersubjectivity within munication between therapist and patient is not
sociocultural psychology (Marková, 2003b) only a personal therapy or analysis, but also a
helps to articulate how language and dialogue social one. As a space of potential understand-
guides the ways we construct experience. In ing, interpersonal psychoanalysis often occupies
particular, the focus on how individuals relate, a space of challenging conventional social nar-
not only through respectful speech, but maybe ratives about success, happiness, health, and so
even more so at moments of difference and forth (Cushman, 2015). This speaks to the reifica-
tension, sharpen our attention to the struggle in tion of certain ideas into cultural at large, or their
interpersonal relationships. Indeed, this resonates social representations (Moscovici, 1961/2008;
nicely within the psychoanalytic discourse on Duveen, 2007) and the processes by which they
intersubjectivity. For instance, Jessica Benjamin are assimilated into individual narratives. For
(1988, 1998) has written about the difference example, for many the idea that symptoms may
between complementarity and mutuality. During have alternative or symbolic meanings can be
complementarity periods of relationships things understood as a form of communication about
have an either/or quality and there is a distinction oneself and should thus be treated as experi-
between self and other that cannot be resolved. ences to be curious about rather than to get rid
This is similar to how Marková (2003b), follow- of is a novel and even threatening idea. This goes
ing Bahktin, suggests that pure empathy leads against more conventional notions of health as
to erasure of subjectivity as one’s self becomes living without symptoms (Rosenbaum & Liebert,
fully submerged (enmeshed as it were) within 2015).
the subjective experience of the other, thus los-
ing themselves. Alternatively, in mutuality the
5.5.3 The Importance of Context
self can hold the experience of self and other,
moving into a space that psychoanalytic writers Implicitly then, the various contexts we inhabit
have termed the “third”2 (Benjamin, 2004). The are a large part of what makes experience under-
ability to hold a both/and space requires dealing standable and interpretable. Cultural mediation –
with tension, similar to Marková’s discussion on as the name implies – always occurs within a
active empathizing. particular time and space and cultural milieu.
It is worth noting that ideas of thirdness were While psychological processes may be general-
also discussed by Charles S. Peirce (1878/1982) izable they are not necessarily universal (beyond
the tendency toward generalization) (Wagner gists understand why and how a particular devel-
et al., 2000, 2012). Paying attention to the con- opmental accomplishment may have occurred out
text, not only of the psychological relationship, of a whole host of other possibilities. Indeed,
i.e., its physicality and location; but the broader sociocultural psychology’s emphasis on devel-
context in which disease and experience are opment as nonlinear and holistic helps ensure
talked about and understood is crucial to making that interpersonal psychoanalysis does not fall
meaning (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). into the trap of metatheoretical speculation about
Notably, it may also lead to very differ- what should have occurred during childhood or
ent understandings about pathology and disease certain “critical periods” during development.
than traditionally endorsed by psychoanalysis. In Notably, this reflects a greater interest in both
this regard, a cultural perspective pushes psy- fields in the ongoing interactive and mutually
choanalytic reasoning to consider different phe- regulating developmental patterns (Harris, 2005;
nomena through more appropriate contextual Thelen, 2005), which provides important abilities
lenses than necessarily psychoanalytic ones. For to consider development from a less normative
instance, psychoanalysis can grapple with more way.
“occult” or “spiritual” explanations of illness in a This is important as working with patients
way that honors where they come from instead involves implicitly recognizing where a person is
of seeking to replace it with more “dynamic” from a developmental perspective at any given
interpretations. point in time. The ability to tolerate increased
It is then important to ensure that the appropri- psychic complexity and to recognize causality
ate research methods are used to study phenom- may be more or less available, much as the ability
ena (Valsiner 2009, 2014). Paying attention to the to formulate experience (Stern, 2003) or to stand
fit between phenomena and method helps to pre- within spaces (Bromberg, 1998). A developmen-
vent a one size fits all approach to study. It further tal perspective recognizes the movement required
recognizes that psychological phenomena present to at times hold more complexity and that it may
themselves at various degrees and levels of com- be a challenge to do so at other times. Moreover,
plexity and organization and that these need to be it speaks to a model of growth and change that is
taken into account when designing research stud- not necessarily causal. Instead, of thinking of psy-
ies and doing therapy. chological change as reflecting linear causality,
Recognizing different levels of abstraction and sociocultural psychology suggests that develop-
complexity speaks to developmental processes by ment may occur from seemingly nonrelated fac-
which certain phenomena become more or less tors and does not have to be linear at all. This
abstract and complex. Moreover, a sociocultural challenges traditional ideas about psychic causal-
perspective values the study of how one state will ity and forces therapists to hold their ideas lightly
lead to another. Or in other words, how individ- (Orange, 2003).
uals are working to preadapt to an unknowable
future (Valsiner, 2007). Here, sociocultural psy-
5.5.4 Goals and Growth
chologies focus on development that offers an
important corrective to interpersonal psychoanal- Paying attention to culture is an important
ysis, which, while maintaining a developmental commitment for psychoanalytic practitioners.
theory (i.e., Sullivan, 1953a), has left it (for lack Notably, this does not mean doing so in a way
of a better word) undeveloped. of trying to become “culturally competent” to the
A focus on the feed-forward mechanisms by various cultures, but instead applying an ethic
which experience is constrained helps psycholo- of curiosity and openness (Hart, 2017). As part
of this, practitioners can learn from a sociocul- Implicitly then, how people construct and label
tural perspective where meaning does not exist their experience as healthy or not healthy (note
a priori (Salvatore, 2015) waiting to be discov- how this takes over the field of non-healthy,
ered or uncovered, but rather is always in the pro- which could be interpreted in a variety of ways)
cess of being constructed and created after the reflects prevailing societal ideas of normativ-
fact (a posteriori). This means that the meaning- ity and health (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007;
making process always involves an act of nego- Brinkmann, 2014; 2016; Rosenbaum & Liebert,
tiation (Bruner, 1990) and looking backwards at 2015). It is perhaps not surprising as society
what has transpired, rather than following more becomes less authoritarian and more decentered
prescribed roles of the therapist as knower and that the process of navigating instability and a
authority. capacity to deal with not knowing are becom-
Alternatively, from a sociocultural perspec- ing more relevant (Mitchell, 1997). Further, it is
tive paying attention to context and how differ- interesting to consider the ways that these may
ent meanings may emerge, be blocked, trans- themselves become coopted into areas of author-
formed, and so forth shifts the focus to a ity or the “way to be.” Holding the tension and the
process of continual learning. This shift seems to space to not know requires an active stance, ulti-
reflect shifts in society at large (and now perhaps mately more anxiety provoking and significantly
also possible counter shifts as well). As West- harder than at any previous point in time. While
ern culture has moved from a more authoritarian therapy still involves a pursuit at “the good life”
and patriarchal society toward one where people as society’s ideas of this change it makes sense
are more comfortable challenging authority and that its patients and thus goals for therapy shift as
value democracy and transparency, being able to well (Levenson, 1983/2005).
accommodate change has become increasingly
important. Simultaneously, this speaks to an inse-
curity within society as well and a decentering
5.6 Conclusion: The Value of
of traditional structures and perhaps even values
Not Knowing
(though whether this has always been the case is
a valid question). Thinking about the ability to deal with the
This has also become noticeable within the unknown speaks, I think, to the importance of
therapeutic space. The analyst is no longer seen further and more explicit dialogue between socio-
as the authority and knower, but, instead, a col- cultural psychology and interpersonal psycho-
laborator working with the patient to make sense analysis. As I hope has been made clear, both
of their experience. This in turn has shifted the fields strive to deal with individual and social
emphasis away from resolving particular com- phenomena at the level of complexity that they
plexes and agreeing to particular interpretations are presented at, without reducing it to particu-
toward processes of freeing up the field of relat- lars or essentials. This is obviously challenging
ing so individuals can move more freely (Stern, and requires working at different levels of theo-
2015). Moreover, growth happens less as a result retical and clinical abstraction in order to theo-
of insight into a problem, and more from the abil- rize both about what is transpiring at the moment
ity to take a different perspective and observe and, more abstractly, about what may be going
other aspects of the problem. The therapeutic on. Further dialogue between these two fields
space becomes less about interpreting experience may be an important source of understanding
and more about navigating existing boundaries and growth for each, helping to shed light on
and barriers. particularly hard-to-reach phenomena. Moreover,
dialogue ensures an openness of ideas and helps Kleinian from destructive objects, Lacanian from
expand fields and creativity. the alienated self, and so forth.
The need for dialogue mirrors, I think, much of 2 Notably, there are many different versions of the ana-
where we are in the world. The consulting room lytic third, see, for instance, volume 73 of Psychoan-
has become less a place to provide answers to alytic Quarterly (2004), devoted to different ideas of
the third.
individuals by way of insight and interpretation
and more a space that strives to help individuals
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Further Reading
Stern, D. B., Mann, C. H., Kantor, S., & Schlesinger,
G. (Eds.). (1995). Pioneers of Interpersonal Blechner, M. J. (2005). The gay Harry Stack Sullivan:
Psychoanalysis. London: Analytic Press. Interactions between his life, clinical work and
Sullivan, H. S. S. (1938/1995). Data of psychiatry. In theory. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 41(1),
D. B. Stern, C. H. Mann, S. Kantor, & G. 1–19.
Schlesinger (Eds.), Pioneers of Interpersonal Cole, M. (1995). Culture and cognitive development:
Psychoanalysis (pp. 1–26). London: Analytic From cross-cultural research to creating systems
Press. of cultural mediation. Culture & Psychology, 1,
Sullivan, H. S. S. (1950). The illusion of individual 25–54.
personality. Psychiatry, 13, 317–332. Harre, R. (2015). The persons as the nexus of patterns
Sullivan, H. S. S. (1953a). Conceptions of Modern of discursive practices. Culture & Psychology,
Psychiatry. New York: W. W. Norton. 21, 492–504.
Sullivan, H. S. S. (1953b). The Interpersonal Theory Marsico, G. (2015). Striving for the new: Cultural
of Psychiatry. New York: W. W. Norton. psychology as a developmental science. Culture
Sullivan, H. S. S. (1953c). The Psychiatric Interview. & Psychology, 21, 445–454.
New York: W. W. Norton. Molenaar, P. C. M. (2004). A manifesto on psychology
Thelen, E. (2005). Dynamic systems theory and the as idiographic science: Bringing the person back
complexity of change. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, into scientific psychology, this time forever.
15, 255–283. Measurement, 2, 201–218.
Thompson, C. (1950/2003). Psychoanalysis: Rosenbaum, P. J. (2013). The role of projective
Evolution and Development. New Brunswick, identification in constructing the “Other”: Why
NJ: Transaction Publishers. do Westerners want to “liberate” Muslim
Tublin, S. (2011). Discipline and freedom in relational women? Culture & Psychology 19(2), 213–224.
technique. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 47, DOI: 10.1177/1354067X12456719.
519–546. Shewder, R. (1990). Thinking Through Cultures:
Valsiner, J. (2006). The semiotic construction of Expeditions in Cultural Psychology. Cambridge,
solitude. Sign Systems Studies, 34, 9–34. MA: Harvard University Press.
Valsiner, J. (2007). Culture in Minds and Societies: Valsiner, J. (2015). Where are you, Culture &
Foundations of Cultural Psychology. New York: Psychology? Making of an interdisciplinary field.
SAGE. Culture & Psychology, 21, 419–428.
Valsiner, J. (2009). Cultural psychology today: Valsiner, J. & Rosa, A. (2007). Contemporary
Innovations and oversights. Culture & socio-cultural research: Uniting culture, society
Psychology, 15, 5–39. and psychology. In J. Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.),
The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural in developmental transitions. Culture &

Psychology (pp. 1–22). Cambridge: Cambridge Psychology, 9, 415–448.
University Press. Zittoun, T. & Gillespie, A. (2015). Internalization:
Zittoun, T., Duveen, G., Gillespie, A., Ivinson, G., & How culture becomes mind. Culture &
Psaltis, C. (2003). The use of symbolic resources Psychology, 21, 477–491.
Part II
Action, Objects, Artifacts, and
Meaning
6 Spirited Psyche Creates Artifacts:
Semiotic Dynamics of Experience
in the Shaping of Objects, Agency,
and Intentional Worlds
Alberto Rosa
Art denotes a process of doing or making. This is as true of fine as of technological art. Art involves
molding of clay, chipping of marble, casting of bronze, laying on of pigments, construction of
buildings, singing of songs, playing of instruments, enacting roles on the stage, going through
rhythmic movements in the dance. Every art do is something with some physical material, the body
or something outside the body, with or without the use of intervening tools, and with a view to
production of something visible, audible, or tangible.
John Dewey (1994, p. 207)
This chapter is about how psyche produces arti- of them. It is as if the evanescent character of
facts of different kinds – tools to operate on mate- these two entities only gets some flesh when some
rial structures, symbols, rules and representations kind of thing or event causes them to appear as
for social interaction, concepts for thinking, and “real” to our senses.
symbolic resources for the regulation of behavior. Psyche is what bodily structures do when keep-
These artifacts, together with the elements popu- ing themselves alive (Chapter 1, this volume).
lating our environment, produce the experiences That is why the study of psyche focuses on
we feel, shape our abilities, and make us able to behavior, on what living organisms do when in
conceive the world and ourselves. contact with objects. Sociocultural psychology
pays particular attention to how these contacts
change those things and the environment and,
6.1 Psyche, Culture, and Things also, how these changes affect the agents’ capa-
Psyche and culture are peculiar creatures. Neither bilities for action. It is the iterative operation of
psyche nor culture can be seen, heard, touched, or these kinds of changes that transforms action and
smelled. More than entities with substance, they opens the way for the development of mental
are creatures of speech referring to the intangible abilities, social structures, and culture.
dynamics among changing things. Without argu- Culture is a historical product of human action
ments and symbolic tools they could not be con- and also a set of resources and constraints for sit-
ceived, communicated, or turned into objects of uated human action, both social and individual.
knowledge. But this does not seem to be an obsta- Culture is a result of cultivation, of putting effort
cle to our understanding of whether an experi- into the transformation of nature. It is made of
enced phenomenon belongs to the psychological material elements and ways of acting that frame
or to the sociocultural realm, to both, or to none human behavior (practices, institutions, norms,
104 alberto rosa
values). The latter would not exist without the the ontogenetic and micro-genetic time scales
former, which makes it inexcusable to refer to the when acquiring new skills (e.g., Cole, 1998), with
material elements of which culture is made. With- research often focusing on the organization of
out things, without matter with which to pair, the social environments for learning or on the
there can be no spirit, even if the spirit cannot be intricacies of the processes being developed in
reduced to the materiality of the things to which those interactions (e.g., Rodriguez, 2007). Most
one relates. typically, ready-made cultural artifacts have been
used as materials for the study of the mastery of
abilities pre-identified as milestones in the course
6.1.1 Material Culture: Artifacts,
of development. In contrast, less attention has
Machines, and Machinations
been paid to the transformation or production
Material culture comprises the material traces of new artifacts and to the processes leading to
human efforts left in the landscape – from a pot- these creations – what is usually called “creativ-
sherd to a castle, a city, a park, or a levelled ity” (see Chapter 9, this volume). The consider-
field – and also the tools that made those trans- ation of how the historical development of cul-
formations possible: hoes, plows, pencils, books. tural devices may affect psychological abilities
Human action has crafted tools and transformed (or vice versa) has been left mainly as a matter
the landscape to respond to the needs of social of concern for cross-cultural studies. Other dis-
life. The use of natural objects to serve new pur- ciplines, such as archaeology, paleontology, and
poses led to the transformation of their struc- history, also provide data and interpretations wor-
ture when searching for a more efficient perfor- thy of consideration.
mance of the function they were given. An angled The concept of the artifact refers to many dif-
stone to tear a skin led to carving pebbles to pro- ferent kinds of meditational means for action. It
duce sharper edges for that purpose, which, in starts with the change of use of a natural object
turn, called for a new use of other stones for sup- for some purpose (a rock to crack a nut) and
porting and pounding. In short, the creation of moves to the manufacturing of tools, the produc-
tools is a recursive process: some tools lead to the tion of symbols for communication (conventional
production of other tools, and the use of one and gestures, words), the development of rules for the
the other transforms the capacities for action of regulation of social interaction (norms), and the
the operator – the agent. So when archaeologists shaping of social groups. All these elements get
study the physical characteristics of objects com- linked in a chain of operations that shapes the
ing from the past, their data are useful for guess- behavior of the operator to produce an outcome –
ing the lifestyle and skills as well as the sym- the efficient crafting of a product. The production
bolic, cognitive, and emotional capacities of their of artifacts is, then, closely linked to the devel-
producers and users, because without them, those opment of agency, the capacity for planning, and
cultural products could never have been produced the ability to set a goal and keep a steady course
and put into use. to reach a preset objective.
Sociocultural psychology claims the centrality Artifacts are developed to increase the effi-
of artifacts for the construction of higher psycho- ciency of human action, but they also canalize
logical functions in three different time scales: and constrain what humans can do when using
cultural–historical, ontogenesis, and microgene- them. Artifacts can also interact with other arti-
sis. The concept of a “zone of proximal devel- facts. Hammers, anvils, bellows, and a hearth
opment” has frequently been understood as a make up a forge where a blacksmith can produce
way of accounting for the intersection between iron utensils. But tools can also work together
Spirited Psyche Creates Artifacts 105
without the participation of humans. A carbure- loops for keeping the system working. If the user
tor together with a set of combustion chambers, of any public service is dissatisfied with its work-
pistons, connecting rods, spark plugs, and electri- ings and attempts to interact with the machination
cal distributors constitute an internal combustion by contacting customer service – which always
engine, where each of these elements coordinates demands the mediation of a computer, a tablet,
with the others so that once the engine is turned or a phone to establish contact – he or she will
on, it can keep functioning as long as its fuel quickly find that humans have little place in these
lasts. These associations of tools, what we call systems. The interlocutor (often a robot) will tell
machines, have the capacity to act autonomously, you what “application” should be used, how, and
to the extent that we may forget what they are when, always within the limits of what “the sys-
made of and they may appear to us as a kind tem” allows. In short, things, tools, machines,
of “black box,” where the inner workings are a symbols, and algorithms have come to constitute
mystery and all that matters is that it keeps going a gigantic machination in which humans appear
when needed – in the same way as many peo- as another piece in the intricate web of objects,
ple think of the engine of a car, always concealed as just another element for keeping the system
inside a hood that is never opened. working, whether as operators or as consumers.
Nowadays, neither tools nor machines are iso- Some anthropologists and sociologists of tech-
lated; they are associated in complex networks. nology and science, proponents of the actor-
A factory is a large association of machines that network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1991; Law 1999),
complement each other to produce a product choose to treat all constituent elements of these
from a raw material. But the factory cannot be systems equally, ignoring who or what is an agent
understood as confined within its walls; it also or an instrument and whether it is human or
needs a logistics system for supplying raw mate- nonhuman. They try to avoid an anthropocentric
rials and distributing their products through a stand by choosing to talk of “actants” when refer-
road and railway system, advertising for market- ring to the elements connected in networks as
ing, banks that provide funding, rules governing a way of emphasizing that agency is distributed
trade relations, and also money to establish the throughout the network. Actants are conceived
value of all such transactions. Machines are now as elements of the network whose structural fea-
able to interact with each other at a distance in tures force one another to shape their operations
a kind of gigantic “machination” (Latour, 1987). so that they work according to a structural logic.
Currently almost 60 percent of Internet traffic So viewed, actants within a network can act as a
controls machines – in what has been called the material equivalent to a sign, a rule, or a norm –
“Internet of things.” For example, home automa- such as a sleeping policeman (a road bump) that
tion sensors are able to readjust the light or tem- regulates the speed of the traffic more efficiently
perature in our houses to regulate our household than traffic signals or the rules of the road. When
electricity consumption. But it does not end there. that happens, the means is literally the message
The costs of these services are directly charged (Malafouris, 2013). The consequence is that the
to the bank accounts into which our salaries are system appears materialized, naturalized, and de-
paid, which also automatically charge commis- semiotized. As Callon and Latour (1981, p. 286)
sions and taxes and transmit all these data to state, actants show “their will into a language of
the computers of the taxing authority. All these its own,” which is not that different from a com-
data get stored and processed in “calculation cen- mand expressed by a holder of power.
ters” (Latour, 1987) that, through the use of algo- Avoiding anthropocentrism is a healthy intel-
rithms, refine indicators that produce feedback lectual habit, but anthropocentrism should not
106 alberto rosa
be confused with anthropomorphism. Malafouris quences of behavior and environmental change.

(2013) claims that anthropomorphism is a bio- It is by acting that one’s body and the things of
logical necessity of the human condition that the environment can turn into objects of knowl-
cannot be ignored, unless one seeks to remove edge so that both become means for expand-
humans from the world and place them above ing the capabilities for acting, transforming nat-
events in the position of a god who acts as an ural objects into tools and thus increasing the
external observer. According to his argument, agency and the awareness of the agent. Sense
“being human, we are the embodied measure and meaning (both social and individual) do not
of all things, yet certainly not the center of all start with symbols and language; rather, these are
things” (p. 132). For Malafouris, anthropomor- outcomes of the varieties of behavior of organ-
phism is essential for understanding our way of isms. That is why semiotics can be instrumen-
being in the world, and it also helps to explain tal for the production of formal models suitable
some phenomena in evolutionary terms. There for describing and explaining the simultaneous
are notions that could not exist without self- development of knowledge, technology, abilities,
referentiality, such as inside–outside, up–down, and self-awareness. The central part of the argu-
right–left, and front–back, which are hard to jus- ment to be presented below will apply a theory of
tify without resorting to the way in which we semiotic action (Rosa, 2007a, 2007b) to examin-
are in the world. This also shows in the behaving how objects, artifacts (both material and sym-
ioral domain: consider, for example, the asym- bolic), and the self arise out of sense making – a
metry of the consequences of an error if, while process that cannot be limited to the cognitive or
hiking in the mountains, we see a silhouette and the pragmatic domains but also includes emotion
hesitate, not sure whether it is a bear or a rock. and aesthetic experience, play and art.
There is little doubt that in evolutionary terms,
it is always safer to attribute the highest level of
6.2 Psyche Turns Things into
organization and act as if it were a bear, just in
Objects
case (Gell, 1998, quoted by Malafouris, 2013,
p. 131). Certainly man is not the center of all Psyche is a way of referring to the acts of a living
things, but when we look at how humans behave body when relating to its surroundings. Psyche
in the world, it seems that subjectivity cannot is inherently relational. Acts of psyche engender
simply be regarded as an annoying inconvenience the mind, and the two together, when in society,
to overcome. Another thing is that when pro- dwell in culture – the realm of the spirit – where
ducing natural explanations, subjectivity should the person develops and also participates in the
be approached in conditions of symmetry with shaping of cultural change (Chapter 1, this vol-
natural objects, avoiding anthropocentrism and ume). This view makes clear that any compre-
reductionism. hensive account of what human beings do, and
This is the approach that this chapter follows. are able to do, has to begin by considering how
Its purpose is exploring how cultural artifacts the structural couplings between the human body
arise as the result of iterative processes going on and the things in its environment produce such
in different time scales (cultural–historical, onto- developments (Maturana & Varela, 1992).
genetic, and micro-genetic). The thesis to be pre-
sented here is that “sense” – the tendency to adapt
6.2.1 Body, Things, and Movement
to the environment – is an immanent feature of
behavior and that sense cannot exist without a James Gibson’s ecological theory of perception
subject of experience who can feel the conse- is based on the assumption of a complementarity
between the perceiver and the environment. He together they set the zone of free movement of the
describes “the environment as the surfaces that individual.
separate substances from the medium in which But does this mean that movement can be
the animals live” (Gibson, 2015, p. 119) and con- reduced to the dynamic properties of the morpho-
ceives perception as resulting from encounters logical structure of the body? Español (Chapter
between the body of the perceiver and things in 11, this volume) claims that the study of move-
the environment, in that “exteroception is accom- ment cannot ignore the consideration of how the
panied by proprioception – that to perceive the different parts of the body relate among them-
world is to co-perceive oneself . . . The awareness selves (coordinating the movements of the body’s
of the world and one’s complementary relations different parts) nor the patterns of body postures
to the world are not separable” (p. 140). This and motor movements developed through early
position took him to develop his theory of affor- infancy while in social interactions with care-
dances, since “the composition and layout of sur- givers. She emphasizes the importance of how
faces constitute what they afford. If so, to per- these early bearings and forms of movement are
ceive them is to perceive what they afford. The combined and developed into a kind of impro-
affordances of the environment are what it offers vised dance that does not refer to anything dif-
the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either ferent than the changes in the body itself nor
for good or ill” (p. 119). searches for a goal besides paying attention to
Gibson took good care in developing a the- the very dynamics of movement, which she terms
ory of perception grounded on this assumption “thinking in movement.” This is a form of play
and went on to study how encountering the sur- that is both motor and social, in addition to emo-
faces of things – the perceptual actions of the tional and communicative, and also has aesthetic
perceiver – causes the affordances, the “val- purposes when evolving into improvised dance.
ues” and “meanings,” of things in the environ- The consequence is that proprioception and feel-
ment to be directly perceived, because they are ings develop together as a basis for the devel-
“properties of things taken with reference to an opment of the awareness of one’s self. Thus the
observer but not properties of the experiences development of posture and movement affects the
of the observer. They are not subjective values; concrete ways in which the operations of percep-
they are not feelings of pleasure or pain added tual action are performed.
to neutral perceptions” (p. 138; emphasis orig-
inal). Perception, then, is an effect of action –
6.2.2 Perception, Action, and
the coupling allowed by the morphological
Affection Add Value to Things
structures of the body and the elements in the
environment. The consequence is that if the Action is what makes the surfaces of the body
perceiver’s body changes, so does its motor- and the things in the environment combine.
perceptual capabilities, with the effect that some Thus, what “we perceive when we look at
elements of the environment may appear as objects are their affordances, not their quali-
changing their affordances. This is the case with a ties . . . Phenomenal objects are not built up of
ladder, which, for a toddler, is a barrier but turns qualities; it is the other way around. The affor-
into an entrance when he or she grows up and dance of an object is what the infant begins
could turn again into a barrier if his or her legs are by noticing. The meaning is observed before
paralyzed. As Valsiner (1998) puts it, the affor- the substance and surface, the colour and form,
dances of environmental elements and the agent’s are seen as such” (Gibson, 2015, p. 134). In
effectivities for action are always in balance; other terms, the way action is applied on the
108 alberto rosa
environmental element being explored causes it also notice their features – their qualities – even
to turn into a “phenomenal object” whose mean- before language is used, as a result of embod-
ing is what it affords to action, its affordances – ied cognition. When this happens, the phenom-
an invariant unit that does not need to be analyzed enal object is not just some kind of awareness
in its different features to have meaning. of what that thing affords but also something
Environmental elements are not completely that regularly appears in the environment – a
detached; they are related among themselves by natural category (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). As
offering affordances to each other. This includes Gibson suggests, affordances are the first mean-
living organisms and their relation with things ing of phenomenal objects, but this does not
and among themselves. The affordance that this imply that qualities and categories do not add
structured landscape offers is the ecological niche some more meaning to the objects perceived.
of the species – the Umwelt – which also has a Objects afford some actions and prevent oth-
social character. This makes the actions of others, which is what causes them to be better or
ers relevant for making apparent the affordances more poorly suited for different uses. This per-
of the landscape, the values of things, and so mits them to obtain a particular value – that
makes them able to (vicariously) add meaning to is, a functional value – in relation to the ongo-
phenomenal objects beyond the results of one’s ing behavior of organisms. The affordances of
action on the thing. objects do not change, but they may be attended
Phenomenal objects are, then, a result of to and perceived in ways that depend on the tran-
the awareness of the meanings arising from sient demands of the situation and the needs or
the encounters between bodies and things. As desires of the agent. Phenomenal objects are not
Valsiner (2014, p. 4) puts it, “things exist inde- just “geographical” objects; they can also turn
pendently of actors, while objects imply partic- into “behavioral” objects and have some new val-
ular relation with an actor. Objects ‘object’ to ues emerging from previous experiences attached
human actions – as they are a part of the estab- to them. This is what causes us to feel the urge
lished relation Actor–Object” (emphasis origi- of, for example, “eat me” when looking at fruit
nal). This makes phenomenal objects the primary or “drink me” when looking at water. It there-
elements of the human Umwelt. But this does not fore acquires a kind of “demand character” that
imply that the meaning of objects gets exhausted operates in different ways whether the agent is
in the awareness of their affordances (the sub- thirsty or hungry – or not (Koffka, 1935, quoted
ject matter of psychology of perception). This is by Gibson, 2015). Objects can then become use-
just the beginning. Further psychological opera- ful for changing how one feels; they can have a
tions are able to develop the meaning of objects function in satisfying our needs. Functional value
by adding new values to them. adds extra meaning to objects. It is a type of
When coupling with things, some qualities can value that could not exist independently of the
be directly felt – if tasted, salt is bitter and sugar affordances of the object, nor without taking into
sweet; a rock feels heavy and a flower light when account states and processes occurring within the
lifted. These sensed qualities add formal value to skin of the agent when orienting its behavior and
the meaning of the phenomenal object. assessing its outcome. It is only through these
Phenomenal objects can be grouped together kinds of processes that functional meaning can
in categories. Barsalou (1999, 2003) offers a con- be added to objects.
vincing explanation of how perception takes to The English word object is an umbrella term
abstraction, opening the way for the construc- referring to something objective – that is, “out
tion of categories that now can also not only take there” – as opposed to subjective. That is
into account what phenomenal objects afford but why some authors resort to the German word
Gegenstand to differentiate objects from things as it now appears and thus take for granted that
(Ding in German) and take the former as result- its structure and affordances were tailored for the
ing from a process in which the actor (and social purpose it was made to serve. When we ask our-
activities) adds value to the latter (see Chapter selves, “what is this?” we are also asking “what
8, this volume; Valsiner, 2014). That is why the is this for?,” and therefore take function to be
term thing has been profusely employed above, the meaning we are searching for – and form as
while the term object has been reserved to refer a hint of what that thing may be for. But what
to things when they have acquired values and if, rather than focusing on the shape of the fin-
expanded their meanings when in relation with ished result, we pay attention to how it was first
humans. Thus the meaning of an object devel- created and try to put ourselves in the place of
ops as recursive actions are applied to the thing: the craftsman struggling to make it? If we do,
it starts when awareness of affordances causes a we would find that when artisans start working
“phenomenal object” to emerge when a thing is on materials, they often do not have a clear idea
encountered; it continues when formal and func- of what the final outcome of their efforts will be
tional values are added, depending on the cir- like, and they try out different movements using
cumstances of the situation and the state of the the object without first forming a definite aware-
agent; and it eventually can become a goal to be ness of their goal, nor do they know the conse-
searched, only if the agent has a mind that, in quences these moves may have on further move-
addition to taking it as belonging to a category, ments – a way of behaving very similar to the
can imagine it when absent. thinking-in-action mentioned above when refer-
It should not be left unsaid that objects are ring to children’s motor play. The consequence
not only to be perceived; they can impact on is that these movements, while executed, could
other things and transform them and can also be not be taken as a means to an end, because this
transformed. When it is said that things afford would have required knowing the outcome in
some kinds of actions but not others, what is advance. The artisan’s actions, rather than pur-
implied is that they keep their morphology when posively searching for a final result, take every
the perceiver’s body couples with them; however, change in the structure of the object as an inscrip-
if these couplings are more rough than gentle, and tion that records the outcome of previous actions
some brute force is applied to them, the structure and also sets possibilities and constraints for
of the object may change and, with that, its affor- actions to come.
dances, its values, and its meaning, that is, its Lambros Malafouris (2013), working in the
identity. The capacity for transforming the struc- field of cognitive archaeology, holds that the pro-
ture of objects and the landscape, together with duction of the first human tools in the Paleolithic
the subsequent change of their functional values, most probably started through a play of circu-
opens the way for the production of artifacts. lar reactions of the kind just referred. Accord-
ing to his view, the repetition of actions with
objects (vegetable fibers, sticks, stones, etc.) cre-
6.3 Playing with Objects
atively explored consecutive outcomes, develop-
Produces Artifacts and
ing new forms until a result considered inter-
Transforms Agency and the
esting or useful appears. If the modified object,
Agent
resulting from these circular reactions spanning
Tools and artifacts are objects transformed by through time, turns out to be useful for some-
human action. When we encounter something thing, it may get to be used as an instrument
that we know in advance is an artifact, we tend for some purpose. When this happens, move-
to assume that its current shape had always been ments can become progressively refined while
110 alberto rosa
searching for the improvement of the desired does); rather, they were the result of “intention-
functionality. Eventually, when the product gets a in-action” applied on new mediators (natural pig-
more or less settled form, it could definitely turn ments, twigs, pointed stones, etc.). So viewed,
into a permanent cultural artifact. It is only then early inscriptions should be interpreted more as
that the movements leading to its production are traces of motor movements and less as attempts
ritualized. to produce a form with meaning. Over time,
The implications of this achievement are and with the accumulation of random forms, the
important. When a new object is made, a tech- repetition of such movements would gradually
nique has been developed and a form – with a become ritualized at the same time that some
particular “style” that sets it apart from others kind of repertoire of forms and variants of these
coming from other times or places – has been forms is generated. The consequence, throughout
established. But something even more important the millennia of the Paleolithic, was the mutual
emerges: a goal to be achieved. It is only then development of motor skills and crafting tech-
that we can properly speak of instrumental move- nologies – which included engraving and paint-
ments and thus recognize the emergence of the ing – that gradually produced different types of
ability to use means for ends. When this hap- lines, closed shapes, colors, and textures in a long
pens, we are already facing a major transforma- process of expanding mutual scaffoldings. It was
tion of the forms of action, which require partic- only afterward that a figure could come to be
ular forms of social organization to enable and referred to as an environmental object (a sketch
facilitate the development of these new individ- of human figures; a profile of a deer, horse, or
ual capacities. We shall return to this later. bison).
Malafouris recognizes this process as the If, again, we look at Paleolithic paintings not as
development of intentionality from the “about- finished products but as searching for the sequen-
ness” (Haye, 2008) of Brentano’s notion of tial ordering of production of the strokes that
intentionality (awareness is always the aware- ended up making the forms, we could guess the
ness of something) to what Searle (1983) termed dynamics of the artists’ movements when pro-
“intention-in-action” – which he interprets as an ducing the formal patterns that we can now con-
ongoing adjustment between the changing struc- template. The evidence collected from the stud-
ture of the object and the movements performed ies that Malafouris (2013) reviewed led him to
on it. It is only afterward that “prior inten- interpret the lines that make up a final figure not
tion” – the formation of a deliberate intention to as the boundaries of a closed and finished figure
act before movement starts – can appear, which but as resulting from a set of consecutive inscrip-
would require a prior mental representation and tions (traces of the execution of a motor action),
would involve mental control over motor activity offering support for conceiving the development
(Searle, 1983). of Paleolithic art as a process going through dif-
ferent steps: (1) movements turning into strokes,
(2) strokes becoming forms, and, eventually,
6.3.1 Art, Artifacts, and the Mind
(3) these forms coming to refer to some element
When studying the development of Paleolithic of the artist’s Umwelt. The consequence is that
art, Malafouris (2013) took a similar stand. a kind of material figurative inscription (image)
According to his hypothesis, early inscriptions is made to appear anew. Such an interpretation,
did not result from any kind of attempt to produce in addition to offering an account of the mutual
a finished product, much less did they arise from constitution of material culture and cognition,
the intention of representing something (as a sign also shows how the development of technology
makes it possible to achieve new ways of becom- 6.3.2 Play and Art
ing aware of the physical world, to act on it and
think about it. The previous argument presents technology and
The consequences are far from trivial. Perceiv- art as evolving from movements that could be
ing – including visual perception – is not inde- considered a form of play. Play is a type of activ-
pendent of the agent’s actions on objects. It is ity that can be found in nonhuman species, pre-
made of skills that develop when acting within dominantly in mammals and birds, as well as
the environment and on the things populating in humans (Pellegrini, Dupuis & Smith, 2007)
it, rather than resulting from innate abilities of and which many theorists consider to have a
representation. The slow evolution of form in functional role in ontogenetic development (e.g.,
Paleolithic paintings can be interpreted as traces Groos, 1901; Piaget, 1951; Vygotsky, 1967) and
left from the cumulative development of material also phylogenetic evolution (e.g., Bateson, 1981,
prosthesis for the exercise of sensorimotor skills 2005; Bruner, 1972; Bekoff, 1995; Carruthers,
that, when coupled with biological evolution, 2002). Such evolutionary and developmental rel-
made possible the emergence of new psychologi- evance contrasts with some of the features often
cal processes. As Malafouris (2013, p. 203) says, taken as typical of play behavior. As Pellegrini,
“we have to understand the Paleolithic image as Dupuis, and Smith (2007, p. 264) say, “play
a perceptual device. This means that we have to is a seemingly ‘non-serious’ variant of func-
account for how lines of pigment depict anything, tional behavior. Playful behaviors resemble seri-
rather than taking for granted that they do so.” ous behaviors but participants are typically more
Or, put another way, if the builder of lytic tools concerned with the behaviors themselves (i.e.,
develops new ways of motor thinking, the builder ‘means’) rather than the function (i.e., ‘ends’) of
of images offers a tool for developing new forms the behavior.” In addition, play allows for try-
of visual thinking. ing new behaviors and strategies, and so pro-
We should also not forget one of the most cru- vides opportunities for behavioral and cognitive
cial effects of graphic images. Graphic images, innovation.
once produced, are not only figures on a back- There are different kinds of playing behaviors.
ground; they are also signs pointing toward ele- Human and nonhuman animals show locomotor
ments of the world. They are devices that indi- forms of play – both with and without objects,
vidualize those objects and also the features alone or in social interaction with others – which
that characterize the objects represented. When, typically start with an exploration of the possi-
in addition, the image becomes itself an object bilities of the object or the situation. Playing is
of contemplation – as a part of the Umwelt – also more frequent in early stages of development
and gets used as a means for social communi- and, in humans, also evolves from motor play into
cation, it also becomes an iconic symbol able other varieties – pretended play and rule games,
to represent something absent. In short, inscrip- which require the use of social symbols.
tions can be considered as “epistemic actions” Dissanayake (1974) argues that art, if taken as
(Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, cited in Malafouris, a kind of behavior, shares many of the character-
2013, p. 194) that not only physically transform istics of play: (1) artistic behavior comes about
mundane things but create technical prostheses after primary needs are fulfilled, making it seem
which help new psychological skills develop. useless; (2) when practiced or contemplated, it
Graphic images are simultaneously scaffolding is self-rewarding; (3) art seems to take one out-
and bricks for the construction of the human side of oneself and relate one to something else –
mind. the material and social others, or both – even
112 alberto rosa
if acting alone; (4) it produces excitement (ten- and the capacity for exercising agency. Play and
sions and releases, surprise and adventure); (5) it art are not only cradles for the development of
is pleasure oriented; and (6) it causes something experiences but also nurse the growth of aesthetic
to be perceived as something else, with a kind of experiences.
metaphorical quality – as in imitation or pretense.
These similarities take Dissanayake to argue that
6.3.3 Artifacts Turn into Tools for
art originates from play: locomotor play evolves
Communication
into dance, vocal play into singing, and both
together into music; playing with objects evolves Graphic images are iconic material signs, but
into graphic arts, and so on. The consequence they are not the only kind of material signs. Other
is the mutual development of motor and cog- inscriptions and objects are useful for pointing to
nitive abilities as well as the transformation something beyond their own materiality: colors
of the objects and the situations in which one painted on the skin, tattoos, feathers, garments, or
plays. batons carved on wood or ivory can all be used as
Play and art also seem to be types of behavior signs indexing somebody’s rank or belonging to a
that are first governed by “intention-in-action,” group. Symbols go beyond that; they do not only
which later can evolve into “prior intention” present or represent a phenomenal object or some
when rule games set goals to reach, as art can of their features but they also have the capability
also turn into crafting. What does not change, to create new kinds of entities – virtual objects
however, is that they seem to have no functional arising from operations of the mind, which can
purpose: they are not “serious.” For the player, also turn into instrumental means for the direc-
the artist, or the spectator, they are means for tion and explanation of experience and behavior,
enjoyment, for sharing enjoyment with others, both objective and subjective.
and also a way of saying, doing, and producing Symbols are born when indexicality and
things that would be inappropriate in more seri- iconicity merge into a new kind of sign. But,
ous activities. But this does not make play and again, for the new entities and concepts so pro-
art useless. They are means of innovation and duced to be conceived and communicated, this
transformation, for social sharing and for the new kind of sign has to be embodied into some
production of cultural materials, new forms of material substance, so that their users could play
behavior, and social institutions. Gadamer (2011) with them and acquire the necessary abilities
comments that play, art, festival, and ritual do not for using them proficiently. It is only then that
only develop from each other but also are interre- they can be incorporated into the reservoir of
lated, making the beautiful relevant in the devel- resources of a group. The invention of numbers
opmental processes of meaning making and in is one of these cases – a concept that arises as
the development of culture and society (Grondin, a result of the production of symbols through
2001). the transformation of tokens and graphical
Play and art are activities that develop motor inscriptions.
and cognitive skills, but they are also for the Nonverbal children, and some animal species,
exercise of affection and excitement, for expand- seem to be able to distinguish between groups of
ing knowledge and imagination, for the explo- objects with more or fewer components, and even
ration of enjoyment, for the development of expe- to identify the difference between small amounts
riences of pleasure and beauty; and, with them, of objects (up to three or four elements), as well
they contribute to the development of the agent’s as discriminate between operations of addition
self-awareness, the ability for steering behavior, and subtraction. However, as the number of items
increases, this task seems impossible to be solved coming from the beads enclosed in the container.
without developing first the concept of cardi- Around 3200 bce, clay tablets, bearing the same
nal number – an ability that adults belonging to types of inscriptions on their surface, replaced
some cultural groups seem not to have acquired. envelopes with the advantage of being smaller,
One can guess that such a concept would not lighter, and easier to transport.
develop unless needed for some practical pur- Shortly afterward, around 3100 bce, when city-
pose, which is unlikely to happen when primary states first appeared, incisions on tablets started
needs get solved by others or by foraging within to be replaced by pictograms (iconic signs) of
or in the surroundings of one’s dwellings – as two kinds: one referring to the kinds of goods
happens with children or adults living in soci- recorded and another to the number of items. This
eties of hunter-gatherers. However, if there is a is the first record of an abstract number detached
surplus of some kind of goods and a deficit of from the types of elements counted. The transi-
others and this imbalance is corrected through tion from one kind of notation to another sug-
commerce and bartering, accounting becomes a gests that the development from ordinal to car-
necessity. This is what happened following the dinal numbers required the recording of a sign
Neolithic revolution. representing the name given to the position in the
Malafouris (2013) reports archaeological evi- sequential ordering of motor operations – an ordi-
dence from Mesopotamian sites that shows how nal number. When this new sign was employed
accounting records evolved in the period between in further operations of addition and subtraction,
the years 7000 and 3000 bce. Accounting started cardinality emerged and, with it, the path for the
by people using baked beads of clay to repre- development of metric measure, arithmetic, and
sent units of cattle or agricultural products. These mathematics.
tokens were molded into different shapes accord- Soon afterward (around 3000 bce), tablets
ing to the kind of product that they represented began to include the name of the owner, sender,
(cones and spheres for large or small grain bas- or addressee of the goods recorded. This was
kets, ovoid with an incision for an amphora of done by changing the use of some of the earlier
oil, or a tetrahedron for a day of work), and their pictograms, which now, rather than representing
small size made them easy to handle and trans- a type of product, came to represent the sound
port. Accounting, however, was still a matter of of the first syllable of the word designating the
motor manipulation of these tokens instead of object represented as it sounded in the oral lan-
their referents, with which they were in a one-to- guage of the group. This allowed the name of the
one correspondence. Later on, these tokens were person to be recorded by combining pictographs
enclosed in “envelopes” (a hollow clay ball) that representing the sounds that when put together
kept them together for convenient transportation. made a name. The resulting inscription made it
As time went on, these envelopes were marked possible, when read, to pronounce a word refer-
with incisions made by pressing the beads on ring to an absent phenomenal object and there-
their fresh surface before putting them in the fore to make it present here and now, even if far
oven. These inscriptions mark the evolution from removed in space and in time from the scribe or
objects for handling (tokens for motor manipu- the reader.
lation) to bi-dimensional notation, which had the The final step, which took two more millennia
effect that accounting operations moved from the to happen, was to abandon the representation of
hands to the eyes. The new notation conserved sounds and change it to inscriptions representing
the iconicity (similarity of form) and indexi- phonemes. When this happened, alphabetic writ-
cal signification (the number of items engraved) ing was born. This resulted in a drastic decrease
114 alberto rosa
in the number of signs necessary for recording 6.4 Experiencing the World and
speech, opening the way for the expansion of Oneself
literacy.
The long process just sketched retraced not Experience is a continuous flow in which objects,
only the change from one system of recording situations, and events appear in unity. It includes
to another but also the transition from indexi- very simple phenomena, such as sensing a qual-
cal and iconic signs, which signal presence and ity (whiteness or warmth) or an affection (pain
form, to conventional symbols, which gather or joy); states of mind, such as finding something
them together into a unity. Now an object, even comforting, desirable, moving, or dreadful; and
if not accessible to the senses – as abstract num- sensing oneself to be comfortable, unsettled, or
bers are – is presented and can be recalled and eager. Whatever the case, experiences are ways of
operated on through utterances or through mate- knowing and feeling; they always refer to some-
rial operations in writing. thing else and to the self in relation to the world.
Thus, material signs, whatever it is that gives The experiencer therefore takes them as indis-
them substance, are objects carrying a new kind pensable for the guidance of conduct (for a dis-
of value – a semiotic value. Beyond their mate- cussion, see Rosa, 2015).
rial affordances or qualities, they also get new Experience appears to the experiencer as a uni-
social affordances and qualities: they become fier that gathers together the operations of dif-
able to point to something present or absent, ferent psychological processes. These processes
embodied or disembodied, or even imagined, as result from perception, emotion, thought, imagi-
abstract numbers are. Signs are always relational, nation, and memory, but none of these processes
but symbols also have ontopotentiality (Valsiner, are immediately experienced; they are concep-
2002) – they have the capacity of producing new tual abstractions useful to account for the psy-
objects even if these objects are devoid of matter. che’s actions, for the explanation of experiences
Material signs are objects crafted in such a way and the elaboration of psychological empirical
that their affordances and qualities enhance their knowledge.
semiotic functionality. Symbols are literally tools
Experience occurs continuously, because the
for communication, artifacts devised to serve as interaction of live creature and environing
semiotic functions, for making present the absent conditions is involved in the very process of living.
in communication, for constraining or opening Under conditions of resistance and conflict, aspects
new venues for action, for working or for enjoy- and elements of the self and the world that are
ment, for thinking and imagining. implicated in this interaction qualify experience
Semiotic value, again, is not an immanent with emotions and ideas so that conscious intent
property of a thing or an object but a conse- emerges. (Dewey, 1994, p. 205)
quence of how it is used and of the abilities of
So viewed, experience is also an abstraction.
the user. Semiotic tools are elements to play or
What we empirically feel are actual concrete
work with; they are the means for experimenting
experiences taken one by one. As Dewey (1994,
with new possibilities, for producing new expe-
p. 205) puts it,
riences, enjoyable or not. They open the way for
new forms of action and thus for new social prac- in contrast with such experience, we have an
tices and forms of art, for ritual and religion, for experience when the material experienced runs its
literature and philosophy, for technology and sci- course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it
ence, and therefore for expanding experiences, integrated within and demarcated in the general
both epistemic and aesthetic. stream of experience from other experiences. A
piece of work is finished in a way that is tive. It is in operation whenever something is

satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game being created:
is played through; a situation, whether that of
eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on The act of producing that is directed by intent to
a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a produce something that is enjoyed in the immediate
political campaign, is so rounded out that its close experience of perceiving has qualities that a
is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an spontaneous or uncontrolled activity does not have.
experience is a whole and carries with it its own The artist embodies in himself the attitude of the
individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is perceiver while he works. (p. 208)
an experience. (emphasis in original)
Such a view makes the aesthetic experience a dis-
Experiences, then, are singular, each having its tinctive feature not only of the practice of art but
own particularity: also of crafting and action at large, so long as
their practitioners look for perfection in their exe-
An experience has a unity that gives it its name, cution and “perceive and enjoy the product that
that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship. is executed” (Dewey, 1994, p. 207). Aesthetics,
The existence of this unity is constituted by a single then, is not about a property of an object but
quality that pervades the entire experience in spite about a way of relating to objects and action. It
of the variation of its constituent parts . . . In going
has more to do with the perceiver’s and crafter’s
over an experience in mind after its occurrence, we
capabilities for enjoying – with taste. Aesthetics
may find that one property rather than another was
is made of emotional and motivational abilities
sufficiently dominant so that it characterizes the
experience as a whole. (p. 206) that can be trained. It is a matter for “sentimen-
tal education” that is not foreign to ethics, to the
Particular experiences are at once general and cultivation of virtue – the search for excellence
individual. On one hand, all experiences can be (Rosa & González, 2013). And, as such, it has a
described and explained by referring to the oper- relational character; it refers to the products to be
ation of a set of psychological processes; and, crafted but also to others, to social life.
on the other hand, they are particular, because Aesthetic experiences, and experience at large,
they are about an individual object or event that belong to the experiencer and result from an exer-
receives a name: cise of abilities, of psychological processes gov-
erning behavior. Their effect shows when in rela-
In final import they are intellectual. But in their tion with objects and with others – in perception,
actual occurrence they were emotional as well; they in action, and in communication – and also when
were purposive and volitional. Yet the experience experiencing one’s own actions and oneself. They
was not a sum of these different characters; they are means for self-direction and also operate in
were lost in it as distinctive traits. (p. 206) the construction of the concept of oneself and
others.
Aesthetic experiences therefore perform
6.4.1 Aesthetic Experience
another function. They add aesthetic value to
What makes an experience “aesthetic” is its meaning. Objects, actions, situations, and people
appreciative character, its orientation toward can thus get an extra quality that expands beyond
enjoyment. “It denotes the consumer’s rather than what their shape, utility, or functionality afford,
the producer’s standpoint. It is Gusto, taste” but also because they themselves are a means
(Dewey, 1994, p. 207). But this does not mean of searching for excellence – enjoyment, beauty,
that the aesthetic attitude is merely contempla- virtue. To say that something or somebody is
116 alberto rosa
“nice” results from an aesthetic judgment that as long as the entity and its surroundings keep
gathers together feelings “of grace and propor- in a dynamic equilibrium. When they do not, the
tion in right conduct, a perception of fusion of structure degrades and dies.
means and ends” (Dewey, 1994, p. 215). The structural flexibility of living bodies is
So viewed, aesthetic experiences are not use- what makes movements possible and also to dis-
less side effects of the workings of psyche; they cern the varied effects it produces in the envi-
influence the direction of action for improving ronment and on its own inner equilibrium. So
its products and also the development of aware- viewed, the changes of the body, while connect-
ness, agency, and self-awareness. They have a ing with things, are informative about what things
role in the processes of development, in giving are like (sensation) and about their value for the
value to objects, actions, one’s own abilities, and maintenance of the inner equilibrium of the body
one’s own self as an object. This leads us into the (affection). Emotions are responses to sensations
examination of the fabric of experience and how that appraise how the body feels affected and are
it develops. then aroused for action. Thus the structure of
the iterative movements (volition) informs as to
what the elements of the environment afford (per-
6.5 The Formal Fabric of
ception), while affection and emotions add value
Experience: Semiotics of
to the outcomes of those movements and also to
Behavior and Experience
the things with which those movements connect.
Experience is what makes us feel alive in the In sum, movements (volition) and the affordances
world. Experiences are informative but also of things (sensation and perception) inform about
deceptive; they present real objects but also the environment, and affections add value to the
fictional entities (angels, demons, leprechauns, elements of the environment so that the three
phlogiston), even entities with no extension (pain, act together to create sense for things to turn
sentiments, duration, or succession). Experiences into objects; and, in so doing, they also attribute
make it possible to profit from learning but also meaning to objects, situations, and events. But
lead to mistakes; they can be enjoyable but also neither sense nor meanings are material things:
dreadful; they also make me feel myself – they they are produced from what living bodies do
are always my experiences. They are useful for and feel when relating to their environment. And
the direction of behavior, for volition. as the shape of movements evolves through their
What are experiences made of? How is it that iterative coupling with things, so do the meanings
the structural coupling between material struc- of objects, actions, situations, and the agent itself;
tures seems able to make such ethereal entities the consequence is that new forms of meaning
such as numbers, rationality, beauty, joy, or virtue appear.
to arise? The argument so far developed took Experience, so viewed, is the informative capa-
material things and movement as key elements in bility that movements have when producing
this process. Body movements cause couplings to value. In other words, movements (volition), sen-
happen. These movements respond to the needs sation, and affection are basic psychological pro-
of living material entities whose structure allows cesses that together turn things into objects to be
those movements when searching for the negative perceived, liked or disliked, desired, or despised.
entropy that supports their own structure. This So viewed, experience is able to orient behav-
gives them the impulse for moving and their sur- ior within an environment where different values
roundings the materials with which to couple and are attributed to elements, in other words, expe-
the energy needed for it. These processes go on riences act as signs. This makes semiotics – the
Goals and ends
Beliefs DOMAIN OF
SUBJECTIVITY
DOMAIN OF Feelings of agency,
OBJECTIVITY Thirdness identity and self,
Experienced objects Interpretant Aesthetic feelings.
Social representations Play, Sport,
Volitional Act Art, Ritual,
Social objects.
Epistemic products Religion,
Citizenship
ACTION
Sensorial Act Affective Act
Representamen Alterity
Phenomena Firstness SEMIOSIS Secondness Feelings
Emotional
Realities EXPERIENTIAL DOMAIN episodes
PRAGMATIC DOMAIN (VALUES)
Attitudes, dispositions, desires, habits.
Social norms.
Figure 6.1 Triadic formalisms accounting for action, semiosis, experience, and realities.
science of supplying formal devices to explain that somebody will form of the way the first sign
the shaping and evolution of signs – a valu- refers to its object – can become a sign (a new
able instrument for the study of how experiences representamen) for a next semiosis, in effect pro-
unfold. ducing a new interpretant, and so on ad infini-
tum. Interpretants can take many shapes. They
can manifest as behavior (a body reaction, a ges-
6.5.1 Semiotics of Action
ture); as some kind of performance (a habit, a
The semiotic approach of C. S. Peirce holds that dance, or a stroke); as a scream, a word, or an
anything can be used as a sign of something else, utterance; or as some cognitive operation. This
as long as there is some respect or capacity relat- causes semiosis to be not only a meaning-making
ing the sign and the thing it refers to (its object) device but also a logical device for the explana-
for some particular purpose. In this way, meaning tion of thinking in action.
is not a fixed entity but the result of a process of The triadic structure of semiosis is isomor-
semiosis. phic to the structure of action, when the action
Semiosis is a triadic process: it includes a rep- is conceived as a composition of three kinds
resentamen (first); something that has the capac- of acts (sensorial, volitional, and affective) (see
ity of acting as a sign that refers to something Figure 6.1). This isomorphism opens the way
else – the object – (second) because both (the rep- for developing a theory of semiotic actuations in
resentamen and the referent) have something in which experience results from the semiotic prop-
common (form for icons, presence for indexes, or erties of body movements when in contact with
some conventional value for symbols); and a new the things of the environment (for a lengthier
sign – interpretant (third) – that interprets the explanation, see Rosa, 2007a, 2007b).
relation between sign and object as a possibility This isomorphism allows experiences, behav-
(rhema), a fact (dicent), or a regularity or reason ior, and their material outcomes (drawings, pic-
(argument). Semioses are recursive, which means tures, crafted artifacts, or written utterances) to be
that the interpretant – the situated interpretation conceived as resulting from semiotic processes.
118 alberto rosa
In this way, semiosis does not only provide of the environment. To explain the flexibility
sense to action and behavior; it also offers of behavior for adapting to changing circum-
formalisms for explaining the way objects are stances and profiting from accumulated experi-
manipulated and transformed, making objects ence, something else is needed – a formalism that
and artifacts both means and results of semiotic also could take into account the changes in the
processes. inner state of the organism while coupling with
The above reviewed “theory of material the environment so that a different volition act
engagement” (Malafouris, 2013) offers a con- could emerge. The iteration of actions in circular
vincing argument of how the semiotic proper- reactions, and their composition in novel struc-
ties of the manipulation of objects are instru- tures in the shape of recursive semiosis, is able to
mental for the explanation of the development produce such emergent properties.
of higher psychological processes. Malafouris’s The intentional schema combines three con-
approach argues that action with objects is a form secutive actions within a novel triadic structure.
of thinking-in-action – which he terms “enactive This new structure is the basis on which more
semiosis” – in which the signifier and the signi- complex psychological processes, such as per-
fied generate each other. His argument is that as ception, emotion, learning, and new forms of
an action transforms an object, the resulting arti- intentionality, can start to develop. These are
fact can become a sign signaling to a new entity, effects of the semiotic processes that this struc-
even if the latter never existed before within expe- ture allows, which makes it possible to com-
rience – as is the case with figures and numbers. bine simultaneously the reference to things of the
The consequence is that artifacts are materialized environment to the inner state of the organism
interpretants of enactive semioses and concepts (affections) and so open the way to the attribu-
an effect of the use of signs. tion of values to two kind of objects: things of the
Objects, as presented in our experience, are the environment and the organism itself.
result of a series of recursive semioses, which The intentional scheme (Figure 6.2) has some
go on until the interpreter gets satisfied with the properties worth mentioning. It combines three
interpreted result or gives up. Semiotized objects semioses, but with the peculiarity that while
result from chains of particular semioses. We can the first and second semioses (OBA and ABC)
think of objects only because signs present them. (see Figure 6.2) have as a referent1 the inner
They may have a transcendental ontic nature or affect that the encountered thing produced in the
not (e.g., stones, birds, hobbits, Madame Bovary, organism of the interpreter (B), the third semio-
phlogiston, obscure matter, the pi number), but sis (CBD) (see Figure 6.2) takes the reiteration
their ontology is provided by semioses (Rosa & of the inner organismic state (C) (see Figure 6.2)
Pievi, 2013). as representative of the affection felt (B) (the ref-
erent again) in the last encounter with the thing,
producing in turn an interpretant that is a voli-
6.5.2 From Action to Intentional
tive act (D) addressed to the environment – a
Schemas, Habits, and Dramatic
desire. Thus affect (B) plays a key role in this
Actuations
process, because it is the permanent (inner) out-
Action (a triad of sensorial, volitional, and affec- come of the encounter between the organism and
tive acts; see Figure 6.1) is the basic mechanism the thing. The consequence is that affect and its
of body couplings. However, its structure is very reiteration and transformation throughout time
rigid and can only account for basic reactions (mood: C) (see Figure 6.2) become key elements
in which the organism simply reacts to changes for the development of mental representations.
d
oo
dm
C
nan
tio
c
ffe
A & D: couplings (movement-sensation)
–a
B & D: affections–moods.
m
nis
ga
or
1st Action OBA: Pre–semiosis
the
O: 1st sensorial act (1st representamen)
of
B: 1st affective act (1st alterity)
tes
A: 1st volitive act (1st interpretant)
sta
er
Inn
2nd Action ABC: Affective action
D
B
A: 2nd sensorial act (2nd representamen)
on
sati
B: 1st affective act (2nd alterity) – affect as inner state
C: 2nd affective act (2nd interpretant) – mood sen
ement-
A mov
g–
thin
ith a
3rd Action CBD: Desire
C: 2nd affective act (3rd representamen) – mood O lin gs w
Coup E
D: 2nd volitional act (3rd interpretant) – movement TIM
Figure 6.2 Semiotic structure of the intentional scheme.
Without the dynamics of affect, no sense could sented in Figure 6.3 by the ABD action semio-
appear. sis. Thus sensorial act A acts as signal to inner
The intentional scheme is a structure capable state B, producing a volitive act D, addressed to
of accounting for the directionality of behavior again produce B (the affect). This is the begin-
as an effect of affect and mood. It is a chain of ning of intentional action and also the basis for
three recursive semioses sharing the same refer- the development of habits.
ent (B) – the inner affect produced by repeated Perceptual action (ACD) takes a sensed prop-
encounters with the thing. The resulting semi- erty of the object (A) as a sign of the repetition
otic structure is that of a legisign – an interpre- of moods felt (C), producing a new act toward
tant able to signal to regularity (D) – a volitive the thing (D). In this way, volitive and perceptual
act addressed to the thing, the intent to reproduce actions are simultaneous effects of the intentional
the result of the encounter with the thing (B): a scheme and signal the emergence of intentional
desire. Legisigns are the semiotic basis for the behavior and the stabilization of experience. Both
production of permanent objects. movements and sensorial qualities can now signal
Actuations are structures resulting from the objects, and behavior can be driven by sensations
semiotic structure of the intentional scheme. As that can perform as signals as a result of previous
Figure 6.3 shows, (1) intentional (volitive) action experiences.
(ABD) and (2) the formal properties of semio- The reiteration of actuations on the same
tized objects (perception) (ACD) develop as pro- thing will enrich the meaning of the object
cesses as interpretative actions unfold throughout by adding further formal, functional, and aes-
time. thetic values as emerging from the semiotic
Volitive action (intentional behavior) is a direct structures of actuations when encountering the
outcome of the intentional scheme. It is repre- thing.
120 alberto rosa
1st Action OBA: Pre–semiosis

O: 1st sensorial act (1st representamen)
B: 1st affective act (1st alterity ) C
e
A: 1st volitive act (1st interpretant )
tat
s
er
2nd Action ABC: Affective action
inn
Ae
A: 2nd sensorial act (2nd representamen)
sth
of
et
ign
l valu
C: 2nd affective act (2nd interpretant ) – mood
ic
s
va
as
lue
a
n
3rd Action CBD: Desire
Form
tio
C: 2nd affective act (3rd representamen) – mood
fec
Af
D: 2nd volitional act (3rd interpretant) – movement
B
Functional value
4th Action ABD: Volitive action-habit D
A: 1st sensorial act (4th representamen)
B: 1st affective act (4th alterity) – affect as inner state t
D: 2nd volitional act (4th interpretant) – movement so bjec
tut ed a
co nsti
hing
5th Action ACD: Perception – semiotized object A
t
A: 1st sensorial act (5th representamen) The
C: 2nd affective act (5th alterity) O
D: 2nd volitional act (5th interpretant) – movement
Figure 6.3 Actuation: Semiotic development of intentional action and objects.
Several consequences follow: (1) sensorial This opens the way for identifying whether the
qualities can trigger intentional volitive actions, encountered thing is a novelty or a known object,
(2) things turn into objects as their affor- making the development of habits possible and
dances are grasped through action, (3) objects enhancing the capability for adjusting behavior
acquire values through successive active encoun- to environmental conditions, that is, learning and
ters, (4) affect turns into moods and feelings early forms of intelligence.
(Russell, 2003) as semioses actions iterate, and The repetition and variation of actuations on
(5) the interpretative construction of objects the same environmental element end up produc-
through semioses (actions) comes together with ing a conceptualization of the object – a reitera-
an increasing sense of one’s own agency, as volition of the same semiotic structure, which makes
tive actions get progressively tuned in successive the resulting successive volitive actions (inter-
couplings. pretants) possible, which could then act as signs
Actuations, as so far described, are enac- referring to the object being constituted, so that
tive semioses, i.e., semioses in which result- its meaning grows as new values are added. Once
ing interpretants are motor actions. They pro- the thing gets constituted as a permanent object,
duce legisigns that stabilize the experience of it becomes an otherness able to be presented
the world through the development of habits and by signs referring to their presence (indexes)
intentionality; they have indexical (sense of pres- and form (icons), e.g., a pain felt (B) can sig-
ence) and iconic (formal) properties (Peirce’s nal a harmful quality (A) of an object, which
signs types 5, 6, and 7; see Rosa 2007a). causes me to scream and move away (D). The
withdrawal movement and the scream are a con- habit, social communication, and conventional-
sequence of what the object is – a bush of net- ization. This is the case for ritualized movements
tles – but they are also signals that may warn oth- (gestures) or their material outcomes, such as
ers about the qualities of the encountered thing, artifacts resulting from human action (tokens, fig-
so they are informed of how to behave in relation ures made with traces on a surface, pronounced
to it. or written words, etc.). Symbols are artifacts
Affects (B), moods (C), and emotional reac- for efficient communication – saying “nettles”
tions (BCD, Figure 6.3) play an important role when walking in the fields is a way of prevent-
in communicative processes. On one hand, they ing harm to others, if the speaker and the listen-
are able to act as intra-organismic signs of the ers know what this word means. Symbols make
encountered thing, and on the other hand, they present here and now something still not noticed
produce behavioral reactions that can act as signs or absent (a harpsichord, a deceased friend, or the
of both the internal state of the reacting organism amount of my mortgage) just by uttering a word
and the aesthetic values of the encountered thing. or by seeing some figures on a piece of paper.
This has the effect of giving a semiotic capabil- Symbols not only represent objects resulting
ity to affects, moods, and feelings – they can act from couplings with environmental things; they
as signs of the thing in addition to adding affec- also inform the values and qualities making up
tive value to other values that give meaning to the the meaning of the object. These values are a
semiotic object in constitution. result of the previously mentioned semiotic pro-
The communicative and informative nature of cesses, which include elements such as affects,
the volitive action adds a dramatic nature to actu- moods, feelings, desires, sensorial qualities, and
ations – they can be interpreted as signals by patterns of behavior, which are also signs able to
others, who may take it as information about an refer to an alterity. This opens the way for iden-
object of the environment or about an intention tification mistakes and also for the production
of the actor. This also makes actuations dramatic of other bizarre objects never physically encoun-
actuations, which then are not only a result of tered – fictitious creatures (angels, elves, fairies)
encounters with things of the environment but or abstract entities such as phlogiston, energy, or
also a means for communicating with others. intelligence. But if such entities come to exist
Thus motor volitive acts (the final interpretant of as creatures of experience, it is not because they
actuations – D) can be shaped for communication have a material structure with which our bodies
purposes and can get progressively ritualized. can couple; they result from a new mental abil-
This eventually results in the production of ges- ity that symbols allow – imagination – which is
tures and words (new ritualized enactive objects) an ability that can only appear as an outcome
tailored for efficient communication. The conse- of recursive interpretative semioses, which com-
quence is that a new kind of sign arises – the bine symbols to produce a new kind of sign:
symbol. arguments.
Arguments (Peirce’s type 10 signs) are able to
produce new meaning by combining sets of sym-
6.5.3 Symbols and Arguments to bols following some rules (a grammar of some
Experience Objects beyond type). These rules start to develop from the con-
Material Encounters straints and possibilities that actuations in the
Symbols are conventional signs. They are objects environment provide, but they can evolve and
able to represent other objects, resulting from be transformed into many varieties in different
122 alberto rosa
Figure 6.4 Fractal structure of experience and behavior: Development of symbols and arguments.
environments for different purposes – such as Whether the ontological status attributed to enti-
ethnic natural languages. They can also be arti- ties of these kinds is to be taken as true or false,
ficially devised for particular purposes – such as real or imaginary, is a matter of judgment not
mathematics, logic, or computer programming. independent of the kind of code and grammar
This causes different symbolic codes to appear applied, the way they were applied, and the social
adapted to the purposes and conditions of their norms and beliefs of the communities and indi-
use – e.g., alphabetic notation, flag codes, sign viduals making those judgments for some pur-
language, traffic signals, musical notation, num- pose (juridical, epistemic, artistic, religious, etc.).
bers, algebraic notation. Such codes reciprocally Arguments are therefore the semiotic struc-
adapt the structure of symbols and the rules ture behind higher psychological processes like
for their combination, searching to enhance their imagination, memory, and symbolic thinking.
functionality. Figure 6.4 sketches how symbols (E) develop
Whatever the case, arguments are logical from actuations, and arguments (F) from actua-
machines for creating new symbols and mean- tions, with the mediation of symbols. As these
ings and therefore for producing new objects one appear, both symbols and arguments are able to
can think of, irrespective of the ontological sta- signal to affects (B) or emotions (C), to senso-
tus they may have. Witches, angels, unicorns, jus- rial qualities (A), and are also able to steer behav-
tice, the pi number, and the gravitational constant ior (D). This is what makes angels appear radiant
are creatures arising from these processes. They and attractive and witches ugly and repulsive; it is
could never exist without previous arguments that what attributes aesthetic value to artistic compo-
provide them with a structure, if not a substance. sitions or elegance to mathematical equations –
and the reverse: how sensorial qualities, feelings, because of the interpretation of such a possibility
or body movements can be taken as signs relating that the “reality” of a semiotic object, presented
some object to another, such as in the production by a phenomenon, could eventually be accepted.
of metaphors. The availability of a common tool kit of artifacts
As Figure 6.4 shows, the semiotic structure of (Wertsch, 1991), icons, symbols, and arguments
actuations can be represented by a tetrahedron, for their use in shared cultural practices is what
a structure that is replicated as new semiosis makes it possible for social phenomena to act
actions appear in the flow of experience. The con- as signs of the presence of sociocultural objects
sequence is that the semiotic structure of the flow within the dynamic flow of current experience.
of experience and behavior resembles a dynamic Social phenomena do not appear chaoti-
system with a fractal structure of which the basic cally, nor are social objects randomly produced
unit is the actuation (see Figure 6.4b). in uncoordinated performances, utterances, or
inscriptions. They get assembled into argumen-
tative semioses in which interpretants are new
6.5.4 The Semiotic Constitution of kinds of objects – social virtual objects (such
Social Objects and Intentional as boss, daughter, bartering, money) that are
Worlds abstract categories that can also get embodied
Actuations are the basic units of intentional in individual objects, which, when invoked by
behavior; they produce legisigns (symbols and a symbol, embody a network of (social) values
arguments) capable of stabilizing experience and when experienced.
thus shape semiotic objects of different kinds. Scenes and events are also creatures of this
Whatever nature they may have, semiotic objects kind. They result from recursive arguments that
appear instantiated in some kind of material arti- relate objects of many kinds – semiotized nat-
fact resulting from previous actuations (gestures, ural objects (stones, trees, cows) and social
uttered or written words, tools, crafted or indus- objects (friends, foes, property, home) – so that
trial products). This causes material symbols, the ongoing drama of social life gets stabilized
concepts, and semiotic objects to be historically and becomes understandable. The consequence
contingent sociocultural products, making up the is that further arguments make more objects
cultural stock of each particular group. appear, such as scripts for actuations and social
Social (semiotised) objects (Wagner et al., rules. When the latter are also stabilized, they
1999) can get to exist and be shared within a can become references for further argumentative
group only if at some moment they were instan- semioses, making new entities appear, such as
tiated in some material element for a convention- morality, justice, responsibility, authority, indig-
alized use. This makes material artifacts indis- nity, family, identity, or belonging.
pensable tools for the kind of communication that Again, none of these new objects could come
enables a social tuning of individuals’ behavior to exist without some kind of material sup-
and experience. They provide the environmental port. If symbols are embodied in gestures,
elements that permit sociocultural phenomena. sounds, or iconic displays of many different
A sociocultural phenomenon is the interpreta- kinds (pictures, statues, pictograms, letters, flags,
tion an observer makes of somebody else’s actua- mathematical signs, musical notation, rituals),
tion on an environmental element, so that the ele- arguments can only materialize when material
ment could be taken as a sign of the possibility symbols are combined within texts of different
(rhema) of a previously semiotized object. It is kinds. Texts, then, are the material support for
124 alberto rosa
the production of argumentative discourses, irre- ethnic group has a language, professional guilds
spective of the material that gives them substance have their own peculiar different codes adapted
or the form they take. Thus an arrangement of to their tasks, and institutions and groups have
letters, words, and sentences on whatever surface developed different social languages. The dis-
(marble, paper, or computer screen) is a text; but courses so produced are a variegated mixture:
a picture, a road with painted lines and traffic booklets of instruction, sacred scriptures, philo-
signs, a parade, a church, a theatre performance, sophical essays, romantic novels, epic poetry, sci-
or a graduation ceremony is a different kind of ence handbooks, political speeches, news reels,
text too. All are made up of sets of symbols celebration or mourning rituals, tragic theatre
arranged according to rules able to convey sig- performances, or memorial monuments are all
nificance to their users. Texts are syntactic con- examples of different discursive genres tailored
structions resulting from their authors’ enactive to serve different communication purposes. Even
semioses but not yet semanticized by an audi- this proliferation of cultural materials allows
ence. individuals access to only a fraction of the texts,
The formal features of the symbols, and the symbols, arguments, and discourses available
purpose and functions they serve in a particular within the sociocultural space in which they live.
realm of sociocultural life, set the rules for their The symbols, arguments, and discourses that
use. The code provides the syntactic possibilities one individual is exposed to and somehow man-
texts have for producing significance. This makes ages to master for one’s own use constitute the
some codes better suited for some purposes than tool kit of symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2017).
others, and then more or less familiar or foreign These are the resources that one has available
to members of different cultural groups. to make sense of personal lived experiences; to
Discourses are semanticized texts (Magariños, identify objects; to think and argue; and also to
2008). They are semiotic machines for creating judge whether one’s immediate experience (as an
entities and for giving them value. It is this semio- object, an event, a cause, or a consequence) is real
genic capacity that makes it possible for discur- or fictitious, subjective or objective, or a belief
sive semioses to create metadiscourses and, with resulting from social convention – even if the
that, to abstract objects further removed from line dividing one experience from another is not
the sensorial experience, for example, literature, always very clear. If the outcome resulting from
grammar, musicology, algebra, logic, theology, such a judgment attributes some reality to what is
and cosmology (but also astrology, demonology, felt, the resulting behavioral actuation restarts the
and ufology). These are domains of knowledge process.
(or fiction?) populated by plenty of creatures Figure 6.5 sketches the unfolding of the pro-
(morphemes and syntagms, characters and plots, cess described in this section. The structural cou-
chords and beats, integers and functions, black plings of the organism and environmental ele-
holes and antimatter) far removed from empir- ments trigger series of recursive semiotic actions,
ical experience, which sometimes seem to be which simultaneously produce transformations
accepted either as plausible or real, as capable in the environment (behavior, inscriptions, texts)
of conveying or producing truth or leading to and lead to the experience of semiotic objects that
mistakes. enrich their meaning as more values (phenom-
Many texts instated in a great variety of codes ena, qualities, functions) are added. The final out-
have been produced throughout time – books, come is the intentional world (Magariños, 2008)
tableaus, frescoes, churches, palaces, arches of which one believes oneself to be living in when
triumph, and city squares are among them. Each performing an actuation.
Figure 6.5 Substitutive semioses in the dynamics of sociocultural phenomena and personal
experiences.
The experiences making up the objects, events, tures with environmental elements. As Brentano
norms, and beliefs that compose an intentional (1874) said, experience is immanently objective,
world are simultaneously objective and subjec- it is always intentional, and it invariably refers to
tive. They could not exist without the mediation something else.
of environmental materials, nor without carrying
out successive coupling actions on the material
6.6 Conclusions: Action Turns
tools developed throughout this process. In this
Things into Objects and
view, the mental domain is made of signs (which
Artifacts When Valuing
material support cannot be but body changes)
Experience for the Direction
whose presentative or representative capability is
of Behavior
provided by the semiotic structure of recursive
actions. These accumulative structures make up This chapter explains how innovation is pro-
the dynamic system that supports the develop- duced; how perception turns things into objects;
ment of new abilities and higher psychological and how action changes the use of objects, their
processes. This does not make body structures or shapes, and their values. Innovation is explo-
the nervous system a repository of stored ideas, ration and the trying out of new possibilities;
meanings, or beliefs. Experiences and beliefs it is more playing and enjoying than mere trial
are fleeting semiotic outcomes of a dynamic and error and only turns into labor once a new
system of successive encounters of body struc- use is given to the product crafted, so that what
126 alberto rosa
before was experimentation is now ritualized, dis- 2005) giving meaning to the shared Umwelt
ciplined operations. of the group.
The main points that were developed in the 7 To participate in the social life of a group, a
argument above can be summarized as follows: newcomer must share its cultural values. This
requires becoming familiar with the use of
1 Phenomenal objects result from couplings artifacts and inscriptions when participating
between bodies and things. It is through in social activities, developing the skills for
action that values are attached to environmen- doing so, and also taming emotions so they
tal elements. Objects are semiotized entities. become tuned to the values and norms of the
2 Perception and production of artifacts are group. Sociocultural scripts regulate not only
related processes: both are consequences of what to do but also how to feel.
how adaptive behavior adds values to the 8 Experience is the subjective outcome of the
encountered environmental elements and to semiotic value of these meditational means
their changes. (signs, symbols, and arguments belonging to
3 Value is a relational concept; it is how some- a variety of codes) for guiding action when
thing is related to something else. Meaning is participating in sociocultural activities. Expe-
the set of values attributed to objects. rience is somehow co-extensive to conscious-
4 Affective processes are crucial for the pro- ness (which also includes unconscious pro-
duction of value, sense, and meaning: they cesses) and therefore related to a family of
not only arouse action and appraise the psychological constructs like controlled cog-
elements encountered and the results of nitive processes, executive functions, or the
actions but also signal the agent’s agency will.
and so add value to the agent, causing a 9 The structural isomorphism of action and
new object to appear – the self. Human semiosis, and their recursive capabilities,
agents cannot act, gauge their actions, and opens the door for a semiotic analy-
value their outcomes and themselves without sis of behavior addressing how experi-
feelings. ence (conscious or unconscious) provides
5 The objects that populate our world and sense to behavior and operates in personal
the artifacts we produce result from human governance.
action and knowledge that are instantiated 10 Semiotics offers formalisms for explaining
in material inscriptions accumulated through- how things turn into objects and are manip-
out time to embody value and meaning, so ulated and transformed: artifacts are materi-
to direct our behavior. Action and cognition, alized interpretants of enactive semioses.
objects and perception, knowledge and crafts
are like the two sides of a coin minted for It is only when novelty is produced that new val-
presenting the values that things have for ues are made to appear. Play and art are socio-
life. cultural activities for producing enjoyment in
6 Material culture is made of the accumulation their participants; they leave room for originality
of artifacts, inscriptions, texts, and landscape and also frequently praise innovation. They are
transformations, resulting from the labor of like sociocultural greenhouses for the production
previous generations. It is the semiotization of new artifacts, values, and meanings, such as
of these artifacts that turns them into the social laboratories for the experimentation of new
tool kit of discourses that together constitute emotions (Vygotsky, 1974), and also a school for
the set of intersecting semiospheres (Lotman, the éducation sentimentelle of their participants.
In contrast, technology and labor do not create Bekoff, M. (1995). Playing with play: What can we
new values but expand the circulation of those learn about cognition, negotiation, and evolution.
that already existed. They are sociocultural activ- In D. Cummins & C. Allen (Eds.), The Evolution
ities that conserve the legacies of past innovation of Mind (pp. 162–182). New York: Oxford
and serve the needs and interests of their practi- University Press.
Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie von Empirische
tioners and of those who profit from the manufac-
Standpunkte. Leipzig: Dunker und Humbolt.
tured products.
Bruner, J. S. (1972). The nature and uses of
Play and labor, art and technology, are prac-
immaturity. American Psychologist, 27,
tices developed from the sociocultural dynamics 687–708.
of human history. They furnish our Umwelt with Callon, M. & Latour, B. (1981). Unscrewing the big
artifacts produced by psyches spirited by the cul- Leviathan. In K. Knorr-Cetina & A. Cicourel
tural values embodied in the matter with which (Eds.), Advances in Social Theory and
they play, in the machines that make our lives Methodology: Towards an Integration of Micro-
easier, and in the machinations that constrain our and Macro-Sociology (pp. 277–303). London:
liberty. The question remains whether these arti- Routledge & Kegan Paul.
facts, while used for working or playing, can add Carruthers, P. (2002). Human creativity: Its cognitive
enjoyment or suffering to our lives, whether they basis, its evolution, and its connection with
childhood pretence. British Journal of the
are a help for us living a meaningful life.
Philosophy of Science, 53, 225–249.
Note Cole, M. (1998). Cultural Psychology: A Once and
Future Discipline. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
1 I have chosen to speak of referent (thing or alterity) University Press.
rather than object, as Peirce did, when describing the Dewey, J. (1994). Art as Experience. In S. D. Ross
three elements of a semiosis, in order to leave the (Ed.), An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory
term object to refer to the semiotized object, once it (pp. 204–220). Albany: State University Of New
has acquired values and thus is conceptualized as an York Press.
entity. Dissanayake, E. (1974). A hypothesis of the evolution
of art from play. Leonardo, 7, 211–217.
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7 Making Social Objects: The Theory
of Social Representation
Wolfgang Wagner, Katrin Kello, and Andu Rämmer
7.1 Veneration and Violence

In the course of such behaviors, be it venerat-
Whenever Muslim believers assemble in a ing one’s god in a mosque, temple, synagogue, or
mosque for Friday’s prayer, they jointly pray to church, or violently confronting nonbelievers –
a supernatural entity that comes into existence for example, in Paris 2016 – and “non-chosen”
in these moments: a being called “Allah” that is others – for example, Palestinians in the case of
the target of the activities of the assembled peo- Israel – (e.g., Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, & Eiran,
ple. If you asked one of the attendees, they would 2016), people establish and give reality to the
say that Allah is the all-merciful and all-mighty object of “god.” In the end, the reality of these
god and responsible for everything on earth and social objects extends even to outsiders, coun-
in heaven. This particular phenomenon can be tries, and governments as far as they feel a need
observed with any religion where people assem- to respond to a threat.
ble and ritually worship their gods according to In this chapter, we present and discuss three
their beliefs. As different as their beliefs may be, social objects that range from the concrete and
the result will always be the same, that is, the cre- material such as a wheelchair to institutionalized
ation of the target of worship that makes its pres- discursive objects such as “global warming” as
ence felt by the participants. well as national identity and nation state. The
There has recently been abundant evidence construction and the dynamics of social objects
attesting to the power of this process in the can be explored within the framework of social
ways that some radical exemplars of the faithful representation theory. Originally, the theory was
of different religions face adherents of other conceived as a means to understand ways of
religions and, in particular, atheists. In several representing new scientific insights and theories
interpretations, their god’s existence demands that became popularized in a society (Moscovici,
elimination of the faithless, a process that state 1961, 2008). It was part of the French tradition
powers in most countries call terrorism. Thus, of “vulgarisation scientifique,” a movement ded-
the mental being that manifests its existence in icated to science education (Bauer, 1993; Jacobi,
collective rituals has earthly consequences for 1977). Over the last few decades, this “narrow”
the victims of the believers’ rage. Let’s not be view of social representation theory has devel-
myopic: this violent phenomenon is not limited oped into a much broader theoretical framework
to Muslim “extremists,” but was, and is, an that can be applied to a wide variety of social pro-
unavoidable potential side effect – or “collateral cesses and social as well as cultural objects as
damage” – of all religions in history, whether can be seen in a recent handbook (Sammut et al.,
Christian (Pratt, 2010), Jewish (Aran & Hassner, 2015) and in the examples that we provide in the
2013; Gubler & Kalmoe, 2015), Muslim (Ginges rest of the chapter.
et al., 2016; Putra & Sukabdi, 2014), or Hindu Note that the use of the term “representa-
(Sen & Wagner, 2009). tion” is ambiguous. In the title we use the term
Making Social Objects 131
to express the activity of representing. In the tain that a representation can best be conceptual-
following we distinguish its use in the sense of ized as iconic and metaphorical and not proposi-
activity from the other meaning, representations tional. The metaphorical structure shows the rela-
as products of the activity of representing: sub- tionship between the source and target domains.
stantial and imaginary constructs observable in In this situation the understanding of the novel
behavior and speech. is linked – or anchored – to the familiar, and
the unfamiliar target domain is rendered intel-
ligible by projecting the basic structure of the
7.2 Social Representation
source onto the target item (Wagner, Elejabarri-
Theory
eta, & Lahnsteiner, 1995). The image incorpo-
rates the meaning of the novel and is tinted by the
7.2.1 Belief and Communicating
affects and connotations that derive – at least in
Communities can be characterized by the fact part – from the source domain (Wagner & Hayes,
that their members maintain a web of communi- 2005).
cation by sharing in a meaning system and the This has been vividly demonstrated in a study
associated language. This system of meanings about intergroup relations in conflict. In inter-
describes and, indeed, defines their local world view studies, the researchers used newspaper pic-
and the objects populating it. The basic part of tures of recent events to stimulate responses of
the shared meaning system comprises cultural Muslim and Hindu focus group participants dur-
items that derive from traditions and long-term ing the political tensions around the year 2000 in
historical processes. Such collective representa- India. The pictures reliably triggered emotional
tions (Durkheim, 1920) are relatively stable and reactions from members of both groups and made
comprise core ideas about the world. They give them express their mutual representations of each
the religious and moral justification for what is other’s stereotypes and actions (Sen & Wagner,
right or wrong, and comprise the rules of the 2009).
community’s social structure. While it is true that social representations com-
In modern times, mass media, and now the so- prise cognitive and affective elements that can
called social media have amended the repertoire be located both at individual and social levels,
of communication tools. These tools have given another and equally important part comprises
rise to a more dynamic and fleeting construction behavior and action, directed toward the material
of meanings that may appear and fade like fash- surroundings as well as other people. This makes
ions, but also add more dynamic “entries” in the social representation theory an approach that cov-
“book of cultures.” ers the crossroads and intersection between indi-
Communication, beliefs, and knowledge fre- vidual psychology and collective behavior and
quently refer to images and metaphorical think- discourse. In the end it is the overt behavior
ing when it comes to talking about novel things. which allows us to construct and define social
Such metaphorical images allow an initial fram- objects.
ing of the new in terms of the old and well known,
a process that Moscovici (2008) called anchoring.
7.2.2 Behaving and Acting
He refers to metaphorical images as “figurative
schemata” that capture the gist of an issue. Even Social representations emerge, are transformed,
if people engage in talk and use a propositional and elaborated in societal discourse. They are a
language when communicating about an object or form of knowledge that allows discursive com-
issue, the majority of scholars in the field main- munities to engage in debates about socially
132 wo lfgan g wag ne r , katrin kello, a nd an d u r ämme r
relevant issues. If the issue of the debate retains a and part of behaviors, the behaviors are an exten-
lasting importance the representation will eventu- sion and indeed part of the representation. The
ally become “emancipated” or even “hegemonic” representation endows the behaviors with mean-
in the sense that large sectors of the commu- ing, because “there is no definite break between
nity unthinkingly subscribe to it. In communica- the outside world and the world of the individual”
tion theory this process is called “cultivation” of (Moscovici, 2008, p. 8). Actors with their reasons
an issue (Morgan & Signorelli, 1990; Moscovici, and agenda do what they do, not because they
1988, 2008). want to realize some implicit representation, but
Knowledge, discourse, and talk, however, are because they want to achieve something concrete;
not enough for social objects to emerge. The criti- people represent social objects in and through
cal interface between minds and talk on one hand goal-directed action.
and objects on the other is behavior and action. Consider the example of the hosts of mentally
As a consequence, social representations must handicapped patients in Jodelet’s (1991) study
be conceptualized as simultaneously comprising who took pains to keep their own crockery and
mental and overt behavioral aspects. clothing separate from their guests’ when wash-
The dominant view in psychology follows ing and storing. This behavior corresponded to a
everyday psychology in maintaining that atti- deep-seated belief in contagion and sympathetic
tudes, beliefs, norms, and intentions are indepen- magic that things in contact will spread impurity
dent from, and causally producing, behavior, as and transmit mental illness. These people rep-
illustrated by numerous models where behavior resented mental illness in a comprehensive way
stands at the end of a series of arrows connecting where their verbal responses to the researcher’s
mental states with behavior and action (Ajzen, inquiry and their everyday behaviors were just
1991; Bandura, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). divergent expressions of the same thing: the fear
This understanding of how the mental relates to of “madness” of their guests.
behavior is also deeply ingrained in our every- Note that behavior, that is any voluntary overt
day understanding and a crucial part of vernacu- movement, would be just an arbitrary movement
lar psycho-logic (Smedslund, 1988). if the representation’s meaning were not attached
In contrast, social representation theory does to it. It is the representation’s situated meaning
not conceptualize the mental as being indepen- that allows justifying and accounting for behav-
dent from and informing or even causing behaviors, making them actions in a social context. Vol-
ior (Moscovici, 2008). The mental and overt untary behavior becomes an action whenever it
behaviors are just different expressions of one is part of a social representation and therefore
and the same representation on the individual and endowed with meaning.
on the collective level. It is in this space spanned
by the mental and behavior of actors that social
7.2.3 Interaction and Cooperation
objects are situated (Wagner, 2015, 2016).
Social objects emerge as a pattern of correlated The diversity of activities by many different
behaviors across actors and situations because actors that unfold in a group’s daily life can
“individuals or collectives to some extent see be bewildering for an outside observer. On one
[them] as an extension of their behaviour and hand there are behaviors related to agriculture
because, for them, it exists only because of the and gardening, building and construction, pro-
means and methods that allow them to understand duction and commerce, and many others serving
the object.” Just as the objects are an extension a reproductive purpose in all walks of daily life.
Such activities involve largely similar purposes ting the “green-house effect” or as abstract as the
and aims across cultures and observers with some idea of god enacted by elaborate rituals in all reli-
knowledge of similar activities in their own cul- gions the world over. The central tenet of social
ture will be able to get a feeling of the purpose representation theory is that individual actors and
and aims of these activities, even in foreign cul- social objects are mutually implied within their
tures. They will understand these behaviors, their shared field (Moscovici, 2008). In other words,
aims, and, perhaps, the technology involved. On through their actions, actors define meaning and
the other hand there are behaviors of which the social characteristics of the objects with which
purpose and details are puzzling to an uninitiated they are interacting and vice versa, the objects
observer. Most often these are related to ritual of their actions define particular characteristics of
and religion, be it celebrating birth, coming of people: your home decoration, for instance, inter-
age, marriage, death, or worship. Although these acts with your social standing and personality.
also consist of overt behaviors, they do not eas- There is a precondition to interaction and
ily disclose their aims and details except as a cooperation that is sometimes neglected. Actors
gross hunch. Observers may guess the reasons naturally have their own representation at their
and occasions for them, but their concrete mean- disposal and enact it in an interactive situation.
ing escapes superficial observation. In contrast to But they also need to have an idea of how
the former group of activities, the latter carries a their interactants represent the situation and the
significant symbolic burden. objects therein. An actor’s mental image and
The symbolic burden that camouflages the related behaviors therefore will comprise aspects
sense in a pattern of interactions for the outsider of their own and inferred aspects of the other’s
is the cultural meaning carried and conveyed by ideas and intentions. The actor’s representation
the representation that a group has elaborated in of a social situation takes a holomorphic, that
their local world. The production of social facts is, a comprehensive form by including meta-
in collective interaction endows the facts and knowledge about the other (Wagner & Hayes,
“representations in interaction” with validity as 2005, p. 276). It is this inclusive character of
the mere existence of the facts are the circular social representations that allows concerted inter-
evidence for their own “truth.” Representation action to occur, be it constructive as in the “dance
and action “remodel . . . and reconstitute . . . the of the sexes” in courtship or destructive as in
elements of the environment in which the violent conflict (Sen, 2012; see also Elcheroth,
behavior takes place” (Moscovici, 2008, p. 9). Doise, & Reicher, 2011, p. 739).
Representations must be seen as the meaning in Before we look at concrete examples of social
concerted behaviors by integrating them into a objects, let’s look at the meaning of histori-
network of relations in which it is bound up with cal events for ethnic groups. In January 2013,
its object (Moscovici, 2008). Hence, representa- a group of historians presented their new book
tions are objectified when the actors recognize on the Estonian medieval era. The book was a
the objects as evident and true. Our acting – tome in a semi-popular series on Estonian his-
the very way we do things – co-constructs our tory, attempting an up-to-date overview based
world and simultaneously is the evidence for its on academic research. It came as a surprise to
“truth.” the authors that journalists picked up a nuance
Social objects that are collectively enacted in in their book as “revolutionary”: the book used
their social representation can be very concrete, the term “North-East European Crusade” instead
such as planting a tree as a step toward combat- of “Ancient Freedom Fight.” The authors were
harshly criticized by parts of the general pub- ing and explaining to us the composition, struc-
lic, being even called “traitors” in some discus- ture, and dynamics of some regions in the fab-
sions. What had happened was that the authors ric of the world. By doing their scientific work
had not paid their dues to the symbolic value and publishing their results, scientists contribute
of the “Ancient Freedom Fight” as the desig- to the “zoo” of social objects that have a name,
nation for local resistance against German and are being talked about, and acted on in every soci-
Danish crusaders from 1208 to 1227. Accord- ety and culture.
ing to a popular core narrative, the heroic, One can say that the part of the world – the
though lost struggle was followed by centuries things, relationships, and events therein, which
of oppression by various foreign powers, but have a name, are being talked about and acted
finally freedom achieved in the similarly heroic on – constitutes the domesticated world of every-
“Freedom War” from 1918 to 1920 (Tamm, day life. Whenever persons express an opinion,
2008). attitude, or belief with regard to an object, we
When a crucial element of national identity must assume that they already have a represen-
was perceived as endangered by a fresh historical tation that relates to it, because the object and
account, the public discourse defended the imagi- the belief “take shape together.” The belief is
nary object. This shows two things of relevance in not a response to the object, “it is, to a certain
the present context. First, evoking social objects extent, its origin” (Moscovici, 2008, pp. 8–9).
may have a strong organizing force when they Hence, if behavior, being part of the representa-
are constituents of ethnic identity. Second, social tion, links the person and the object, it does not
objects can attain a surprisingly explicit reality make sense to juxtapose a representation to its
in discourse and collective action even after hav- object as alluded in the expression “representa-
ing remained dormant and implicit for a long tion of object X.” It is only through the behavior
time. On one hand, people who were outraged that is part and parcel of the representation, that
by historians’ “denial” of the “Ancient Freedom the object becomes socialized in the first place;
Fight” expected “historical truth” of historians. the representation is the origin of the social object
On the other hand they already “knew” what the (Wagner, 1996).
“truth” was, and wanted the historians to par- Using the word “object” with its “material”
ticipate in its enactment (see Chapter 22, this connotation in the present context might unduly
volume). restrict our understanding of the things popu-
lating our local world. Due to their materiality,
objects like stones, tree roots, as well as unnamed
7.2.4 Social Objects
“somethings” can hurt us when we trip over them
Finally, how do things become social objects? independently of whether the object is socially
Without intending to enter a philosophical dis- represented or not. Once represented, the thereby
cussion it is useful to assume that what we call socialized material objects constitute a signifi-
the world is the ensemble of an infinite set of mat- cant part of our local world. There are, how-
ter, energy, phenomena, relationships, events, you ever, a host of objects that we cannot literally
name it. Organisms and humans, being part of trip over, but which are as relevant as the for-
this set, are endowed with the capacity to cut real- mer. This class of objects should better be called
ity’s pulp into entities that are necessary to sense “social facts” or even “issues,” because they are
the world in a way that allows them to secure their not physical in the original sense. They owe
survival and procreation. Modern times’ scien- their existence to patterns of concerted collective
tific methods and insights do the same by show- behaviors.1
(a) (b)
Figure 7.1 An antique (a) and a modern (b) wheelchair. The antique chair has been used by
Margarete Steiff (1847–1909), a victim of polio and the inventor of the teddy bear. Source:
Wikimedia, public domain: (a) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Steiffmargarete.jpg
(b) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Standard_rollstuhl.jpg.
Let us remind you of the aforementioned the state welfare system introduced an integra-
example of the term “Ancient Freedom Fight” tion policy during the last decades. In the social
having been omitted in a recent textbook on Esto- reconstruction of the object “disability,” con-
nian history. The people’s behavior, in fact, their sidering equality and integration mark a funda-
commotion about this omission, marks the social mental change in the speech, in the ways of
fact of an historical issue, given importance by interaction between people on the street and the
the people’s beliefs and behaviors. “objects” construed by the representation, that is,
Let’s look at a clear-cut example of a social the handicapped persons. Consequently, disabled
object that we all have experience with and that people change their behavior and self-image and
is also embodied in a technical artifact: disabil- the social “object” of handicap is fundamen-
ity and wheelchairs. In many countries, the dis- tally different from understanding handicap hun-
course surrounding disability and people with dred years ago. Here again, we can observe an
disabilities has undergone a transformation in example of a holomorphic representation inte-
recent decades. In Sweden, for example, Gus- grating the “average” and the handicapped per-
tavsson (1996, 1997) describes different dis- son’s ideas and behaviors – the latter assertively
courses about intellectual disability in the con- defending autonomy and the former respecting
text of an advanced welfare system. The old- the autonomy of the other but being ready to help
est and most basic level refers to intellectually if necessary. This example illustrates how social
disabled people as “slow,” “weak,” “disabled,” representations give rise to historically variable
and “disadvantaged.” This level is complemented objects, notwithstanding the differences between
by the speech about “the right to special edu- mental and physical disablement (Anastasiou &
cation, subsidized work,” “the right to an ordi- Kauffman, 2013).
nary life, among others,” and “the right to equal- Figure 7.1 shows the technical equivalent to
ity,” which has become more dominant when the change in the representation of the physically
disabled during the last hundred years. The con- we will present two examples of more complex
struction of antique chairs reflects the formerly objects.
widespread view of disabled persons as depen-
dent on others, indicated by the prominent push
handle in the back. Chairs with large front wheels 7.3 The Paradigmatic
are difficult to handle even with hand rims. Emergence of a Representation:
In addition, three wheels as shown in Figure “Climate Change”
7.1(a) give little stability. Today, the chair is
constructed differently, supporting the modern 7.3.1 From Science to Communal
image of the disabled as self-determined, affir- Discourse
mative, and independent people (e.g., Swain &
French, 2000). Large rear wheels with a hand rim There are not many recent social processes
greatly facilitate self-propelling, which gives the that offer themselves as a paradigmatic exam-
users relative independence and reduces the need ple and illustration of the principal components
for assistance. Wheelchairs are social objects of social representation theory as pointedly as
that illustrate well the overarching role of repre- the discourse about “global warming” or “climate
sentations and their materialization in technical change” during the last three decades. The emer-
devices. Their details are a direct consequence gence of this social object is characterized by
of the changed ways in which able-bodied peo- at least three periods that we will describe step
ple interact with handicapped individuals and by step (see also Castro, 2012): first, a scientific
how they collectively enact a “material social development and insight that carries relevance
object.” for daily life; second, a media process, agenda
To summarize, social objects are constituted setting, and the associated public discourse; and
by social representations in a threefold way: third, the uptake of the issue by politics, the ensu-
by individual behavior, by collective interaction, ing institutionalization, and its reifying effect on
and by belief. First, behavior links people with public discourse.
the objects of the outside world and substanti- At the beginning there was a series of observa-
ates their existence. In fact, social representations by climate scientists across the world, show-
tions always imply a relationship of the person ing that after the medieval warm period and the
to the object. Second, the relationship between subsequent “little ice age” until the nineteenth
people holding a representation and the social century the average global temperature appeared
object is also expressed by collective interac- to rise in an unprecedented way since the 1950s
tion; and it is the cooperation of many sub- due to mankind’s burning of fossil hydrocarbons.
scribers to a representation that gives rise to This fact alone might not have ignited the imag-
the multitude of nonmaterial constructions in ination of journalists was it not for a poten-
a culture and society, such as gods, justice, tially bleak outlook on our daily quality of life in
and the myriad of ideas that populate modern the decades to come. Once a useful catchphrase
minds and can be talked about. Third, social was found, such as “global warming,” “green-
objects, their names, and the ways we imag- house effect” or “climate change” (Whitmarsh,
ine and talk about them, can be called mental 2009), the media set the agenda, and nongovern-
entities; these provide the framework of mean- mental organizations (NGOs) and the general
ings that a representation implies and that are public engaged in an extended discourse about
attached to its object. In the following sections the causes and conceivable remedies for this
development (e.g., Caillaud & Flick, 2013; Cas- by the involved institutions, the United Nations
tro, 2015; Grundmann & Scott, 2014; Uzelgun & (UN) and IPCC, the European Union (EU),
Castro, 2014; Liu, Vedlitz, & Alston, 2008). NGOs, national politics, and the media. The phe-
This second phase in the development of nomenon, its human causes, the meteorologi-
a social representation is characterized by a cal consequences, and anything that these things
communal discourse in the public sphere where imply for humankind’s future became represented
people may dispute the existence and human- in discourse in a narrowing way, restricting diver-
made character of the phenomenon and where sity. This goes hand in hand with increasing
they are free to express their support or doubt. hegemony of the dominant and “politically cor-
Both believers and skeptics of global warming rect” representation (e.g., Callaghan & Augousti-
may engage in debate and accept each other’s nos, 2013; Jaspal, Nerlich, & Koteyko, 2012;
arguments as justified and noteworthy. Uzelgun & Castro, 2015). The social ideas
During this period the media engage in “global warming” and “climate change” finally
suggesting a variety of different images and became objectified as an institution.
metaphors in an attempt to capture the essen- In this phase the majority of actors accepted
tial characteristics of the issue. Given the fact the available evidence of climate change as con-
that sections of society have also local media, vincing and sufficient. It was characteristic for
the imagery may vary widely within a society this stage of the process that the communal multi-
(Höijer, 2010; Luke, 2015; Moloney et al., 2014; plicity of opinions and attitudes that is so signif-
Nerlich, 2015; Uzelgun & Castro, 2014; Wein- icant for daily communication and conversation
gart, Engels, & Pansegrau, 2000). became eroded and replaced by a narrow social
representation. It became increasingly difficult to
express doubt in the phenomenon itself and in
7.3.2 Political Institutionalization its human-made character in conversations with-
and Reified Discourse out facing stiff resistance, such as “shit storms”
An issue as important and threatening as global in social media that any outspoken skeptic risks
warming must rather sooner than later be taken (see Jaspal & Nerlich, 2014; Jaspal, Nerlich, &
up by politics and its national actors. As a Van Vuuren, 2015). This funneling is a typical
global phenomenon, the issue was deemed rele- characteristic of reified discourse in the context
vant enough to set up international meetings and of institutionalization processes (Wagner, Mecha,
negotiate agreements (Jaspal & Nerlich, 2014). & Carvalho, 2008) and has been theorized as
This phase of institutionalization by governance, “semantic barriers” in disputes (Gillespie, 2008).
international treaties, and the setup of the Inter- In theoretical terms, the social object becomes
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) a discursive truth and a fully objectified represen-
marks the time when the discourse about the issue tation. It becomes an element of a group’s local
of global warming also changed its tone. world, a dominant fiduciary truth that is beyond
While in the earlier communal form of dis- doubt. In this situation, actors are no longer free
course people were unrestricted in expressing to assert whatever they wish because even with-
their opinion, a step toward institutionalization out any vested interests expressing ignorance or
marks the beginning of a reified discourse. In doubt is no longer warranted within one’s group
this period, the representation and its associ- and may be socially sanctioned (Habermas, 1985,
ated discourse were increasingly molded accord- p. 44; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Often such insti-
ing to the institutional definitions negotiated tutionalized objects play an important role for
a group’s identity as we showed above with the two stages of mass media reporting: the change
example of the Estonian myth of the “Ancient from divergent images to converging on a few
Freedom Fight.” dominant images in media reports and picto-
rial illustrations that depict the objectified social
object of “biotechnology.” In this representation,
7.3.3 Mass Media
“genes” are seen as foreign to natural organisms
It is the mass media in modern societies that and as potentially dangerous justifying rejec-
play a significant role in constructing a social tion of the technology (Wagner, Kronberger, &
object by taking up scientific and technological Seifert, 2002). A similar parallelism between
advances. The media process accompanies and media depictions and subjective ideas and images
drives to a certain extent the public discourse was found for the issue of climate change (Smith
about global warming, genetic engineering, and, & Joffe, 2012), illustrating the importance of the
more recently, synthetic biology as well as other “short-circuit” between media reporting and the
social objects in the making. Genetic engineer- general public’s discourse.
ing, for example, gained prominence by years
long media reporting and setting the agenda in
7.4 National Identity as an
Europe, where this technology met widespread
Emerging Social Object in
resistance.
History
Initially, during the stage of communal dis-
course, media experimented with metaphors and
7.4.1 Building a Nation: Estonia
pictures that were able to anchor the basic idea
of genetic engineering to varying degrees. Later, Nations and national identities are excellent
the media discourse converged to a few images examples of social construction processes in
and metaphors that often had to do with toma- that they exemplify how “objective” conditions
toes as the quintessence of healthy looking nat- such as the existence of an ethnic group in a
ural food being “violated” by genetic manipula- certain cultural, economic, and political situa-
tion (Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002). This tion are interwoven with “subjective” interpreta-
was when public opinion and attitudes converged tions, self-awareness, and discourses. A “nation-
on an objectified representation of genetic engi- building” process exemplifies how a social rep-
neering and synthetic biology that typically dif- resentation is linked to consensual groups that
fered between social sectors and professions as engage in concerted interaction. This consensus
is the case with global warming (see Grund- will never be complete, but needs to reach a func-
mann & Scott, 2014). Additionally, information tionally necessary number of people for collec-
derived from media reporting led to polarization tive phenomena to emerge (Wagner & Hayes,
between groups with different levels of involve- 2005, p. 221).
ment in the issue, and increased opinion certainty There are different disciplinary traditions to
(Kronberger, Holtz, & Wagner, 2012; Uzelgun & define “nation” and “nationalism”: a state-based
Castro, 2015). Anglophone tradition opposes a culture- and
Hence, the two-stage process of collective heritage-focused definition within the German-
symbolic coping with a new and potentially speaking tradition. The latter offers a better
threatening phenomenon, that is, from the change understanding of the cultural and national forma-
of open-minded and communal to a narrow tion characteristics of dominated ethnic groups in
and reified discourse, has its counterpart in the nineteenh-century Europe (Hroch, 2015). In the
Estonian case, language, culture, and a myth of ancestors had lived here in this country for over
common descent were the most important ele- 2.5 thousand years as pagans . . . as God sent
ments in the process, prevailing over history, reli- some people of German origin to this country six
gion, and state (Raun, 2003, p. 140) as defin- hundred years ago . . . who through God’s guid-
ing elements of a nation (see Chapter 23, this ance heralded the holy Christian teaching to your
volume). ancestors” (Viires, 2001, p. 23). Later, since the
A distinct language is the most important second half of the nineteenth century, this pre-
attribute to distinguish oneself from other groups Christian time was reframed as a golden era of
in a “naturalizing” way that reifies group bound- “ancient freedom” in nationalist history writing.
aries. In Estonia up until the nineteeth cen- From then on, the “Ancient Freedom Fight” (i.e.,
tury, Estonian was the dominant language among they finally lost wars against Danish and German
peasants, whereas German dominated among invaders from 1206 to 1227) took the position of
non-peasant classes. The German-speaking elites one of the central events in Estonian history, both
favored neither social mobility of peasants nor in history books and in historical fiction (Viires,
the learning of German, as German was con- 2001, pp. 31–36). It has since offered a resource
sidered the language of higher status and edu- of national pride for generations.
cation. Instead, the Bible and later secular lit- In a Herderian vision of culture, the first gener-
erature were published in Estonian. For the few ations of nineteenth-century national ideologues
Estonian peasants who climbed the social ladder, promoted the idea that Estonians should first and
their advancement meant becoming “German” as foremost pursue modern education and economic
being “Estonian” meant being a peasant, and vice advancement combined with valuing the her-
versa (e.g., Siimets-Gross & Kello, 2018). Only itage of previous generations. Such aims could
in the wake of the nineteenth-century “roman- rely on the already high literacy rates among
ticism” an ever growing number of individuals peasants and their high esteem for education.
decided to “remain Estonian” despite advancing This Estonian national “awakening” went along
socially. They were, in fact, the first Estonian with a broad movement of voluntary associations
nation builders. (Figure 7.2) that united groups of people engag-
Thus, before the nineteenth century ethnic self- ing in music, theatre, sports, education, and pub-
awareness existed as distinction from other social lic welfare (Raun, 2003; Jansen, 2007). Together
and language groups such as Germans, Rus- with an increasing upward social mobility, the
sians, and Swedes. As words and concepts denot- association culture became the basis of a modern
ing ethnicity and status overlapped, it is diffi- Estonian culture by the first decades of the twen-
cult to distinguish “ethnic” identity from “class” tieth century (Karjahärm, 2009). Among other
consciousness in early modern Estonia. Nev- things, since 1869 the association culture brought
ertheless, Estonian-speaking peasantry was the forth the all-Estonian song festival tradition as
main and rather homogeneous population group an anchor of unity, which continued in the post-
which was represented as a clear-cut histori- World War I Estonian Republic and during the
cal entity in an oeuvre as authoritative as the Soviet era.
Bible itself. Since 1739, the Estonian-language First attempts to politicize the national move-
Bible started with an “historical introduction” ment were made in the 1870s with the demand
that constructed the Estonians as an entity and for legal equality between Estonians and Baltic
an historical subject (Viires, 2001, pp. 23–24): Germans (Jansen, 2007, p. 501). The volun-
“it is known about the old times that your tary associations “began to be seen as the
Figure 7.2 Choir from Tõstamaa 1865. Source: Estonian National Museum, ERM Fk 355:90;
http://muis.ee/museaalview/665317.
basis . . . for future political activity,” enhanced 7.4.2 Collective Memory Work
by the Estonian-language press that expanded
rapidly. In the 1880s and 1890s, the national History-based identities are a powerful social
movement acquired a mass basis with an annual “object” in nearly all countries and they are an
average of Estonian book titles increasing from unavoidable part of international policy making
148 in the 1880s to 254 in the 1890s and with an and conflict. This is particularly visible at times
Estonian-speaking population of just under one where there are changes in social dominance and
million (Raun, 2003, pp. 136, 144). subordination. It is during such periods of change
Many dominated ethnic groups in Europe that people engage in collective memory work,
developed a “cultural nationalism” (Hroch, 2015) reinterpretations of the past and present, and it is
and the Estonian national movement was no here that new narratives are constructed to sup-
exception with an emancipation movement that port one’s self-image and identity.
gradually turned into a full-blown mass move- In the Estonian case, historical consciousness
ment by the end of the nineteenth century. The and written scholarly history were not the first
idea of political autonomy gained considerable and foremost factors in the national movement,
ground during the revolution of 1905 and was but their importance grew in the course of the
realized in 1918 after the fall of the tsarist regime nineteenth century (Raun, 2003). By the time
(Raun, 2003). of establishing the Estonian state in 1918, the
framing of Estonian history as consisting of and was only punctuated by a to and fro during
an age-old struggle against Germans had been World War II when first the Germans occupied
accepted by the masses and became an important the Baltic region and the Soviets reoccupied it in
driving force in the Independence War of 1918– 1944. Being part of the USSR, Estonians had to
1920 (Tamm, 2008). accept the dominant representation that located
A military coup in 1934 brought about a them in the “friendly Soviet family of nations”
change from a multiparty system to an authori- under the leadership of the Russians.
tarian government, which was a fertile ground for The Soviet rule worked by maintaining con-
some proponents of academe and army to project trol over public discourse and stifling open dis-
Estonia’s statehood far into the past: “Estonians cussions (see Marková, 1997). Soviet media did
had been a state-based nation even under the not offer a venue for debates in the public sphere.
rule of the Teutonic Order” and the “Estonian Reminders of earlier political events, for exam-
state is not young, it is . . . a societal-political con- ple, the names of streets, statues of past politi-
struction spanning from a primeval age to the cians, or the books of authors who did not fit
present time” (Tamm, 2008, p. 504). Irrespective the regime’s current ideology, were removed or
of the scientific veridicality of the claim, project- destroyed. These restrictions aimed at eliminat-
ing one’s statehood into the deep past was obvi- ing memory of the previous era, called “the bour-
ously considered necessary to engage the people geois republic” in Soviet historiography.
as followers of the present state and to collec- This situation provoked concerns about how to
tively secure its enduring existence. preserve Estonian language, culture, and histor-
During the period of the independent Estonian ical memory particularly when the demographic
state in the 1920s and 1930s, Estonians main- composition of Estonia changed because of
tained their interest in forming associations. Soci- officially encouraged immigration from other
eties and clubs became widespread and most parts of the USSR. One way of preserving the
people were members of at least one of them. endangered identity was the conscious preserva-
It was still as if the Estonians had participated tion of former narratives and ways of life, that is,
in a collective enactment of their nation. Later, creating a counter culture in families and among
many remembered this period as rather non- small friendship circles. First, the past was an
hierarchical and communal (Bennich-Björkman, important symbolic resource for distinction
2006; Kõresaar, 2004). It was a broadly peas- and identity maintenance on an everyday level
ant and middle-class society considering visible (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010). Specific cultural
social distinction as inappropriate. At the same taste and material environment, such as home
time, such egalitarianism did not necessarily indi- decoration and clothing, maintaining continu-
cate a collectivist mindset because peasants need ity with prewar (1930s) ideals, and creating
to behave and think quite individualistic, care- new distinctions by accommodating modern
ful, and responsible in guarding land and prop- “non-Soviet” Western styles, was a widespread
erty (Bennich-Björkman, 2006). Throughout the identity strategy of Estonian-ness (Kannike,
Soviet era and into the 1990s, this pre-World War 2006; Rakfeldt, 2015). It is noteworthy that,
II period would figure as the “golden age” of free while the idea of an Estonian nation had been
Estonia and would become a template for recon- inspired by German culture and the Finnish
structing the state half a century later. model in the nineteenth century, it was created
The abrupt rupture from a newly gained inde- in opposition to the German ruling elites. Later,
pendent state to a nation among many in the mainly since World War II, Germans were
Soviet Union lasted from 1940 until about 1990 replaced by Russians and Russia in their role
as the “main negative other” (Petersoo, 2007). feelings, a space where national pride and unity
Second, a considerable number of Estonians did could be experienced briefly while singing some
not accept the Marxist “newspeak” (Ahonen, nationalist songs in between Soviet ones. Start-
1997) that was used to talk about Estonian past ing in the spring of 1988, at first spontaneous and
and to retouch unwelcome facts such as the later organized singing events with up to 300,000
forceful annexation and large-scale deportations. participants became pivotal for expressing dis-
Instead, “grassroots” counter-memories of offi- content with the Soviet regime and consolidat-
cially “forgotten” or reinterpreted events were ing popular demands (Brüggemann, 2015). As
cultivated. Many people quite clearly differ- no social representation would be complete with-
entiated between the official history taught at out enacting its symbolic side, as early as 1988
schools and the “true one” that was passed on in the freshly established Estonian Heritage Soci-
the family. This allowed for a rather broad and ety promoted restoration of the monuments of
coherent body of communicative memory to be the Estonian War of Independence that were built
maintained “from the Estonian perspective” for during the 1920s and 1930s, but were destroyed
over half a century. by the Soviets in the 1940s.
As the gradual liberalization in the Soviet Consequently, the years from 1987 onwards
Union since 1985 gave space for public debates, became a period of collective public shows of
a public history was reconstructed in part exactly cultural uniqueness. All this became known as
based on such grassroots memories. Reconstruct- the “Singing Revolution,” was highly visible to
ing the “true” history was a work to which histo- everyone, and contributed to strengthening eth-
rians – some of whom became politicians later – nic feelings. Like in many post-communist coun-
as well as writers and ordinary people contributed tries, individual members of the local elite played
(Kivimäe, 1999; Wulf & Grönholm, 2010). a role in organizing the politics that finally led
to independence of the Estonian nation. Unlike
some other formerly socialist countries this elite
7.4.3 Reifying National Identity as
had already been active as a “counter elite” dur-
a State
ing Soviet times (Bennich-Björkman, 2007). The
By the end of the Soviet Union there were sev- shared visions elaborated during the Soviet era
eral important resources available that the new made “real politics” easier in the late 1980s and
nation builders could use: a vision of the nation’s 1990s. This fact may explain the relative success
history shared by a big part of the population of post-Soviet Estonia compared to other post-
as well as strong personal networks from which Soviet and post-socialist countries in implement-
various new associations could spring (Bennich- ing political and economic reforms (Bennich-
Björkman, 2007). Environmental and heritage Björkman & Likić-Brborić, 2012). The intentions
protection movements (including the so-called of the new elites, however, would have been much
“Phosphorite War” that opposed planned mining more difficult to realize if they could not build on
and new immigration of Russian-speaking work- the collective memory work and the widespread
ers) were the first since 1987, and the movement feeling of identity as a delimited ethnic group
of the “Popular Front” followed in 1988. Differ- with a well-remembered history.
ent social movements mobilized approximately The social object that emerges when an ethnic
70 percent of the Estonian population during this identity is being enacted necessarily also involves
period (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). setting boundaries and excluding others. In the
During the Soviet era, the song festival tradi- reestablished Estonian state there were ample
tion, established in 1869 (see Figure 7.2), had numbers of Russian-speaking people (about
continued as an accommodated field for national 30 percent), Russian workers and administrators,
who had immigrated during the 50 years of Soviet involved in constructing a social object by social
rule. This immigration was seen as a threat by representation. Additionally, it appears that
the Estonian “silent majority.” Although the Estonians could cling to their ethnic self-image,
value structures of the two communities were preserve it in collective memory, and use it to
similar on a macro level (Titma & Rämmer, reconstruct their statehood because no other
2006), they were not perceived as such by the overarching institution provided an identification
“silent majority” and a symbolic distinction from target. In countries like Poland and Lithuania,
Russians was an important part of everyday Catholic religion merged with nationalism in
life. After their dominant position during Soviet a highly effective amalgam while Estonian
times, Russian-speakers suddenly became an nationalism became a similarly emotional, but
unwelcome sector of the country’s population. secular, feeling of attachment to the new state.
Always an uneasy relationship, this became a And, yes, like any religion, a national identifica-
burning issue in the decades to come (Raudsepp, tion also harbors the potential for violence and
2009). hatred against the Other (Raudsepp & Wagner,
The existence of a Russian-speaking commu- 2012).
nity was constructed by many as a potential trig-
ger for Russian interference. This constellation
7.5 Conclusion
resembles a kind of “siege mentality” (Bar-Tal
& Antebi, 1992), which resulted in automati- Social representation theory provides a frame-
cally granting citizenship only to those whose work that allows us to look at small- and large-
ancestors had lived in the Estonian Republic scale social processes in an integrative way. The
before 1940. The principal reason was that politi- theory takes into account the social psychol-
cians had no interest in allowing a large num- ogy of individuals – how they represent social
ber of Russian-speakers to attain citizenship and issues, that is, what are their ideas, memories,
thus parliamentary representation. This would perceptions, and feelings related to the issues,
have implied an unwelcome “Russian-speaking” and how ideas correlate with behaviors in a larger
influence on lawmaking. Second, of course, social context. Hence, if we conceive of indi-
the simple psychological desire to collectively vidual behaviors as part of a representation, the
“pay back” for past oppression also played a behaviors are fundamentally social and will, on
role. a larger scale, translate into a behavioral pattern
In the end, the Estonian case illustrates how that is the collective mirror image of the indi-
an ethnic identity becomes institutionalized in vidual’s ideas. In providing a link between the
a national state. Like other such social objects, individual and the collective level of analysis,
this “macro”-object is maintained by beliefs con- the theory embraces the individuals’ minds, their
veyed in communication, collectively informed actions in an intrinsically social world, societal
individual action, and cooperation. It has a name, discourses, and the forming of collective events
a history, a foundation myth, and possesses a and social objects.
discriminating attribute such as a language; the The example of handicap and its changing
members act concertedly in the creation and con- representation over time reveals the close link
firmation of collective events such as collective between discourse and material objects as exem-
singing and established symbols, all underpinned plified in the wheelchair. The unfolding dis-
by a strong affective component. course on global warming illustrates the process
The development of the Estonian nation of the stages from a scientific insight through
provides an example of the psychological com- a period of relaxed conversations and disputes
ponents and collective large-scale processes about a potential climate threat to a reified and
institutionalized representation that meets deviat- References

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8 Beyond the Distinction between
Tool and Sign: Objects and
Artifacts in Human Activity
Reijo Miettinen and Sami Paavola
8.1 Introduction & Peim, 2009). The first, sociocultural theory,

has focused on mediation by signs and the use of
This chapter addresses the significance of objects language as a foundation of thought, communica-
and artifacts in human activity. Vygotsky dis- tion, and meaning making – often characterized
cussed object and objectification in his theory of as semiotic mediation. It is based on Vygotsky’s
creativity and imagination as well as in his dis- seminal view of mediation by signs and the inter-
cussion of the significance of object substitutes nalization of language as a foundation of higher
in the development of play and symbolic thought. psychological functions. This research program
It is, however, A. N. Leontiev’s concept of object has studied the dialogic nature of thought and self
of activity (1978) that has extensively been as well as communication, cultural mediation,
discussed and debated in the cultural-historical and human discourses.
tradition (e.g., Mind, Culture and Activity, 2005) The other research program, that is, cultural-
if not so much in the sociocultural tradition. historical activity theory (CHAT) is based on
Vygotsky distinguished between internally the concept of object-oriented activity introduced
oriented signs and externally oriented tools. He by Leontiev. He adopted concepts of practice
also, however, found that the integration and and work from Marx, in particular, as well as
unity of sign mediation and tool use is “the from Hegel. In his Economic and Philosophic
essence of complex human behaviour” in human Manuscripts of 1844, Marx (1964, p. 177) stated
adults (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 24). We suggest that that “the outstanding achievement of Hegel’s
a much richer and versatile language than the Phenomenology is that it grasps the essence of
one based on the distinction between sign and labour . . . and comprehends objective man . . . as
tool is needed to understand mediation in human an outcome of man’s own labour.” Work is here
activity in a changing society with increasingly understood as a prototype of practice, a creative
complex objects and social challenges. Media- transformation of the environment resulting in
tional means tend to form complex constellations the development of new human capabilities. In
of artifacts or instrumentalities in which semiotic this process, the objectification of human thought
and practical functions are fused and intertwined and activity into cultural artifacts plays a central
in many ways. We also suggest that an analysis role (Ilyenkov, 1977a; Lektorsky, 1980; Bakhurst,
and redesign of these instrumentalities are essen- 1991). It creates “humanized nature,” an envi-
tial for the transformation of human activities. ronment composed of human-made and therefore
It has been customary to draw a distinction meaningful objects, norms, and institutions. The
between two research programs within activity interaction between an individual and humanized
theory and the Vygotskian legacy (e.g., Martin nature has been analyzed as co-evolution in terms
Beyond the Distinction between Tool and Sign 149
of cycles of internalization and externalization. object concepts introduced by the social sci-
An individual not only internalizes or appropri- ences. Second, we discuss the relation between
ates cultural resources and ways of acting but also the concepts of sign, tool, and artifact. We will
participates in their transformation in creative discuss the function theories of artifacts and their
work, where the results of an activity are objecti- relationship to the objectification. We analyze
fied into new cultural artifacts and resources. two examples of such instrumentalities. These
Vygotsky indicated the importance of analyz- instrumentalities comprise concepts, symbolic
ing the intertwining of tool use and mediation resources, standard procedures, and different
by signs (1978, p. 24): “Although practical intel- kinds of tools. In the first case, a new care model
ligence and sign use can operate independently was not realized because the use of other arti-
in young children, the dialectical unity of these facts in the instrumentality (manuals, care plan,
systems in the human adult is the very essence of diagnostic imaging) were not redesigned. In the
complex human behaviour.” The challenge, how- second case, we analyze how a specific digi-
ever, lies in determining whether and in which tal technology, building information modeling
ways a symbolic activity’s organizing function (BIM), is implemented and used in construction
“penetrates the process of tool use” (1978, p. 24). design. It has multiple shifting functions during
For our own studies, this is a “natural” question a design process. It functions as a tool of indi-
to analyze since we have studied the develop- vidual designers, as an object of joint attention
ment and implementation of new technologies in and problem solving, as well as an evolving
which materiality is constantly present and the intermediary outcome of the design work.
repeated failures of experiments are a reminder
of the objectivity of activity. In order to under-
8.2 The Object of Activity
stand better the object–means relationship, we
and Its Uses in Studying
will shortly discuss some concepts of objects
Human Activities
developed in social sciences – among them,
epistemic object (Knorr-Cetina, 2001), boundary In his theory of imagination and creativity
object (Star & Griesemer, 1989), and interme- Vygotsky discussed external objects in two
diary object (Vinck, 2011). To elaborate the senses. First, Vygotsky (2004, p. 20) postulated a
integration of different types of means we utilize cycle of imagination which is completed in exter-
Wartofsky’s (1979) idea of functionally different nal embodiment: “once it has been externally
kinds of artifacts and the concept of “instru- embodied, that is, has been given material form
mentality,” that is, a constellation of different this crystallized imagination that has become an
artifacts as suggested by Engeström (2007). In object begins to actually exist in the real world,
this chapter, we will analyze constellations of to affect other things.” Vygotsky says that “the
artifacts and instrumentalities in two activities: imagination’s drive to be embodied . . . is the
oral health care and construction design. real basis and motive force of creation” (2004,
We will proceed as follows: first, we analyze p. 41). He cites and agrees with Ribot’s statement
how the concept of an object of activity intro- according to which “creative imagination in its
duced by Leontiev has been used in activity full form attempts to affirm itself by taking some
theoretical studies. We think that without an objective form that exists not only for the creator
object of activity it is hard to understand the himself but for everyone else as well” (Ribot
mediating artifacts and social forms of collabo- cited in Vygotsky, 2004, p. 41). This concept is
rative activity. We will discuss how the concept an early formulation of the theory of objectifi-
of the object of activity is related to certain cation and externalization of thought that was
150 reijo m iettinen and sami paavo la
subsequently developed by E. V. Ilyenkov in his subjective (imagined). It underlines that human

theory of the ideal (1977b). thought needs to be studied as a part of prac-
Second, Vygotsky analyzed the role of objects tical activity, that is, as bodily transformative
in his theory of the development of play and interaction with the environment which can be
symbolic thought. In this development the use characterized as objective activity.
of object substitutes help children to separate Second, Leontiev stated that the “object is a
their thoughts from perceived objects and events real motive of activity” and that an activity is rec-
(Karpov, 2005, p. 122). As an example Vygot- ognized based on its object:
sky (1978, p. 98) provided a stick used as a
horse by a child: “He cannot detach meaning The main thing that distinguishes one activity from
another lies in the difference between their objects.
from the object, or a word from an object, except
It is the object of activity that endows it with a
by finding a pivot in something else. Transfer of
certain orientation. In the terminology I have been
meaning is facilitated by the fact that the child
using the object of activity is its motive. (Leontiev,
accepts a word as the property of a thing . . . For a 1977, p. 52)
child, the word ‘horse’ applied to the stick means
‘there is a horse,’ because mentally he sees the This statement was related to Leontiev’s dis-
object standing behind the word.” The followers tinction between the goal-oriented actions of
of Vygotsky developed further the idea of the role individuals and groups, and collective activity
of object substitutes in the development of sym- based on a division of labor. When Engeström
bolic thought (e.g., Elkonin, 2005). (1987) further developed Leontiev’s ideas into
Leontiev introduced the concept of the object a theory of expansive learning, he located these
of activity and object-orientedness in activity concepts in the context of the political economy,
theory. Russian and German languages have that is, in the context of the production and con-
separate words for an object (objekt in both lan- sumption of commodities in a capitalist society
guages) that is an existing material thing and an (e.g., Engeström & Blackler, 2005). In this way
object of activity (predmet, Gegenstand), that is the concepts developed in psychological theory
an object of conscious transformation by humans became a means of analyzing the transformation
able of resisting the projections of the humans of work activities in society and were applied in
(Kaptelinin, 2005). In the English language, the the study of various types of work such as health
term object is used for both meanings, which is a care, teaching, scientific research, and the design
cause for confusion. Leontiev (1978, p. 52) gave of ICT systems (Engeström, 1990; Miettinen,
two basic meanings to the concept of “object of 1998; Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006).
activity.” First, it has a dual nature as something In the context of the development of work, the
given and as something imagined and projected. term “object of activity” assumed a double mean-
ing. On the one hand, it referred to the “purpose”
Thus the object of activity is twofold: first, in its or aim, in other words the motivating background
independent existence as subordinating to itself and
rationale of an activity: it is a horizon for actions
transforming the activity of the subject; second, as
that constantly need to be reinterpreted in a
an image of the object, as a product of its property
changing society (Engeström, 1990). The joint
of psychological reflection that is realized as an
activity of the subject and cannot exist otherwise. reflection on the changing historical circum-
(Leontiev, 1978, p. 52) stances of an activity, defining its contradictions,
and the formulation of “a new model of activity”
This definition aims at surpassing the Cartesian (or a model of a zone of proximal development)
dualism between the objective (given) and the in interventionist studies serve such a historical
reinterpretation. The second meaning of object in constant need of being redefined. This is why
of activity was a concrete object of activity, they can be characterized in terms of open, con-
something that is designed and produced in the stantly unfolding epistemic objects. The theme
form of a product, a service, or a commodity. of the open and expansive nature of objects has
The relation between these two was sometimes been further developed by introducing the term
characterized by saying that a concrete object “runaway object,” ambiguous large-scale global
to be constructed is an “instantiation” of the phenomena which are not in anyone’s control and
motive of the activity (Nardi, 2005) or a separate which have far-reaching consequences that are
type of a “project object” (Hyysalo, 2005). difficult to anticipate (Engeström, 2008). Com-
The expression “construction of an object” (a pletely new forms of transnational distributed
product, service, IT system, building) was partly agency are needed in order to tackle such
formulated because of the influence of the con- objects and problems. The increased complexity
structivist science and technology studies that of objects is evident both in the construction
theorized and analyzed the production of facts industry and the ICT industry. The sheer size
and technological artifacts.1 of buildings and the complicated devices and
In the 1990s and 2000s, new dimensions and technology embedded in them has increased the
meanings of an “object” of activity were intro- number of contributors and correspondingly the
duced. These include its complex and contra- need for coordination and collaboration.
dictory, open-ended, multifaceted, and expanding The increased number of relevant stakeholders
nature. This complex and contradictory nature has created the need for understanding how
(referring to the functional complexity of the they are able to collaborate and coordinate their
objects to be constructed) was discussed in prod- actions. The concept of boundary object origi-
uct development literature and in science and nally introduced by Star and Griesemer (1989)
technology studies (Hobday, 1998; Miettinen, has been used to make sense of this problem
1999). Complex products are composed of sub- (Gal, Lyytinen, & Yoo, 2008; Whyte & Lobo,
systems whose design and construction call for 2010). In terms of activity theory, this concept
the contribution of a different kind of expertise. mostly refers to the means or infrastructure of
Correspondingly, different actors have different activities, not to the object of an activity. A les-
interpretations of the object. The contradictory son from the discussion of the object of activity
nature of objects refers to the tension between is evident. The increasing complexity of the
use and exchange value in them, as well as to the object of activity requires increasingly versatile
differing interests of the participants that need to constellations of means and artifacts and new
be negotiated as a part of the object construction forms of collaboration.
(Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005).
In science and technology studies, Karin
8.3 The Relationship between
Knorr-Cetina introduced the concept of an epis-
Language and Tool Use in
temic object analogous to an object of inquiry
Vygotsky and in Studies of Work
in science, in which “the lack in complete-
ness of being is crucial” (Knorr-Cetina, 2001, Vygotsky (1978) made a basic distinction
p. 182). Knorr-Cetina argues (2001) that in a between two types of mediational means: tools
contemporary knowledge society, the objects of and signs. Tools and signs are both cultural
professional work are rapidly changing. Com- means; they differ in the way that they orien-
pared with mass products or services, these tate an activity. Tools are externally orientated
objects are ever more complex, dispersed, and and are used to transform objects (mastering their
nature). Signs are used to coordinate the actions tive processes of problem solving (p. 131), and,
of individuals in a collaborative activity. Signs finally, in their conclusions, a biological line of
are also used as psychological tools, that is, to development (p. 148), which then is integrated
direct and control an individual’s behaviors and with a “social or cultural” line of development
actions (mastering oneself). In addition, Vygot- based on the use of signs. We think that this
sky says (1978, p. 55) that these two activities rhetorical distinction does not give justice to the
are mutually linked “just as man’s alteration of social and cultural nature of preverbal behavior
nature alters man’s own nature.” He analyzes this of the children, to which Vygotsky himself refers
in terms of the integration of practical intelli- (1978, p. 30).2 A one-year-old child imitating the
gence and sign use (speech) in child development voice of an engine when playing with a toy car
where “the creation of these uniquely human is evidently a cultural phenomenon. The child’s
forms of behaviour later produce the intellect and operations with objects are mediated by interac-
become the basis of productive work: the specifi- tion with the mother and other significant people
cally human form of the use of tools” (Vygotsky, and with the cultural environment, and they
1978, p. 26). acquire a cultural meaning and emotional color-
In their essay “Tool and Symbol in Child ing through these interactions.3 This acquisition
Development” (1994), Vygotsky and Luria of the meanings of objects might well be char-
criticize the prevailing “zoologist” approach acterized as an early form of semiotic mediation
to the study of child development, in which (Leiman, 1999). Also Lektorsky (1999, p. 111)
the preverbal forms of child development are suggests, based on studies on the education of
compared to those of apes. They conclude that deaf and blind children, that a baby can only
“[t]he child’s use of tools is comparable to that of appropriate genuine speech after appropriating
ape’s only during the former’s pre-speech period” meaningful social modes of dealing practically
(1994, p. 108). The planning and self-regulation with human-made objects.
function that speech brings to problem solving We find a sign- and language-bound concep-
is missing from the apes. The main thesis is to tion of semiosis to be limited. First, it seems
show that (1994, p. 116) “the transition from the that the concept of an object is underdeveloped
biological to the social way of development con- in semiotic approaches to cultural mediation.
stitutes the central link in this process of develop- Semiotic relationships are often seen from the
ment, the cardinal turning point in the history of point of view of symbols and language, which
child behaviour.” The transition becomes visible themselves, however, include indexical and
in the uses of egocentric speech in problem practical relationships. Peirce’s seminal works on
solving by the young children. This is used for semiotics define a sign as mediating between its
arguing for the emergence of the specifically object and interpretant, or, roughly, its meaning
human higher psychological functions that con- (Peirce, 1998, pp. 477–491). He defines semiotic
stitute a foundation for a psychological science. relationships not just with symbols but also with
Many authors have pointed out (Wertsch, indices, which have a physical connection to
1985; Leiman, 1999; Arievich & Stetsenko, objects and with icons that represent objects with
2014) that Vygotsky and Luria do not analyze their characters. Human beings use not only talk,
the preverbal intelligence of children in depth. but gestures, bodily dispositions, and affordances
Vygotsky and Luria (1994) use various terms or semiotic features of the environment in their
for it: practical intelligence or thinking (p. 102), activities (Goodwin, 2000).
instrumental thinking (p. 102), tool use (p. 109), The excessive focus on speech, narrative, and
elementary process or function (p. 144), primi- discourses also makes activity theory vulnerable
to the critique of pragmatism, phenomenology, of artifact refers to a human-made object that

and ethnomethodology that underlines the signif- has a meaning and constitutes a part of our
icance or primacy of habits, skills, and embod- culture.5 Engeström adopted (1987) the concept
ied forms of intelligence. These approaches argue of an artifact from the historical epistemology
that human practice is composed of bodily ways of Marx Wartofsky (1979). Wartofsky draws a
of acting or of habits. Reflection and the use distinction between primary, secondary, and ter-
of language are needed primarily when a habit tiary artifacts. Tools and related bodily skills are
breaks or to legitimate the ways of acting. primary artifacts. Secondary artifacts, typically
According to these approaches, learning skills models, are “distinctive artifacts created for the
and tool use may take place by imitation and by purpose of preserving and transmitting skills, in
trial and error without systematic instruction and the production and use of ‘primary’ artefacts”
the use of language. (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 201). Tertiary artifacts are
A recurrent observation of studies of practi- alternative imaginative perceptual models, “a
tioners and professionals in work is that they are representation of possibilities which go beyond
unable to formulate verbally why they do as they present actualities” (p. 209). Although Wartof-
do (e.g., Engeström & Engeström, 1986). A key sky’s levels have not been extensively used in
statement of the pragmatism-inspired theory of empirical research and provide only a rough clas-
professional knowledge by Argyris and Schön sification, they are important in suggesting that
(1978) is that professional practitioners present artifacts have different functions in an activity
verbally an “espoused theory” which deviates beyond the distinction between sign and tool.
from the real way of acting, a “use theory” that Engeström (2007) has used Wartofsky’s term
can be uncovered by studying the actual work “tertiary artifact” characterizing it as a where-to
process. These findings question the idea that a type of cognitive artifact that is used to orient
speech or a verbally formulated plan in itself is to the future and to imagine and define alterna-
able to guide the uses of tools. They rather sug- tive forms of activity. Engeström (2007, p. 34)
gest that there may be incompatibilities or loss of has also made a distinction between epistemolog-
interaction between future-oriented “where-to” ically different levels of orienting models used
models (Engeström, 2007) and meanings embod- in work and in teaching. For example, procedu-
ied in different types of artifacts already used in ral models included in guidelines and instruc-
work. If cultural means – as we will suggest – tion books mainly express the order in which
comprise complexes of various means having dif- actions and operations are to be done. They do
ferent origins, it is likely that there are tensions not provide knowledge of why the defined order
and contradictions between them. This leads us is selected nor of the nature of the object of the
to the analysis of different kinds of means and work. Answers to these issues require systems
their interaction activity. models or theoretical models. For the develop-
ment of activities, it is a major challenge to study
empirically the functions of various artifacts and
8.4 Artifacts and the Concept of
their interdependencies.
Instrumentality
The prevailing theory of artifacts both in phi-
In sociocultural psychology and activity theory, losophy and in design studies, is a theory of the
it has become customary to refer to both signs functions of artifacts. In design theories, design-
and tools with terms such as mediational or ers deliberately create the functions of an artifact
cultural means, instrument (e.g., Engeström, or organize material affordances in order to sat-
1987) and artifacts (Cole, 1996).4 The concept isfy the needs of the users (e.g., Norman, 2002).
The function theory in analytic philosophy also used for analysis and design, but also straight-
analyzes the functions or capabilities and disposi- forward primary tools used in the daily practice
tions of cultural artifacts (Preston, 1998; Houkes and made visible for examination, reshaping
& Vermaas, 2004). A multiplicity of functions and experimentation” (Engeström 2005, p. 188).
of artifacts emerges when users invent uses that The term instru-mentality reminds us that intel-
depart from the focal use planned by the designer. lectual and practical embodied functions are
The function theories are compatible with the inseparably and in various ways interconnected
theories that regard the objectification of human in an instrumentality and even in single artifacts
activity into artifacts as a central mechanism of within it.
cultural development. Ilyenkov (1977a, p. 277) The concept of instrumentality has an anal-
suggests that “all forms of activity (active facul- ogy in Elinor Ostrom’s (2007) concept of a rule
ties) are passed on only in the form of objects constellation or rule configuration which is used
created by man for man.” Actor-network theory in the analysis of institutional change in self-
has studied the agency of material artifacts and organizing resource governance systems. Ostrom
the delegation of human functions and norms underlines the configurational nature of rules
to objects (Latour, 1992). According to Latour (2007, p. 18): “One needs to know the basic con-
(1994, p. 31), technical artifacts have a script, an tents of a full rule configuration, rather than a sin-
affordance, a function or a program of action and gle rule, to infer both the structure of the resulting
goals. situation and the likely outcome of any particular
Dewey (1938/1991, p. 52) finds that: “A tool or rule change.” For the examination of the trans-
a machine, for example, is not simply a simple or formation of rules, she has made a distinction
complex physical object having its own physical between seven clusters of rules according to the
properties and effects, but is also a mode of element of action and the decision-making situa-
language. For it says something, to those who tion they directly affect (2007, p. 11).
understand it, about operations of use and their After the emergence of the Internet, ICT
consequences.” Dewey underlines that the uti- researchers have likewise pointed out that digi-
lization of embodied norms of and understanding tal objects cannot be studied as separate, stand-
the consequences require the learning of embod- alone, or single artifacts or tools (Henfridsson
ied skills. Lektorsky’s characterization includes & Bygstad, 2014). Digital artifacts are relational
three objectified elements (1980, p. 137): and modular and tend to form complex sys-
“The instrumental man-made objects function as tems, mediate activities of several organizations
objective forms of expression of cognitive norms, and knowledge domains, and create connections
standards and object-hypotheses existing outside between distant data sources through the Inter-
the individual.” However, these general defini- net. Information systems research suggests that
tions do not uncover how specific functions are information or digital infrastructures constitute
embodied in different artifacts and how these dif- a new type of information artifact (Henfridsson
ferent artifacts together constitute what is needed & Bygstad, 2014). These views agree on the
in a mediated collaborative activity. Engeström “expansive potential” of the systems: because of
has introduced the concept of instrumentality their inherent digitally enabled scalability and
(2007). The concepts, models, and tools in flexibility, they are generative: they grow and
work “are not separate meditational entities, but evolve. To enable the integration of new modules
form integrated toolkits . . . tool constellations into the evolving systems, gateways and stan-
or instrumentalities” (p. 33). They “include dards are core elements of the infrastructures
multiple cognitive artefacts and semiotic means (Hanseth & Lyytinen, 2010, p. 4).
“An environment that supports health behaviour”

8.5 A New Vision does not
(Teräs & Nuutinen, 2010, p. 55).
Suffice: A Failed Remediation in
The model was planned to be experimented
Oral Health Care
on and put into practice in an interim period
A conscious change in an instrumentality as a in a dental clinic in the city of Helsinki. In the
part of developing an activity has been charac- interim period, dental students and oral hygienist
terized as remediation. Remediation includes students together cared for adult patients under
the formulation of a vision or a model of an the supervision of their teachers. Two patient
alternative way of approaching an activity (a care trajectories of nine sessions were recorded
where-to model or a working hypothesis) as well and analyzed in a study (Teräs, 2015) to find what
as a change in the whole constellation of artifacts kind of changes took place in the collaboration
and social forms of collaboration (Miettinen & and in the division of labor between the profes-
Virkkunen, 2005). To clarify this, we will shortly sionals and in the interaction between the pro-
analyze an example of an attempt to develop fessional and the patient. The study provided an
dental care for adults with periodontal diseases opportunity to study whether and in which ways
in Finland. the new model, to use Vygotsky’s expression,
As a result of demographic change and a more “penetrated the process of tool use.” For that,
inclusive level of dental care, periodontal and the instrumentality used in the collaborative care
gum diseases have become the most frequently activity needed to be characterized. A distinction
encountered oral health problem among the adult can be drawn between seven types of means.
population in Finland. In a study of adults over
1 The model of health-centered teamwork.
30 years, 64 percent of the studied adults had
2 Instructions and manuals defining good
periodontitis to some degree of difficulty (Teräs
practice – one for the dental students (PARO
& Nuutinen, 2010, p. 56). Periodontitis is a seri-
Manual) and one for the oral hygienist students
ous gum infection that damages the soft tissue
(instruction for the care of adult patients).
and destroys the bone that supports the teeth.
3 Diagnostic means: (a) X-ray images, (b) digi-
Periodontal and gum diseases call collaboration
tized pictures, and (c) an instrument for mea-
between dentists and oral hygienists as well as
suring the depth of the gum pockets.
active preventive self-care by patients. A new
4 A care plan: the patient’s diagnosis (see
model, called a health-centered teamwork model,
Figure 8.1) and a plan of care measures.
was outlined for dental care in two projects in
5 The means of evaluation.
the years 2007–2010 by representatives of a uni-
6 The instruments for caring for the teeth and
versity dental clinic, an oral hygiene clinic of a
gums.
university of applied sciences, and a city dental-
7 The instruments used by the patients in
care clinic. The model was defined in a graphic
self-care.
form in the thesis of one of the participants in
2009. It envisioned three kinds of transforma- The researchers (Teräs & Nuutinen, 2010, p. 58)
tions in the care: first, a transition from individual used the concept of a “script” to characterize
care to teamwork; second, from a pathogenesis- the tools of the second category (instructions
based orientation to a health and preventive and manuals). They provided a description of
orientation; and third, from expert-centered to the phases of the care process and characterized
patient-centered and activating care. The key the actions and operations included in each of the
elements in the graphic model were “Preventive phases. A decisive means in this system is
advancement of the health of the mouth” and without doubt the care plan. The details of the
Helsingin terveys- SUU JA HAMPAISTO Testi Taina

keskus/Hammashuolto 110552-A020
Esitiedot
Pvm Vastaanottopaikka Vastaanottaja Ika Maksuluokka
1.9.2008 YLIOP 45
Status
4 4 4 Parostatus
4 44 5 5
0 mm 5 4
1 mm 4
Plakki
5 4 4
554
2 mm 4 45 4 4
5
4 5
4 4
Ienvetävtvmä
3 mm 4 4
4 4 4
4
Hariausvaurio
4 mm 5 4
4 4 4 4
5 mm 4 4 11.5 mm
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4 4
6 mm 3.0 mm
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7 mm 8.5 mm
8 mm 3.0 mm
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4 4 5.5 mm
9 mm 4 4
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10 mm 4 4 3.5 mm
4
4 4 5.5 mm
11 mm 4 4 4 3.5 mm
4
12 mm 0.5 mm
4 4
4
CPI-mittari
T
Figure 8.1 Status of the gum disease defined in the care plan.
diagnosis are assembled in it (see Figure 8.1), of the patient’s teeth used in the consultation to
which provide a basis for the plan of care mea- clarify the status of the disease for the patients.
sures, most important of which are removing The care plan was not shown to the patient, who,
the dental plague and cleaning the gum pockets. according to the new model, was supposed to take
The care plan combines an object hypothesis increasing responsibility for the care. The care
(analysis of the state of the disease) and an plan remained a means of the professionals. The
operational plan for care. short discussions with the adult patient focused
The results of the analysis of the communion very elementary measures of caring for the
cation and tool use during the care trajectories teeth and questions covered topics such as smok-
show that the new ideal model of the collabo- ing, the use of an electric toothbrush, or flossing.
rative patient-centered model tended to remain As mentioned before, no information of the state
an “espoused theory.” An important reason for of the disease whether illustrated in pictures or
this is that the ideas presented in it were not defined in the care plan was shown to the patients.
included in the manuals that regulate the care The ideals presented in the new model and the
activity. For example, although consultation and traditional ways of professional work embodied
dialogue with the patients to stimulate self-care in the instruction manuals were in gross contra-
was a central goal in the model, no space was diction. The exclusive use of diagnostic tools and
reserved for this in the care process defined in the care plan by the professionals also contra-
the manuals. Nor were the diagnostic pictures dicted the model.
Each program has specific pre-planned func-

8.6 Shifting Multiple
tions, such as allowing architectural design, cal-
Functions of Building
culating energy consumption, and viewing the
Information Modeling
clashes between the models. BIM is not an estab-
We have been involved in studying the imple- lished infrastructure or a system. New special
mentation of building information modeling purpose software is continually emerging and dif-
(BIM) in the construction industry in Finland ferent firms configure their own unique systems
(Miettinen & Paavola, 2014). BIM is a new tech- of them to meet their needs and develop their own
nology that combines 3-D digital representations particular expertise and organizational forms to
of a building with parametric data of the objects utilize these programs. The process resembles
(parts) of the building. BIM tools allow new the creation of enterprise information systems,
levels of spatial visualization and – as a result of which have been characterized as architectural or
the parametric data of the objects – simulations configurational technologies (Fleck, 1994). Typ-
of the behavior of the building such as energy ically, parts and modules developed by several
consumption and lighting. BIM was developed vendors are combined and adjusted to meet the
from standards that allow interoperability of local needs of the users. In addition, in each con-
information between “native” design models and struction project, the key partners must agree
data sharing (at least potentially) between vari- on which software will be used in the project
ous partners in the construction process, that is, and how. That is why we characterize BIM as
between architects, structural engineers, HVAC an evolving, configurational, and constantly re-
(heating, ventilation, air conditioning, electric- negotiated instrumentality.
ity) engineers, customers, contractors, and site The disciplinary software programs are used to
engineers. The most important of the BIM stan- produce native models (plans of the building) that
dards is the IFC (Industry Foundation Classes) play a central role in its design. These models
data format, published in 1997. The standard work as intermediary artifacts or objects in the
enables the creation of a unified model or data design work and collaboration. The term “inter-
repository shared by all stakeholders during the mediary object” has been used to refer to the
planning process and the lifecycle of a building open and evolving nature of the design process
(Miettinen & Paavola, 2014). According to the instead of the traditional model of design as a
proponents of BIM, this possibility will revolu- linear and sequential process (Boujut & Blanco,
tionize the collaboration both between designers 2003; Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009; Vinck, 2011).
and between designers and other stakeholders The term intermediary object depicts the nature
in the construction industry, but it requires the of the design process as composed of cycles
development of new ways of working with BIM. of collaborative design during which the disci-
It is expected to lead to an integrated way of plinary native models (architectural, structural,
working and to the increased productivity of the HVAC) produced by different design disciplines
industry. using special-purpose software (see Table 8.1)
Like most digital artifacts, BIM is not a are fused into combined models. The models
separate entity. It is composed of a number of are simultaneously a partial outcome of joined
different software programs, most of which may work and a means of joined reflection and prob-
be used interactively thanks to the standards. In lem solving concerning the following cycles of
the Finnish construction project that we studied, design. The function of BIM changes during the
the designers used nine different software pro- design cycles from a tool used by the designers to
grams from seven different providers (Table 8.1). an intermediary object and back to a tool again.
Table 8.1 BIM-related software used in a Finnish construction project in 2011–2012.
Software Main users Main uses and outcomes
1 ArchiCAD Architects Architect model

2 Tekla Structures Structural engineers Structural model
3 Tekla BIM Sight Structural engineers Creating a combined model and checking the
Architects compatibility of the native models (1 and 2)
4 MagiCAD HVAC engineers HVAC-models (electricity, plumbing, ventilation)
5 Dialux HVAC engineers Lighting
6 NavisWorks HVAC engineers Combining HVAC models and checking the
compatibility of the native models (4)
7 Solibri Model Checker BIM expert Creating combined models of all native models
and clash detection lists
8 Solibri Model Viewer All designers Viewing the clashes (7)
9 Riuska HVAC engineers Energy simulations
The BIM software and models are used in the example, embodies theoretical knowledge of the
design process in the following ways. physical properties of construction materials and
is used as a tool to provide calculations of the
1 As tools for design work within each design
energy consumption of the building alternatives
discipline: The designers of different fields,
to the clients. In the area of engineering design,
individually and as a group, construct native
the uses of sketches, paper drawings, and plans
models using BIM software (software 1, 2, 4,
have been seen as tools of collaboration and
and 5 in Table 8.1).
communication as the designers engage with
2 As tools of constructing combined models
these artifacts in design meetings in indexical
(software 3, 6, and 7 in Table 8.1).
and even tactile ways (Ewenstein & Whyte,
3 The combined models function as tangible and
2009; Henderson, 1999). The use of BIM models
indexical objects of joint problem solving and
does not change these basic functions and uses of
reflection, and as intermediary outcomes of
design plans. The combined models are not only
joint work.
symbols but modifiable intermediary artifacts,
4 The combined models function as means
or “special objects” (Ilyenkov, 1977a, p. 280)
of coordination of the further work of the
that are revised collaboratively during the design
designers.6
process. Ilyenkov characterizes a special object
5 The models function as a data source for
using the example of the drawings in an archi-
(a) simulations of the behavior of the build-
tect’s work: “In changing it he potentially alters
ing (energy, lighting), (b) for cost calculations,
the real house, i.e. changes it ideally, poten-
(c) for project planning, and (d) for complet-
tially, which means that he alters one sensuously
ing the orders from the suppliers.
perceived object instead of another” (Ilyenkov,
A simple distinction between sign and tool 1977a, p. 280).
can hardly be used to characterize BIM. The We consider one novel feature of BIM mod-
designers use BIM software as the main oper- els as intermediary artifacts to be their capacity
ative tool to produce the native models. The to provide new means for collaboration and to
software is packed with symbolic and operative play several functions in the course of a design
knowledge. Energy simulation software, for process: a tool of disciplinary design work, a
tool of collaborative problem solving as well as can be incompatible. The old artifacts in use,
an immediate object of reflection, and an evolv- relations of power, and traditional ways of pro-
ing intermediary object to which the outcomes of fessional thinking and acting resisted the imple-
the cycles of design are objectified. The modifi- mentation of a new model or an idea of activity. It
able, updatable, modular, and variable nature of is therefore essential for the transformation of an
digital artifacts allow this flexibility (Kallinikos, activity to achieve a sufficient fit and coordina-
Aaltonen, & Marton, 2010). This changing status tion between the artifacts. If this is not done, the
is compatible with the activity theoretical view, “tertiary,” or where-to artifacts, or the verbalized
according to which any entity may gain different visions of alternative practices, risk remaining
functions depending on its position in the struc- utopias unable to become the practical transfor-
ture and course of an activity. In the temporal mation of an activity. It seems to us that analyses
process of an activity an object can become a of instrumentalities, that is, the different levels
tool and a tool can become an object. The most and types of artifacts, their specific functions, and
evident transformation takes place when an out- their interdependencies characteristic of different
come of the design phase, an as-designed model, activities, are needed to enlarge our understand-
is handed over to the constructors and becomes ing of semiotic, practical, and cultural mediation.
a tool of the construction work. Because of the Such analyses are also important for well-
modifiability of digital artifacts, the transitions informed remediation in interventionist studies.
between functions seem to be much more flexi- The study of BIM revealed that the constel-
ble than when using traditional tools. lation of artifacts not only constitutes complex
constellations, but the artifacts also constantly
evolve, are locally configured and call for
8.7 Conclusions
constant negotiations between partners in col-
In the activity-theoretical tradition, the distinc- laborative projects. The building information
tion between sign and tool drawn by Vygotsky modeling also showed that during the cycles of
has been a central starting point. Vygotsky, design BIM software functioned as a basic tool
however, found the intertwining and unity of of design disciplines, an immediate object of
sign mediation and tool use at the center of collaborative problem solving, and an interme-
complex human behavior. Our cases indicate the diary outcome of joint work as well as a means
increasing significance of preparatory work and of collaboration. BIM models as intermediary
planning in professional activities. In preparatory artifacts play several functions in the course of
work, models and plans are typically worked a design process. The modifiable, updatable,
on as “special objects” instead of a final object. modular, and variable nature of digital artifacts
These tend to be hybrids fusing intellectual and contributes to the flexibility of their functions.
practical-operational functions, as in case of a
care plan or a building information model. In Notes
addition, artifacts of different types and levels
1 Nardi (2005, p. 40) argued that “the notion of
within an instrumentality complement each other.
constructing an object is ambiguous in much of
Since the artifacts within the constellation
the activity theory literature.” According to her,
have, however, been adopted at different times “we speak of constructing an object when we mean
and have different origins, different meanings formulating it, that is, figuring out what it should be.
and operational logics have been embodied in Instantiating an object then refers to the work that
them. Our example of the instrumentality of the goes into realizing a particular object, to achieving
oral care of adults showed that different artifacts an outcome.”
2 “This complex human structure is the product of Ilyenkov. Cambridge: Cambridge University
a developmental process deeply rooted in the links Press.
between individual and social history” (Vygotsky, Boujut, J.-F. & Blanco, E. (2003). Intermediary
1978, p. 30). objects as a means to foster co-operation in
3 Evidence of the beginning of the social and cul- engineering design. Computer Supported
tural development of human fetuses and newborns is Cooperative Work, 12: 205–219.
accumulating. During the last trimester of pregnancy Cole, M. (1996). Cultural Psychology: A Once and
human fetuses develop sensitivity to melody contour Future Discipline. Cambridge, MA: Belknap/
in both music and language. A newborn prefers his Harvard University Press.
or her mother’s voice over other voices and distin- Dewey, J. (1938/1991). The Later Works of John
guishes prosodically different languages based pri- Dewey, 1925–1953. Volume 12: Logic: The
marily on melody (e.g., Mampe et al., 2009). Theory of Inquiry (ed. by Jo Ann Boydston).
4 The root of the term instrument may be found Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
in Vygotsky, who speaks about instrumental as Press.
synonymous with “artificial” and in opposition to Elkonin, D. B. (2005). Theories of play. Journal of
natural. He also uses the term “artificial device” Russian and East European Psychology, 43(2),
(1981, p. 137). 3–89.
5 Miller (2011) warns about the danger of using the Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by Expanding: An
concept of artifact, because it hides the distinction Activity Theoretical Approach to Developmental
between sign and tool. This interpretation seems Research. Helsinki: Orienta Konsultit.
dichotomic in studying such modern mediational Engeström, Y. (1990). Constructing the object in the
means discussed in this chapter as a care plan or a work activity of primary care physicians. In
digital model of a building. Y. Engeström (Ed.), Learning, Working and
6 The definition of the functions of the combined Imagining (pp. 107–129). Helsinki: Orienta
models depends on the temporal perspective. In Konsultit.
a joint meeting of designers, they are immediate Engeström, Y. (2005). From individual action to
objects of attention, from the point of view of the collective activity and back: Developmental work
following cycle of design they are means of coor- research as an interventionist methodology. In
dination, and from the point of view of the entire Y. Engeström, Developmental Work Research:
design process they are intermediate objects or Expanding Activity Theory in Practice
outcomes. (pp. 171–199). Berlin, Lehmanns Media.
Engeström, Y. (2007). Enriching the theory of
expansive learning: Lessons from the journeys
toward coconfiguration. Mind, Culture and
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9 The Sociocultural Study of
Creative Action
Vlad Petre Glăveanu
It is undeniable that creativity is currently one of cultural factors within creative action. Despite
the “hot” topics in both science and society, from a growing interest in the role of the social
economy and management to education and pol- since the 1980s (e.g., Simonton, 1975; Ama-
itics (Dubina, Carayannis, & Campbell, 2012). bile, 1983; Amabile, Hennessey, & Grossman,
In a world marked by connectivity, globalization, 1986; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988), the main concern
and rapid changes, creativity is often considered has been to demonstrate how social dimensions
essential for adapting to new circumstances and shape (from the outside) the creative processes
as the driving force of progress in a variety of of individuals. In contrast, sociocultural psychol-
applied areas. We are constantly told we need ogy starts from the premise of the social and
creative leaders and creative followers, creative cultural as intrinsic components of the human
teachers as well as creative students, creative mind as it creatively acts within and on the world
marketing campaigns and consumers ready to (Glăveanu, 2010a, 2014; Moran & John-Steiner,
understand and express creativity, and so on. 2003). The general lack of more sociocultural
What exactly each one of these slogans implies thinking in the psychology of creativity is both
by “creativity” is not exactly clear and, when a consequence and an outcome of the long his-
forced to clarify their choices, teachers, for tory of individualizing this notion and making it
example, often end up preferring “good” (mean- the – sometimes exclusive – quality of isolated
ing obedient) rather than “creative” students (see individuals or, rather, isolated individual minds.
Karwowski, 2010). Meanwhile, psychologists Recently, significant efforts have been made to
more or less consistently endorse a product-based rethink creativity from a sociocultural perspec-
definition of creativity as the psychological pro- tive (Glăveanu, Gillespie, & Valsiner, 2015) and
cess leading to the generation of new, original these efforts need to be consolidated and con-
and valuable, or meaningful outcomes (Stein, nected to other current developments in the
1953). The question remains of how we can sociocultural study of the imagination (Zittoun
account for processes when considering out- & Gillespie, 2015) and human agency (Gruber
comes alone, for instance, number and quality of et al., 2015). This chapter hopes to contribute to
ideas in divergent thinking tests. More than this, this general direction.
what can a focus on ideas tell us about real-life The sociocultural study of creativity starts
processes of creating, about the embodied nature from the basic idea that creativity is not a purely
of making new objects, crafting new practices, mental process but a quality of human action
and renewing cultural traditions? (see also Joas, 1996; Sawyer, 1995; Glăveanu,
While today’s psychology of creativity per- 2013a, 2014). In other words, creativity is not
fected its study of cognitive and even neurologi- a constellation of personality traits, cognitive
cal mechanisms involved in creative ideation, it is styles, or neural associations, for as much as these
still struggling to account for material and socio- features contribute to the creative process. A
164 vlad petre g l ăveanu
sociocultural, thus holistic, way of understanding 2004; Moran & John-Steiner, 2003), there is
creativity starts from its expression in activity or little collaboration between creativity and culture
action. As such, it is the process of creating rather specialists. As mentioned in the introduction,
than a reified, unitary, and universal notion of this state of affairs relates first and foremost to
“creativity” that interests sociocultural psychol- prioritizing individuals over groups, ideas over
ogists. However, in order to develop a holistic actions, and cognition over culture in the study
and developmental approach to the study of cre- of creativity. Moreover, the notion of creativity
ating or creative action, specific for sociocultural is often bound in public debates with ideals
psychology, we need to go beyond “elements” specific for neoliberal economies, capitalism,
and investigate the dynamic relations between and consumption societies (creating new goods
them (Glăveanu, 2015a). These relations, as I and constantly trying to persuade others of their
argue here, are represented by various forms of value). The mixture of individualism, cogni-
(inter)action. In this chapter, I use several socio- tivism, and capitalism shaping contemporary
cultural theories to shed new light on the nature discourses of creativity contributed to its lack of
of self – other – culture interactions within cre- appeal for sociocultural thinkers.
ativity and, toward the end, consider the broader And yet, as I argue here, more sustained
conceptual and methodological consequences of exchanges between researchers focused on cre-
this exercise. But, before developing these ideas ativity and researchers interested in culture would
further, it is worth considering a more fundamen- be highly beneficial for both. Let’s consider, in
tal question: why exactly do we need a sociocul- order to exemplify this, two essential problems
tural theory (or theories) of creativity? faced by experts in both areas: the nature of the
creative process and the relation between mind
and culture.
9.1 Theoretical Roots
Models of the creative process have been pro-
Change, emergence, development, transfor- posed for more than a century in psychology.
mation, imagination, agency, appropriation – Some of the first ones, inspired by the accounts
all these topics have been extensively studied of celebrated creators such as the mathematician
by sociocultural psychologists belonging to Henri Poincaré (1924), postulated a succession of
different orientations, from cultural-historical different stages within creating, from preparation
and activity theory (Leontiev, 1978; Cole, to incubation, illumination, and, finally, verifica-
1996), pragmatism (James, 1981; Dewey, 1934), tion (Wallas, 1926). These stages are descriptive
and semiotics (Peirce, 1977; Valsiner, 2007) and leave open the issue of what exactly people
to social representations (Moscovici, 2000; do when they create – the question of creative
Jovchelovitch, 2007) and dialogicality (Bakhtin, processes (Lubart, 2000). In order to address
1981; Marková, 2003). These diverse schools of this question, creativity researchers turned first
thought are ultimately all reunited by an interest and foremost to cognitive psychology and, to
in the dynamic between the new and the old, date, there are a variety of thinking processes
stability and change, the internalization and supposed to underpin creative production (e.g.,
transformation of culture and mind. One would divergent thinking, Guilford, 1968; conceptual
rightfully expect, under these circumstances, for combination, Ward, 2001; bisociation, Koestler,
creativity to be firmly placed on the agenda of 1964; Janusian thinking; Rothenberg, 1971; lat-
sociocultural researchers. Surprisingly, however, eral thinking, de Bono, 1970). Creative cog-
except for some attention paid to Vygotsky’s nition, as the dominant paradigm in the field,
work on creativity and imagination (Vygotsky, systematized its findings with the help of both
The Sociocultural Study of Creative Action 165
autobiographic and experimental research (Finke, of creating does not suffice, the concept of cre-
Ward, & Smith, 1992) while rarely questioning ativity itself should not be thrown out with the
its basic assumptions. Key among them is that proverbial bath water. Moreover, cognitive and
the creative process is reduced to the production even neurological studies of creativity can inspire
of ideas (idea generation) and thus located within new efforts to understand creative action sys-
the mind (with its cognitive structures, personal- temically – from the brain to society across the
ity traits, motivation, neurological processes, and developmental lines of phylo-, socio-, onto-, and
so on). Where are the body and the material world micro-genesis. If culture is both the premise and
within this dynamic? What about other people outcome of human action, then creativity occu-
and the symbolic resources made available by pies a key role in understanding the continuous
culture? When operationalized in research, these cycle between contributing to and renewing our
often appear as external “constraints” on the cre- shared legacy (Festinger, 1983). If the relation
ative process, factors that come to influence what between mind and culture stands at the core of
takes place before or after the creative act of sociocultural interests, then this relation cannot
ideation (see Runco, 2015). For as useful as this be separated from the notion of creativity, even if
paradigm might be for experimental studies – as it is often expressed in other terms such as imag-
it greatly simplifies the number of variables one ination, transformation, or co-evolution. Indeed,
should focus on and try to control – it visibly many (I would dare say most) sociocultural psy-
falls short of explaining real-life acts of creativ- chologists are studying, one way or another, cre-
ity outside of the laboratory. And this is because, ative processes under the guise of other con-
when people create in their daily lives, at home, ceptual labels. What would it mean to actually
at work, at school, and so on, they do so as mem- consider these processes as forms of creativity,
bers of society and culture and not as indepen- among other things? The implications of this
dent brains or isolated minds. While cognition conceptual move, for both creativity and socio-
is crucially important for understanding creative cultural researchers, are explored in more detail
ideation, it can never fully account for creativ- below.
ity as a psycho-sociocultural and material process
(Glăveanu, 2011). It is toward a deeper under-
9.2 A Sociocultural Proposal for
standing of this complexity that sociocultural the-
the Study of Creativity
ory can make a significant contribution.
On the other hand, sociocultural researchers Creative action is distributed across people,
would benefit from insights drawn from the psy- people and objects, and time (Glăveanu, 2014).
chology of creativity. In their efforts to theorize This means that, in order to study creativity, one
mind and culture as interdependent phenomena cannot stop at the level of the creative product
(Shweder, 1990; Cole, 1996; Valsiner, 2007), the or at scores of divergent thinking. Questions
emphasis often falls on how the mind appro- related to sociality, materiality, and temporality
priates, understands, and is transformed by cul- need to be raised for a comprehensive, sociocul-
ture. The developmental roots of sociocultural tural exploration of creative action. And these
psychology become evident in questions related questions do not address exclusively “eminent”
to the internalization and use of cultural ele- creators and revolutionary creations. On the con-
ments; what about their production? In other trary, they point us toward the everyday, habitual
words, what about the transformation of culture basis of creativity as it unfolds in human rela-
through the creative work of minds, people, and tions, interactions, and communication. A deeper
communities? While a purely cognitive theory understanding of creativity can only be systemic
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Gruber, 2005) and rely

on the articulation of different levels of analy-
sis from the intrapersonal and interpersonal to
society and culture. Even those types of creative
expression that seemingly do not leave a visible
mark – for example, children’s creative expres-
sion – reflect the complexity of creativity as a
system. They bring together different social roles
(e.g., the creator and the audience), make use of
material and symbolic resources (at minimum
the use of language, to externalize thoughts and
images), and draw on a variety of existing cul-
tural traditions (in the case of children’s play, the
rich basis of norms, values, and tools mobilized
to construct a play situation). For a long time, the
study of creativity focused on celebrated creators
and creations at the expense of more mundane
forms of creative production (Glăveanu, 2010b).
Sociocultural psychology reverses this hierarchy:
Big-C creativity cannot be understood outside
Figure 9.1 Decorated eggs at different stages.
of its microsocial, cultural, and developmental
Source: Eggs decorated by Maria Ciocan;
roots.
photograph taken by the author.
We can take as an example the focus on every-
day or mundane forms of creativity embedded
within cultural traditions such as the decoration instruments used to “write” on the egg, to warm
of eggs for Easter. This is a cultural practice spe- up the wax, etc.), and other people (those who
cific for several societies around the world and decorate eggs, those who buy them, and so on).
prominent in eastern European countries such as Moreover, studying this kind of mundane cre-
Romania, where artisans, usually in rural com- ativity in a systemic and longitudinal manner –
munities, decorate eggs all year long using wax by considering how the practice developed, how
and different color pigments (see Figure 9.1). The it is acquired and performed, how it is transmit-
marker of creative action in folk art is repre- ted, and so on – can inspire the study of Big-C
sented by the potential to combine and recombine forms of creativity in the same area of decorative
existing cultural elements (in this case, decora- art (one can think here about the famous Fabergé
tion motifs and tools) in the making of artifacts egg, pieces of jewelry praised for their design
that are never perfectly identical with one another and the craftsmanship that contributed to their
(Glăveanu, 2013b). This example also points us making).
to the systemic nature of creativity – the decora-
tion of eggs is not an activity learned and prac-
9.2.1 The Five A’s of (Distributed)
ticed in isolation and based exclusively on men-
Creativity
tal abilities. It involves mind and body, decora-
tor and community, personal habits and tradition In this regard, sociocultural psychology operates
in order to exist, as well as a variety of mate- with a distinct framework from the traditional
rial, tools (from eggs, wax, and color pigments to four P’s of creativity: person, process, product,
NEW ARTIFACT
CREATIVE ACTION
ACTOR AUDIENCE
MATERIAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL

AFFORDANCES
Figure 9.2 The five A’s framework of creativity.

Source: Glăveanu, 2013a, p. 72
and press (Rhodes, 1961). While outlining these artifacts mediate (shape, facilitate, make possi-
various “components” of the creativity complex ble) the relation between actors and audiences,
can be a useful analytical step, it is undoubtedly that is, between creators and the different other
insufficient. This is because the different facets of people, groups, and communities they address. In
creativity remain largely disconnected from each this sense, the newly produced artifact – it can
other. In theory, persons create products through be a concrete product, an idea, a performance,
a process that takes place within a certain envi- and so on – connects creators and others through
ronment (press). In practice, each one of these collaborative processes of making and sensemak-
can and has been studied independently of the ing (i.e., understanding the novelty being pro-
rest. In contrast, a sociocultural framework for duced). In turn, creative actors mediate the rela-
the study of creativity replaces the four P’s with tion between the new artifact and audiences who
the five A’s of actor, audience, action, artifact, get to use and transform it. Creators, in this
and affordance (Glăveanu, 2013a). This rewriting regard, present their work to others and persuade
goes beyond a simple change of names; it actively them of its qualities. Last but not least, audiences
stresses the interdependence of each component also mediate the relation between actors and their
within the system: actors create in relation to own productions. It is only by seeing one’s work
multiple audiences, their actions exploit material “through” the eyes of others that we get to under-
and cultural affordances and lead to the genera- stand it and its creative potential better. All these
tion of new and useful artifacts. Most of all, this action-based processes are grounded in the use of
framework places action at the center, organizing material and sociocultural affordances.
the rest of the A’s around this central notion (see In summary, a sociocultural approach to cre-
Figure 9.2). ativity starts from considering it in terms of rela-
What Figure 9.2 depicts is the centrality of tions – between self and other; self and objects;
action within a mediational model of creativity. present self, past self, and future self, and so
Drawing on the legacy of numerous mediational on – rather than as a stable property of people
schemas in sociocultural psychology (see Zittoun or outcomes. And these relations are quintessen-
et al., 2007), the present theoretical proposal uses tially expressed in actions (or, rather, interac-
a basic actor–audience–artifact triad in order to tions). As such, the study of action in creativity is
study creative action. Within this triad, creative not restricted to the activity of making something
(the artifact). On the contrary, various actions It is worth noting again that the term “artifact”
bind together actors, audiences, and artifacts thus does not designate exclusively material objects
resulting in particular ecologies of creating, a cre- but also includes symbolic and processual out-
ativity complex that goes beyond isolated peo- comes (e.g., the production of speech, of dance,
ple and products or even specific moments in and of music).
time (for example, getting the creative idea). In What is the essence of creative action in
what follows, I will unpack further these types bringing about such artifacts? A close dialogue
of actions with the conceptual means of socio- between material-making and meaning-making is
cultural psychology/psychologies. In particular, intrinsic to this facet of creativity. This is because
I will focus on understanding what kind of cre- creative actors are producing a materialized (in a
ative actions define the relations between actors broad sense) product as well as its meaning. The
and audiences, audiences and artifacts, actors and notion of artifact itself, as described in sociocul-
audiences, and how these actions make use of tural psychology (see Cole, 1996), points to its
environmental affordances. In doing so, I am not double – material and symbolic – nature. Cre-
trying to offer an exhaustive list of authors or ative artifacts are, from the initial process of
texts useful for exploring creativity – the space making, products of culture because they are not
of one chapter would not suffice; rather, I aim to only crafted but also made sense of. In other
give a brief overview of some concepts and the- words, they are represented, evaluated, and sym-
ories from outside the “mainstream” psychology bolically placed within a cultural universe well
of creativity that can meaningfully inform current before being shown to other people or used by
debates about how we create. them. The creative actor is, recurrently, the cre-
ator and the first receiving audience for his or her
own nascent creations (Dewey, 1934). The mean-
9.2.2 Creative Action in Actor–
ing(s) given to what is made can be later nego-
Artifact Relations
tiated with others (as we will see in the follow-
The most studied relation within the creativ- ing section), but they are also dialogical from the
ity complex is that between the actor (creator) start. In order to understand what is being made,
and artifact (creation). Mainstream approaches why it is novel and potentially creative, what its
understand this relation primarily in terms of the uses might be, and so on, the creative actor needs
mental processes of the creator – for example, to see it from multiple (other) perspectives, often-
conceptual combination, bi-association, diver- times contradictory. This tension between poten-
gent thinking, and so on – thus, in effect, reducing tial meanings is shaping material forms of mak-
the relation to only one “pole”: the mind. Yet, in ing and guides creative action; at the same time,
sociocultural terms, the very essence of creative the state of what is being created in the material
production is represented by forms of “doing” or world impacts and constrains the possible mean-
“making,” the visible externalization of thought ings assigned to it.
into action (Moran & John-Steiner, 2003). This The alternation between immersion and
externalization is bi-directional, pointing both detachment, between doing and observing –
toward the person and the materiality of the arti- from a symbolic and/or physical distance – the
fact being created (more details about the latter effect of what has been done, is placed by differ-
can be found in Section 9.2.5). In this section ent strands of sociocultural theory at the core of
I will focus mostly on what sociocultural theo- creative action. John Dewey (1934), for example,
ries tell us about the making of new and use- offered a classic account of creativity in art that
ful (thus at least potentially creative) artifacts. articulates “doing” and “undergoing,” acting in
the world and being acted on by the world. This 9.2.3 Creative Action in
account not only emphasizes the importance Audience–Artifact Relations
of perception in creativity but also postulates a
bi-directional relation between actor and arti- It is common to assume that creativity con-
fact, between creator and emergent creation. In cerns primarily, if not solely, the relation between
Dewey’s words: actor (creator) and artifact (creation), a relation
defined, as explained above, by different forms of
A painter must consciously undergo the effect of making or producing. However, from a sociocul-
his every brush stroke or he will not be aware of tural standpoint, the creative act is never “com-
what he is doing and where his work is going.
plete” in the absence of a second position – that
Moreover, he has to see each particular connection
of the audience (see Figure 9.2, also Glăveanu,
of doing and undergoing in relation to the whole
2015b). While the actor or creator him/herself is
that he desires to produce. (Dewey, 1934, p. 47)
the first audience of the artifact being produced,
Although Dewey referred specifically to the work this kind of distantiation can only be achieved by
of artists, his cyclical relation between doing and internalizing the perspective of others on one’s
undergoing is the marker of creative action in work. This means that, in order to be an audi-
a multitude of other domains (for an example ence to your own creation, a history of interac-
see Glăveanu et al., 2013). It also resonates with tion with others is needed. From the young child
current theorizing in the psychology of creativ- showing her parents colorful drawings, excited to
ity, including the branch of creative cognition. get their praises, to the student fearfully awaiting
The geneplore model (Finke, Ward, & Smith, exam grades and the employee reading a feed-
1992), for instance, describes creativity as an back report, we exist in a social world that con-
interplay between the generation and evaluation stantly confronts us with the “view of the other,”
of ideas. Despite a clear lack of materiality, a view we come to incorporate into our own activ-
including the materiality of the creative artifact, ity, including creative activity (for more details
this model alludes nonetheless to an element of see Section 9.2.4). This outside perspective is
“undergoing” in the form of evaluation – decid- essential for creativity because it infuses the cre-
ing which ideas are indeed novel and useful and ative act and its product with new meaning and
should be developed further. This is a central part value. Essentially, the relation between audience
of what sociocultural psychologists, particularly and artifact is one of evaluation and meaning-
drawing on semiotics, would define as meaning- making, appropriation (often through use) and,
making. Indeed, as argued above, the creative ultimately, transformation. In this section I use
actions that connect actors and artifacts coordi- the notion of audience both to designate specific
nate both material and symbolic forms of “mak- others (e.g., family members, collaborators, crit-
ing.” In the process of creating, what is being ics) and “generalized” others (society, the public,
physically made or expressed is only part of the etc.; see also Mead, 1964).
process. The other part, often less visible, has to In the study of creativity as action, the
do with the hierarchy of signs constructed by the relations between actor–artifact and audience–
creator to make sense of the new artifact (see also artifact operate as two sides of the same coin. In
Valsiner, 2014). A sociocultural study of these Vygotsky’s terms, these relations are defined by
processes would focus on when and how the sign externalization and internalization, respectively
“creative” emerges within the process, what other (see Moran & John-Steiner, 2003), by expres-
meanings are associated with it, and how it comes sion and reception. However, the audience never
to regulate ongoing action. occupies simply a “receptor” position in the
creativity triad. On the contrary, audiences are whole that is in form, although not in details, the
creative actors in their own right. This is because same as the process of organization the creator of
they never passively “receive” the creations of the work consciously experienced . . . There is work
others – audiences have to appropriate them. done on the part of the percipient as there is on the
In what follows, I will focus on three types of part of the artist. (Dewey, 1934, p. 56)
actions included in this process of appropriation:
interpretation, evaluation, and use. Each of these Perception as a creative, constructive way of
actions leads to a more or less marked trans- relating to the world and its new artifacts forms
formation of what is being created, from new the basis of creative action for audiences and cre-
meaning to physical or embodied aspects. In this ators alike, whenever the former adopt an audi-
sense, all audiences of a creative artifact ulti- ence position to their own work. But beyond per-
mately become co-creators of its value (Taillard ception there is also a need to represent the new
et al., 2014), contributing to its “creativity.” artifact, to anchor it within existing structures
Audiences of new artifacts necessarily begin of meaning and signification, in other words to
by interpreting, in their own terms, what has been “domesticate” its unfamiliarity and turn it into
made. In the previous section, we noticed how something that is known and thus usable (for
actors both make and give meaning to their cre- interesting parallels see the theory of social rep-
ations (often by becoming their first audience resentation; Moscovici, 2000; Marková, 2003).
and adopting an evaluative position in relation Important to note, representing here is not used
to them). This original meaning is often already in the cognitive sense of creating a mental image
inscribed within the physical properties of the of external objects, although this might be part of
artifact, metaphorically defining its “intentional- the process. What I am referring to here are lit-
ity” (for an account of human existence within erally processes of re-presentation, of appropriat-
an intentional world, see Shweder, 1990). This ing artifacts in ways that make them seem “new”
intentionality, however, almost always has to be to others, including their creators. Consider, for
negotiated with audience members who might example, classic creations such as the Mona Lisa.
very well interpret the artifact differently, sub- If we apply our current definition of creativity
verting its original meaning. This kind of process to it – novelty plus value – we can immedi-
is at the basis of many contemporary art instal- ately notice the fact that, while immensely valu-
lations in which common objects like urinals or able (particularly if we consider its worth esti-
bicycles become something they were not meant mates), it certainly is no longer a “new” artifact
to be, including art objects. The creative pro- by any standards. And yet, what makes it con-
cess at play here, on the side of the audience, is tinuously new is its reception and re-presentation
that of interpretation. Interpretation itself ranges by diverse audiences (if you want to convince
from perception to re-presentation. The former yourself of this, just type “Mona Lisa funny” in
was defined by Dewey as a constructive process an image search engine and you will discover
of engaging with existing work. He notes in rela- various forms of irreverent appropriation of this
tion to art: image by users).
At the same time, there is another fundamental
role audiences have in relation to the creativity
For to perceive, a beholder must create his own
experience. And his creation must include relations status of artifacts such as the Mona Lisa. They
comparable to those which the original producer evaluate it and, when in a position of gatekeepers
underwent. They are not the same in any literal (which includes critics, museum curators, collec-
sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, tors, etc.), they validate it as a product of creativ-
there must be an ordering of the elements of the ity or even genius. This kind of action/relation
is what Csikszentmihalyi (1988) argues for in ultimately, co-created and creative action itself
his systemic model bringing together creators, is collaborative in nature (see also Barron, 1999,
field, and domain. In order for something to for a similar argument). As such, actor–audience
be integrated within a cultural domain as a relations not only constitute the basis of creativ-
creative addition, formal recognition by the field ity as distributed action (see also Figure 9.2)
(of experts) is needed. From this position, the but they also ground it in the interaction and
audience emerges as a judge of what is creative communication processes that bring together cre-
and what is not, what is worth keeping and trans- ators and their multiple audiences. These interac-
mitting and what can be neglected or forgotten. tions are, first and foremost, bidirectional, which
Of course all these judgments are contingent on means they are not restricted to creative actors
history and group membership but they reveal persuading audiences nor to audiences imposing
yet another necessary contribution made by their views on creators. The essence of self–other
audiences to the creative act – its evaluation. relations in creative expression is dialogue, the
Last but not least, beyond interpretation and exchange and negotiation of perspectives leading
evaluation very often audiences are faced with to the acceptance, transformation, or rejection of
the possibility of using new artifacts in their own the new artifact.
activity. From this position they are asked to imi- Often in the psychology of creativity the cre-
tate the creator(s) and others in their use of what ator’s relations and interaction with other peo-
was created and, often enough, to transform the ple (e.g., collaborators, observers, evaluators) is
creation for their own purposes. For the former considered separately from the creative process
we can think about a parallel with basic processes as an external factor coming in to influence
of socialization through which children become its dynamic (through peer pressure, surveillance,
competent users of the objects surrounding them. rewards, etc.). This led to a growing literature in
Baldwin’s (1894) theory of imitation is useful to the past decades on “the social psychology of cre-
understand this dynamic by postulating a creative ativity” (Amabile, 1983; Amabile, Hennessey, &
underlining dimension even for the most basic Grossman, 1986) and, in a more narrow sense,
acts of imitation and particularly what he calls prompted group creativity research (for a review,
“persistent imitation” – the act of repeatedly try- see Paulus & Nijstad, 2003). While informative
ing to appropriate a new artifact. For the latter we in their own right, experimental research findings
can be reminded of the active involvement today about the impact of other people on the creator’s
of users in the production of innovation. User- mental states and actions constitute only one
generated content and objects (see Van Dijck, aspect of actor–audience relations. This aspect
2009; Potts et al., 2008) are increasingly recog- relates to forms of direct, face-to-face or medi-
nized as engines of creativity for both business ated, online communication between people as
and society. Examples ranging from Wikipedia to they generate ideas (together or in the presence
fan-made novels and games illustrate the increas- of others). Are the same processes these studies
ingly blurry line that separates actors and audi- uncover supposed to characterize real-life, long-
ences in the process of creating, a topic I dis- term forms of collaboration as well? Another
cussed in more detail below. field of study, typically drawing on sociocultural
theory such as the writings of Lev Vygotsky,
focuses on creative collaboration in science, art,
9.2.4 Creative Action in Actor –
and society (e.g., John-Steiner, 1992). The main
Audience Relations
benefit of adopting a creative collaboration rather
As suggested in the previous sections, from a than a group creativity perspective in research is
sociocultural standpoint, all creative artifacts are, that the former considers social relations as an
integral part of creative action. Creators not only one spoken to through what he perceived. He
create with others but also for and because of oth- observes and understands as a third person might
ers, based on their inputs and knowledge. note and interpret.
However, the question for many researchers
remains whether we are better off creating The possibility to understand the creative artifact
together or alone? Here group creativity research as other people would is founded on our capacity
pointed for a long time to the necessity of gen- for perspective-taking. Seeing oneself – and,
erating ideas alone, at least at times (Lamm & by extension, one’s action and its outcomes –
Trommsdorff, 1973). While it is undeniable that, as another would is fundamental for the devel-
across domains of activity, combining stages of opment of the self (Mead, 1964) and agency
individual and group work is probably the best (Martin & Gillespie, 2010). It is also one of
solution, the question itself of whether people the key psychological processes underpinning
are more “creative” alone or together is mislead- creative action (Glăveanu, 2015b). In previous
ing. This is so because it starts from the premise work, I suggested understanding the generation
that the social aspects of creativity can be dis- of creative ideas, objects, or performances as
entangled from its processes by simply removing an interplay between perspective-taking and the
the physical presence of other people. A dialogi- reflexive turn, in other words, the process of
cal analysis (see Bakhtin, 1981; Marková, 2003) relating one’s “first person” perspective with
of creative action problematizes such an easy “third person” ones. Once more, dialogue – this
assumption. Most of all, it challenges the pre- time between perspectives – is postulated as a
supposition that being alone is an asocial state. condition for creative action. This theoretical
On the contrary, by considering the mind as position not only manages to integrate the social
dialogical, sociocultural psychology focuses on aspect within creativity but also gives it a privi-
dialogues with the internalized voices of others leged role when it comes to creative action. The
even in those moments in which creative actors essence of creativity, it is argued, rests precisely
work in perfect solitude (Barrett, 1999). In other in being able to decenter from one’s position
words, creators do not require direct exchanges and, in a collaborative, dialogical act of relating
with other people while producing their arti- to others and their views, to gain a new under-
facts (although other people are never com- standing of what is being made and how other
pletely absent since, for example, most creativ- people might perceive it. This evaluative aspect
ity requires “invisible” forms of division of labor; is intrinsic to creative cognition (Finke, Ward, &
see Becker, 2008); these exchanges are internal- Smith, 1992) and both its origin and dynamic are,
ized as creators themselves regularly adopt the at once, cognitive and sociocultural. The direct
perspective of different audiences while work- consequence of alternating between perspectives
ing. We can once more return to Dewey’s (1934, is that our creative action becomes adaptive and
pp. 110–111) thoughtful analysis of artists’ activ- flexible, a flexibility that allows us to exploit
ity to highlight this issue: existing affordances and even discover new ones.
The external object, the product of art, is the 9.2.5 Creative Action in Using
connecting link between artist and audience. Even Material and Cultural Affordances
when the artist works in solitude all three terms are
present. The work is there in progress, and the artist Up to this point, I have discussed at length the
has to become vicariously the receiving audience. role of both actor and audience in relation to
He can speak only as his work appeals to him as the creative artifact and in relation to each other.
It is important to notice, however, that creative nothing of what can be done with a computer
action and its intricate system of social relations is obvious from perceiving it, closed, in front
does not take place in a material vacuum. For as of us. It is our personal history of socialization
much as existing models of the creative process, and acculturation that guides the use of objects
including the geneplore, emphasize the mental or within the intentional world of culture (Shweder,
cognitive dynamic of creativity, the fact that cre- 1990). And these uses are represented by exploit-
ativity is, ultimately, materialized action should ing existing affordances in a new way, perceiv-
not be forgotten. Similarly, we need to account ing new affordances that we were not aware of
for the fact that creative action not only leads before, or using affordances in ways that are ini-
to the emergence of (new and meaningful) arti- tially sanctioned by culture (for more details, see
facts but also uses existing artifacts as tools in Glăveanu, 2012).
this very process. How can we include this mate- The use of objects within creativity repre-
rial dimension within creativity theory and, most sents a wide and yet largely unexplored area
of all, how can we relate it to the actor–audience– of research, at least within psychology. While
artifact triad explored until now? the material world is usually accounted for in
One option, drawing again on sociocultural terms of constraints or mental representations
sources, is to use the notion of affordance. This (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992), this conceptual-
concept was first introduced by Gibson (1986) to ization is insufficient as it sidesteps questions
denote the action-based nature of our perception related to materiality and embodiment. All the
of the environment. What he rightfully observed creative processes outlined in this chapter – mak-
is that when we perceive the things that surround ing and meaning-making, appropriation and use,
us we “see” much more than their color, texture, perspective-taking and reflexivity – have a mate-
or consistency – we grasp also what can be done rialized dynamic that brings together minds, bod-
with them or how they can be used. This obser- ies, objects, and institutions. In order to under-
vation is highly relevant for understanding cre- stand the kinds of affordances used in each
ative action since, in essence, such action gen- case we need to operate with a sociocultural
erates new artifacts by exploiting, in a new and rather than purely cognitive framework. Figure
original manner, the affordances of already exist- 9.2 points to the fact that actors, audiences, and
ing artifacts. Importantly, these affordances do creative affordances, as well as the system of
not derive solely from the material properties actions and interactions that unite them, exist
of things, accessible directly to our perception, within a material and cultural environment. This
as Gibson suggested at some point (see Gibson, environment should not be understood only as
1986, p. 140) but they are culturally organized a “place” or an “influence,” but the very locus
(see Costall, 1995). While Gibson himself was of creativity – the encounter between person and
not sensitive to how affordances can be trans- world (see also May, 1974). Affordances are not
formed – as he considered them to either exist or only used but constrain creative action and guide
not – the first task of sociocultural researchers is it. While many things can be done with one and
precisely to reformulate this notion in ways that the same object, not everything is possible or
emphasize (re)construction and learning. This “afforded” by it, even as a prop for imagina-
is because the things we make use of in order tion and creativity. The meanings we invest into
to create reveal their action potential only to a objects and the forms of doing we engage in
mind shaped by culture and interaction with other when relating to them are “responded” to by the
people. How else would we become aware, for material properties of these objects; this response
instance, of what a computer affords? Almost is one we have to undergo in order to continue
creating (Dewey, 1934). Many authors talk in this manner. Sociocultural psychology offers a useful
regard about the continuous dialogue between framework for this study but does not postulate
creator and creation (e.g., Mace & Ward, 2002), relations in advance.
mediated by material tools and social relations. The study of creative action, within the socio-
This dialogue is not based on rudimentary forms cultural tradition, needs to be context dependent,
of anthropomorphism although, phenomenolog- developmental, ecological, and emic (Glăveanu,
ically, many creators might in fact experience 2010b). This of course poses great challenges
objects as agents in their own right (see Glăveanu to a traditional methodological apparatus built
et al., 2013; Gell, 1998). It is rather a sign of co- around the use of tests and experiments. Without
agency (Glăveanu, 2015c), of interdependence claiming these tools are useless, it is important
between self and object, action and context, that to understand them as insufficient, encouraging
marks creativity at each stage of its unfolding. a kind of methodological reductionism described
by Montuori and Purser (1997). This is because
the methods above often take individuals and
9.3 Concluding Thoughts on
their psychological states as a unit of analysis. In
How to Study Creative Action
contrast, for sociocultural psychology, the unit of
In this chapter, I argued that the sociocultural analysis in creativity research is a complex that
study of creativity considers this phenomenon articulates actors, audiences, artifacts, actions,
in ecological, systemic, and distributed terms. and affordances (Glăveanu, 2013a). In order to
The ecology of creative action expands far investigate the creativity complex we need to
beyond creators and their creations and includes develop more process-oriented methods, meth-
other people, objects, and the relations between ods capable of studying creativity forward, as it
them. These relations, expressed in action, not unfolds, and not only backward, based on finished
only contribute to the creation of new artifacts products or the number of new ideas (Ingold
but represent its different facets. As such, it & Hallam, 2007). Qualitative methods are well
is not only (and sometimes not even primar- equipped to deal with such complexity and they
ily) the relation between actor and artifact that should more often inform and complement the
defines “creativity,” but different audiences and dominant use today of psychometric tools. The
the action/relations they establish with both cre- call for more qualitative investigations of creativ-
ator and creation. Moreover, time has a crucial ity comes at a time when key journals within
role to play in sociocultural studies of creativity. the field (e.g., Creativity Research Journal; Psy-
The processual nature of creative action engages chology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts)
various registers of temporality, from the histor- actively deter authors from submitting this type
ical to the personal (life course) and the micro- of studies. The shortsightedness of such editorial
genetic (moment-to-moment). In this sense, the decisions has consequences for the current devel-
system of actions and interactions that brings opment (or lack thereof) of creativity theory.
together the actor–artifact–audience triad (see Sociocultural psychology is but one of the
Figure 9.2), evolves in time and should be stud- many approaches to creativity, alongside the cog-
ied, whenever possible, longitudinally. Last but nitive, biological, evolutionary, and sociological,
not least, this ecology of relations is also domain to name just a few. In consequence, its posi-
dependent (for a review, see Kaufman & Baer, tion needs to be articulated with that of other
2005). Since creative action is largely domain- disciplines and more interdisciplinary dialogue
specific, the five A’s and the relations between is needed to elaborate comprehensive and inclu-
them can only be specified in a domain-based sive theories and methods in this area. However,
the sociocultural approach has an advantage that Cole, M. (1996). Cultural Psychology: A Once and
many other orientations lack: its view is, from Future Discipline. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
the start, systemic and integrative. Enriching this Press.
conceptual framework is therefore a task that Costall, A. (1995). Socializing affordances. Theory &
transcends the boundaries of isolated domains Psychology, 5, 467–481.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and
and exclusive methodologies. Just as creative
person: A systems view of creativity. In
action itself is distributed and collaborative, so
R. Sternberg (Ed.), The Nature of Creativity:
should theory-building be in order to achieve a
Contemporary Psychological Perspectives
wider synthesis and a more clear sense of its prac- (pp. 325–339). Cambridge: Cambridge
tical applications. This chapter stands as an open University Press.
invitation for culture and creativity researchers de Bono, E. (1970). Lateral Thinking: Creativity
to engage in a more sustained dialogue; the Step-by-Step. New York: Harper & Row.
promise of such dialogue far exceeds creativity Dewey, J. (1934). Art as Experience. New York:
or psychology itself as it can shed new light on Penguin Books.
the nature of emergence in the mind and that Dubina, I. N., Carayannis, E. G., & Campbell, D. F.
of change and transformation in society and in (2012). Creativity economy and a crisis of the
culture. economy? Coevolution of knowledge, innovation,
and creativity, and of the knowledge economy
and knowledge society. Journal of the Knowledge
Economy, 3(1), 1–24.
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(trans. by G. B. Halstead). New York: Science European Psychology, 42(1), 7–97.
Press. Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. London:
Potts, J. D., Hartley, J., Banks, J. A., Burgess, J. E., Jonathan Cape.
Cobcroft, R. S., Cunningham, S. D., & Ward, T. B. (2001). Creative cognition, conceptual
Montgomery, L. (2008). Consumer co-creation combination, and the creative writing of Stephen
and situated creativity. Industry and Innovation, R. Donaldson. American Psychologist, 56(4),
15(5), 459–474. 350–354.
Rhodes, M. (1961). An analysis of creativity. Phi Zittoun, T. & Gillespie, A. (2015). Imagination in
Delta Kappan, 42, 305–311. Human and Cultural Development. London:
Rothenberg, A. (1971). The process of Janusian Routledge.
thinking in creativity. Archives of General Zittoun, T., Gillespie, A., Cornish, F., & Psaltis, C.
Psychiatry, 24, 195–205. (2007). The metaphor of the triangle in theories
Runco, M. A. (2015). A commentary on the social of human development. Human Development,
perspective on creativity. Creativity. Theories – 50(4), pp. 208–229.
Research – Applications, 2(1), 21–31.
Sawyer, R. K. (1995). Creativity as mediated action: A
Further Reading
comparison of improvisional performance and
product creativity. Mind, Culture, and Activity, Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in Society: The
2(3), 172–191. Development of Higher Psychological Processes
Shweder, R. (1990). Cultural psychology – What is it? (ed. by M. Cole, V. John-Steiner, S. Scribner
In J. Stigler, R. Shweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), & E. Souberman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative University Press.
10 Symbolic Resources and
Imagination in the Dynamics
of Life
Tania Zittoun
The notion of “symbolic resources” was pro- the emotional and semiotic aspects of the pro-
posed out of the need to account for the fact cesses involved (Zittoun, 2004a, 2004b, 2008,
that when people internalize specific artifacts, 2011a); and attempts have been made to confirm
these maintain their power of semiotic guid- the model quantitatively (Grossen, Baucal, &
ance (Zittoun, 2001). Although the term had Zittoun, 2010; Märtsin, Chang, & Obst, 2016;
been used before in the social sciences, a first Stankovic, Baucal, & Zittoun, 2009). Finally the
attempt to systematically explore the semiotic theorization of symbolic resources has joined a
functions, consequences and conditions of use more general theory of imagination, as shown
of symbolic resources was then started. Over here (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a, 2016). Hence,
the past fifteen years the heuristic power of that today, “symbolic resources” appears as a con-
notion has become clear through many studies. cept, located within a broader sociocultural
Uses of symbolic resources have been studied in theory of the life course which underlies the role
youth transitions (Märtsin, Chang, & Obst, 2016; of imagination in development.
Zittoun, 2006b), in the access to the army (Hale, This chapter is therefore constructed as fol-
2008), in young parenthood (Zittoun, 2004b), lows: first, it sketches a sociocultural psychology
in migration (de Abreu & Hale, 2011; Greco of life course and its challenges. Second, it
Morasso & Zittoun, 2014; Kadianaki, 2010; presents imagination as concept for sociocultural
Mehmeti, 2013), at war (Zittoun et al., 2008), or psychology, and third, symbolic resources. For
more generally in the life course (Martin & Gille- these two sections, a short historical exploration
spie, 2010; Perret-Clermont, 2015; Zittoun, 2003, is proposed and then a model is outlined. The
2012a; Zittoun et al., 2013). Interpersonal social fourth section puts these two concepts at work
dynamics involved in uses of symbolic resources and shows how they participate to the definition
have been explored at school (Hale & de Abreu, of the life course and societal change, but also
2010; Zittoun, 2014b; Zittoun & Grossen, 2012), that these can be constrained. The last section of
in experimental situations (Breux, Miserez Cap- the chapter puts forward further theoretical and
eros, & Perret-Clermont, 2013; Cerchia, 2009; methodological questions.
Psaltis, 2011), within musical practice (Diep,
2011), in religious settings (Baucal & Zittoun,
2013; Dahinden & Zittoun, 2013; Zittoun,
10.1 Sociocultural Psychology
2006a), or in parliamentary debates (de Saint-
of the Life Course
Laurent, 2014). Also, theoretical clarification As this volume shows, the sociocultural per-
and expansion have also been brought in (Zittoun spective on human development has been in
& Gillespie, 2013, 2015b), notably to highlight full development since the 1990s. Although a
Symbolic Resources and Imagination in the Dynamics of Life 179
relatively marginal domain within psychology, crises, and ruptures have been the locus of many
it has been fortunate enough to be carried on scholars interested in the life course (Bühler,
persistently by scholars and their groups in 1973; Erikson, 1959; Konopásek, 2000; Levy
institutions that could preserve such approaches et al., 2005; Schuetz, 1945a, 1945b; Sherif &
and allow its authors to explore it further, both Sherif, 1965; Zittoun, 2006b; Zittoun & Gille-
theoretically and empirically, in dialogue with the spie, 2015c). It is precisely looking at these
history of sciences and other disciplines in the studies that it progressively became clear that,
social sciences and beyond. In very broad lines from a sociocultural perspective, people’s cul-
(but see this volume), sociocultural psychol- tural and imaginary lives play a core role. It is
ogy has the project to describe and understand often through imagining how life could be that
the processes whereby humans develop in and we initiate change and decide to transform our
through their worlds of culture, and how in lives, and it is usually when our ordinary lives
doing so, they become unique and participate are disrupted that we have to find new ways of
in the transformation of culture. Sociocultural handling things, explore alternatives, remind us
psychology can thus be understood as a project of the past, or explore what could be (Zittoun &
for a general psychology that starts with a core Valsiner, 2016). In effect, within the permanent
assumption – the cultural nature of human life as movability of our lives, people also need some
we know it (Valsiner, 2014; Vygotsky, 1971). sense of sameness – what Erikson used to call
A sociocultural approach to the life course integrity and continuity – in which imagination
in addition focuses on the trajectories of living, plays a core role to allow change and maintain
on how people develop as the move through sameness, to feed forward and live backward, to
historico-culturally defined time-spaces. It pays anchor and to explore. And, as we will see, sym-
special attention to the fact that how people bolic resources are precisely culturally cultivated
experience time spaces does not strictly corre- techniques for guiding imagination.
spond to “objective,” physical, or, more simply,
to a third-person perspective view. Hence, if time
10.2 Imagination as
can be physically described as irreversible and as
Sociocultural Concept
people have to be seen as located in one and only
one sociocultural, time-space location, human In the history of humanities and social sciences
experience is different. People can imagine the (Geisteswissenschaften) and psychology, one
future and the past, feel the layers of present recurrent distinction is between the real and
and past experiences in any specific situations, the non-real, the actual and the possible, what
or be located somewhere while hoping to be is immanent or transcendent, what is and what
somewhere else (Brinkmann, 2014; Hviid, 2015; could be, what belongs to human and what
Zittoun et al., 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a, belongs to deities, spirits, or angels. In psy-
2016). The richness of cultural life courses has chology, this articulation has been regularly
been described in terms of people’s engage- addressed under the notion of imagination as
ments, sensemaking, experiences, or interests. opposed to reality. This exclusive opposition cre-
Also, explorations over the past fifteen years (and ates more problems than it solves, and it prevents
to be honest, the past two thousand years) have the apprehension of the role and function of
invited researchers to examine people’s lives imagination in real life. In contrast, imagination
when these seem to be engaged in the usual – and the real are seen as mutually related oppo-
routines, behavioral settings, etc. – as well as sites within a whole (Valsiner, 2015; Valsiner &
in unusual situations. Studies of disruption, Lawrence, 1997; Zittoun et al., 2013).
180 tan ia z ittoun
10.2.1 Imagination as individual imagination and collective culture,

Forgotten Concept was based on the assumption of a continuum of
human experience, from its more intimate and
Interestingly, since the beginning of the study of unrealistic to those responding to the demands
the relation between human psyche and culture, of the socially shared reality, in its embodied
one recurrent theme appears: that of the role and emotional aspects. He developed a semiotic
of arts, fiction, and, more generally, imagina- understanding of psyche. Finally, his approach to
tion in human life (Kant, Vico, James, Freud, theories and facts could be seen as pragmatist or,
Vygotsky, etc.). In philosophy, the question has at least, empiricist (Zittoun, 2011b, 2015a). In
for a long time been about the status of these his view, imagination is a dynamic reassembling
things we “see” when they are not there, that is traces of experiences of different modalities –
to say, in the “mind’s eye.” The debates, from the sounds, images, tastes – from different layers of
Greek to the seventeenth and eighteenth-century our experience – recent past, marking situation
philosophers, organized the field in a series of from the past, myths we know or arts we expe-
oppositions: is imagination reproductive (only rience, or social representation we met – and
things we know appear in mind) or can it be recombining these in a unique way, according
genuinely creative? Is it based only on a visual to some emotional-experiential configuration.
experience or can it be based on other aspects of Freud devised a “grammar” of such a recombina-
our experience? And after all, is the fact that we tion, known as the “dream work,” and included
imagine (which is often full of emotions and dif- the processes of displacement, condensation,
ferent from reality) a primitive or childish form figuration, and synthesis. Finally, Freud rightly
of thinking that should be replaced by reason, or identified that imagination allows us to live some
is there something that is specific to our humanity experiences on a plane that have emotional con-
in it (Jørgensen, 2018; Marková, 2016; Zittoun sequences, yet none in the socially shared reality:
& Gillespie, 2016)? In that realm, Giambattisto one can imagine punching one’s manager, feel
Vico was one of the few to consider imagination the relief it may bring, yet while not touching
as fundamental in the ways in which humans the actual manager (Freud, 1940, 1957, 2001a,
constructed their environment and created cul- 2001b).
ture as we know it (Marková, 2016; Zittoun, Well versed in Freud’s work and also very
2015b; see also Chapter 22, this volume). interested in the arts, Lev Vygotsky proposed an
The same division could be found in psy- unequalled conceptualization of imagination at
chology. If imagination, or as it was long called, the articulation of human psyche and the social –
fantasy, interested some fields of psychology in this time emphasizing not only the cultural nature
the eighteenth century, this was soon forgotten of the material with which we imagine, but also
with the development of so-called scientific psy- the cultural outcomes of imagining. Vygotsky
chology (Cornejo, 2015). Only psychoanalysis thus proposed:
took the time to consider seriously what people
do when they do not reason or are not engaged When, in my imagination, I draw myself a mental
picture of, let us say, the future life of humanity
with what their community considers as reality –
under socialism or a picture of life in the distant
in daydream, night dreams, artistic activities,
past and the struggle of prehistoric man, in both
and creation. Looking at extreme cases where cases I am doing more than reproducing the
fantasies impeded human action – as in neuro- impressions I once happened to experience. I am
sis – Freud actually built a theory of fantasy, not merely recovering the traces of stimulation that
or imagination. His model, accounting both for reached my brain in the past. I never actually saw
this remote past, or this future; however, I still have tion of the cultural world that allows their very
my own idea, image, or picture of what they were existence (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016; Zittoun &
or will be like. All human activity of this type, Glăveanu, 2018).
activity that results not in the reproduction of
previously experienced impressions or actions but
in the creation of new images or actions is an 10.2.2 Imagination as an
example of this second type of creative or Integrative, Sociocultural Concept
combinatorial behavior. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 9)
In order to reconceptualzse imagination as a
He elaborates further that imagination is the sociocultural process, we need to redefine the
ability to combine elements in a new way and old distinction between real and non-real. We
that this ability “is an important component of thus establish a theoretical distinction between
absolutely all aspects of cultural life, enabling experiences that occur in a given socially “shared
artistic, scientific, and technical creation alike” reality,” from those that are in a given historico-
(Vygotsky, 2004, p. 9). Although Vygotsky cultural space, socially acknowledged as “non-
inspired studies on children’s play as well as cre- real.” The “socially shared reality” in a given
ativity, his proposition – to see imagination as the societal context groups the material and social
process allowing to conceive the future of human construction of certain settings by following a
life under socialism or our prehistoric past – certain number of physical and social rules. In
has received little attention (for an overview, see most occidental societies, basic rules about real-
Singer & Singer, 2005). Contemporary psychol- ity include temporal succession, causalities, and
ogy has mainly reduced imagination to a process certain setting-specific rules (what some have
eventually leading to cognition or as one of its called scripts, e.g., Strauss & Quinn, 1998, such
variations as, for instance, in hypothetical reason- as a dinner at a restaurant, watching a film, or a
ing (Bogdan, 2013; Byrne, 2005; Harris, 2000). classroom discussion). Within it, each person can
Only social sciences and anthropology have individually engage in different spheres of experi-
conceived imagination in their social and collec- ence: being mainly engaged with what is actually
tive dimensions – as in the sociological or the going on and respecting these rules (e.g., order-
geographical imagination (Harvey, 2006; Mills, ing food, thanking the waitress, unfolding one’s
1959/2000). For these approaches, imagination napkin while waiting), which we have called a
enables either social scientists or groups of proximal sphere of experience; or being engaged
people to see beyond the limit of their direct in any other, distant experience in which one or
apprehension. This is also the case in theoretical many of these rules can be suspended (thinking
imagination, or when laypeople develop new about yesterday’s discussion, imagining the taste
imaginations for themselves or their commu- of the food to come, wondering how it is to eat
nities thanks to new media and transnational in another country), which we have called distal
movement (Appadurai, 1996). Hence, for these experiences (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a, 2016).
approaches, imagination is a process or product Based on these distinctions, imagination can be
of collective activity. defined as the process of temporarily disengaging
From a sociocultural perspective, imagination from the here and now of a proximal sphere of
can be considered as a type of psychological experience (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a).
process, with origins, guidance, and outcomes in This temporary disengagement can be further
the social and cultural world. Our claim is that described as a sequence of imagining: first,
it actually designates the very process by which something triggers this disengagement (bore-
humans actively participate to the transforma- dom, surprise, cultural guidance); second, the
182 tan ia z ittoun
Figure 10.1 Loop of imagination in a three-dimensional space.
person “loops” into a distal experience; and the cat? The question then becomes, in either
finally, he or she reengages in a proximal sphere case, what are the resources used for imagining:
of experience, now slightly changed by this expe- personal traces of experiences, pictures, stories
rience, which may have different outcomes – heard about another family’s cat, dream, or nov-
what Vygotsky called “altering the present.” els – all material which is known to enter in the
The “loop of imagination” (Figure 10.1) can work of remembering (Brown & Reavy, 2015)?
be described along three different dimensions, If it is recurrent enough, and it finds a form of
or three vectors: its time orientation, its degree crystallization – one writes down the story, or it
of generalization, and its degree of plausibility is narrated at every family meeting – the cat loop
in a given social and cultural setting (Zittoun & (whether “true” or not) becomes a distal experi-
Gillespie, 2016). Imagining going to the moon ence for each involved person. There is, so to say,
was thus until the 1950s a future oriented, rel- a sphere of experience that can be reactivated
atively abstract, and still relatively implausible by the person who revisits the story about the
idea. Since the 2000s, imagining going to the afternoon when the cat went missing. Of course,
moon is an alternative present, quite likely and the distal experience is always dynamically
quite concrete – it is a matter of having the recreated, yet it has some stability in time.
money or the skills to gain a seat in a rocket. A second example could be that of thinking
The model thus allows grouping many about the future. Anticipating, desiring some-
instances of imagination or, rather, many socio- thing, planning, daydreaming about who we
cultural activities as variations of imagination. could become are loops of imagination oriented
First, for example, a person remembering their toward the future. Again, these require the uses of
childhood is remembering about the past; different resources: one’s own experience, other
remembering one specific occurrence – the sum- people’s recognition of what we can do or exam-
mer when we lost the cat – or a generalized set of ples of what they do, films seen, stories heard of
events – when we had family meetings – makes read, images of magazines and arts, and so on.
it either a concrete, or more general, loop. If the These can be very labile or have some stability
lost cat episode is narrated in a family meeting and thus become distal experiences that become
and nobody confirms its veracity, it makes it projects or plans. Their plausibility is again given
an implausible imagination within that family. by the limits and demands of the setting in which
So perhaps one has only fantasized having lost the person’s sphere of experience takes place.
A third line of examples comes from our l’Isle-Adam, 1886/2000). In some cases, some
various fictional experiences. Playing online groups confer themselves or are given the role of
games, role playing, getting lost in a movie, authorities who control the degree of plausibility
but also enjoying a symphony, a theater play, of others’ imaginings. Hence, visionary scientist
or a contemporary art installation, all demand or philosopher’s imagining can be considered
loops of imagination. Their temporal orientation as implausible by censors, scientific or political
might be less relevant and their generality might authorities – usually because these contest the
vary. In a given social setting, their plausibility rules taken for granted by a given society.1
varies and is partly a matter of genre conven- Let us now go back to the quite banal cases of
tions. Hence, a documentary film is meant to be imagination guided by cultural elements in our
plausible, yet a “fantasy” story not. In terms of everyday life.
resources used, all demands to draw on one’s own
embodied emotions, past art experiences, and
10.3 Symbolic Resources as
personal events. Yet the specificity of this type of
Sociocultural Concept
imagining is the very strong cultural guidance:
having a cultural experience is to have a semioti- Human culture has devised many artifacts to
cally guided experience of imagining. This point expand people’s capacities and power in time
will be specifically addressed in the next section. and space. One range of artifacts are cultural
Two other variations of imagination need elements which allow guided imagination, that
to be considered. One is collective imagina- is, experiences of fiction (e.g., when watching
tion: instances where resources are brought a film) or alternatively belonging to a different,
collectively and the “loop” is co-created or non-mundane reality (e.g., in a ritual) or liminal
shared among people. Typically, children play- experiences (Stenner, 2018). Hence we can
ing together all add material that can become distinguish two main types of cultural elements.
resources for the general play (“say, I was the Books, movies, pieces of art and pictures, are
father,” “say, the cat got lost,” etc.) (Gillespie, made out of semiotic configurations of various
2006b; Hviid & Villadsen, 2018). It is also the codes (musical, graphic, verbal, etc.), bounded by
case in collective situations of task solving, to a material support (Diep, 2011; Zittoun, 2012c,
such an extent that one cannot say who is doing 2013a, 2013b; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2014). Sym-
the imagining – it is a shared experience and a bolic systems such as religion, political, or ethnic
collective emergence (Hilppö et al., 2016). The systems are also organizations of signs, including
other question is that of who has the authority texts or rules of reference, objects and places for
in determining the criterion of plausibility in rituals, and “wardens” or authorities that fix the
a given sociocultural setting. To come back to system’s boundaries (Geertz, 1972; Grossen &
our previous point, imagination demands the Perret-Clermont, 1992; Zittoun, 2006a).
suspension of the rules organizing a given socio- Cultural elements allow people to have cultural
cultural setting. Accordingly, in many cases these experiences: guided experiences where they see,
are consensual, given a state of socially shared feel, hear, embody, through different modalities
knowledge. Hence, most nineteenth-century (touch, view, sound, etc.), and that are not given
European citizens probably did not imagine the by proximal spheres of experiences. Common
mobile phone. Yet some individual, typically cultural experiences include listening to music,
artists or visionary, could, within the same watching a film, enjoying a theatre play, playing
environment, imagine ways to communicate an online game, or participating in a religious
beyond walls and material limitation (e.g., de ritual.
184 tan ia z ittoun
People do not only have cultural experiences. that sense, indeed, symbolic resources are semi-
These semiotically guided experiences can be otic mediations grouped in specific culturally
internalized to some extent; people can then “go defined configurations. Second, the concept was
back” to such experiences, even in the absence of inspired by French anthropology and sociology.
the actual cultural element. People can remember Lévi-Strauss (1966) observed people engaging in
the feeling of a film scene, have a bit of song symbolic bricolage, using bits and pieces of the
coming to mind, or recall some lines of poetry. symbolic and material means available to them to
They can also feel the urge to read again a confer sense to events. Sociologists also empha-
specific scene in a novel, or to pray. In other size the logics of users of cultural goods: people
words, people can partly guide their experience often use new manufactured objects in a very
from within, having internalized the path of their unpredictable way according to their needs and
imagination through actual cultural experiences. the context (Lévi-Strauss, 1966; Perriault, 1989).
In other words, “what has been internalized, is Third, the concept of use has a psychoanalytical
the pattern of experience guided by a semiotic origin in the work of Winnicott (Winnicott, 1968,
configuration; only then, a similar experience 2001; Zittoun, 2013a), who observed the emer-
can be guided from within” (Zittoun & Gillespie, gence of the children’s capacity to “use” their
2015b). Why would they do so? Because these mother, then transitional objects, and then the
guided experiences allow them to do something. potential space of cultural experiences. “Use,”
These can be used as symbolic resources. here, is an emotional investment in an object,
Although the terms of “symbolic resources” which can then acquire some psychic function:
designate a familiar phenomenon, it has only it externally supports and transforms feeling
recently been the object of a systematic the- and thinking. The concept of symbolic resource
oretical enquiry (Zittoun et al., 2003, 2008; carries echoes from these various anchorages.
Zittoun & Gillespie, 2013; Zittoun & Grossen,
2012). As concept, “symbolic resources” aim at
10.3.2 Defining Symbolic
offering a theoretical understanding of people’s
Resources
uses of cultural artifacts, or semiotic tools, as
developmental resources, especially when they A person using a symbolic resource is a person
face new, unpredictable situations. using a novel, a film, a picture, a song, or a ritual,
to address another situation in her everyday life.
This person is thus not simply having the cultural
10.3.1 A Very Short History of the
experience of watching the film or hearing the
Concept of Symbolic Resources
music, or even of only remembering it: she has
The concept of symbolic resources is, first of all, that experience, or remembers it, in relationship
rooted in cultural psychology as it has developed to something else, located in her social world or
over the past thirty years, mostly in the Anglo- in her inner life. This aboutness is an intention in
Saxon world (Bruner, 1990, 2003; Cole, 1996; the most elementary way (Brentano, 1995) and
Valsiner, 1987, 1998; Wertsch, 1998), where does not need to be a conscious goal orientation.
it is an offspring of the idea of psychological For example, when Paul comes back from work
mediation promoted by Vygotsky (Toomela, feeling tense and irascible, and immediately
2015; Vygotsky, 1971, 1975, 1986). It follows listens to his preferred band, he is using the
the distinction between tools – mediation that music as a symbolic resource to modify his
acts on the world – and signs – cultural mediation mood and, possibly, to prepare himself for a
that act on minds (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2013). In nice evening with Julie. After having been told
that she would have to spend three months in is to language (Bakhtin, 1996; Wertsch, 1998),
Spain, Julie entertains herself by reading Spanish or what an used “instrument,” is to a potential
novels, watching Spanish films, and developing “tool” (Rabardel, 2001). Second, the notion has
an interest for Spanish music. Julie is using these also to be distinguished from that of a cultural
various cultural elements as symbolic resources scheme, or model, as these are meant to organize
to develop some representations about the Spain canonical situations in a smooth an automatic
awaiting her, and to envisage possible futures. way (see, for example, Strauss & Quinn, 1998,
Hence, using a symbolic resource is something on marriage), whereas symbolic resources are by
we all do, at times in a very unaware way – definition used “out of place.” Third, we propose
when we start to hum “I’m singing in the rain” to limit the concept “symbolic resources” to
because some pleasant idea popped in our mind designate the use of semiotic constructs that have
while we were walking through a spring shower, a clear delimitation and demand an imaginary
or sometimes, in a more explicit way, when we experience; in contrast, we thus propose to say
discuss romantic films that we have seen with that fragments of social representations or media
friends and relate them to personal events. There discourse are used as semiotic resources, not
are three important conditions for a cultural symbolic resources (contrary to an earlier defini-
element to be considered a symbolic resource. tion; Zittoun et al., 2003). Finally, a perspective
focused on the persons’ unique use of artifacts
1 A person must be using such a cultural element
radically different from cultural, social, or cog-
(e.g., a picture, a song, a film) or part of such
nitive approaches to films, the mass media, or
a symbolic system (e.g., a religious metaphor)
television; it does not refer to analyses in terms
with some intention, that is, in relationship to
of “gratifications,” “effects,” or “influences” of
something that is at least partially exterior to
media (e.g., Blumer, 1933; Young, 2000).
that cultural element (its “aboutness”).
2 The notion is restrained to uses of symbolic
resources in situations normally not contained 10.3.3 A Model for Analyzing uses
by the cultural element, that is, beyond the of Symbolic Resources
immediate cultural value or meaning of that
Studying people’s uses of symbolic resources
cultural element (e.g., Julie does not listen to
offers an interesting access for investigating pro-
the song for its melody, but to feel closer to
cesses of change in their lives. People are indeed
Paul).
most likely to use cultural elements as symbolic
3 Additionally, the notion of symbolic resource
resources when they face situations that question
refers only to the cultural elements that require
the taken for granted or one of many of their
an imaginary experience – the creation of a
spheres of experience. What are the semiotic
sphere of experience beyond the here and now
dynamics through which symbolic resources
of the socially shared reality (the “musical
will help the person to explore alternatives,
space” of a song; the sacred space of a ritual;
reduce uncertainty, and to open new possibili-
the vicarious experience enabled by fiction).
ties? Different uses of symbolic resources can be
First, a symbolic resource is not just a cultural described along three dimensions, related to the
object that can potentially be used as resource; modalities of the guided imagination they allow.
it is the fact of being used that turns a cultural Mainly, uses of symbolic resources can orient
device into a symbolic resource (Zittoun & imagination along time, it can become more or
Gillespie, 2013). A symbolic resource is to an less generalized, and it can allow more or less
artifact or symbolic system what an utterance plausible imagination. In addition, it can have
186 tan ia z ittoun
different intentions, that is, aim at different types mutually dependent. While traveling, the tourist
of outcomes and because of this become more or may also have “their” past version of Little
less generative. This also implies that, although Buddha probably transformed by the trip and
cultural elements have stable forms, symbolic opening other futures; and young people quoting
resources are dynamic and transformed by their films as they live go back and forth between
(often repeated) uses. reality and imaginary, in the past and what is
about to come; their enduring present is a dense
fabric bound between past and immediate future.
10.3.4 Time Orientation of
Symbolic Resources
10.3.5 Level of Mediation of
Although cultural elements’ duration unfolds in
Symbolic Resources
an extended present, symbolic resources guide
imagination which escapes the irreducibility of Psychic life is possible through semiotic medi-
time. As with all semiotic dynamics, uses of ation, or symbolic elaboration, that turns per-
symbolic resources have a location within the ceptions, impressions, affects, intuition, actions,
flux of time (Valsiner, 2001). For one part, cul- and desires into thinkable thoughts or sharable
tural experiences always require some knitting experiences. It is through semiotic elaboration
of past and future in the present. In order to that these experiences can then be linked to one’s
“understand” the cultural experience, one has memories and understanding, that is, become
to draw on memories of past impressions and part of semiotic dynamics and thinking. Semiotic
feeling to nourish images, words, and melodies; elaboration is partly done through the mediation
one also has to use cultural knowledge (about of our knowledge and memories, but can also
narrative, musical, or cinematographic genres) to be supported by the semiotic environments; as,
create some expectations about what will come for example, when one realizes being sad while
next. For the other part, the aboutness of the use, listening to sad music. The music, not memories,
which is also located in time, can be detached provides a semiotic configuration that enables
from these temporalities. One can see a film set distancing from sadness. One of the dimensions
in Paris, and remember one’s own past trip to on which loops of imagination vary is that of
Paris. Before travelling to Ladakh, tourists watch their generality: for example, the imagining
films such as Little Buddha that enable them to of eating strawberries is quite concrete, while
shape a representation of their future (Gillespie, imagining Sehnsucht – this rather abstract nos-
2006a). Finally, symbolic resources can be used talgic feeling coined in German language – is
to support a current, enduring experience. The more abstract or general because it is based on
movie The Dreamers (Bertolucci, 2004) follows a multiplicity of other experiences. It is because
a love triangle over a couple of weeks in the Paris cultural experiences provide us with the external
of the 1960s during the glorious years of the means to support such an elaboration of expe-
French cinema. The young people are continu- rience that symbolic resources can be “used”
ously watching films together, quoting these, and at all. Symbolic resources can thus enable one
playing out some of their scenes. Films – and to take a more or less distant position toward
especially Jules et Jim (1962), a classical love one’s immediate and embodied experience. They
triangle – are here symbolic resources through can thus bring various “levels” of distancing,
which the young people are creating what is each progressively less dependent on the specific
shown to be the enduring presence of that love experienced situation or of a more general situ-
affair. Of course, these time orientations are ation (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2013; Valsiner, 1998,
2007; Werner & Kaplan, 1963; Zittoun, 2006b). lover”). At this third level, the world and herself
Following Valsiner’s propositions, four levels of become classifiable and organized.
distancing can be proposed. At a fourth level, symbolic resources can be
A person can be in a state of diffuse feelings used to define and clarify higher-level rules and
and impressions – what Valsiner (2007) calls a principles or commitments. Such commitments
field. At a first level of mediation, the symbolic have the power to organize categories (level 3),
resource can group those immediate, embodied or to sustain specific actions (level 2). Hence,
experiences, reflect them, and enable a person Emma Bovary seems to have used her romantic
to identify them. Hence, Emma Bovary and her reading to develop the overarching principle that
lover are watching the sky on the boat back home “life is not worth living without passion,” which
after a romantic escape: leads her to see herself as a martyr (a category
to define self at level 3) and to commit suicide (a
The moon rose, and they greeted it with no lack of specific conduct at level 2).
phrases, finding the planet melancholy and full of
At each level, thus, the semiotic media-
poetry. She even began to sing: “Un soir, t’en
tors offered by symbolic resources meet some
souviens-t-il? Nous voguions,”2 etc. (Flaubert,
1857/2007, p. 279)
aspect of Emma’s experience, and re-present
it in a transformed, more distant way: from an
Here, Emma uses this song as symbolic resource embodied state to contained and fixed emotional
to contain, reflect, and fix the diffuse melancholy, patterns; from these patterns to a labeled situ-
sadness, and anxiety she shares with her lover ation; from the labeled situation to categories
and which is diffracted onto the landscape. It grouping various experiences of self and the
mediates a first level of reflection that enables world; and from categories to orienting values.
the acknowledgment of a state of experience. Symbolic resources provide such distancing pos-
At a second level, semiotic mediations offered sibilities because they create a distal, imaginary
by a symbolic resource can help to identify sphere where personal, unique experiences meet
and label a specific current state of mind or culturally elaborated versions of other people’s
situation – a point-like mediation (Valsiner, comparable experiences as signs can, more
2007). Hence, Emma Bovary finds herself in generally, integrate first person and third person
an incomprehensible state of exaltation after perspectives (Chapter 13, this volume). Again,
her first intimate meeting with a man; she then using different levels of distancing of symbolic
recalls romantic novels she used to read, which resources transforms one’s relationship to cul-
make her realize: she has a lover! She thus tural elements and thus one’s symbolic resources:
articulates in a symbolic manner her experience, these may gain more depths, or progressively
which makes it thinkable and communicable. use their power, leading to other ones (Zittoun,
At a third level, symbolic resources can be 2007b) (see also Section 10.3.8).
used to define class or categories of conduct
or events, or attributes of self. Again, Flaubert
10.3.6 Plausibility
makes a point at showing us that Emma Bovary
has used all her religious and romantic readings Because uses of symbolic resources are instances
to build a distinction between “friendly, but of imagination guided by cultural elements, there
boring marital relationships,” and “fascinating, degree of plausibility depends on the acceptance
exciting, adulterous passions.” On the basis of and status of that very cultural element in a
these two categories, Emma aims at defining her- given community or sociocultural setting. If
self as belonging to the second type (“passionate one uses one James Bond film – say, Skyfall
188 tan ia z ittoun
(2012) – as symbolic resource to imagine that used to understand a contemporary historical or

one could recover a former physical condition, political world situation. Watching South Park
the imagination is both shareable (many people (1997) can be used as resource to develop a new
know about it) and plausible. In effect, although perspective on current politics. Hence, symbolic
most people are unlikely to become MI6 agents, resources are cultural elements which, when
the very status of the cultural element as shared used intentionally, become about something else
fiction makes it available to be used as a partly (Zittoun et al., 2003). During uses, these about-
ready-made metaphor for physical recovery. ness, level of mediation, and time orientation can
of course change; these changes of modalities
of use are likely to be actual transformation of
10.3.7 Aboutness of
the symbolic resources for the person (that is, the
Symbolic Resources
internalized version of a cultural element or the
Finally, if imagination is often gratuitous, it can sense it has for him or her) (see also Chapter 24
also have outcomes in a given situated activity in and Chapter 30, this volume). This can also lead
one’s life trajectory or at a more collective level – to further resources, as we will now see.
yet this outcome is not necessary planned ahead.
In contrast, most uses of symbolic resources have
10.3.8 Generativity of
a conscious or unconscious intention or direction
Symbolic Resources
of use or aboutness. In effect, a cultural element
that a person uses as a symbolic resource is The tridimensional model artificially separates
always put in relationship with something that various modalities of uses of symbolic resources.
exceeds the cultural experience it offers and is In fact, people using symbolic resources usually
related to the experience of the person in her combine dimensions and modalities of uses. The
world. outcomes of such combinations can be extremely
As with other cultural tools, when a symbolic diverse. Emma Bovary’s uses of symbolic
resource is used, it can produce meaning or resources are particularly dramatic: although they
action about self, about others, and/or about first open alternative lives (the young countryside
the socially shared reality. A novel can be used woman lives new adventures), they quickly bring
“about” self when it is used to deepen one’s her to a point where she has no other option but
understanding of oneself or experience new to kill herself (at the end of the novel, she has
aspects of self or change oneself. Jack London lost her lover and ruined her husband; inspired
narrates the story of Martin Eden who aimed at by her readings, she drinks poison). Yet uses of
educating himself and becoming a writer through resources can also be highly generative. A gen-
patient and systematic readings; fiction becomes erative use of resources usually moves across a
here a means to change his own identity and his wide range of modality of uses. For example,
social position (London, 1909/1994). A novel Julia, a fan of a British pop band, the Manic Sreet
can be used as a way to connect, to cooperate, or Preachers, uses their songs as resources to soothe
to share some experience with others – such as her in a mourning period (about self); she then
when two friends discuss their readings, which uses this music as a means to meet other fans
will then become part of their relationship. (about others). Also, she realizes that the lyrics
Famous literary or philosophical friendships, of that band have some political meaning; trying
such as the one between Jean-Paul Sartre and to understand them, she starts to see the world
Simone De Beauvoir exemplify such uses of in a new way (about the social world). The uses
symbolic resources. A symbolic resource can be also vary on the time perspective: Julia first uses
the songs, that speak about poor English regions, otic guidance, to detach from the here and now
to think about the place where she grew up (past and anticipate others’ moves (Trevarthen, 2012;
orientation), before using them for making plans Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016); similarly, infant and
for her future (which professional position might very young children’s humor can be seen as the
bring her to improve this region). The songs capacity to circle out and expect, if not explore,
finally enable here to progressively distance her- things to come (Reddy, 2008). The emergence
self from her experience. The sad melodies first of the capacity of using symbolic resources also
contain and reflect her sad and fuzzy feelings develops in early interactions through regular
(level 1); she then realizes that the lyrics seem patterns of shared and culturally defined actions
to name her feelings and re-present them to her with adults, progressively internalized by the
(level 2); the lyrics also give her a position in the child, that allow qualitative changes in her pos-
world: she is a revolted person, the world con- sible thinking and actions in the world (Lyra &
tains injustices (level 3); finally, they bring her to Valsiner, 1998; Moro & Rodriguez, 1998; Nel-
define political values that will guide her actions son, 1996, 2007). To summarize these dynamics,
(level 4). At each of these changes of modality of a semiotic prism was proposed (Figure 10.2;
uses, Julia picks up new symbolic resources (nov- see also Zittoun, 2006b; Zittoun et al., 2007).
els or poems mentioned in the lyrics) to support The prism expresses a topological configuration:
her moves. These uses of resources are highly the fact that symbolic resources demand the
generative: they bring her to new transitions and establishment by a person, of a relation between
open up new possible situations of choices and a given cultural element and its socially shared
uses of resources (Zittoun, 2006b, 2007b). meaning, and the personal sense it has for him
or her – this double relation always taking place
in relation to social others. It is a topological
10.4 The Study of Symbolic
configuration because none of its poles (e.g.,
Resources and Imagination in
sense, self) are fixed points. Especially, personal
the Life of People and Societies
sense is dynamic and evolves from a vague
In this section, I now put at work the sociocultural emotional field to life philosophies; similarly,
concepts of symbolic resource and imagination the other can be one person associated to a first
to show their participation to the life course, vision of a film, but replaced by others with
but also to social and cultural transformation. I time. Hence, the general topology of the prism
finally explore some constraints on these as well is preserved although it can be transformed and
as one way to see the emancipatory power of evolve (Brown & Reavey, 2015; Lewin, 1936).
imagination. Ontogenetically, this prism includes the infant,
a state of the world, a reflecting parent, and a
symbol with which the parent will reflect the
10.4.1 Symbolic Resources and
child’s recognition of the state of the world
Imagination in the Life Course
(Fonagy et al., 2005; Green, 2005). Basic sym-
The capacity to imagine and to use symbolic bolic abilities are fundamental for later uses of
resources both develop early on in people’s lives. symbolic resources. It is also quite likely that
They are linked to the mastery of the symbolic later uses of symbolic resources will emerge
capacity, but demand specific type of interac- within similar interactive pattern. In short, the
tions. As shown elsewhere, imagination grows transformation of cultural experiences into
in very elementary interactions in which infants usable symbolic resources is likely to occur when
and then children are able, through specific semi- two persons interact on a regular basis about a
190 tan ia z ittoun
riences (for a child’s use of a story as symbolic

resource, see Miller et al., 1993). The devel-
opmental hypothesis proposed here is thus that
the internalization of such interpersonal semi-
otic dynamics, or semiotic prisms, will enable
Figure 10.2 Semiotic prism. further uses of cultural elements as symbolic
resources (Zittoun, 2010; Zittoun & Gillespie,
symbolic object and come to an acknowledg- 2015b).
ment of the shared meaning it designates (the It is likely that in good enough conditions,
shared and/or objective referent) and a mutual and independently of socioeconomic factors,
acknowledgment of its personal sense, that is, people develop a way to relate to stories, images,
what it means/feels for each of them person- and symbolic objects, and to link these with
ally (within each person’s internal, embodied their experiences in the world. Social or cultural
representational and emotional world). differences can affect what will become a sym-
When parents read a bedtime story to their bolic resource – a traditional tale, one’s preferred
child or sing her a lullaby when she is anxious, videotape, a painting in a museum – but not how
they create such a temporary configuration of the these will be used. It is interesting to observe
semiotic prism (see Figure 10.2) encompassing that, although children or people might be
them, the child, the story or the lullaby, and the exposed to the same available cultural elements
emotional state of the child (reflected by the in a given social and cultural environment, the
parents, perceived by the child, adjusting in a fact that these might become symbolic resource,
feedback loop). The child who then asks for her and how these might be used, is highly variable
preferred lullaby or bedtime story is already a and personal. People might use the same element
user of a symbolic resource: she uses that ele- for different uses or might use different elements
ment as a way to regulate her emotions and open comparably. Some highly socially promoted
an imaginary space in the comforting and medi- cultural elements might not be used at all as
ating presence of her parents. The parents might, symbolic resource by some, and some unlikely
or might not, acknowledge the function of that cultural element might be life turning for others
use. The child might then be confronted with a (Zittoun, 2004a, 2006b, 2013a). As a whole,
multitude of such semiotic experiences in which trajectories of uses of symbolic resources are
the parents might be replaced by other adults highly personal and unique, and constitute also
or peers; hence the pole “other” of the semiotic the person’s unique melodies of living (Zittoun,
prism is changing, until it might become a gener- 2007a, 2010, 2016b; Zittoun & Grossen, 2012;
alized Other pole; the mediating position of these Zittoun et al., 2013).
others or the generalized others will eventually In the life course, the outcome of symbolic
be internalized by the child. Mothers singing resources can have short or long-standing conse-
rhymes to their babies or telling them traditional quences. Any daily situation might be enriched
tales, fathers supporting their child’s reading by using symbolic resources: looking at a land-
taste, parents commenting on their children’s scape and recalling a particular painting which
television watching, teachers accompanying infuses our contemplation and quoting a film
children in their discovery of stories, pictures, or character in a conversation to underline some
the Bible, can support such semiotic dynamics. exchange are such examples. Similarly, in many
Eventually, these mediations and the presence situations we loop back and forth from the ongo-
of others will be internalized, and the child will ing action to some distal experiences to solve
take a progressive distancing from cultural expe- a task, bake a cake, or write a letter. Similarly,
loops of imagination can enrich a given activity, more reflective, or, also, more diffused. At times
such as when children imagine various scenarios these can develop into personal life philoso-
to solve a problem in the classroom or when phies – but, again, some may be more generative
a sportsman imagines complex movements to than others. Some longitudinal analyses indi-
guide his or her action. Imagination and pat- cate these developments (de Saint-Laurent &
terns of guided imagination, as in symbolic Zittoun, 2017; Gillespie et al., 2008; Gillespie
resources, enrich our daily life, add thickness to & Zittoun, 2013, 2015; Zittoun, 2007a, 2014a,
our exchange, and create the cultural and per- 2016a, 2016b; Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015;
sonal semiotic harmonics that resonate with our Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a), but many more have
daily conduct and that constitute the fabric of our to be done to show the diversity of developmental
lives. Yet, imagination and symbolic resources trajectories and the role of imagination and uses
are useful to question such easy-going, flowing, of symbolic resources.
and taken for granted moments.
In the longer term, uses of symbolic resources
10.4.2 Symbolic Resources
can thus play an important role in the orientation
and Imagination in
of life trajectories, first because these are often
Sociocultural Change
used in periods of transitions (Fuhrer, 2003;
Habermas, 2012; Young, 2000; Zagórska & People use symbolic resources and imagination
Tarnowski, 2004; Zittoun, 2007b, 2014a) and, in specific situations, and this has consequences
second, because their use might create rup- in the short term and for their life trajectories;
tures that lead into their following transitions yet these uses also take place within the texture
(Rosenberg, 1993; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). of social relationships, institutions, and, more
In addition, imagination plays an important role generally, cultural and social environments.
in exploring possible present and future alter- Thus, imagining and uses of symbolic resources
natives to our living and thus guide its course can participate not only in psychological devel-
both in real and imaginary ways (Zittoun & opment, but also in social and cultural change.
Valsiner, 2016). This is the case as much in chil- First, as people internalize symbolic resources
dren’s and young people’s lives as in adult and and imagination, drawing on a variety of
elderly persons’ lives (Hviid & Villadsen, 2018; resources, they might end up externalizing
Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015; Zittoun & various semiotic forms – from the informal eval-
Sato, 2018). uation of a film to the more expert production of
A final issue is how uses of symbolic resources a new cultural element. Hence, writing a theater
and imagination develop along the life course. play, composing a piece of music, or painting
Our hypothesis is that, as with any other com- an Easter egg can be seen as the creation of a
petencies and abilities, these can develop over new cultural element on the basis of their cre-
time – or immediately. Eventually, as people ators’ imagining and uses of symbolic resources
develop other skills and fields of expertise and (Glăveanu, 2014; Klempe, 2018; Tanggaard,
engage in various imagination and cultural expe- 2015; Zittoun, 2016d; Zittoun & Rosenstein,
riences, they can draw on more resources and 2018), elements that then can become resources
these can also be used more or less intentionally to others.
or reflectively (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010b; Second, these new externalizations can thus
Zittoun, 2004b, 2010; Zittoun et al., 2008). Uses create collective trajectories of imagination, from
can become more differentiated, especially if it individual creation to shared utopia, until new
goes with formal mastery of specific semiotic social realities are formed. Hence, the story of
systems; they can be more generalized, at times the moon conquest can be seen as a trajectory
192 tan ia z ittoun
going from the first Greek or Roman represen- having access to TV series or images representing
tations of Selene, the goddess of the moon, into life on the other side of the planet allow billions
representations of Selenites; the invention of the of people to use these as symbolic resources
telescope in the sixteenth century allowed authors to imagine new possible futures for themselves
to develop new stories, depicting the moon as a or their children, leading to major societal
place similar to earth, inhabited by the type of transformations and movements of population
creatures imagined at that time; at the end of the (Appadurai, 1996). Finally, the same dynamics
nineteenth century, Jules Verne drew on these are at the heart of any local or collective utopia
stories and his knowledge of cannons developed (or dystopias). Reversely, however, social, eco-
at that time to imagine and share his stories of nomic, or political powers that aim at preventing
visits to the moon; these inspired further shared change have always controlled the production
imagination; among others, Hergé’s Tintin trips and diffusion of cultural elements, mainly in
to the moon in the 1950s, this time propelled by a an attempt to channel individual and collective
V-20 shape rocket. Only ten years later, scientists imagination in a specific direction only – the one
fed by these stories could use the techniques reinforcing their power (Marková, 2018).
finally available to them to enable the first trip
to the moon, with men in costumes looking just
10.4.3 Constraints in the use
like those of Tintin’s (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016,
of Symbolic Resources
pp. 114–118). In such cases, then, the imagina-
and Imagination
tion of some people, nourished and guided by
the cultural elements available used as symbolic Because uses of symbolic resources and imag-
resources, allowed the creation of new cultural ination are always culturally, institutionally, and
elements available to others. Over time, these socially located practices, these can also be
cultural elements continue to be internalized, constrained socially and culturally.
feed the imagination of many who, eventu- For economical, geographical, political, or
ally, given their other resources and expertise, social reasons, a person’s access to cultural ele-
externalize and create new cultural and material ments might be reduced. Yet it seems that socioe-
realities. In this sense, the trip to the moon can be conomic factors do not predict how symbolic
seen as resulting from a distributed, or collective, resources are used (Livingstone, 2005). Rather,
imagination whose outcome affected the lives of it is important to question the settings in which
many as well as the history of a society. the person’s sphere of experience is embedded.
A further example of collective imagination These might indeed support legitimate or prohibit
based on the uses of similar cultural elements by uses of cultural elements as symbolic resources.
many who contribute themselves to new cultural Hence, we have observed that certain class-
elements and which are resources for further room dynamic allow pupils to explore the
imagining that eventually lead to major social personal sense of books they read in class, and
changes is that of any collective movement. It is not only their relevance to a school task. Using
the case for revolutions, especially when these the prism model, we have shown that their pos-
appear as “people led” – for example, the Russian sible uses as resources depend on the teachers’
Revolution, the end of apartheid (Engeström, work of acknowledging that the teacher as well as
1999), the Velvet Revolution in the Czech Repub- the students can engage personal sense-making
lic (Zittoun, 2018), and the Arab Spring (Wag- and imagining guided by a book, even though
oner, Jensen, & Oldmeadow, 2012). Globaliza- the teachers have more expertise and knowledge
tion has also been said to allow new imaginings: (Zittoun, 2014b, 2015c). Therefore, learning to
Social norms
Social norms
Shared discourses
Cultural artifacts/objects
Figure 10.3 A star-like model.
use symbolic resources occur in interpersonal We have also tried to sketch more generally
situations, located in institutional settings, which how, in any situations, a person is taken at the
thus can support or hinder students’ engagement heart of multiple streams of determination: social
in more personal, imaginary experiences, and norms, shared discourses, and social represen-
hence, in imagination (Marková, 2016; Zittoun, tations; others with whom one has emotional,
2014b, 2015c). social, or power relations; available cultural ele-
Also, wider social and cultural dynamics – ments, and so on. Very often, people can “use”
such as gender dynamics, socioeconomic forces, one of the elements to resist another tensed sit-
and religious belongings – can orient and guide uation: for example, a rich family life may allow
what elements are available to whom, how they resisting unpleasant professional conditions,
can be used, and for what result (Lawrence, literature may allow resisting political coercion,
Benedikt, & Valsiner, 1992; Zittoun et al., 2003). and so on. Each time the resistance to the threat of
Societal forces (political, economic, or ideolog- alienation – losing one’s self – is partly supported
ical) can impinge on these spheres of activities: by other elements used as resources for what is
they can impose or prohibit access to cultural experienced, such as thinking, feeling, acting,
elements (through cultural monopole or censor- and imagining, in other spheres of experiences.
ship, or through control of their circulation); they Imagination thus depends on the possibility to
can control the uses made out of these resources draw on and beyond these social and cultural
(controlling interpretations and critics); they can elements to constitute a new and personal sphere
endanger the social and psychological spaces of experience (Zittoun, 2016a). The star-like
in which these resources are used (by con- model (Figure 10.3) was thus proposed to rep-
trolling interpersonal or group communication resent the field of possibilities and constraints
about symbolic resources; by imposing forms that shape or constitute the semiotic streams
of life that prevent people to become absorbed and social forces in some zone of the field of
in worlds of imagination; and by condemning a person’s experience; the center designates the
symbolic thinking) (Marková, 2016; Zittoun emergence, away from yet through these forces
& Gillespie, 2016; Zittoun & Perret-Clermont, of a new, unique experience – a subjective one,
2009). or an imagination (Zittoun, 2012b).
194 tan ia z ittoun
In other words, society and culture at large signs, which are the means by which we make
constrain, guide, and enable human experi- sense of the world and render psyche possible;
ence, both at the scale of the life course and and meaning, both personal and cultural. In
of collective history – but these are also the this chapter, we propose to consider cultural
very conditions of the emergence of newness: elements as cultural productions that need to
imagination is the emancipating force that draws be invested by a person’s experience to start to
to, yet away from, them, or to lead elsewhere, be meaningful – individually and collectively –
into the yet-unknown. as one locus for the meeting of the person
and the sociocultural environment. The study
of symbolic resources suggests that, behind
10.5 Openings
these, it is imagination that plays a core role
The concept of symbolic resources gives an in the development of people and societies.
entrance to the study of imagination in the Additionally, we also recently suggested that the
dynamics of life. The past 15 years have con- conceptual analysis that can be done of semiotic
firmed the heuristic power of the concept. work at stake in uses of symbolic resources and
They have allowed sketching three-dimensional imagining, opens a new route to understand the
models by which both symbolic resources and processes of internalization at the heart of the
imagination could be described in their vari- sociocultural psychological project (Zittoun &
ation, along three vectors. Such analysis has Gillespie, 2015b). This route is, however, still
participated to the construction of integrative open, and old problems surface, such as how
models of life trajectories, for instance, showing to fully articulate emotional and embodied and
the layering of human experience, proximal and more distanced experiences (Gfeller, 2017), or
distal, as people move through time and space the boundary between imagining and other forms
(Gillespie & Zittoun, 2015; Zittoun & Gillespie, of thinking allowed by such internalization.
2015a). More longitudinal studies as well as In more general terms, as a concept, imagina-
situated analysis in a variety of settings might tion and symbolic resources demand to reopen
help to pursue such theorization in dialogue many taken-for-granted oppositions and notions,
with current developments in the sociocultural and calls for reconceptualization of basic con-
analysis of lives, as in this volume. In this last cepts related to change, time, or experience. At
section, theoretical and methodological advances a metatheoretical level, the elements sketched
and points still to be explored are finally here also show the need to develop general,
suggested. flexible, nonlinear models to conceive human
development and emergence.
10.5.1 Theoretical Problems

10.5.2 Methodological Implications
One of the constant challenges of sociocultural
psychology is to understand the ways in which How to study people’s uses of symbolic
societies participate in the shaping of the human resources, as well as imagination in the life
mind and the definition of unique personal lives, course, has of course been a constant inter-
and how individual people participate to the rogation over the past fifteen years. It has
transformation of settings and societies. On progressively become clear that there are three
a theoretical level, the three core concepts of main routes for accessing these, and that it prob-
this section in the Handbook’s offer entries in: ably needs a combination of these to apprehend
actions, of the human in the world, yet guided; phenomena at its best.
The first route is the dominant in psycholog- of this route consists in using longitudinal data,
ical research: identify a person or a group of such as in long-term letter exchanges, longitudi-
persons or a situated activity, and define ways nal documentaries, and diaries, or even the public
to produce, document, or collect their external- media (Gillespie, 2005b, 2013; Gillespie & Zit-
ization. For studying people’s uses of symbolic toun, 2016; Zittoun, 2014a, 2016b; Zittoun & de
resources, the most common technique has been Saint-Laurent, 2015; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016).
to interview people retrospectively, usually about Although such data are not usually produced for
one or a series of transitions (among others, research purposes, it informs rich developmental
Gyger Gaspoz, 2014; Gillespie, 2005a; Greco case studies in which variations of imagining
Morasso & Zittoun, 2014; Hale, 2008; Märtsin, and uses of symbolic resources clearly come to
2010; Zittoun, 2004b, 2006b, 2011a). The ana- the fore (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010a; Zittoun &
lytical model presented above was also the basis Gillespie, 2012, 2016).
of some questionnaires to document uses of sym- Altogether, it is, however, through a con-
bolic resources (Grossen, Baucal, & Zittoun, frontation of perspectives that these complex
2010; Märtsin, Chang, & Obst, 2016; Stankovic, phenomena can be best investigated, as well
Baucal, & Zittoun, 2009). Finally, observation as in dialogue with theory through abduction
was used to document uses of symbolic resources (Tanggaard & Brinkman, 2018; Zittoun, 2015d).
or collaborative imagination in interactions (Cer- Yet, how to fully accede to these dynamics, partly
chia, 2009; Grossen, Zittoun, & Ros, 2012; psychological, partly embodied, needs still to be
Hilppö et al., 2016; Zittoun & Grossen, 2012). refined when it escapes verbalization.
The second route is the oldest one in psychol-
ogy, yet also the one that was the most ignored
over the last century – it is that of introspection or 10.5.3 And Future
self-reflection of the researcher. These methods Sciences sometimes grow from the margins. The
can be done directly or through various media- study of symbolic resources started as an explo-
tional techniques, and bring important insights ration of often overlooked informal learning,
based on the researcher’s own experience of and eventually it was brought to reconceptualize
phenomena (Binder, Hirokawa, & Windhorst, imagination (Zittoun, 2016c). Part of the prob-
2009; Clegg, 2013; Danziger, 1980; Lyons, lems that were not studied in a psychological
1986; Vermersch, 2009; Zittoun, 2015d). The science because they were thought to be too
recent exploratory turn in qualitative methods complicated – such as people’s relation to arts
has brought these techniques again to the fore and imagination – were revealed to be simple
(Brinkmann, 2013; Corti et al., 2015; Dauphinee, and essential (Valsiner, 2015). Pragmatically,
2010; Ellis, Adams, & Bochner, 2010; Fox et al., indeed, these concepts invite reconceptualizing
2013; Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011; Valsiner, many aspects of our theories; and they also
2013). enable a fresh look at many old empirical prob-
The third route is that of observing every- lems or identifying new ones, thus indicating
day situations in the sociocultural world as possible modes of actions. There is a future for
well as other people’s externalization based on imagination.
that world – that is, turning non-data into data
(Brinkmann, 2012; Valsiner, 2014). Again, this
can be done by producing secondary analysis
Notes
of existing data, or analyzing media or cultural 1 A variation of this question is that of the meet-
elements. A specific and most fruitful example ing between groups that have adopted very different
196 tan ia z ittoun
sets of assumptions: don’t we risk considering as Bogdan, R. J. (2013). Mindvaults: Sociocultural

implausible any sets of beliefs different from ours? Grounds for Pretending and Imagining.
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Part III
The Agent Rises a Reflective Self:
Education and Development
11 Early Infancy – a Moving World:
Embodied Experience and the
Emergence of Thinking
Silvia Español
11.1 Introduction action. Alberto Rosa (Chapter 6, this volume)

suggests that, with repetition in time, strokes
The linguistic turn that occurred in human sci- would become ritualized gestures intended to
ences in the twentieth century produced extraor- produce forms; and in the very long term, these
dinary conceptual reorganizations. It especially first “graphic babblings” would derive in progres-
gave us the chance to see the implications of sively more complex ways.
language and hence the symbolism in almost As shown, the foregrounding of corporeal
every human issue: in the construction of real- perceptual/kinesthetic present experience does
ity and subjectivity, in our criteria of truth, and not deny our symbolic nature, but does limit
in our interpersonal relationships. From it, a sec- its domain. In relation to early development,
ond turn seems to have been born and is now it leads us to notice the self’s and the other’s
bearing its first fruits. That which Maxine Sheets- non-symbolic, essentially kinetic perception and
Johnstone (2009) calls the corporeal turn. It pro- organization (Stern, 1985, 2010; Español, 2010,
poses that we open the door to ways of thinking 2014). It evidences the biological, psychologi-
outside any system of symbols able to mediate cal, and cultural weaving of the first “strokes”
a reference to something else. It assumes pay- in ontogenesis. These are strokes in the air or
ing attention to what is and what is presented on the ground: the marks of playful movement
(not what is represented). It is also expected that and movement toward the standing position. The
we see our dynamic body in resonance with oth- singularity of our prolonged immaturity is prob-
ers as an indivisible unity with our mind (see ably human ontogeny’s most impressive biologi-
Chapter 1, this volume, for a clear argument cal fact (Bruner, 1972). This fact is linked to sev-
in favor of this indivisible unit). Concomitantly, eral features that make us who we are. Among
the corporeal turn leads to a shift toward the others, the emergence of adult–infant social play
study of the body in movement. For example, forms, between a baby’s second and fifth months
in the twentieth century cave art was seen as (Fagen, 2011), and with our slow (compared to
the first manifestations of the human symbolic other species) motor development (Feldenkrais &
world, its possible nature of symbolic representa- Beringer, 2010).
tion monopolized attention. Currently, however, Social play requires an organization of sensi-
Lambros Malafouris (2013, cited in Chapter 6, tivity toward the other’s behavior to act as part
this volume) analyzes cave art from the move- of a coordinated system (Raczaszek-Leonardi,
˛
ment that produced it: the stroke. He thinks those Nomikou, & Rohlfing, 2013). When adults play,
strokes did not begin as an attempt to produce a they color the baby with their personal move-
finished product, or a representative intention of ment style. In the heart of their social play they
something, they are the result of intentions into make the baby’s first strokes appear. His first
208 silvia español
kicks, arm movements, head turns, and spine In the short film, Emotional Deprivation in
column snaking will have roughly the timing, Infancy: Study by Rene A. Spitz (1952; www
scope, and intensity of the movements of their .youtube.com/watch?v=VvdOe10vrs4 – specifi-
culture. In the Afro-Colombian community of cally from 2:22 to 4:30 minutes) it is possible
Guapi in Colombia, it is possible to see a six- to see how psychological pain is expressed by
month-old baby girl resting on her sit bones on Lam, a 9-month-old baby, unsuccessfully trying
her mother’s lap, letting a pulsing and striking to join hands (something usually achieved by
rebound of her mother’s legs pass through her three–four months), it can also be seen how after
own body. And later one can see her incorporat- each attempt, with stiff fingers and palms, the
ing the rebound to generate a strong and broad baby goes back to a tense undifferentiated side-
flexion and extension movement involving her to-side balancing movement of his entire body.
whole body resembling the snaking column of Pain is seen in his movement’s form and quality.
the mapalé, a typical dance of their region. Her Movement fully expresses our being in all stages
movement is only possible because support in of life’s cycle.
her seat bones leaves her pelvis free to move In developmental psychology, the increasing
back and forth. Such freedom and vitality of shift toward the study of movement is grounded
body movement is characteristic of adults in her in theoretical, gradual, and profound changes. In
culture who transmit it to their babies through the first place, it is given by psychology’s deep-
early social play (Ospina & Español, 2014). The ening in embodiment theory, and in social cog-
spirit, as lived in each culture reaches the baby nition’s second-person approach; and second, by
through movement. As noted by Jaan Valsiner the relationship established with the somatic dis-
and Alberto Rosa (Chapter 1, this volume) a liv- cipline. This work is the product of the second
ing body can be encouraged by the spirit of a change, which is even more recent than the first.
culture. In Section 11.2, I discuss fundamental aspects of
Our long immaturity period also affects our these theoretical bodies: the role of experience in
motor development. The road to bipedalism is not motor development, the enactive program’s qual-
phylogenetically programmed. We learn to move, ity of mindfulness, the emergence of the field of
turn, sit, and stand up and we need time to do so. somatics, and the qualities of body awareness.
Moshe Feldenkrais showed that this – never error- In Section 11.3, I attempt to outline a develop-
free – organic learning provides experiences of mental trajectory of the first months of the baby’s
freedom and self-control every time a reversible life that does not have the emergence of the sym-
movement is reached (Feldenkrais & Beringer, bolic capability as an ethos (ending point of the
2010). Each culture’s raising patterns affect the most acknowledged developmental theories). By
baby’s organic learning, building his corporeal- rather paying attention to the baby’s experiences
ity. Some tie or wrap their babies tightly around with gravity, of being held, of breathing, I intend
their bodies so that they can barely move (as to show our initial ways of being in the world
Hopi tribes, Bolivians, the Turks), in turn, others and of organizing our experience. This is a sta-
encourage movement, as in the Colombian Choco tus that, although with changes and transforma-
where it is thought that if not allowed to move tions, subsists in adult life. To outline this psy-
their little baby bones become stuck, impeding chological path, I use a progression of corporeal
normal movement later on (Arango, 2014). patterns proposed in the somatic discipline. In
When a catastrophe occurs early in life, such Section 11.4, I briefly present the kind of think-
as anaclitic depression in socially deprived babies ing that the corporeal turn allows to recognize
(Spitz, 1963), motor development breaks down. and name, and give some examples of how they
Early Infancy – a Moving World 209
operate. Finally, I point out the main conclusions work where some paths are strengthened. We are
of this work. talking about experiential selection: the weaken-
ing and strengthening of synapses populations in
virtue of experience. The neural map is based on
11.2 Motor Development,
lived experience. Experience shapes the brain.
Experience, and Body
Thelen’s view of development implies under-
Awareness
standing children as online problem solvers and
emphasizing goal-oriented actions. This is her
11.2.1 Motor Development and
theory’s great directive line. In earlier work
Iterative Experience
she noticed that rhythmic movements of the
Esther Thelen (2000a) discusses Piaget’s found- baby’s body parts (such as rhythmic kicks) where
ing assumption that the goal of human develop- repeated at least three times in intervals of a sec-
ment is increasing abstract thinking and estrang- ond or less. She described around 47 types of
ing from its predecessors, perception, and action. rhythmic stereotypes, thought of as transitional
Like all those defending embodiment theory, she behavior when preceding more complex activities
believes that the endeavor of mental activity is to or appearing while the baby gained control over
continually perceive and act in the world not only new positions. She stated that development pro-
in the initial state, but throughout life. The mind ceeds from non-goal-oriented stereotyped behav-
is embodied: it emerges from corporeal interac- iors toward more variable and goal-oriented ones
tions and is continually influenced by it. It is not (Thelen 1979).
just a matter of seeing the sensorimotor origins In Thelen, Corbetta, and Spencer (1996), the
of cognition, but the intimate and inextricable infant’s reaching is a natural solution to get a
linkage between thinking and action throughout distal object and bring it to the mouth. It has
life. Thinking starts with perceiving and acting, one goal: to orally examine the object. Dynam-
retaining its sign of origin forever. From day one, ical systems theory emphasizes that new skills
in the embodied experience, motor and nervous must arise from the interplay of new demanding
systems relate with the environment. The nervous tasks with already existing movements. In line
system is dynamic and embedded in and with with this, they describe movements involved in
the body. Nervous system and body are inserted reaching and non-reaching (like bringing hands
into and coupled with the environment; at no to the face, a pattern established before the baby
point in development are they not paired. What can grasp an object). They point out that some
changes is the nature of the coupling. In devel- non-reaching movements, like certain rhythmic
opment, it is not about describing how purely arm movements, are spontaneous and act in
abstract cognition structures arise but to under- conjunction with goal-oriented ones (reaching
stand the emergence of a flexible and dynamic an object). Sooner or later, each baby in its own
merge between direct online cognition and one unique manner makes contact with the object –
less closely connected to the immediacy of the through padding, touching, or sliding its hand
senses. Adopting Edelman’s theory of neuronal over it. These moments of contact select certain
group selection, Thelen (2000a) points out that moves, carving patterns that are repeated more
the brain’s functional mapping depends on expe- frequently. The cycle – arousal activation by the
rience, especially on experience coming from sight of an object, action, and occasional con-
perception and motor examination. When babies tact – will be repeated for weeks. Finally at about
are awake they continuously move and search for the fourth month, the efficient, successful action
things. Every acquired experience adds to a net- of object reaching emerges. The movements
210 silvia español
involved in the whole cycle are described in to trigger the developmental cascade leading to
the same way: direct or indirect, soft or abrupt, reaching.
fast or slow, or with sudden or tortuous sec- In an exercise of admirable parsimony she
tions. Regardless of the action being performed, suggests that reaching may arise from a few
movement has inherent traits that define it. How- perception/action biases, some basic processes,
ever, the description is subsumed to the action’s and the infant’s active problem-solving skills. By
crucial feature: its goal-oriented nature essen- bias she means that certain neuronal connec-
tially defines it in terms of success or failure. The tions are intrinsically favored and their activation
authors note that babies have different initial con- strengthens and increases. Biases considered are:
ditions, such as body size and energy level, thus (i) looking at contrasting patterns and moderately
face different postural and biomechanical prob- complex stimuli (babies like to look at interesting
lems so that each child finds a solution following visual stimuli); (ii) suction – having something
individual developmental paths. Some have hec- in your mouth feels good; and (iii) grasping or
tic movements of arms and legs, like a working hand closing when hand receptors are stimulated
windmill. From the beginning, they have to learn (although some believe it is a remnant reflex from
to control their arms’ agitation in order to grab climbing trees, she believes it is only a reflection
the object and bring it to their mouths. Others are of the newborn’s flexor muscle tone, not a rem-
quieter and spend much time with hands close to nant reflex from climbing). These biases, together
the face: they must learn to expand and extend with (i) basic processes of interest and habitua-
their arms enough to reach the toy. As we can tion (that ensure the baby fills his visual world
see, biomechanic and postural descriptions focus with changing scenarios); (ii) the tight coupling
on the limbs’ distal movements unattached to the between vision, hand, and mouth touch (the ten-
center. It is proper of academic psychology to pay dency to put your hand on the mouth, to respond
attention to hands, mouth, and eyes forgetting the with mouth movements to interesting visual stim-
center, the navel area, the tantien zone of East- uli); and (iii) the ability to repeat a pleasant result
ern tradition, thinking it is possible to describe or circular reaction is sufficient to start a cascade
baby movement evolution without considering culminating in the emergence of distal object
it. reaching to the mouth. Initial biases and basic
While far from proposing phylogenetically processes establish the substrate for motivation.
prefigured complex behaviors, Thelen does not The action of reaching is not prefigured.
militate in favor of a tabula rasa either. In Thelen As Thelen (2000b) notes, descriptive studies
(2005) she says that in order to be formed through on motor development flourished around 1920
self-organization, patterns must be minimally with the work of Arnold Gessel, Myrtle McGraw,
organized in their initial state. Development cas- and others. The notion that motor development
cades and is organized around a small node or was due to universal principles ended this line
disturbance in the homogeneous field. Oppos- of research in the 1950s. Thelen’s findings show
ing to Colwin Trevarthen’s patterns of visually that motor development is an interesting field
elicited pre-reaching in newborns explained in of study that can be reopened. If maturation
terms of maturity (the reaching pattern is there is not decisive, there are interesting psycho-
waiting to be refined), Thelen wonders if this logical processes to be explained. Thelen was
apparent visually elicited pre-reaching is not sim- intensively trained in the Feldenkrais method of
ply a tightening of the extremities, accompanied somatic education – which she referred to in
by a flexor tone, that activates at object sight. She one of her articles (Thelen, 2005). It probably
wonders about the minimum that needs to be built enhanced her clear awareness on experience as a
fundamental category of analysis in develop- shared world of significance, allowing us to make

ment and on the relevance of iterative move- sense of our world or to “have a world.” They
ment experience. She focused on a fraction of suggest embodiment has a double meaning: the
the experience of baby movement: one voluntar- body as (i) a lived experiential structure and (ii) a
ily self-made, goal-oriented in relation to objects field of cognitive processes. Our bodies are lived
out in the physical world. In Section 11.3, I and experiential structures, biological and phe-
will show that self-oriented or oriented-to-others nomenological events. Cognition depends on the
baby movements can also be interesting. Appar- experiences originated in possessing a body with
ently the brain’s functional mapping depends many sensorimotor skills embedded in a biolog-
on repeated experience through perceptual-motor ical, psychological, and cultural context. Cogni-
examination. If, as actually occurs, the baby’s tion rises from repeated sensorimotor patterns
perceptual-motor examination is not limited to that allow action to be perceptually guided. Motor
the physical environment but encompasses the and sensory processes cannot be separated from
exploration of his own and the other’s body, the lived cognition.
brain is shaped by corporeal experiences lived The enactive program is constructed on the
by the baby on his own and in early reciprocity concept of experience. Although Varela, Thomp-
patterns. son, and Rosch recognized phenomenology as a
Western philosophical perspective dealing with
human experience and emphasizing its pragmatic
11.2.2 Experience and Awareness
corporeal context, they noted that it was put
In a sense, Thelen seems to adhere to the cogni- together in a purely theoretical way. Merleau-
tive school’s tacit and arguable assumption that Ponty – they argue – tried to learn the immedi-
cognition is all about solving problems. Also, her acy of our nonreflective experience and to give
concept of embodied experience seems limited. It it a voice in conscious reflection. But because it
is not enough to indicate that in embodied expe- is a post factum theoretical activity, he failed to
rience the motor system is related to the ner- capture the wealth of experience. Thus his work
vous system and the environment. The embodied could only be a discourse on experience. Search-
experience supposes a body consciousness and a ing for a tradition that examines human expe-
sensemaking of our world. rience in the aspects of reflective and immedi-
The enactive program proposed by Francisco ate life, and allows cognitive science to include
Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch immediate experience, they turned to Eastern
(1991) is probably the intellectual initiative that philosophy, particularly to the Buddhist tradi-
more openly addressed the experiential dimen- tion of mindfulness/awareness.2 I always thought
sion of human life in cognitive science. This pro- this program puts experience in its rightful place
gram’s basic intuition is that our understanding is since it does not limit or destroy it (as do
rooted in the structure of our biological embodi- other versions of enactivism). But my ignorance
ment but is lived and experienced within consen- on Buddhism and meditation practices, and my
sual action and cultural history.1 Cognition is not belief that they are essentially first person activi-
understood as problem solving (from representa- ties, prevented me from following them.
tions) but as a world enactment – bringing about Recently, Schmalzl, Crane-Godreau, and
a world – through a viable history of structural Payne (2014) distinguished the “movement-
coupling. Cognitive skills are linked together as based embodied contemplative practices.” They
vivid stories. Thus, intelligence is not the ability include Eastern meditation practices, such
to solve problems but the ability to enter into a as yoga, and modern approaches to somatic
212 silvia español
education, such as the Feldenkrais method and practices based on meditation engage selective
the Alexander technique. The cultivation of brain areas and neural networks involved in atten-
interoceptive, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic tion, body awareness, emotion regulation, and
awareness combines these Eastern and Western the sense of self. Finally, they say they are also
practices entwined with the enactive program forms of movement-based embodied contempla-
proposal opened by Varela, Thompson, and tive practices (as many Eastern movement-based
Rosch. Schmalzl, Crane-Godreau and Payne systems) that involve two people (master and
make the interconnection clear. In embodiment disciple, teacher and student, therapist and client,
theory, it is understood that one’s experience or co-practitioners). Together, they enter a state
in the world as a cognizant being portrays a of enhanced connectivity referred to as “reso-
complex interplay between brain, body, and nance.” In this state, affective and somatosensory
environment, and the seamless integration of experiences are largely automatically shared;
interoceptive, proprioceptive (including vestibu- apparently they involve a simultaneous activation
lar), kinesthetic, tactile, and spatial information. of affective and sensory brain structures in both
In consonance, movement-based embodied con- individuals.
templative practices all emphasize on paying Although now included in the enactive pro-
attention to the interoceptive, proprioceptive, gram, these practices have been a subject of
and kinesthetic qualities of experience. They reflection for some time in the nonacademic
also use expressions like “being in one’s body,” world. Thomas Hanna (1986, 1988) identified a
to promote an embodied experience of the self. broad field called “somatics” which he defined
Likewise, they stress that movement is a fun- as the art and science of processes or concur-
damental characteristic of the embodied state, rent synergistic interaction between awareness,
and the enactive approaches propose that one’s biological functioning, and environment. Somat-
ability for self-movement is a constitutive part ics refers to practices in the field of movement
of all cognitive processes. Movement-based studies emphasizing internal physical perception.
embodied contemplative practices are based on Used in movement therapy the term signifies an
internally generated self-willed movement that, approach based on internal body perception, and
opposed to externally evoked or purely passively in dance is an antonym for techniques such as bal-
imposed ones, is intrinsic to the sense of agency, let that care about the audience’s observation of
thus central to self sense development. Every movement. The field encompasses Eastern prac-
contemplative practice involves some sort of tices and various methods of somatic education,
movement. Even in the most static forms of among others, the Feldenkrais method, body-
seated meditation the whole body is constantly mind centering, Laban-Bartenieff fundamentals –
in subtle motion with the breath’s rhythm. The that is, contemplative embodied movement-based
principal focus of movement-based practice is on practices – but also extends to certain dance tech-
the intentional induction or the disinhibition of niques like contact improvisation. In all cases,
overt movement or subtle internal sensations of there is an appreciation and a validation of the
movement. In a similar way, in movement-based living body experience closely linked to how we
practices, redirecting attention entails cultivating organize ourselves as we move into our coupling
awareness of bodily sensations and propriocep- with the world. And the body of propriocep-
tive feedback related to the specifically used tion and interoception is addressed, the one per-
movement and breathing techniques. Regarding ceived from within. It is about interactive prac-
the neural mechanisms under contemplative tices affecting two or more people. Some involve
states, studies in neurophenomenology show that hand-on practices or listening to the other’s body
through one’s whole body; the latter have, as a hinder the growth of embodied self-awareness
distinctive feature, the corporeal contact or touch which requires our conceptual mind to slow
with the other. They all intend to refine the kines- down and take a break from its continual stream
thetic and proprioceptive senses and assume that of ideas. According to Fogel, there’s an indi-
consciousness can be expanded. They look for rect transition between embodied and conceptual
the expansion of awareness of the vital moving self-awareness. We cannot be in conceptual and
body in its physical and social environment. embodied states of self-awareness at the same
In the field of somatics, body awareness is time, but under certain circumstances we can
at the center. As Alan Fogel (2013) points out, regulate the switch. Taking on Fogel’s assump-
formal education emphasizes awareness of our tion, Silvia Mamana (2016) says that keeping
thinking processes and the ability to regulate the perception of sensations active requires a
them toward specific goals, such as planning or deliberate and systematic training that implicates
problem solving. However, self-consciousness – learning to quiet our minds among other things.
in the sense of thinking about oneself – is not the She prefers the term “open awareness,” closer to
same as feeling yourself in a corporeal conscious- Varela, Thomson, and Rosh’s proposal (instead of
ness. Embodied self-awareness involves intero- embodied self-awareness), more consistent with
ception (sensing our breathing, arousal, emo- the goals of somatic education: opening to inter-
tion) and the body outline (movement awareness nal perceptions consciousness, but also to envi-
and coordination between different parts of the ronmental stimuli.
body or between the body and the environment). Many methods of somatic education have a
Embodied self-awareness begins before birth, direct link with motor development knowledge.
during the last months of life in utero and con- Feldenkrais’s (1972) awareness through move-
tinues to grow throughout life as we learn more ment classes are based on accurate observa-
complex living and acting in the world forms. It is tion of baby movements. Bonnie Bainbridge
fundamentally linked to the conscience of others. Cohen (2012) – creator of body-mind centering –
Interoception begins with ergoreceptors, recep- describes in detail the patterns of movement
tors placed in different body tissues that sense from life in uterus to bipedalism. Peggy Hackney
internal states. Exteroception includes receptors (2002) reinterprets Bainbridge Cohen’s post-birth
for sound, light, taste, and smell. Interoception patterns linking them to Bartenieff fundamentals
and exteroception rely on different sets of recep- (where Rudolph Laban’s imprint, father of mod-
tors and different neural pathways to and through ern dance, is obvious). Years ago, Fogel explic-
the brain. The afferent nerve cell fibers that orig- itly proposed linking the science of movement to
inate in the ergoreceptors are small and unmyeli- developmental psychology (Fogel, 1992). I want
nated. Myelin is a protective coating around align with his proposal and extend that link to
nerve cell fibers that speeds transmission. There- other ways of movement knowledge. In the next
fore, unmyelinated fibers are slow conductors. point I will concentrate on the baby’s develop-
This partially explains why it often takes several ment process following Hackney’s synthesis on
minutes to feel particular embodied sensations afterbirth patterns, and I will attempt to cross it
and sense their source within the body. Expand- with some of the ideas presented above.
ing embodied self-awareness is slow and deliber- In terms of movement, birth involves a dras-
ate when compared to the rapid and instantaneous tic change: the baby faces gravity and the expe-
generation of ideas and thoughts in conceptual rience of being supported by some kind of sur-
self-awareness. The faculty of conceptual reason- face. He also transitions from being in the womb,
ing is so powerful and rapid in humans, it can fully in contact, to, especially in our culture, be
214 silvia español
dispossessed of full contact, be released in the work, as a proposal for somatic education is
air, and experience partial contact (the back, the focused on the process of re-patterning (return-
stomach) depending on how he is supported. He ing to basic patterns to facilitate skill develop-
goes through the birth canal and breathes on his ment or technical virtuosity or personal creativ-
own for the first time. Gravity, support, breath- ity and artistry). My interest, however, is in her
ing will be constant throughout our life history description about patterning; I think it opens the
(except under singular conditions) and are key to door to a dimension of the baby’s bodily experi-
the formation of our psyche or our way of being ence that psychology has not incorporated until
in the world. I will try to demonstrate this in the now. In this, my first approach, I will consider
next point. only some aspects of the first three fundamental
patterns (out of six described) and combine them
with some concepts mentioned above to draft a
11.3 The Fundamental Patterns
comprehensive description of the baby’s kinetic
of Total Body Connectivity
experience during the first months. All I present
The essence of movement is change. As we move below on fundamental patterns of total body con-
we are constantly changing. In the process of nectivity is taken from Hackney’s text.
movement change we go on creating our embod-
ied existence. Change is not random or pre-
11.3.1 Breath Pattern
established. It is relational. As we move we are
always making connections, building relation- Birth is the entrance to the world of breathing air.
ships within and among us and the world. Con- The baby fills and empties his body, expands and
nections created by the use of our body become contracts his whole being on his own, tuning in
patterned as we grow. Some patterns, like prim- with his internal body impulse, being an undiffer-
itive reflexes, righting reactions, and equilibrium entiated whole. It is the breathing pattern. Breath-
responses, are built in our neuromuscular system. ing is our first experience with internal space. The
But every human being is physiologically com- space in our world is displayed in three dimen-
pelled to perform certain bodily developmen- sions – vertical (up and down), sagittal (forward-
tal tasks to become fully functional and expres- backward), and horizontal (side to side). With
sive. We all go through a similar progression of each breath you may experience changes in all
movement patterns from lying down to stand- three dimensions. In inhalation, the diaphragm
ing up. This progression is largely made pos- expands the thorax area’s three dimensions (the
sible by the display of fundamental patterns of vertical by pushing down the tendon, the horizon-
total body connectivity. They represent a primary tal by raising the lower ribs, the sagittal by raising
level of development and experience. Each one the higher ribs using the spine). During exhala-
of them organizes a way of relating with one- tion, the diaphragm movement contracts the three
self and with the world. As development patterns dimensions of the thorax area. Though breathing
are being established, each individual is forming is involuntarily, it is influenced and is a reflec-
its experience of interaction with the world, and, tion of changes in consciousness, feelings, and
consequently, this interaction is included within thoughts as these are developed. Therefore it is
the body pattern. Although there is a sequence, considered a pattern. In the baby we can assume
development is not linear and patterns overlap. it is a reflex influenced by arousal changes in per-
There is not a single path for all people; each formed activities and the stimuli received.
engaging story is unique and culturally defined. Breathing is a rhythmic movement that
This is Hackney’s (2002) idea in a nutshell. Her contains the phrase’s key. Movements happen in
phrases. Each individual organizes and sequences tory phrase’s unity (see next point for an expla-
their movements within meaningful units. nation of the concept of vitality forms). Since
Breathing’s round phrasing “inhale-exhale- the baby is unaware of any disturbing conscious-
pause” is the base of voluntary movement phras- ness (such as adult conceptual consciousness, the
ing; it organizes all subsequent fundamental quick and almost permanent flowing of ideas,
patterns. The breathing pattern is the foundation images, memories), he fully and deeply lives his
and support base of those coming next. All breathing in open awareness.
movements emerging later will organize and find
support in the breathing pattern. Breathing also
11.3.2 Core–Distal Connectivity
allows a primary experience of being with oth-
Pattern
ers. In Bartenieff’s fundamentals, in body-mind
centering and in the Feldenkrais method (and The fundamental pattern of core–distal connec-
other methods of somatic education), there are tivity or umbilical radiation is one of radial sym-
many exercises promoting participation in the metry, with the center of control in the middle
“Mind of Breathing” (in the words of Bainbridge of the body. Patterns of flexion and full exten-
Cohen taken up by Hackney). Using breathing as sion develop in the uterus during the last trimester
the central organizer of consciousness, moving of intrauterine life and both contribute to the
in such a way that reality’s nature is experienced basic postural tone. Being born is experienc-
as the pace of the birth pattern organization, ing gravity, when the baby is prone there is an
and providing bodily knowledge of what it is increased flexor tone throughout his body, when
to be empathically attuned with another person lying supine there is an increased extensor tone.
through a breath pattern (walking, dancing, Both lead the baby to the ground and provide a
running, quiet). The conscious cultivation of sense of grounding. The baby feels the connec-
breathing is also recognized in several Eastern tion with the earth. The center’s value becomes
disciplines – like t’ai chi – as an important apparent when holding a newborn: you have to
element for attuning individual and universe in a continually hold his head because at any moment
spiritual connection. he will pull it backwards. But if you pay atten-
We can then imagine a newborn baby in arms, tion you will see that the movement does not start
participating in the “mind of breathing” attuned in the neck but in the navel. And when the baby
to the other’s body breath pattern, living one of cuddles in arms one can see that the total bend-
his first mutuality experiences where each other’s ing of the body occurs from the navel. The core–
phrased breaths fall into place. The baby is there distal pattern holds the basic rhythmic relation-
almost an undifferentiated totality with the other. ship to go inward, toward oneself, and out into the
We can also imagine him awake and alone, lean- world in an organism with limbs connecting to
ing against a nonliving surface (which does not the center. The baby radiates outward, away from
provide reciprocal information about his own his center, and returns to it. The organized pattern
vitality and experience), tuning in with his inner of flexion and extension emerges.
space and respiratory phrasing. Breathing is a This movement pattern establishes the
dynamic way of being with himself and with oth- “twoness” of the “inward-outward” experience
ers as an undifferentiated unit. The baby expe- as opposed to the “oneness” of the breathing
riences vitality forms in the movement of filling pattern. In the basic patterns of entering and
and emptying his body, or in the inhale-exhale- leaving the center, and of breathing, the rate of
pause original phrasing. When in arms, adult and “input and output” is essential. But there is a
baby live the same form of vitality in the respira- difference: breathing organizes our entire body
216 silvia español
in a fluid form, while the pattern connecting linked to language and symbol. When thinking in
center with limbs is less circular. It resembles movement, phrasing organizes our corporeal cou-
a star that presses and releases energy from the pling with the world, this means with the earth
center toward the ends. The pattern of becoming and those that inhabit it. And that is relevant.
concave or convex can be seen as a primary expe- Phrase sequence does not necessarily generate
rience of phrase contrast, this means a phrase narratives; it could result in dance improvisation,
built in two differentiated parts. In microanalysis scaling a mountain, simple repeated baby move-
of adult movement in contexts of social play, ments, or simple vowel exchange sequences. This
particularly in infant directed performances, might make sense in the next section, when I talk
adults often build multimodal phrases on move- about thinking in movement.
ment phrases resembling flowing backgrounds
of going to and fro in the sagittal plane (Español
11.3.3 Head–Tail Connectivity
& Shifres, 2015). Apparently, when the baby
Pattern
enters into the primordial experience of phrase
contrast through this fundamental pattern, adults Returning to fundamental patterns, the follow-
show and illuminate (by using temporal arts’ ing is linked to the spinal level. Head and tail-
resources) the same kind of phrase contrast in bone are the spine’s ends; they are in a constant
social interactions. and ever-changing interactive relationship. The
From the theoretical framework of com- spinal movement is organized by differentiating
municative musicality – very close to this yield and push and reach and pull patterning.
work – Gratier and Trevarthen (2008) describe Development is never linear, it occurs in over-
adult–infant early vocalization exchanges as a lapping waves, first the baby learns to yield and
nonverbal, musical narrative or a narrative with push and later to reach and pull in an effective
communicative musicality. They recognize that phrasing. During life in the uterus, especially in
narratives are typically about something worth the last weeks before birth, the spine is primarily
telling, about events involving other people that a flexed. Both, head and tailbone, have chances of
person feels impelled to recount. But suggest that being in contact with the uterine wall. The fetus
although baby and mother do not relate events or gains proprioceptive knowledge when yielding
talk about other people’s actions, they construct a and pushing against this container, sending mes-
nonverbal narrative with contents in the form of sages through the spinal cord from the head to the
“aboutness.” In the same way that Jazz musicians tailbone and vice versa. When holding or watch-
describe the feeling of telling something through ing a newborn in the cradle one can notice he con-
music, or telling a story when jamming, mother tinues to push the head or the tailbone by elongat-
and infant tell something in their vocalization ing and shortening. Some seem to like pushing
exchanges. “Phrases” – they say – might consti- against the end of the crib. Others seem to climb
tute the events that build narrative. I’m not sure upwards when resting on their caregiver’s chest.
adult–infant exchanges are a narrative. I think Yielding provides a supporting bond, before
that perceiving, creating, and exercising units of pushing for separation. Reaching provides space
meaning is a basic mode of organizing the world goal-orientation before pulling. The yield and
and ourselves. And although subsumed to the cre- push pattern relates to grounding and to a sense
ation of linguistic, gestural, or musical narratives, of self. When resting on our belly and actively
it also forms non-narrative non-referring ways of yielding the body weight on the ground, pass-
organizing the world. The phrases’ value must ing the weight through the forearms, we feel
not be reduced to narrative or reference, both an immediate confirmation of our embodied
existence. When ground and yielding meet, Discriminating between yielding and pushing
yielding turns into pushing and raising up from and reaching and pulling – with their unitary
the floor is possible. Yielding before pushing phrasing stated at the spinal level – will con-
connects us with gravity and earth and creates tinue in all the following fundamental patterns.
a link behind the eventual separation brought Reaching (the action of reaching an object) is
by the push. By pushing, the baby momentar- linked to yielding and pushing and reaching and
ily compresses his body (bones, muscles, and pulling patterns, and immersed in other funda-
organs), stimulating proprioceptive knowledge mental patterns that I will not describe here. But
about the strength or structure of being. Push- their beginnings are here. Reaching’s develop-
ing also empowers getting away, separating the mental history – which called much attention in
self from the ground or a supporting other; estab- developmental psychology – is bounded by the
lishing one’s own kinesphere, becoming an indi- grasping bias, the desire to mouth a distal object,
vidual. The yield and push pattern at the spinal and other processes described by Thelen summa-
level usually develops during the first six months rized in the previous section. But the evolutionary
and relates to strength development. It promotes history leading to the motivational cascade starts
internal attention to heavy and grounded move- here. Reaching is not a natural solution to obtain
ment. The reach and pull pattern gives us the a distal object and bring it to the mouth, or is not
ability to move in the world, in a space beyond only or essentially that. Reaching is a manifesta-
the individual. Attention is focused outwards tion of the baby’s vitality and complex history of
enabling the baby to move toward the environ- blending with the ground and the world. It allows
ment. This expands attention and limbs into a him to rise from the floor and stand on his own,
space beyond personal. It is the beginning of roll, and change positions. It moves him into a
intended-to-space movement (key to movement direction he finds attractive due to light, temper-
in dance), an open door to the possibility of going ature, company, or an eye-catching object.
somewhere or toward someone. The reach and
pull pattern involves more outside attention and
11.4 Thinking in Movement
lighter movements. Yielding and pushing has to
do with establishing the kinesphere, reaching and Developmental psychology has recognized the
pulling with going through it. Both are linked existence of two modes of thought: the mathe-
to the molding of the baby’s spine. The spinal matical logical thinking and narrative thinking.
curves are different in newborns and adults. New- Undoubtedly, the second is one of the major
born’s vigorous kicking and crying during the reformulations of the linguistic turn. Jerome
first months of life develop the muscles needed to Bruner (1990) contrasted the narrative to the log-
produce and stabilize the lumbar curve in its con- ical thinking and drew attention to the child’s
vex direction toward the front. This curve needs ease or readiness to organize experience narra-
to be established for the baby to lift his head up. tively. He suggested that the narrative structure
When the baby throws his arms and legs, turns his is present in social interaction before acquiring
head side to side, or lifts it up when he lies down, its linguistic expression and provides a certain
he is gradually developing the muscles and lig- prelinguistic predisposition for meaning. Narra-
aments that control the secondary curves. From tive thinking has referential palatability (Español,
here on, the cervical and lumbar curves, and 2012), its analysis showed everything there is to
therefore the ability to support himself, come in language before the child acquires language (pro-
response to his desire to see the world, to develop toconversations, protodeclaratives, deictic and
in interaction with the world. symbolic gestures, pretend play).
218 silvia español
Sheets-Johnstone (2009) proposes there is a perceiving someone directing their attention

way of thinking that is not “about something,” and action to oneself inescapably involves the
that does not represent something different than proprioception of our response to them. Many
itself. This is thinking in movement. She takes exteroception/proprioception phenomena reflect
improvised dance, particularly contact improvi- movement’s dual mode of presence. For example,
sation, as a paradigmatic example of thinking a baby bringing hands together collects proprio-
in movement. She describes it as a continuous ceptive information that allows him to organize
flow of movement from an ever-changing kinetic his own movements (where to stop moving one
world of possibilities where goal-reaching is hand in order to touch the other) and also receives
not required, where nothing is achieved or fails exteroceptive information (sees his hand passing
to be so. And suggests that ways of thinking in front of his eyes). The baby feels and sees
in movement may differ considerably: it has how his hands move at exactly the same time and
exploratory-organizational purposes in infancy apportioned. On countless occasions he experi-
and aesthetic ones in dance. In both cases it is ences the perfect exteroception/proprioception
not necessary to refer to, or to have a verbal level contingency. It will become a self’s invariant that
to create meaning. Thinking in movement in will last a lifetime. It will be faced against the
infancy creates (does not refer to), among other different and repeated noncontingent experience
things, a sense of self as separate and bonded between the exteroception of the other’s hand
to others, largely thanks to movement’s double and the proprioception of his own moving hand
mode of presence. This means the bimodal nature (or lack of proprioception if not moving) that
of self-produced movement – visual and propri- specifies others (Reddy, 2008, Sheets-Johnstone,
oceptive – that allows us to perceive movement 2009). Other cases of thinking in movement
from within and from outside. that relate to the sense of authorship or agency
Sheets-Johnstone links thinking in movement have been described (a synthesis can be found in
with processes described in current developmen- Español, 2010, 2012).
tal psychology, especially in social cognition’s I believe that thinking in movement is pay-
second-person approach. Reciprocity character- ing attention to the experience of forms of vital-
izes all of our interpersonal encounters. In these ity. Daniel Stern (2010) had set movement at the
moments of meeting, behavior is influenced forefront by saying that the dynamic experience
by each other’s presence. Locating reciprocity of movement is the original source of psycholog-
in the center of our interpersonal world arises ical life. Movement and its consequent proprio-
from the adoption of a comprehensive second- ception are the earliest manifestations of being
person approach on it. The second-person animate, providing a primary sense of aliveness.
approach is part of the embodiment framework He proposed a “dynamic pentad” that creates
in which the emotional world, the perceptual the experience of vitality composed by move-
processes, movement, and action take center ment, time, force, space, and direction/intention.
stage for the understanding of psychological A form of vitality is a gestalt, the spontaneous
processes. In this framework, our interpersonal integration of these five elements emerging from
world is mainly based on perceiving others holistic experiences. Our minds grasp dynamic
directly, the experience of “making together,” events through this pentad. Vitality forms are
and dynamic and reciprocal exchanges. Accord- perceived as felt experiences of temporally con-
ing to Reddy (2008), being in contact with toured moving forces, and a sense of being alive.
another person presupposes an assembling Forms of vitality outcome form experiences and
between exteroception and proprioception: can be directly observed in another’s behavior.
They involve the style in which we make things, ful play frame, where adult and infant elaborate
the “how.” Di Cesare et al. (2013) used func- units (or motifs) of movement and/or sound (like
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) find- moving a spring forward, stretching and shak-
ing that the somatosensory-insular-limbic circuit ing it) according to a repetition-variation form.
could be under the observers’ capacity to under- These units are repeated at least twice with vari-
stand the vitality forms conveyed by the observed ations in the rhythm of sound and movement pat-
action. terns, in the form, the dynamic or the quality of
Stern (2010) found in early social play a movement, in melodic contours, sound sonority,
ground where forms of vitality become evident. dynamics, and timbre. The whole activity unfolds
Sometimes early social play is almost purely around the varied repetition of sound and move-
a play on vitality forms (e.g., sudden almost ment, making it the core of this activity (Español
explosive movements when a mother tickles her et al., 2014, 2015).
child). Adults usually play with forms of vitality Original and improvised adult–infant social
to avoid the child’s habituation and boredom. play are ways of thinking in movement, as are
The result is a theme-and-variation format of forms of vitality play, proper to the third year of
vitality forms. The form of repetition-variation life. Their improvised character and the unattach-
helps adults to level, modulate, and play off the ment to the achieved unity, liken them to con-
baby’s arousal as much as themselves. Stern tact improvisation. The fundamental patterns of
also defends the idea that forms of vitality total body connectivity described in the previ-
are a meeting point between early social play ous point are also ways of thinking in movement.
and time-based arts: the feelings that run from In fact, Bainbridge Cohen (2012) suggests that
excitement to quietness, tension to relaxation, contact improvisation – the paradigmatic exam-
characteristic of early social play, are the same ple of thinking in movement – is a recapitula-
feelings that time-based arts such as dance and tion of early experiences of the baby’s move-
music express with mastery; and together with ments, which makes it a very enticing form of
early social play they share the same backbone: dance. However, with all these, descriptions hap-
the repetition-variation form. In early social pens as with the most recognized embodiment
play, adults manipulate forms of vitality through approaches in early development (see Needham
the repetition-variation form, while the baby and Libertus’s [2011] state of the art description
participates primarily as a receptor. Recent on embodiment in early development): they treat
microanalysis of early social play using analyt- specific issues, isolated, without tracing a path or
ical categories and analysis methodologies of a developmental becoming.
music performance and movement analysis in
contemporary dance (Español & Shifres, 2015)
11.5 Conclusion
empirically confirm this hypothesis.
Finesse in manipulating or elaborating vitality This work’s pledge has been linking developmen-
forms is most likely to be acquired along devel- tal psychology to scientific, practice, and experi-
opment, and interactive play is certainly a privi- ential understanding of human movement. I think
leged context for a safe rehearsal. At some point it opens the door to a dimension of the infant’s
in infancy, early social play turns into forms of bodily experience that psychology has not incor-
vitality play when the child actively wields these porated until now. By paying attention to inte-
vitality forms with repetition and variation. Now roceptive, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic qual-
child and adult play together with forms of vital- ities of infant’s experiences and his states of
ity. Forms of vitality play is a pleasant and joy- enhanced connectivity or resonance with others,
220 silvia español
I tried to imagine and describe how the mapping described by Hackney. The patterns that follow
of infant embodied awareness develops. Accord- them could be incorporated and open the pro-
ing to somatic understanding, the fundamental posal to prenatal patterns exposed by Bainbridge
patterns represent a primary level of develop- Cohen and the complexity of his description of
ment and experience. Each one of them orga- postnatal patterns, which render more explicit its
nizes a way of relating with oneself and with the obvious link with vitality forms and the second
world. I think each one of them can also relate to person approach. If done, I think we would be
ways of making contact and having experiences continuing the enactive program’s original pro-
with others. It is what I tried to show in the pat- posal. I think we could then expand and trans-
terns I described – breathing pattern, core–distal form assembled intuitions we have about thinking
connectivity pattern, and head–tail connectivity in movement in a more precise idea. And maybe
pattern. aim in that way toward the elaboration of a theory
Each infant movement fundamental pattern is of development.
an occasion for learning, expressing feelings, and
developing cognition. This is this work’s first con-
Acknowledgment
clusion. The second one is that shared move-
ments, even the most basic, such as breathing, I am grateful to Alberto Rosa who encouraged
are an occasion for intersubjective encounter. The me to think and write about these issues, and his
third one is that the spirit, as lived in each cul- trust in how it would turn out.
ture, reaches the baby through movement’s vital-
ity forms perceived, received, and shared with Notes
others. This is the complex process that molders
1 Some current versions retain this trait of origin
in socially deprived babies. They are the ontoge-
and point to that experience, far from being an
netic strokes, the sensible levels of development
epiphenomenon, it intertwines with being alive and
and experience, which are affected when motor immersed in a world of meaning (Di Paolo, Rohde,
development breaks down in socially deprived & De Jaegher, 2010).
babies. 2 It is worth mentioning they distinguish the sense
What we have today in psychology is a frag- they give to the term “mindfulness” from the non-
mented, incomplete, and disconnected picture Buddhist meditative sense used by Ellen Langer to
of infant movement development. I think if we refer to certain widespread practices in today’s West-
incorporate the vision on motor development pro- ern world.
vided in the field of somatic education (interlaced
with the field of dance), if we allow the funda- References
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12 Object Pragmatics: Culture and
Communication – the Bases for
Early Cognitive Development
Cintia Rodríguez, Marisol Basilio, Karina Cárdenas, Sílvia Cavalcante,
Ana Moreno-Núñez, Pedro Palacios, and Noemí Yuste
In Doctor Brodie’s Report, the Argentinian writer objects, obvious to adults, are not so to children
and literature Nobel Prize winner, Jorge Luis in their first months of life. For them, things have
Borges, talks about the Yahoos, a very remote no names. They do not see chairs, or everyday
tribe situated in a faraway place. He says that objects, for what they are. This has evident conse-
only a very few individuals have names, and that quences for psychological development. Observ-
to address one another they fling mud. Because ing children shows that the same object can be
“they lack the capacity to fashion the simplest used to do very different things. The first thing
object,” they believe ornaments like gold pins are children usually do with objects is sucking, bang-
natural. ing, or throwing them, irrespective of the object.
Only gradually do they abandon these undiffer-
To the tribe my hut was a tree, despite the fact that entiated noncanonical uses to acquire the cultural
many of them saw me construct it and even lent me uses of the community. Object and use do not
their aid. Among a number of other items, I had in coincide. One thing is the object and another is
my possession a watch, a cork helmet, a mariner’s the use of it.
compass, and a Bible. The Yahoos stared at them,
Because children are not born knowing the
weighed them in their hands, and wanted to know
functions of objects (as evidenced by how they
where I had found them. They customary reached
use them), these functions have to be learned.
for my cutlass not by the hilt but by the blade,
seeing it, undoubtedly, in their own way, which Here, the adult guide the educational action –
causes me to wonder to what degree they would be done by parents and teachers, for instance –
able to perceive a chair. (Borges, 1970/1972, intervenes through different semiotic systems
p. 114, translated by Norman Thomas di Giovanni (language, gestures, intonation, rhythm, uses of
in collaboration with the author) objects, and so on). This idea is in tune with
one of the most deeply rooted sociocultural max-
Beyond the beautiful fiction by Borges, it would ims: the child does not discover meaning or sig-
be chaotic for humans to relate to one another nifies the world on his/her own. It is evident
disregarding the functional attributes of objects. that to “learn to write, add or use a map, help
Objects are defined by what they are for in every- is needed from other more competent persons
day life. Communicating in a meaningful and who know how to interpret writing, numbers
functional way implies a regard for their prag- and maps” (Martí, 2003, p. 21). Schooling and
matic aspects, that is, their practical purposes educational intervention provide the necessary
(Groupe µ, 1992). The functional attributes of guidance (Vergnaud, 2013; Saada-Robert, 2012).
224 c. ro dr ígu ez et al .
There is no reason not to apply these maxims to 2016; Sinha, 2014; Valsiner, 2016; Zittoun, 2010;
babies, who are in greatest need of the presence see also Chapter 6, this volume), resembling,
of others. The observation unit to understand the thus, to semiotic systems traditionally consid-
emergence of meaning-making is adult–child– ered cultural, whether language (Nelson, 2015),
object triadic (educational) interaction, which images (Sonesson & Lenninger, 2015), cal-
occurs right from the beginning of life. The pop- endars for understanding social time (Tartas,
ular idea that triadic interaction begins at the 2008), maps (Brizuela & Cayton-Hodges, 2013),
end of the first year, when children can com- or graphic representations of number (Martí,
municate intentionally with others (Tomasello, Scheuer, & de la Cruz, 2013).
2014), is therefore subject to question. Before To assert that children “explore” or “play with”
then, someone has communicated intentionally objects during their first years of life is impre-
with children, providing them significant clues to cise and absolutely banal. It is necessary to ana-
functionally understand the world. Adults offer lyze what they do in everyday life with objects
their intentions by involving children in their own and instruments, how and what for they use them,
action (Rodríguez, 2006) while cleaning, caring, and with what degree of semiotic complexity. In
feeding or interacting freely (Rodríguez, Benassi, this chapter we will deal with the diversity and
et al., 2017). Indeed, adults promote the first development of first uses of objects (and instru-
triadic interactions in the most diverse scenar- ments) from a pragmatic perspective. The role of
ios and children take part in them long before the adult is also addressed.
they know it. During these early triadic inter- We will begin with functional, canonical uses.
actions, adults communicate with and about If objects and instruments are used with spe-
objects. Language alone does not suffice to gen- cific functions (the bottle to drink, the spoon to
erate shared meaning because it is too com- eat, the cradle to sleep, etc.), we must ask: How
plex. Objects are not mere external referents, but do children appropriate them? How do they get
instruments for communication (see Figure 12.1) to canonical uses of objects? Using objects by
that children understand and use before they can their function means they become permanent.
speak. This permanence is functional, pragmatic, and
In the first edition of this Handbook, shared with others. This does not coincide with
Rodríguez (2007) referred to Bruner’s (1975) the “physical” object permanence proposed by
pragmatics of speech position, opposing Chom- Piaget, and the competent baby paradigm (see
sky’s formalism and claiming that children learn discussion in Rodríguez, 2012). We will con-
to speak by using language in everyday life. clude this section by suggesting a possible rela-
Our objection back then was that applying this tion between the functional permanence and the
pragmatic approach to language alone does not origin of concepts.
suffice and that objects, too, should be analysed Rhythmic-sonorous uses occur when children
regarding their range of uses in everyday com- produce sound with objects. They are the most
municative situations. When objects are used, basic uses along with undifferentiated noncanon-
they “come to life” (see with adults in Clark, ical uses (such as sucking or throwing any
2003). object). Even though developmental psychology
Fortunately the sociocultural paradigm no has reserved an important place for rhythm in
longer banishes objects from culture or rele- studies on early dyadic intersubjective interac-
gates them to “physical reality.” The idea of tions, few studies have investigated the rhythmic-
objects having social status is gaining momentum sonorous characteristics of adult–baby–object tri-
(Kontopodis & Perret-Clermont, 2016; Moro, adic interactions.
Object Pragmatics 225
When children know social uses of objects, petent baby paradigm, which consider that chil-
they share with the adult a common ground that dren are born with the concept of number (core
becomes a base for more complex uses (linked to knowledge), and who defend more constructivist
new forms of communication). That is the case of and sociocultural approaches that state number is
symbolic uses. They are “traveling uses” referring the result of a complex process of construction.
to momentarily absent situations performed out In this process, the communicative and educative
of context that are neither effective nor efficient. influence of the adult cannot be ignored.
There is a debate about the origin of symbols.
Here, we argue that the root of symbolic uses is
12.1 How do Children Learn to
found in the functional uses of objects. Without
Use Objects According to their
that socially shared base, it would be impossible
Function?
to comprehend children (and adults!) when they
use an object as another, or when they change This is the first question that needs to be
their attributes. answered.
We will also mention metacanonical uses. To do that it is important to distinguish
They are uses that, as symbols, are rooted in between object and uses of the object. Adults,
functional or canonical uses. Here, the object who no longer remember how they learned
is momentarily used in an efficiency way to do to relate functionally to objects, consider both
something functional for which it was not con- things equivalent. Adults automatically see
ceived. Thus, the object “breaks in” a function objects according to their practical purposes.
that does not belong to it. For example, using Upon seeing a chair they think: “I can sit on it”;
a chair, instead of a stair, to reach a book on a a cup: “I can drink from it”; a spoon: “I can eat
very high shelf. They are very creative uses. They with it.” If they sit on chairs or drink from cups, it
corroborate that object and use do not coincide. is not because they make an individual decision,
Metacanonical uses confirm that it would be very or randomly discover their function, but because
strange that every specific use could only be realit is what their ancestors have done for ages.
ized with a unique object. These are ancient objects, manufactured with a
Another consequence of knowing functional clear purpose (Tilley et al., 2006), they are part
uses is that children become able to self-regulate of the cultural practices that transcend individual
and correct themselves when they have difficul- decisions, that is, socially conveyed knowledge.
ties with these uses. This fact has important con- During ontogenesis, children have to acquire this
sequences. The first is that language cannot con- knowledge, internalize the objects’ social rules of
tinue to be considered the first nor the unique use. Our first step was to study this process.
instrument of self-regulation. Although within In the first edition (Rodríguez, 2007), we
the “semiotic approach” of sociocultural psychol- described the longitudinal study in which six
ogy, language is the privileged semiotic system Spanish children (Rodríguez & Moro, 1999) and
(Vygotski, 1934/1985; Rivière, 1985; Bronckart, six Swiss children (Moro & Rodríguez, 2005)
2002), while gestures and uses are now recog- were observed in their homes at 7, 10, and
nized for their self-regulation utility. This con- 13 months of age, interacting with their mothers,
firms that executive functions are functional from a replica telephone and a shape sorter truck.1
the end of the first year of life, before language Children performed three types of uses:
occupies the hegemonic place. (1) non canonical, (2) protocanonical, and
We will end with numerical uses. There is an (3) functional or canonical. Despite the various
important debate between advocators of the com- efforts by their mothers, children at seven months
never used those objects according to their func- ing the canonical use of cups and telephones
tion, that is, canonically. They did not interpret implies using any cup as a cup, any telephone as
their mothers’ intentions when pointed at and a telephone (see discussion in Rodríguez, 2012).
touched the hole through which the blocks were This does not seem farfetched if we consider that
meant to fit in the shape sorter. The children also objects in daily life are functionally permanent to
performed protocanonical uses when “riding” on adults, who relate to children on the basis of this
the adult’s functional action as a consequence assumption.
of the magnet effect: the adult’s action on the Functional permanence may be a pragmatic
object was like a “powerful magnet” to the child, link in the origin of concepts.3 If first concepts,
who stretched his/her hands toward it. Some relative to the function of objects, are rooted
canonical, or functional, uses were performed at in socially shared everyday meanings, they may
10 months and increased at 13 months, by which arise as a product of educative interactions, and
time the children also understood the moth- functional uses may play a major role in their
ers’ intentions when they used gestures (see development.
Dimitrova & Moro, 2013 on the relationship
between understanding adult gestures and object
12.2 Rhythmic-Sonorous Uses
function).
of Objects
Adults did not behave as though children
learned by “direct” imitation (if they had done Rhythm is ubiquitous in children’s lives from
so, they would have repeated the canonical use the moment of birth. Piaget (1936/1977) referred
over and over). Their actions were diverse and to rhythm in the movements of his newborn
adjusted to the children’s actions, first stress- children. Rhythm is such an essential fea-
ing ostensive interventions2 (with gestures or ture of baby–adult interaction (Papoušek, 1996;
uses in which the objects were always part of Trevarthen, 2003; Reddy, 2008, 2012; Trehub,
the communicative act) and subsequently, invi- 2003) that if it was stripped away not much would
tations. Adults also performed many gestures of be left (Perinat, 1993; see also Chapter 11, this
varying degrees of semiotic complexity, of which volume). A classic example is the way moth-
the most efficacious were ostensive gestures (sign ers rock their children making use of babies’
and referent coincide) such as showing, giv- pauses while nursing (Kaye, 1982/1986). Con-
ing, or placing objects to children (Rodríguez sidering biological rhythms, such as breathing
et al., 2015). Adults also realized pointing ges- tempo, heart rate, or intensity of body move-
tures, either touching or keeping a distance to the ments, and consistently acting according to
referent. them, improves adult–child interaction (Foster &
An important insight derived from these stud- Kreitzman, 2004). All that is very helpful with
ies is that when children use objects canoni- hospitalized infants in music therapy sessions
cally, it is because they have acquired a type (Del Olmo, Rodríguez, & Ruza, 2010).
of functional permanence, shared with the com- However, “triadic rhythms”, when there is an
munity. This permanence is not the same as object between the adult and the child, have
Piaget’s (physical) permanence of the object, or gone unnoticed. Adults do not present objects to
as the permanence recently proposed by sup- children “anyhow”, but in an organized, rhyth-
porters of the “competent baby” (Rochat, 2012; mic manner, often adding sonority (Rodríguez
Karmiloff-Smith, 2012). Functional permanence & Moro, 2008).4 The rhythmic-sonorous com-
allows objects to be considered not as unique ponents facilitate making the objects shared ref-
specimens, but as members of classes. Know- erents. Triadic rhythmic interactions start very
Figure 12.1 Triadic interaction. L. (age two months) pays

attention to her mother’s rhythmic-sonorous use of the rattle
and begins to use it herself according to function (Moreno-
Núñez, Rodríguez, & del Olmo, 2017). (a) At two months,
L. pays attention to the ostensive gesture of the rattle when
presented by her mother. The rattle is both sign and referent at
the same time. (b) At four months, L. holds the rattle offered by
her mother. (c) L. shakes it slightly while watching her mother.
early (sometimes even as early as at age one any initiative him/herself. Before knowing it, the
or two months5 ), when the adult communicates child is already a “user according to function”
intentionally by presenting and using objects for when the adult “lends his/her intentions”.
the child, sharing the same referent (see Figure Rhythmic-sonorous uses (along with non-
12.1), and introducing the child in “his own final- canonical uses) are the first uses of objects that
ized action”. These joint actions clearly illustrate children perform without the help of others. As
how the adult introduces the child to the func- shown in Figure 12.1, by four months, children
tional use of the object long before the child takes start using rattles according to its function, by
shaking them and producing sound. These are the between objects (signifier and signified). How-
first instances, however rudimentary, of an instru- ever, according to Vygotski (1931/1995b) sim-
ment being used according to its social function. ilarity is not perceptual (related to how objects
By six months, children are active agents, seek- look) but functional (related to how objects
ing and producing sounds with any object. And are used). This is a key point because canon-
7-month-olds produce sounds by banging objects ical – functional – uses of objects may be the
together. At 10 months children are “skillful per- root of symbolic uses.6 Similarity should be
cussionists” (Rodríguez & Moro, 1999). found between uses (canonical and symbolic),
Rhythmic-sonorous uses deserve special atten- not between objects (Rodríguez et al., 2014).
tion for two other reasons: (1) because very little Developmental psychology is not conclusive
is known about musical development during the regarding the emergence of first symbols. What
first years of life, and (2) because rhythm may be are the minimum requirements for a given behav-
a basic ingredient for cultural (canonical, sym- ior to be considered symbolic? According to the
bolic, self-regulatory, metacanonical or numeri- prevailing position, there needs to be substitution
cal) uses of objects in general. of one object by another (El’konin, 1966; Leslie,
1987; Lillard et al., 2013; Piaget, 1945/1976;
Tomasello, 1999), for instance, when pretending
12.3 Symbolic Uses of Objects:
to “eat with a pencil” (where the pencil represents
What is Their Relationship to
the spoon). However, it seems difficult to claim
Functional Uses?
that “eating” with an empty spoon is not symbolic
Another milestone in early development is when because it is the same spoon with which eating is
children produce symbols, representing absent effectively performed.
objects or situations with differentiated signi- Following Vygotski, the functional uses of
fiers (Bronckart, 2012; Español, 2004; Martí, objects seem good candidates as anchor points
2012; Rivière, 1990). There is plenty of litera- for symbols. To pretend one is eating with an
ture on symbols, nevertheless, several questions empty spoon, or one is talking on a replica mobile
remain, such as in what previous meanings are telephone, one needs to know that spoons are
they rooted. For instance, according to Leslie used for eating and mobile telephones for talking.
(1987) and Baron-Cohen and Swettenham (1996) The conventional rules of use arise from “gen-
previous meanings are literal. Piaget claims that uine” objects, from where they “transfer” and are
there is no need for previous conventions. Sym- applied to (1) situations different from the every-
bols are solitary products, although he does not day, such as “eating” with an empty spoon out of
explain how he managed to understand his chil- context (level 1); (2) to different objects, by sub-
dren (Piaget, 1945/1976; Belsky & Most, 1981; stitution, such as “eating” with a pencil (level 2);
McCune, 1995). Another position that is gain- (3) without an object, with the empty hand rep-
ing ground is that the child requires meanings resenting the spoon (level 3); and (4) narratives
agreed on with others regarding objects as the of symbols in action, when several symbols are
basis for symbolic uses (Barthélémy-Musso, Tar- linked (level 4) (Palacios et al., 2016).
tas & Guidetti, 2013; Rodríguez, 2006; Vygotski, Symbolic and canonical uses differ in that
1931/1995a; Wallon, 1942/1970; Zittoun, 2010). canonical uses must be efficacious (if one eats
Another unresolved issue is that of similar- with a spoon, the contents must reach the
ity between symbol and referent. The domi- mouth without spilling), and efficient (if pos-
nant position (explicit or implicit) is Piaget’s sible, without dirtying oneself), whereas sym-
(1945/1976), which claims that similarity exists bolic uses need not be – no one gets dirty while
pretending to eat. How does this “functional even more so in children with different devel-
knowledge” affects the origin of symbols? The opmental paths, for example, autism or Down
adult as a guide plays an important role in this syndrome. This information may help to guide
process. But we do not know of any studies on the actions of child educators and early child-
how children construct their first symbols in tri- care professionals. Since children with Down
adic interaction with adults, even though the need syndrome tend to have delayed language devel-
to study this topic has been widely recognized opment, nonverbal communication works as a
(Adamson, Bakeman, & Deckner, 2004; Carpen- strategy to compensate their linguistic deficits
dale & Lewis, 2004, Göncü & Gaskins, 2011). (Jackson-Maldonado, Badillo, & Aguilar, 2010).
In various triadic interaction studies with chil- It is thus highly relevant to understand prelinguis-
dren with typical7 and atypical development, tic semiotic systems, including symbols.
adults communicate using objects symbolically In general, more variability was observed in
long before children do. And that works! Chil- the symbolic uses of children with Down syn-
dren pay attention and include themselves in drome8 than in typically developing children. In
the adults’ symbolic scenarios. The first symbols triadic situations with their mothers, they per-
(the more frequent ones) occur with the same formed their first symbolic uses between 12
object with which canonical use is made (level and 21 months’ chronological age (Cárdenas,
1). Although they are “very close” to canoni- Rodríguez, & Palacios, 2014), much earlier than
cal uses, they are still symbols because they are usually mentioned in the literature (mental age is
abbreviated and lack the efficacy of the missing considered to enable comparison with typically
elements. Nevertheless, symbols by substitution developing children).
(level 2) or without material support (level 3) are The diversity and complexity of symbols per-
not usual. Sometimes adults correct “inadequate” formed may be influenced by the greater or lesser
children symbols, such as “drinking” from a plas- complexity of the proposals from adults. It is
tic replica horse (see observations in Palacios important for the adult to know what the child is
et al., 2016). able to do, to promote increasingly complex uses
Children also perform the first and most fre- (see Figure 12.2). Knowledge of each individual
quent symbolic uses with the same object of the should prevail over any stereotypical belief about
canonical use (level 1). A very interesting exam- “what children with Down syndrome can or can-
ple happens with the instrument spoon. The sym- not do” at early ages (Cárdenas, 2012, p. 232).
bolic use (Palacios et al., 2016) is very different It is well known that peer interaction provides
from the functional one when they effectively eat an important source of learning at nursery school
with it (Ishiguro, 2016; Rodríguez, Estrada, et al., (Amorim, dos Anjos, & Rossetti-Ferreira, 2012;
2017). Li, 2012). It could be thought that the specific
The low percentage of symbols by substitu- object is irrelevant in the production of sym-
tion and in absentia shows the complexity of bols, however, this is not true. In a study car-
transferring the rule of use to other objects or ried out at the nursery school about peer inter-
without material support, suggesting that rules action,9 it became apparent that with replica
for canonical uses disengage gradually from the objects, children aged 11 months already pro-
niche where they first arose, in order to be “trans- duced symbols with the same object of the func-
ferred” (to other objects or to no object). tional use (level 1). What is noteworthy here is
Knowing whether or not a child produces sym- that the observed symbolic level remained sim-
bols (their first manifestations should be iden- ple. Children aged 15–24 months did not per-
tified) is important in typical development, and form more complex symbols by substitution or
Figure 12.2. V. interacting with her mother performing symbolic uses of objects (Cárdenas,
Rodríguez, Miranda-Zapata and Palacios, forthcoming). (a) At 21 months old, V. with DS offering the
doll to her mother. (b) V. “talking” on the telephone. (c) V. positioning the mobile phone near the doll
for it to “talk.”
without material! Replica objects did not reflect ond year of life when they apply, through gener-
children’s more advanced symbolic ability. One alization, the rule of canonical use to any object
possible explanation is that replica objects facil- which enables an efficacious result. One exam-
itate the first symbols at 11 or 12 months, but ple was observed with a 13-month-old child
may limit higher symbolic levels later on. These (Rodríguez & Moro, 1999). During the record-
objects are “strongly marked” and it is difficult to ing session he used the shape sorter effectively
turn them into something else. and a few minutes later went to the kitchen and
In an ongoing study on 20 children, aged 11 to showed the hollow plastic block to the mother,
21 months, everyday artifacts were added (Yuste, asking her to fill it with water, thus doubling the
Rodríguez & de los Reyes, forthcoming). Pre- use of the plastic block as a cup. This was not
liminary results show that 11-month-olds with an a symbol since the child was not pretending to
expert peer perform symbolic uses (level 1) with drink from the shape, but rather wanted to use it
replica objects. At 13, 15, 17, 18, and 21 months, as a functional cup to hold real water.
they produce more complex symbols (level 2 by
substitution and level 3 in absentia), but only
with artifacts. These first results seem to confirm
12.4 Functional Uses of Objects
the “ceiling effect” of replica objects. The type
and Executive Functions before
of object seems to influence the symbolic level
Language
achieved by children who do not yet talk. This In the sociocultural tradition, language is the
important finding needs to be explored further on. instrument of self-regulation (see Winsler, 2009,
We will finish the section by referring to meta- for a review). Vygotski dedicated much atten-
canonical uses. Halfway between canonical and tion to private speech due to its “transitional”
symbolic uses are the metacanonical uses, which status between communication with others, and
are efficacious and efficient, like canonical uses, self-regulation or communication with oneself.
but performed with objects or instruments which Katherine Nelson (2015) recently studied the
were not designed for that purpose. They are “crib speech” of children alone in their cot before
“creative uses” very frequent in everyday life. sleeping. She considers it “private in a double
Children begin to perform them during the sec- sense (1) being addressed to the self (2) with
no one else present” (p. 172). Self-regulation ring on a vertical pivot, she began producing self-
comes from the internalization of semiotic tools directed gestures before attempting the complex
employed previously with others (Wertsch, 1979; use, without asking her parents for help. We pub-
Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976; Tartas, Perret- lished a paper dealing exclusively with this obser-
Clermont, & Baucal, 2016). Luria (1979) devel- vation session (Rodríguez & Palacios, 2007). In a
ops this tradition in neuropsychology: the pre- detailed analysis we identified these behaviors as
frontal cortex and other neurological systems private gestures (ostensive gestures and immedi-
form interactive – not modular – functional sys- ate pointing gestures) with a self-regulatory pur-
tems, which enables conscious regulation of one’s pose. As she was unable to achieve her aim –
own behavior. placing ring on the stick – she corrected again
Now, is language the first and unique instru- and again. And although she did not say any-
ment for cognitive self-regulation? Can other pre- thing during the session, there was no doubt that
vious semiotic systems serve that purpose? If the she was attempting to use the object according
answer to the second question is “yes,” we must to its function. There was also no doubt that she
say which and from when they are functional. knew what the function was, but had difficulties
There is increasing support within the socio- regarding how to do it. It had become a cogni-
cultural paradigm for the idea that private ges- tive challenge, which is why she sought various
tures are used for self-regulation and may be solutions with private gestures before attempting
precursors for self-regulation through language it repeated times.10 Language, therefore, is nei-
(Delgado, Gómez & Sarriá, 2009, 2011). Chil- ther the first nor the only instrument for cognitive
dren direct pointing gestures toward themselves self-regulation.
with a private, contemplative function (Bates, Instruments can also be used for self-
Camaioni & Volterra, 1975) before pointing regulation. Two recent studies on children 11 to
to others (Carpendale & Carpendale, 2010). 18 months old (Basilio & Rodríguez, 2011; 2016)
Symbolic and aesthetic self-directed gestures showed once again that triadic interactions with
(Español, 2006), such as shaking the head to for- complex objects and instruments11 provide sce-
bid and signs taught in nurseries as part of the narios that are highly appropriate for triggering
Baby Signs Program (Vallotton, 2008), may also self-regulatory behavior with preverbal signs. In
serve for self-regulation. both studies, we observed children’s use of pri-
Besides, if children already know the func- vate gestures (ostensive, indexical, and symbolic
tional uses of some objects of their everyday life, gestures), supporting previous preliminary evi-
we should ask what place do this knowledge has dence suggesting that these gestures may be the
within the first forms of cognitive self-regulation early precursors of private speech.
when, for instance, they have difficulties with the Moreover, the conventional uses of these
functional use to which they hope to arrive. The objects allow researcher to interpret children’s
timing of the first manifestations of executive semiotic productions reliably in relation to the
functions (end of the first year of live) (Zelazo regulation of their actions when using the objects
& Müller, 2004) fits very well with the idea that conventionally. For example, if a child is attempt-
gestures and objects can serve a function for self- ing to put a ball through a hole with a hammer,
regulation before language. tries several times but fails, and at that moment
In a longitudinal case study with N., a child the child extends her arm to show the hammer to
with Down syndrome, on the last day of record- her father, one can interpret such ostensive ges-
ing, when N. was 18 months old, an interesting ture as a request for help (Basilio & Rodríguez,
situation took place. As N. could not insert a 2011; see also Moreno-Núñez, Rodríguez, &
Figure 12.3 Self-regulation with private gestures and protocanonical uses. At 11-month-old, I.
self-regulates with private gestures and protocanonical uses until he is able to use the spoon
according to function. His teacher presents a challenge, which the child accepts. (a) The teacher
places the spoon in the plate: “How about it?” She confronts him with a new challenge. (b) After
grasping the spoon, I. performs protocanonical uses, sliding the spoon left to right and right to left as
he seeks the right position to fill it. (c) I. seeks the position through private ostensive gestures with
the spoon. He alternates protocanonical uses and private gestures. (d) He finally manages to eat with
the spoon – functional use – with the dessert. He achieves the aim set for him with the puree. Source:
Rodríguez, Estrada, et al., 2017.
Miranda-Zapata, forthcoming). It is the precise with the spoon – dragging it horizontally left
circumstance of the performance of the gesture to right, right to left, inside and outside the
in relation to the use of the object (Rodríguez, dish, constantly approaching the goal. Finally,
2009) which gives an observer the grounds for and without seeking any help (rejecting it when
interpreting the cognitive function of this com- the teacher tries to guide his hand to his mouth),
municative behavior. Asking for help is a widely he manages to eat dessert with the spoon.
accepted behavior interpreted as a self-regulatory This case illustrates that executive functions
control strategy. It implies knowledge of how begin at the end of the first year of life (Zelazo
(a) the goal has not been achieved, (b) the cur- & Müller, 2004), and material objects (here,
rent strategy is not working therefore a different an instrument) are protagonists in this process
one is needed, (c) that someone knows how to through self-directed gestures and uses. We join
achieve the goal, and (d) how to communicate the voices claiming the need to study self-
this request. Not only did children self-regulate regulation and executive functions in their socio-
with private gestures, but they could also do so in cultural contexts (Moro, 2012; Müller & Kerns,
communicative situations such as this. 2015).
We shall conclude this section with a case
study of a child (I.) aged 11 months and 9 days,
12.5 From the Uses of Objects
regarding the first manifestations of executive
in Interaction with an Adult to
functions at mealtime at the nursery school12
Numerical Uses
(Rodríguez, Estrada, et al., 2017). Child I. man-
ages to eat with the spoon after a laborious pro- There is an open debate since the 1980s regard-
cess of self-regulation. He knows that spoons are ing whether babies possess or not early numerical
for eating, but at the beginning of the session, he abilities. According to the advocators of the com-
does not know how to do it himself. After ask- petent baby paradigm (Spelke, 2000), the baby
ing his teacher with gestures (symbolic, pointing, would come equipped with the concept of num-
emotional) to feed him (as usual) and faced by ber as a core knowledge. However, children aged
her refusal (she challenges him by placing the 3 or 4 have many difficulties to functionally use
plate of puree and the spoon within his reach, numbers (Martí, Scheuer, & de la Cruz, 2013).
“How about it?”), I. begins a series of increas- There is, therefore, the following paradox. If chil-
ingly successful approaches to the goal he is dren are so competent at birth and already have
given: to eat alone, without help, using the spoon the concept of numbers: Why are they such slow
(see Figure 12.3). The first obstacle is how to learners and such clumsy users of numbers (even
hold the spoon to eat, anticipating its future use with small quantities) in everyday life situations,
(11-month-olds do not have problems with hold- between two and four years of age? (see discus-
ing objects), and he performs successive attempts sion in Rodríguez & Scheuer, 2015).
at holding. He tells himself that “he is hungry” Part of the debate on the use of numbers is
with private symbolic gestures of “eating.” After related to the fact that only what is segmented
much hesitation and attempts at holding, he man- can be counted (what is continuous cannot be
ages to pick up the spoon. The next obstacle counted). It also relates to what to count and for
is how to fill it with puree. He self-regulates what to count. This seems trivial, but without
with private ostensive gestures (changes the hand practical and pragmatic aims, why would children
holding the spoon repeatedly, looking at it care- want to use numbers?
fully, in order to find the best position), with pri- It is very striking what we found in a study.
vate pointing gestures and protocanonical uses At 24 months, the children could not have
Figure 12.4 Numerical uses of objects. P. interacting with his

mother, performing the pony task at ages 27 and 33 months.
(a) The mother points at/touches the dots to quantify them
rhythmically (ooone, twooo, . . . ), while the child, at 27 months,
watches his mother’s demonstration. (b) Six months later, the
mother guides P.’s hand to point at/touch each dot, while P.,
aged 33 months, accompanies the action rhythmically with
numerical words (ooone, twooo, . . . ). Source: Cavalcante &
Rodríguez, 2015.
comprehended the aim of the game – a “pony” reached the “food.” At 24 months of age, children
(replica) was “hungry” (see Figure 12.4) and had had serious difficulties with the numerical part
to reach “food” (represented by a bottle top) at of the task, despite the enormous help of their
the end of a “road” (represented by a strip of mothers. Children used the die as a “projectile”
rubber) – without some conventional-symbolic to knock the pony down, as a “seat” for the pony,
understanding enabling them to accept all that or took the pony directly to the “food,” without
(Cavalcante & Rodríguez, 2015).13 ever resorting to numbers either to count the dots
The aim was to “feed” the “hungry” pony by on the die or the squares on the road.
(1) rolling the die, (2) counting the dots, and (3) They also had difficulties counting the dots of
moving the pony forward along the road by the the die. And when they achieved that, they had
number of squares indicated by the die, until it problems in using the numerical information to
count the squares of the road where the pony ing” the numerical system in prior semiotic
was meant to advance. There was a misalignment systems (that children could understand and
between both things. employ).
Nevertheless, in the last session, at 36 months In short, success in children’s play with the
of age, they used the die conventionally, or die suggests that the numerical uses of objects
counted the dots, to regulate the pony’s progress are based on semiotic systems previously con-
along the squares. Between the first and last ses- structed with adults. These results question seri-
sions, the children gradually understood the rules ously the nativist approach to numbers.
of the game and the conventional – numerical –
uses of the objects.
12.6 Conclusions
In most studies on this subject, children resolve
tasks alone (Martí, Scheuer, & de la Cruz, 2013). As everybody knows, in their first years of life
In our study,14 children received help from their children do not communicate as adults do. It is
mothers. We analyzed the use of objects and ges- also obvious that children and adults differ in the
tures performed by the children at ages 24, 27, 30, way they use objects.
33, and 36 months and their mothers. We do not There is a great amount of research devoted to
know of any other longitudinal studies on num- communicative and linguistic development; the
bers in triadic interaction (Cavalcante, 2016; Cav- same does not apply with objects. One impor-
alcante & Rodríguez, 2015). tant reason is that psychology often has natural-
Particularly interesting was the new function ized the material world, considering objects as
of pointing gestures15 as a support for counting the “physical reality,” with only physical proper-
(Graham, 1999; Schaeffer, Eggleston, & Scott, ties. Often psychology has ignored that humans
1974). The mothers and children pointed at (usu- use objects in the everyday life according to
ally by touching) and accompanied by a numer- their function, to their pragmatic properties. For-
ical word, the dots on the dice and the squares tunately, this reasoning is changing. Voices are
on the road to count (see Figure 12.4). This new gaining ground within the sociocultural psychol-
use of the pointing gesture highlights the fact ogy field reclaiming a social status of objects
that any entity, which is counted, must be treated as part of the material culture (Moro & Muller
as a single, segmented, item (Fuson, 1988), with Mirza, 2012; Sinha, 2014, see also Chapter 1, this
one-to-one correspondence (Gelman & Gallistel, volume).
1978). The same happens within the ecological per-
Another striking observation was that moth- spectives. Alan Costall (2012) for instance, refers
ers pointed at and touched the dots on the die to canonical or cultural affordances. They dif-
while rhythmically saying, “ooone, twooo, three, fer from affordances (Gibson, 1979/2014) in that
and fooour,” for example (see Figure 12.4). cultural factors influence canonical affordances.
Rhythmic-sonorous aspects were key to ensur- Culture in chimpanzees gain further ground, for
ing correspondence between numerical words, example, when they use or make instruments or
dots, and the pony’s progress along the squares. convey techniques to new generations (Goodall,
Some children did it at 30 months. Sometimes 1990).
children and mothers performed joint actions, To say children “explore” objects is absolute
for example, one pointing and the other count- banal. Children only “explore” objects when they
ing (Cavalcante & Rodríguez, 2015). Adults’ realize noncanonical uses. When they do not
multimodal interventions (language, gestures, know the rules of use and do with objects what
uses of objects) were essential for “anchor- they physically allow.
In this chapter, we have examined the fol- interactions start at the beginning. And little by
lowing cultural uses: rhythmic-sonorous, pro- little children take the initiative through their first
tocanonical, canonical or functional, symbolic, year of life.
metacanonical, uses with a self-regulatory func- (2) Adults also realize cultural uses –
tion, and numerical uses. These uses are linked rhythmic-sonorous, canonical or functional, sym-
between them. Their development during the bolic, metacanonical, numerical uses, and so on –
firsts years of life is spectacular. Their presence, for children. When children can do them, both
as a cascade, follows a developmental “ordered” adults and children take part in a common ground
path. of meanings in the everyday life.
Canonical or functional uses have a pivotal sta- (3) This common ground affects how they com-
tus. Once children use objects by their function, municate. Everybody knows that. Once children
according to specific rules, in the everyday life, use spoons to eat, adults adapt their tools of com-
they become permanent by their function. This munication to this functional shared knowledge.
means they are not unique exemplars, as they The communicative scenario is very explicit
become members of classes. And the commu- when adults present the spoon for the first
nity of users shares classes (any spoon belongs time to children: gestures, diverse demonstra-
to the class of the spoons, any telephone, any tions of use, invitations, suggestions, challenges,
house, any car belong to a class and we know it as and so on, will be part of it. Shared knowledge
users). If first concepts are related to this “every- between adults and children about the function of
day doing things in an user’s community,” func- objects and instruments impacts communicative
tional permanence may be a pragmatic link in the intention.
origin of concepts (Rodríguez, 2015). Once an (4) When an adult uses an object for the child,
object has functional permanence and becomes the object used (regardless of the use) is part of
a member of a class, the door is open to new the communicative act. This use is a referent and
and more complex uses. If children and adults a sign at the same time. This means that objects
understand symbolic uses, it is because there is can be part of the communicative act. The same
similarity between uses (symbolic and canoni- happens with children. When adults and children
cal), not between objects. The same happens with use objects, they communicate with each other.
metacanonical uses. Symbolic uses, metacanoni- This is essential when objects have no names
cal uses, numerical uses, and self-regulation are yet for children. All that is part of the “life of
based in a way or on another in this functional objects.”
knowledge. In conclusion, objects are social in a double
More complex forms of communication arise sense, because (a) they are part of the material
with symbolic, metacanonical, self-regulating, culture, and (b) often they are part of the commu-
and numerical uses. We have stressed several nicative act. This implies that objects need to be
things about the cultural uses. included as protagonists in a pragmatic turn that
(1) Infants produce rhythmic-sonorous uses considers seriously what happens in the everyday
(the most basic cultural ones) owing to adults’ life with them.
interventions. As we have shown, they might
appear as early as two months of age. They are
Acknowledgments
users before knowing it, in joint action scenarios,
when the other offers her/his intentions and intro- This chapter has been written with the support of
duces him/her into a functional material universe. the Ministry of Economy of Spain (EDU2015–
They know it later in development. First triadic 64129-P MINECO: FEDER). We would like to
thank Alberto Rosa for very valuable comments the same) often at all three ages. They gave it to
on previous drafts of the chapter. their children more often as age increased from
two to four months, inviting the children to be
agents. Adult rhythmic-sonorous structured uses
Notes
(with pauses) were more frequent than nonstruc-
1 Other common denominators among the stud- tured (without pauses). Structured uses enabled
ies addressed in this chapter are: (1) longitudi- children to become involved and pay more atten-
nal design, (2) naturalistic settings (participants’ tion. Nonstructured uses occurred more frequently
homes or room at nursery school), (3) all inter- at two months, when children have greater diffi-
actions observed were triadic: adult–child–object culty in becoming involved in the adult’s action.
(or sometimes child–object–child); the instructions At two months, parents tapped the rattle directly
were “play with your child as you usually do,” and on the child’s body (immediate demonstrations).
(4) they all used micro-genetic analyses. They did less often at three and four months. How-
2 Adults performed distant demonstrations (i.e., ever, they placed the rattle in the child’s hand
using the object itself to communicate about the and performed joint rhythmic-sonorous uses at two
object), immediate demonstrations (involving chil- months, increasing at three and four months. The
dren directly in the uses), and preparations and children were very active and nearly all of them
adjustments (to facilitate use). This resulted in held the rattle given to them by the adult as from
episodes of joint action as from seven months of two months. Some of them did so on their own ini-
age. tiative at three months.
3 Rosch, known for her theory of prototypes, recently 6 At another level, according to Alessandroni (2016),
proposed an “ecological” theory for the ordinary the emergence of metaphorical though does not
use of concepts: “concepts, categories and other proceed from a transparent world, but it is an emer-
conceptualisations are participating parts in life gent result from prelinguistic cultural semiotic sys-
games” (Rosch 2009, p. 202, cited in Duque & tems.
Packer, 2014). 7 In two longitudinal studies on Spanish children at
4 In a longitudinal study on three parents and their ages 9, 12, and 15 months (Palacios & Rodríguez,
children at ages two, four, and six months, at home, 2015) and Mexican children at ages 9, 12, 15,
parents and children were given three rings con- and 18 months (Palacios et al., 2016), dyads were
taining beads (which rattled when shaken) and allowed to interact freely with 10 everyday objects:
three hollow rings (which did not rattle). Adults replica objects – rag doll, plastic horse and mobile
preferred the rattling rings and performed many telephone; artifacts (human-made objects) – empty
rhythmic-sonorous uses which helped segment and pot of skin cream, lighter, toothbrush, rag, empty
organize their own action for the child. At four cardboard box with a string attached to one end,
and six months, children paid close attention both and wooden spoon; and a natural object – a rock.
to the adult and to their own actions. The magnet Adults performed symbols to communicate with
effect occurred when children stretched their arms 9-month-olds. They created scenarios, delimiting
out towards the adult’s action, triggering episodes structure, content, and objects involved. Most of
of joint action. By six months, children were active the symbols were level 1: using the same object
agents, seeking and producing sounds themselves involved in functional use.
(Moreno-Núñez, Rodríguez & del Olmo, 2015). 8 In two longitudinal studies using the same objects,
5 In another study (Moreno-Núñez, Rodríguez & a similar pattern was observed in children with
del Olmo, 2017), children at two, three, and Down syndrome – chronological ages 12 to 21
four months old were offered a very light rattle months (Cárdenas, 2012; Cárdenas, Rodríguez &
(see Figure 12.1) of which the functional use is Palacios, 2014; Cárdenas et al., forthcoming). The
sonorous. Mothers showed the rattle (ostensive ges- first symbolic uses were performed with the refer-
tures are the simplest, as sign and referent are ent object, e.g., “eating” with an empty spoon or
“talking” on the telephone (see Figure 12.2). It is complex objects impose cognitive challenges once
confirmed that similarity exists between uses – a children understand and internalise their goals:
symbolic use present to the observer and another putting shapes through the right holes, hammer-
conventional use which is absent, represented by ing balls until they fall into the box, position-
the symbol. Object substitution and symbolic nar- ing and turning keys to unlock doors. These chal-
ratives in action were also observed, as occurred in lenges present the need for self-regulation. This is
18-month-old, typically developing children. of paramount importance when eliciting children’s
9 In a study on symbols in peer interaction, ages 9 self-regulatory behaviours, because without a cog-
months to 24 months, at nursery school (Yuste, nitive challenge, self-regulation is not necessary
2012), we used replica objects included in the (think of the difficulties of a rattle compared to
supplies received at nursery schools, with which these complex objects).
the children were familiar. These replicas were 12 La Cigüeña María in Madrid.
(1) set of dishes and cutlery, including plates, forks, 13 At age 12 months, children made a replica pony
spoons, cups, and glasses; (2) hair styling set, “gallop,” or “galloped” themselves, or the parents
including dolls with hair, brushes, combs, and dry- made a doll gallop on the pony (see Palacios &
ers; and (3) telephone set, including complete tele- Rodríguez, 2015; Palacios et al., 2016).
phones, mobile telephone, and headset. It was con- 14 Mothers were to play with their children, following
firmed that the production of symbols is a grad- the rules as far as possible. Two boys and one girl,
ual process. Nine-month-olds did not produce sym- at ages 24, 27, 30, 33, and 36 months, were filmed
bols, but 12-month-olds did, even when interact- at home with their mothers. They had never played
ing with young peers rather than adults. Symbols with dice before.
were level 1: they “eat,” “drink,” or “push the food 15 In contrast, there is a vast literature about younger
around the plate”; they “comb” their own or com- children pointing to objects (Butterworth, 2003;
panion’s hair. They “talk” on the telephone. At 15, Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). See
18, 21, and 24 months, children produced sym- also the section about self-regulation with private
bols during longer times and symbolic narratives in gestures.
action (Palacios et al., 2016), always at level 1, with
the object of functional use. At 24 months they set
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13 Distinguishing Two Processes of
Self-reflection
Alex Gillespie
Self-reflection can be defined as a temporary phe- Four types of theory can be distinguished: rup-
nomenological experience in which self becomes ture theories, mirror theories, conflict theories,
an object to oneself. According to theorists like and internalization theories. In order to address
Mead and Vygotsky, self-reflection is a defining the limitations of these theories, Mead’s theory
feature of humans and fundamental to the higher of the social act is advanced. These theories are
mental processes such as self-regulation. Central then evaluated against an empirical instance of
to a sociocultural approach to self-reflection is self-reflection and a novel conception of complex
the idea that it entails using semiotic mediators semiotic systems is proposed.
to distantiate from self and the immediate situa-
tion (Valsiner, 1998). 13.1 Rupture Theories
Naming (i.e., using a semiotic mediator to pick
out) an affective experience or a situation dis- Rupture theories of self-reflection posit that
tances the individual from that experience or sit- self-reflection arises when one’s path of action
uation. Furthermore, such naming turns self and becomes blocked or when one faces a decision of
the situation into objects among other objects in some sort. Peirce provides an early articulation of
the social world (i.e., capable of being the object this idea:
of action). For example, in order to conceptual- If for instance, in a horse-car, I pull out my purse
ize obtaining dinner one must first name either and find a five-cent nickel and five coppers, I
one’s hunger or the object to be eaten. This nam- decide, while my hand is going to the purse, in
ing, which is a moment of self-reflection, is the which way I will pay my fare. . . . To speak of such
first step in beginning to construct, semiotically, a doubt as causing an irritation which needs
a path of action that will lead to dinner. to be appeased, suggests a temper which is
What triggers this process of semiotic media- uncomfortable to the verge of insanity. Yet looking
tion? Exactly how do semiotic mediators enable at the matter minutely, it must be admitted that, if
distancing in general and self-reflection in partic- there is the least hesitation as to whether I shall pay
the five coppers or the nickel (as there will sure to
ular? What is it in the structure of semiotic medi-
be, unless I act from some previously contracted
ators, or signs, that enables this “stepping out”
habit in the matter), though irritation is too strong
from immediate experience? And how are these
a word, yet I am excited to such small mental
signs combined into complex semiotic systems activities as may be necessary in deciding how
(representations, discourses, cultural artifacts, or I shall act. . . . Images pass rapidly through
symbolic resources) that provide even greater lib- consciousness, one incessantly melting into
eration from the immediate situation? another, until at last, when all is over – it may be
The present chapter will address these ques- in a fraction of a second, in an hour, or after long
tions by beginning with a review of sociocul- years – we find ourselves decided as to how we
tural theories of the origins of self-reflection. should act. (Peirce, 1878/1998, pp. 141–142)
246 alex gillespie
According to Peirce, the problematic situation and semiotic mediation that enables us to become
stimulates reflective thought. Even a small irri- aware of such contradictions.
tation, or rupture, can stimulate a stream of Piaget (1970) offers a more contemporary vari-
thought. This is a phenomenological experience ant of the rupture theory. According to Piaget the
that many people would be inclined to agree with. child is forced to abstract and reorganize his/her
But why should a rupture spontaneously generate developing schemas when those schemas lead to
the semiotic system necessary for distancing? unfulfilled expectations. For example, the child
Dewey (1896), developing Peirce’s ideas, expects the consequence of action X to be Y,
argued that in the ruptured situation the object but instead the consequence of action X is Z.
ceases, from the perspective of the actor, to Like the other rupture theorists, Piaget points
be objective and becomes, so to speak, subjec- to a proximal cause of self-reflection, namely a
tive. Specifically, the object becomes subjective problematic situation, but he does not give us
because the actor has two or more responses much purchase on the semiotic processes through
toward the object. Dewey gives the example of a which self-reflection arises. Again, one can ask,
child reaching for a flame. The child is attracted why should a rupture stimulate the emergence
to the flame because it looks like something to of semiotic mediators? In order to address this
play with; but the child is also afraid of the question we need to move beyond the subjectob-
flame because of a previous burn. Thus there ject relation that Dewey and Piaget were working
are two contradictory responses in the child: to with, and examine the self–other social relation.
reach toward the flame and to withdraw from the
flame. It is due to the disjunction between these
two responses, Dewey argues, that self-reflection 13.2 Mirror Theories
arises.
The defining feature of mirror theories of self-
Mead (1910; see also Gillespie, 2005) criti-
reflection, compared to the rupture theories, is the
cized this theory arguing that there is nothing in
presence of a significant social other. These the-
having two contradictory responses which neces-
ories assume that the other perceives more about
sarily leads to self-reflection. In nonhuman ani-
self than self can perceive. The reflective distance
mals there are conflicting responses, yet there is
from self which self-reflection entails first exists
no self-consciousness. Pavlov (1951), for exam-
in the mind of other. This “surplus” (Bakhtin,
ple, trained dogs to salivate on seeing a circle,
1923/1990; Gillespie, 2003) can be fed back to
and not to salivate on seeing an ellipse. In succes-
self by other, such that self can learn to see self
sive trials he reduced the difference between the
from the perspective of other. In this sense, mir-
two contradictory stimuli, until the ellipse was
ror theories assume that the other provides feed-
almost a circle. When the stimuli became diffi-
back to self in the same way that a mirror pro-
cult to differentiate, thus evoking two contradic-
vides feedback about appearance that we cannot
tory responses, the dogs, usually placid, became
perceive unaided. An early variant of this theory
frantic and remained disturbed for weeks after-
can be found in the writings of Adam Smith:
ward. Pavlov called this “experimental neurosis.”
Assuming that these dogs did not become self-
Were it possible that a human creature could grow
reflective (and there is no evidence to suggest up to manhood in some solitary place, without any
they did), then these experiments show that con- communication with his own species, he could no
tradictory responses can coexist without leading more think of his own character, of the propriety or
to self-reflection. Indeed, rather than contradic- demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the
tions leading to self-reflection, it is self-reflection beauty or deformity of his own mind, than the
Distinguishing Two Processes of Self-reflection 247
beauty or deformity of his own face. All of these tions back to the child, is still current in theories
are objects which he cannot easily see, which that draw on the psychoanalytic tradition (e.g.,
naturally he does not look at, and with regard to Hobson, 2002; Gergely & Watson, 1996; Winni-
which he is provided with no mirror which can cott, 1971).
present them to his view. Bring him into society, The social feedback theories, despite articulat-
and he is immediately provided with the mirror
ing a proximal cause of self-reflection in social
which he wanted before. It is placed in the
interaction, encounter three problems if extended
countenance and behavior of those he lives with.
into a theory of the origin (i.e., ontogenesis)
(Smith, 1759/1982, p. 110)
of self-reflection. First, many nonhuman ani-
For Adam Smith it is “fellow man” who teaches mals live in complex societies and are constantly
self the value of self’s actions, who is a “mirror” exposed to feedback from others, yet they do
redirecting self’s attention to the meaning of self’s not demonstrate the same level of elaborate con-
own actions. Growing up alone, without such a sciousness of self as evident in humans. Presum-
mirror, Smith writes, there is nothing to make a ably the difference between humans and other
person reflect on him/herself. The “mirror” is the animals is that humans take the perspective of
“countenance and behaviour” of other. the other in the mirroring process, such that they
The metaphor of society as a mirror, lead- have dialogic representations (Tomasello et al.,
ing to self-reflection, was elaborated in Coo- 2005). However, this only raises the second prob-
ley’s (1902, p. 184) concept of the “looking-glass lem, namely, how does self take the perspective
self.” According to Cooley, the self is a social of the other? This seems to be assumed in mir-
product formed out of three elements: “the imag- ror theories rather than explained (Whiten, 2005).
ination of our appearance to the other person; The third problem is the apparently neutral nature
the imagination of his judgment of that appear- of the other in mirror theories. The idea that
ance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride the other is a passive mirror, neutrally reflect-
or mortification.” Interestingly, self-reflection for ing emotions, actions, and facial expressions,
Cooley is always entwined with judgments, lead- is problematized by the third group of theories
ing to emotions such as pride, shame, guilt, or dealing with self-reflection, namely, the conflict
gloating. Unfortunately, much of the literature theories.
which has taken up Cooley’s ideas has become
mired in examining the extent to which self is
13.3 Conflict Theories
“actually” able to take the perspective of the
other (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979; Lundgren, According to the conflict theories, self-reflection
2004). arises through a social struggle. Hegel’s the-
Psychoanalysts, on the other hand, have ory of self-consciousness as exemplified in the
bypassed this trivial question, and have devel- master–slave allegory is a paradigmatic exam-
oped a sophisticated theory based on the mir- ple (Marková, 1982). Self-consciousness, Hegel
ror metaphor. According to Lacan (1949), before argues, arises through gaining recognition from
the mirror stage the child is fragmented: feelings, an other who is not inferior to self. According
desires, and actions are unconnected. Within this to the master–slave allegory, initially, self and
scheme the mirror reveals the child to him/herself other treat each other as physical objects, and thus
as a bounded totality, a gestalt. The self, by deny any recognition to each other. Due to this
perceiving itself as bounded, and thus isolated, mutual denial, self and other enter into a strug-
becomes alienated through self-reflection. This gle, the outcome of which is a relation of domina-
idea of mirroring, and especially reflecting emotion and subordination, that is, the master–slave
248 alex gillespie
relation. The master dominates the slave and in it differs from Dewey by extending the defini-
that sense is free, while the slave, having lost the tion of the problematic situation to include prob-
struggle, is in bondage to the master and is, thus, lems introduced by the perspective of others. This
not free. The slave is in the service of the master is quite clear in Engeström’s (1987) concept of
and sees the master as superior, while the master “expansive learning,” which refers to participants
sees the slave as inferior. According to Hegel’s within an activity system prompting each other to
logic of recognition, the paradoxical outcome of reflect on the conditions and rules of their ongo-
this situation is that the slave can get recogni- ing interaction. The roots of expansive learn-
tion from the master, but the master cannot get ing are to be found in “disturbances, ruptures
recognition from the slave. The slave struggles and expansions” which arise in communication
for recognition from the master and thus works within an activity system (Engeström et al., 1997
toward increased self-consciousness and eventu- p. 373).
ally equality with the master. The master, on the Finally, at the level of representation, recent
other hand, cannot satisfy the need for recogni- work in social representations theory empha-
tion because recognition by the slave is worthless. sizes the contradictions between different bod-
The interesting dynamic that Hegel describes is ies of knowledge circulating in modern societies
that self-consciousness, and thus self-reflection, (Moscovici, 1984). Bauer and Gaskell (1999)
arise through struggling for recognition from the argue that people become aware of represen-
other. In sociocultural psychology one can find tations at the points at which they overlap or
variations on this basic idea at the levels of inter- contradict each other. “It is through the con-
action, institution, and representation. trast of divergent perspectives that we become
At the interactional level, for example, the tra- aware of representations, particularly when the
dition of research on socio-cognitive conflict has contrast challenges our presumed reality” (Bauer
clearly established that conflict between self and & Gaskell, 1999, p. 169). Divergent represen-
other over how to proceed in a joint task can tations, sustained by different groups in dif-
lead to cognitive development (Doise & Mugny, ferent domains of practice, can come together
1984). Moreover, recent research has shown that and clash in the public sphere (Jovchelovitch,
a key component of durable cognitive develop- 1995). When this occurs, individuals and groups
ment results from social interaction that takes the may come to participate in conflicting represen-
form of “explicit recognition” (Psaltis & Duveen, tations. According to Bauer and Gaskell, it is
2006), which is defined as the interaction or this conflict which produces awareness of rep-
conversation where new acquired knowledge for resentations. This coexistence of multiple forms
self is recognized by other and self. Sigel’s psy- of knowledge in society, and consequently, in
chological distancing theory expresses a similar the individual minds of members of society
dynamic. Sigel (2002, pp. 197–198) asserts that engenders a state of “cognitive polyphasia” (e.g.,
discrepancies introduced by the utterances of oth- Wagner et al., 1999), which can, but does not nec-
ers can put a cognitive demand on the child which essarily, lead to self-reflection.
can in turn lead to representational work and thus By critically examining the conflict theories,
distancing. one could say that they have the same basic
Moving to the institutional level, activity the- structure as the rupture theories. In the rupture
orists posit that contradictions between different theories, tension is introduced through a prob-
components of an activity system lead to reflec- lematic self–object relation, while in the conflict
tion. Activity theory has much in common with theories tension is introduced through a problem-
Dewey’s ideas (Tolman & Piekkola, 1989), but atic self–other relation. This similarity exposes
the conflict theories to similar critiques, namely, evident Vygotsky’s analysis of the emergence of
while a social conflict may be a proximal cause pointing (1997, pp. 104–105).
of self-reflection it does not necessarily explain According to Vygotsky, the child becomes able
how self-reflection can arise in the first place; to point only when he/she is able to reflect on
again, social conflict occurs throughout the ani- the meaning of the pointing from the standpoint
mal kingdom without leading to the evolution of of others. How does this come about? “Initially,”
mechanisms for self-reflection. The question to Vygotsky (1997, p. 104) writes, “the pointing
ask is: what is it about the social situation (self– gesture represents a simply unsuccessful grasp-
other relation) that is not present in the practical ing movement directed toward an object and
situation (self–object relation) and which can denoting a future action.” At first the child is not
account for the emergence of self-reflection at self-conscious of pointing, and thus is not try-
both ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels? One ing to communicate anything. Rather, the child
possible answer to this question is provided by is simply reaching for something out of reach.
the internalization theories. However, from the perspective of the mother, the
child’s reaching is meaningful, it indicates that
the child desires the reached-for object. Vygot-
sky (p. 105) states: “In response to the unsuccess-
13.4 Internalization Theories
ful grasping movement of the child, there arises a
The idea that thought is a self-reflective inter- reaction not on the part of the object, but on the
nal dialogue with absent others goes back, at part of an other person.” The grasping first has
least, to Plato (e.g., Sophist, 263e; Theaetetus, the meaning of pointing for the mother, and only
190). Forms of internalization are evident in later has meaning for the child. It is only when
the theories of Freud (in the formation of the the grasping becomes a meaningful gesture for
superego), Bakhtin (the super-addressee), and the child that we can say the child is pointing, for
Vygotsky. Today this line of theory is carried for- it is only then that the child knows the meaning
ward by Hermans (2001), and Josephs (2002). of his/her gesture for others. The child, Vygotsky
Within this tradition of theorizing, one can con- (p. 105) writes, “becomes for himself what he is
ceptualize self-reflection as arising through inter- in himself through what he manifests for others.”
nalizing the perspective that the other has on self, That is to say, the child becomes self-aware of
followed by self taking the perspective of other his/her own being through how he/she appears to
on self. Or more simply: self-reflection arises others.
through an intra-psychological dialogue between Summarizing the emergence of self-reflective
internalized perspectives. meaning through internalization, Vygotsky
There are, however, problems over how the (1997, p. 105) writes: “Every higher mental
metaphor of “internalization” should be under- function was external because it was social
stood (Matusov, 1998). Wertsch (1985, p. 163) before it became an internal, strictly mental
has called the idea that social relations are simply function; it was formerly a social relation of
“transmitted” into psychological structure “unin- two people.” Social relations, like conversations,
teresting and trivial.” While some theorists make become internalized and constitute the higher
this mistake, Vygotsky (1997, p. 106) empha- mental functions. Self-reflection, for example,
sized that the process of internalization is a can be understood as a change of perspective
process of “transformation,” rather than simple within the individual (analogous to the change
“transmission” (see also Lawrence & Valsiner, of perspective between people taking turns in
1993). The process of transformation is clearly a conversation). “I relate to myself as people
250 alex gillespie
related to me. Reflection is a dispute” (Vygotsky, ture is a response which may become a stimulus
1989, pp. 56–57). to the other. But crucially, the angry gesture may
The tale that turns grasping into pointing can also become a stimulus to self, in the same way
also be used to articulate Vygotsky’s concept of that it is a stimulus to other. To the other person
the sign. According to Vygotsky (1997), signs are the angry gesture may be evidence of an impul-
first used to mediate the behavior of others, and sive personality, and self may also become aware
are later used to talk about self, reflect on self of this possible meaning of his/her angry gesture.
and mediate the behavior of self. The child learns If the gesture becomes a stimulus with the same
to point, first in order to direct the attention of meaning for self as it has for other, then it is a
others, and later to direct his own attention (for sign.
example, using his/her finger to keep his/her eyes Vygotsky’s conception of the sign is astonish-
focused on the text). Equally, the child learns to ingly close to Mead’s concept of the significant
ask questions of others before he/she asks ques- symbol. Mead (1922) defines the significant sym-
tions of him/herself. But what is it in the structure bol as a gesture which self experiences both from
of the sign that enables humans, on the one hand, the perspective of self and from the perspective
to communicate and, on the other hand, to self- of other. As Mead (1922, p. 161) writes: “It is
reflect? through the ability to be the other at the same time
The difference between grasping and pointing that he is himself that the symbol becomes sig-
is that grasping is a response (to the stimulus of nificant.” The key point of similarity is that both
the desired object), while pointing is a response Mead and Vygotsky conceive of the sign (or sig-
that is also a stimulus to both self and other. nificant symbol) as comprising two perspectives.
While grasping may be a stimulus to other, it is On the one hand, there is the embodied actor per-
not a stimulus to self. Pointing becomes a sign spective (the response) toward some object (e.g.,
when it is not just a response but also a stim- the reaching child desires the object). On the
ulus to self in the same way that it is a stimu- other hand, there is the distance introduced by
lus to other. Thus, signs differ from other stim- the observer perspective of the other on the action
uli because “they have a reverse action,” that is, (e.g., the mother sees the child’s grasping as indi-
signs are responses which can also be stimuli cating desire). When the child takes both his/her
(Vygotsky & Luria, 1930/1994, p. 143). The clas- own grasping perspective and the mother’s per-
sic example of “reverse action” is tying a knot in a spective toward that grasping, then the grasping
handkerchief as a mnemonic aid. Self ties a knot becomes pointing. Thus there is an equivalence
in a handkerchief (a response), so that later, the between Vygotsky’s concept of “reverse action”
knot will function as a stimulus, reminding self and Mead’s concept of taking the perspective of
that something must be remembered. The idea the other.
of “reverse action” is fundamental to Vygotsky’s Vygotsky’s theory of the sign, and Mead’s the-
concept of the sign, which he initially theorized ory of the significant symbol, are fundamentally
as a “reversible reflex” (Vygotsky, 1925/1999). different from the theories of Peirce, Saussure,
Only human actions and their products possess Bühler, and Morris (Gillespie, 2010). The last
the key property of “reverse action.” A naturally all have monological theories of the sign. Sim-
occurring tree might be a stimulus, but it is not a ply put, they conceive of the sign as represent-
response. A dog might bare its teeth in response ing something or some relation to the world.
to the stimulus of a wolf. The baring of teeth may However, according to the present reading of
be a stimulus to the wolf, but it will never become Vygotsky and Mead, the sign (or significant sym-
a stimulus to the dog itself. A human’s angry ges- bol) is a composite of two different perspectives,
namely, an actor perspective and an observer per- of social structure that is fundamental for Mead.
spective. Thus the sign (or significant symbol) Rather, it is position exchange within the insti-
is fundamentally intersubjective: it evokes both tutional structure. In nonhuman societies there
actor and observer perspectives in both self and is a division of labor, but there is never fre-
other. quent position exchange. However, humans fre-
The fruitful consequences of the present con- quently exchange positions within institutional
ception of the sign are immediately evident when structures. For example, people sometimes host
one tries to explain the role of the sign in either parties and at other times attend parties. The per-
empathizing or self-reflection. In empathy, the spectives of host and guest are quite divergent. If
sign carries the empathizer from an observer per- these social positions were never exchanged, or
spective (on, for example, the suffering of the reversed, then it is unlikely that either would be
other) to an actor perspective (participating in able to take the perspective of the other. However,
that suffering). In self-reflection, or distantiation, because people are sometimes hosts and some-
the sign carries the person from an actor perspec- times guests this means that most adults have
tive (a fully absorbed action orientation toward experience of both perspectives, and thus are able
something) to an observer perspective (reacting to take the perspective of the other when they are
to the absorbed action orientation). in either social position.
In the context of the present review of theo- Additional social acts in which frequent posi-
ries of self-reflection, Vygotsky’s theory of the tion exchange occurs include: buying/selling,
sign and Mead’s concept of the significant sym- giving/receiving, suffering/helping, grieving/
bol are landmark contributions, because both the- consoling, teaching/learning, ordering/obeying,
ories specify precisely the semiotic structure that winning/losing, and stealing/punishing. Each
can account for self-reflection. However, a gap of these social acts entails reciprocal actor and
remains. How does the child come to react to observer positions and, importantly, because
his/her own grasping in the same way that the most people have enacted both social positions,
mother responds? How do the perspectives of self they have both the actor and observer perspec-
and other, actor and observer, become fused into tives for each social act and thus are able to take
semiotic structures such as signs? How are these the perspective of each other within a social act.
two perspectives brought together? In order to Returning to the example of pointing, the child
address this question we turn to Mead’s theory of cannot learn the meaning of his/her own pointing
the social act. without first having been in the social position of
responding to the pointing of others.
However, having previously been in the social
13.5 The Social Act
position of the other, within a social act, does not
Mead’s theory of the social act is a theory of insti- mean that self will necessarily take the perspec-
tutional structures (Gillespie, 2005) and people tive of the other. Why should the perspective of
moving in time (Gillespie & Martin, 2013; Gille- the other be evoked in self when self is not in the
spie & Zittoun, 2013). The first defining feature social position of the other? The problem is that
of humans for Mead is that they move among most of the stimuli for self and other are quite
positions within a relatively stable social, or insti- divergent. The child, who desires the object and
tutional, structure. Of course social structure is is grasping toward it, is in a completely differ-
not unique to humans. Within an ant colony one ent situation to the mother, who is attentive to the
will find the queen, workers, foragers, nurses, child’s grasping. Even if the child had previously
and soldiers. But it is not simply the existence responded to the grasping of others, why should
252 alex gillespie
the child now respond to his/her own grasping? is both self and other simultaneously. The ques-
The feeling of grasping is quite different to the tion then is: what can trigger this double evoca-
sight of someone else grasping. What is common tion? Simply, there are two ways in which self
in these two situations that could serve to unite can arrive at an observer perspective on self (i.e.,
these two perspectives in the mind of the child? self-reflection). The process can begin with either
Mead (Mead, 1912; see also Farr, 1997) points an actor perspective engaged in some action, or
to the peculiar significance of the vocal gesture. an observer perspective on someone else’s action.
Stimuli in the auditory modality (like vocal ges- Either of these perspectives can evoke, via the
tures) sound the same for self as they do for other. structure of the significant symbol (or sign), the
Accordingly, the vocal gesture is ideally poised complementary actor and observer perspectives,
to integrate both actor and observer perspectives. thus resulting in self-reflection. Specifically, with
Because self hears self speak in the same way this model we can distinguish two conceptually
that self hears other speak, so self can react to distinct pathways to self-reflection. First, there
self’s utterances in the same way that self reacts can be distantiation from self (moving from an
to other. actor to an observer perspective) and, second,
It is often asserted that self and other co- there can be identification with other (moving
emerge in ontogenesis. For example, Baldwin from an observer to an actor perspective). The
(1906, p. 321) famously wrote that: “The Ego and next section illustrates these two forms of self-
the Alter are thus born together.” However, Mead reflection.
would disagree with this, arguing that the other
exists for self (and self exists for other) before
13.6 Two Processes of
self exists for self. First self reacts to other, then
Self-Reflection: An Illustration
self changes social position with the other, and
finally self is able to react to self (in the same The following analysis is taken from a study on
way that self previously reacted to other). Empir- the interactions between tourists and Ladakhis, in
ical evidence for rejecting the co-emergence the- northern India (Gillespie, 2006a). Ladakh, on the
sis, in favor of Mead’s theory, is found in studies border of Tibet, is a popular backpacker desti-
of children’s use of words denoting self and other, nation. Tourists are led to Ladakh by represen-
which have shown that children talk about other tations of the Himalayan mountains, spirituality
before talking about self (e.g., Cooley, 1908; and traditional culture. Usually the tourists in
Bain, 1936). Ladakh reject the idea of package tourism, and
Mead’s theory of the social act fits closely claim to be searching for something more authen-
with his theory of the significant symbol. The tic. In the following exchange, an English uni-
structure of the significant symbol (or sign) is a versity student is explaining, to me and another
pairing of an actor perspective engaged in some tourist, how she wants to have an authentic expe-
action with an observer perspective reacting to rience of Ladakh:
that action. The social act is the institution that,
Laura: I wanted to come up here for longer, to do
first, provides individuals with roughly equiva-
voluntary work, to be more part of it, rather than
lent actor and observer experiences and, second,
just a tourist passing through, taking photos and
integrates these perspectives within the minds of buying things, eh, eh, I am quite disappointed I
individuals. haven’t, I don’t know, eh, in eight days you can’t,
When both actor and observer perspectives em, . . . it’s just, having been with a family in the
within the significant symbol (or sign) are first place, I now want everything to be personal,
evoked, then there is self-reflection, because self to see proper India rather than just the India that
everyone – that sounds rather clichéd – but that she may have perceived skeptical looks concern-
tourists see (pause) – (sigh) so I am a tourist really. ing her search for authenticity, thus triggering this
self-reflection (Gillespie, 2006b). But the feed-
The actor perspective that Laura is initially back she received was not neutral. Her utterance
embedded in is that of wanting “to be more part (“that sounds rather clichéd”) is pejorative. Such
of” Indian life, and wanting “to see proper India.” a cliché is an embarrassment. Thus we could
This desire for an authentic experience is posi- describe Laura as struggling for recognition from
tioned against the other tourists who are merely her audience. However, such an analysis, while
“passing through” and touring “the India that insightful, does not explain the semiotic process
everyone . . . sees.” Before traveling to Ladakh, underlying Laura’s self-reflection. The internal-
Laura had spent two months in south India, liv- ization theories, on the other hand, do provide
ing with an Indian family, and thus having seen a model. According to these theories one could
the “proper India.” Although she had planned to argue that Laura became self-aware by taking the
stay in Ladakh for longer, and even do voluntary perspective of her audience. But how does she
work, she is now planning to leave Ladakh after take the perspective of her audience? The answer
just eight days. Accordingly, it is difficult for her is to be found in Mead’s concept of the vocal
to claim the position of someone who has expe- gesture.
rienced the “proper” Ladakh. The reality is that Laura’s phrase, “that sounds rather clichéd,”
she, like many other tourists, is merely “pass- is particularly revealing because according to
ing through.” The contradiction becomes appar- Mead it is precisely the sound of her previous
ent and leads to two interrelated, but theoretically utterances that trigger self-reflection. The pecu-
distinct, processes of self-reflection. liar significance of vocal gestures is that they
sound the same to self as they do to other. Laura
hears her own utterances (expressing a desire
13.6.1 Self-Reflection via
to see the “proper India”) in the same way as
Distantiation from Self
her audience. Accordingly, she is able to react
The first movement of self-reflection, which cul- to her own utterance as if it were the utter-
minates in the utterance “that sounds rather ance of an other. Presumably, if Laura heard
clichéd,” is quite straightforward. Laura begins another tourist talking about finding the “proper
in the actor perspective of wanting an authen- India” she would think that it sounded clichéd.
tic experience of India and Ladakh, and then, in Using Vygotsky’s terminology, one could say that
the self-reflective utterance (“that sounds rather Laura’s initial utterance is not only a response
clichéd”) switches to an observer perspective to my question, it is also a stimulus to her-
on her previous actor perspective. She ends up self. In short, she becomes self-aware because
reflecting on herself, suggesting that such a she reacts to herself in the same way that she
search for the “proper” Ladakh is in fact a tourist reacts to others. The key process underling this
cliché. How can this self-mediation be explained? instance of self-reflection is a movement from
The rupture theories are obviously inadequate, an actor perspective to an observer perspective
because there is no pragmatic subject–object rup- on her previous actor perspective. The vocal ges-
ture. The mirror theories have more to con- ture is the semiotic means that carries Laura from
tribute, because this self-reflection is embedded being embedded in an actor perspective (search-
in a social situation. Laura is speaking to me and ing for the “proper” India), to an observer per-
another tourist, and her self-reflection may have spective on herself (that what she says sounds
been stimulated by social feedback. For example, clichéd).
254 alex gillespie
13.6.2 Self-Reflection via an empathetic actor response in self. In Laura’s

Identification with Other case, this empathetic response “resonates” with
her own experiences. She hesitates (“eh, eh”)
The second movement of self-reflection culmi- and begins to speak (“I am quite disappointed I
nates in the utterance, “so I am a tourist really.” haven’t”) and then hesitates again (“I don’t know,
This movement begins with the contradiction eh”) and finally we discover what it is that is
between Laura’s criticism of tourists “passing welling up in her mind, namely, that she has only
through, taking photos and buying things” and spent eight days in Ladakh (and was leaving the
the fact that she only spent eight days in Ladakh next day). The significance of this takes time
(and, as she mentioned elsewhere, that she took to manifest explicitly and, when it does, Laura
many photos and bought many souvenirs). This can only say that, despite her wishes, she is a
movement is analytically distinct from the first tourist just like any other tourist in Ladakh (“so
instance of self-reflection, because here, the I am a tourist really”). This is self-reflection via
movement is from an observer perspective on identification with the other (i.e., other tourists)
other tourists (criticizing them for having a shal- because it begins with an emphasis on the dif-
low experience) to an observer perspective on ference between self and other, and then this dif-
self (specifically, seeing herself in the other, ference collapses and self becomes equivalent to
as opposed to seeing, or hearing, the other in other.
herself). Mead’s theory of the social act takes the analy-
The rupture theories again are of little use in sis even further. Laura’s self-reflection via iden-
this analysis because there is no subject–object tification can only occur because of frequent
rupture. Both the mirror and conflict theories exchange of social positions within the social act.
can contribute an understanding of the proximal If Laura had not been in the actual social position
cause of Laura’s self-reflection. One could spec- of the other tourists, if she had not been merely
ulate that the gaze of the audience made the con- “passing through,” taking photos and buying sou-
tradiction salient, thus leading to a collapse of venirs, then the self-reflection could not have
the self–other distinction (Gillespie, 2007). But occurred. Stating the case even more forcefully,
again, this does not explain the semiotic process position exchange is a necessary precondition
through which this might occur. Interestingly, the for this type of self-reflection. In this type of
internalization theories also have little to con- self-reflection, one can see clearly that self and
tribute. Laura is not taking the perspective of the other do not co-emerge, as argued by Baldwin,
other, rather she is taking her own perspective on but rather that the characteristics first associated
the other tourists and turning this on herself. with “they” become subsequently recognized as
Vygotsky’s theory of the sign and Mead’s the- characteristics of “me.” First there is action, sec-
ory of the significant symbol, however, can begin ond, there is observing the other doing the same
to unpack this movement of self-reflection. When action, and finally, in the integration of these per-
Laura is criticizing the other tourists, she is using spectives, there is self-reflection.
signs (or significant symbols) to describe the
other. She says that other tourists are just “pass-
13.7 Complex Semiotic Systems
ing through, taking photos and buying things.” In
the moment of speaking, Laura is blind to the fact The analysis of Laura’s self-reflection, as outlined
that this is exactly what she has done. However, so far, could be criticized on two fronts: first it
because signs are pairings of actor and observer is too individualistic (isn’t Laura’s self-reflection
perspectives, describing the other always evokes part of a larger cultural pattern?) and, second, it
is overly concerned with individual signs (what by various representations, to a tourist destina-
about more complex semiotic systems?). Both tion where the only obvious paths of action are to
of these criticisms are well placed. Laura is not sightsee, take photos, and buy souvenirs. Laura
the first tourist to hypocritically criticize other thus participates in a discourse that conceives
tourists (Prebensen, Larsen, & Abelsen, 2003). of these typical tourist actions as shallow and
Moreover, Laura’s description of other tourists instead aspires to less attainable subject positions
as just “passing through, taking photos and buy- (i.e., having authentic encounters). Thus Laura
ing things” is a complex collective and histor- is caught in a contradictory stream of cultural
ical product. Neither Vygotsky nor Mead pro- meanings. This collectively produced, and histor-
vides an adequate theory of the more complex ically sustained, fault-line makes self-reflection
transindividual semiotic systems that circulate via distantiation and identification immanent.
in society. One of the significant advances of The fault-line in the cultural stream corre-
sociocultural psychology, since the work of Mead sponds to the structure of the sign. The contradic-
and Vygotsky, has been the theorization of these tion is between the semiotic guidance of tourist
complex semiotic systems in a variety of ways: action (actor perspective) and the criticism of
as social representations (Moscovici, 1984), cul- other tourists (observer perspective). There is, at
tural artifacts (Cole, 1996), symbolic resources the level of discourses and representations, then,
(Zittoun et al., 2003; see also Chapter 10, this a lack of integration between actor and observer
volume), narratives (Bruner, 1986), interpretive perspectives. It must be emphasized that this is
repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and dis- not simply a contradiction between two semiotic
courses with subject positions (Harré & Van Lan- systems (i.e., a conflict theory of self-reflection),
genhove, 1991). rather it concerns a very specific contradiction,
Laura participates in a collective and histori- namely between actor and observer perspectives.
cal discourse that contains several subject posi- The position that self claims and the position that
tions. First, there is the subject position of the self enacts are disjunctive. This is what Ichheiser
tourist dupe. This is the tourist who just passes (1949) called a mote-beam divergence and what
through, takes photos, and buys souvenirs. Most in common sense is called hypocrisy. The preva-
tourists willingly ascribe this subject position to lence of this divergence reveals that the lack of
other tourists, yet few ascribe this position to integration between actor and observer perspec-
themselves. Instead, tourists try to occupy one of tives is not simply something that occurs at the
the more favorable subject positions, like that of level of individual signs, but something that is
adventurer, spiritual searcher, or reflexive post- played out in much more macro-semiotic dynam-
tourist. Laura, for example, tries to occupy the ics. The point, then, is that the structure of the
position of having authentic encounters with the sign (or significant symbol), is not only evident
local population, as evidenced by her aspirations at the level of individual words or gestures, but is
to do voluntary work and live with a local family. evident in the macrostructure of whole complex
The question is: How can these complex semi- semiotic systems.
otic systems be used to help explain the semiotics
of self-reflection? The interesting thing about the
13.8 Concluding Discussion
discourse is not simply that it has several sub-
ject positions, but that Laura claims, in discourse, Returning to the questions raised at the out-
one position, while enacting, in action, a different set of this chapter, it is now possible to offer
position. On the one hand, Laura’s actions con- some concise answers. The proximal reasons for
form to typical tourist practices. She has been led, self-reflection are diverse. Humans can be led
256 alex gillespie
to self-reflection by ruptures (problems with the that this implies narratives. According to Nelson,
subject–object relation), social feedback (where the developing child is offered self-narratives,
the other acts as a mirror), social conflict (in and by appropriating these, the child is able to
the struggle for recognition), and internal dia- conceptualize him/herself in time. Combining
logues (through internalizing the perspective of this with the present theoretical approach, we can
the other on self). Moreover, there is a cultural say that before appropriating a narrative a child
level to the analysis; the complex semiotic sys- will have certain fields of undifferentiated expe-
tems in which people are embedded contain con- rience. For example, the child may have experi-
tradictions that can make self-reflection imma- enced the loss of a loved one, but have not any
nent. However, fundamental to all these proximal reflective articulation of this experience (i.e., they
causes of self-reflection is the logic of the sign. have not put it into words). The narrative offered
Before the formation of the sign (or signif- to the child provides an observer’s perspective on
icant symbol) there is undifferentiated experi- their actor experience of loss – giving raw expe-
ence (level 0 experience in Valsiner’s [2001] ter- rience a name and thus externality. And it is the
minology). But this experience is structured by integration of actor and observer perspectives,
social acts: it contains experience belonging to that enables the child to distantiate from the expe-
both actor and observer perspectives. The magic rience (while simultaneously being connected to
of the social act is that it integrates these actor it), thus enabling them to talk about the loss.
and observer experiences, or perspectives, into A similar dynamic is evident in Zittoun’s
the formation of signs. Conceiving of the sign (Chapter 10, Section 10.2.3, this volume) anal-
as this integration of perspectives elucidates the ysis of Emma Bovary’s use of novels as a sym-
logic of self-reflection. Whenever one uses a sign bolic resource. Initially, Emma is embedded in
to describe self’s own actor experience, the sign the actor perspective of being in love. She feels
may carry self from an actor perspective to an exalted and has no self-reflective awareness of
observer perspective on that experience (as illus- this experience. Then she thinks of some romance
trated by Laura’s self-reflection via distantiation). novels that she’s read. These provide her with
Equally, whenever one uses a sign to describe, an observer’s perspective on an other’s love.
or observe, the actions of others, the sign may Combining the actor perspective (elation) with
carry self from this observer perspective to an the observer perspective (on the love of oth-
empathetic actor participation in the actions of ers) results in the self-reflective awareness of
the other (which in Laura’s case leads to self- herself being in love. Thus the narrative is not
reflection via identification). just a narrative that is analogical to self’s own
Introducing the concept of the sign (or sig- experience, it is an intersubjective structure that
nificant symbol) into our conception of com- enables translations between actor and observer
plex semiotic systems entails abandoning the perspectives.
assumption that the complex semiotic systems Partially integrated actor and observer per-
“mirror” the world, and instead conceptualizing spectives are the precondition for self-reflection.
these semiotic systems as architectures of inter- Rupture, feedback, and social conflict can cause
subjectivity (Rommetveit, 1974) which enable self-reflection because of a preexisting, and only
the translation between actor and observer per- partially integrated, architecture of intersubjec-
spectives within a social act. tivity. These social dynamics can provide the
Consider, for example, narratives. It has been impetus for self-reflection, and thus have a part
argued by Nelson (2000) that the key to self- to play in constructing the architecture of inter-
consciousness is awareness of self in time, and subjectivity. However, these social dynamics, in
themselves, cannot explain the semiotic process transitions in legal work. In M. Cole, Y.
underlying self-reflection. The origin of self- Engestrom, & O. Vasquez (Eds.), Mind, Culture
reflection is not just in social interaction, but in and Activity: Seminal Papers from the Laboratory
social acts, or institutions, which provide struc- of Comparative Human Cognition (pp. 369–385).
tured actor and observer perspectives, and a Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Farr, R. M. (1997). The significance of the skin as a
mechanism for integrating these perspectives in
natural boundary in the sub-division of
the minds of individuals.
psychology. Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour, 27, 305–323.
Gergely, G. & Watson, J. S. (1996). The social
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internalization in Vygotsky’s account of the Perret-Clermont, A. N. (1980). Social Interaction and
genesis of higher mental functions. In J. V. Cognitive Development in Children. London:
Wertsch (Ed.), Culture, Communication and Academic Press.
14 Making Memory: Meaning
in Development of the
Autobiographical Self
Katherine Nelson
The construct of an “autobiographical self” (in ultimately arises from cultural experience, what
the title of this chapter) is the self that emerges ensures that it appears in individual lives? I begin
from one’s accumulation of memories from the with an overview of early development in which
past. There is of course no single “self” that both meaning and memory play a major role. I
emerges from this source: one’s adolescent self, then consider the emergence of autobiographical
for example, may seem alien to the present self. memory within this framework, emphasizing its
Nonetheless, the self in the past is recognized as reliance on social and cultural models. Finally, I
an earlier version of “me.” The account here con- will discuss the tangled issues of self and self-
siders the emergence of autobiographical mem- understanding as they relate to this process.
ory and the concept of “self” in early childhood,
while recognizing that significant further devel-
14.1 Experience, Meaning, and
opment of both self and memory takes place after
Memory in Development1
that point. The central implication is that the con-
tinuity of memories over one’s lifetime is mean- The development of memory in the social-
ingful – and may even be necessary – for self con- cultural environments of infancy and childhood
ception. This claim relies on two other parts of is considered here from an ontological framework
the title above: “making memory” and “meaning” that views development of humans within an evo-
as the source of memory contents. The “autobio- lutionary historical cultural ground. This frame
graphical self” overall is viewed as one perspec- has roots in Vygotsky’s (1962) work and thus
tive on the many versions of self available to the relates as well to many others working within that
adult introspector (Neisser, 1988). and related perspectives, perhaps most specifi-
Of major interest here is how memory changes cally that of Michael Cole (1996) and his col-
over human infancy and early childhood, with leagues. It derives also from the evolutionary
implications for understanding the almost uni- framework of Merlin Donald (1991, 2001). The
versal accumulation of long-lasting memories specific developmental approach based on Don-
derived from past experiences and their recollec- ald’s work was elaborated in Language in Cog-
tion in adulthood. In what sense do we “make nitive Development (Nelson, 1996). As Donald’s
memory” and why? How does this change over analysis makes clear, the complexity and enlarge-
time, especially in the early years of life? In ment of the modern human brain, and its cogni-
what ways does the social and cultural world tive operations, can only be understood in terms
frame the self that emerges from this source? of its evolutionary and cultural history. It can also
If – as Merlin Donald (2012) claims – auto- only be understood in terms of its development in
biographical memory is unique to humans and human infancy and childhood. In a sense this is a
Making Memory 261
proposal of extended epigenesis, where the pro- context . . . human social life has become dom-
cess involves not only extended biological devel- inated by a public theater of language acts,
opment but development within and dependent and narrative accounts of experience are con-
on social and cultural environments. structed essentially as real or latent public per-
Donald’s model envisions three major cultural formances” (Donald, forthcoming; italics in orig-
eras, each defined in terms of its communica- inal). To fully enter the literate world children
tive and cognitive potentials. The first (among must be tutored in the skills of reading alpha-
pre-Homo sapiens primates) is termed mimetic betical scripts and the uses of these resources,
and relied on the use of mimesis for commu- requiring lengthy formal schooling. Most very
nication between individuals and within cultural young children worldwide do not participate in
groups. The emergence in Homo sapiens of oral this written part of the culture, but are embed-
language between persons and within groups ded in the still vibrant oral culture of childhood.
enabled the beginnings of both narrative and This gradual introduction to the complexities of
argument – group exchanges inconceivable with- the language-using world may be appropriate for
out language. This mode, termed mythic, is most the kinds of biocultural development that natu-
distinguished by group participation in the telling rally takes place in the first five years of life, as
of oral narratives, the cultural mode that young well as providing the practices that enable mov-
children enter from infancy as they develop lan- ing into the more complex literate world.
guage competence. Such narratives include not The influence of language on memory and
only fictional stories but accounts of events in mind, of human knowledge, and representation
the past and anticipated future. This mode is so is incontestable. Considering the impact of lan-
dominant in humans that the neurologist, Dama- guage on the development of individual minds
sio (1999) views it as the natural mode of human is essential to our understanding of how mature
memory. Jerome Bruner (1986) proposed that it minds emerge. The course in development is
is one of two dominant modes of human thought obviously not the same as that experienced
(the other being logical or rational thinking). through evolution or history. Just as the onset of
A major cultural change (termed theoretic by shared language that supported group narratives
Donald) emerged much later in human history, such as myth was a critical point in human evolu-
about four millennia ago, following the invention tion, so experiences in early childhood with con-
of alphabetically based written scripts and their versations and stories may be viewed as analo-
preservation in documents on paper and other gous critical points of development. All human
media. It was intensified with the invention of behavior takes place in social and cultural con-
printing and subsequent widespread literacy and text, but that context is only relevant to an
scholarship in the sixteenth through nineteenth individual to the extent that it is discernible,
centuries. These later changes are associated with through action, perception, language, or memory.
the emergence of modern science and technol- Although lacking language, the infant develops
ogy and literary works – including biography and in an intensely social world and begins to under-
novels – accessible to all who can read. stand its contours in interactive activities, devel-
Overall these culturally based language evo- oping scripts or scenarios for them (Bruner, 1983;
lutions have meant radical revisions in people’s Nelson, 1986, 2007). All aspects of the envi-
brains, cognitive processes, and ways of life. ronment that are not personally engaged, how-
“Living in a linguistic community is largely a ever, remain outside the child’s memory and
question of mastering and performing conceptu- knowledge base. In late infancy the child slowly
ally complex representational skills in a social becomes a user of the local language, thus
262 katherine n elson
entering into the language-based cultural sur- through developmental time is of particular inter-
round that was previously hidden. Fortunately, est in this account. I refer here to “events”
the social environments of most young children because that is what people experience. (We
include older persons who support them in the rarely experience simple “scenes” except in pho-
adventure into this new “mythic” context. tographs or paintings.) In Figure 14.1 the center
It is important to recognize that what changes of the hexagon is the person’s (constrained) expe-
for the child in the early childhood years is rience within any given context or time. Each
access to the vast areas of the social and cultural segment of the hexagonal boundary indicates
world that are inaccessible to anyone – including individualized boundaries on such experience,
babies – without language. The cultural milieu regardless of the “objective” space as viewed
that slowly emerges with language challenges from outside. As depicted, the person’s experi-
the child’s previously established personal knowl- ence is constrained by variable conditions in both
edge base derived from nonlinguistic experience the individual person and the environment.
as an infant and very young child. It is reason- The left segments of the hexagon are the phys-
able to assume that even the physical world is ical or biological constraints through evolution
perceived differently by those who have a shared (lower segment) and current individual condi-
communicative system for interpreting it. Previ- tions of body and mind, such as health, state of
ously hidden aspects of the cultural world include growth, and current stature (upper left). These are
basic frameworks such as temporal and spatial continuously modified by the specific conditions
categories and terms, family relationships, and of the body and mind, including health as well
the life spaces and activities of people beyond the as learning and skills, and by all specific indi-
bounds of one’s personal experience. vidual characteristics of these. The top segment
represents the constraints of the particular phys-
ical and material environment within which the
14.2 Experience Space and Its individual experiences ongoing events, including
Constraints its familiarity or novelty. The top right segment
is the space of social conditions and interactions
An abstraction of the bounds of experiential
(including the use of language) that surround the
space is sketched in Figure 14.1, designed to rep-
child from the beginning, which may include var-
resent the range of constraints on personal expe-
ious known and unknown figures, familiar or not.
rience in any environmental event or encounter
The bottom right refers to the ongoing cultural
(Nelson, 2007). How these constraints operate
background whether apparent to the experiencer
or not. It consists of the cultural store of language
ecological and social interactions, and of any relevant cul-
tural organizations or practices in the given sit-
socially
embodied embedded uation (e.g., home, school, or church). Whether
or not the language, knowledge, or practices are
Interactive known or familiar to the experiencer is one of
encounters
the possible parameters of these constraints on
evolved encultured experience.
The bottom segment of the diagram is mem-
past experience ory for prior experience. The main point here is
Figure 14.1 Bounds of experiential space in an that all of these conditions or constraints work
environmental event or encounter. simultaneously in determining what aspect of any
Making Memory 263
present experiential encounter the individual will in partially determining what is attended to and
observe and perhaps interact. Given differences how it is interpreted; and in filtering meaning-
among the participants in a given event, on any ful parts of the experience for memory and future
of these dimensions, it is clear that different per- reference. This applies to all kinds of experience
sons will vary in their experience of the same at all ages and for all types of memory, short-
event. There is in fact a great deal of experimen- term, long-term, semantic, or episodic. From this
tal research verifying this. The point, of course, meaning perspective we can better understand the
is that each participant derives different meaning development, operation, and significance of auto-
and therefore different memory from any given biographical memory.
event. A major point of this model is that engage-
That Figure 14.1 absorbs language into the ment with the environment (physical, social, cul-
cultural and social components of experience is tural) through perception, action, or language is
not to downplay the significance of language in conditioned by meaning, arising from present or
human experience; rather, it assumes that lan- past (remembered) encounters and from any of
guage is a cultural endowment that is realized the sources delineated on the hexagon. What is
through social interactions and grows with expe- noticed, as contemporary theories of perception
rience. Although the figure is static, an important recognize, is not what is “there” but what is indi-
assumption of this model is its constantly chang- vidually meaningful in the present context. The
ing components: mental and physical growth, major implication of this point for the present
temporal and seasonal change of physical envi- purposes is that what the infant, the young child,
ronment, expanding social and cultural worlds, the older child, and the adult may “see” in a scene
developing and expanding memory. All change at or a narrative may each be different, depending
different rates, and what was “in sync” for a child on the meaningful context they each expect and
at one point may easily be “out of sync” within partially provide for interpretation. This is true
days, weeks, or months. The basic biology of the for the language that the child hears and learns
lower left segment is no different in this regard: as well as for the physical scene before his or her
physical and mental growth proceeds inescapably eyes. For example, the scene may demand atten-
regardless of other conditions, even though many tion through rapid continuous changes or through
such developments depend on social and cultural bright colors, while the child may experience
as well as nutritional and physical conditions for pain, sleepiness, or indigestion interfering with
their success. In the present context, what enters a response, and social-cultural interactions pose
memory from any experience may change over demands, questions, situations, and practices.
time as these different constraints change. The model implies that meaning is interior to
What determines whether an aspect of any the participant, guiding the interaction as well
encounter enters memory, and thus becomes as memory related to it. Meaning may emerge
available for future informative purposes, is from biological sources such as hunger or thirst,
meaning. Meaning lies at the center of all cog- and may be biased by other genetic or ontoge-
nitive activity, not only or primarily in language. netic conditions, shared across species or indi-
Meaning emerges initially from the operation viduals. For example, a given child may be espe-
of sensorimotor, affective, and cognitive systems cially drawn to shapes, another to colors within
relevant to “interests” based on needs, wants, a scene. Much of what is meaningful to the
emotions, and prior experiences. Memory has a individual child or adult resides in what is in
central role in recognizing meaning in experien- memory, shaping the future. This sense of mem-
tial encounters. Memory is involved in two ways: ory is generic, applicable to all memory, not
just recallable information or narrative. It may action, or gesture) at the later test. Recallable
reside in one’s physical experiences and be far memory by two- to three-year-olds is, however,
from consciousness. However, much is present still limited in length of retention time and in con-
in the immediate encounter, evoking knowledge tent. For example, Peterson and Rideout (1998)
or past experience. In this sense meaning is sim- reported a study of 18- to 20-month-old toddlers
ilar to relevance, where relevance is individu- who had each suffered illness or injuries requir-
ally determined. It is essential to understanding ing emergency room treatment. When inter-
how words, narratives, poetry, and politics work, viewed about the experience six months later,
through shared symbolic and sometimes implicit most remembered little or nothing of the pre-
meanings evoked in the individuals who experi- sumably traumatic and memorable event. Greater
ence them. Meaning is essential to understanding use of language by the child at the time of the
the development of children’s language, knowl- injury was associated with greater likelihood of
edge and behavior over years reaching from no recalling some parts of it. Two-year-olds were
experience in the world to the accumulation of much more likely to recall some of the incident
vast quantities of cultural knowledge (Nelson, at six months, and some retained the memory for
2017). In short, both meaning and memory are another six months to a year.
vital conditions of all sentient creatures: neces- It may be inferred that memory in the first and
sary for engaging in environmental encounters second year of life greatly expands the infant’s
(Millikan, 2006). familiarity with people, places, objects, and
activities, accumulating much personal learning
and cultural knowledge, but its recall time span
14.3 Memory
is much more limited than in older children
As just argued, memory – including autobi- and adults. About one year is generally found
ographical memory – is intimately related to to be the longest retention for two-year-olds.
meaning, indeed dependent on it. From this What kind of memory is this? One view is that
perspective the construction of a self-construct early memory is based in the sensorimotor sys-
also emerges naturally. As possible meanings tem, which is referred to as procedural. Such
change over developmental time and new mean- memory is context-dependent, not declarative, or
ings emerge, so memory develops from infancy recallable out of the context of its use (that is,
to early childhood, enabling the accumulation it is not accessible to consciousness). Procedu-
of experience and derived knowledge in infants ral memory is clearly evident in other primates
and children from birth. That very young infants (as well as other mammalian species such as cats
remember aspects of the experienced world is and dogs). Procedural memory continues as part
well established (although prior to the mid- of the general human system relevant in activities
twentieth century infant memory was doubted by such as sports, dance, or bicycling.2 Karmiloff-
many experts). Retention of memory increases Smith (1991) proposed that procedural memory
over the first two years (Bauer, 2007). A scene underlay the later more complex knowledge sys-
watched by a 9- or 12-month old infant may be tems developed through analytic processes.
recalled one or even two months later. By 18 Two types of declarative or recallable mem-
months a child’s memory may be extended to a ory recognized by most memory theorists are
full year. The child’s use of relevant language at termed episodic and semantic, as distinguished
the time of initial viewing aids later recall: chil- by Tulving (1983). Episodic memory is memory
dren with little or no productive language at pre- for a specific happening from the past encoded
sentation recall less (indicated through speech, from self experience, not one that emerged from
Making Memory 265
others’ accounts or general history. In Tulv- next. In addition, compared with older children
ing’s view, episodic memory is uniquely human, and adults, the life spaces of infants and young
allowing us to travel back into time to reex- children change with great rapidity as they grow
perience an event (Tulving, 2005). From this both physically and mentally, giving rise to dif-
position, the memory is necessarily self-oriented ferent daily routines and possibilities for action.
or anoetic.3 The second major characteristic of Familiarity is a product of memory but it is not
episodic memory in Tulving’s account is the the same as “past.” Retaining what was remem-
sense of “pastness” that enables reference to bered about a specific past event would be only
experience in a specific past time. It may appear confusing in the rapidly changing conditions of
that all memory is “about” the past, but as Tulv- infancy. With no motivated interest in the past it
ing (1993) has argued (see also Nelson, 1993), is not surprising that young children do not begin
basic memory is oriented to the present and acquiring a self history or autobiographical mem-
future; its basis on past experience is incidental ory until nearly school age.
to its value in the present. Location in the past is
clearly part of autobiographical memory: it is an
14.4 Emergence of
account of what happened in one’s personal past
Autobiographical Memory
life. But it may not be relevant to all memories of
specific events in short or long term memory that Autobiographical memory is distinguished by its
have little relevance to one’s ongoing life expe- focus on the self in experiences from one’s past
rience. For example, one may remember experi- life. For many people these memories appear to
encing a song or a novel or movie without being make up a “life story,” a super-narrative of the
able to place it in a specific person-relevant time self over time. It may then be considered a meta-
slot. narrative while each episode within it contributes
The second and complementary type of declar- a narrative to the whole. This self-involved mem-
ative memory – semantic memory – is not about ory has been of continuing interest in psychology
either the past or the self but is constituted of gen- since the late nineteenth century, but remained
eral knowledge about the world, whether assem- on the sidelines of serious research for most of
bled from direct experience or conveyed through the next century. One issue of continuing inter-
other sources such as stories, books, school, or est over that period was “childhood (or infan-
interpersonal communication, including gossip. tile) amnesia,” that is, the absence for most adults
Often, this kind of memory does not retain infor- of any memories from one’s life before the age
mation about its source, when and where one of three years, and the relative paucity of these
learned a fact; the fact may simply be encoded before the school years (age 7 to 10). This initial
for future use. gap for all memory from the first years of life was
That memory is basically oriented to future use highlighted by William James in his 1890 Prin-
has important theoretical implications. It may be ciples of Psychology as the cause of the lack of
relevant to questions about why some memories any genuine “warm” feeling of “self” with regard
drop out or are nullified and others continue. It to the person’s first years. Freud (1905/1953)
sheds light on the beginnings of memory in all famously attributed the absence of such early
species, as well as our own, in infants and young memories to repression associated with sexual
children. Very young children have no specific anxiety during these years.
concept or interest in the past. The present is Studies of adults’ earliest memories, using
where they live and in which they are interested, written or interview questionnaires, accumulated
as well as limited interest in what will happen over decades before and during the twentieth
century and established that their onset (among Bauer and many others emphasize that both
European-Americans) appeared on average at episodic and autobiographical memories involve
about 3.5 years of age. Little more was stud- conscious awareness of “re-experiencing” some-
ied with regard to this absence (or to the later thing that happened in the past. Episodic mem-
persistence of memories over the long term) ories may or may not include such conscious
until the late twentieth century4 when identi- awareness of reexperiencing, but rather the
fication of episodic memory as a special kind weaker “bringing to mind” some of the contin-
also brought attention to its long-term persistence uing meaningful aspects of a previous event and
(Tulving, 1983). More specifically, Tulving’s cri- in most cases letting go of the vast majority of
teria for episodic memory, focused on self and both details and whole events. Those retained
about the past, appear most clearly characteristic in autobiographical memory are rightly consid-
of memories of the long-term autobiographical ered a special kind, constructed from the basic
kind. episodic kind, and they may (but not necessar-
Whereas episodic memory is the kind of per- ily) be worthy of the conscious awareness of
sonal experience memory that constitutes the “reexperience.” Reexperience appears to involve
typically vast accumulation of autobiographical experiencing the event from the conscious per-
memories, not all episodic memories are retained spective of the past self. An alternative is view-
for the very long term. Rather they may exist ing the memory as a story or movie from
as a kind of record of currently relevant aspects the observer’s perspective about the prior self’s
of our daily lives, subject to extinction or for- actions and feelings. Another alternative is view-
getting, just as infant memory is. Most episodic ing the event from the experiencer’s perspec-
memories will turn out to be repetitions of prior tive but with the interpretive sense of the older
experiences – nothing very new or meaningful self.
there. Bauer (2007), whose account of autobio- Blurring the distinction between episodic and
graphical memory is a greatly valued resource autobiographical memory is a barrier to any
in this area, views autobiographical memory as account of the fact that very few episodic memo-
a subset of episodic memory. In my view, how- ries from the preschool years (3 to 5) are retained
ever, the relation is more complex, in that auto- even into the school years much less over the
biographical memory is assembled from a sub- longer term. The evidence seems clear that dur-
set of episodic memories, specifically those that ing these years children are recounting memo-
contribute to the self story of a continuous life ries of specific episodes. Very few of these spe-
in the past. Specification of time in the past is cific memories continue on from that age in auto-
expected in the narrative of “what happened” biographical memory, some for decades, some
that characterizes episodic memory and much but for a lifetime.5 What determines their continu-
not all of what is included in autobiographical ous availability is not easily explained, nor is the
memory. The selection of episodic memories that determination of the reasons for either loss or
are retained over long periods of time requires retention, despite decades of study of memory in
some discrimination among the great number this period.
of possible candidates. How such discrimination The most detailed and long-term study in
is made – by what process and what criteria – adults of retention and loss of memory for signif-
is not at present known. It is clear from the icant events that were recorded daily over a one-
study of trauma and unwanted but lasting memo- year period was documented by White (2002,
ries that not all that are retained are consciously reported in Bauer, 2007). This study revealed
valued. an 83 percent loss of memories after a one
Making Memory 267
year delay (no memory at all of the recorded 14.5 The Self in
event remained). Other studies have shown that Autobiographical Memory
we remember more memories from some of the
years of our lives than of others (Rubin, Rah- The claim that autobiographical memory is
hal, & Poon, 1998). Bauer (2007) provides a full uniquely human has been met with little contra-
accounting of the work on forgetting and reten- diction. Moreover, its typically late and patchy
tion from infancy to adulthood, emphasizing that start implies developmental reliance on social
the same processes operate through the lifespan, and cultural experiences. Development of nar-
but that the motivations for retention of memories rative appropriate language, enabling memory
may differ from childhood to later life. exchange with others, is important, analogous to
The point here is that the initial (unconscious) the mythic culture in Donald’s model, providing
decision (in the hippocampus) to record and con- accounts of both the personal and cultural past.
solidate a memory does not explain its retention In brief, both self and autobiographical mem-
over time. As argued earlier, that initial deci- ory emerge from social-cultural experiences in
sion depends on meaning, and it seems proba- relevant contexts (Nelson, 2003b, 2014, 2012;
ble that retention does as well. However, as pre- Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
viously noted, meaning cuts a broad swath and The self in memory is central to the concep-
varies depending on all the conscious and uncon- tion of autobiographical memory as a record of
scious circumstances of the person’s life. There past experience. This raises a relevant question:
is unlikely to be a singular cause of the deletion Is a clear concept of self necessary to the reten-
of a memory in part or whole over the lifespan. tion of long-term memories of personal episodes?
It is important in this connection to also empha- Or do memories in effect construct a specifically
size the great variability, among individuals and human version of self? Both – self and story –
within individuals, across cultures, and at vary- develop in concert, typically in the late preschool
ing ages, of both the extent and the content of years of childhood. In a broad sense, all mem-
autobiographical memory. This variability is to a ory is derived from self experience – including
large extent reflective of the dependence of the that from infancy – but the memory may retain
system on meaning, individual and momentary, neither the self or the experience (in the sense of
or social and cultural, sustained over many years the occurrence of a specific event) but only the
or decades.6 perceived sight, sound, meaning, learning, facts,
The ability to reconstruct the personal past language, information, or speculation related to
and to imagine a personal future, in addition it. What is unique to autobiographical memory is
to the construction of the cultural and historical its prototypical form as a coherent scene or event
past and visualized future, is essential to social involving people and self in different settings and
and cultural cognition and communication. Nar- happenings. Any part of this may be eroded in
ratives of episodic memory, reporting on specific time so that the rememberer is left with a vague
events in personal experience build on the expe- sense of knowing or remembering but with few
riential memory of infancy and early childhood. or no details to report. As a whole, autobiograph-
Autobiographical memory then builds on these ical memory is essentially a life story, requiring
episodic memories of everyday life. These moves the capability of forming an extended causal–
require experience with other rememberers and temporal sequence. Such abilities have not yet
the construction of a specific kind of self that cohered in infancy or early childhood.
changes over time but has continuity from birth Furthermore, specific awareness of the past
to death. must be dependent on the establishment of a
personal past and future time line, which is then about children’s memory accounts have been
readily extendable to the group or cultural past. found in adult–child talk to vary in different soci-
Prior to this development memory without con- eties (Wang, 2014). Specifically, Chinese parents
sciousness of the specific past (e.g., “it happened” are more likely to emphasize children’s learning
but not “it happened one time”) certainly exists from speech rather than American parents’ typi-
for facts about the world or the way events can cal emphasis on the child’s personal experience.
be expected to unfold (e.g., script knowledge, Both Japanese and Chinese adults include more
see Nelson, 1986). Talk among adults and with social relationships in their accounts, especially
small children frequently refers to past and future those among relatives, than do American children
events, and children acquire past tense markers and adults. In some rural Indian settings memo-
relatively early, thus setting favorable conditions ries of the long-ago personal past are considered
for entering the realm of “pastness.” At the same irrelevant to present life and not worth remember-
time, the child’s semantic memory may contain ing (Leichtman, Wang, & Pillemer, 2003). The
information about past happenings or the exis- conclusion from studies from different cultures
tence of unexperienced things (e.g., dinosaurs) is that children learn how to remember their per-
without invoking a personal past. Viewing the sonal past self and the position of self in society
past self as the same as but different from the through conversational exchange with both adults
present self may require considerable experience and peers. The result is a social-cultural construc-
with both adult and peer talk about what hap- tion of what is in fact an inevitably very private
pened, as well as introspection on self in time self.
(Moore & Lemon, 2001; Nelson, 2001, 2008).7 From the child’s and, later, the adult’s view
An extensive body of research on talk between (rather than the observer’s), however, the discov-
parents and children about their experience in ery of the past self and continuing accumula-
past events (Fivush, 2014; Nelson & Fivush, tion of episodes involving it may have the effect
2004; Reese, Haden, and Fivush, 1993) has of projecting a new version of self altogether.
shown that many children have ample opportuni- Prior to its appearance in autobiographical mem-
ties to learn the cultural modes of talking about ory the self in infancy is intricately connected to
the personal past and become more capable of the social relations within which it exists. There
doing so themselves by the age of four to five is no doubt that there is awareness of the physi-
years. Some of this talk refers directly to the cal reality of the individual being, but beyond that
child’s perspective on an event (e.g., “how did the relationship of self with others dominates. In
you feel?” “Were you scared?”). Such experience general in infancy there is conscious awareness
(which varies among parents and children in both of the outside world but not of the internal world.
content and in elaborating on the child’s contribu- The independent physical and social self begins
tion) may well support the child’s ability to con- to emerge during the second year as an awareness
ceive the personal past as interesting and valu- of individuality apparent in the ability to recog-
able, and to perceive the self in the past as of nize the self in a mirror (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn,
interest to the self in the present. In short, the 1979), and to use personal pronouns (e.g., “I” and
past self becomes meaningful within the social- “you”) to refer to self and other. This is a present
cultural exchange in a way that was inaccessible self, not one in time with a past and future. Some
earlier. experts assume a self concept in the two-year-old,
The social-cultural view of “self” in social seeing it reflected in the bits and pieces of young
exchange can have an important impact on the children’s memories. These fragments, however,
child’s concept of self. Cultural expectations lack the sense of a self in time, a narrative self.
Making Memory 269
The recalled memories of the two-year-old are riorized “me self” arises within the development
reports on aspects of a situation or a scene, a part of memory, concepts of the physical world and
of an event, rather than a narrative of the event self, understanding of past and future reference,
(Hudson, 1991). and reflective processes. These cohere during the
Early experiences with narrative reminiscing later preschool years, in conjunction with social-
may “trigger” the onset in the young child of nar- cultural interactions and narratives. The interior-
rative thinking, a basic mode of human thought ized self in autobiographical memory is not sim-
(Bruner, 1986). As hearing language spoken ply the agent in action but is part of an ongoing
around the child triggers the urge to learn the lan- realization of a “continuing me” (Nelson, 2008).
guage, so hearing events narrated may trigger the Psychologists have in fact long recognized that
disposition to narrate one’s own stories of things a change in children’s interior self-awareness is
experienced. During the third and fourth year evident toward the end of the preschool period
children typically hear many accounts of narra- (e.g., Harter, 1999). Recently, the philosophers
tives, in the form of stories or personal experi- Hutto (2010) and Bogdan (2010) have each
ence, providing a route into the intricacies of tem- pointed to aspects of children’s growing insight
poral relations and the narrative frames that make into their own minds and selves in response to
talking and thinking about sequences, causes, their experience with social and cultural models
beliefs, and motives possible, as well as the char- by way of conversation and stories. Consistent
acters that are presented as protagonists or partic- with the present emphasis, in both accounts this
ipants in different narratives. Thus a framework emerging sense of self depends to a large extent
is provided for memory to interiorize a self story on language use in narrative and interchange with
from past to present. others, especially adults. Through these experi-
The narrative frame sets the self in particular ences, a child may come to recognize the interi-
roles, such as recipient or protagonist, or sim- ority of beliefs and motives that are involved in
ply observer. It enables as well the possibility of the intentionality of others and their actions.
reflection on the actions of the past self and on Two points here are important: one, as Hutto
the reactions of the social others in the scene or has emphasized, is the child’s recognition of
event. The self that emerges from these experi- other people’s interior experience as different
ences then is a self in a social-cultural frame- from one’s own, highlighted in works such as
work; or, in different language, a self in a commu- the classic Aesop’s fables. Second, as Bogdan has
nity of minds, a self like other selves, with minds claimed, the child is exposed to others’ interior-
to share (Nelson, 2005). Henceforth, it depends ity – their thinking and feeling – through specific
in part on the accumulation of self experiences uses of language in natural contexts, in narra-
in autobiographical memory. With the realiza- tive, or direct conversational exchange, inducing
tion of the past self the possibility of compar- thereby an emerging consciousness of one’s own
ison with the present self may become possi- self and mind. These effects take place during
ble together with the realization that the self is the later preschool years (age four to five), which
changeable over time. The self in the remem- is consistent with the onset of autobiographical
bered past is quintessentially an earlier version memory. Not so incidentally, this is also the age
of the present self; but the subject reflecting on range of achievement on the classic measure of
the memory may also recognize that the self in “theory of mind,” the “false belief” task (Hutto,
the remembered event was a younger, less knowl- 2010). For the present purposes, what is impor-
edgeable, more naïve version of the present, yet tant is that a new interior sense of self emerges
still recognizably “me.” The origin of this inte- together with the sense of one’s own and others’
minds (Bogdan, 2010). This interior self has both This is one possible determiner of which old
a past, accessible through memory, and a future, memories are retained for the future and which
accessible through the imagination. Henceforth, are left behind. Retention, not forgetting, is the
the standard idea of the self that is continuous critical issue here; the vast majority of even “out-
over time (Sani, 2008), and distinctive in terms of standing” daily episodic memories are forgotten
experience, perspective, and emotional reactions over a year’s time (Bauer, 2007). Both mean-
from those of others, takes hold. ing and self must be involved in “decisions” of
How such self-awareness affects memory to retention, but the formula is unlikely to be a
support a self history of experiences, retaining straightforward one. Of course, autobiographical
times and places as well as people and events, memory is but one part of the entire memory sys-
is beyond the scope of this inquiry. It is clear tem, which also retains a vast quantity of social-
that some major change takes place in the period cultural information without personal reference,
between four and eight years revealed in stud- some of it over very long periods of time. Forget-
ies of the beginnings and accumulations of early ting occurs within that part of memory as well;
childhood memories by adults. There are wide thus how remembering and forgetting are bal-
individual differences in all measures related to anced within the system is a question that applies
these developments, as well as cultural differ- to memory in general and not only to autobio-
ences in both the nature of the self that is estab- graphical memory. Referring back to Figure 14.1,
lished and the degree to which a personal record meaning emerges from memory as well as from
of the past is valued and thus fostered by a par- the physical, social, and cultural surroundings of
ticular community, as discussed earlier. These the bodily self. We can hope to understand the
differences in memory and self understanding parameters of such a system but not its individual
within contemporary cultures have been well outcomes for retaining long-term memory over a
documented.8 lifetime.
In summary, the self in autobiographical mem- Finally, addressing the implicit question of the
ory is historical in nature, existing in a record of title of this chapter: what is meaning in the devel-
more or less meaningful events of the personal opment of the autobiographical self? I have dis-
past, connecting the adult to the child who was, cussed the role of meaning in memory at length
and also to the older person who can be fore- here, as well as the characteristics of autobio-
seen. I have focused on the emergence in the early graphical memory and the role of self therein.
years of this self as it relates to autobiographical However, the very notion of “the self” in that con-
memory, but this self continues to change over text is misleading, as both the remembered self
time while maintaining its identity as a present and the remembering self are continuously being
self. Each version of self may be viewed in terms updated over time. The self of 20 years ago lacks
of the meanings that led to its retention of mem- the experiences of the present-day self; the mean-
ories over time. The self at a younger age has dif- ings that led to its retention over time may not
ferent wants and values recognized by the more be the same as the meanings that bring it back
mature self as immature but understandable in to consciousness in the present. The current self
the context of the past age. Because the memo- may struggle to make sense of this old/younger
ries that are retained over long periods of time self, even as that self has played a role (however
were initially formed on the basis of then rele- minor) in the revised sense of self in the present.
vant meanings these may no longer resonate with In brief, development never ends. “The” autobio-
the older self, with the possible result of selective graphical self exists only as an abstract construct,
forgetting. not as a psychological reality. Nonetheless, there
Making Memory 271
is typically a sense of continuity over time and life history. My husband, for example, has extensive,
the younger self is generally recognizable as the detailed, and reliable memory for professional and
“same me.” Autobiographical memory is a major historical materials, but very sketchy and few reli-
reason for this feeling of continuity. able autobiographical memories at any age.
7 See Nelson (1989) for analyses of one child’s ven-
tures in this domain.
Notes 8 See also Nelson (2003b) for speculation about his-
torical influences on some of this change within
1 The heading of section 14.1 is the same as the title
European-American cultures.
I initially proposed for my 2007 book, published as
Young Minds in Social Worlds. I am content with the
final book title (which I later submitted at the urg-
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Uniquely human? In H. S. Terrace & J. Metcalfe Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
15 Mapping Dialogic Pedagogy:
Instrumental and
Non-instrumental Education
Eugene Matusov
The concept of dialogue has become increas- 15.1 The Growth of Interest in
ingly popular in diverse areas of social sciences. Dialogic Approaches
In the field of psychology, a dialogic framework
has been introduced from studies of emotions An interest in the concept of “dialogic peda-
(Garvey & Fogel, 2007) to the studies of mem- gogy” (aka “dialogic teaching,” “dialogic educa-
ory (Fernyhough, 1996). Interest in the concept tion,” “dialogic learning”) has also been grow-
of dialogue can be found in many classical psy- ing in education in the last twenty years. On
chologists who have influenced modern sociocul- November 24, 2015, Google Search showed
tural psychology: Vygotsky, Piaget, Mead, and 50,300 combined entries on these terms. Google
so on. There has also been affinity between Ngrm Viewer (https://books.google.com/ngrams)
sociocultural psychology and dialogic frame- shows that the use of these terms in academic
work (Wertsch, 1991). One of the major issues books in English emerged in 1965 and has grown
that dialogic approaches have faced in diverse since. Although modern interest in dialogic ped-
social science fields is to conceptualize dialogue agogy seems to emerge only in the 1960s, it
itself (e.g., O’Connor & Michaels, 2007). What was a very old and probably widespread educa-
is dialogue? What is a good dialogue? In this tional practice. Perhaps, one of the best known
chapter, I want to discuss diverse approaches examples of dialogic pedagogy in the ancient
to dialogic framework in education as an inde- times is Socrates’s dialogic pedagogy practice
pendent sociocultural practice that sociocultural described by his student Plato (1997). However,
psychology investigates and consider how the dialogic practices and dialogic pedagogy existed
field of dialogic pedagogy tries to address this in ancient Greece, before, during, and after
issue of conceptualizing dialogue. I introduce Socrates’s time, although possibly in some other
non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies where dia- forms than those depicted by Plato (Apatow,
logue is viewed as the medium, in which 1998). There has been a long tradition of dialogic
and through which meaning making and truth pedagogy, called chavruta, chavrusa, or havruta,
live. This view is contrasted with instrumental in Jewish Yeshivas, involving dialogic studies of
approaches to dialogic pedagogy that view dia- Talmudic texts, that goes back to the eras of the
logue as a tool for more effective education. tannaim (rabbis of the Mishnaic period, 10–220
Although being particular to the field of edu- ce) (Hezser, 1997). A famous economist, Nobel
cation, these conceptual and even political ten- prize winner, Amartya Sen argues that dialogic
sions in education may affect important debates pedagogy has been well situated within the Indian
in sociocultural psychology. religious and civic traditions and spread across
Mapping Dialogic Pedagogy 275
Asia with the rise of Buddhism (Sen, 2005), cation (although non-dialogic approaches alter-
however, I think that this claim has to be tested native to conventional education are also avail-
and studied systematically. Historic research of able). However, for some other dialogic educa-
dialogic pedagogy practices and ideology in the tion, the opposition to conventional education
ancient time is needed. is less important. Dialogism triggers students’
activity to make learning active, meaningful, and
deep. The third common trend involves the nature
15.1.1 What Is Dialogic Pedagogy?
of a relationship between “monologic pedagogy”
So, what is dialogic pedagogy? For the pur- and “dialogic pedagogy.” This relationship can
pose of this chapter of mapping dialogic ped- vary from a dichotomy to a juxtaposition in or
agogy, I define this term as a self-reference – even mutual complementing of diverse types of
whenever an educator claims that he or she dialogic pedagogy. Sometimes, but not always,
desires or engages in “dialogue” in his/her teach- this trend relates to the first trend of dissatisfac-
ing or learning or education, he or she is tion with a conventional education that is often
involved in “dialogic pedagogy” as opposition considered and criticized as being “monologic.”
to “monologic pedagogy.” Of course, what edu- At the same time, ironically, these three com-
cators may mean by “dialogue,” by “pedagogy/ mon trends in dialogic pedagogy also distinguish
education/learning/teaching,” and the relation- and at times polarize the diverse dialogic peda-
ship between these two concepts may vary from gogy approaches themselves. Although all dia-
educational participant to educational partici- logic pedagogy frameworks may be dissatisfied
pant. My goal here is to try to map these with a conventional institutional pedagogy, their
differences. dissatisfaction differs in degree and quality. They
I argue that the modern emergence of “dia- may answer differently to what is wrong with
logic pedagogy” has been rooted in the three a conventional education and why dialogism is
main common related trends. The first com- necessary for education. Similarly, although they
mon trend among probably all dialogic pedagogy all are attracted to the notion of dialogue, they
approaches is dissatisfaction with the conven- may understand this notion differently as I will
tional education, based on diverse forms of trans- discuss below. Finally, the monologue–dialogue
mission of knowledge. In this conventional form opposition may have diverse forms in diverse dia-
of education, teachers cover/transmit the curricu- logic pedagogy frameworks and can be viewed as
lar material, selected by the teachers and/or other a dichotomy, a dialectical contradiction, comple-
authorities, while students remain passive and mentary aspects, or even a stylistic juxtaposition.
silent receptacles (Rogoff, Matusov, & White, Thus, these three trends of similarities and differ-
1996). Dialogic critique of a conventional insti- ences provide me with lenses on my analysis of
tutionalized pedagogy is its disinterest in and the similarities and differences among the exist-
insensitivity to students’ subjectivity often leading diverse dialogic pedagogy approaches.
ing to teachers’ insensitive guidance and stu- Of course, non-dialogic pedagogies – pedago-
dents’ alienation (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, gies that are not interested in the notion of dia-
2012). The second trend is educators’ attraction logue – have their own great diversity as well.
to and interest in the concept of dialogue itself as They involve both conventional transmission
the foundation of education. Some dialogic peda- of knowledge/skills/attitudes/values approaches
gogy educators see the concept of dialogue as one and non-dialogic innovative approaches, such as
of the main possible remedies (if not the remedy) discovery learning, scaffolding, apprenticeship,
to address the problems of a conventional edu- problem-based learning, and so on. Innovative
276 eu gen e m atus ov
non-dialogic pedagogies may also criticize con- By “instrumental dialogic pedagogies,” I

ventional institutionalized education but they do define a family of diverse dialogic pedago-
not evoke the concept of dialogue to address gies that treat dialogue as a tool or a means
its problems. Some non-dialogic pedagogies may for achieving otherwise non-dialogic goals that
involve dialogue but they may not emphasize its exist outside of dialogue. These non-dialogic
pedagogical importance and/or dialogue that may goals usually involve varied curricular endpoints,
exist on the periphery of the pedagogical and such as particular philosophical truths (Plato &
learning efforts. Incidentally, sociocultural edu- Bluck, 1961), state defined educational standards
cational approaches may or may not involve a (Lefstein & Snell, 2013), or preset social jus-
dialogic framework either. The non-dialogic ped- tice and equity values (Freire, 1978; Paley, 1992;
agogies will remain in the background of my Rule, 2015). Dialogue is often viewed as a better
analysis here as they remain “dialogic opponents” or the best (more/most effective) way to achieve
for diverse dialogic pedagogy. these preset curricular endpoints so the students
deeper understand, accept, and socialize in them.
The biggest issue for instrumental pedagogies –
15.1.2 Diverse Dialogic
dialogic or not – is how to make students arrive at
Pedagogies: Instrumental and
the preset curricular endpoints in the most effec-
Non-Instrumental Education
tive and deepest way for each student. The instru-
My analysis of diverse approaches to dialogic mental dialogic pedagogies see dialogue as the
pedagogy has been limited to analyzing diverse answer to this question.
conceptual dialogic frameworks, focusing on By “non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies,” I
their declarative nature – i.e., the espoused theory define a family of diverse dialogic pedagogies
of practice – rather than on how educational prac- that views the meaning making process as inher-
titioners enact their espoused dialogic pedagogy ently dialogic (Bakhtin, 1986, 1999; Matusov,
in their particular pedagogical practice – i.e., 2009a; Sidorkin, 1999; Wegerif, 2007). Meaning
the theory-in-action (Argyris & Schön, 1978). In making, on which arguably genuine education is
other words, the “data material” for my analysis based, emerges and lives in dialogue. Outside of
were pedagogical texts articulating their partic- dialogue meaning does not exist. From this point
ular concepts of dialogic pedagogy – theoretical of view, dialogue cannot be a tool for achiev-
work, educational manifesto, and even empirical ing non-dialogic goals. It cannot be a tool or a
studies that involved conceptualization but not means – period. Also, dialogue as meaning
analysis of educational practices directly. The last making transcends any particular activity and
can be an important and necessary study on its practice. Dialogue cannot be exited or avoided,
own. Thus, my finding claims can be warranted but dialogue can be distorted by excessive
only for espoused dialogic pedagogy framework. monologism or by excessive dialogism (Bakhtin,
The main finding of my investigation is that 1999; Matusov, 2009a). Non-instrumental dia-
the literature on dialogic pedagogy presents a logic pedagogy approaches to open dialogic
vast terrain of diverse conceptual families and investigations focus on how to promote the
approaches; and within this vast terrain two power of dialogue, as a meaning-making pro-
big strains of dialogic approaches that I call cess, cleaning it from distortions of exces-
“instrumental dialogic pedagogies” and “non- sive monologism (and, to a lesser degree, of
instrumental dialogic pedagogies” that vary in excessive dialogism). The difference among
how they see the major purpose and function of these non-instrumental approaches is in empha-
education (see Figure 15.1). sis. Some non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies
Conventional Dialogic pedagogy
pedagogy
Dramatic meeting
Preset curricular Preset curricular Preset curricular of consciousnesses
endpoints endpoints endpoints with equal rights
Non-instrumental Non-instrumental
Non-dialogic Instrumental dialogic
non-dialogic dialogic approaches
approaches approaches
approaches
Epistemological I Social justice Epistemological II Ontological Ecological
* Platonic Socrates (Plato & Bluck, 1961); * Espoused Socrates * Bakhtin (1993, 1999); * Linell (2009);
* Freire (1986);
* Burbules (1993); * Lakatos (1981); * Lobok (2001, 2008); * Sidorkin (1999, ch. 3)
* Paley (1992)
* Adler (1982) * Berlyand (2009a, 2009b); * Sidorkin (1999); * Lensmire (1994);
* Bibler (2009); * Wegerif (2007);
* Kurganov (2009); * Shor (1987);
* Phillips (2002); * Ranciére (1991);
* Lampert (2001) * Tolstoy (1967);
* Matusov (2009a, 2009b);
* Instructional
conversations (1995)
Figure 15.1 Diverse and vast terrain of dialogic pedagogy. Source: author’s website at https://diaped.soe.udel.edu/dp-map/?page_id=18.
emphasize dialogic production of knowledge social cohesion, health, economic reproduction,

(Lakatos, 1981), some emphasize ontology of the social justice, citizenship, economic and polit-
participants (Sidorkin, 1999), and yet some may ical equity, patriotism, nationalism, ethnic and
emphasize ecological well-being of the partici- racial tolerance, and so on. Educational sociol-
pants (Linell, 2009). ogist David Labaree (1997) conceptualizes these
Previous discussions of my terminology with instrumental public goals of education as follows:
my dialogic pedagogy colleagues have revealed (1) democratic participation, (2) social efficiency,
several possible confusions that I want to clar- and (3) social mobility. When I presented Laba-
ify from the beginning of the presentation of ree’s research to my education research gradu-
my findings. By labeling “instrumental” versus ate students by coding their own goals of edu-
“non-instrumental” families of dialogic peda- cation, we often found the forth common goal
gogy approaches, I want to emphasize that for that we called “education for education’s sake”
the first family instrumentality is what defines or “education for growth” or “education as self-
the role of dialogue in dialogic pedagogy. Of actualization.” When on request of my graduate
course, instrumentality also plays a role in the students I contacted David Labaree about this
non-instrumental dialogic pedagogy family of fourth goal of education, he replied that he would
approaches. Thus, certain instrumentality can not count it as “a public goal of education.” In my
promote good dialogue – e.g., instrumental orga- view, David is both right and wrong. He is right
nization of the pedagogical time–space (i.e., that “education for education’s sake” is an inher-
“chronotope” Bakhtin, 1991; Matusov, 2009a, ently and fundamentally personal need, and thus a
2015a; Renshaw, 2013) of the educational pro- fundamental human right, that cannot be imposed
cess (i.e., pedagogical design). However, this or demanded by society, in contrast to the three
instrumentality does not define the role of dia- instrumental goals that he listed. But, I respect-
logue in these dialogic pedagogies. In contrast, fully disagree that society does not have inter-
instrumentality does define the role of dialogue est in promoting the inherent, non-instrumental,
in the instrumental dialogic pedagogies. sphere of education rooted in the fundamental
Thinking deeper about my main 2010 finding private need or that the public does not engage
of the division of the terrain of dialogic ped- in debates on the non-instrumental education,
agogy approaches on “instrumental” and “non- although it is true that these public debates are
instrumental,” I have come to a conclusion that more quiet and less recognized.
it probably reflects a bigger divide in the entire The fact that the intrinsic, non-instrumental,
field of education (and probably beyond, in social sphere of education is not publicly well recog-
sciences). Instrumental education views educa- nized may have deep historical and sociocul-
tion as a servant for other spheres of human tural roots. The notion of education expressed
activity, necessities, survivals, and needs. Non- by the Greek word “school” means “leisure” and
instrumental (or intrinsic) education views edu- was understood as a leisurely pursuit of criti-
cation as a goal in itself, as a fundamental exis- cal examination of the self, life, world, and soci-
tential human need, not reducible to other needs ety (Arendt, 1958; Plato, 1984). This type of
(i.e., as “the final cause” in Aristotelian terms) leisurely pursuit of critical examination, freed
(Matusov et al., 2017). Public debates on edu- from labor and work, became available for free
cation often reveal its instrumental role (Laba- male citizens of a Greek democratic polis and
ree, 1997). Education is often viewed as a means was based on exploitation of slaves and women
for achieving upward social mobility, leader- (Arendt, 1958). Until people again become free
ship in global economic competition, morality, from labor and work – free from survival
and necessities – non-instrumental education for self, life, world, and society embedded in a crit-
self-actualization cannot be mass education. Cur- ical dialogue (i.e., “internally persuasive dis-
rently most of economic and institutional prac- course”; Bakhtin, 1991). I present the terrain
tices require people to act as smart machines: to of dialogic pedagogy not from the objective
predictably arrive at preset goals and to be mutu- bird’s eye view, which I view as impossible and
ally replaceable (Mitra, 2013). But it is true that undesirable, but from my own interested – read
humans can never act as perfect smart machines “biased” – perspective.
even when they engage in the most routine work
(Wenger, 1998), the so-called “human factor.”
15.2 Instrumental Dialogic
It is also true that the instrumentalized modern
Pedagogies
economic and institutional practices require their
own architects and designers – an intellectual The instrumental dialogic pedagogies criticize
elite – who do not act as smart machines but are the conventional institutionalized education for
engaged in the creative imagining of new goals, its inefficiency to engage students into deep
new values, new practices, new art, new theo- understanding of the preset curricular academic
ries, and so on. Besides, the fundamental need of material. They argue that this is especially true
people for self-actualization and personal growth, for students from disadvantaged communities,
remaining mostly unrealized for the majority of whose learning is mainly based on memorization
modern humanity (Maslow, 1943), also pushes and drills (Adler, 1982). Freire (1986) criticized
for non-instrumental education. These pressures conventional pedagogy as “the banking model,”
apparently create oases and safe havens of non- in which teachers deposit knowledge and skills
instrumental education (e.g., Greenberg, 1992; in the heads of the students without this knowl-
Neill, 1960) in the vast ocean of instrumental edge and skills being critically examined by the
education. students.
However, we may come increasingly closer Dialogue is supposed to address this main
to the point when a need for human instru- problem of conventional education, “Dialogue
mentality will diminish through robotization, is an activity directed toward discovery and
automatization, and telecommunication, when new understanding, which stands to improve the
economic and institutional practices may not knowledge, insight, or sensitivity of its partici-
need mass human employment in general (so- pants” (Burbules, 1993, p. 9). There are various
called “technological unemployment”) and smart way of defining understanding of what dialogue
machine-like employment in specific (Ford, is in the instrumental dialogic pedagogies. In
2015; Markoff, 2015; Rifkin, 2014). These grow- some instrumental pedagogies, dialogue is under-
ing changes in technology, economy, and insti- stood as an interactive genre of guidance, where
tutional practices may create a new demand for the teacher–student talk ratio is low (O’Connor
mass non-instrumental education. Thus, the ten- & Michaels, 2007). Thus, describing pedagogical
sion in the field of dialogic pedagogy may reflect dialogue, Burbules (1993) focuses on behavioral
bigger historic sociocultural tectonic tensions in interactivity: increasing students’ talk, asking
our society, if not in modern civilization. open-ended questions, setting interactional
Finally, I want to warn my readers about turns, avoiding lecturing, and so on – what he
my biases. I subscribe to a particular non- calls “dialogue game.” In another instrumental
instrumental ontological dialogic pedagogy that, dialogic pedagogy, dialogue is understood as
like the ancient Greeks, views education as a “heteroglossia” – juxtaposition of diverse voices
leisurely pursuit of critical examination of the of the students (and the teacher), referring to
Bakhtin’s (1986) notion (e.g., Lefstein & Snell, logue is a part of human nature and social rela-
2013). Some other instrumental dialogic edu- tionship rather than a pedagogical method or
cators define dialogue as a Socratic method of technique,
questioning students about their own beliefs and
knowledge to lead them to the correct knowledge first of all we should understand liberating dialogue
(Adler, 1982). Yet, other instrumental dialogic not as a technique, a mere technique, which we can
educators argue for engaging the students in the use to help us get some results. We also cannot,
must not, understand dialogue as a kind of tactic we
analysis of dialectical, mutually constituting,
use to make students our friends. This would make
contradictions in the studied material (Freire,
dialogue a technique for manipulation instead of
1986). I am sure that this list of definitions
illumination.
of instrumental pedagogical dialogue is not
complete. On the contrary, dialogue must be understood as
The relationship between dialogue and mono- something taking part in the very historical nature
logue can also vary in diverse instrumental dia- of human beings. It is part of our historical
progress in becoming human beings. That is,
logic pedagogy approaches. It is complementary
dialogue is a kind of necessary posture to the extent
in writings of Adler and some others (e.g., Lef-
that humans have become more and more critically
stein & Snell, 2013). Thus, Adler argued that
communicative beings. Dialogue is a moment
new material, unfamiliar for the students, has where humans meet to reflect on their reality as
to be known monologically via a lecture and/or they make and remake it. (Shor & Freire, 1987,
demonstration (and drills of new skills) and then p. 13)
the new knowledge and skills, experienced by
the students, can be deepened through a Socratic In my view, the difference between Freire’s
method of (instrumental) pedagogical dialogue of instrumental dialogic pedagogy approach and
carefully defined leading questions. Elsewhere, I many other instrumental approaches is that his
characterized this relationship between dialogue approach is focused on social justice rooted in
and monologue in the following way, the oppression–liberation dichotomy, while oth-
ers’ approaches are focused on epistemology of
Dialogic method can be done once a week or one
acquiring and producing knowledge. I will con-
hour a day or not at all – it can be dosed, scheduled,
sider this issue further.
and well located in the classroom.1 This claim [of
Finally, all instrumental dialogic pedagogy
instructional dialogue’s efficiency – EM] can be
tested empirically by comparing students’ learning approaches are aimed at making students arrive
stemming from dialogic and non-dialogic at the preset curricular endpoints at its mini-
instructions. This prescriptive approach focuses on mum. Of course, arrival at the preset curricular
consideration when dialogic instruction is needed points have to be personal – via a student’s own
for better learning of new material or for unique learning trajectory rooted in the student’s
reconceptualization of already known material, own biography and subjectivity – and deep. By
for learning factual information or for learning deep, it means a student has to be able to prove
conceptual understanding, for younger students or and defend these endpoints through a dialogic
for older students, for math or social studies, and so argumentation. Also, through pedagogical dia-
on (see for proponents of the weak dialogism in
logue, students may come to additional endpoints
education: Adler, 1982; Burbules, 1993; C.
beyond ones that were preset by the teacher,
Phillips, 2002; Renshaw, 2004). (Matusov, 2009a,
school, or state (although the legitimacy of the
p. 75)
student’s emerging endpoints is often established
However, the dialogue–monologue is dichoto- by the authority). At times, instrumental dialogic
mous in the writings by Freire. For Freire, dia- educators can be critical of state preset curricular
endpoints (i.e., educational standards), when they measure students’ skills, not just their ability to
disagree with them. However, they are usually not recall facts. Paideia offers resources aligned with
opposed to the educational standards and their the Common Core, integrating all four language
assessment through testing per se. Often they arts skills. We believe the Paideia approach to
show effectiveness of instrumental dialogic ped- Socratic Seminar is the best way to teach students
the essential, lifelong skills of reading, speaking
agogy by citing test scores (Brown & Campione,
and listening, and writing. (http://www.paideia.org/
1994; Burbules, 1993; Lefstein & Snell, 2013).
about-paideia/common-core-standards/)
At the same time, instrumental dialogic pedagogy
educators often argue that testing is not enough to Similarly, Freire (1978) was not apologetic to
assess depth of students’ understanding and other accept and actively promote the preset socialist
types of assessments are needed (e.g., portfolios, state curricular goals in Guinea-Bissau and Sao
observations, dialogic assessment). In many (but Tome because these preset curricular goals were
probably not all) instrumental dialogic pedagogy socially just, from his point of view, regardless
approaches, educational standards seem to define how dogmatic, authoritarian, and problematic
and ensure the minimum quality of education. these preset socialist views on social justice actu-
Thus, the instrumental dialogic pedagogy can be ally were (Matusov, 2009a). Suddenly, Freire’s
characterized as standards/testing plus dialogue. passion for a critical discourse disappeared. Not
It is compatible with the progressive pedagogi- all alternative ideas are allowed in instrumental
cal movement seeking for individualized subjec- dialogic pedagogy with focus on social justice.
tive pathways for achieving curricular endpoints Certain endpoints, at which students may arrive
preset by the society. Thus, Dewey (1956) argued in a critical dialogue, are not legitimate and have
for “double psychologizing” the societal preset to be silenced by the authority (including a crit-
curriculum by analyzing the historic psychological meta point that education may not or should
ical needs for the society to arrive at this curricu- not serve social justice at all or not only). Sim-
lum and by grounding this preset societal cur- ilarly in Paley’s instrumental dialogic pedagogy,
riculum in the psychology of the student. It can children could deeply discuss issues of social
be concluded that the instrumental dialogic ped- justice, they had experienced in the classroom,
agogy sees dialogue as a means for such dou- until their impasse to address the injustice. After
ble psychologizing, insisted on by progressivist the impasse was detected, Paley (1992) simply
educators. imposed her vision of social justice on the chil-
The nature of the preset curricular endpoints is dren and powerfully shut down the dialogue (see
different for different instrumental dialogic ped- my analysis, Matusov, 2009a, chs. 7, 8).
agogy approaches. For epistemological instru- Before, considering epistemological and social
mental dialogic pedagogy approaches, these pre- justice instrumental dialogic pedagogies, I want
set endpoints are knowledge- and skills-based. again to warn the readers that when I make
For social justice instrumental approaches, these a distinction between these two instrumental
preset endpoints are involved social justice and approaches I focus on their priorities of the pre-
equity. Thus, Adler’s “paideia proposal” endorses set curricular endpoints: epistemological versus
the recent Common Core educational standards social justice. Of course, epistemological instru-
in the United States, mental approaches may involve issues of social
justice but these approaches treat these social jus-
Paideia supports the shift of emphasis from content tice issues as particular knowledge along with
to skills – preparing students to learn independently other knowledge. Similarly, social justice instru-
and throughout life. Paideia especially supports the mental approaches may involve many epistemo-
improvement in student assessments, so they logical issues but these pedagogies treat them
through the prism of social justice issues con- teacher (but not always) and often goes through
tributing to people’s “liberation” (Shor & Freire, four phases.
1987).
1 Engaging the students into the teacher-defined
material – as the Meno dialogue shows, it can
15.2.1 Epistemological be quite a struggle because the students might
Instrumental Dialogic Pedagogies have their own agendas and/or might not be
(Epistemological I) immediately interested in the teacher-defined
issues.
The epistemological instrumental dialogic ped-
2 Searching for and revealing misconceptions
agogy is characterized by the use of dialogue
in the students’ subjectivity on the teacher-
between the teacher and the students and among
defined issues – this revelation is firstly done
the students to achieve some intellectual, epis-
for the teacher him or herself as the students
temological curricular endpoints, preset by the
often are not aware that they have misconcep-
teacher. Dialogue here is a pedagogical method
tions and contradictions in their thinking and
(e.g., Socratic Method) or an instructional strat-
perception of the reality. Here is where a gen-
egy along with other pedagogical methods and
uine dialogue is more permitted and tolerable
instructional strategies which can be switched
by the teacher.
on and off. Thus, both Adler (1982, 1983) and
3 Leading the students into numbing contra-
Burbules (1993) argue that presentation of unfa-
dictions about their misconceptions (so-called
miliar material or new information should be
“torpedo touch”) – it is important to develop
done by the teacher in a straightforward lectur-
in the students a sense of paralysis from
ing or in general direct instruction ways, while
the revealed contradiction between two strong
deepening understanding has to be done in a
alternatives rooted in the students’ own subjec-
form of (Socratic) dialogue. Since the students
tivity; all ways out suggested by the students
do not have any prior knowledge of unfamil-
should be convincingly blocked by the teacher.
iar material, it does not make sense to dialogue
4 Leading the students into the preset curric-
about it, from this instrumental perspective. This
ular endpoint as the only possible and logi-
approach to dialogue as a method can be traced in
cal solution of the contradiction – the teacher
Plato’s Socrates when Socrates gives an example
usually blocks any alternatives in themes and
of giving directions to a certain place to some-
in solutions. Here is where usually genuine
one as a task of not worthy and not appropriate
dialogue is less permitted and tolerant by the
of dialogic investigation (Plato & Bluck, 1961).
teacher.
Thus, the epistemological instrumental dialogic
pedagogy is primary concerned with deepening As in the case of Plato’s Socrates, I suspect that
students’ intellectual understanding about some- the teacher’s manipulation of the students’ sub-
thing but this deepening has some curricular end- jectivities often involves self-manipulation of the
points like, for example, in case of the Meno dia- teacher’s own consciousness to truly believe that
logue, that the virtue is problematic and inherited, the preset curricular endpoint is the only one pos-
or that, in mathematics, by increasing the sides of sible and logical. Indeed, it is a mathematical fact
a square twice, the area of the square will increase that the area of a square is equal the square of
four times. its sides. What can be problematic there? But,
The dialogic method of the epistemological as I showed with the example of 2 + 2 = 4, it
instrumental pedagogy is organized in a series is never the case – anything and everything is
of questions and answers usually initiated by the questionable and problematic if there is desire to
look deeper (Matusov, 2009a). As Bakhtin (1986) mental dialogic pedagogy. Since the truth and
argued, understanding is always unfinalized and, power associated with it is rooted in the dia-
thus, bottomless. logic method of investigation, people who pro-
Elsewhere I argued (Matusov, 2009a, ch. 2), fess in the method have to be on the top of the
that Plato’s Socratic Dialogic method is a bizarre society – this is a rather logical conclusion from
combination of radical pedagogical construc- the epistemological instrumental dialogic peda-
tivism, based on dialogic investigation of truth gogy. According to Plato’s Republic, the world
though revealing contradictions in people’s think- has to be ruled by philosophers.
ing, and radical philosophical positivism, based
on the preset curricular endpoints reflecting the
eternal, universal ideas. Now, I wonder if this 15.2.2 Social Justice Instrumental
combination of radical pedagogical construc- Dialogic Pedagogies
tivism and radical philosophical positivism is
a birthmark of the epistemological instrumental Sufferings generated by social injustice, unfair-
dialogic pedagogy in general. Since Socrates, this ness, and oppression are symptoms of social
position has been reinforced by the rationalism untruth. In my view, uncovering, naming, reveal-
of the Enlightenment (the modernism), according, analyzing, and addressing this social untruth
ing to which reasonable, well-intended people is a very legitimate goal of dialogue and dia-
with access to the same information will come logic pedagogy. Some dialogic pedagogies pri-
to the same conclusion (Rawls, 1993). The mod- oritize social justice (e.g., Ferrer Guardia, 1913;
ernist rational mind has to subordinate itself to Freire, 1986; McLaren & Lankshear, 1994; Shor,
the iron logic of the universal necessity and 1987) and try to consider all other human phe-
purify itself from any other irrational and cor- nomena through the prism of social (in)justice.
rupting influences like emotions, values, beliefs, This by itself does not necessarily make these
responsibility, traditions, social justice, loyal- dialogic pedagogies instrumental (especially, if
ties, and judgments (Matusov, 2015b). In this nonsocial justice approaches are also permit-
approach, consensus and agreement are priori- ted). However, in my contested analysis, some
tized – because by achieving a rational consen- of them (Freire, 1978, 1986; Paley, 1992) indeed
sus among rational people through the free mar- become instrumental (Facundo, 1984; Matusov,
ketplace of ideas becomes a proxy for reach- 2009a). The basic premise of social justice is
ing the truth (Habermas, 1984). When the ratio- that at some point social action, social engi-
nal consensus is reached, it sets a curricular neering, promoting the correct social justice is
endpoint for education. In my view, necessity more important and more responsible than a
is only an aspect of discourse and by itself it dialogue.
is shaped by other aspects (e.g., values, emo- In my analysis, a social justice instrumental
tions) and penetrates them as well (Matusov & dialogic pedagogy goes through three phases.
Marjanovic-Shane, 2015). People’s logic does
not need to follow the necessity and does not 1 Critical dialogic pedagogy revealing evidence
need to slavishly submit it but also define it. of social injustice, its naming, analysis of
The logic and necessity do not provide “alibi- its contemporary structure and its historical
in-being” using Bakhtin’s metaphor (Bakhtin, causes, and ways to undermine and eliminate
1993). it. Here is where a genuine dialogue is more
Finally, I want to comment on the inher- permitted and tolerable and even promoted by
ently elitist nature of the epistemological instru- the teacher.
2 Coup/revolution forcefully imposing the right r Unity

social conditions on the students by the teacher r Discipline
that must promote social justice in time. Dia- r Work
r Vigilance
logue is not allowed anymore.
r Unity of all, having the same objective in sight:
3 Regime of social engineering focusing on the
the creation of a new society.
enforcement of the right social conditions,
r Discipline in action, in work, in study, in daily
collecting proofs of the successes, promot-
life. Conscious discipline, without which nothing
ing propaganda. Free and genuine dialogue is
is done, nothing created. Discipline in unity,
actively suppressed through manipulation and without which work is lost.
violence. r Work. Work on the farms. Work in the factories.
For example, Freire’s (1986) famous and influ- Work in public service. Work in schools.
r Vigilance, much vigilance, against the internal
ential book describing dialogic principles of his
and external enemies, who will do anything they
critical pedagogy work with Brazilian peasants
can to deter our struggle for the creation of the
seems to fit the first phase of a social justice new society.
instrumental pedagogy – critical dialogic peda-
gogy in which Freire helps his students reveal This text, as simple as it was, posed the problem of
and analyze instances and conditions of social the national reconstruction and played with the
oppression they experience and through that they words unity, discipline, work, and vigilance.
learn “to read and write the world.” Freire’s Obviously, the theme of the national reconstruction
or the reinvention of the society of Sao Tome is
(1978; Freire & Macedo, 1987) less known and
imposed by its present state. The game played
less influential books are about his pedagogical
with the words unity, discipline, work, and
work in Africa in socialist Guinea-Bissau and vigilance, which appear in a great number of
Sao Tome where social coup/revolution already slogans, was introduced to present them in a
occurred. Freire saw his educational role in pro- dynamic text preserving or recovering their most
moting the party efforts in socially engineer- profound meaning (threatened by the uncritical
ing social justice in these socialist countries. No character of clichés). (Freire & Macedo, 1987,
genuine dialogue was allowed but totalitarian pp. 79–80; italics in original; bold added)
monologic discourse with “tertium non datum”
While analyzing the Marxist totalitarian
(Bakhtin, 1999) is imposed on the students. Here
regimes of the twentieth century, Laclau and
is an example of Freire’s brainwashing of peas-
Mouffe (2001) came to a conclusion that onto-
ants with the party’s dogmatic ideology taken
logical privilege of unquestioned power (i.e.,
from Freire’s own account:
the party dictatorship) in association with the
The next theme dealt with in the Second Popu-
extreme epistemological certainty of the politi-
lar Culture Notebook is:
cal leadership leads to totalitarianism. It does not
National Reconstruction: II help that Freire and Paley provide some critical
comments about their own pedagogy (e.g., see
We saw, in the previous text, that to produce more
bolded text above) because they constitute the
on the farms, in the factories, and to work more
phenomenon of “awareness without responsibil-
in the public services is to struggle for national
reconstruction. We also saw that, for us, national ity,” probably, aiming on self-manipulation to co-
reconstruction means the creation of a new society, opt the educators’ own consciousness (Matusov,
without exploited or exploiters. A society of 2009a, chs. 4, 8).
workers. For this reason, the national The logic of a social justice instrumental dia-
reconstruction demands of us: logic pedagogy seems to be rather persuasive on
the first glance. Indeed, if we, educators, under- tal dialogic pedagogy. In the proposed dialogic
stand and explore with our students the harm- impositions, the teacher’s unilateral actions are
ful consequences of social injustice – economic viewed as tests of ideas that are evaluated by
and political oppression, in the case of Freire, the entire community. Dialogic impositions can
and systematic social exclusion of some children be in space (i.e., in some part of the commu-
by other children, in the case of Paley – is it nal space the participants experience new and in
morally and pedagogically irresponsible for the some old social regime) or in time (i.e., in the
teacher to continue the status quo? For how long past there was the old social regime but start-
can we dialogue with our students while some of ing from some time there will be a new social
them keep suffering? Isn’t it legitimate to stop regime defined by the teacher). In contrast to
dialoguing and start to act? Isn’t it the legiti- social engineering, the participants through expe-
mate and most important professional responsi- rience of the consequences of this action and
bility by the teacher to ensure social well-being democratic decision-making can decide to return
of the students? Dialogue without action becomes to the status quo, to remain in a new regime,
irresponsible blah-blah-blah (verbalism in terms or to keep changing it. In our view, the issue
of Freire). with a social justice instrumental dialogic ped-
My response to that very powerful and legiti- agogy leading to totalitarianism is not only in
mate call for the teacher’s responsibility is that: the teacher’s unilateralism or imposition them-
(1) truth does not live in statements produced selves but more importantly in the suppression of
by dialogue, it does not have internal territory dialogue.
(using Bakhtin’s metaphor), but lives only in dia-
logue of many truths and (2) any action is a
15.3 Non-Instrumental Dialogic
part of discourse and it has a discursive aspect,
Pedagogies
which makes it meaningful. When the teacher
stops and suppresses a free dialogue in the class- In contrast to the instrumental approaches to dia-
room, he or she does not stop discourse but logic pedagogy, the non-instrumental approaches
rather makes it oppressive. Totalitarianism does to dialogic pedagogy view dialogue not as an
not solve previous oppressions but rather trans- effective means or a powerful pathway or a strat-
forms and intensifies them by total assault on egy for achieving meaning, truth, knowledge, jus-
the participants’ freedom, in which imposed sys- tice, and so on, but the medium in which mean-
tematic social inclusion arguably becomes more ing, truth, knowledge, justice, and so on, live
oppressive than systematic social exclusion (in (Bakhtin, 1986, 1999; Matusov, 2009a; Morson
the case of Paley) and imposed total equality & Emerson, 1990; Sidorkin, 1999). As Bakhtin
arguably becomes more oppressive than system- (1986) pointed out, meaning lives in the rela-
atic inequality (in the case of Freire), leading to tionship between a genuine question seeking for
totalitarianism, concentration camps, and mass information and a sincere answer aiming at hon-
murders in their historical extremes of the twen- est addressing this question. Any statement by
tieth century. itself makes sense only because it is embedded
In my book (Matusov, 2009a, ch. 8), my col- in dialogic relationships of the address and the
league Mark Smith and I discussed possibili- response. This dialogic relationship is often invis-
ties for the teachers’ dialogic impositions on ible and taken for granted, which creates an illu-
students, which we called “dialogic objectiviza- sion in people that statements make sense by
tions,” and their contrast with social engineer- themselves rather than being tokens and knots
ing promoted by a social justice instrumen- of the dialogic relationships. This illusion often
leads to the conventional, monologic goal of edu- high cultures (Matusov, 2009b) in their defining
cation as promoting preset curricular endpoints – the concept “genuine dialogue.”
self-contained statements, skills, values, and dis- Since meaning making has the inherently dia-
positions – to the students. Thus, educational logic nature, according to the non-instrumental
standards are not only a bad idea for good educa- dialogic pedagogy approaches, dialogue is ubiq-
tion, hindering meaning making, but also a mis- uitous and omnipresent. There is nothing but dia-
leading and unreal concept. And this is the main logue. Dialogue is inescapable. Anything mean-
critique of a conventional institutionalized edu- ingful is dialogic. Monologue as a negative and
cation based on preset curricular endpoints. In even ethically evil force is still a form of this
a genuine dialogue, any truth can be tested and ubiquitous dialogue – a distorted dialogue. For
is forever testable (Morson, 2004) and emerging example, Hegel (Hegel & Baillie, 1967) convinc-
endpoints are always provisional, transcending, ingly showed in his analysis of slave–owner’s
and never fully predictable for any participant or dream for “the ideal slave” that beneath such
observer. Meaning making is never given (preset, inhumane, oppressive, and abusive relationship
finalized, positive) but always emergent, unfold- of slavery, there is a human desire for genuinely
ing, unfinalized, and relational, in the eye of the human care and dialogism, however, the slavery
beholder. relationship distorts this dialogism. Thus, exces-
What is considered “genuine dialogue” sive monologism of dogmatism, silencing, or rad-
beyond meaning making varies in diverse non- ical relativism (Bakhtin, 1999) is a fallen angel
instrumental dialogic pedagogy approaches. of the genuine dialogism (Matusov, 2009a). The
Thus, the epistemological II and the onto- “genuine dialogue” is dialogue, constantly expe-
logical non-instrumental dialogic pedagogy rienced by all of us, cleaned from the distor-
approaches define “genuine dialogue” as critical tions of excessive monologism (and excessive
and puzzlement-based, while this is not neces- dialogism). A part of this distortion is caused
sary in the ecological non-instrumental dialogic by scarcity of and competition for resources and
pedagogy. These two approaches view the over- by the fact that the majority of people still need
all pedagogical goal as in helping students to to spend a huge part of their time on providing
develop their own strong voices through making for their living rather than on self-actualization,
authorial judgments informed by other in a crit- envisioning good life, and self-growth. From
ical dialogue. The epistemological II approach this point of view, any pedagogy is dialogic,
puts its emphasis on intellectual self-growth although the dialogism of any pedagogy can be
often rooted in the intellectual achievements very distorted by excessive monologism. Here,
of the high culture2 (e.g., “dialogue of high the dialogue and monologue are not genres of
cultures” – elitism), which would define “gen- the teacher’s instruction (e.g., instructional con-
uine dialogue.” In contrast, the ontological versation vs. lecture), but degree and nature of
approaches prioritize people’s being-in-the- distortion of the genuine dialogue as free, open-
world (Packer & Goicoechea, 2000) in defining ended, interested, honest, and (critical) meaning-
“genuine dialogue.” Finally, the ecological making never-ending discourse. At the same,
approaches are more interested in the ecology of dialogue–monologue relationship can legiti-
human beings free of pedagogical coercion. In mately take a form of a dichotomy3 when dia-
contrast to the epistemological II approaches, the logue and monologue become opposing, antago-
ontological and the ecological dialogic pedagogy nistic, paradigmatically different pedagogical and
are concerned with both the mundane low and human values, mobilizing people for different
conflicting actions, relationships, ideologies, and his introduction to the book with the following
practices. words, “The dialogue form [in his book] should
reflect the dialectic of the story [i.e., history of
the discoveries and developments of math ideas];
15.3.1 Epistemological
it is meant to contain a sort of rationally recon-
Non-Instrumental Dialogic
structed or ‘distilled’ history” (Lakatos, 1981,
Pedagogies (Epistemological II)
p. 5, emphasis in original).
The epistemological non-instrumental dialogic I want to focus on this nature of “distillation”
pedagogy prioritizes the sublime intellectual crit- or purification that Lakatos mentioned. Lakatos
ical achievement. It focuses on “the eternal intel- was talking about distillation, reconstruction, and
lectual damn final questions” raised by diverse purification of the history of the math practice,
high cultures. It is interested in the mundane only while I am interested in his distillation, recon-
because it can give it the material and oppor- struction, and purification of ontological dia-
tunity to move to the sublime inquiries (e.g., logue. History represents an ontological dialogue
“what is moderation,” see Phillips, 2002, as a that occurred in certain physical time and space.
good example). The non-instrumental “episte- But ontological dialogues can also be ahistorical
mological dialogue” (the term has been intro- and even imaginary (Dostoevsky’s novels is an
duced by Sidorkin, 1999) is a purified dialogue example, see Bakhtin, 1999).
to abstract a single main theme, a development of What are the differences between epistemolog-
a main concept, and unfolding the logic. Due to ical and ontological non-instrumental dialogues?
this purification, epistemological dialogue occurs Let me start with making observational notes
in de-ontologized space and time. As a tool about their similarities. First, like epistemological
of investigation of an ontological dialogue, this dialogue, ontological dialogue can also involve
purification can be legitimate. However, model- abstractions from and reconstructions of live con-
ing classroom discussion after an epistemolog- versations (and it can be entirely fictional). So,
ical dialogue can lead to pedagogical coercion it is not focused on “exactness” that produces
as a way of “disciplining the students’ minds” the difference, although it is true that ontologi-
so they remain staying on the theme defined cal dialogue has more of what can be called “life
by the teacher as the most important. It brack- details.” Second, ontological dialogue can also
ets the complexity and interconnection of the focus on epistemological issues. Thus, it is not
diverse themes and makes certain “irrelevant” that thematic focus makes the difference. Third,
agendas, interests, strengths, desires, and onto- epistemological dialogues usually (or maybe even
logical groundings as inappropriate and illegiti- always) preserve particular voices and generate
mate (which, in its own turn, requires policing the person-ideas, although in an epistemological dia-
discourse and punitive actions for violators of the logue, the person is subordinated and deduced
epistemological regime). from the idea. Hence, the strong presence and
In my view, one of the good representatives depiction of particular rich voices does not distin-
of the epistemological non-instrumental dialogic guish ontological and epistemological dialogues.
pedagogy is Lakatos (1981) focusing on the ped- Fourth, both types of dialogues can both promote
agogical development of math ideas via non- (as well as deviate from) the regime of “inter-
instrumental epistemological dialogue. Lakatos nally persuasive discourse” (IPD) described by
starts his book with a very keen and thought- Bakhtin (1991) as open-ended honest search for
ful observation on his own endeavor. He ended truth by all the participants (but not as a sense
of “appropriation” of the teacher’s voice by the of the non-instrumental epistemological dialogic

voices of the students, see instrumental dialogue) pedagogy. For example, the mundane fact that a
(Matusov & von Duyke, 2010). Fifth, they both father of the American Revolution, Thomas Jef-
can be carnivalistic with throning and dethroning ferson, was a slave-owner to the end of his life
the authority (Bakhtin, 1984; Sullivan, Smith, & (he had 187 slaves), who fathered black children,
Matusov, 2009). Sixth, both types of dialogue can who became slaves (he freed all of them before
involve dramas of ideas and people, although in or after his death), from a slave concubine Sally
an epistemological dialogue, drama of the ideas Hemings (Sloan, 1998), colored (or smeared) his
defines a life drama of the participants. sublime position on freedom and equality to the
I argue that the distillation, reconstruction, and point that has allowed some scholars legitimately
purification nature of epistemological dialogue is claiming that Jefferson was not only a father of
about creation of the comprehensive, totalized, modern democracy but also a father of modern
focus of all the participants of the dialogue on racism as the practice of the slavery, which Jef-
some unfolding theme (what is probably called ferson was a part, and his claim that “all men
by Berlyand, 2009a; Bibler, 2009, as “a dialogic are created equal” written in the Declaration of
notion”; Kurganov, 2009). In contrast to ontolog- Independence required a justified exclusion of
ical dialogue, epistemological dialogue is essen- slaves from the notion of “men” – i.e., the ideol-
tially mono-topic and comprehensive. Epistemo- ogy of racism (D’Souza, 1995). Jefferson’s voice
logical dialogues are self-contained. Let me pro- and fate in a dialogue on freedom has been an
vide ethnographic evidence for my conclusion. uneasy intertwinement of the sublime freedom
I will group my evidence around themes that loving philosopher and politician and the mun-
are present in ontological dialogue and absent in dane slave owner, enslaving his own children and
epistemological dialogue. lover.
From ontological dialogic position, intellec- Let me now turn to differences between
tual positions cannot be separated from people’s non-instrumental epistemological and ontolog-
ontology – i.e., how one lives his/her life (see a ical dialogues. First, epistemological dialogue
detailed discussion of this concept below). Who does not involve an ontological meeting of
is speaking can be no less important than what is the participants: their emergent sociocultural,
spoken. The person’s ontology changes the mean- historical, and political relations among each
ing of the statements. Thus, Bakhtin defined the other and with and in the world (see Bakhtin’s
notion of “voice” as one that “includes a per- notion of “encounter”). Lakatos’ dialogue starts
son’s worldview and fate. A person enters into his epistemological dialogue with the following
dialogue as an integral voice. He participates in disclaimer:
it not only with his thoughts, but with his fate
and with his entire individuality” (Bakhtin, 1999, The dialogue takes place in an imaginary
p. 293). The person’s fate cannot be reduced to classroom. The class gets interested in a
PROBLEM: is there a relation between the number
one dialogue, to person’s position in a dialogue,
of vertices V, the number of edges E and the
to the theme, to the logic, or to the sublime.
number of faces F of polyhedra – particularly of
Although, people can never be reduced to their
regular polyhedra – analogous to the trivial relation
mundane life circumstances, in which the peo- between the number of vertices and edges of
ple are thrown and find themselves, the deeds polygons, namely, that there are as many edges as
that the people made in these mundane circum- vertices: V = E? This latter relation enables us to
stances penetrate and color the sublime dialogue, classify polygons according to the number of edges
which is the primary interest of the proponents (or vertices): triangles, quadrangles, pentagons, etc.
An analogous relation would help to classify agendas. This problem space is often shaped by
polyhedral. (Lakatos, 1981, p. 6, emphases in diverse, multiple, often fuzzy, simultaneous and
original) dynamic ontological concerns by the participants.
For example, in the ontological dialogue exam-
What is interesting here for me is how this imag- ple (see below), the participants had multiple
inary “class gets interested in a PROBLEM” is ontological concerns about fairness, grades, past
taken outside of the brackets of Lakatos’ dia- interpersonal alliances and conflicts, making and
logue. We do not know how and why this interest maintaining friendships, explanation of percent-
was developed and negotiated. We do not know ages, academic motivation, and so on. All of
how this interest is grounded in the participants’ these mundane concerns – the mundane noise –
lives. It is unclear of why the participants care seem to be annoying for an educator working
about the problem and what makes them care. in the non-instrumental epistemological dialogic
What if some of the participants had not cared pedagogy who wants to bracket and suppress
about this math problem in particular or math in them from the public space of the dialogue.
general – how did Lakatos made them interested Third, there are no ontological concerns in
or, at least, cooperate with his dialogue? Was participants about their reputation that emerges
pedagogical coercion and pedagogical violence in and transcends the epistemological dialogue.
involved in that process and if so, how? What Dialogue can change people’s relationships, pro-
(and how) created conditions for this classroom? fessional and institutional stands, careers, fates –
Could the participants have freedom to leave it at it can open and close institutional, relational, and
any moment (like participants of Socrates’ dia- societal opportunities that might have little to do
logues, for example)? with the theme of the sublime dialogue at hand.
From a pedagogical point of view, an assump- All that is often bracketed in epistemological dia-
tion or an expectation that all participants are logues, probably, are spoilers of the purity of the
automatically and non-problematically interested arguments. Nothing outside of epistemological
in a problem can lead to big pedagogical disas- dialogue, outside of its world of ideas – “pulp”
ters and eventually to oppressive pedagogical vio- of the life – is a concern.
lence. Yes, it is true that a common interest in a Participants of an epistemological dialogue
particular problem can emerge in the classroom are often involved in drama, but it is a drama
but I argue that it usually requires a lot of work of ideas. In Lakatos’s dialogue, student Alpha
from the teacher and/or it is relatively short lived leaves the dialogue, slapping the door in dis-
and ecologically (i.e., emotionally, intellectually, gust, so to speak. However, his dramatic actions
physiologically, motivationally, and relationally) can be deduced from the unfolding logic of
unsustainable. colliding ideas in the dialogue. People, their
Second, there is no ontological diversity – i.e., personalities, their actions, their relations are
diversity in the ways the participants live their reduced to their ideas (see Bakhtin, 1999, on the
lives – nor it is clear how the participants’ inter- notion of “person-idea”). They are puppets of the
ests and agendas intertwine in epistemological self-contained logical development. For exam-
dialogue. In Lakatos’s dialogue all the participle, some proponents of epistemological dialogue
pants are totally committed to the problem set view suicide by famous German quantum physi-
by the teacher. In contrast, in an ontological dia- cist Paul Ehrenfest in 1933, as a logical devel-
logue, the participants are involved in a prob- opment of his position in a debate with Einstein
lem space (not one problem) that often has the and Bohr (Kurganov, personal communication,
shared and collective ownership and the diverse July 2008) rather than as a possible tragic result
of his struggle with chronic depression (Klein, (not always successful) the famous Russian say-
1985) (or a combination of both). In an epis- ing, “The morning is wiser than the evening” and
temological dialogue, the participants’ ontology not to make important relational decisions in the
originates and is produced by the development of evening. Epistemological dialogue does not know
ideas rather than in their lived experiences. ecological concerns, rather it mandates its regime
Fourth, there is no ontological urgency in of mono-topic total commitment and purity of the
an epistemological dialogue. The chronotope of spiritual sublime.
epistemological dialogue is the world of ideas. Sixth, despite all assurance to the contrary
Here-and-now ontological urgency of life is not (e.g., Phillips, 2002), the overall contempt for
known epistemological dialogue. Arguments can the mundane that the non-instrumental epistemo-
be postponed for 300 years or even more. Epis- logical dialogic pedagogy expresses generates a
temological dialogue can occur whenever and kind of elitism with all its moral, ethical, and
wherever. Historical time is bracketed, physical political consequences. If the “unexamined life
and embedded semiotic space is bracketed. His- is not worth living” (Socrates–Plato), the worth
torical time with its ontological urgency is ran- of life and, ultimately the person living this life,
dom, shallow, and unimportant (Lakatos placed is defined by the degree of how much a person
his historical comments into footnotes, probably can be a dialogic epistemological philosopher,
in order not to interrupt the flow of his epistemo- examining his or her own life and lives of oth-
logical dialogue). ers (Kukathas, 2003). The intellectual discourse
Fifth, epistemological dialogue does not know on life – it is discursive examination – becomes
interest in the ontological ecology of the partic- more important than the life itself (examined or
ipants (e.g., what is going on with their bod- unexamined). Using Aristotle’s (2000) terms, the
ies and feelings at the moment) – only in episteme overrules the phronesis (and the techné
the universal logical necessity (which can be and the sophia). The epistemological dialogue is
multiple, according to Bibler, another propo- focused not just on any dialogue but rather on dia-
nent of the non-instrumental epistemological dialogue of the high cultures. Thus, Bibler’s idea for
logic pedagogy; see the Russian founder of the school as “The School of the Dialogue of Cul-
school of dialogue of culture pedagogical move- tures” can be characterized as “The School of
ment Berlyand, 2009b; Bibler, 2009). In contrast the Dialogue of High Cultures” (see my debate
to the spirituality of the sublime, emphasized on this issue with Irina Berlyand in Matusov,
by the non-instrumental epistemological dia- 2009b). Mundane chat or mundane activities
logue, the ontological ecology – the corporality might have different and sometimes more impor-
of the mundane – is essentially non-dialogic but tant wisdom than philosophical discussion of the
it can be pulled in a sphere of ontological dia- sublime.
logicity. For example, with aging, I have noticed I think that epistemological dialogue can
that I become crankier, more irritable, impulsive, inform, inspire, and provoke an ontological dia-
and even depressed in late evenings. Although, logue. Ontological dialogue can be legitimately
at the time of these evenings, I’m feeling that studied by reducing it to an epistemological dia-
I have a reason to be like that – something or logue (e.g., for tracking the logic of some par-
somebody bothers me and gets on my nerves – ticular theme unfolding in a dialogue). But epis-
I have learned to know that it is probably a result temological dialogue should not guide ontologi-
of some biochemical imbalance in my body. In cal dialogue, especially in education, because in
the morning, I’m fine: full of enthusiasm, opti- my view, the pedagogical regime of epistemo-
mism, patience, and sensitivity. I try to dialogize logical dialogue with its insistence on the “disci-
my non-dialogic ecology by my attempts to use pline of the mind” based on the total commitment
on the mono-topic development of an idea and being in his or her human quality is a result
bracketing the ontology of the participants can be of dialogue. In the non-ontological conception
supported only by pedagogical violence. People of dialogue, this relation between dialogue and
cannot simply commit totally all the time to the human existence is reversed: dialogue is treated
development of one theme, by themselves with- as secondary to human existence, mainly as a
out an external coercive, if not violent, push on form of communication (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 7).
them. Let me provide my understandings and infer-
ences from Sidorkin’s deep and dense definition:
15.3.2 Ontological
Non-Instrumental Dialogic
1 I understand the polysemic notion of ontol-
Pedagogies
ogy, “human being,” “human existence,” as our
As far as I know the term “ontological dia- big and small deeds and relations with oth-
logue” was coined by educational philosopher ers that define us in the world that we cre-
Alexander Sidorkin (1999) in opposition to other ate, find ourselves, and are thrown in (Packer
understandings of the notion of dialogue such & Goicoechea, 2000). Ontology has priority
as “instrumental dialogue,” “epistemological dia- over epistemology – i.e., what and how we
logue,” “communicational dialogue,” “linguistic know about the world. Ontology is charged
dialogue,” and so on. Sidorkin argues, with ethic, moral, judgment, politics, aesthet-
ics, desire, will, emotions, responsibility, and
Notion of dialogue is treated [in an ontological
so on. Epistemology is embraced by ontology,
understanding of dialogue] as central for defining
human existence, not merely a form of “How we breathe is how we write” (Soviet
communication. To experience what it means to be poet Bulat Okudzhava’s lyrics) but not the
human, one needs to engage in dialogical relations. other way around, despite the fact that ontol-
We are human in the fullest sense when we engage ogy is often the object of investigation by
in dialogue. This ontological understanding of epistemology.
dialogue has its implications for education. I argue 2 Ontological dialogue penetrates all aspects of
that schools should focus on helping children the human existence. “Buber and Bakhtin, like
experience and learn what it means to be human. Copernicus, discovered the new center of the
Therefore, the entire social arrangement called human universe, the dialogical. It is the center
“school” should be designed around this purpose of
in a sense that the very fact of human existence
introducing children to the life of dialogue.
is contingent on engagement in dialogical rela-
(Sidorkin, 1999, p. 4)
tions. An individual may exist as an organ-
The word “ontological” does not refer to just any ism in a physical or a biological sense. But we
kind of particular being, neither does it deal with are truly human only when we are in a dia-
the existence of dialogue; it refers specifically to logical relation with another. The most impor-
human existence. This may not be the most con- tant things in human lives happen between
ventional use of the term, but from my point of human beings, rather than within or without
view, it is the most accurate one. The ontologi- them” (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 11). Ontological dia-
cal concept of dialogue explores the place of dialogue penetrates both minute, routine, mun-
logue in the human way of being-in-the-world. dane, as well as big in time and the sublime.
One of the reasons for using the adjective onto- It does not have the beginning and the end. It
logical is a need to distinguish between what I penetrates even evil deeds, like slavery. Any
propose and a number of non-ontological con- teaching even, super conventional and mono-
cepts of dialogue. The very existence of a human logic, is penetrated by ontological dialogue.
Oppressive regimes generate distorted onto- opinion. I told her my honest opinion that in this
logical dialogue. dress she looked like a cow. You know that I like
3 The concept of ontological provides two major to tell “mama-truth” [“pravda-matka” in
frameworks: descriptive (i.e., how things are, Russian] in people’s face. It’s not my fault that
see no. 2 above) and prescriptive, normative she looked like a cow in this dress.
We: You hurt her feelings. You didn’t need to lie to
(i.e., how things should be).
Rosa but you could deliver your truth to Rosa in
Where is ontological dialogue? I do not try to a more soothing and nice way. For example, you
mystify ontological dialogue but it is different could have said something like, “It seems to me
that this dress makes you look a bit chubby, no?”
than traditional methodology of “operationaliza-
Klara: That would have been a lie. I did not
tion.” Ontological dialogue is not in the text
“seem” but I saw with my own eyes that she
but always in dialogic, questioning and answer- looked like a cow in it. Not “a bit” and not
ing – addressing and responding – relationships “chubby,” but as a cow! Somebody must tell that
between the beholder and other people. Let me to her.
provide an example to provoke and engage you, We: Klara, she wanted to hear a word of
my reader, in what I mean. encouragement from you, not your offending
In the mid-1980s, I, in my twenties lived in a “mama-truth.”
big Moscow apartment with my wife, my very Klara: Truth can’t be offending. “Don’t blame
young son, my grandmother Tanya, in her mid- the mirror, if your face is ugly!” If Rosa had
80s, and her older sister, my grandaunt Klara, wanted to hear a complement, she should have
who was almost 90 at that time. Klara used to gone to men-suitors – not to me.
We: But admit, Klara, you don’t like truth about
be a technical editor but also she worked infor-
yourself when it’s unpleasant.
mally (and illegally, according to the Soviet laws
Klara: I always love the truth whatever it is. I
of the time) all her life as a tailor almost until always like when people tell me the truth even
her death making and adjusting dresses for our when it is bitter.
big extended family. Once at a dinner when we We: Do you? What about when people say that
all met at a circle table, Klara asked us why her you are rude and insensitive? [we gave her a
niece Rosa, who was in her late 60s then, had not specific example when Klara did not like some
come recently. Rosa often visited her aunts run- truth about her said by a relative]
ning errands for them and provided them with Klara: I don’t like it because that simply isn’t
company. I try to reconstruct our conversation true.
that my wife and I had with Klara – I combine
us as “we” because neither I nor she can remem- So, is it an example of ontological dialogue? Not,
ber our exact utterances and who made them. I by itself, until it starts puzzling and interest you.
do not remember Tanya verbally participating in It puzzles and interests me. I wonder if Klara’s
the conversation but she smiled showing sympa- logic is based on some kind of logical fallacy
thy with my wife and me. that grants her the right to tell unpleasant “mama-
truth” to others, while rejecting this right when
Klara: I wonder why Rosa has stopped showing
she is on the receiving end of “mama-truth”. Or
up at our place.
We: We aren’t surprised at all! You called her her logic is OK – it is consistent and correct, but
“cow” last time. She was upset. We think she logic, itself, is not omnipotent in humans’ affairs.
probably still feels being offended by you. I wonder if Klara would agree that truth can-
Klara: Why would she become offended with not be rude and insensitive, that rudeness based
me? She brought a new dress and asked my on meanness, while insensitivity is based on the
wrong perception. With Rosa, as with many other thinks it can. Could we present our objections
people, Klara was not mean-spirited but rather to Klara in a different way without using her
sincere and useful to Rosa (remember Gricean telling-mama-truth-to-your-face logical way? If
maxims of good communication: be truthful, be so, what might it be? Should teachers tell their
informative, be relevant, and be clear?) (Grice, students mama-truth about their shortcomings to
1975). their face? Why? Why not? What are the alter-
Arguably, Klara fulfilled all of these maxims natives? Finally (for now), does presentation of
in communication with Rosa, but we argued that truth affect the truth itself? Ontological dialogue
it was not enough. Of course, Klara’s observa- involves an inquiry puzzle that emerges in and
tional judgment that Rosa looked like a cow in addresses life. It involves a critical examination
the new dress could have been wrong, but we did of life, self, world, and society to understand and
not challenge Klara’s professional fashion judg- envision life not only as it is but also as it is “sup-
ment – we agreed with Klara that the new dress posed to be.”
did not suit Rosa well. My wife and I were con- This case of ontological dialogue is outside
cerned not with the truth of whether or not the of an educational institution but arguably it has
new dress really suited Rosa (not with whether or an educational value of an inquiry and it placed
not grandma’s soup is salty, using another exam- us, my wife and me, in the role of educators,
ple), but with something else altogether that may facilitating exploration of this inquiry. But is
(or may not) be equally or even more important this pedagogical dialogue really ontological? This
than concerns about truth. Besides truth, one can question cannot be addressed without taking the
be concerned about psychological well-being of observers into consideration. Dear reader, if my
another person, as it is in the case of Klara, or excerpt managed to interest you to such an extent
about being appreciative of another labor as in that you wish to discuss these issues further with
a case of grandma’s over-salted soup. Of course, me, Klara, my wife, silent Tanya, Grice, Lorde,
the concern about truth can overweight these non- Delpit, and other people that I did not mentioned
truth concerns. At least, this something else has above, my example of ontological dialogue has
to be taken into account when a person provides a been successful, but if not, then, sorry, it was not
response. However, it is interesting for me in this successful. As a successful example, ontological
example that my wife and I chose Klara’s own dialogue does not exist without your, the reader’s,
way of delivering “mama-truth” to communicate engagement. I used my case because I thought it
to her about the limitations of this way of relat- would be easier to engage you in a puzzle (but I
ing with people. We were telling Klara our bitter could be wrong – if so, sorry). However, sociolin-
“mama-truth” in her face about possible reasons guists (and Bakhtin) used very mundane, almost
of why Rosa stopped visiting us. Not only did dull, trivial examples to discuss and analyze onto-
Klara use her narrow selective logic in response logical dialogue (see, for example, Linell, 1998).
to us, we also tried this same narrow reasoning to See the following examples from Bakhtin,
address her, and showed the limitations of using
In the ordinary speech of our everyday life such a
such narrow reasoning. The difference was that
use of another’s words is extremely widespread,
she believed in using selective logical reasoning
especially in dialogue, where one speaker very
and we did not. Was it our hypocrisy? Could
often literally repeats the statement of the other
we defeat Klara using her own weapon? Using speaker, investing it with new value and accenting
Audre Lorde’s (1984) famous phrase, “Can mas- it in his own way – with expressions of doubt,
ter tool be used to dismantle the master house?” indignation, irony, mockery, ridicule, and the like.
Lorde thought it cannot, but Lisa Delpit (1995) (Linell, 1998, p. 194)
The embedding of words and especially of accents dialectics when it comes to a finalizing synthe-
from the other’s rejoinder in Makar Devushkin’s sis of contradictions and differences. This was
speech is even more marked and obvious in the not a particularly safe thing to do in a thor-
second of the quoted passages. The words oughly Marxist and therefore “dialectic” coun-
containing the other’s polemically exaggerated try. For Bakhtin, differences never fully merge,
accent are even enclosed here in quotation marks:
instead, they coexist in an engaged interaction.
“He’s a copying clerk” In the preceding lines the
Dostoevsky, an embodiment of dialogical think-
word “copy” is repeated three times. In each of
ing for Bakhtin, saw everything as coexisting in
these three instances the other’s potential accent is
present in the word “copy,” but it is suppressed by one single moment. He could only understand
Devushkin’s own accent; however, it becomes the world as coexistence of different things. This
constantly stronger, until it finally breaks through does not mean that Bakhtin denied the impor-
and assumes the form of the other’s direct speech. tance of change. What he rejected was the ideas
We are presented here, therefore, with gradations of genesis, where the past determines the present.
of gradual intensification in the other’s accent: “I He also rejected the reduction of difference (syn-
know very well, of course, that I don’t do much by thesis) as the end of development. Dialogue does
copying . . . [then follows a reservation] Why, what not reduce plurality of human worlds and yet it
if I am a copying clerk, after all? What harm is connects various parts of this plurality (Sidorkin,
there in copying, after all? ‘He’s a COPYING
1999, p. 18).
clerk!’” We have indicated by italics and
Studying and revealing ontological dialogue
underscoring the other’s accent and its gradual
means to engage and change it. It cannot remain
intensification, which finally dominates utterly the
line of discourse enclosed in quotation marks. But the same and non-contaminated by the new
even in these final words, obviously belonging to understanding that the researcher brings, by the
the other, Devushkin’s own voice is present too, for researcher addressing and replying to its par-
he polemically exaggerates the other’s accent. As ticipants, since a case of ontological dialogue
the other person’s accent intensifies, so does is in the researcher’s response provoked by
Devushkin’s counter-accent. (Bakhtin, 1999, the presented case and its participants. Inter-
pp. 208–209) observational consensus is not a proxy of the
validity of interpretation anymore as traditional
The notion of ontological dialogue reminds me research is. An interpretation is validated through
of a quantum particle that is both localized and its testing and depth – i.e., through internally
distributed. Ontological dialogue is localized in persuasive discourse involving agreements, dis-
the events – it is always here-and-now (like a agreements, and changing topics. Ontological
particle). But it is also distributed in time and dialogue requires very different research than tra-
space – it does not have the beginning and the ditional social research. It is oriented toward a
end (like a wave). It does not have cause or dialogic partner – rather than toward a silent
genesis. object (Bakhtin, 1986).
Another important feature of the (ontologi-
cal) dialogue, according to Bakhtin, is that it
15.3.3 Ecological Non-Instrumental
knows neither genesis nor causality. Dostoevsky
Dialogic Pedagogies
did not use such a fundamental German classi-
cal philosophical category as becoming or evolu- I am not sure that the non-instrumental eco-
tion. For him, the central philosophical categories logical dialogic pedagogy exists in the sense
were such notions as “coexistence and inter- that I have understood it. But it may exist in
action” (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 28). Drawing from practice in a way that has not been described
Dostoevsky, Bakhtin questioned the relevance of and/or published yet, or I have not accessed or
recognized yet. I have got a gist and inspira- themes). The last mentioned can be crucial for the
tion of this approach by reading sociolinguist participants’ socializing, negotiation, and goal
Per Linell’s book (1998) and educational philoso- defining processes. I see this interesting devel-
pher Alexander Sidorkin’s book (1999). The non- opment in the literature on dialogue and dialogic
instrumental ecological approach to dialogic ped- pedagogy as a potential call for “free-range dia-
agogy focuses on: logic pedagogy.”
In my view, famous avant-garde composer
1 the dialogicity (Bakhtin, 1999; Matusov,
John Cage helped to visualize a version of the
2009a, ch. 5) of the mundane everyday social
non-instrumental ecological approach in the fol-
interaction;
lowing Buddhist legend,
2 the non-constrained nature of this interactional
regime in which the participants can have free- We are inevitably, each minute, wherever we are,
dom to move in and out of the interaction, without lifting a finger, without anything being
remain silent, change and modify the themes, transmitted, unavoidably being educated
and engage simultaneously in several activities [p. 115] . . .
and agendas;
3 absence or minimum of pedagogical coercion I think you have to begin, quite conscientiously,
and violence. with the notion that education is taking place
without its being any effort, without doing
Using the agricultural metaphor of “free-range anything – that would already be a step in the right
chicken,” I would define the participants in this direction. I give you two instances. In the 12th
dialogue as free-range dialogic participants. century there was a great man in the time of Dante
Arguably, Sidorkin (1999, pp. 73–108) has pio- and Meister Eckhart, but he lived in Tibet, and his
neered the description of this free-range mun- name was Mila Repa. He studied, first Black Magic
dane dialogue in his ecological theory of three because he wanted to get even with his mother’s
drinks. Observing restrained and unrestrained relatives who had been cruel to her – and he was
able, from a distance, to bring hailstorms down on
social interactions among children in school, he
their property, but at the same time not to have the
extracted three types of dialogue that he com-
hail destroy his mother’s property. He was able to
pared with types of dialogue one can experi-
bring buildings down when they came together for
enceat a party involving alcohol: (a) monothe- dances and killed whole groups of the evil relatives.
matic, (b) polythematic, and (c) chaotic. In his After he accomplished all this revenge and Black
book, Sidorkin argues that these three types of Magic activity, he then went to a teacher of White
dialogue (and their dynamics) constitute the nec- Magic, to study White Magic in a spirit of
essary fabric of overall dialogic ecology. Any repenting, you know. Well, that teacher taught him
attempt to temporarily extend one type of dia- absolutely nothing for years – just let him live in
logue at expense of the others puts stress on the house and eventually Mila Repa became very
the participants’ psychological well-being (the impatient, because he was of the opinion that he
participants become extremely tired), the qual- wasn’t learning anything – nothing was being
taught to him. At one point he became so alarmed
ity of their relation, and emergence of aggres-
that he secretly left the teacher and went to another
sion, non-cooperation, and pedagogical violence.
teacher, but the first teacher was clairvoyant and
However, many conventional and even innova-
knew where he was going and what he was doing
tive pedagogies prioritize exactly the monothe- and everything and sent a message, mentally, to the
matic dialogues in their classroom and put a lot second teacher telling him to refuse to take Mila.
of efforts on suppressing any emergence of the So Mila Repa was obliged to come back to his
chaotic dialogues with multiple and highly ill- teacher who looked as though he were teaching him
defined themes (or better to say germs of the nothing and by this process of not teaching, he
ultimately educated him: and he became one of the dynamics at expense of the dialogic meanings
greatest leaders of Tibetan spiritual life. This story and dialogic events.
occurs over and over again in the annals of Zen
Buddhism – the student who comes to the teacher Although I agree with this critic of this extreme
and begs him for instruction. The teacher says (pure) ecologic approach to dialogic pedagogy, I
nothing – he’s just sweeping up leaves. The student appreciate its concerns with human ecology of
goes off into another part of the forest and builds dialogue and with vertical authority-based ped-
his own house and when he is finally educated what agogical coercion and even violence. Both con-
does he do? He doesn’t thank himself: he goes back
cerns are not typical and rare for our educational
to the teacher who said nothing and thanks him.
community.
It’s this spirit of not teaching which has been
completely lost in our educational system. We had
a great man in the United States, Thorsten Veblen,
15.4 Anti-Conclusion
who wrote a book called “Higher Learning in
America.” The original subtitle was “A Study in In this final section, I want to raise several
Total Depravity.” Why? Because the educational unresolved issues with the instrumental versus
system in the United States is under the control of non-instrumental education in general and with
all the things to do with politics and economics. All the (ontological) dialogic pedagogy in specific.
of these things which are transmitted as though
My first issue is the relationship between non-
they were the things we had to learn are, in truth,
educational and educational goals in educational
means to force us into the accepted social structure.
practices, regardless of how education is defined.
Therefore, the educational system as it is at present
distorts and enslaves the mind. You want to know Educators are often faced with non-educational
the basic thing I am interested in? The basic thing, goals such as babysitting, ensuring personal and
I would say, is to do nothing. The second thing social safety, providing health, policing students/
would be to do, so to speak, what enters our heads. children, and so on. Of course, all these non-
It should not be fixed in advance what that would educational goals and concerns have educational
be. (Filliou & Cage, 1970, p. 116) aspects but I am talking here about necessity
of non-educational actions that go beyond and
There can be several objections of the non- even against educational goals. Although, I argue
instrumental ecological approach to dialogic that on average educational goals have to be
pedagogy: prioritized in educational practices, there can
be moments when non-educational goals must
1 reduction of the notion of dialogue to any take priority. The drawing of legitimate bound-
social interaction; aries between educational and non-educational
2 “mundanization” of dialogue and learning (i.e., goals and concerns are very important in edu-
no education, no the sublime, no high culture); cational practices, as arguably non-educational
3 no critical view on the free-range dialogue that goals often illegitimately invade the sphere of
might have very violent overtone even in the education (e.g., “the zero tolerance” policies in
absence of pedagogical violence (i.e., vertical, the USA) (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2011).
authority-based) but the emergence of mob- My second issue is about the relation-
type horizontal violence of peers (see Lens- ship between educational instrumental and
mire, 1994, for his wonderful ethnography and non-instrumental spheres. When one of these
analysis of this possibility); spheres are prioritize by educators the rela-
4 ecological formalism – focus on the intersub- tionship between these espoused pedagogical
jective forms of dialogue and psychological approaches become adversarial. However, when
these spheres are seen as aspects of the edu- lives on boundaries with other, alternative, ped-
cational practice and not as priorities, their agogical approaches (including non-dialogical,
relations can be complementary, although not instrumental, and adversarial). Also, from the
symmetrical. Thus, even in non-instrumental critical ontologic dialogic pedagogy, the issue
ontological dialogic pedagogy, the issue of instru- of what constitutes good education has to be
mental aspect of this pedagogy is there on differ- included in education as a part of itself (Matusov
ent levels. One level is instrumentalism of peda- & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012, call this principle
gogical design, which generates the issue of the “praxis of praxis”). The principle of internal dial-
pedagogical design of ontological dialogic peda- ogism and the principle of praxis of praxis push
gogy and its spirit. the critical ontological dialogic pedagogy for plu-
The third issue is about the relationship among ralism that can be expressed by paraphrasing the
instrumental, creative, and critical aspects of any famous motto about pluralism of speech, “I may
education, which involve learning the existing disagree with your pedagogical approach but I’m
practice as it is, transcending the given practice, ready to give my life for your freedom to practice
and critical examination of the existing and imag- it.” This tension between the visionary aspect and
inative practices. Even though, critical ontolog- the pluralist aspect of the critical ontological ped-
ical dialogic pedagogy prioritizes critical exam- agogy may constitute important dualism in the
ination, it stills involves the other two aspects. critical ontological dialogic pedagogy (Matusov
One hypothesis is that the other two aspects & Marjanovic-Shane, 2011, 2016).
are by-productive but it requires a more sys- Finally, the fifth issue about the instrumental-
tematic investigation. This issue may also relate non-instrumental opposition in education I want
to the issue of the relationship between pattern to bring here is sociocultural. As I argue above,
recognition, creative meaning making, and crit- non-instrumental education, as a fundamental
ical meaning making (Matusov & Marjanovic- human desire for education for education sake,
Shane, 2017) – what are differences among all of requires freedom from survival and necessities,
these processes from a critical ontologic (i.e., cri- from labor and work (Arendt, 1958). This free-
tique of the current life) dialogic pedagogy point dom is always relative, both for the individual
of view? and for society. Thus, within the individual there
The fourth issue is about the relationship will always be pressure and a need for instru-
between the critical ontologic dialogic pedagogy mental education along the line with a desire
and all other educational approaches: dialogic or for non-instrumental education. As to the soci-
not, instrumental or not. On the one hand, the ety, there may still be division of the society with
critical ontological pedagogy provides a vision those who may primarily (or entirely) engage
of “the best” pedagogy for the proponents of in labor/work and those who may primarily (or
this approach. However, on the other hand, it entirely) engage in leisure that can afford non-
argues for a dialogic relationship with, rather instrumental education (Gorz, 1989). Resolving
than annihilation of, others. From a Bakhtin- this non-universality, i.e., hybridity, of a leisure-
inspired ontological dialogic pedagogy’s point of based society will be probably based on advances
view, this approach has inherent internal dial- of technology of smart machines, political will
ogism: even adversarial approaches contribute and struggle, economic and environmental pres-
to the meaning defining ontological dialogic sures, and contended cultural definitions of
pedagogy. Paraphrasing Bakhtin’s famous state- justice and “good life.” Until then, critical onto-
ment about culture, ontological dialogic peda- logical dialogic pedagogy may remain on the
gogy does not have its internal territory but periphery and in oases of the formal educational
institutional sphere, even perceived by some as contexts. Second, ironically, an anti-dichotomist

elitist, suitable only for those who are not very stand, which dividing positions on dichotomous
pressed by survival or necessities. and non-dichotomous with the former being bad
I wonder if these tensions between instrumen- and the latter being good, is self-contradictory
tal and non-instrumental education in general and because it is meta-dichotomist in itself. My posi-
tion is that some dichotomies are good but some
in dialogic pedagogy in specific penetrates other
bad and this is not solely defined by how com-
field of social sciences in general and psychology
plex a social phenomenon is but also, and even
in specific by being important, relevant, or at least
more importantly, it depends on our relationship
interesting. with the phenomenon, our purposes, and other con-
texts. For example, such a complex socio-politico-
economic phenomenon as slavery may warrant
Acknowledgments both a dichotomous moral analysis of its oppres-
I want to thank Dana Simone, Ana Marjanovic- sion and a non-dichotomous historical analysis of
Shane, and Nermine Abd Elkader for their feed- attempts to soften slavery. Non-positivist rehabil-
back, editing, and discussions of earlier versions itation of dichotomies is badly needed in social
sciences.
of the manuscript.
Notes References
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16 Development and Education as
Crossing Sociocultural Boundaries
Giuseppina Marsico
the pioneering efforts of James Mark Baldwin,

16.1 Axiomatic Premises Jean Piaget, and Lev Vygotsky. The developmen-
All human activity – if seen in the framework of tal perspective implied in the notion of transcen-
time – takes place on the border.1 The border, dence through the border is elegantly illuminated
between what already exists in the life of a person by Simmel’s (1994, p. 7) words: “It is absolutely
and that which could still come into being in the central for humanity that it set itself a boundary,
next moment, is the norm – rather than the excep- but with freedom, that is, in such a way that it can
tion – of human psyche. As Simmel (1918/2010, also remove this boundary again, that it can place
p. 1) pointed out: itself outside it.”
This chapter aims to discuss the role of bor-
Man’s position in the world is defined by the fact der conditions in the context of development and
that in every dimension of his being and behavior
education.
he finds himself at every moment between two
boundaries. This condition appears as the formal
structure of our existence. 16.1.1 Transcending Function of
Education
We live in between more or less, right and left,
above or below, and better or worse. Borders are As humans, we live in a multibounded world we
“means for finding direction in the infinite space ourselves constantly create, regulate, and cross
of our worlds” (p. 1). Borders are created pre- to modulate our relationships with the environ-
cisely for such a move toward the expected but ment and with others (Marsico et al., 2013;
not yet certain future. Borders help to create secu- Valsiner, 1999). Hence education – with its limi-
rity for the future. In that process, they stabilize nal and always future-oriented nature – undoubt-
the otherwise nonstable flow of events. edly occupies a leading position because it con-
According to Simmel, borders are necessary, stantly works on the border of the “beyond-area”
yet every single specific border can be stepped (Boesch, 1991).
over or crossed. Nevertheless, in such acts we find Education is the outer border of human devel-
or create a new border. In crossing the borders we opment, but it is the only border that is never
confirm their reality. In Simmel’s words “the uni- actually crossed. It is a borderland of indetermi-
fied act of life includes both boundedness and the nacy; it is our unreachable horizon that moves
transcendence of the boundary” (p. 3). Simmel with us. At every step, we move forward to the
called this process the transcendental movement new, higher level of education, and the horizon is
between more-life and more-than-life. I will point moving with us.
out that this perfectly fits with what research in The idea beyond this conceptualization of the
human development has attempted to do since educational processes is the notion of being on
Development and Education as Crossing Sociocultural Boundaries 303
the move within culturally organized life con- In fact, drawing a line on the ground is not
texts (school, family, church, etc.) within specific enough to define a space, as you should also
spatiotemporal coordinates. Striving for uncer- occupy it and make it “yours” if you want to be
tainty is an unavoidable characteristic of the able to claim rights to it. Space is essential for
human sociocultural locomotion, which implies establishing the “sovereignty” of a state: without
crossing the borders between different social set- a territory, a nation cannot exist. However, it is
tings within the insurmountable limit of the irre- also an important starting point for the affirma-
versible time. tion of its rights and of its “own culture,” an indis-
The border condition makes evident the rele- pensable element for groups and individuals in
vance of the “space in between” (Marsico, 2011), need of a spatial context where they can express
which is a challenging issue in development themselves.
and educational psychology. What discourses and The mark that indicates the space for the first
practices saturate this interstitial zone and/or time takes it away from the “nothingness” and
cross from one side to the other? How many kinds gives it existence. In addition, it allows us to take
of human activities, educational processes, and possession of it and establish a right (Brunet-
social dynamics are made possible because of Jailly, 2005; Sevastianov, Laine & Kireev, 2015).
this “betweenness”? This has not merely to do with a fragmentation
The crossing borders phenomena, which entail of the territory but deals with the human need
migrating from one place to another while liv- to control what is precarious and vague. What is
ing in this liminal state, are themselves devel- different and unknown anguishes human beings,
opmental and educational processes. Yet they who try to put a limit on the unknown and to cre-
have rarely been recognized as a relevant part ate a sanctuary of well-known things, approved
of the individual developmental and educational rules, and shared beliefs. It not only gives a sense
enterprise. of protection from the dangers “out there” but
also limits the anxiety caused by the uncertain,
the darkness, and the unknown.
16.2 Meanings of the Border
The term border, in many Indo-European lan-
16.2.1 Line as the Minimal Border
guages, may be ascribed to “pull,” “drag,” or
“plow” and describes the border as a sign or a The line is the most immediate image that we
trace left on the ground. The border is the furrow associate with the concept of the border. The sim-
that the plow tracks in the soil. It is here where plest way to represent a border is, indeed, to draw
the first signs – indexical in Peirce’s terms – are a line that is somehow visible. Nevertheless, a
constructed (Peirce, 1901/1935). border can be represented in several other ways or
This sign marks an area that, in ancient times, even be present without taking any visible form.
would be a demarcation between town and coun- In both cases, it shows its effects on the social
tryside. This sign, or trench, circumscribes a and psychological realms. Thus it is not just a
defined space that can be, then, bounded in a tan- matter of concreteness, because a border orga-
gible way by stones, fences, or walls. Between nizes and regulates our lives even if it is invis-
the border and the space it bounds exists a close ible or if it is a visible mark (Marsico & Varzi,
relationship that is expressed not only through a 2016).
visible trace on the ground but also through the There are, for example, administrative borders,
process of its progressive appropriation. between municipalities and regions, and borders
304 giu seppina m a rs i co
16.3 Making Borders, Causing

Ambivalence
When one identifies the differences and creates
distinctions between individuals, groups, things,
or events, one also automatically creates bound-
aries that refer to such distinctions and set the
stage for human action to determine the respec-
tive belongings.
Making distinctions and creating identi-
fications and belongings are simultaneously
opposite and complementary functions in the
border-construction process. The existence of
differences allows us to build borders and bound
Figure 16.1 In the elevator: regulation of
our psychological and sociocultural territories
sociocultural, interpersonal, and inner borders.
within precise contours. Yet, in parallel, these
Source: Courtesy of Dr. Graciana Azevedo,
same borders act in recognizing, underlining, and
Recife, Brazil, 2016.
reinforcing these differences.
Establishing a border means an action of dif-
that demarcate private property as opposed to ferentiation based on certain criteria. Hence,
public spaces (fences, walls, gates, etc.). There within the newly established entity (i.e., group,
are, of course, natural borders marked by mor- territory, category, etc.), those units (i.e., indi-
phological elements (rivers, mountains, etc.), but viduals, things, dimensions, etc.) that meet the
there are also borders as a result of a politi- selected criteria will be included and acquire
cal agreement between states (i.e., the borders a special value, while those that do not have
that determine where the national waters end and these characteristics will be excluded. As a result,
the international waters begin or the boundaries once a boundary is established, it operates to
between two states that run through a forest or a strengthen this distinction, reducing the internal
desert). differences and making possible the perception,
Borders are not only in the physical world; they construction, or even invention of a homogeneous
exist in time (the beginning and the end of life or unit.
of a football game) in the individual mind and The border-making process determines at the
between people (Figure 16.1). same time what might be included in the
It is difficult to confine the concept of border “bounded region” and what should stay out.
to a single rigid definition, unchanging and sta- Therefore meaning making, distinction making,
ble over time. In Euclidian terms (Euclid, 1970), and value adding are the three processes that an
a border is the edge of something; it is a place dis- individual uses to construct borders in the mind
tinct from other places that has the specific prop- and in society (Marsico et al., 2013) through
erty of being in relation to all the others, but in which human beings try to organize, negoti-
such a way as to suspend or neutralize the system ate, and hierarchically integrate the surround-
of already designated relations (Foucault, 1972, ing world and make sense of their relation-
p. 37). Borders limit and define at the same time. ships with self and others. It is precisely in this
Like the contours of a figure, they attribute iden- border construction, ideal for reducing ambigu-
tity to things, events, and people. ity, that ambiguity is increased. So far, three
ambivalent features of the borders have been can always cross the line that separates us from
emphasized: they simultaneously differentiate the others. In the same way, others can cross the
and identify and divide while connecting, as well threshold and enter our space.
as both including and excluding. Lessening ambi-
guity while at the same time increasing ambigu-
16.4.1 Borders Are for Crossing
ity is the inescapable fate of any process of border
construction! Crossing a border changes the relationship
between the individual, the space, and the bor-
der itself, with consequences for both those who
16.4 Permeable Borders
cross the boundary and those who have to accept
In general terms, the function of a border is someone that was on the other side of the border
to define a space, to encompass the content of (Marsico, 2016). This move from side to side can
that space, and to exclude what is not part of provoke different reactions in people: attitudes
it. The border is a sign of demarcation, a sep- of acceptance or rejection, of inclusion or exclu-
aration between what is inside and what is out- sion, or all at the same time. This is exactly what
side. However, it is not only a tool to keep two is happening with the massive flux of migrants
spaces divided but can also be a point of con- that is transforming the geography of the planet.
tact between two different worlds and cultures. In The outcome of a border-crossing phenomenon
this case, more than a sign of separation, the bor- is always uncertain, because beyond a border can
der can be seen as a threshold that allows move- be recognition or marginalization.
ment between the delimited spaces (Innis, 2016).
In biological terms, this equals the “membrane”
16.5 Borders in the World and
that facilitates the bidirectional transfer of some-
Borders in the Mind: The
thing from inside to outside in a biological system
Theoretical Aspects of the
and permits the cell movement within the larger
Border in Cultural Psychology
biological environment (Beloussov, 1998). Thus,
on one hand, borders are a way to keep your dis- It seems that we desperately need to draw bor-
tance, and on the other hand, they may become an ders, for instance, by labeling, categorizing, and
opportunity to meet and know others. The border making distinctions between both concrete and
invokes different feelings, depending on whether abstract objects and things. As Varzi (2011, 2013)
it is a closed space or a symbol of openness. It pointed out, we, as human beings, must define
can provoke a feeling of fear of what is different and determine the world around us in order to
or unfamiliar, triggering a need to defend oneself, understand it – or we will become lost. In other
or it can stimulate curiosity and a desire to learn, words, by defining the world and distinguishing
leading to overcoming the barriers and meeting objects from one another, we create an under-
the other. standing of the world, but at the same time, we are
A border, however, even if well built, cannot creating partitions within the whole. As a conse-
guarantee to “remove” or “enclose” all that we quence, new part–whole dynamics emerge with
want, because, at any time, it could be overtaken all the psychological implications in regulating
by something or someone. A boundary does not our relationships in this new set of circumstances
guarantee its total impermeability, because, as (Marsico & Varzi, 2016). In addition, the three
with the cell membrane, it is inherently perme- processes of border construction (meaning mak-
able (Marsico, 2011). The border is thus nei- ing, distinction making, and value adding) occur
ther inwardly nor outwardly impermeable – we on the basis of the understanding of the human
condition we have at that specific moment. All cesses. They happen in the present time, which
these issues make border construction and bor- is the inevitable border between past and future
der regulation very interesting psychological phe- (Marsico & Valsiner, 2016). Therefore, border
nomena to investigate. construction and border regulation are defini-
tively driven by the imagery of the future (Mar-
sico, 2015b).
16.5.1 Epistemological Focus
If psychology as science starts looking at bor-
Yet what is the “nature of the borders”? From a ders, it has to presume inherent ambivalence of
very abstract and philosophical standpoint,2 we the border zone in between the world “where we
can adopt a realist or a constructivist perspec- are” and the world “out there.” After all, psy-
tive to decide on their nature. One of the main chological phenomena exist at the border of the
determinations would be whether borders are nat- person and the environment; for this reason, psy-
ural or artificial. At this point, we can introduce a chology is intrinsically an “in-between” science.
first conceptual differentiation between bona fide
borders – based on some objective discontinu-
16.6 The Future-Oriented
ity or qualitative heterogeneity – and fiat or for-
Nature of the Life-Course
mal borders, which are the result of conventional
Organization
demarcations of political, social, and administra-
tive agreements, defining, as in the case of geopo- The peculiar nature of psychology as a science
litical borders, where a territory starts and ends of human liminal constructions will become even
(Smith, 1997; Smith & Varzi, 2000; Varzi, 1997). more evident if the assumption of the future-
In other terms, bona fide are natural borders, oriented nature of our life-course organization is
while formal borders are limits established by brought into the discourse.
humans. Although formal borders are artificially I can act in a specific way because of pre-
produced by human action, their power is no less viously existing conditions (i.e., the reactivity
binding than that of a natural border, and they assumption), but I can also act in that same way,
have practical effects on the management of our but based on my expectation of some future goal
daily lives. You need only think of all the walls I have set up. The focus on the future introduces
and fences we build in our ordinary lives (i.e., the relevance of phenomena that do not exist but
urban environment), which indicate the property are important in the present and of the human
of the individual owners, or at the geopolitical capability of making future plans (and their pos-
level, the invisible and imaginary lines in the sky sible modification) while acting (or not acting) on
from which derive practical consequences in the the environment.
air traffic between different states. Imagination, therefore, plays a role in think-
This aspect assumes a crucial role in cultural ing and acting in terms of as-is/as-if possibilities
psychology’s perspective. In fact, the arbitrari- (Tateo, 2015).
ness of the borders allows us to negotiate, reor- Here again, recalling Simmel (1918/2010), it
ganize, and, ultimately, modify them. What is is something that is more than life. Developmen-
imperative to investigate from a psychological tal issues imply the need to reconsider the role
point of view is, then, not only the borders per of the nonexisting objects (Meinong, 1902/1910)
se but also the process of border crossing and in the human trajectory. What is already devel-
the human vicissitudes that take place on those oped is a basis for something that does not exist
borders. Equally important from the theoretical but is expected to come. This is the theoretical
point of view is the triadic nature of border pro- foundation of Vygotsky’s notion of the “zone of
proximal development” (Valsiner & Van der Veer, The theoretical focus on phenomena in
2014). In both cases, the relationship between the “becoming” implies the centrality of time and of
existing and nonexisting objects, worlds, lives, transitional processes. The reliance of time needs
and so on, is central. The world of nonexist- to go together with the idea of directionality: any
ing objects has a predominance over the existing developing person moves from a previously set-
objects. “Any assumption about what might hap- tled – already known – state to an area of inde-
pen in the future is the basis for emergence of the terminacy (a not-yet region), crossing a series
new present. Our imagination leads our further of boundaries in the space in between (Marsico,
development” (Valsiner, 2014b, p. 297). 2011, 2015).
16.7 Beyond Ontology: From 16.8 Borders in Time: Temporal

Mereotopology to Development Border Zone and Developmental
Issues
Defining two kinds of linked realities – the worlds
of existing and nonexisting objects (Meinong’s The irreversibility of time comes together with
attempt) – has a limitation in the ontologi- the idea that the novelty is a main feature of
cal effort to make sense of a world that is in human life, and therefore, the future – as well
constant movement. What we need is to move as the present and the past – plays a central
from ontological classifications to an ontogenetic role in the temporality of human experiences.
perspective. The process of development links the past with
The effort to build a general developmental the future in the present, making the boundary
perspective is evident in the work of James Mark between present (including elements from the
Baldwin, who elaborates a developmental logic past) and the future the real space for “becom-
of things (Baldwin, 1895, 1906, 1908, 1911, ing.” This view of time is of irreversible time,
1915). Baldwin brings the notion of irreversible which entails the continuity of the change from
time into developmental logic and elaborates on the infinite past toward the infinite future. A liv-
Meinong’s ideas as they fit into developmental ing being seems to experience his or her rela-
time sequences. tion with the world on the border between the
In Baldwin’s perspective, things do not merely immediate present – an infinite small time that
exist or not exist; rather, they develop and change. links the vanishing past – and the approach-
Thus, if we want to know them, we must identify ing unrevealed future. Thus temporality is not
the difference between what they were like before only the awareness of time passing but also
and afterward. made up of different layers of experience that
The same ontological limit is of that of intertwine with the dimension of goal orienta-
mereotopology and its ontological analysis of tion. In developmental processes, indeed, the time
formal structures of parts and whole (Smith, issue is interwoven with the construction of goals
1997; Smith & Varzi, 2000; Varzi, 1997, 1998). (teleologic/guided development and teleogenetic/
Mereotopology is interested in the existence of self-guided development). Through semiotic
some static entities at a given time. Dealing with activity, steps and rhythms of development are
qualitative time-based changes, instead, develop- continuously negotiated and guided within cul-
ment is antithetical to any ontological system. tural frameworks. Individual development in
It is founded on the epistemology of becoming society is marked by temporal signs that regulate
and is bounded into the irreversibility of time the relationship between social time, temporality,
(Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2014). and goal orientation (Marsico & Valsiner, 2016).
During development, individual everyday life is ral borders represents the way values are guid-
characterized by the tension between being time- ing development. Culture establishes the kind
liness and being displaced in time with respect of acceptable outcomes on the basis of the set
to the negotiation between guided and self- values of developmental objectives. These kinds
regulated transitions. “You are too young for that” of values are instantiated in a given institution
or “It’s time to grow up” are examples of such to be put in practice and interrelate with self-
socially guided rhythms that are negotiated at the regulated development. The student’s process of
intersubjective level with the self-guided devel- negotiation between the academic scanning of
opmental trajectory. The experience of tempo- stages and the individual temporal organization
rality is thus situated in a temporal border zone and reorganization of goal orientation represents
where the negotiation between different levels of instead self-guided development. The outcomes
time (from the inner temporal dimension to the of this process are the result of the negotiation in
settled social timing) happens (Marsico, 2015a). the temporal border zone between guided devel-
But what exactly happens in this temporal border opment – constrained by societal timing – and
zone? self-guided development. The understanding of
development as a process that takes place in irre-
versible time has come back as a central focus in
16.8.1 Time, Borders, and
developmental sciences.
In-Betweens
This relationship is, however, extremely com-
The example of a situation involving a 25-year- plex. In this respect, we can say that time puts
old undergraduate student, coming late on her development in question and development some-
course of study, with her ambivalence toward oth- times puts time in question. First, what we call
ers and social timing (Tateo & Marsico, 2015), time is a multilayered construct involving sev-
would be illustrative of the negotiation that goes eral levels. Second, a modulation takes place
on in a personal developmental trajectory on the between different temporal levels in a tempo-
border of different time levels. One may sup- ral border zone. Third, time as context inter-
pose that she feels “behind” with a sense of dis- sects with an articulated idea of development in
comfort. Where does this inner temporal expe- which goal orientation exists at two different lev-
rience of “feeling behind” come from? It is els: teleologic (guided development) and teleoge-
one of the possible outcomes of the modulation netic (self-guided development that involves set-
between different temporal levels in a tempo- ting future goals through signs and acting toward
ral border zone. In this case, the personal expe- attaining these) (Valsiner, 1999, 2014a). Borders,
rience of “coming to it late” is due to a tem- guidance, and time are interwoven, neither avoid-
porary desynchronization of personal time (as a able nor fixed coordinates in the navigation of the
student) with the institutional time frame (pro- unknown river of human development (Tateo &
vided by university) and the wider historically Marsico, 2015). On the contrary, they shape the
set sociocultural timing that values a young age human experiences of temporality in perennial
as a proper life stage for learning. Only a short transformation and self-transformation. Develop-
delay is allowed along this path. So one may ment constantly deals with crossing sociocul-
term this phenomenon “institutional setting up of tural borders in a movement toward the unknown
temporal borders” along the life’s course, which future, keeping with both sides between guided
strongly guides human development prescribing and self-guided development and hiding in the
and, consequently, what is normal, abnormal, or darkness of the night while looking for others’
deviant. The institutional setting up of tempo- complicity.
As we have discussed so far, fiat (artificial) in the case of a commuter who takes the same
boundaries are artificial but not, for this reason, seven o’clock train), we should assume that these
less binding. By analyzing the way in which the nonplaces are the stage of many ordinary micro-
double contemporaneity (one along the axis of stories that are built and knotted together.
the mutually shaped time levels – through the Furthermore, I am more and more convinced
temporal border zone – and the other along the that the places to be observed are exactly
axis of irreversible flow of time, past to present those many “in-between places” where existence
to future) acts over the emerging set of potential- unfolds and the intersubjectivity is possible.
ities, it would be possible to define a conceptual But what are these places of which these inter-
framework able to explain the qualitative trans- faces, gaps, and in–between spaces are made?
formation of previous configurations into new And in between what? They are, basically, in
ones. This embryonic attempt should provide the between contexts, objects, events, and situations
basic temporal mereotopological rules to support that have delimited borders. I call this place the
the understanding of the complex phenomena of border zone.
dynamic borders moving through time, which
is a fundamental feature of any developmental
16.10 An Educational Border
process.
Zone: The Early-Morning
Entrance Routine at School
16.9 Ordinary Life on the Border
The conceptual difficulties of making sense of a
If it is true that we move from one place to border zone are particularly evident in the case
another every day, would it then not be beneficial of specific social institutions (i.e., kindergartens,
to pay more attention to these phenomena cross- schools, churches, workplaces, family) that are
ing our paths (Marsico, 2013)? Where, for exam- set up for guiding human development in some
ple, do such social movements take place? Are specific social direction. While the general direc-
these spaces merely “empty places” that do not tionality of such frames is relatively easily speci-
offer anything to the understanding of our psy- fiable, the concrete mechanisms through which
chological world, or are they rather spaces where such guidance operates still need to be clarified.
life events of various kinds happen, helping to In recent years, new efforts for understanding
shape our developmental paths? the processes of schooling (Daniels, 2010, 2015;
Yet, it seems that psychology refuses to Marsico & Iannaccone, 2012; Marsico, Komatsu,
accept emptiness. Everything has to be filled & Iannaccone, 2013) have provided examples
by some concept of an ending, in such a of where the search for those mechanisms and
way as to exclude from scientific reflection the meaning-making processes could be productive.
extraordinary heuristic significance of the places One of these loci is the social structure of
“in-between” (Marsico, 2011). schools and the border zone between school and
If we assume, instead, that an individual’s nonschool.
entire existence takes place along the axis of irre- More specifically, school entrances are an
versible time (Sato & Valsiner, 2010), we should example of an environment where, through a
admit that each transit, though short-lived, leaves process of “bordering” the institutional place,
a trace in the individual’s life (just think of all the explicit–implicit–tacit encoding of sug-
the times you have entered an airport). And if gested knowledge occurs (Bernstein, 1999,
these transits are not occasional but rather occupy 2000) (Figure 16.2), producing a special school
a specific time slot in a person’s daily life (as borderscape.
Figure 16.2 “School borderscape” (gates and

fences as “bordering” devices) of a primary Figure 16.3 The school border zone (lines are
school entrance in the province of Naples, spatial locations of cultural suggestions).
southern Italy. Source: Photograph by Marsico Primary school courtyard in the province of
(2015). Naples, southern Italy. Source: Photograph by
Marsico (2015).
According to Ogawa et al. (2008), schools

“adopt formal structures that reflect their insti- of the border structures. Persons who encounter
tution, which are enacted and carried out by such borders will carry tacit knowledge about the
coercive, normative, and mimetic mechanisms” sociocultural border and its crossing (Marsico &
(Ogawa et al., 2008, p. 90). Valsiner, 2016).
The use of border devices such as gates and The yellow lines in Figure 16.3 in an Italian
fences creates a border zone between school– primary school courtyard are not for parking cars
nonschool domains. This liminal social space but for grouping the students of each class before
simultaneously divides and connects the school entering the school.3 They are fiat borders (in
territory with the public environment “on the out- mereotopological terms) that simultaneously dif-
side.” What is at stake is the constraining of ferentiate and identify the students. They encode
access to the school area and the way in which the institutional guidance and strongly regulate
the space in-between is delimited (Figure 16.3). the way in which students daily cross sociocul-
The entrance to the institutional space is strictly tural borders between outside and inside the edu-
framed – from beginning to end. The school bor- cational context (Marsico et al., 2015).
der system is ambivalently set up – the visitors The daily entrance (and exit) routine from the
are both wanted (if they have legitimate activities school, as shown in Figure 16.2 and Figure 16.3,
to perform, as in the case of students and teach- follows specific institutional rules that make the
ers) and unwanted (generic audiences, tourists, borders very effective and the school sometimes
vagabonds, and other outsiders). Thus, even if the inaccessible from the exterior. This sociocultural-
school entrance is an apparently open and acces- borders school system makes it possible to
sible location, a special invisible border control develop a certain set of experiences while lim-
takes place on the threshold. iting others. For instance, this social structure
In more general terms, discrete barriers (walls, of places promotes the horizontal relationship
fences, etc.) furnished with designated places for between students of the same age and same class,
border crossing (and conditions for such cross- while inhibiting vertical interactions among dif-
ings) set the stage for social semi-permeability ferent age levels. The vertical/horizontal and
Figure 16.4 The border zone within a school: the entrance hall
of a primary school in Rome, Italy. Source: Photograph by
Marsico (2015).
classification/framing devices are here set up in by allowing or prohibiting access of the parents
space (lines in Figure 16.3) and in time (the short who accompany the children within the school
time of the daily entrance morning routine) in the territory.4
border zone between school and nonschool that Figure 16.4 shows the exact moment of cross-
students are asked to cross every day. ing the school threshold of the main entrance
after the bell rings. Differently from the rigidity
of the sociocultural bordering processes encoded
16.10.1 Institutional Borders as
in the yellow lines (see Figure 16.3), here the stu-
Social Membranes
dents have not previously been grouped accord-
So far, we have seen how the structure of edu- ing to age, and the entrance hall becomes the
cational borders (and the psychological climate arena for possible social interactions between stu-
produced by them) can enable some “boundary dents independently from their formal belonging
behavior” (in terms of Lewin, 1951), promoting to a specific class. The students will be grouped
or disabling the emergence of innovation. within the set limits of the class when they cross
In my international research program on the threshold of the classroom.
border-crossing phenomena, I explored another Thus the bordering processes will take place
border zone within the school territory: the in different points in time and space (in the
entrance hall (Figure 16.4). It is a space in- courtyard, at the main entrance, in the entrance
between school and not-yet school activities, hall, or at the classroom threshold) depending
where the permeability of the border plays a cru- on the structural border system the institution
cial role and the complex dynamic of border con- adopts. However, the school boundary constitutes
struction and border negotiation is at stake. The an extended border zone of selective and sequen-
main research focus was on understanding how tial institutional accessibility both for students
students cross the borders of the school con- and for parents.
text, entering into a sociocultural setting differ- The access of other persons to the school
ent from that of the family (and of the other entrance hall, which is already part of the
not-school places they eventually meet in their school territory (aside of teacher, principals, stu-
daily migrations from home to school) and how dents, and staff), is theoretically limited and hap-
family and school regulate this daily encounter pens under specific circumstances, within the
Figure 16.5 School entrance hall as a social membrane

between school and family. Daily routine interaction between
a mother and a teacher in a primary school entrance hall in
Rome, Italy. This short meeting happened regularly, each
morning, over the month of the data collection and was
repeatedly recorded on video. Source: Marsico (2015).
framework of an institutionally guided partici- yet within the border of a guarded participation
pation as in school–family meetings (Marsico & (Valsiner, 2000).
Iannaccone, 2012). However, the entrance hall The school entrance hall shows its permeabil-
sometime operates like a social membrane, con- ity and its ambivalence of being a place where
necting family and school beyond the school– explicit “pulls” of opposite suggestions are at
nonschool dichotomy. work. Being both school and nonschool terri-
Figure 16.5 shows a mother–teacher interac- tory, the entrance hall is the borderland (Marsico,
tion in the entrance hall during the 15 minutes in 2016) of different crossing processes.
between the ringing of the bell (8:15 a.m.) and the
start of class activity (8:30 a.m.). This daily meet-
ing, which happens in such a short time and in
16.11 Concluding Remarks:
a specific place, illuminates the meaning-making
Crossing Sociocultural Borders
process and the border negotiation in the school
in Development and Education
structure. In this way, a compelling prospect is So far, we have discussed how a border is not just
to analyze the heterogeneity and the ambivalence a nonplace but a space with its own characteris-
of social suggestions within a school. A daily tics. According to our conceptualization, it is not
massive presence of all the parents of the entire just a thing that can be removed from our con-
school population during the early-morning rou- ceptualization. A border is not a fixed line but
tine entrance seems impracticable. A generalized an oscillatory activity that takes place in a bor-
practice like that would create an enormous num- der zone where crossing phenomena are possible.
ber of problems for the regular school activities; The border’s conditions are characterized by an
thus it is strictly regulated. Yet, a little deviation inherent vagueness, and since they deal with what
from the general rules is somehow tolerated and is no longer A but not-yet B, they place theoreti-
even welcomed, because it tacitly inoculates the cal focus on phenomena (“becoming”) and on the
idea of a flexible institution authentically inter- emergence of the novelty. Thus the epistemology
ested in positive cooperation with the parents, of becoming and the crossing border phenomena
become the core of the investigation in develop- Education serves future development. It is
mental and educational psychology. a complex process through which individuals
After all, the entirety of human existence is become human that operates on the border
performed on the borders, since development between the actual and the possible (Marsico,
and change – toward which the human being 2015). Yet, what is actual and what is possi-
is naturally oriented – happen on the bound- ble are culturally determined (Bruner, 1986), and
ary between inner and outer parts of the self, what is possible for one person would not be
between one context and another, between one possible for another under different sociocul-
social setting and another. Those distinctions tural conditions. The “window of possibilities”
generate borders as a result of a sophisticated for human development is mostly determined by
ability of humans to make distinctions in the field the border-construction process of life experi-
of meaning and then project them onto the pub- ence. The actual and the possible, usually con-
lic settings where they live. Boundary making sidered polar opposites, are mutually linked in
is an effort to diminish the ambiguity between what is called bounded indeterminacy, which
person, others, and environment while creating simultaneously eliminates and provides a range
another ambiguous “something in-between.” In of possible new forms in the future (Valsiner,
the attempt to overcome this ambivalence and 1997).
the tension of the boundary condition, novelty In the act of making a border, we both demar-
emerges (Abbey, 2012). Novelty is the key fea- cate the reality and frame the space of opportuni-
ture in all developing systems. Development, ties beyond the passive acceptance of the reality
then, entails movements beyond the settled bor- itself. Borders, while structuring the human con-
ders toward a never pre-known immediate future, dition in the present time, also set the stage for
while education creates borders that guide devel- future horizons.
opment. In fact, the whole enterprise of edu- Borders in mind and society are mostly
cation is placed in a sort of peripheral area. constructed artifacts to culturally organize and
It is the frontier of the developmental process. shape human psychological functioning. They
Education, indeed, can be fully realized only are thus the outcomes of conventional agree-
in a border zone, which implies crossing the ments. Although they give an essential structure
line between “here” and the “beyond” (Boesch, to the otherwise chaotic flux of the events, it does
1991). In such a way, education mostly deals not mean that they represent objective possibili-
with the “not-yet events” and entails a crossing ties or impossibilities (Varzi, 2016). This claim,
condition. which seems to be just an epistemological stance,
The inherent fluid nature of “betweenness” has instead enormous implications with respect
makes education the border zone par excellence to the developmental and educational issues. The
for human development. This calls for a renewal sociocultural borders are not a given reality but
in psychology’s conceptual system in order to a human product that could be either a potential
grasp the vagueness and heuristic richness of arena for fostering human development or a set
boundary processes (Marsico et al., 2015). By of constrains and limitations that can produce and
placing the crossing sociocultural borders phe- reproduce the social inequalities. Hence, if we are
nomenon at the very center of our research inter- aware of our agentive role (at individual and col-
ests, we could illuminate the dynamic part of our lective levels) in bounding our life experiences,
psychological existence, which deals more with we will probably also work at opening the “win-
uncertainty and ambiguity than with security and dow of possibilities for human development” as
immovability. much as we can.
Notes Culture and Psychology (pp. 989–997). New

York: Oxford University Press.
1 Border/borders and boundary/boundaries are used Baldwin, J. M. (1895). The origin of a “thing” and its
as synonyms. nature. Psychological Review, 2, 551–573.
2 I am referring here to mereotopology, which is a Baldwin, J. M. (1906). Thought and Things: A Study
part of contemporary philosophy that provides tools of the Development and Meaning of Thought, or
for the ontological analysis of formal structures of Genetic Logic. Volume 1: Functional Logic, or
parts and whole (Smith, 1997; Smith & Varzi, 2000; Genetic Theory of Knowledge. London: Swan
Varzi, 1997, 1998). Mereotopology faces, from an Sonnenschein & Co.
ontological point of view, the part–whole issue and, Baldwin, J. M. (1908). Thought and Things: A Study
therefore, the question of the relationship between of the Development and Meaning of Thought, or
a border and the thing it encloses. Mereotopology Genetic Logic. Volume 2: Experimental Logic, or
rises from the ambitious attempt to provide a uni- Genetic Theory of Thought. London: Swan
fied framework of the way we represent space, the Sonnenschein & Co.
objects that occupy it, and the relationships between Baldwin, J. M. (1911). Thought and Things: A Study
them. It consists of a combination of topology – the of the Development and Meaning of Thought, or
discipline that deals with the qualitative aspects of Genetic Logic. Volume 3: Interest and Art Being
geometric structures – and the “theory of parts and Real Logic. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.
the whole” (or mereology), whose Aristotelian roots Baldwin, J. M. (1915). Genetic Theory of Reality. New
have been systematized by Brentano (1981). York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
3 In the Italian school system, the class is formed by Beloussov, L. V. (1998). The Dynamic Architecture of
students of the same age and remains identical over a Developing Organism. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
the years, unless a student fails or drops out. Kluver Academic.
4 The research on the school border zone was car- Bernstein, B. (1999). Vertical and horizontal
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da Bahia (Brazil). It was part of a wider research of Education, 20(2), 157–173.
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were observed and video recorded in their early Cultural Psychology. Berlin:Springer.
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Part IV
Institutional Artifacts for Value
17 Ownership and Exchange in
Children: Implications for Social
and Moral Development
Gustavo Faigenbaum
the other child. In such situations, the strongest or

17.1 Introduction most dominant individual usually prevails. How-
Most readers of this Handbook probably share ever, the law of the jungle creates an unstable
the conviction that children are born into a social condition which, in the long run, is detrimen-
world. What this social world is made of, how- tal for all. Since possession has to be decided in
ever, is unsettled. It seems to be populated by each case from scratch, everybody is threatened
heterogeneous entities, such as individual agents at some point.
(aka “humans”), interpersonal relations, orga- Alternatively, a possession conflict can reach a
nizations, artifacts, symbols, ideologies, norms, peaceful resolution via the introduction of a rule
and values. The list is incomplete and some- for sharing the scarce resource, such as taking
what arbitrary: depending on the theoretical point turns. One remarkable discovery of psychologi-
of view one embraces, some element of society cal research is that very young children appear
might be emphasized while some others might be to minimize possession conflicts by observing
neglected. rules. Bakeman and Brownlee (1982) hypothe-
In this chapter, we will focus on some aspects sized that young children are capable of sponta-
of children’s social life that have been typically neously developing rules “as a consequence of a
overlooked in psychological research. We will fundamental human propensity to regulate social
begin by presenting what is currently known interaction in a ruleful manner.” The authors
about the development of ownership of objects in observed children between one and three years of
children. Second, we will discuss peer exchange age who engaged in possession episodes (inter-
and reciprocity. Finally, we will make the point actions in which a child tries to take an object
that both ownership and exchange belong to an from another child), and analyzed the rate of suc-
unmapped domain that we call institutional expe- cess by object takers and the rate of resistance
rience, and will discuss this domain’s signifi- attempts by object holders. They found that pre-
cance for children’s development. vious possession influences the outcome of pos-
session episodes. If a taker has had prior posses-
sion of the object, then her take attempt is more
17.2 From Possession to likely to succeed. In other words, already in one-
Ownership year-olds, the outcome of possession episodes is
When two children want to play with the same not simply a matter of brute force or social dom-
toy, they sometimes oppose each other violently inance, but can be partly explained by reference
by both pulling on the object, pushing or hitting to a prior possession rule. The researchers also
320 gu stavo fai g e nbaum
found that one-year-olds are as likely to resist a early appearance of such expressions is proba-
taker who has had prior possession as not, while bly fostered by their frequent use in possession
three-year-olds were less likely to resist a taker episodes. Second- and third-person possessive
who has had prior possession. This suggests that pronouns also appear later than first-person pos-
among the three-year-olds the prior possession sessive pronouns. First come “my” and “mine;”
claim is recognized by both children. Toddlers, later come “I,” “George,” and “yours.”
Bakeman and Brownlee (1982) conclude, “may Possession conflicts are an important aspect of
have a far greater capacity for ruleful regula- children’s everyday life. Ross (1996) observed
tion of their social affairs than we usually grant children in their homes when they were between
them, a capacity which only careful observations two and six years old, and found that access to
of young children playing with their age-mates is personal or family property was the most fre-
likely to reveal.” quent reason of fighting among siblings. Simi-
The pioneering work by Bakeman and Brown- larly, a study by Dunn (1988) shows that posses-
lee (1982) was corroborated by other studies (see sion is “an issue at the center of many conflicts”
examples in Ross, 1996) confirming that pre- between 24 and 36 months of age.
vious possession increases the chances of win- Rossano et al. (2011) made two- and three-
ning a possession conflict. Some of these stud- year-old children participate in situations in
ies conclude that 18-month-old children already which a puppet took stuff (such as a scarf or a
recognize that previous possession entitles indi- hat) from another person and attempted to throw
viduals to hold and use objects. This rule may it away. They found that two- and three-year-old
partly derive from our evolutionary history. It has children protested when the puppet tried to take
been shown that current possession is respected their stuff. However, only three-year-old children
in several species, including nonhuman primates. protested when a third party’s item was involved.
Members of those species do not attempt to This suggests, according to these researchers,
take objects from other individuals, even when that around three years of age children begin to
the current possessor is a subordinate (Brosnan, understand the normative dimensions of property
2011). This is a relevant evolutionary precursor rights. In the authors’ words: “Standing up for the
of the prior possession rule observed by toddlers. property rights of a third party, demonstrates . . .
In addition, children between 18 and 24 young children’s emerging understanding of the
months already recognize the habitual possessor normative dimension of property as it applies to
of a thing even when that person is not present all persons equally in an agent-neutral manner. It
(Blake & Harris, 2011; Bloom, 1973; Fasig, is not just that I do not like it when someone takes
2000). Also, at about 18 months of age, chil- or throws away an object that doesn’t belong
dren start using the possessives “my” and “mine,” to them; it is wrong.” Three-year-olds already
especially in the context of object requests and understand ownership rules as agent-neutral, and
possession conflicts with siblings or other peers therefore protest transgressions against owner-
(Bates, 1990; Deutsch & Budwig, 1983; Hay, ship when they affect a third party and not only
2006; Tomasello, 1998). Possessive phrases such when they affect their own interests.
as “daddy’s cup” appear on average at about Dunn (1988) claims that children at 36 months
22 months of age (Blake & Harris, 2011). It is are most likely to engage in argumentation or
remarkable that children start using first-person justifications in disputes about those very issues
possessive expressions well before the appear- over which children at 18 months are most angry
ance of self-referencing words such as the per- or distressed, and that those disputes usually
sonal pronoun “I” or the child’s proper name. The concern the right to use a certain object or to
Ownership and Exchange in Children 321
perform a certain activity. Disputes about com- to which an individual can gain ownership of pre-
pliance with conventional rules, destruction of viously unowned natural resources (such as land
objects, or aggression toward siblings or parents or game) by mixing her labor with the resource
are less likely to occasion argumentation. The before anybody else. Thus, Locke’s labor theory
novelty at 36 months is, then, the explicit use of of property rests on a right established by first
arguments to justify ownership claims. possession (see Rose, 1985, especially note 4).
Children’s first arguments are not very sophis- A number of studies have shown that the
ticated. The most common reason given by two- principle of first possession plays a crucial
year-olds is “I want” (Dunn, 1988), a simple role in both children’s (Friedman et al., 2013;
assertion of will. But, by three years of age, kids Kanngiesser, Rossano, & Tomasello, 2015;
are no longer satisfied with other people sim- Rochat et al., 2014) and adults’ (Friedman &
ply acknowledging their temporary possession of Neary, 2009) reasoning about ownership. Fried-
things; they also want to be recognized as the man and Neary (2008) studied children’s abili-
legitimate proprietors of those things, and they ties to infer who owns what from contextual cues
can justify this aspiration: “They gave me this and found that three- and four-year-olds assume
doll for my birthday,” “My daddy said I could that the first person to possess an object is its
have this pen,” “I saw it first,” and so on. owner, an assumption shared by adults (Friedman
One of the most extended and basic ways & Neary, 2009). Verkuyten, Sierksma, and Thijs
to claim an object is to apply the principle of (2015) studied the use of the “first arrival” princi-
first possession, which grants ownership to the ple in disputes about land ownership in children
party that gains control of the object before other between 9 and 12 years of age. Their study con-
potential claimants. Typically, children shout cluded that “children believe that a person owns a
things like “I had it first,” “I came here first,” or particular land relatively more when that person
“I got dibs.” We’ve already seen that children at arrived first.” Furthermore, the first arriver is con-
18 months of age seem to recognize prior pos- sidered to own the land relatively more even when
session in their behavior; but at three years of she did not work the land, compared to the later
age they can use prior possession as an argu- arriver who did work it; first arrival outweighs the
ment against a competitor. This type of argument laboring of the land of the later arriver. Children
stays with us throughout our life and is still com- connect first possession with entitlement.
mon sense for most adults (Friedman & Neary, Developmental psychology, legal theory,
2009): we ardently demand a parking spot based anthropology, and philosophy all agree on the
on the fact that we arrived there first or even that ubiquity of the principle of first possession. How-
we saw it first; we consider ourselves as owners ever, children sometimes use other arguments
of an idea simply because we “had it” (mean- to justify ownership. Here are some common
ing “it occurred to us”) first. Even nations claim examples:
sovereignty over territories on the grounds that
Creation: “I built this chair myself.”
their explorers were first to set foot in them. And
Discovery: “I found this cave.”
most legal systems tend to prioritize possession
Transaction: “My brother gave this pen to me.”
when dealing with property disputes (Holmes,
Adverse possession: “Nobody was using this
1991, p. 245). The view that ownership begins
bike, so I started using it and taking care of
with taking possession is a basic tenet of prop-
it.”
erty law around the world (Lueck, 2008), and
has a philosophical justification in John Locke’s Sometimes these principles clash. For example,
(Locke, 1690) labor theory of property, according one person asserts that a table belongs to her
because she built it, while another argues that she An alternative interpretation of this experiment,
had previously discovered the wood the table was however, is that while the original owner had
built with. Some types of ownership claim might prior possession of the play dough (the raw mate-
be more decisive, fundamental or relevant than rial), the person who models a new object is the
others. Consequently, some scholars have won- first possessor of the object just created.
dered whether it would be possible to establish Faigenbaum, Sigman, and Casiraghi (forth-
a hierarchy of ownership principles according to coming) tested children and adults in order to
which, for example, “creation” trumps “discov- look for differences in the application of the
ery” (or the other way around). principle of first possession. Participants watched
Rochat et al. (2014) studied how children videos that featured ownership conflicts. In one
from different cultures apply ownership princi- of the scripts, a girl climbs a mountain, discovers
ples. three- and five-year-olds were presented a cave and inscribes her name on the entrance.
with a series of scripts involving two identical Later, a second girl finds the cave and starts liv-
dolls fighting over an object. Participants had to ing there. In another script, a boy discovers some
decide which of the two dolls should own the pieces of wood and puts them aside; a second boy
object. Each script enacted a potential reason for arrives and manufactures a chair with them. It
attributing ownership: creation, familiarity, first was found that, while reacting to exactly the same
contact, or equity. For example, in one of the stories, children are significantly more likely than
scripts, a doll claims to have created the object, adults to grant ownership to the character that
while the other one only asserts that the object was the first possessor of the object under dispute
is hers without providing a competing reason. (84% versus 55% of cases when summarizing all
Results show that, across cultures, children are stories, respectively). Children’s reasoning rests
significantly more consistent in attributing own- on first possession significantly more than adults.
ership when one of the protagonists created the There seems to be a developmental trajectory that
object, as compared with other kinds of reasons weakens the weight of first possession on owner-
such as first contact, familiarity with the object, ship reasoning as the child grows.
or equity considerations. “Creation” appears to Most dictionaries define ownership as a legal
be more stable across cultures than the other right of possession. Possession and ownership are
criteria. in fact synonyms and can be used interchange-
Levene, Starmans, and Friedman (2015), in ably in many contexts. However, the verb “to
a study with adults, conclude that “creation possess” emphasizes the physical control of the
trumps first possession as a means of acquir- thing, whereas “to own” highlights the fact that
ing ownership.” Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, and Hood one holds a right to possess the object. For exam-
(2010) made a researcher and a participant bor- ple, if I rent my car to someone else, I do not pos-
row modeling-clay objects from each other to sess it for some time, yet I am still its owner (and
mold into new objects. Participants were more other people should recognize this legal title).
likely to transfer ownership to the second indi- Ownership creates an abstract link between the
vidual after she invested creative labor in the owner and the object that does not depend on the
object than after other manipulations (holding the physical traits of the object but is rooted in social
object, making small changes to it). This effect norms only.
was significantly stronger in preschool children Babies, up to about 18 months of age, use
than in adults. In the context of the experiment, stuff. Toddlers starting at about 18 months pos-
then, invested effort and creative labor overruled sess things, in the sense that they actively fight
the first-possessor bias for preschool children. for exclusive access to the object, and want their
possession to be recognized and respected by ral cognitive links among one’s past, present, and
others. Toddlers are frequently interested in the future by providing biographical references. Thus
things other people have or are paying attention Fasig (2000) argues that children’s ability to link
to, yet they seem to observe some basic, practi- objects to owners “indicates knowledge of the
cal version of the prior possession rule. At about self as continuous in time.” Rochat (2009) pro-
36 months of age children want to be explic- vides an in-depth exploration of the role that pos-
itly recognized as owners. They uphold property session and ownership conflicts play on the emer-
rights even when a third party object is at stake. gence of self-consciousness, while taking into
They can now justify why they are the legiti- account not only the cognitive, but also the affec-
mate owners of a certain object (“I saw it first,” tive aspects of development, with special focus
“my mommy gave it to me”), and infer who the on social emotions like shame and guilt.
owner of a certain object is in many everyday
settings. The principle of first possession plays a
17.3 Exchange and Reciprocity
prominent role in three-year-olds’ ownership rea-
soning: children explicitly ground ownership in At around nine months of age, children start
prior possession. In other words, they translate to engage in give-and-take games with adults
into words and arguments the practical rules that (Bruner & Watson, 1983; Stern, 1998). “No par-
govern their relationships with their peers (i.e., ent and no observer can fail to be aware of how
one does not take stuff from someone who had it often very young children show, offer, and give
first). Yet, three-year-olds also go beyond physi- objects to others. Often such gestures appear to
cal possession: they treat ownership as an abstract be social overtures, friendly actions or attempts
relationship between owner and object. They can to engage another in interaction” (Dunn, 1988,
go on vacation for one month, but they still know p. 99). By 18 months, children regularly give
that the toys they left behind are theirs. objects to (and receive objects from) their peers;
The developmental progression we are propos- they understand that a sibling wants what they
ing, then, is: (1) use, (2) possession, and (3) own- have and on occasion will offer to share before
ership. Insofar as we start having a more per- they have been asked. By three years of age, chil-
manent bond with our “stuff,” mere possession dren not only recognize what the other wants, but
becomes property; we go from physical seizure also grasp the idea that sharing is often expected
of the object, through public recognition of pos- (especially if it is food) and use this as a justifica-
session, to property rights. tion for their own demands (Dunn, 1988, p. 106).
Children’s participation in the normative, con- In addition, at age three, children are often
flicting world of possession and ownership probable to make explicit agreements (for example, in
ably impacts on other domains. Levine (1983) turn-taking). It is true that two-year-olds already
hypothesizes that the tendency to claim and can share (toys, food), have negotiation skills, and
defend toys by using the possessive adjective can give up some things in order to obtain others.
“mine” and territorial behaviors in general estab- But it is only at three that children start articu-
lish boundaries between self and other, and are lating rules and contracts such as “you use it for
therefore relevant for self- (and other-) defini- a while, then I use it for a while.” Obviously, we
tion. Fasig (2000) suggests that, by controlling are not saying that physical aggression has dis-
the toy’s use and by recognizing the relation- appeared or that three-year-olds “talk things out”
ship between the toy, the self, and the other, whenever there is a dispute. Yet, it seems to be
children gain knowledge of their own self. In the case that many conflicts over possession are
addition, cherished possessions facilitate tempo- now ended by means of verbal argumentation,
sharing, turn-taking, and reconciliation, without An analysis of children’s argumentative discourse

adult intervention (see Ross & Conant, 1995; supported the distinction of two kinds of reci-
Ross, Conant, & Vickar, 2011). Three-year-olds procity in children: associative and strict.
are capable of making explicit agreements. Associative reciprocity takes place when chil-
Typically, an owner can use, modify, destroy, dren exchange for the sake of establishing or
or lend her possessions. In certain circumstances, re-defining personal bonds. Children often give
she can also alienate her property; that is, she goods to their peers while invoking favors
can transfer ownership to another person. Chil- received in the past, favors they shall receive
dren at three years of age are able to justify their in an undefined future, alliances, or membership
ownership claims, seal contracts (deals, agree- in a common group. The following are spon-
ments) with other persons and transfer ownership taneous utterances recorded in the schoolyard
of their property (Faigenbaum, 2005). This opens (Faigenbaum, 2005):
up a new range of experiences for them: they now
participate in exchanges. For the purpose of this “I like to make presents to my best friends . . . I
discussion, we will define an exchange as an give away the cards that are repeats”
interaction in which ownership of an object (7-year-old).
is voluntarily transferred from an individual “He gave me a teddy bear, so I promised I was
going to give him a marble” (7-year-old).
to another. For example, three-year-olds grow
“You don’t give me the swing; I will not give you
increasingly interested in presents. They under-
my paints. I am no longer your friend. You will
stand that a gift is more than the friendly gesture
never come to my house again, and at my
of handing out an object: gifts bestow ownership. birthday party you won’t blow my candles”
Kindergarten and primary school children (3-year-old).
trade objects with their peers. A vibrant under- “[You will not borrow my puppet] because you
ground economy is alive in the schoolyards of the don’t trade cards with me” (10-year-old).
world (Faigenbaum, 2005; Webley, 1996). There,
girls and boys trade cards, marbles, sweets, toys, Associative reciprocity predominates in most
and even intangible goods (such as favors or exchanges in kindergarten children. Although
the right to participate in a game). Ecologi- it never disappears completely, older children
cal observation reveals that these activities are become increasingly interested in maximizing
not random: children’s peer societies distinguish the value of the objects obtained in their
between legitimate and illegitimate transfers, and exchanges, and accordingly do trades that involve
enforce procedural and moral rules that govern a tit-for-tat, strict reciprocity. For example, when
exchanges. trading cards, they save the “repeats” in order
Things change hands. Economists, anthropolo- to trade them for cards they lack. When assess-
gists, and sociologists agree that social exchanges ing the precise value of each card, they consider
involve reciprocity, the rule that establishes that a several factors (beauty, scarcity, etc.) Strict reci-
person has the obligation to pay back in kind what procity becomes progressively more important
other people has provided her. Sometimes the throughout primary school.
obligation created is vague or unspecified (as in Developmental psychologists are ever more
gifts); at other times it is precisely defined (as in interested in reciprocity in children. Warneken
sales). Faigenbaum (2005) studied spontaneous and Tomasello (2013) designed experimental sit-
peer-interaction in the schoolyard with the aim uations in which children had to share resources
of uncovering the values, rules, and conceptions with a researcher. They found that it is not until
of reciprocity implicit in children’s exchanges. 3.5 years of age that children modulate their
sharing contingent on their partner’s antecedent on culture, since they were not able to replicate
behavior. Babies and young toddlers already have the results originally obtained in America with
prosocial tendencies; helping and sharing emerge Samoan children.
before children begin to worry about directly The literature on economic games and bargain-
reciprocating what others have provided to them. ing offers another approximation to the devel-
Later in development, they seem to become more opment of reciprocity. For the last thirty years,
sensitive to reciprocity, adjusting their behav- there’s been a surge of research on games like
ior accordingly. In summary, children’s proso- ultimatum, dictator, and common good in chil-
cial behavior emerges spontaneously but is later dren. In ultimatum, the first player or “proposer”
mediated by reciprocity. Olson & Spelke (2008) receives something valuable (money, stickers,
also found that 3.5-year-old children already have candy) and proposes a method to divide it
a tendency to share resources with close relations, between herself and another player. The second
with people who have shared with them (direct player or “responder” chooses to either accept
reciprocity), and with people who have shared or reject the proposal. If the responder accepts,
with others (indirect reciprocity). the goods are split according to the proposal. If
Rochat et al. (2009) studied fairness in three- the responder rejects, neither player receives any-
and five-year-olds. They made children distribute thing. The game is typically played as a one-shot
small collections of candies, either between the interaction, so that future reciprocation is not an
participant and an adult experimenter or between issue. In the dictator game, the first player or
two dolls. The authors compared the responses “dictator,” determines how to split an endowment
of children growing up in seven different cultural between herself and another player. The second
and economic contexts. Across cultures, three- player or “recipient” simply receives what the
year-olds tend to optimize their own gain, not dictator assigned to her; her role is entirely pas-
showing many signs of self-sacrifice or generos- sive and has no input into the outcome of the
ity. By five years, overall, children tend to show game.
more fairness in sharing. What varies across Harbaugh, Krause, and Liday (2003) had chil-
cultures is only the magnitude of young children aged 7 through 18 play ultimatum and dic-
dren’s self-interest, but the direction of develop- tator games. They found that bargaining behav-
ment (from selfishness to fairness) seems to be ior changes substantially with age. Children
universal. at age seven already make strategic propos-
Robbins and Rochat (2011) define strong reci- als: they offer the partner a smaller amount
procity as the propensity to sacrifice resources to than what they keep for themselves, but not
be kind or to punish in response to prior acts. small enough to offend the partner and lose
They tested three- and five-year-old children in all the money. Thus, on average, younger chil-
a sharing game involving the participant child, dren make and accept smaller ultimatum pro-
a generous puppet, and a stingy puppet. At the posals than older children. What improves with
end of the game, the child was offered an oppor- age is children’s preference for fairness, but not
tunity to sacrifice some of her personal gains to their bargaining ability. Similarly, Murnighan and
punish one of the puppets. They found that only Saxon (1998) report on a study of bargaining
five-year-olds show some evidence of strong reci- attitudes in children from kindergarten through
procity by orienting their punishment systemati- ninth grade. While they found a similar strate-
cally toward the stingy puppet (thus manifesting gic behavior in elementary school children, they
what the authors call an “ethical stance”). The also discovered that kindergartners made quite
authors suggest that strong reciprocity depends “unstrategic” proposals: sometimes they told the
experimenter they would give away everything and peer relationships at this age. Preschool-
they had. ers might appear as nonstrategic from the point
Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008) used a of view of economists who identify rational-
modified version of the dictator game to test chil- ity with calculating the best means to achieve
dren between three and eight years of age. They a desired end-result (individual profit, equality,
found that, at age three–four, the overwhelm- etc.), but they are actually well adapted to their
ing majority of children behave selfishly, whereas real social context.
most children at age seven–eight prefer resource 2 The apparently selfish tendencies of three-
allocations that remove advantageous or disad- year-olds moderate themselves as children
vantageous inequality. They conclude that the mature, so that between five and seven years
force behind other-regarding choices in seven- of age (depending on the specific study) chil-
and eight-year-old children is inequality aversion. dren start demanding fairness and rejecting
Inequality aversion is, however, modulated by inequality. In certain cases, they even embrace
parochialism, a preference for favoring the mem- an ethical stance and engage in costly punish-
bers of one’s own social group. ment. This emerging mindset is in harmony
If we now put together the results of these dif- with the strict reciprocity embedded in expe-
ferent studies on peer exchange, reciprocity, and riences such as bartering with peers or deal-
economic games, a general picture emerges: ing with money and prices, which gain promi-
nence in children’s daily life as they grow up.
1 Three-year-olds show self-optimizing and In the culture of adults, barter and monetary
hoarding behaviors. Should they be labeled transactions are considered fair when both par-
as selfish capitalists who optimize their own ties receive an equivalent value. Similarly, fair
gain? Before jumping to conclusions, let us distributions between partners with the same
remember that, in the context of the fam- merit are expected to be 50/50. This kind of
ily, children regularly receive food, toys, and institutional context comes to dominate chil-
other stuff from adults, and that they are not dren’s interactions and provides them with a
always obliged to reciprocate or share what new sense of fairness.
they receive. Children acting as ultimatum pro-
posers (and receiving candy from an adult To sum up: preschool children can sometimes be
researcher) might see themselves as fully enti- quite shrewd and egotistic, and at other times
tled to whatever they get. Occasionally, how- they can be generous and prosocial, but in gen-
ever, children go from extreme selfishness to eral they do not frame their relationships in terms
extreme generosity: they can give everything of strict reciprocity contracts. By way of contrast,
to the other player. How to explain this dis- the strategic thinking of seven-year-olds relies on
crepancy? We should take into account that, in a calculation of what their partners would accept
their daily life, children do give stuff to their as a good deal, and in that sense it presupposes
peers (for example, when trying to make new a contractual framework (see congruent evidence
friends). Preschool children do not frame their in Lucas, Wagner, & Chow, 2008). Three-year-
relationships in terms of strict-reciprocity con- olds already have a certain sense of fairness that
tracts. It should be no surprise that their behav- they apply to the distribution and exchange of
ior in economic games and fairness experi- objects (Rochat et al., 2009); however, this sense
ments is consistent with a culture of associative evolves as children engage in different exchange
reciprocity and the gift economy, which pre- practices, framed by age-specific cultures and
dominate in the context of familial institutions institutions.
practices is crucial in such an environment, and

17.4 Institutions and
ownership experiences can become emotionally
Institutional Experience
charged. Conflicts always pop up, because “the
There are people, out there in the social world, intent to appropriate or deal with a thing as owner
who acquire, use, and sell property. Some can hardly exist without an intent to exclude oth-
researchers take it for granted that children obtain ers” (Holmes, 1991, p. 221). As Rochat (2009,
information about those ownership-related events 2014) argues, these experiences shape children’s
by witnessing them directly and by complemen- identities, their place in the social world, their
tary sources such as verbal input provided by sense of justice. Think only about the feelings of
adults or the mass media. They consider children jealousy that arise when a sibling gets the best
as embarked in the “cold” enterprise of concep- presents for Christmas; or about how showing
tualizing ownership, which is supposed to be “an off expensive stuff brings about prestige for an
interesting cognitive problem” (Kalish & Ander- owner, envy and humiliation for her friends.
son, 2011) involving distant adult institutions. Our environment is both natural and social.
Consistently, these scholars use individual inter- The social dimension of our environment is itself
views with children to present third person, hypo- complex and includes diverse types of entities
thetical situations to participants so as to uncover such as persons, cultural artifacts, rituals, and
their concepts and reasoning about social institu- institutions. We consider Searle’s (1995) the-
tions, which are treated as external phenomena. ory as the most illuminating characterization of
In order to navigate the social world, children the institutional milieu in which humans live.
need to master norms regulating ownership. Pic- Searle’s account is based on the insight that
ture a child entering a room full of toys: she will human beings, in their everyday life, create insti-
need to apply some kind of heuristics to iden- tutional facts by means of a particular type of
tify the owner of each object; she will need to rules that he calls “constitutive.” Constitutive
follow specific procedures to ask for permission rules can be expressed by the formula X counts
to use a given object. An example of heuristic as Y (Searle, 1995, 2005). For example, a cer-
reasoning is provided by Friedman et al. (2011), tain move in a football game counts as scor-
who show that both adults and children usually ing a touchdown; a given set of voting proce-
expect human-made objects (artifacts) to belong dures counts as the election of the president of
to someone, since making an object typically the United States. In all constitutive rules, the
establishes ownership over it. Natural kinds (a X term identifies certain features of an object
bird, a tree in a forest) are commonly assumed not and the Y term assigns a special status to that
to belong to anybody. Children also infer that the object.
person who gives permission to use an object is Ownership is clearly an institution, since it
its owner (Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). is constituted by rules of the type X count as
This progressive mastery of social norms, Y, such as “taking possession of something in
however, may not happen as a cold exercise such and such circumstances counts as becom-
in social cognition, but as a hot engagement ing its owner.” Gift, barter and sale are also insti-
with a world of conflicting claims. Children do tutions according to this criterion. For example,
not merely witness social phenomena; they are giving something to someone in a given context,
deeply immersed in a first-person experience. while saying certain words, counts as “making a
They navigate social institutions (family, school, present.”
peer societies) from dusk till dawn. Success- Searle emphasizes that institutions populate
fully dealing with ownership-related rules and and shape our everyday world. His list of
examples of institutions include money, rule clearest and most compelling example of recip-
games, property, promises, schools, marriage, rocal moral principles originating in the soci-
birthday parties, presents, friendships, tenure, ety of children rather than that of adults” (Ross,
summer vacations, and industrial strikes, among Conant, & Vickar, 2011). Morality might be pri-
many others. Searle explains that institutions marily framed by our “hot,” rich experiences
have deontological consequences, that is, they with institutions such as ownership, which create
create rights and obligations. For instance, when a fertile ground for the development of mutual
a child owns certain toys she has concurrent respect.
rights such as playing with them without ask- In the previous section we suggested that insti-
ing for permission, but also duties such as pick- tutional experience impacts on children’s con-
ing them up when she’s done playing. And all ceptions of fairness. This hypothesis receives
these rights and duties interlock with other social indirect support from intercultural research on
institutions (Searle, 2005), such as borrowing or economic games with adults, as it was summa-
sharing. Searle claims that the capacity to collec- rized and integrated in Henrich et al. (2005).
tively assign social functions to objects, thus cre- The authors of this ambitious paper emphasize
ating institutions, rights and duties, is specifically the importance of local institutions in shaping
human. individuals’ responses to economic games. They
Children inhabit an institutional environment mention the case of the whale hunting people on
since early in their life. If it is the case that institu- the island of Lamalera (Indonesia), where perfor-
tions shape children’s actions, values, beliefs, and mance at the ultimatum game mirrors the fish-
forms of thinking, then they should be studied by ers’ behavior when distributing a large prey. Hen-
developmental psychologists. What are the con- rich and colleagues also note that the Tsimane of
sequences for human beings of living in an envi- Bolivia and the Machiguenga of Peru, who live
ronment that is saturated with institutions such as in societies with little cooperation or exchange
ownership? beyond the family unit, tend to make low ulti-
“Ownership is both invisible and abstract” matum offers. Lamalera proposers in the ultima-
(Noles & Keil, 2011) and yet, as research shows, tum game think of the money as owned in com-
its fundamentals are grasped by young children. mon with the recipient, whereas Tsimane and
The fact that ownership pervades our everyday Machigenga proposers see the money as their
life may favor specific, abstract forms of think- own and feel entitled to keep it (see also Gowdy,
ing as a matter of adaptation to a world saturated Iorgulescu, & Onyeiwu, 2003; Henrich, 2000).
with abstract, “invisible” constitutive rules. This In the same vein, J. Ensminger (another con-
adaptation may also impact in the development of tributor to Henrich et al., 2005) studied the Orma,
other domains, such as morality. “The develop- a tribe living in East Africa, and concluded that
ment of a moral sense in children finds a partic- the presence or absence of wage or trade income
ularly rich soil in the early inclination to possess in a community is a highly significant predictor of
and appropriate things to the self . . . [the develop- offer size in ultimatum games. People with more
ment of a sense of ownership] correlates with and exposure to a free market (those engaged in wage
possibly causes the emergence of a moral sense” labor and trade) have a greater tendency to pro-
(Rochat, 2011; emphasis added). Similarly, Ross, pose ultimatum fair offers than those habitually
Conant, and Vickar (2011) argue that children’s engaged in subsistence production. This is coher-
observance of property rights might contribute to ent with the teachings of anthropologists such
the development of morality: “Children’s under- as Mauss (1967) or Godelier (1999), who show
standing of ownership rights may provide the how reciprocity is embedded in local practices.
Markets are institutions that teach people how stand fairness in terms of tit-for-tat reciprocity.
to coordinate their actions equitably with other, The apparent altruism of some children (or the
anonymous individuals. It might be counterintu- altruism of adults that is reported by intercul-
itive to think about markets and money as pro- tural researchers) should not be seen as resulting
moting fairness (rather than selfishness), but the from a lack of rationality, but as expressing the
interpretation makes sense: it is only in the con- predominance of the institutions of associative
text of market institutions and commercial trans- reciprocity.
actions that fairness comes to be identified with In spite of the evidence showing that reci-
the equitable (either equal or proportional) distri- procity is to some extent shaped by institu-
bution of benefits. Again: institutions and social tionalized practices, Baumard, André, and Sper-
practices impact on individual’s conception of ber (2013) suggest that there is an innate, core
what is fair. representation of fairness “inside the head” of
Henrich et al. (2005), after a thorough review each individual. This core is postulated to be
of the evidence, conclude that economic orga- identical (or very similar) across cultures. This
nization and the structure of social interactions nativist conception of fairness assumes that cul-
explain a substantial portion of the behavioral tural specificities cause participants in economic
variation across societies: the higher the degree games to misunderstand the researchers’ instruc-
of market integration and the higher the payoffs tions. An alternative view (that we endorse) is
to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the that institutions model basic conceptions of reci-
level of prosociality expressed in experimental procity from the very beginning of development,
games. By way of contrast, economic and demo- and that culture in general interacts with humans’
graphic variables do not explain game behav- innate capacities such as empathy all along (see
ior, either within or across groups. As Baumard, Castorina & Faigenbaum, 2002, for a discus-
André, and Sperber (2013) sum it up, respondents sion of how social constrains can be treated as
interpret the experimenters’ instructions in terms an integral part of epistemological processes,
of their everyday practices. rather than as an external limitation). There is no
Intercultural research, then, has shown that misunderstanding of the experimenters’ instruc-
there are broad differences in the way people act tions; rather, people have no option but to use
in economic games, and that the reasons for this institutional frameworks to make sense of their
divergence are mostly found in local practices, interactions.
shaped by markets and other institutions that reg-
ulate the exchange and distribution of objects.
17.5 Conclusion
This account is basically the same that we pro-
posed in the previous section to explain children’s In this chapter, we described certain aspects of
performance at economic games. In the context children’s social development in the domains of
of the family, preschool children regularly receive ownership and exchange. We highlighted some
food, toys, and other stuff from adults, without important cognitive milestones in the develop-
an obligation to reciprocate. In the context of ment of ownership, such as the acquisition of pos-
peer societies, preschool children use presents in sessives, the use of heuristics to attribute objects
order to establish alliances, define social relation- to persons, and the understanding of property
ships, and make new friends. This is a plausi- rights. We postulated a transition from mere use
ble explanation for the apparently irrational, non- of objects (since birth), to possession (at about
strategic performance of children younger than 18 months), and to ownership (at about three
five in economic games. They do not yet under- years of age).
Children defend their possessions by argumen- Bates, E. (1990). Language about me and you:
tation and trade them with their peers. Gifts, Pronomial reference and the emerging concept
associative reciprocity, and apparently selfish of self. In D. Cicchetti & M. Beeghly (Eds.),
behaviors predominate in kindergarten chil- The Self in Transition Infancy to Childhood
dren. Primary school children engage in strict (pp. 165–182). Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
reciprocity exchanges (barter and monetary
Baumard, N., André, J. B., & Sperber, D. (2013). A
transactions) which promote fairness-oriented
mutualistic approach to morality. Behavioral and
and inequality-averse thinking. Everyday social
Brain Sciences, 36(1), 59–78.
practices influence children’s conceptions of Blake, P. R. & Harris, P. L. (2011). Early
fairness. representations of ownership. New Directions for
Fairness, reciprocity, and other moral notions Child and Adolescent Development, 132, 39–51.
are partly shaped by institutions present in chil- DOI: 10.1002/cd.295.
dren’s everyday life. According to Searle (1995, Bloom, L. (1973). One Word at a Time: The Use of
2005) ownership and exchange are institutions, Single Word Utterances before Syntax. The
since they are constituted by rules of the type X Hague: Mouton De Gruyter.
count as Y. Beyond the innate pro-social tenden- Brosnan, S. F. (2011). Property in nonhuman primates.
cies shared by all humans, individuals are also New Directions for Child and Adolescent
Development, 132, 9–22. DOI: 10.1002/cd.293.
required to master institutional reality in order to
Bruner, J. & Watson, R. (1983). Child’s Talk: Learning
function in their social world. They need to deal
to Use Language. New York: W. W. Norton.
with ownership, gifts, barter, trade, and money on
Castorina, J. A., & Faigenbaum, G. (2002). The
a daily basis. Development can be seen as a pro- epistemological meaning of constraints in the
gressive appropriation of such institutional real- development of domain knowledge. Theory &
ity, a process which seems to impact back on the Psychology, 12(3), 315–334. DOI: 10.1177/
agent’s reasoning processes. For example, since 0959354302012003013.
ownership relations are not self-evident and are Deutsch, W. & Budwig, N. (1983). Form and function
not displayed as physical traits of objects or own- in the development of possessives. Papers and
ers, they demand a kind of abstract reasoning that Reports on Child Language Development, 22,
appears at a very early age. Similarly, exchange 36–42.
practices might play a role in the development Dunn, J. (1988). The Beginnings of Social
Understanding. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
of the understanding of quantities. Institutions
University Press.
provide a framework for thinking. We hope that
Faigenbaum, G. (2005). Children’s Economic
future research will offer a more detailed pic-
Experience: Exchange. Buenos Aires:
ture of children’s social development, their insti- LibrosEnRed.
tutional life and the interactions between owner- Faigenbaum, G., Sigman, M., & Casiraghi, L.
ship, exchange, and other domains of knowledge (forthcoming). Young children use first
and experience. possession significantly more than adults for
deciding ownership.
Fasig, L. G. (2000). Toddlers’ understanding of
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18 Possessions and Money beyond
Market Economy
Toshiya Yamamoto and Noboru Takahashi
cases, depends on the specific personal relation-

18.1 Basic Viewpoint for
ship between those who exchange. In this context,
Analyzing Possessions and
the value neutrality of money is not absolute.
Money
Gift exchange is the most basic pattern of
social exchange and completely depends on spe-
18.1.1 Money as a Cultural Tool
cific personal or intercommunity relationships.
A human is a creature who uses tools. Such Those who exchange gifts do so based on their
tools could be physical instruments or psychoso- personal relationships, and such exchange cannot
cial ones, such as signs, which Vygotsky (1997) be established when a relationship does not exist.
advocates – concept, thought, and social sys- Humans are the only species to interact with
tem. Humans have sociohistorically inherited and others through social exchange using various
developed these tools into the creation of per- kinds of media, including materialistic objects,
sonal inner life, interpersonal communication, such as money, goods, and gifts, and spiritual
and, moreover, a social system. Here we follow objects, such as words, concepts, and thoughts.
the usage extended by Cole (1996) – we use the All of these interactions are based on human sym-
concept of tools with such expansiveness. Money bolic function or a psychological system of signs.
is one of the basic tools generating human eco-
nomic activity. Money is, however, not just an
18.1.2 Two Types of Exchange
economic tool. An economic tool is merely one
and EMS
type of cultural tool. This is our basic standpoint
in our discussion on the economy and the cultural Here we can schematize the structure of such
nature of money. human-specific interaction using the concept of
Generally, money is regarded as a simple eco- expanded mediational structure (EMS), as shown
nomic tool that represents exchange value and in Figure 18.1. The figure shows how subject 1
thus mediates exchange, becomes a unit of price, approaches subject 2 using some sort of object
and stores’ value. Its only use value is that money as a medium (object 1); then, subject 2 responds
can represent exchange value. Money can be to subject 1 using an object (object 2), and all
exchanged for any kinds of goods. For that rea- of these interactions are mediated or guided by
son, the value of money is universal – anyone a normative element of some kind (normative
who has money can use it – and neutral. It does mediator).
not depend on any specific personal relationship. The media can be money or goods in an eco-
Money as an economic tool has been cre- nomic interaction, gifts in a gift exchange, or
ated through the development of barter exchange. words in a conversation. The normative medi-
However, barter exchange hinges on the practical ator can be common practice in social interac-
use value of goods to be exchanged and, in many tion, including economic exchange or logic or
334 to shiya yamamoto and noboru takahashi
intersubjective value functions as a medium that

accommodates the children’s interactions over
the product.
Meaning is also given to a subject who uses
money. Just like the rich are expected to return
their money to society, every adult uses money
mediated by his or her role according to the
socialized meaning of the subject. In the case of
a company officer, he or she is anticipated to use
money to benefit the company. But the same per-
Figure 18.1 Expanded mediational structure son as a father or mother in the home is expected
(EMS). to use money for the family and his or her own
personal use.
rules in discussion. Subjects act out appropriate Money as an object functions as a special
roles in respective interactions, which means they exchange tool in such multiple mediational struc-
become sellers and buyers in a market exchange tures comprising subjects having a social role,
or listeners and speakers in a conversation. objects a given social or intersubjective mean-
Using this schema, the different nature that ing, and some norms accommodating their inter-
money has in market exchange and that a gift actions. A person plays the role of a subject
has in gift exchange can be explained as fol- with given cultural meaning and exchanges an
lows. In a market economy, neutral subjects that object with value while following social norma-
do not have individual personalities exchange tive constraints and being mediated by money,
money for goods as objects, and those objects and thus the socioeconomic system functions.
are regarded simply as representing a neutral Understanding money from a psychological per-
exchange value. These interactions are mediated spective means analyzing the multiple media-
by a highly abstract and universal law (normative tional structures and understanding the generat-
mediator). On the other hand, in gift exchange, ing and changing processes of the structure with
subjects exchange gifts based on their personal given meaning (see also the discussion about
relationships, maintaining mutual credibility and the relationship between objects that people pos-
following certain customs or ethics. sess and use to extend the self; Simmel 1950,
Nevertheless, when analyzing a specific eco- 322).
nomic phenomenon in daily life, gift exchange
and market exchange cannot always be differenti-
18.1.3 Polysemic Nature of Money
ated in such an absolute manner. This is particu-
larly true when trying to understand cultural dif- Although money is regarded as neutral from a
ference and cultural conflicts in a global economy market economy viewpoint, as mentioned above,
or the process of children learning about money money and possessions bear polysemy, which
through their daily exchange practices. cannot be described only by a one-dimensional
For example, when children buy certain goods, value structure; in our lives, we find that many
they often talk with their friends about appeal- things hold subjective values and that those val-
ing points of a product. Through their conver- ues differ from their market values (Belk, 1988,
sation, the product develops its subjective value, 1991). Memory-laden objects, including gifts,
which is shared by the children. In this way, value family photographs, souvenirs and mementos,
becomes an intersubjective substance. The shared heirlooms, antiques, and monuments, are typical
Possessions and Money beyond Market Economy 335
examples (e.g., Belk, 1991; Dittmar, 1992). We Although money is avoided in some cases owing
can find numerous examples that indicate that to its neutrality, it is not always neutral (versatile
possessions carry subjectively important mean- in its use). According to excerpts from Webley,
ing for individuals. For the aged, roles are given Lea, and Portalska (1983), European currencies
to possessions in providing control and mas- were usually used to purchase ordinary goods and
tery – moderating emotions, cultivating the self, native money was used for purchasing wives in
symbolizing ties with others, constituting a con- West Africa. From the end of the nineteenth cen-
crete history of one’s past (Kemptner, 1989). On tury through the beginning of the twentieth cen-
the other hand, loss of possessions due to theft tury in America, income earned by labor of a
or disaster accompanies a strong sense of loss household wife in a lower economic stratum was
and depressing feelings (Belk, 1988). Following regarded as an extension of her housekeeping,
James (1890), we see that those possessions have and the income was appropriated for the purchase
a “Material Me” nature, or an “expanded self,” in of daily necessities, while her husband’s income
our terms, which is seen as representing the pos- was used as the money that circulated in a market
sessor’s intention or will. economy, such as in investments (Zelizer, 1989).
Although people have the strong notion that Two important points here are that (1) money
money is free from specific human relationships does not hold the neutrality that allows it to be
and that it is abstract, they refrain from using it exchanged for anything but has specific applica-
in some cases. A typical example is money as tions and specific meanings in some cases and
a gift (Webley, Lea, & Portalska, 1983). In the (2) such meaning is not fixed but varies his-
case of a gift, a sender gives an item that the torically and culturally. Therefore money and
sender made an effort to make or select, and a possessions are not issues that can be grasped
receiver accepts it. In the specific relationship within and explained by a neutral money-goods
between a sender and a receiver, a gift exists exchange system in a market economy. Rather,
as a symbol representing a specific effort (or they should be understood in the context of the
goodwill) of a specific person (Csikszentmiha- cultures and histories of the societies in which
lyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981). Because money people are living.
transposes the value built on a specific individ-
ual relationship and/or experience onto the crite-
18.1.4 Dialectical Study of Culture
ria used for all other items and grade such val-
ues, it is shied from. In addition to its use as Money is a cultural tool which has a specific
a gift, money is avoided for use as a return for meaning in each culture. While the universal
the goods or help given by neighbors (Webley & meaning of money is its function as medium for
Lea, 1993b). In Korean farm villages, when help market exchange, its cultural meaning appears
is given by a neighbor to a resident, it is com- through the way people acquire, share, and use
mon to give help to the neighbor in return. But if the money and through their evaluation of those
the resident is a part-time farmer, giving help by behaviors. We can elicit patterns of meaning-
labor becomes difficult. In that case, some start giving to money through interviews, observa-
to pay for the labor in return. This also means tions, or questionnaires and interpret their cul-
such a family losing its role as a full member tural meanings.
of the community of mutual collaboration. This How should we interpret these meanings?
kind of exchange is not carried out based on When considering this question, one of the
market economy principles but rather based on biggest theoretical and methodological difficul-
communal exchange rules (Mills & Clark, 1982). ties that cultural studies have faced becomes
important, that is, what is the best way for Research is primarily intended to create the world
researchers to overcome ethnocentrism and of meanings communally among researchers, and
obtain somewhat common meaning? a member of the culture to be described is usually
Herein, two strategic poles can be considered placed outside this world of communal meanings.
to relativize a researcher’s cultural perspective. As long as a researcher tries to introduce his or
One, as presented by Lévi-Strauss’s structural- her acquired world of meanings of the target cul-
ism, is to extract a formal structure for overcom- ture unilaterally by translating it into his or her
ing the limit of “subjective interpretation” (Lévi- own world of meanings, the world of meanings of
Strauss, 1950, 1964). In this case, mathematics as the researcher dominates, and consequently, the
a tool is considered as a universal form of think- issue of ethnocentrism arises again.
ing independent from any particular culture and Therefore, the real issue is how to avoid ethno-
thus required to serve as the basis for objectiv- centrism brought about by a researcher’s world of
ity. However, what we question is the world of meanings, aiming to understand the target world
meanings itself, and this method does not give an of meanings. One such effort is our dialectical
answer. research. Therein, researchers with their own cul-
The other extreme is, conversely, to become tural backgrounds interpret the meaning of a dif-
deeply involved in a specific world of meanings ferent culture, explain the meaning in their own
and to describe the other party’s world of mean- culture, relativize their own culture by referring
ings, which is different from one’s own world to other researchers’ cultural interpretations as a
of meanings, following the other party’s world mirror, and then try to interpret the meaning at a
of meanings as much as possible. Participant higher level, which enables both parties to under-
observation embodies such an ideal. We find the stand the cultural meanings of the other party. We
cultural nature of money in such a world of regard the process itself as research.
meanings. Understanding culture here is not unilateral
However, the ideal of these meanings encoun- work where a researcher regards the culture as a
ters the following difficulty: studying the world static substance and translates it into the words
of meanings of a different culture requires a of his or her own culture. Rather, it is an inter-
researcher to get inside, to share the same world active creation process where researchers mutu-
of meanings, and, as a researcher, to record and ally adjust their different interpretation schemes
analyze the acquired world of meanings using his of culture. For example, as discussed later, we
own words. It is a textual construct process called have found that there are considerable differences
“writing culture” (Clifford, & Marcus, 1986), and in the reciprocated giving between Japanese and
the work cannot avoid being an ethnographer’s Korean children. Researchers observed a nega-
translation/representation of a particular culture tive attitude in Japanese children toward gifting,
(Asad, 1986, p. 163). while researchers noticed a more positive atti-
In this case, the following issue arises between tude toward gifting in Korean children. Through
two different cultural worlds of meanings, which the reciprocating process, the meaning of treat-
means between the culture to be described and ing is understood that “both treating and bill-
the culture to which a describer, researcher, or splitting are intended to respect others and main-
researcher group belongs: “the anthropological tain good relationship, but their approaches are
enterprise of cultural translation may be vitiated different.” Here the higher-level world of mean-
by the fact that there are asymmetrical tenden- ings is shared while maintaining worlds of mean-
cies and pressures in the languages of dominated ings for both parties without indicating which is
and dominant societies” (Asad, 1986, p. 164). superior.
Important for us is not a descriptive taxon- 18.2 Children and Money: An

omy of culture viewing the culture from an exter- Overview
nal standpoint but creating a new recognition
of culture dialogically, and for researchers to 18.2.1 Children and Economics
interact and mutually adjust recognition of cul-
ture starting from their own cultural viewpoints, People have different desires. These desires vary
so that culture is analyzed as an intersubjective and, seemingly, have no end. Meanwhile, the
and dynamic product in the ongoing adjustment means of satisfying those desires – especially
process. material needs – involve the use of goods and
Using the concept of EMS, we can describe the services that are the objects of such desires.
process as follows. It started when a researcher Bargaining between people, who try to cre-
who has certain cultural nature encountered and ate balance between their desires and scarce
was surprised by “the different ways of liv- resources, is the basis of economic behavior at
ing” (different EMS). Encounters with the peo- a micro level. Experimental studies about chil-
ple with whom a researcher tries to create EMS dren’s economic activities have been carried out
but fails to share it lead to the discovery of dif- from economics and economic psychology view-
ference in mutual communality, reflectively giv- points. These studies were conducted to find out
ing shape to their own worlds of meanings and if children would behave as the logic of eco-
those of others. Researchers living in different nomics assumes – in other words, how rationally
cultural worlds of meanings serve as cultural mir- children would behave in economic decision-
rors. This means culture does not exist statically making (see the examples of Harbaugh, Krause,
within each individual researcher but emerges, & Liday, 2003; Murnighan & Saxon, 1998).
taking specific shape whenever different commu- The research demonstrates that children behave
nalities are encountered and researchers become rationally even when they are young, and their
aware of differences. This is the fundamen- knowledge becomes more consistent with age,
tal perspective of our “cultural psychology improving the level of rationality in economic
of differences” (Takahashi, 2016; Yamamoto, decision-making.
2015, 2017). However, children’s economic activities in
This effort is the creation process of new EMS daily life are not always based on rationality.
between research subjects who have different cul- They sometimes choose behaviors that deviate
tural backgrounds. What proceeds thereafter is a from economic rationality to build and maintain
kind of communication practice which integrates peer relationships. An ethnographic study of chil-
meaning giving to an object, transformation of a dren in England playing with marbles (Webley &
subject, and readjustment of normative relation- Lea, 1993a) indicates that the children exchange
ships. The study of the cultural nature of money marbles, following a rational scarcity-based prin-
viewed from such a perspective shows us a new ciple of exchange, while intentionally carrying
aspect of the meanings in the real-life, daily prac- out disproportionate exchanges, such as giving
tices of people. Research itself is one of these cul- marbles as a pledge of friendship to a new class-
tural practices. mate. In a similar study, various phenomena of
The cultural meaning of money can be elicited “treats” are observed among children in Korea
and interpreted in the same way. Children’s (see the following section). These studies imply
allowances are one of the significant phenomena that the social function of establishing and main-
paving the way to new semantic generative and taining interpersonal relationships and economic
dialectical practical research. activities are closely tied. Therefore, the valid
research strategy is not to trace the development According to Bourdieu (1979), social strata
of economically rational behavior. Instead, we reproduce themselves through categorization of
inquire how children become independent from consumption-style differences and social worlds
parents and develop interpersonal relationships as well as internalization of value systems. Cul-
through money in their ecological environments – tural assets that comprise children’s lifeworlds
all united by the economic nature of human activ- differ within the social stratum or culture, and
ities. Therefore, developmental psychology for children build up their thinking about the social
money is not predicated on Homo economicus. world under such circumstances. Additionally,
Rather, it inquires into the foundation of human understanding about the causes of being rich
relationship structures that make exchange and and poor and the attitudes toward them are nei-
possession possible. ther the knowledge which exists within individ-
uals nor the substance which exists externally;
rather, they are socially constructed and shared
18.2.2 Beyond Children as as predominant knowledge (see Moscovici,
Individuals 2001).
While much research has systematically Research on children’s understanding about
approached children’s understanding of money the causes of poverty and wealth found differ-
and economic concepts and has grouped it into ences among the different classes, on one hand,
several stages based on the Piagetian framework, and the potency of predominant knowledge in the
and, therefore, universal developmental stages of culture beyond classes, on the other. According
their understandings (e.g., Berti & Bombi, 1988; to Furnham (1982), in which interviews about
Strauss, 1952), there were also wide cultural the causes of economic inequalities were held
differences among them (Jahoda, 1983; Leiser, in England, the relatively rich public school
Sevón, & Lévy, 1990; Ng, 1983). Jahoda (1983) students tend to attach weight to individualistic
demonstrates that Zimbabwean children (who explanation about the causes of poverty, while
do not have direct experience of selling and state school students, who are financially below
buying commodities but see their parents make the middle class, attach weight to a society-
and sell commodities) understand the relation- conscious explanation. Alternatively, according
ship between selling and buying and a shop to a study of American junior and senior high
clerk’s wage as well as its system more quickly school students, children in any economic sta-
than European children do. Likewise, children tus give reasons such as competence of and
in Hong Kong, where economic activities are efforts by individuals instead of social factors,
bustling, understand banking systems more while children who belong to a lower economic
quickly than Western children do (Ng, 1983). status tend to be more positive about the pos-
Children do not build up their knowledge about sibility of eliminating poverty through social
economic systems independently or separately change (Leahy, 1981). According to compara-
from their lifeworlds. tive research conducted in 15 countries, which
Children’s attitudes toward economic inequal- mainly consist of European countries, children
ity, such as poverty and wealth, is another theme who belong to the middle class accept present sit-
in which understanding of economic events uations as a whole more readily than children in
cannot be separated from real life (Dittmar, a more individualistic country (Leiser & Ganin,
1996; Emler & Dickinson, 1985, 2004; Furn- 1996). Therefore developmental psychology for
ham, 1982; Leahy, 1981; Leiser & Ganin, 1996). money does not focus on the process of a child
acquiring internal knowledge as an individual. by parents in their use of money. The man-
Rather, it discusses that such knowledge is built ner of such parental constraint provides clear
up in association with the societies and cultures guidance to children on the use of money
in which children grow. from implicit knowledge that adults possess as
well as cultural logic concerning its control
(cultural differences in constraints on use of
18.2.3 The Sociocultural Use of allowances).
Children’s Allowances Furthermore, when considering its use in
Here we specifically discuss the cultural nature human relationships, in addition to personal con-
of money and focus on phenomena involving sumption, money is used as a resource to adjust
children’s allowances. With adults, the norma- interpersonal relationships. Children are in the
tive nature of money remains almost uncon- process of learning ways to establish cultural
scious and difficult to find. Observing the interpersonal relationships where the appropriate
process where children learn how to use the spe- use of money with friends is directed by adults.
cial tool called an allowance helps researchers In this process, the characteristics of cultural
uncover the norms usually not recognized among interpersonal relationships can easily be observed
adults in parents’ disciplinary actions with (cultural differences in uses of money in human
money and conflicts between parents and chil- relationships).
dren concerning money. Additionally, compari- In the following section, we will focus on the
son of these recognized norms among different cross-cultural developmental research involving
societies makes the cultural nature of these norms allowances that we conducted with researchers
clearer. from Japan, China, Korea, and Vietnam and
Children’s allowances especially demonstrate then we identify cultural characteristics of
the cultural nature of money in the following parent–child relationships and peer relationships
way. When considering acquisition, allowances observed in the learning process of using money
are resources given as a gift. Whereas adults typ- and describe how children create cultural worlds
ically acquire money through market exchange, of meanings using money as a tool.
children acquire allowances as a gift unilater-
ally given by adults. In gift giving, the personal
18.3 East Asian Children and
relationship between subjects has greater signif-
Money as a Cultural Tool
icance than in market exchange. Therefore pro-
cesses where children acquire or use allowances In our project, we call money a “tool” rather than
firmly incorporate the characteristics of personal a “symbol”: money is a tool to realize our desires
relationships with adults and thus reflect cultural and serves to link relationships between people.
nature in an easy-to-understand manner (cultural Our project aims to disclose how human relation-
difference in parent–child relationships involving ships, including parent–child and peer relation-
money). ships, develop in different cultures through the
Next, when considering the use of allowances, use of money and how individual children cultur-
allowances are special resources that can be ally sophisticate themselves. Our project, named
exchanged for a variety of commodities. But straightforwardly the “Pocket Money Project,”
because of this special power, children’s mis- intends to show the following three points. First,
use may lead to unrestrained, runaway desires. money is not only a tool of exchange in the mar-
That’s why children are strongly constrained ket economy but also a tool that mediates human
relationships in each culture and is actually used on comparative studies between East and
while mediated by norms about the usage. Sec- West has emphasized their homogeneity (e.g.,
ond, the norm structures are different across cul- Hofstede, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Even if a
tures, and even the same behavior has different few studies have indicated their diversity, it
meanings in different cultures – once the norm merely concerned subcultures in what was
structure in a culture is identified, the meaning considered a dichotomous world (Kashima
of behavior in that culture also becomes clear. et al., 1995; Kim et al., 1994). It is, then, both the-
Nevertheless, third and most important, it should oretically and practically important to understand
be indicated that such a norm structure and mean- different cultures within East Asian countries.
ing of behavior in a culture do not exist as sub- Three main methods were used: first,
stances in a cultural group in the manner of stable researchers visited the other three countries
preferences. for home visits, during which they interviewed
These points emerge dynamically in the children and parents. Second, researchers visited
research process, although we can recognize the other three countries to directly observe
crystallized, static forms of them. Researchers children shopping at various places, such as
can study a culture only from their own per- candy stores, stationery shops, bookstores, and
spective. Studying and understanding cultures supermarkets. Third, researchers handed out
takes dialogical effort for both parties, wherein a questionnaire about pocket money to fifth-,
researcher A (who is concurrently a member of eighth-, and eleventh-grade students as well as to
culture A) tries to understand cultural practices their parents in the four countries. The question-
of a member of a different culture B, and simul- naire was made up of questions regarding ways
taneously, a researcher B (who is concurrently a of receiving and using pocket money, right and
member of culture B) continuously tries to under- wrong judgments and allowable level judgments
stand cultural practices of a member of a different on use, and parent–child and peer relationships
culture A. “Cultural psychology of differences” revolving around money.
aims not to extract such a crystallized “culture” In this section, we will outline the results of
as substance but rather to show the possibility of the project. We will summarize the three main
understanding a different culture with a prescrip- findings: life in a consumer society, the struc-
tion to handle and analyze the process by which it ture of parent–child relationships, and that of
is being crystalized and, through this, ultimately peer relationships for children in the four coun-
to show a practical way to “understand different tries of Japan, Korea, China, and Vietnam. The
cultures.” differences between the four countries are visu-
alized through the practice of cultural psychol-
ogy of differences, in which the researchers
18.3.1 Outline of the Project
from the four countries continuously discussed
In this project, researchers from the four East these based on the data and tentatively reached
Asian countries of Japan, Korea, China, and Viet- a mutual understanding of their cultural mean-
nam jointly conducted research in various coming. Therefore, these are not stable entities but
binations on the relationship between money and have been dynamically taking on their forms. The
children in each country. While countries in East main results of the project have already been
Asia, which have a mixed history of peaceful reported elsewhere (Oh et al., 2012; Takeo et al.,
and/or antagonistic relationships, have many dif- 2009; Yamamoto, & Takahashi, 2007; Yamamoto
ferences in their lifestyles and cultures, research et al., 2012).1
18.3.2 Children’s Lives in a on their parents in regard to how they use

Consumer Society the money because it is not completely sepa-
rated from their households. The children’s world
Undeniably, our lives have become more affluent around money is limited predominantly within
and convenient with the development of the com- their family lives; their personal activities are not
modity economy; the changes are also apparent very important to them. The present study about
in children’s allowances. Children participate in children’s allowances among these four countries
their social lives as single consumers and build illustrates the diversity of their lives in consumer
relationships with others. societies.
The following is a simplified summary of chil- While the development of a consuming econ-
dren’s lifestyles in the four countries as part of omy reflects the type of affluence in a country,
consumer societies. In Japan, children tend to use the development indicates that our relations with
their money entirely for the fulfillment of their things converge into a simple picture, namely,
own desires. Namely, children’s allowances are in the relations are mediated entirely through
principle separated from their households; there- money. This may imply that relations between
fore, they have their own place in the consumer people and things have become significantly
society, in which they need to learn how to use poorer (Hamada & Itō, 2010). In exchange for
the money and control their desire for possession. the affluence and convenience of a consuming
Their rights are basically limited to their personal society, we may impair the symbiotic feelings
activities, and children are negative about bor- between parents and children. While children
rowing from or lending money to friends. Sim- grow principally within their relationships with
ilar to Japanese children, children in Korea use their parents and other adults, the involvement
the money mainly for fun. However, contrary to of parents and the household in children’s
Japanese children, they are positive about bor- allowances in China and Vietnam particularly
rowing from or lending money to friends. In makes us recall the origin of parent–children
addition, the interchange of money is generally symbiosis.
more active in Korea; children have more chances The cultural diversity in the children’s
to acquire and, therefore, use money. In China, lifestyles involving allowances can be com-
while the situation has been gradually chang- prehensively interpreted only by characterizing
ing due to the quick economic growth, children’s them within both parent–children relationships
allowances are mainly regarded as being within and children’s individuality. Since concluding
the framework of the household, where children’s these surveys, the Chinese economy has grown
free use of money tends to be suppressed. Con- rapidly, and the economy in Vietnam has shown
sequently, the range of their money use is lim- marked development. As we can see from the dif-
ited compared with children in Japan and Korea; ferences between Japan and Korea, the situations
however, it steadily extends with age. Children in China and Vietnam must be different from
in China are not particularly negative about bor- those in Japan and Korea. In general, both the
rowing or lending money. In Vietnam, children marketization and growth of the market economy
have fewer chances to get monetary allowances, strongly affect the lives of children; however,
and the amount of money is small. Moreover, these never led to changes in their lifestyles in a
children are not positive about using money for single manner. With such high diversity, we must
themselves. Vietnamese children seemingly have find a way to portray the children’s lifestyles in
a sense of unity with the family and depend detail.
18.3.3 Parent–Child Relationships view survey shows that Vietnamese children are
Mediated by Allowances usually negative about “getting their allowances
in compensation for their assistance with the
Most Japanese children in elementary and junior housework,” and many children think that chil-
high schools are given fixed allowances at reg- dren should help around the house as mem-
ular intervals. The children at those ages agree bers of the family. It is seemingly not surpris-
that parents should keep their promises to their ing for Vietnamese children to place the family’s
children about allowances, while they disagree demands ahead of personal fun. For the children,
that an allowance belongs to parents because it “the family’s demands and personal fun” may not
is provided by them. Japanese children secure be alternatives; they may think that working for
their territory, such as their own money and their the family leads to satisfying their desires. The
desires, while the parents respect the children’s circumstances involving children’s allowances
territory. reflect the value of “doing good for the family”
In contrast in Korea, how much allowance in Vietnam.
is provided and when are determined through Money circulates through the global market
direct communications between parents and chil- economy and exchanges with anything as a uni-
dren. Such characteristic relationships involving versal tool. However, when money is used as
allowances are found to be extended outside of an allowance circulating from parents to chil-
the family, for example, to the parents’ brothers dren, the circulation is very individual and varies
and sisters and to friends of the parents and the depending on specific relationships. Although
children. The results from the Korean children relationships between oneself and others in East
illuminate their distinct way of creating trust- Asian countries have been described as collec-
ing relationships with others, which is developed tivistic, the relationships are mediated by var-
through direct communications with familiar per- ious cultural tools, including allowances, and
sons and the flexible exchange of money based on show diverse cultural characteristics that cannot
these. be explained by cultural dichotomy.
In China, many children have experienced that
“parents use the children’s allowances without
asking” for daily food, groceries, and school
18.3.4 Friendship and Money
expenses; however, they feel that this cannot be Without doubt, it is common in all countries for
avoided, since “the allowances do not necessar- both parents and children to wish that children
ily belong to the children.” As Chinese children form good relationships with friends at school;
grow older, they develop through experiencing furthermore, children are expected to spend their
such conflicts with parents while accepting them. money wisely and not waste it. What, then, is
Through the process of accepting direct demands the best way for children to spend money within
from their parents, Chinese children, even though their relationships with friends, and how should
they sometimes feel frustrated, may build trusting children use their own money to form good
relationships with their parents. friendships? In this section, we uncover friend-
The results of the questionnaire show that chil- ships mediated through money, with a particular
dren in Vietnam are positive about paying liv- focus on children’s feelings and actions regarding
ing and education costs, such as “the family food treats, bill splitting, and borrowing and lending
expenses” and “the school expenses including money between friends.
the food service fees,” from their allowances, In the questionnaires, we asked children ques-
whereas they are mostly negative about using tions about treats, bill splitting, and borrow-
allowances for personal fun. In addition, the inter- ing and lending money between friends, such
as “Children should not treat or get treated by tively as a “mutually supporting and harmonious”
their friends” and “Can you lend money to your friendship.
friends without hesitation, if they are strapped One could expect that the normative view
for money?” In the interview surveys, we asked about friendship and money will be related to
them, for example, “Which do you more often growing consumption along with the develop-
do, treating your friends or splitting the bill ment of the economy in each country. The four
with them?” “When do you treat your friends?” countries can be arranged in decreasing order
and “What do you think about treats and bill of GDP per capita as follows: Japan, Korea,
splitting?” We summarize the characteristics of China, and Vietnam. However, contrary to expec-
friendships mediated through money in the four tations, this GDP difference does not necessar-
countries as follows. ily directly reflect feelings and normative views
Japanese think bill splitting is better than treats about friendship mediated through money in
among friends. For Koreans and Vietnamese, these countries. Instead, as the section on “chil-
treating friends is common; they think splitting dren’s lives in a consuming society” illustrates,
the bill with friends at all times should be avoided children’s lives in terms of “individualism” and
for good friendships. In China, children both treat “relationships with others,” or as the section on
friends and split the bill with friends, depending “parent–children relationships” discusses them
on the situation. Importantly and interestingly, from the perspective of allowance, the norma-
people’s feelings and actions in regard to treating tive view about friendship is also likely to be
and bill splitting are different for Japan, Korea, determined in association with parent–children
and Vietnam. In addition, for Japanese, “treat” relationships and the children’s positions in a
corresponds to “money” with a negative image, society.
while in Korea and Vietnam, “bill splitting” is
connected negatively with “money,” although the
18.4 Beyond the Dualism
underlying purpose of “forming a good rela-
of Collectivism versus
tionship with friends” is the same for these
Individualism
countries.
We define a relationship that allows for treat- Next, among findings about the cultural nature
ing or borrowing and lending money between of the meaning given to allowances, we focus on
friends as a reciprocal friendship, while a rela- cultural differences found in good or bad judg-
tionship where treating or borrowing and lend- ment of treating, refer to the collectivism versus
ing money is relatively unfavorable is defined individualism argument that cross-cultural psy-
as a self-limiting friendship. Japanese prefer a chology has emphasized (e.g., Hofstede, 1984;
self-limiting way of thinking and action, while Triandis, 1995), and propose our new dialectical
Koreans and Vietnamese prefer a reciprocal way. methodology to compare cultures and read out
We aim not to impose our personal value judg- cultural meanings.
ments when defining the relationships as recip- The East Asia region covered by our Pocket
rocal and self-limiting friendships. However, Money Project has been regarded as adhering
with the normative view in each country con- to collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1995, among oth-
sidered, the “self-limiting” friendship could be ers). The “treating” of the others on which we
redefined negatively as a “selfish and isolating” focus in this chapter is not a market exchange
friendship or positively as an “independent and but rather a gift exchange involving a formation
self-responsible” friendship. Similarly, “recipro- of a personal connection and an important activ-
cal” could be redefined negatively as a “depen- ity which represents social characteristics of the
dent and self-irresponsible” friendship or posi- interpersonal relationship. If the way in which
gifts are exchanged is regarded as inappropriate understanding culture and how marketization
between subjects, it easily leads to serious prob- changes people and culture become visible. Con-
lems where both parties negatively perceive a per- cerning the former, the collectivism versus indi-
sonal connection or personality. Actually, it is one vidualism argument relativizes ethnocentrism, a
of the culture shocks that Chinese and Korean psychological theory based on the modern West-
students encounter in Japan, where they interpret ern perspective of humanity, with collectivism,
the Japanese habit of bill splitting to indicate a which is considered as a nonmodern and non-
“cool relationship” (Oh, 2016). Western (and rather more equal to an Eastern)
Based on the theoretical viewpoint of the principle, in cross-cultural psychology. But, with
collectivism versus individualism argument, we the rise of the Chinese economy, two of the
can interpret “treating” as collectivist behavior world’s top three GDP countries are in East Asia,
that emphasizes relationships over self and bill and the economic size of Japan, China, and Korea
splitting as individualist behavior that puts an exceeds the GDP of the European Union’s top
individual ahead of a relationship. However, as ten countries (IMF, 2015). Thus, in the drasti-
mentioned before, positivity toward “treating” cally multipolarized present world, analyzing cul-
cannot be explained by the simple “marketization tural conflicts with theories of collectivism and
= individualism” scheme when considering mar- individualism as a key perspective has already
ketization level and GDP per capita. become difficult. This is exactly what we observe
Meanwhile, in our research, the phenomenon in cultural differences in “treating” within East
that can be interpreted as individualism enhanced Asia.
through marketization is the expansion of one’s Every human society has the issue of rela-
personal realm through the purchase of goods to tionship adjustment between the individual and
“create his own world,” such as a hobby (Pian, a group, wherein conflict between individualism
2016). Money is the tool that allows an individ- and collectivism universally arises in every cul-
ual to acquire goods as he or she desires with- ture. This is why a collectivism versus individ-
out considering another’s will. But when the indi- ualism comparison is persuasive. Nevertheless,
vidual wants to “deepen the relationship with the the theoretical and practical tasks that we face
other through treating,” he or she can also use now would be to discuss “in which aspect Japan
money for “the world with the other” in a col- and Korea are collective or individualistic,” by
lectivist manner. exploring their internal structures. For the afore-
In fact, the increase in disposable income along mentioned reason, the same issue arises when-
with market economy penetration is used for ever any society is compared to another.
treating in Korea, but the same is not true in Next, concerning the last point above, it is
Japan. Behind this, completely opposite logics of obvious that a market economy system brings
cultural interpersonal relationships are observed: significant cultural transformation to a society.
treating each other is to value friendship in Korea, As one aspect, there is no doubt that it universally
while being self-responsible without putting a enhances the individualization of the economic
burden on others is valued for maintaining good unit from a community embedded in a village or
friendships in Japan (Oh, 2016). This results not household to a “Homo economicus or economic
from the difference in marketization level but man” based on the free economic activities of
from the difference in the cultural logic of inter- individuals. On the other hand, market exchanges
personal relationships. are conducted for individuals to create their own
Hereby the limits and potential of the collec- worlds of meaning given through the acquisi-
tivism versus individualism perspective toward tion of goods, whereby how to create a world of
meanings becomes an issue: What is worth These social interactions are created through
acquiring? How should an individual compete for individual, specific interactions by the use of
or share with others such valuable things? How a tool, where various patterns of interaction
should an individual form a self, and what kinds emerge depending on subjects, their environ-
of human relationships should be constructed? ments, and combinations of subjects and envi-
As repeatedly described, a market economy sys- ronments. However, through this adjustment pro-
tem is often considered as a culturally neutral cess, choices are made on various patterns, and
and universal system. But it is established and the chosen patterns are elaborated by people and
maintained by participants in economic activi- become steadily shared among some people.
ties who create their own worlds of meaning and When a subject who uses the pattern (EMS 1)
involve others. People constitute a group, such as shared by some people encounters people who
an enterprise, a nation, or a regional community, share a different pattern (EMS 2) with other peo-
and steer the economy while carrying their histo- ple, the subject may find that the subject’s own
ries and mutually adjusting their senses of values. pattern and the pattern of the other are respec-
The market economy system and money as its tively unique to the group to which each belongs.
tool are integrated uniquely into people’s lives in In this context, the subject’s own group is differ-
their respective cultural worlds of meaning, and entiated from the group of the other, and such
thus marketization cannot unify cultures in the groups emerge as cultural groups.
world. As observed in our Pocket Money Project, Money is one of the tools that creates the eco-
this is the reason that market exchange behaviors nomic intersubjective interaction called market
have cultural differences and are reproduced. In exchange, and it is a cultural tool. Thus inter-
such a context, the cultural conflicts seen in the action through money shows cultural properties.
present economic activities are conflicts between The abstract pattern of market exchange, that
worlds of meaning. Cultural barriers in the econ- is, the exchange of equivalence between objects
omy also arise as an extension of this. Thus the each of which represents an equivalent amount of
core issue is not to interpret the abstract iden- neutral exchange value, is universal, although its
tity of a formal social system but to understand practical meaning varies.
the specific diversity of the worlds of meaning in In fact, we find that pocket money has diverse
which people live. meanings among children in Asian countries.
Such diversity in the meaning of money corre-
sponds with various relationships between chil-
18.5 Conclusion
dren and parents or friends, and such cultural
Human beings are unique because they create meanings of money create a culturally unique
their environments using tools. Tools are not just pattern of interaction or human relationships.
physical objects but objects that function as signs. These findings cannot be explained simply by
A sign is cultural in its nature, and a tool is the concept of marketization or the dichotomy
inevitably a cultural tool. By sharing the meaning of collectivism versus individualism. Moreover,
of a sign, humans create an intersubjective world such cultural difference often leads to serious
of meaning, and in such a world of meaning, sub- economic conflicts that do not disappear through
jects’ social roles are created. In a shared world a process of marketization or individualism. For
of meaning, subjects interact and develop certain that reason, to ease conflicts created in the marke-
norms to accommodate their conflicts. Societies tization process and promote mutual understand-
of all kinds are created in such a manner and ing among cultural groups, we should explore
become intersubjective.2 a different type of study and theory on the
cultural nature of human beings. The socio- Belk, R. W. (1991). The ineluctable mysteries of
cultural psychology that this Handbook helps possessions. Journal of Social Behavior &
develop takes one new direction in theory and Personality, 6(6), 17–55.
research. Our cultural psychology of differences Berti, A. E. & Bombi, A. S. (1988). The Child’s
views culture dynamically through dialogical Construction of Economics. Cambridge:
interactions among researchers who have differ-
Bourdieu, P. (1979). La distinction: Critique sociale
ent cultural backgrounds and is one of the afore-
du jugement. Paris: Editions de Minuit.
mentioned efforts in psychology.
Clifford, J. & Marcus, G. E. (1986). Writing Culture:
The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Notes
Cole, M. (1996). Cultural Psychology: A Once and
1 This section is a summary of Takahashi et al. (2016). Future Discipline. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Respective findings were the result of the efforts University Press.
of project members from four countries to under- Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Rochberg-Halton, Y. (1981).
stand meanings in a mutual and reflective manner The Meaning of Things: Domestic Symbols and
through the practice of cultural psychology of differ- the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University
ences. The part for “Lives in a Consumer Society” Press.
was summarized by Pian, the part for “Parent–Child Dittmar, H. (1992). The Social Psychology of Material
Relationships” was by Takeo, and the part about Possessions: To Have is To Be. Hemel
“Friendship and Money” was by Oh. The author dis- Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
cusses each section comprehensively in Takahashi Dittmar, H. (1996). Adolescents’ economic beliefs
and Yamamoto (forthcoming). and social class. In P. Lunt & A. Furnham (Eds.),
2 To be exact, we should differentiate intersubjec- Economic Socialization: The Economic Beliefs
tivity at two different levels. The first level is and Behaviours of Young People (pp. 69–92).
composed of two parties who share their present Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
world of meaning. The second level of intersub- Emler, N. & Dickinson, J. (1985). Children’s
jectivity is composed of three parties, and such representations of economic inequalities: The
a triadic configuration gives a certain objectivity effect of social class. British Journal of
to the first-level intersubjectivity. The normative Developmental Psychology, 3, 191–198.
mediator in EMS is the third party and stabilizes Emler, N. & Dickinson, J. (2004). Children’s
interactions between two parties. Thus such an inter- understanding of social class and occupational
actional system emerges as a kind of stable substan- groupings. In M. Barrett, & E. Buchanan-Barrow
tial object. The intersubjectivity that may generate (Eds.), Children’s Understanding of Society
social interaction is the second-level or collective- (pp. 169–198). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
intersubjective one (Yamamoto, 2015, 2017, n.1). Furnham, A. (1982). The perception of poverty
among adolescents. Journal of Adolescence, 5,
135–147.
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Journal of Economic Psychology, 14(3), Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin (ed. by
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unacceptability of money in repayment for of Texas Press.
neighborly help. Human Relations, 46, 65–76. Freud, S. (1916). Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die
Webley, P., Lea, S. E., & Portalska, R. (1983). The Psychoanalyse. Leipzig, Germany: H. Heller.
unacceptability of money as a gift. Journal of Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society. Chicago:
Economic Psychology, 4, 223–228. University of Chicago Press.
Yamamoto, T. (2015). Bunka toha nani ka? Doko ni Valsiner, J. (2007). Culture in Minds and Societies:
aru noka? [What is culture? Where is it? Foundations of Cultural Psychology. New Delhi:
Psychology about conflict and coexistence.] SAGE.
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Yamamoto, T. (2017). Cultural psychology of [Elementary school children and pocket money].
differences and EMS: A new theoretical Hattatsu, 51, 68–76.
Part V
Aesthetic and Religious Experiences
19 The Sociocultural Constitution of
Aesthetic Transcendence
Mark Freeman
For some, the very title of this chapter may 19.1 Wagering on
seem contradictory. Generally speaking, the idea Transcendence
of transcendence, in the aesthetic sphere and
beyond, connotes a realm beyond culture – According to George Steiner (1989), perhaps the
indeed, perhaps, beyond the material world. As I preeminent spokesperson on behalf of the idea of
put the matter some time ago (Freeman, 2004), in aesthetic transcendence, the very experience of
speaking of transcendence, “I refer not simply to meaning presupposes a transcendent dimension.
a feeling (akin, for instance, to the oceanic feel- Contra Nietzsche and company, for whom God
ing about which Freud speaks) but to an experi- is (in Steiner’s view) essentially understood as “a
ence of that which is assumed to exist in a realm phantom of grammar, a fossil embedded in the
beyond the earthly, material one that houses most childhood of rational speech,” Steiner wants to
of everyday life” (p. 214). As I quickly added, the argue that “any coherent understanding of what
word “assumed” was key: “Whether in fact there language is and how language performs, that any
is such a realm cannot, of course, be decided.” coherent account of the capacity of human speech
Nevertheless, the idea of transcendence would to communicate meaning and feeling is, in the
seem to bear within it this dimension of beyond- final analysis, underwritten by the assumption of
ness, the most basic premise being that the expe- God’s presence” and that “the experience of aes-
rience in question somehow surpasses the more thetic meaning in particular, that of literature, of
ordinary realm we usually inhabit and thus can- the arts, of musical form, infers the necessary
not be contained by the kinds of sociocultural possibility of this ‘real presence’” (p. 3). Devel-
frameworks privileged in volumes like this one. oping this line of argumentation further, Steiner
In what follows, I hope to show that the idea of goes on to state that
aesthetic transcendence and the idea of the socio-
cultural constitution of experience are not only the wager on the meaning of meaning, on the
compatible but require one another, the requi- potential of insight and response when one human
voice addresses another, when we come face to
site condition of the transcendent being our very
face with the text and work of art or music, which
belongingness in and to culture. The task is a
is to say when we encounter the other in its
difficult one, entailing nothing less than show-
condition of freedom, is a wager on transcendence.
ing how the everyday world we inhabit becomes This wager – it is that of Descartes, of Kant, and of
ecstatic. I also believe it to be an important one, every poet, artist, and composer of whom we have
that serves to clear a space for thinking anew explicit record – predicates the presence of a
about some significant features of the human realness, of a “substantiation” (the theological
condition. reach of this word is obvious) within language and
352 m a r k fr eem a n
form. It supposes a passage, beyond the fictive Music and dance, he suggests, “are of themselves
or the purely pragmatic, from meaning to primordial motions and figurations of the human
meaningfulness. The conjecture is that “God” is, spirit which declare an order of being nearer than
not because our grammar is outworn; but that is language to the unknown of creation” (1997,
grammar lives and generates worlds because there p. 74). Certain music, in particular, seems “closer
is the wager on God (Steiner, 1989, p. 4).
to the border-crossing into ‘otherness,’ into the
Music looms especially large for Steiner. In terra incognita of a humanity beyond itself than,
encountering the music of composers such as perhaps, any experience else. Song leads us home
Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, there are to where we have not yet been” (p. 75). As for
“felt intimations of open horizons, of well- the challenge of coming to terms with such expe-
springs of recuperation and self-surpassing for a rience, “I know of no deeper, more neglected
constricted and worn humanity” (p. 63). Later in conundrum in epistemology, in semiotics and the
his essay, Steiner returns to this theme by asking cognitive sciences de l’hommes” (p. 78). Indeed,
whether, in the end, “a hermeneutics . . . of valu- “The more captive our delight, the more insis-
ation – the encounter with meaning in the verbal tent our need of ‘answering to’ a piece of music,
sign, in the painting, in the musical composition, the more inaccessible are the reasons why” (p.
and the assessment of the quality of such mean- 83). Whatever these reasons may be – or, for that
ing in respect of form – can be made intelligible, matter, if they even exist – there remains “the
can be made answerable to the existential facts, if reality of a presence, of a factual ‘thereness’”
they do not imply, if they do not contain, a pos- (p. 84), as palpable as the things of the material
tulate of transcendence” (1989, p. 134). Steiner world.
speaks also of “enchantment” and Admittedly, it is not entirely clear what Steiner
means by “transcendence.” Moreover, assum-
the inviolate enigma of the otherness in things and ing he wishes to speak about it in “objective”
in animate presences. Serious painting, music, terms, as above – that is, in terms that posit
literature or sculpture make palpable to us, as do no the “real presence” of some sacred realm out-
other means of communication, the unassuaged, side the perimeter of the self – there is no get-
unhoused instability and estrangement of our
ting around the fact that his own affirmation of
condition. We are, at key instants, strangers to
the ostensibly objective nature of transcendence
ourselves, errant at the gates of our own psyche.
derives in large measure from his own subjec-
(p. 139)
tive experience. Finally, it is open to question
A “radical flinching” is involved in such encoun- whether a wager on transcendence is the same
ters, even a kind of “embarrassment.” And this as a wager on God. These qualifications notwith-
embarrassment, which we may feel “in bearing standing, Steiner makes a claim in his work that
witness to the poetic, to the entrance into our is surely worthy of attention: there is no deep
lives of the mystery of otherness in art and in and abiding aesthetic experience that does not
music, is of a metaphysical-religious kind.” So bring us an intimation of transcendence. Indeed,
it is that Steiner offers a “wager” on the idea what he seems to suggest is that aesthetic expe-
of transcendence. There is, and can be, no proof rience – at least of the deep, ecstatic sort being
for it. All there is, is experience; and for him, considered – is in a certain sense transcenden-
it is quite enough to put forth the wager at tally constituted. As such, not only is it diffi-
hand. cult to avoid raising the question of whether such
At the heart of Steiner’s “postulate” of tran- experience makes some sort of contact with an
scendence is the experience of “otherness.” other-than-human realm; it is difficult to avoid
The Sociocultural Constitution of Aesthetic Transcendence 353
the abiding conviction that it does make such sonal’ because it shows us the world, our world
contact. and not another one, with a clarity which startles
For a somewhat more measured perspective on and delights us simply because we are not used
the idea of transcendence, we might also turn to to looking at the real world at all” (p. 63). As
some of the work of Iris Murdoch (1970). First, Murdoch goes on to suggest,
a question: “Are you speaking of a transcendent
authority or a psychological device?” The ques- Consider what we learn from contemplating the
tion is an important one. “As with so many of characters of Shakespeare or Tolstoy or the
these large elusive ideas,” she notes, “it read- paintings of Velasquez or Titian. What is learnt
ily takes on forms which are false ones.” Peo- here is something about the real quality of human
nature, when it is envisaged, in the artist’s just and
ple latch onto these false forms with alarming
compassionate vision, with a clarity which does not
frequency, seeking just that sort of comfort and
belong to the self-centred rush of ordinary life. It is
consolation that illusions so readily provide. She
important too that great art teaches us how real
therefore asks again: “Is there . . . any true tran- things can be looked at and loved without being
scendence, or is this idea always a consoling seized and used, without being appropriate into the
dream projected by human need onto an empty greedy organism of the self. (1970, pp. 63–64)
sky?” (p. 57)
Whether transcendence is to be considered Here, then, is Murdoch’s answer to the ques-
“true” or not – and we will have occasion shortly tions posed earlier:
to question this very question – it is clear that, for
Murdoch, it is only to be associated with great There is . . . something in the serious attempt to
works. She writes: look compassionately at human things which
automatically suggests that “there is more than
The chief enemy of excellence in morality (and this.” The “there is more than this,” if it is not to be
also in art) is personal fantasy: the tissue of corrupted by some sort of quasi-theological finality,
self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams must remain a very tiny spark of insight, something
which prevents one from seeing what is there with, as it were, a metaphysical position but not
outside one . . . We cease to be in order to attend to metaphysical form. But it seems to me that the
the existence of something else, a natural object, spark is real, and that great art is evidence of its
a person in need. We can see in mediocre art, reality. Art indeed, so far from being a playful
where perhaps it is even more clearly seen than in diversion of the human race, is the place of its most
mediocre conduct, the intrusion of fantasy, the fundamental insight, and the centre to which the
assertion of self, the dimming of any reflection of more uncertain steps of metaphysics must
the real world. (Murdoch, 1970, pp. 57–58) constantly return. (pp. 71–72)
The fact is, she continues, “Art presents the It may be helpful to know that Murdoch was not
most comprehensible examples of the almost a believer – if by “believer” we mean someone
irresistible human tendency to seek consolation who subscribes to some specific god or set of reli-
in fantasy and also of the effort to resist this gious principles. In this respect, she would almost
and the vision of reality which comes with suc- certainly consider Steiner’s proclamations to be
cess. Success is in fact rare. Almost all art is excessive given their theological tinge. This, in
a form of fantasy consolation and few artists my view, makes her perspective that much more
achieve the vision of the real” (pp. 62–63). Even compelling. For, the primary evidence has noth-
these few, she notes, are “‘personalities’ and have ing whatsoever to do with faith commitments.
special styles . . . But the greatest art is ‘imper- Rather, it has to do with experience itself.
As Murdoch states in a subsequent work discovery of something independent of us, where

(1993), that independence is essential. If we read these
images aright they are not only enlightening and
A hymn of praise in gratitude for the joys and profound but amount to a statement of a belief
consolations and general usefulness of art might which most people unreflectively hold. Non-
run as follows. Art is informative and entertaining, philosophical people do not think that they invent
it condenses and clarifies the world, directing good. They may invent their own activities, but
attention upon particular things. This intense good is somewhere else as an independent judge
showing, this bearing witness, of which it is of these. Good is also something clearly seen
capable is detested by tyrants who always persecute and indubitably discovered in our ordinary
or demoralise their artists. Art illuminates accident unmysterious experience of transcendence, the
and contingency and the general muddle of life, the progressive illuminating and inspiring discovery
limitations of time and the discursive intellect, so of other, the positive experience of truth, which
as to enable us to survey complex or horrible things comes to us all the time in a weak form and comes
which would otherwise appal us . . . It calms and to most of us sometimes in a strong form (in art or
invigorates, it gives us energy by unifying, possibly love or work or looking at nature) and which
by purifying, our feelings. In enjoying great art we remains with us as a standard or vision, an
experience a clarification and concentration and orientation, a proof, of what is possible and
perfection of our own consciousness. Emotion and a vista of what might be. (p. 508)
intellect are unified into a limited whole. In this
sense art also creates its client; it inspires intuitions Again, this is not theology; Murdoch is talking
of ideal formal and symbolic unity which enable us
about ordinary experience, and what is revealed
to co-operate with the artist and to be, as we enjoy
in it, to anyone able to truly see, hear, and
the work, artists ourselves. The art object conveys,
in the most accessible and for many the only
feel.
available form, the idea of a transcendent
perfection. Great art inspires because it is separate,
it is for nothing, it is for itself. It is an image of 19.2 The Priority of the Other in
virtue. Its condensed, clarified, presentation enables Aesthetic Transcendence
us to look without sin upon a sinful world. It
Following Steiner and Murdoch in broad out-
renders innocent and transforms into truthful vision
line, it is clear that the kind of rapturous,
our baser energies connected with power, curiosity,
envy and sex. (Murdoch, 1993, p. 8) ostensibly transcendent experience they are con-
sidering entails an encounter with an “Other” or
More simply put, “It is the height of art to be able “otherness” of some sort, one that takes hold
to show what is nearest, what is deeply and obvi- of the experiencing person. In addition, I would
ously true but usually invisible” (p. 90). suggest that such experience entails what I have
Why invoke the language of transcendence to referred to as the priority of the Other (Free-
describe all this? On Murdoch’s (1993) account, man, 2004, 2014a) – which, in the present con-
the key, again, is experience. In encountering the text, refers to the felt conviction that this Other or
good, in art and elsewhere, otherness is larger than me and that it bespeaks
a dimension of reality that is somehow prior to
We experience both the reality of perfection and its
distance away, and this leads us to place our idea of ordinary experience.
it outside the world of existent being as something Let me try to bring these issues closer to psy-
of a different unique and special sort. Such chology by bringing William James into the pic-
experience of the reality of the good is not like an ture. As James notes in The Varieties of Reli-
arbitrary and assertive resort to our own will; it is a gious Experience (1902/1982), “It is as if there
were in the human consciousness a sense of sort being described here generally bear within
reality, a feeling of objective presence, a per- them the conviction that this realm is real. The
ception of what we may call ‘something there,’ word “beyond” is tricky too, especially if it con-
more deep and more general than any of the spe- notes a realm metaphysically separate from the
cial and particular ‘senses’ by which the cur- one we ordinarily inhabit. As shall become clear
rent psychology supposes existent realities to shortly, however, one need not posit such a realm
be originally revealed” (p. 58). The strongest when invoking the idea of transcendence. On
evidence for the existence of this sense is to the contrary, it may well be that being in con-
be found in hallucinations. For instance, “The tact with the ordinary, the quotidian, is the very
person affected will feel a ‘presence’ in the condition of possibility for transcendent experi-
room, definitely localized, facing in one particu- ence to emerge. For now, in any case, I wish
lar way, real in the most emphatic sense of the to supplement the aforementioned definition of
word, often coming suddenly, and as suddenly transcendence by suggesting that the “Other” or
gone; and yet neither seen, heard, touched, nor “otherness” to which it refers may be under-
cognized in any of the usual ‘sensible’ ways” stood as “an extra-ordinary object of attention
(p. 59). In calling attention to this, James is thus that, for the experiencing person, carries within
acknowledging that what may feel like the prior- it the magnetic force of a realm that is felt and
ity of the Other – the “wholly Other,” as Rudolph assumed to be transcendent” (Freeman, 2014a,
Otto (1923/1958) has put it – may actually refer p. 154; emphasis in original).
to nothing more than the hallucinatory imagina- In view of this working conception, I shall be
tion – which is to say, a product or projection of using the language of the priority of the Other in
the psyche. This does not rule out the possibility advancing my own views about the sociocultural
that the “something there” about which he speaks constitution of aesthetic transcendence. In doing
is, at times, actually there. It simply means that so, I shall abide by the customary epistemolog-
we ought not jump too quickly to transcendental ical “rules” of academic psychology by remain-
conclusions. ing within the sphere of phenomenology. Unlike
Two points warrant emphasis at this juncture. Steiner, in other words, who, as we saw, seemed
Phenomenologically speaking, James, not unlike comfortable extrapolating a theological dimen-
Steiner, is referring here to “a feeling of objec- sion from his phenomenological considerations, I
tive” – that is, real – “presence.” It is some- will be more restrained about such extrapolating.
thing “there,” outside the self, Other. Moreover, The fact is, bringing the divine into the picture
this Other, insofar as it appears “more deep and entails an “over-belief,” as James (1902/1982)
general than any of the special and particular might put it, a going-beyond the data given; and
‘senses,’” is felt to be primary, primordial, prior. as even Steiner himself would likely acknowl-
Bearing these two points in mind, I want to offer a edge, there is no way of knowing, for certain,
working definition of transcendence drawn from whether what is felt to be so, when it comes to
some of my own previous work. At a most basic transcendental otherness, really is so. The issue
level, transcendence involves “an experience of at hand is thornier than it may appear. This is
that which is assumed to exist outside ourselves, clearest in the case of religious experience. As
in a realm that is beyond the more ordinary Louis Dupré has argued in his book Religious
one that houses most of everyday life” (Freeman, Mystery and Rational Reflection (1998), “All liv-
2014a, p. 153; emphasis in original). The word ing religion centers around a nucleus that its
“assumed” is tricky; “felt” would be easier. But believers consider to be transcendentally given.
the (phenomenological) fact is, experiences of the To exclude that nucleus from phenomenological
reflection means to abandon what determines the of course, that plenty of people have addressed
religious attitude” (p. 6). Not unlike what was just comparably intense aesthetic experiences with-
said about Steiner, Dupré also realizes that there out such a postulate. Turning to the baldest, most
is no way of knowing, for sure, whether what theologically grounded, formulation of aesthetic
believers consider to be transcendentally given transcendence, however, does well to underscore
really is so given. This too is an over-belief – what is ultimately at stake in thinking the issue
or, to use the more common parlance, a matter through. You will recall that Steiner swooned
of faith. But it is emphatically not a matter of over Bach, Beethoven, and others. Murdoch, in
“blind” faith, in the sense of an a priori convic- her own more measured way, did much the same
tion that one brings to the table of experience. over the likes of Velasquez and Titian. I have
For, whatever one’s convictions may be, “the reli- my own artistic idols, as do the rest of us. In
gious act . . . displays a distinct quality in the pas- music, mine tend to be hard rockers. In paint-
sive attitude that the subject of this act adopts ing, I am especially drawn to some of the abstract
with respect to its object. That object,” Dupré expressionists. Now, it is possible that Bach,
tells us, “appears as providing its own meaning Beethoven, Velasquez, Titian, and other such
rather than receiving it from the meaning-giving renowned heroes have in fact tapped into aspects
subject” and thus “resists all attempts to define its of reality that are of universal significance. This
meaning exclusively as actively projected” (p. 7). is, of course, debatable; and I would venture that
Dupré also employs the language of “disclo- there are some who read Steiner or Murdoch
sure” in this context: and see them as aesthetic imperialists, advancing
their own decidedly Western aesthetic predilec-
Religious insight enriches all facets of the real with tions as universal. This criticism is a familiar one;
a new ontological destiny . . . This insight appears for now, we will have to let it go. When it comes
as given gratuitously, an unearned disclosure of to my own predilections, in any case, the claim
truth. However much the religious mind is aware for universality would be harder to make. Not
of its own creative part in concretizing this
only is much of the music I find ecstatically trans-
all-comprehensive vision in rituals, myths, and
porting relatively unknown to people in faraway
institutions to express its new symbolic richness,
the Source is experienced as surpassing the mind.
lands, it would likely be alien to many of these
They serve as privileged symbols allowing the same people.
transcendent meaning to penetrate all of reality. This brings us to a fact about aesthetic tran-
(Dupré, 1998, p. 18) scendence that will serve as a takeoff point for
much of what is to follow – namely that, how-
The upshot of this formulation is that is that some ever powerful the objects inciting aesthetic tran-
intimation of the divine – “the Source” – is, in a scendence may be, and however much their power
sense, built-in to the very idea of religious expe- may be felt to issue from from the objects them-
rience, which in turn implies that there is no get- selves, in their otherness, these same objects are
ting away from transcendental claims that extend frequently local in nature – which is also to say
beyond the sphere of the phenomenological. that the magnitude of their power is likely to vary,
Returning to the question of aesthetic tran- considerably, as a function of persons and, per-
scendence, it may be that Steiner and company haps most important for present purposes, cul-
would adhere to much the same sort of con- ture. As is the case with mystical experience, the
ception as Dupré: the proposed “postulate,” for objects in question embody meanings that are, in
him too, seemed to be built-in to the very fab- part, a function of prevailing beliefs, values, ide-
ric of aesthetic experience. It should be noted, als, and, of course, knowledge (see, e.g., Belzen,
1997; Hollenback, 1996; Katz, 1978; Proudfoot, We therefore need to explore the process further
1986). This is surely one reason why many of and to see whether there are some other “factors”
the objects that incite aesthetic transcendence in that might be brought to bear on the dynamic
one person or culture would not, and could not, at hand. How does the world become ecstatic?
do so in another. By all indications, however, And how is it that the specific world of aesthetic
there is more at work than beliefs, values, ide- objects becomes a primary site for gathering this
als, and knowledge. These sound very cognitive ecstatic power? More to the point still: how might
in nature. In considering aesthetic transcendence, one preserve the idea of aesthetic transcendence
there is frequently a much more sensuous, vis- while also recognizing its deep sources in the life
ceral connection, one that feels wholly unmedi- of culture?
ated and that cannot readily be traced back to
this or that form of cognitive preparation. In any
case, it seems safe to say that the power aesthetic
19.3 Transcendence Within
objects possess has somehow been “acquired”
Immanence
in and through the culture in question. This in
turn suggests that, even though the experiences in By way of translating the above questions into
question may feel wholly and utterly unmediated, more explicitly philosophical terms, the chal-
they are not. Now, it could be that our responses lenge at hand is to articulate a view that entails
to aesthetic objects are simply learned, condi- transcendence within immanence – that is, tran-
tioned in some way. There is little doubt that basic scendence, as we have defined it via the idea of
principles of conditioning may in fact be oper- the priority of the Other, emerging in and through
ative in these experiences. But such principles the immanent fabric of culture. Let us see if we
cannot possibly account for the sheer intensity of can make some headway in working through this
such experiences. Something else is clearly going difficult challenge.
on. What? How do certain aesthetic objects, local Returning to Steiner (1989, 1997) for a
though they may be, come to possess the tran- moment, I acknowledged that some would reject
scendent power they have? his theologically oriented point of view out of
Let me try to sharpen the problem before hand for the simple reason that there is too much
us. On the one hand, through Steiner, Mur- cultural variability in the arts for so “absolutist”
doch, and, in the context of religious experi- a perspective. As Storr (1992) puts the matter,
ence, Dupré, we have essentially been told that referring to music, “I don’t believe that musi-
the ecstatic power of certain objects is “transcen- cal reality exists apart from the minds that cre-
dentally given,” and that, as such, this power ate it . . . It’s too dependent on widely differing
is a function not of the self but of the Other, cultural traditions to be regarded as an absolute”
whatever it may be. On the other hand, the cul- (pp. 182–183). But there is a conflation of two
tural specificity of many of these objects would quite distinct issues here: the reality of music,
seem to suggest that, appearances notwithstand- whether it is an “autonomous” one or somehow a
ing, there has to have been a process whereby part of the mind, and its alleged universality. For
they acquired, or became infused by, culture- Storr, in other words, the only way to posit the
specific meaning and value. Knowing that this transcendent is to posit universality; and because
process is a function of extant beliefs, values, there is so much cultural variability in music, and
ideals, and knowledge, though surely important all the other arts as well, the notion of its tapping
to acknowledge, does not account sufficiently for into some realm of transcendental otherness has
the sheer ecstatic power such objects may have. to be rejected.
A similar conflation may be found in Hollen- As Clifford Geertz (1983) has noted, “The
back’s (1996) contextualist critique of the essen- chief problem presented by the sheer phe-
tialist view of mystical experience referred to nomenon of aesthetic force, in whatever form and
earlier. According to Hollenback, “The contex- as a result of whatever skill it may come, is how
tualist thesis implies that mystical experience in to place it within other modes of social activity,
its ‘pure’ state (free from all context-dependent how to incorporate it into the texture of a par-
influences) simply does not exist . . . There is ticular pattern of life” (p. 136). Central to this
never a moment, from the time that a mystical view is the idea that “art and the equipment to
experience begins to form until the time that it grasp it are made in the same shop” (p. 118). On
is over, when it is not being shaped by context- this account, it may be that art objects acquire
dependent elements” (p. 10; see also Katz, 1978; their transcendent power by virtue of their abil-
Proudfoot, 1986). Hollenback goes on to speak ity to embody and explicate a particular cultural
of the capacity of mystical experience “to exhibit lifeworld. “Embody” and “explicate”: these may
an almost infinite plasticity in reifying and ren- not be the right words. For what has to happen,
dering concretely present the beings, objects, and for this power to emerge, is that there has to be
spiritual locales posited by the mythology of any some sort of standing-forth, such that the hidden
given religious tradition” (1996, p. 77). He also potential of the lifeworld is, as Heidegger (1971)
speaks of “the amazing sensitivity of the mysti- has put it, “unconcealed.” Taking this idea one
cal experience to the subject’s religious and philo- step further, such standing-forth may be seen as
sophical assumptions” (p. 79). According to Hol- correlative with the kind of ecstasy – ekstasis,
lenback, this experience is therefore “anything following the ancient Greek – found in aesthetic
but spontaneous” (p. 78). But this last assertion transcendence.
does not follow. The contextuality of mystical Consider once more the experience of music.
experience, Hollenback has told us, is necessar- “People take such satisfaction in music,” Stephen
ily correlative with its lack of spontaneity. But Crites (1971) has written,
there is no reason whatsoever why there cannot
because it answers to a powerful if seldom noticed
be true spontaneity within the discursive con-
aspect of everything they do, of every gesture,
fines of culture and history. As has been sug- every footstep, every utterance; answers to it and
gested already, we are often moved by objects gives it purified expression. Courtship, worship,
that are local in nature, objects whose very even violent conflict, call forth musical expressions
meanings are mediated by and enmeshed within in order to give these activities a certain ideality, a
culture. But this says nothing about the spontane- specific ideality rooted in the activities themselves.
ity of our response. Contra Hollenback, I main- That is why the music of a culture or subculture has
tain that there is ample room for true spontaneity such a vital connection, so revealing yet so hard to
within a perspective that recognizes the contextu- define, with its whole style of life. The music of a
ality of mystical experience. People do not need people, or even a cohesive group, is peculiarly its
to “leave” culture in order to experience transcen- own. It is the particular musical style that permits a
group’s life style, its incipient musicality, to express
dence; oftentimes, I have suggested, the experi-
itself in full dance and song. (pp. 293–294)
ence of transcendence emerges in and through
the fabric of culture itself. What this implies is Crites goes on to highlight the fact that “There
that we are somehow hermeneutically “readied” is a beautiful paradox in the peculiar intensity
for such experience, that its very condition of with which a person responds to music which is
possibility is our own existence in tradition (e.g., ‘his own’: Even if he has not heard it before it
Gadamer 1975). is familiar, as though something is sounding in
it that he has always felt in his bones; and yet it nate, which comes to us, paradoxically, through
is really new. It is his own style, revealed to him words which have turned away from incarnation”
at an otherwise unimaginable level of clarity and (p. 164). As for the result, it is the opportunity
intensity” (p. 294). What we see in Crites’ way “to bear witness to an existence beyond, to a
of framing the issues, once again, is that cultural being, to a plenitude they don’t even know how to
context, far from precluding transcendence, may name” (p. 167). The situation is a quite remark-
be understood as its very condition of possibility; able one: words, language, products of discrete
it is precisely what allows for revelation, of the cultural worlds, sometimes become imbued with
new within the old and the old within the new. such power and passion as to awaken an “exis-
But what is it that allows for this revelation? tence beyond,” a magnetic “plenitude” that bears
How might we understand the process? Seen within it intimations of a truly extraordinary
from one angle, we are considering “the famil- reality.
iar’s sacramental transformation into the alien” One may also be reminded here of the won-
(Edwards, 1997, p. 212). “The setting-into-work derful passage from The Varieties of Religious
of truth,” Heidegger (1971) adds, “thrusts up the Experience (James, 1902/1982) that articulates
unfamiliar and extraordinary and at the same time the “deeper significance” we sometimes experi-
thrusts down the ordinary and what we believe to ence in encountering works of art.
be such” (p. 75). Seen from another angle, how-
ever, we are considering a kind of recognition, This sense of deeper significance is not confined
to rational propositions. Single words, and
“knowing something as that with which we are
conjunctions of words, effects of light on land and
already acquainted,” which “always implies that
sea, odors and musical sounds, all bring it when the
we have come to know something more authen- mind is tuned aright. Most of us can remember the
tically than we were able to do when caught up strangely moving power of passages in certain
in our first encounter with it” (Gadamer, 1986, poems read when we were young, irrational
p. 47). The heretofore alien thus becomes recog- doorways as they were through which the mystery
nizable, familiar, seen anew, in fuller measure. of fact, the wildness and the pang of life, stole into
With this putative paradox, we have in hand our hearts and thrilled them. The words have now
a potential key to deepening our understanding perhaps become mere polished surfaces for us; but
of the sociocultural constitution of aesthetic tran- lyric poetry and music are alive and significant only
scendence. But there is another paradox, that may in proportion as they fetch these vague vistas of a
serve to bring us still closer to addressing ade- life continuous with our own, beckoning and
inviting, yet ever eluding our pursuit. We are alive
quately the challenge at hand. The poet and critic
or dead to the eternal inner message of the arts
Yves Bonnefoy (1989), reflecting on the power of
according as we have lost this mystical
poetry, speaks of “the moment when the young susceptibility. (pp. 382–383)
reader opens passionately a great book and finds
words, of course, but also things and people, and But where exactly is the “existence beyond” that
the horizon, and the sky: in short, a whole world Bonnefoy identifies, unnamable yet supremely
given at once to his thirst” (p. 162). For the author real? How far beyond is it? And what exactly are
of these words, the experience may be more we to make of these “vague vistas of a life contin-
intense still; for, “this world which cuts itself off uous with our own” about which James speaks?
from the world seems to the person who creates As Marcel (1973) adds, “I think that each of us
it not only more satisfying than the first but also is invited, as it were, apart from any appeal to
more real” (p. 164). Bonnefoy goes on to speak faith, which does not concern us here, to restore
of the “impression of a reality at last fully incar- the traces of a world which is not superimposed
from without ours, but is rather this very world to preclude the possibility that aesthetic tran-
grasped in a richness of dimensions which ordi- scendence also makes contact with some wholly
narily we are simply unaware of” (p. 212). The Other realm; indeed, I think it is well worth
artist is no “superman,” Merleau-Ponty (1964a) our entertaining this possibility, if only to cast
insists, no direct path to the divine – if, by divine, into question the thoroughgoing naturalism that
we are referring to some wholly Other realm. pervades academic psychology (see Freeman,
“One admires as one should,” he writes, 2014b, 2015; also Slife & Richardson, 2014).
For present purposes, however, it will be quite
only after having understood that there are not any enough to acknowledge that we can plausibly
supermen, there is no man who does not have a
speak about aesthetic transcendence within the
man’s life to live, and that the secret of the woman
confines of the earthly, culturally saturated world.
loved, of the writer, or of the painter, does not lie in
some realm beyond his empirical life, but is so
Generally speaking, in fact, it would seem that
mixed with his mediocre experiences, so modestly the ability of art and artist to make contact with
confused with his perception of the world, that this world is a precondition for this very tran-
there can be no question of meeting it face to face scendence. The question remains: How does this
apart from his life . . . The painter himself is a man work?
at work who each morning finds in the shape of
things the same questioning and the same call he
never stops responding to. (1964a, p. 58) 19.4 Metaphor and the
Standing-Forth of the World
Each painting, in turn, is “a response to what
There are numerous accounts of the process by
the world, the past, and the completed works
which aesthetic transcendence comes about, most
demanded” (p. 59). “To live in painting,” there-
of them essentially “ego-centric” and individual-
fore, “is still to breathe the air of this world –
centered, in nature. In Ernst Schachtel’s (1959)
above all for the man who sees something in the
seminal piece on memory and childhood amne-
world to paint. And there is a little of him in every
sia, for instance, there is the classical notion that
man” (p. 64). For Merleau-Ponty, then,
art is fundamentally recollective, that it seeks to
The difficult and essential point here is to restore and recover those more pure and unsullied
understand that in positing a field distinct from the modes of experiencing, exemplified especially in
empirical order of events, we are not positing a the spontaneity of childhood, that predate the sort
Spirit of Painting which is already in possession of of conventionalized, highly schematized modes
itself on the other side of the world it is gradually of experiencing that characterize adult life. The
manifested in. There is not, above and beyond the power of art, from this perspective – which is a
causality of events, a second causality which makes
sort of amalgam of Plato and Freud – thus derives
the world of painting a “suprasensible world” with
from its capacity to reawaken those modes of
its own laws. Cultural creation is ineffectual if it
experiencing, some of which may be preverbal
does not find a vehicle in external circumstances.
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 68) in nature, that have largely been superseded by
the demands of adult life but not entirely forgot-
So far so good: for Bonnefoy and James, and now ten. The ineffability of aesthetic experience may
Marcel and Merleau-Ponty, there is no need – thus have as much to do with the preverbal nature
or no immediate need – to invoke some wholly of early experience as it does with some alleged
Other world. The Other, such as it is, is found transcendent realm. The otherworldly thus refers
right here, in this one, woven into its very fab- precisely to that sort of otherness that consists of
ric. Speaking for myself, I would not be one the unspoken vestiges of the distant past.
Another version of psychoanalytic think- “standing-forth” of the world occurs. Let us

ing about aesthetic experience may be found therefore return to the idea of “transcendence
in Anton Ehrenzweig’s The Hidden Order of within immanence” to see if we can make some
Art (1967), which, to risk oversimplification, additional headway.
explores the undifferentiated “inner fabric” of “As a rule,” James (1902/1982) notes, “mysti-
art, particularly modern art, in relation to the cal states merely add a supersensuous meaning
undifferentiated structure of unconscious percep- to the ordinary outward data of consciousness.
tion. For Ehrenzweig, the primary interest is not They are excitements like the emotions of love
to locate hidden psychic contents, à la Freud. or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which
Nor is it to establish a deep link, via memory, facts already objectively before us fall into a new
between the child’s mode of experiencing the expressiveness and make a new connection with
world and the adult’s, à la Schachtel. Rather, it our active life” (1902/1982, p. 427). There is,
is to try to show how it is that the heterogeneous, again, a standing-forth, and in this standing-forth,
fragmented, even manifestly chaotic, structure of the making of a “new connection”: a bridge has
much of modern art can resonate with us – if been built between the “facts already before us”
we can endure the anxiety – by virtue of our and some sort of new rendering of them.
own inner heterogeneity and fragmentation. As This is precisely where the idea of metaphor
for the depth and possible profundity of the resul- enters the picture. According to Paul Ricoeur
tant aesthetic experience, it owes itself precisely (1981), the task of metaphor is to fashion a
to what is occurring in the deepest, most obscure, new “resemblance.” “Things or ideas which
strata of the psyche. were remote appear now as close. Resemblance,”
A similar idea may be found in the context of therefore, “ultimately is nothing else than this
religious experience. According to Jones (1991), rapprochement which reveals a generic kinship
for instance, the experience of the sacred has a between heterogeneous ideas” (p. 233). In offer-
transcendental quality “not because the sacred is ing this perspective, Ricoeur draws on Kant’s
a wholly other object but because such experi- concept of productive imagination by refer-
ences resonate with the primal originating depths ring to “predicative assimilation.” This process
of selfhood” (p. 125). As he explains in a later “consists . . . in making similar, that is, semanti-
(Jones, 1998) work, those defenses that func- cally proximate, the terms that the metaphori-
tion as barriers to connection to ourselves and cal utterance brings together” (p. 234). As he
to others can also prevent access to the sacred. explains,
“When these barriers are broken through and the
real self emerges,” Jones writes, “a sense of con- In order that a metaphor obtains, one must continue
nection with or concern about the transcendent to identify the previous incompatibility through the
new compatibility . . . . The insight into likeness is
often surfaces” (pp. 183–184). This is a variant
the perception of the conflict between the previous
of the same idea: “transcendence,” such as it is,
incompatibility and the new compatibility.
is a function of release, of defenses being broken
“Remoteness” is preserved within “proximity.” To
down, revealing the “real self” in its primal given- see the like is to see the same in spite of, and
ness; it is the “sense” one may get on realizing the through, the different. (p. 234)
full depth and measure of one’s inner life.
Important though these sorts of accounts are, Translated into the terms we encountered ear-
they do not take sufficient account of culture. lier, the familiar – the “old” – becomes revivi-
More specifically, they do not take sufficient fied, as it were, via the act of predicative assim-
account of the way in which the aforementioned ilation; it becomes transformed into something
other than what it was, gaining new energy, new rience of familiarity and recognition,” therefore,
life, through its new “kinship” with what had “may in turn be understood in terms of the Other’s
heretofore been different. Speaking of poetic lan- priority,” which in turn may carry with it an inti-
guage, in particular, Ricoeur goes on to suggest mation that there is more to the world than meets
that it is the eye. “This world that comes before me is
infinitely larger than me, the mystic” – or the
no less about reality than any other use of language
poet – “might say, but it is also one to which
but refers to it by the means of a complex strategy
I belong.” I have framed this experience as “a
which implies, as an essential component, a
suspension and seemingly an abolition of the
kind of homecoming, wherein one’s very belong-
ordinary reference attached to descriptive language. ingness in and to the world is revealed in and
This suspension, however, is only the negative through its otherness.” It is perhaps this quality
condition of a second-order reference, of an of belongingness that calls for the transcendent
indirect reference built on the ruins of the direct dimension we have been exploring throughout
reference. This reference is called second-order this chapter: “Insofar as the world is revealed as
reference only with respect to the primacy of the home, as the place where I belong, I am ‘at one’
reference of ordinary language. For, in another with it, able, if only momentarily, to move beyond
respect, it constitutes the primordial reference the condition of ordinary oblivion against which
to the extent that it suggests, reveals, unconceals . . . the experience is juxtaposed” (p. 171). Such
the deep structures of reality to which we are
experience
related as mortals who are born into this world and
who dwell in it for a while. (p. 240) may thus be understood to embody a kind of
dialectical tension between the ordinary and the
In sum: “In the same way as the metaphorical
extraordinary. The notion of the extraordinary
sense not only abolishes but preserves the literal
itself reflects this tension; there is reference to a
sense, the metaphorical reference maintains the
world or a sphere of reality that is other than the
ordinary vision in tension with the new one it one ordinarily inhabited. However otherworldly
suggests” (pp. 240–241). mystical [or aesthetic] experience may feel,
None of what Ricoeur has told us about the therefore, the condition of this otherworldliness
metaphorical process necessarily leads to aes- is its relation to, and difference from, the “this-
thetic transcendence. The fact is, some metaphors worldly” experience that surrounds it. In this
are “dead,” and may thus yield little in the way respect, there is a metaphorical dimension to [such]
of the “deep structures of reality” to which he experience: the “old” world and the “new” one that
refers. Others, however, are quite alive, and may supersedes it are somehow held together, resulting
serve just the sort of “unconcealing” function in the aforementioned co-presence of the familiar
and the alien. The world is refigured and, through
Ricoeur is positing. In trying to unpack this
this refiguring, remade, such that it appears realer
set of ideas, I want to turn to some of my
and truer. The sudden irruption of [this] experience
own thoughts from The Priority of the Other
may thus be tied to the rapture of discovery,
(Freeman, 2014a). “The experience of encoun- wherein the hidden potentiality of ordinary life is
tering the familiar-made-alien,” I have suggested, disclosed. (Freeman, 2014a, p. 171)
“is another way of speaking about and encounter-
ing the Other”: the world stands forth, becomes I will not pretend to have solved the problem
visible, in its otherness. At the same time, there at hand. Indeed, in view of what I suggested ear-
is also a reference “backward,” as it were, to the lier when I raised the possibility that aesthetic
heretofore concealed, such that in this very new- transcendence may in fact bespeak the existence
ness there is, in addition, a dimension of famil- of the wholly Other, in Steiner’s more explicitly
iarity and recognition. “The simultaneous expe- theological sense, I do not know that the idea
of problem-solving even applies here. It may be projection or “construction” involved in its gene-
that there is no “problem” nor a “solution” but sis or there is something otherworldly going on,
only mystery (Marcel, 1950) – the mystery that something that leaps beyond the confines of his-
the world is and that, by degrees, it can come to tory and culture.
light. And it may be that this is enough to set the I will say it again: it is possible that there is
wheels of transcendence in motion and to thereby such a leap, and, following James (1902/1982)
“restore the traces of a world which is not super- especially, we ought not to be too hasty in rul-
imposed from without ours,” as Marcel (1973) ing it out. But there is no need to posit it either.
had put it, “but is rather this very world grasped As he told us earlier, mystical states and the
in a richness of dimensions which ordinarily we like “merely add a supersensuous meaning to
are simply unaware of” (p. 212). The main point, the ordinary outward data of consciousness” and
in any case, is, again, that our belonging in and are thus best regarded as “gifts to our spirit by
to this world – to tradition (Gadamer, 1975) – means of which facts already objectively before
is the very condition of possibility for the “rap- us fall into a new expressiveness and make a
ture of discovery” we may experience when see- new connection with our active life” (1902/1982,
ing it anew, through art. In this respect, we might p. 427).
speak of historically or culturally prepared tran- Whether or not there is a giver of such gifts,
scendence (Freeman, 2004, 2014a). the gifts themselves remain. In receiving them,
On some level, Forman (e.g., 1990, 1998) we should certainly take measure of the mys-
and others who reject contextualism (at least terious way in which the everyday, culturally-
in its constructivist forms) in their conceptual- saturated world stands forth. In the end, it may
ization of mystical and religious experience are not matter what the “ultimate” source of aes-
quite right when they suggest that such experi- thetic transcendence is, for the result remains
ence is not created from culture, in the sense the same. Elaine Scarry puts the matter well in
of being a “construction.” “Not created by cul- her discussion of the frequently made claim for
ture, this structure . . . comes with the machin- the “immortality” of beauty, in art and beyond.
ery of being human” (1998, p. 27). It does not “Even when the claim on behalf of immortal-
follow, however, that transcendent experience is ity is gone, many of the same qualities – pleni-
wholly unmediated or that “we must all be able tude, inclusion – are the outcome” (Scarry, 1999,
to temporarily let go of the contents of our own p. 47). Experientially speaking, Scarry continues,
minds” (p. 27) so as to let the putative “pure con- “beautiful things . . . always carry greetings from
sciousness experience” emerge. As Gass (1999) other worlds within them.” We can be grateful
puts the matter, “We should not imagine that for that. And we can also be grateful for their
such moments involve the cancellation the self. impact on our lives. “What happens when there
A union is not a cancellation. What has to be left is no immortal realm behind the beautiful per-
out of the self is its selfishness, but not its partic- son or thing is just what happens when there is
ular quality of mind” (p. 144). And not, I would an immortal realm behind the beautiful person or
reiterate, the world in which this mind has taken thing: the perceiver is led to a more capacious
shape. regard for the world” (pp. 47–48). This is the
pragmatic dimension of aesthetic transcendence,
and it is mysterious in its own right. For, in being
19.5 Re-Imagining
led to this more capacious regard for the world,
Transcendence
we are also led to an appreciation of its very exis-
Oftentimes, the issue of transcendence is posed tence and our great good fortune in being a part
in either/or terms: either there is some sort of of it.
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20 Sociocultural Science of Religion
and Natural Belief
James Cresswell
outline a socioculturally informed science of reli-

20.1 Introduction
gion by outlining an approach that can address
The purpose of this chapter is to outline an the givenness of religious belief without predi-
approach to the study of religion by chal- cating itself on socioculturally decontextualized
lenging reliance on self-contained mechanistic mechanisms.
approaches to cognition. I will realize this pur- To address this challenge I must first discuss
pose by discussing the cognitive science of reli- how CSR researchers also use “natural” to also
gion (CSR; see Barrett, 2007). CSR researchers refer to their scientific enterprise (e.g., Bering,
write about religion as “natural” in the sense 2011; McCauley, 2011; Slone, 2004; for dis-
of what I will call phenomenological natural- cussion see Jong, Kavanagh, & Visala, 2015).
ism. This phrase refers to the way that peo- They use the notion of natural to refer to an
ple’s seemingly immediate experience manifests approach that seeks to use the methods of sci-
to them (for discussion of using the notion of ence to understand the general laws of the phys-
natural in this way see Corcoran, 2009).1 Believ- ical universe (see Chirkov, 2016; Polkinghorne,
ers live beliefs in a way that simply seems nat- 1983). CSR rests on a presumption of cogni-
ural because they are taken-for-granted as tru- tive mechanisms that function universally simi-
isms. Researchers, such as those inspired by lar regardless of sociocultural particularities. A
CSR, outline how such taken-for-granted beliefs challenge is that this amounts to a metaphysical
intuitively emerge as epiphenomena of cogni- naturalism that is too narrow because, as I will
tive mechanisms cumulatively working together show, it actually does not include materiality as
(see Barrett, 2007). Hence, researchers in CSR well as sociality. Drawing on William James, I
address how religious beliefs seem to come nat- will outline how a fixation on universal laws of
urally to religious believers as intuitive presup- human cognition cannot account for the sociocul-
positions that are manifestations of unseen laws tural constitution of religious beliefs and actually
of human nature (e.g. Barrett, 2008; McCauley, ignores an organism’s physical embeddedness in
2011; Slone, 2004). I will discuss how this its milieu. To do justice to phenomenological
approach to phenomenological naturalism misses naturalism one must also take an approach that
the richness of the socioculturally constituted incorporates the material embedded functioning
religious beliefs and so ignores the very thing of humans that entwines sociocultural phenom-
that is most pragmatically valuable to religious ena with the physicality of organic systems. As
believers: how religious beliefs are experienced such, I draw on Humberto Maturana and Evan
as phenomenologically natural in a way that Thompson’s enactive approach to cognition to
includes specific content (see Cresswell, 2017; propose how researchers can rework their under-
McLean, Cresswell, & Ashley, 2016). I seek to standing of cognition in a way that allows for
Sociocultural Science of Religion and Natural Belief 367
a broader approach to scientific naturalism. The that humans operate according to unseen mech-
chapter concludes by cycling back to sociocul- anisms that facilitate beliefs in things like super-
tural theory and a discussion of Mikhail Bakhtin. agents.
Natural, in this sense, pertains to the idea that
religious beliefs are experienced as phenomeno-
20.2 Religious Belief
logically natural because they are taken funda-
Researchers in CSR note that there is an ostensive mentally to be epiphenomena of the natural world
giveness to religious belief and write comments (see Barrett, 2012; Sperber, 1996). Per theorists
such as: “humans are often generally unaware in CSR “the study of religion must be informed
of the reasons for their thoughts and actions in by an updated epistemology and philosophy of
the first place . . . our thoughts and actions sim- science” (Slone, 2004, p. 124; see also Barrett,
ply make sense at the time” (Slone, 2004, p. 9). 2012). What is meant by an updated form of
They are trying to get at how religious belief science is one that resonates with a search for
tends to come to most people as an immediate natural laws of human functioning (see Jong,
given such that the “naturalness of cognition” Kavanagh, & Visala, 2015). It entails an approach
refers to how “the more transparent a thought’s that searches for the underlying mechanistic laws
(presumed) soundness, the more elaborated the of behavior captured as the “nature of things”
judgment, and the faster it dawns, the more nat- (Crotty, 2004, p. 20; for discussion see Nola &
ural is the cognition involved” (McCauley, 2011, Sankey, 2007, pp. 312–336). Religious beliefs
p. 13). The naturalness of religious cognition per- are experienced as phenomenologically natural
tains to how a thought comes without any effort because they are operations of mechanistic prin-
and this approach is a claim about how people ciples underlying the laws of nature.
phenomenologically experience religious cogni- Researchers in CSR turn to such scientific nat-
tion in the flow of life. uralism because they take the position that an
The explication for why such cognition is so insider’s view of religion and/or folk psychology
immediately available is predicated on a partic- cannot help understand the cognitive underpin-
ular understanding of what is meant by natu- nings of religious belief. In CSR, development of
ral. Slone (2004),2 for example, reviews theo- religious cognition is treated as maturing along a
ries about religion to show how it is important predetermined path as environmental input facil-
to turn to cognitive science as a way of providing itates it. Much of this work involves examin-
a naturalist explanation of religious belief. One ing children with the hopes of assessing them
particular group that is subject to near-vitriolic at a young enough age to preclude the mean-
aspersion are what he dubs “sociocultural” theo- ingful influence of enculturation and so get at
rists and writes that “we know that cultural the- the intuitive beliefs (e.g., Barrett, 2012; Kele-
ories of religion are impoverished by a lack of man, 2004; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). A central
understanding of how the mind works and thus of presupposition entailed in this work is that chil-
why humans think what they think and do what dren have such capacities as a function of hard
they do” (p. 121). This discussion of how “the wired mechanisms. While such mechanisms are
mind works” hearkens to the well-worn notion taken to have been developed over evolutionary
that humans operate per two cognitive systems: time, language as an immediate influence on such
one that is intuitive and fast and another that is cognitive architectures is relegated to the sta-
slow and analytical (Kahneman, 2011; Gervais & tus of input stimuli (e.g., Slone, 2004; Sperber,
Norenzayan, 2012). There is a pervasive theme 1996). Doing so allows scholars to “reduce the
368 james c r ess w e l l
complexity [of religion] one layer at a time” includes how our senses entwine with happen-
(Slone, 2004, p. 43) to explain the underlying ings in life. We move through life with our body
cognitive unity of all religions. When researchers responding in relation to things and so one expe-
in CSR seek to embody scientific naturalism, rience passes into another in a constant flow.
what they mean is discovering natural laws and The constant flow of experience involves more
predictors that supposedly underlie behavioral complexity than merely being stimulated by an
outcomes associated with religiosity. environment. Previous flows of experience bleed
An effective place to critically consider the for- into the current flow to give sensory stimulation
going position in CSR is William James because shape. James (1996) pointed out that experience
he wrote a substantial amount on the topic of reli- includes a constant flow of stimuli in-relation-
gious belief (e.g., James, 1982). He highlighted to one another and in-relation-to psychological
how the phenomena of belief works in a way that phenomena like concepts and emotions. Experi-
leads to reconsidering CSR and how scientific ence involves an inseparable relation among psy-
naturalism is approached. It is first necessary to chological phenomena and physiological ones.
discuss James and then return to CSR’s form of The flow of human experience includes contin-
scientific naturalism. ual relations among a range of elements and so it
does not make sense to abstract conscious phe-
nomena like religious belief from the concrete
20.2.1 William James and Religious
materiality of the world and one’s action in it.
Belief
Religious beliefs are thereby entwined with mate-
James (1981, 1996) wrote about psychology in a riality so that they involve a complete way of
way that contradicts approaches that are disem- relating to the world that shapes reality that feels
bodied and abstract. To refer to belief as abstract objective. When someone is faced with a situa-
involves conceiving of it unnecessarily tied to tion, religious beliefs come to bear in their expe-
the actual happenings of life because it belongs riential sense and entail immediate bodily dispo-
to the realm of mind. He highlighted how belief sitions.
is about relationships in the sense that one can It is in this way that James wrote about belief
have knowledge about another thought or another being both objective and subjective (e.g., 1996, p.
thing but it always involves a relation to another 10; for a sophisticated discussion on the fallacy
thing. All things that fall under the banner of reli- of the subjective–objective fallacy see Chapter 3,
gious belief involve relationships so that we do this volume). A belief in another belief can be
not have any element of belief that is isolated subjective but the web of relations involved in
and on its own. That is, every belief is related to belief never stops in self-contained subjectivity.
something else and it simply does not make sense All belief eventually comes into necessary rela-
to talk about a belief that stands as an isomorphic tion with something in the world we share with
proposition. others. To paraphrase James (1981), if one dies
To say that belief is disembodied refers to and stops believing in something, belief rarely
Descartes’ famous mind–body split where the disappears and it continues on without depen-
mind is considered abstract in its ethereal nature dence on any single individual: “I could perfectly
and this abstractness meant that it is not necessar- well define [belief], what the knowing actually
ily tied to the body or anything physical. James and practically amounts to – leading towards,
contrastingly argues that belief is best character- namely, and terminating in percepts, through a
ized in terms of a collection of “sensible natures” series of transitional experiences which the world
(1996, p. 27). Experience, at its most basic level, supplies” (James, 1996, p. 25). He therein opens
the possibility of considering psychological phe- in the phenomenologically natural experience of

nomena like religious belief as sociocultural religious belief. In his seminal The Varieties of
phenomena and principally not self-contained Religious Experience (1982), he pointed out how
subjective phenomena. An implication is that religious beliefs are often relegated to a “noth-
considering religious belief requires recognition ing but -” and the forgoing addressed how CSR
of it social-relational quality that is entwined with could result in treating belief as nothing but a-
concrete acts of life. relational mechanisms (see Slone, 2004, pp. 9,
Returning to James reveals a challenge to the 47). In contrast, “what you want is a philosophy
practice of reducing phenomenological natural- that will . . . make some positive connection with
ism to cognitive mechanisms. One challenge to this actual world of finite lives” (James, 1981,
CSR researchers is that they take an approach p. 9). A concrete and embodied approach is one
that treats religious belief as, what James would that does not dismiss folk psychology or materi-
consider, abstract and disembodied. James (1996) ality. James shows us how we ought not to take
would be critical of the notion that focusing on the study of religious belief out of the hands of
cognitions gets at religious belief because he was religions people or the materiality in which they
against idea that religious belief can be disentan- are embedded. We need to grasp their perspective
gled from the world in the way that an abstract from within if we seek to understand religious
approach implies. CSR does not intend to explain beliefs and, to outline how this would be so, I will
religion away, but just the cognitive level of anal- turn to a view of mind that is not disembodied and
ysis and so focuses on intuitive cognitions that abstract. That is, I propose a scientific naturalism
are taken to be universal laws. Consider how, non-reductively inclusive of both materiality and
in CSR, the “key to understanding religion – sociocultural context is needed.
especially ‘lived’ religion – is to identify aspects
of cognition that constrain religious behavior”
20.3 Non-Reductive Scientific
(Slone, 2004, p. 122). This approach to cogni-
Naturalism
tion is about abstract mental modules that are not
easily seen without a set of guiding disciplinary Researchers interested in CSR may note that the
presuppositions (for discussion see Cresswell, addressing of the complex culturally embedded
2017). This approach amounts to metaphysical content of religious belief comes at a sacrifice,
naturalism that presumes unseen laws underly- which is the seeming loss of a naturalist science.
ing the observable happenings in the word (see Slone, for example, ironically accuses sociocul-
Nola & Sankey, 2007, p. 313). The mechanisms turally oriented theorists of “biophobia” in this
are not really treated as natural phenomena in the vein (2004, p. 43). I propose that grasping reli-
world as they are locked within the mind as self- gious belief in a broader way that includes socio-
contained processing mechanisms. If we plan to cultural content is more robust insofar as it need
get at the way belief is lived, then it cannot be not exclude biology in the way readers like Slone
done by examining it as presumed metaphysical suggest. My position is that including folk psy-
cognitive mechanisms. Despite attempts to pro- chology is to give a rich account of phenomeno-
vide a natural account, CSR takes an approach logically natural religious belief. What is possible
that is largely disembodied. is an approach to religious belief without precon-
James, in contrast, drew attention to the impor- ceptions such as abstract and disembodied cog-
tance of understanding belief from the embod- nitive mechanisms, which miss the phenomena.
ied perspective of the people who live it and so I will outline this proposal by first articulating
from a wider consideration of what is entailed how cognition is socioculturally constituted as
an enacted phenomenon and then how we could out that it is the emergence of competent per-
retheorize religious cognition. formance among many interrelated systems. Rich
interconnectivity among many mutually interde-
pendent biological and social systems is needed
20.3.1 Sociocultural Cognition:
for any kind of activity to develop (see Thelen &
Enacting Psychology
Smith, 1996, p. 189).
An ontological split among mind, body, and Walking is a comparatively simple illustra-
folk psychology is misguided and this claim can tion that can be used as a bridge to understand-
be understood by first discussing what we can ing higher mental functions. Like walking, psy-
observe in caregivers and their children. Consider chology does not need to come from an initial
Thelen and Smith’s (1996) discussion of learn- blueprint or design because it can be understood
ing to walk and what it tells us about cognition. as enacted. A well-known developmental theo-
What they noted is that walking is not a case of rist in sociocultural psychology, Barbara Rogoff
a complex function emerging along genetically (2003), discusses such interdependent systems in
hard-wired maturational paths from digit-grade terms of human interaction and the development
to heel-strike gait. That is, what they address of the skill to perform higher mental functions.
is how constraints and enablements on develop- She shows how every community has its reper-
ment need not be by blueprint or design. A heel- toire of concepts and categories by which the
strike gate is not possible at an early stage as world of its participants’ experience is structured.
multiple systems work in concert to resist grav- They enact such categories and concepts in their
ity. Such systems include coordinating balance language-use of terms like “God” and “Kharma”
with a caregiver, dynamically stabilizing the legs, because the practiced use of the terms constitutes
coordinating the forgoing with other movement the perceptual categories. Infants should learn
and proprioceptive faculties, and so forth. The how words are meant and in what contexts such
heel-strike in walking comes much later after a meanings are used so that, when they enact them,
massive systematic integration has taken place. they do so in a way that is appropriate according
In fact, Thelen and Smith point out that “every- to the normative standards of a community. Just
time someone speaks or touches an infant . . . the like walking entail multiple social and material
infant receives time-locked multimodal sensa- systems, language involves many different com-
tions” (Thelen & Smith, 1996, p. 193). It is the ponents working in concert to be acquired and
development in a dynamic adjustment among developed.
multiple systems where organisms manage to An implication is that cognition is about enact-
function effectively in their contexts. A crucial ing language to shape the same world as others
point is that autonomous walking activity is not and so participate in the same phenomeno-
an a-social behavior. That is, researchers who logical nature of the world. We can see from
tend to look at one aspect of development and observing human interactions that competently
isolate it from its interdependence with other sys- experiencing phenomenologically natural life
tems actually create an abstraction from real life. like others means participating in the commu-
In the case of learning to walk, the eventual emer- nity by virtue of how our perceptual activities
gence of load-bearing heel-strike gait depends fall into rhythm with others. It means to enact
on the interaction among infants’ own systems what is phenomenologically natural in ways
and those present in the environment. Rather than that others in a community recognize as legiti-
treating walking as an unfolding maturing capac- mate and sensible. Religious believers become
ity stored as mechanistic know-how, they point legitimate participants in communities through
dynamic co-regulation that shapes our capacity responsive agents. This give-and-take is dynamic
to perform normatively appropriate cognition, in terms of the interdependent give-and-take in
which in turn entails what is phenomenologically relationships that enables participation and point
natural. out the need for a view of cognition that diverges
This view of human development is very from the metaphysical naturalism like we see in
different from CSR because the latter treats CSR.
sociocultural phenomena very differently. The
characterization of sociocultural approaches to
20.3.2 Enactivism and the
religious cognition can, at times, be framed in
Socio-Material Embeddedness of
terms of cultural rules being imposed on a tabula
Cognition
rasa. For example, Slone (2004) accuses socio-
culturally oriented theorists of treating religion Humberto Maturana and Evan Thompson are
as a symbolic system governed by group-specific central figures who propose an enactive approach
rules or codes. The codes supposedly ought to to cognition. Enactivism provides an approach to
be impressed on people’s minds and so reli- cognition that fits well with the foregoing and it
gious cognition is formed. This characterization is predicated on a view that gets away from dis-
leads to concerns that a socioculturally oriented embodied and asocial representations and cogni-
approach cannot explain diversity because all tive mechanisms (Maturana, 1978; Maturana &
members of a culture should be carbon copies Varela, 1980; Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thomp-
of each other. After all, if his challenge of a son, & Rosch, 1993). It moves us toward a view
sociocultural position is correct, people’s tacit that addresses the enactment of cognition by pre-
assumptions that are not in line with official senting a phenomenon called autopoiesis. This
doctrines should not happen. phenomenon refers to how a living organism can
Such a characterization misses that culture is be an autonomous agent that actively generates
not codified and static (see Baerveldt & Voester- and maintains itself. In particular reference to
mans, 2005). Figures such as Thelen and Smith humans and cognition, a person develops over
(1996) and Rogoff (2003) point out that a care- time to bring forth its own cognitive domain in
giver’s response is not unidirectional in its effect. the sense that it performs psychological phenom-
Rogoff, for example, is interested in showing ena in an appropriate manner. It learns to do so
how caregivers and children are mutually inter- insofar as it adequately organizes itself to effec-
dependent as co-regulators in the performance of tively function in a given environment. As such,
cognition. Their interactions are dynamic inso- neuro and physiological components of a human
far as people depend on the flow of interaction system dynamically organize in order to perform
together to accomplish normativity that is con- in a generically similar manner to conspecifics.
textually appropriate. That is, infants are respon- This organization includes abstract qualities of
sive as they are learning to enact a phenomeno- human interaction such as language and so orga-
logically natural world and they do not repeat a nizing oneself autopoietically is to dynamically
caregiver’s cognition with exact mimicry. Infants form a relation among components that define
also take action in the sense that they enact cogni- and specify a system as an individual (see Mat-
tion in ways that are generically similar enough to urana, 1978). A human is demarcated by being
be recognizable, otherwise a caregiver would not able to self-organize in such a way that there is
respond or would respond with corrections. They generically consistent performance of cognition
are nevertheless inexact replications – always cre- and it is this organization that defines a human
ating novelty – because infants grow into active- system as a composite unity.
Neurophysiology entwines with symbolic sys- operate recurrently in its medium without
tems like language and concomitant emotions disintegration. I call this process “structural
to enable a person to perform religious cogni- coupling.” If the medium is also a structurally
tion. Physical sensation, memory, auditory capac- plastic system, then the two plastic systems may
ity, sight (as caregivers point to things), and be reciprocally structurally coupled through their
reciprocal selection of plastic structural changes
emotions are all entwined in the cultivation of
during their history of interactions. (pp. 35–36)
language performance. That is, human percep-
tual capacities enabling a sensible environment
Structural coupling is when autopoietic systems
do not form in a vacuum because an infant is
impact each other and, in a sense, perturb each
born into a community of people who experi-
other into mutually shaping each other. It is
ence a world as ordered and sensible through their
for this reason that Thompson (2007) proposes
language and interactions. Instead of relying
that self-organizing dynamic systems are con-
on cognitive mechanisms and self-contained
stitutionally integrated with the world. In the
representations, an autopoietic system is a
words of enactivists, “the activities performed by
network of productions of components that
the perceiver/actor with basic level objects are
recursively interact to realize the network of
part of the cultural, consensually validated forms
productions as a unity (see Varela, Thompson, &
of life of the community in which the human
Rosch, 1993). This approach means to come to
and the object are situated, they are basic-level
a point where one organizes one’s experience to
activities” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993,
experience phenomenologically natural religious
p. 177). They present themselves to us in its cul-
experiences.
turally constituted experiential richness because
It is important to realize that an autopoietic
experience does not have an object standing
system is conceived of as being very different
over against us as a distinct subject. As such,
from a self-contained system detailed in most
as opposed to merely computational mechanics,
CSR theory. Evan Thompson (2007) argues that
cognition can be understood in terms of contex-
an autopoietic system involves enacting cogni-
tually bound embodied action.
tion through a network of relations within its
boundary and that this network of relations gener-
ates components of the system. That is, cognition
20.3.3 Rethinking Religious
involves a human experiencing the phenomeno-
Cognition
logically natural world as a personal experience
and can generate such experience for itself. This Rather than taking a fundamentally sociocultural
idea does not lead to a self-contained view of activity and projecting it into the heads of indi-
cognition because such a system has a semi- viduals like we see in CSR’s approach to scien-
permeable boundary. Maturana (1978) argues tific naturalism, this approach avoids mystifying
that systems interact recurrently to realize the cognition as properties of self-contained individ-
autopoiesis of each other and he describes the uals that cannot be observed. Thinking, feeling,
process as follows: and religious believing are understood in terms of
dynamic self-organization in relation to a milieu.
The outcome of continued interactions of
structurally plastic systems in a medium with In contrast to the idea of domain-specific process-
redundant or recurrent structure, therefore, may ing mechanisms where the authors “do not intend
be the continued selection in the system of its a reading of domain as content domain, in the
structure that determines in it a domain of states folk sense of domains individuated by the mean-
and a domain of perturbations that allow it to ing of their constituents” (Barrett & Kurzban,
2006, p. 630), folk meaning is central in an 2007, p. 173). Religious realities, insofar as they
enactive view. Where the paradigm generally pre- can possibly be experienced, are constituted by
sented by CSR rests on the presumption that cog- such dynamic mutuality. Realities present them-
nition pertains to happenings rooted in natural- selves to us in ways that compel us because
ist laws, enactivism treats it as belonging to the they are integral to us and our embodied engage-
whole sensorimotor activity of an embedded and ment in life. A generative implication is that cog-
contextually located person. Cognition extends nition is shaped in its coupling with others in
beyond the brain into the whole body “such as the a way that intrinsically includes sociolinguistic
sensory organs, the musculoskeletal system, and practices. The vision for this updated version
relevant parts of the peripheral nervous system” is one that considers socioculturally constituted
(Robbins & Aydede, 2009, p. 4; Varela, Thomp- folk psychologies to include the content-specific
son, & Rosch, 1993). At the neurological level, religious meanings seen in communities.
for instance, “individual neurons do not detect Treating cognition as enacted adds a deeper
objectively defined features. Rather, assemblies view that explicitly integrates materiality (see
of neurons make sense of stimulation by con- Baerveldt & Verheggen, 2012). Language is cou-
structing meaning, and this meaning arises as a pled to the sensorimotor engagement with life,
function of how the brain’s endogenous and non- making language deeply embodied. There never
linear activity compensates for sensory perturba- is a natural reality over which experience is laid
tions” (Thompson, 2007, p. 530). What looks like because it is experienced as laden with soci-
self-contained religious cognition could be rein- olinguistically constituted value and meaning:
terpreted as an autopoietic system coupled to a it presents itself to us in it experiential rich-
milieu. ness. Simply put, enactivists further show how
Thompson (2007) also points out that human cognition can also be understood as experien-
cognition, as such, should not be separated from tially bound to realities constituted by sociolin-
the environment in terms of stimuli and domain- guistic practices in which we are embodied par-
specific processing mechanisms because it is ticipants. This view opens up an approach to
always coupled with something beyond itself. cognition that can handle a phenomenological
It is for this reason that he wrote “‘inner’ and naturalism within which people, including reli-
‘outer’ are not pre-existing separate spheres, but gious practitioners, live. It makes sociocultural
mutually specifying domains enacted or brought theorists naturalists in a very strong sense that
forth by the structural coupling of the system explicitly includes material systems in addition to
and its environment” (Thompson, 2007, p. 26). folk psychology.
In accordance with William James, stimuli would It entails consideration of how cognition is
not be considered triggering conditions because, something that people naturally do and so move
with the dismantling of the dichotomy between scientific efforts toward observation and partic-
“inner” and “outer,” there is a blurring of the ipation in cognitive systems. Where CSR can
boundary between world and cognition. Instead characterize sociocultural approaches to presume
of treating it as an environment with stimuli, consistent religious cognition and static doctrine,
it is treated as phenomenologically natural as the enactive approach to cognition presumes
per communal constitution realities. As such dynamic and flexible normativity that is generic,
“(1) perception consists in perceptually guided yet not determinist. Such an approach matches
action and (2) cognitive structures emerge well with what we see in everyday religious
from recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable believing: inconsistent beliefs that are generically
actions to be perceptually guided” (Thompson, recognizable. A sociocultural approach that I will
outline below leaves room for dynamics and cap- is fine for cognitive scientists who believe in nat-
tures the way religious belief is performed in uralist laws of cognitive functioning. I and oth-
everyday life. ers in the volume, however, have shown that a
As such, I have sought to provide a background specific religious belief involves particular con-
on which I can briefly transition to sociocultural tent that is integrated with emotional entangle-
theory. My aim is to further show how socio- ment with the world and wider aspects of belief.
cultural theory offers substantial insight into the People may indeed have simplistic basic cogni-
working of mind in terms of offering a compara- tions, but they are fractionally relevant to reli-
tively broader account of phenomenological nat- gious belief as it shows up in life because of how
uralism. In what follows, I will turn to sociocul- complex culturally embedded folk psychologies
tural theory to outline an account of the working are just as crucial in phenomenological natural-
of mind to contradict Slone and similar minded ism. To study natural laws, CSR must reduce the
researchers in CSR. phenomena and this reduction impoverishes the
research. The attention to abstract mechanisms
bypasses this integration and loses what it means
20.4 Sociocultural Theory and
to have the experience of religious belief.
Phenomenological Naturalism
Sociocultural psychology is ideal for consid-
The previous sections orient readers to my chal- ering religious belief in a manner that compli-
lenge that CSR’s approach to scientific nat- ments James and enactivists because it high-
uralism impoverishes what people experience lights how interpreting belief as an abstract and
as phenomenologically natural because it runs disembodied phenomenon is misguided. Hamp-
the risk of coming at the expense of everyday son (2005), for example, points out the insiders’
sociality and materiality. Other authors in this views and folk psychology cannot be dismissed
volume highlight how specific religious beliefs because our understanding of the phenomenon
are central to the constitution of mind. Guerro becomes impoverished. As such, he promotes
(Chapter 28, this volume) shows how specific a turn to religious belief that takes sociocul-
religious concepts are sociocultural phenomena tural phenomena very seriously. A socioculturally
that show our mind. Others, such as Zittoun informed approach is ideal because it has been
(Chapter 10, this volume), show how sociocul- explicitly concerned with meanings entailed in
tural symbolic resources provide guides that con- insiders’ views and folk psychologies (see also
stitute imagination. Such sociocultural phenom- Belzin 2010, p. 25). Hampson (2005) specifically
ena shape everyday life and we cannot understand argues for the necessity of enfolding theology
human minds without them. It is important to tie into the study of religious belief and so takes
the forgoing into broader sociocultural theory. the opposite stance to CSR. Such an approach
is one that does not treat what people them-
selves say about their religious beliefs as sec-
20.4.1 Mikhail Bakhtin,
ondary. To understand our research participants,
Sociocultural Theory, and
CSR researchers ought to turn to folk psychology
Embodying Language
about metaphysical agents to address how people
A proponent of CSR would say that such an actively make sense of the world in sociocultural
endeavor is irrelevant because what matters is practices.
what happens underneath in the realm of nat- Mikhail Bakhtin is a philosopher who has
uralist mechanisms (e.g., Boyer, 2001; Guthrie, inspired work in sociocultural theory and he
2002; Sperber, 1996; Slone, 2004). This position offers a view of language that can help us
understand folk psychologies as they relate to an emotional-volitional tone (1990, p. 31). In

experience. Bakhtin’s early work described how childhood, humans are socialized into how to
people are caught up in just living life and so feel about the world (Bakhtin 1990, pp. 50–52,
offers insight into the phenomenological qual- 153–154; see also McLean, Cresswell, & Ashley,
ity of religious belief. That is, he described how 2016). A significant part of language is the expe-
people act in a flow of experience: “all that riential insofar as generic terms used to describe
which is given, present-on-hand, already realized an experience are not separate from the experi-
and available – recedes, as such, into the back- ence. A repercussion is that language is bound to
ground of the action-performing consciousness” experiences socialized in a community through
(Bakhtin, 1990, p. 43; see also p. 85). Consider language and researchers ought to learn insiders’
Bakhtin’s comment that “the act performed pro- folk psychology to apprehend the concomitant
ceeds in an objectively valid context: in the world experience.
of narrowly practical ends (ends relative to living I have argued elsewhere that an implication of
one’s daily life), in the world of social and politi- the foregoing is that there is an ideological ought
cal values, the world of cognitive validities (the entwined with the language that shapes the world
act of cognition)” (1990, pp. 138–139). When people take to be phenomenologically natural
he writes about an act proceeding in an objec- (Cresswell & Teucher, 2011; McLean, Cresswell,
tively valid context he is talking first about how & Ashley, 2016). As a child develops thinking
we are caught up in life. When Bakhtin writes and emotion through interpersonal interaction,
about notions like “an objectively valid context” she is developing as caregivers feel she ought to
and “the validity of the object,” he was address- develop, which implies a morally performative
ing how the world is immediately experienced quality to participation in community. Authentic
as seemingly natural. The “objectively valid con- participation in a community is to competently
text” also involves “social and political values” perform the communal categories and feel them
and “cognitive validities” and these constitute the in the appropriate way when speaking them. It
insiders’ folk psychology that is just as real as is for this reason that to be competent is to per-
anything else. form in a manner that resonates with one’s milieu
What makes Bakhtin’s claims sociocultural in a deeply pervasive sense that includes care-
is that he writes about folk psychologies in givers’ cognitions. A child does not develop to
term of language and speech genres (Bakhtin, have emotions because she, rather, enacts them
1986, pp. 76–78). A community of religious peo- as per an appropriate fit with the world. Just like
ple, for example, would have a speech genre knowing how to walk is a matter of being able
that includes a particular repertoire of terms to perform in concert with the dynamic demands
that involve sociocultural shaping of the world of one’s own self-propelled locomotion in tan-
(see Cresswell, 2011). That is, the folk psychol- dem with environmental contingencies, knowing
ogy expressed in insiders’ speech genre shapes how to think or feel is being able to perform such
the way that people understand the world; they activities authentically in an contextually appro-
shape meaning by way of shaping how people priate way. According to the normativity of a
apprehend the world around and within them. community, one is competent when one speaks
Such understanding is meant in a deeply per- using categories that are performed and felt as
vasive sense to Bakhtin as speech genres are they ought to be.
embodied and so include experience. Consider Bakhtin leaves us with an understanding of
how Bakhtin argued for in intimate relationship religious belief that complements the forego-
between language to embodied notions such as ing. Religious belief manifests in the world
with seemingly concrete reality because “non- 20.5 Moving Forward

incarnated thought, non-incarnated action, non-
incarnated fortuitous life is an empty possibil- I have advocated a turn to sociocultural theory
ity” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 43). It is in this way that is predicated on a broader conception sci-
that religious belief involves an experience of entific naturalism. This move means to consider
the world that it shows up in life as ostensi- the phenomenological realities religious believ-
bly natural. James’s pragmatism and Hampson’s ers live instead of realities that researchers deter-
(2005) advocacy for sociocultural psychology is mine a priori. When we take an approach inspired
a radical turn to “what is.” It offers a science by James, we turn to the shared realities that are
looking at facts as they show up in the experi- not entirely objective. Such realities, however, are
ence of religious beliefs rather than dismissing not just subjective because they are constituted
them. We must address the deeply experiential in sociocultural contexts. The forgoing departure
feature of religious belief if we want to get at the from abstract and disembodied mechanisms does
socioculturally constituted givenness of religious not mean a collapse into studying the subjective
belief. Bakhtin inspires an inductive approach fancies of religious believers. As such, it is pos-
that can potentially address the deeply mean- sible to study religious experience while staying
ingful and phenomenologically natural experi- grounded in sociocultural realities. Importantly,
ences that people live as part of their participation such facts include a rich approach to phenomeno-
in religious communities. This approach broad- logically natural religious belief.
ens the study of religious belief to include the There is an important ethical implication
meanings people enact in their religious believ- bound up with this proposal. Teo (2008) dis-
ing. Researchers are no longer restricted to look- cusses “epistemic violence” that emerges in
ing at simple intuitive beliefs and can consider much of psychologically oriented research. I
the more ecologically valid religious experiences. showed how the concern for cognitive mecha-
This approach differs from the approach that we nisms means that much of what we write about
usually see in CSR because it deals with what in CSR from a metaphysically naturalist per-
beliefs are about. spective is speculative because the subject mat-
A sociocultural approach takes on a fallacious ter in cognitive science cannot literally be seen.
claim sometimes seen in CSR: that all knowledge The speculative quality of CSR is not a prob-
is local if one takes a sociocultural view (e.g., lem so long as researchers are not intending to
Slone, 2004, p. 37). I’m taking a position that say anything to religious believers. A challenge is
helps grasp local knowledge but does not pre- that researchers cannot remain cloistered among
clude comparative discussion as we are not only like-minded academics and researchers are com-
concerned with subjective perspectives. It is one monly branching out to speak to practical con-
of epistemic humility that attempts to grasp reli- cerns. It is in this context that Teo (2008) notes
gious belief from the inside of a community by how speculation has serious practical, behavioral,
taking a richer approach to phenomenologically or existential consequences and I argue that such
natural experience. It looks to lived religion as consequences are rooted in the manner that spec-
it is constituted in language and so grasps local ulation is a communally situated practice. One
experiences but this understanding is not merely community can relegate another’s purview as
subjective. A sociocultural approach treats cogni- inferior and
tion as constituted in language practices that are as soon as these speculations construct the “Other”
not reducible to individual subjectivities or, as I as problematic or as inferior, with possible negative
discuss above, static religious codes. consequences for the “Other,” one should speak of
a form of violence that is produced in References

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21 Psyche and Religio Face to Face:
Religion, Psychology, and Modern
Subjectivity in the Mirror
Luis Martínez Guerrero
Within the realm of activities that constitute the as religion? Doesn’t psychology, a producer of
human experience, religion is one of the most official images of what an individual should be,1
outstanding. This is because, over time, religion owe its own identity largely to religion? Are these
has produced a heavy cultural engineering of questions we ask ourselves not an effect of the
guidance and control of individuals’ built-upon conditions of possibility generated deep down by
stories, rites, symbols, images, chants, prayers, religious thought?
and so on, which have been employed day and If we agree on the fact that the formal cause
night, at different times of the year, at decisive of both psyche and psychology – which is a cul-
moments in life, on certain sexual customs, on tural artifact that informs us about the properties
food, on clothing, and so on. The application of attributed to a psyche at a given moment – lies in
this entire symbolic universe has resulted in a the cultural regimes of meaning, religion must be
psychologically problematic arena to respond to considered one of the main highways of meaning
with respect to the formation of the personal and through which both have traveled. In this regard,
collective identity (Rosa, Bellelli & Bakhurst, certain sociology schools of thought and critical
2000), the development of habits for action thought have studied religious practices as tech-
(Bellah, 1985; Giner, 1996), or the introduc- niques that culturally and historically create spe-
tion of ethical, aesthetical, and moral values cific ways of being an individual (see, for exam-
(Luckmann, 1971). ple, Bourdieu, 1999; Elias, 2000; Foucault, 1990;
Due to the sociocultural role that psychology Sombart, 2005; Weber, 2001).
has been given in the study and interpretation The logic of our work is then located within
of psyche, it is not strange that it takes charge the historiographical tradition with genealogical
of creating an understanding of how the phe- traits, seeking to explore this cultural decanta-
nomenological context of the individual is orga- tion process of modern subjectivity (see, for
nized based on religious practices and ideas by example, Danziger, 1997; Rose, 1996) and
considering them as tools guiding their actions in attempts to account for some of those pro-
the world. cesses which have taken part in shaping such
The aim of this chapter is to invert that a contemporary statute of the self. Our chap-
premise. What happens if we put psychology in ter will therefore attempt to propose an expla-
front of a mirror? What if the physiognomy of nation for these matters by trying to respond
psyche as we currently think about it – a virtual to (1) how psyche is conceived of by modern
set of functions and skills culturally stabilized for thought and how it can be studied; (2) what
action – has been forged on environments such image of religion allows it to be considered a
Psyche and Religio Face to Face 381
source of cultural resources for the configuration oretical sensitivities within and without psychol-
of psyche and psychology; and (3) what role ogy (Bourdieu, 1999; Danziger, 1997).
genealogical methodology can play in this mat- Therefore, in contrast to any intrapsychic con-
ter. Finally, we will exemplify all these aspects ception of subjectivity, new formulations arise
through the case of the Spiritual Exercises of from it, conceived of as a liquid and unstable fic-
Ignatius of Loyola and his Christian conception tion (Bauman, 2004), an historical object (Rosa
of subjectivity and the government of emotions. & Blanco, 2007) resulting from the fabric of val-
ues, concepts, beliefs, moral guidelines, ethical
and aesthetical criteria, and so on, in a set of spe-
21.1 Modern Subjectivity in cific historical and cultural situations (Arruda-
Times of Liquid Identities: Leal, 2011).
Psyche as an Historical Object Subjectivity, understood then as the frame of
semiotic mediations each person has at a given
We remain unknown to ourselves, we seekers after moment to interpret and assign a meaning and
knowledge, even to ourselves: and with good
significance to reality, is thereby understood as
reason. We have never sought after ourselves, so
a virtual object segregated through the prac-
how should we one day find ourselves? (Nietzsche,
tices and contingent devices of history, which
1988, p. 3)
have conformed their own historical methods
A constructivist perspective that denaturalizes the of subjectivation (Foucault, 1982/2005; Rose,
unitary and ahistorical notion of psyche, from 1999). Subjectivity is then generated through its
a long tradition in Western philosophy, must be concomitant relationship with cultural artifacts,
born from an estrangement forged in modern specifically through those which have the pur-
times: the idea of the compositional and hetero- pose of managing the conscience that Foucault
geneous nature of the individual and his con- calls “technologies of the self” (techniques de
sciousness. According to Taylor (1992), such soi) (1991).
an idea would be an inescapable effect of any Foucault defines these technologies as the cul-
society based on a liberal economy that places tural devices that allow individuals to carry
the individual at its core as an autonomous and out certain types of operations on their bod-
responsible being (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). ies, thoughts or behavior, thereby obtaining a
This psychological ethos, perfectly grasped by transformation of themselves with the purpose
Illouz (2008) as the summit of the Delphic maxim of attaining a certain state of happiness, purity,
(“know thyself”), has resulted in the discursive wisdom, or immortality by shaping desires, aspi-
exaggeration of the realm of subjectivity, plac- rations, and dissatisfactions through the incul-
ing the individual itself as one of many objects cation of certain practices of introspection and
of knowledge in epistemic projects such as self-awareness. From this perspective, the indi-
psychology. vidual has an active involvement in the formation
Indeed, the effect of such a state of affairs of his own self.
would have been that subjectivity itself – The fact that the individual and the technolo-
explanatory hypertrophied – is conceived of as a gies of the self are developed in parallel to each
problem to be studied, largely signing the death other gives us a hint into how a simple explo-
certificate of the self when understood as an ration of these technologies, which are present at
innate and universal entity, taking instead con- each moment in history, can reflect the process
sciousness of its composition from certain the- of transit, retreat, change, and so on, from some
382 lu is m a rt ín e z g ue rre ro
conceptions of subjectivity to others. Of the sev- which fields such as psychology have picked
eral anthropological projects, and, therefore, of up.
the historical development of the successive the-
ories of the individual that grow at the same point
of the social objects through which they crys- 21.2 Christianity as an
tallize, human history can then be considered Outstanding Source of
a chronicle of this process of self-construction Technologies of the Self
(Blanco, 2002).
The effort to understand the constitution of the The Western body is Christian. Two thousand
modern subject, which can result only from an years of Christian discourse – anatomy, medicine,
analysis through time of the processes of stabi- physiology, of course, but also philosophy,
lization or change which have set their orientation theology, and aesthetics – have fashioned the body
in the present, is devoid of purpose without the we inhabit. And along with that discourse we have
support of genealogy (Nietzsche, 1988). Thus, inherited Platonic-Christian models that mediate
genealogical thought (Foucault, 1991) focuses on our perception of the body, the symbolic value of
the body’s organs, and their hierarchically ordered
technologies of the self that place human beings
functions . . . All have contributed to Christianity’s
within specific regimes of the person from the
sculpting of the flesh . . . our image of ourselves . . .
logic of governance, while the shape taken by that None of this could exist in the absence of the
technical relationship of the individual with him- above-mentioned discourse. (Onfray, 2011,
self has been the subject of all manner of levels of p. 47)
rationality which have intended to shape the way
in which we comprehend and lead our existence Religion can be understood as one of the
as human beings in the name of certain moral, realms of rationality in which the technologies
aesthetic, political, religious, and epistemological of the self have been used and promulgated
objectives. with greater emphasis through time. Specifically,
One of the objectives of such a genealogi- Christianity – due to its historical relevance in
cal project, about which we commented above, the West – saturates with its meanings the natural
is the dismantling of the individual as a sort world and its phenomena (death, pain, suffering)
of “ideal” object, underscoring instead his con- through the personal psychological realm (expe-
tingent nature that stems from the conveyance rience, habits, conscience) and the community
of a highly heterogeneous amalgam of trails environment (values, guidelines, beliefs), teleo-
of thought, regulation techniques, organizational logically intertwining the destinations of man, the
problems, and so on, understanding “interiority” group, and the universe itself into a common fab-
as a type of bend or fold of exteriority that does ric of values.
not imply the existence of a background struc- This is because the shadow that Christian-
tured a priori inside him (Deleuze, 1992). ity has cast over Western civilization is immea-
Thus, genealogy represents the instrument that surable to the point that, without using it as a
allows for the exploration of the precursors of reference, the culture of European roots would
modern subjectivity, which seeks its own for- be completely incomprehensible.2 Therefore, it
mation process through the analysis of proper seems unquestionable that, at least in the West,
subjectivation technologies of diverse areas of most of the human cultural capital for manag-
knowledge within the culture which several the- ing and developing directive functions has been
ories about human nature have disseminated, concentrated within religious devices from Chris-
which have arrived at the present time and tianity (del Río & Álvarez, 2007) and from other
equally influential religions, such as Judaism words of Fierro (1979), “the existence of gods
(Speltini & Passini, 2014; Loewenthal, 1992) and is uncertain . . . But religions, those do exist and
Islamism (Tiliouine, Cummins, & Davern, 2009; they are from this world” (p. 17).
Haque, 2004). Consequently, religious action is deeply
Nonetheless, identifying the nature of the reli- ingrained in the cultural dimension, in the sym-
gious as a cultural occurrence in addition to its bolic system of meanings through which each
theological connotations was neither a sponta- society finds a meaning for reality. If culture
neous nor an evident assumption for the social is that frame of reference common to a whole
sciences (Smith, 1991). Just like with psyche, populace, which provides ideas, values, and
religio has a long history as a supernatural entity. explanations about society, man, and the world,
After a long historical process, religio gradually which guides, motivates, and gives a sense to
split off into two identities: one of them consid- actions both individual and collective, religion
ered a system of transcendental ideas in hand is undoubtedly a very significant part of such a
with theology, philosophy, and the phenomenol- frame.
ogy of religion, and the other a practice that Excluding, henceforth, metaphysical consider-
shapes cultural devices such as myths, rites, and ations reserved for personal beliefs, anthropo-
institutions, which were embodied in the work of social sciences – those fields that cultivate cul-
anthropologists, sociologists, and historians. tural phenomena to a highly epistemological
The cultural analysis of the religion is, then, degree – should engage in its study without delay.
only possible by the late nineteenth century with Such study should undoubtedly encompass cul-
this constructivist and conventional understand- tural psychology and the genealogical project it
ing of it in lieu of the naturalist interpretations comprises to comprehend the current statute of
of the religious experience.3 A movement would subjectivity.
develop in parallel – not by chance, we believe –
with the progressive psychologization of Western
21.3 Psyche and Religio Face to
culture and along with constructivist approaches
Face: A Genealogical Approach
to subjectivity.
From Cultural Psychology
Thus, from just a modern standpoint, we can
state that, independently from our opinion on reli- If we agree, then, on the fact that culture is an
gious beliefs (i.e., whether we identify ourselves immense driving force in the shaping of the indi-
as believers, atheists, or secular), Westerners vidual and his experience, it will therefore be
are culturally religious (Christians) because such unquestionable for the psychological explanation
meanings and values can be found, metaphori- that the context be at the core of its workings. One
cally speaking, at the very heart of our cultural of the theoretical schools of thought that has the
constitution as persons. greatest compromise with this premise is cultural
Hence, even if the content of religious atti- psychology, since its research field would con-
tudes – whether the sacred, divinity, mystery, the centrate on the space formed by the crossroads
absolute, or the supernatural – is subjected to of cultural artifacts and psychological processes,
belief or lack thereof, but not to science, reli- placing the meaning and the mediated action at
gious standpoints themselves constitute instead the core of its concerns (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007).
an unquestionable anthropological reality ruled The task of cultural psychology is to account
by the same principles of those of any social phe- for how culture and mind configure each other
nomenon and are therefore susceptible to a possi- through chronotopic dispositions4 which are
ble scientific expression. This is because, in the always personal; this calls for constant support of
the historical explanation, since it absolutely can- Furthermore, it is not only that trying to
not comprehend psychism without considering understand our experience without contemplating
the specific developmental conditions that shaped religion is set to fail given the complexity and
it. Thus, cultural psychology has understood the intensity of its anthropological and social impli-
religious universe as one of its main fields of cations, and that the contribution of psychologi-
study, as a spontaneous “laboratory” where the cal insight becomes irreplaceable when trying to
ways in which cultural artifacts and the mind are comprehend the impact such a phenomenon has
affected in parallel can be generally understood had – and still has – over human patterns of activ-
(Belzen, 2010). ity. Our point goes beyond that; if we agree that
Hence, from this idea, we can infer two lines of psychology does not describe natural categories
constantly overlapping work within cultural psy- it “encountered” during its epistemic activity, but
chology in regards to religion. that they are rather a product of history (Smith,
One approach is to emphasize a synchronic 1991), psychology itself should also reorient its
analysis of the instruments and psychological focus toward how the anthropological conception
effects that the usage of religious technologies it accommodates, the tools of analysis it employs
implies in the management of the conscious and, overall, its own endeavors which largely pre-
experience. It would thus involve consider- scribe what a person “should be like” today are
ing the mental mechanisms though which the result of a long process of historical segrega-
religion becomes psychologically relevant, tion, among other realms of activity, of the same
requiring, to that effect (a) the analysis of the religious practices (see, for example, Loredo &
operational structures of religious practices and Blanco, 2011; Cohen, 2011; Balltondre, 2011;
(b) the type of conscience phenomena they Loredo, 2005).
produce for the management of the everyday In a manner of speaking, the “genetic code”
experience nowadays. of psychology is imbued with technologies
This is particularly relevant in a time when employed by religion, which have set histori-
zealotry leads to harsh wars, when the strength of cal conditions of possibility for psychology as a
creeds can mobilize populations and when moral field to be a viable project. Although psychol-
and ethical crises transform societies. In sum- ogy has progressively dislodged the theological
mary, an understanding of the life of the indi- sense from Christian practices, the anthropolog-
vidual of the twenty-first century is affected by ical model they generate is still unsuspectingly
religion. in effect, which proves that, after all, they are
This approach, therefore, researches prayer still cultural architectures which are very much
and its properties for the affectionate-cognitive alive. Consider the redefinition that psychology
regulation under certain circumstances of partic- has made in regards to figures such as that of the
ular vulnerability for the individual (Pargament, spiritual director or the confessor, the examina-
1997; Martínez Guerrero, 2010), also studying tion of conscience, self-observation, and visual-
the role of religious discourse in the development ization techniques, and so on. Psychology should
of the identity and habitus (Jesús, 2011; Belzen, also be part, then, of a historical project in itself
2011), conversion processes and discourse shifts that makes aware the fact that it is also the prod-
of the individual from a narrative standpoint uct of time that informs the genealogy of the
(Popp-Baier, 2008; 2012), the analysis of reli- progressive psychologization of Western culture
gious beliefs when making moral decisions (Day, (see, for example, Danziger, 1997; Rose, 1996;
2007), and so on.5 Elias, 2000).
This is why in a set of recursions that should At the heart of Christian theology, emo-
never stop, cultural psychology must operate tions have been a constantly problematized phe-
an endless circular motion between present and nomenon within ethical discussion in the aspect
past times that researches and acknowledges the of its influence over action. They appear, then,
process of development of its technologies and as forces that can obstruct the progress of an
analysis categories from religious practices of organized life around faith (under ideas such as
other times but also be aware of the fact that temptation), or as a means of celestial contem-
they have set the conditions of possibility for plation (the heart as a via regia toward God). In
such a questioning to be carried out in current any case, these must be subjected to proper reg-
times. ulation through a set of rules, precepts, and tech-
To sum up, psychology can only find the gen- nologies of the self as devices for action, identity,
esis of its own rationale – the one that seeks to and deliberation.
explain itself from the past and in the present – Given that Christianity would have understood
in the frame of a genealogical model that tracks action itself as the direct consequence – among
those areas, especially the religious ones, from other aspects – of the ways of feeling, its role with
which it may have surfaced. Thus, we can estab- respect to this aspect would have been to conform
lish a contemplation loop in which religion is the way in which people experienced their emo-
psychologically relevant as much as psychology tions under the light of an axiology that saturated
itself has been religiously fundamental in the the representational environment of affective life
past. While this line of research is still in its by cultivating among its followers those emo-
early stages, we will demonstrate the potential it tions it considered relevant (love, compassion),
has for better understanding modern subjectivity while at the same time inhibiting others consid-
from realms of activity as relevant as religions ered undesirable (envy, pride), imbuing with its
by means of a case we have developed in other significance the secular aspects of life (family,
places (Martínez Guerrero, 2015). work), creating the situations, both external (tem-
ples, liturgical calendars) and internal (difficul-
ties, anxiety, guilt) where emotions “should have”
21.4 Emotions,
been felt, as well as the specific activities that
Self-Governance, and Religious
would have stimulated or inhibited them (prayer,
Development of the Inner Life
confession) (Emmons, 2005).
Emotions constitute one of the main areas of sub- Christian subjectivity, built around morals,
jectivity which have been developed in the West finds in the education of affections and will the
with the greatest force through their overlapping pillars on which self-governance supports itself.
with the fabric of religious practices. The impor- The Christian, therefore, is turned into a philolo-
tance that affectivity has had in the conformation gist of his own spirit, which should be explored
of the model of the Western person seems to be to find God concealed within his own emotions.
free from questioning (Corrigan, 2007). One of In this sense, it would not be very hard for us to
the reasons for it can be found in the persistent identify the history of theology as a discussion
support that anthropologies offered by Christian- of the subject of the functions of feelings in the
ity have given it with respect to such an endeavor, management of the conscience, life in a society
constructing through it the leitmotif of knowl- and knowledge of the afterlife.
edge of the self as a guardian of the moral consti- If the progressive control and acknowledg-
tution of the individual. ment of affections has managed to identify itself
in the Western way of thinking with the develop- ship with God. Ignatius wrote that the exercises
ment of subjectivity itself – supported by the pre- “have as their purpose the conquest of self and the
scribed manners (largely religious) of organizing, regulation of one’s life in such a way that no deci-
understanding, and expressing the repertoire of sion is made under the influence of any inordi-
emotions sponsored by a series of socially struc- nate attachment” (Loyola, 1548/2010, para. 21).6
tured mechanisms for private and collective intro- In this process, the individuals must undertake
spection (Foucault, 1990) – Christianity repre- these exercises with the assistance of an experi-
sents an inexhaustible source for examining and enced spiritual director who will help them shape
understanding how psychological categories of the retreat and understand what they are experi-
affections were built. Consequently, this develop- encing.7
ment affected the construction of a more complex In any case, Ignatian exercises did not emerge
agency which bestowed on the individual a con- ex nihilo. Many of their elements can easily be
stantly growing inner space for deliberation when found in previous sources. Paul Rabbow (1954)
acting. demonstrated that the exercises of Loyola were
nothing more than the result of the Christian
understanding of a certain philosophical tradi-
21.4.1 The Spiritual Exercises at
tion with a Graeco-Roman origin – Stoicism –
the Dawn of Modern Subjectivity
applied, through Neoplatonism, based on a dif-
Some of those sets of Christian technologies of ferent ascesis linked to the moral environment
the self for the regulation of affection which reach that gradually developed from the fourth to the
their summit during the sixteenth century are the sixteenth century led by the Desert Fathers and
Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola (1491– Philocalia, through the Augustinian doctrine, the
1556). scholastic conception, the Franciscan criticisms
Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Society of to Nominalism and, finally, through Erasmus’
Jesus, represents one of the decisive milestones in Humanism and its psychological anthropology.
the history of spirituality and thought that merges (For a detailed walkthrough of this process, see
with the appearance of the modern subject in Martínez Guerrero, 2015.)
the sixteenth century. In this regard, the Spiritual From the standpoint of the development of
Exercises were the founding text over which most subjectivity, the relevance given to the exercises
of this process balanced from the viewpoint of its gained significance in the context of a change
religious school of thought. in the locus of mind control, shifting from an
What are the Spiritual Exercises and what is external consideration linked to certain collective
their purpose? The origin of the Ignatian exer- solidarities (masses, fief), to another one which
cises lies in his personal experience as a man was fully internal and individualist, which we
searching for growing in union with God and to could agree to consider modern (Verger, 1999).
discern God’s will. During this process, he kept This transition was particularly intense within
a journal as he gained spiritual insight and deep- the realm of religious life where, not by coinci-
ened his spiritual experience. He added to these dence, ethics and mysticism were the practices
notes as he directed other people and discovered on which the subjectivist shift was forged faster,
what “worked.” Eventually, Ignatius compiled a shifting faith from the medieval research mostly
set of meditations, prayers, reflections, and con- concerned with God toward a theological idea
templative practices into a carefully designed of man which sought to reveal the mysteries of
framework of a retreat, which he called “spiritual metaphysics based on human nature through self-
exercises,” to help people deepen their relation- development and self-cultivation. This direction
resulted in a concern for the nursing of the soul as tion of the processes week by week and day by
a manifestation of that new religious trend of the day, different types of prayers required depend-
interior as a means to achieve community piety. ing on the weekday, processes of scrutiny of
Either way, this process gravitated over the the concealed meaning that emotional reactions
Spiritual Exercises of Loyola, a perfect syn- may hold, imagination training that results in
thesis of Renaissance humanism and Christian- an increased exercise efficacy, exercises of sum-
ity, which were simultaneously an incentive for maries and repetitions through which the exerci-
and an expression of that shift in the anthro- tant has had the most intense affectionate expe-
pological paradigm that enriched the soil for riences, regulation of the daily space and time
modernity with the advent of autonomy and self- with prayers, aesthetic configuration of appro-
consciousness and, consequently, the realm of priate internal scenarios for each weekday that
freedom and individual responsibility with it. include elements relating to the body, food, cli-
mate, and so on, recommended reading, atten-
dance of liturgical services, and so on – all of this
21.4.2 On the Notion of Exercise: A
under the supervision of a director who verifies
Book for Building Yourself
that each exercise is properly performed.
In this regard, within the psychological realm, the This complex structure of exercises is set up
pedagogy of the Spiritual Exercises is based pre- with the sole goal of enabling the exercitant to
cisely on this development of the will (willing- learn to find, study and discern the origin and
ness) and, consequently, the development of char- cause of the subtle internal movements of his
acter (habits of willingness) and the encourage- spirit, which may originate from both God and
ment of self-governance. To that effect, its whole the disarray of their affection itself, according to
system focuses on the control of emotions, con- Ignatius, thereby setting up the discernment that
sidering that they have the key to the will and, precedes any choice aligned with the divine will
therefore, to moral action. or against it (Loyola, 1548/2010).
The Spiritual Exercises are therefore a com- The exercises can then be interpreted as knowl-
plex psychological methodology concentrated on edge that stems from the praxis, a development
correcting the flawed physiognomy of the soul and learning of the dynamism of the internal
to achieve the proper and normal development space that grows from the continuous motion the
of its spiritual functions and on educating affec- exercitant is subjected to during its many exer-
tion so that it results in a pedagogy of the will cises, with the end purpose of generating a reper-
that is naturally ambivalent until it is turned into tory of experience over the mental life that allows
an affection oriented toward God (Arzubialde, him to achieve an increasing autonomy (Peeters,
2009). That is how Ignatius himself puts it when 1926). In spite of its brevity, the book of the
he defines the exercises as “every way of prepar- exercises contains up to 118 different verbs of
ing and disposing the soul to rid itself of all the activity referring as much to external actions as
disordered tendencies, and, after it is rid, to seek to those which are mainly internal (García de
and find the Divine Will as to the management of Castro, 2002).
one’s life for the salvation of the soul” (Loyola, This is the reason why, besides being consid-
1548/2010, para. 1). ered a dialectic of the spirit, they are mainly
An objective by which the exercitant is taken a dialectic of will that provides an entire psy-
through an exhaustive program of activities that chological tactic of transformation of the person
includes exercises both general and particular who, through his own efforts, allows himself to
for testing the conscience, a written objectiva- conquer himself (Codina, 1931).
ing self-control and an increasingly lucid, pene-

21.4.3 Realizing and Relishing
trating, and subtle discernment of that world of
Things Interiorly: Knowledge of
emotions and thoughts that often cross paths, col-
the Self
lide in the realm of freedom, and move in oppo-
As we can see, the Spiritual Exercises are a site directions.
time for training the functions that prepare the Therefore, we can consider the exercises as a
exercitant to chart, comprehend, and study the psychological technology for the creation of a
meaning and tendency that each affection he self that helps in distancing the individual from
feels leads him to make decisions. From this his soul. This is because the effect of continuous
item, we can infer that the main exercise present reflection on the self that Loyola proposes ulti-
across the Ignatian exercises is the examina- mately causes an internal diffraction that turns
tion of consciousness, which will constitute the the exercitant into a subject and an object at
realms of the mind as a formally psychologi- the same time: one part of him appears in the
cal space in which the possible consequences third person as an analyst and judge, while the
of each intention and action can be unraveled other – the one who acts in the first person – goes
through their continuous practice. For Ignatius, through the experiences. Whether a participle or
consciousness is therefore positioned at the core a noun, the subject is an object possessed by the
of human reality, which is why both piety and exercitant (according to Gillespie’s taxonomy –
metaphysics would adopt an unmistakably psy- Chapter 13, this volume – this process of self-
chological direction based on his work (Aldea, reflection would be found within the rupture the-
1993). ories of reflexivity).
Thus, ruling yourself (that is, conquering That is why the method of Loyola is based fun-
yourself) unfailingly implies knowing yourself, damentally on introspection and dialogue, on a
specifically, according to Ignatius, conversing deep reflective character over the experience. The
with our feelings or knowing the tendencies growing importance of the subject in the realm
toward which they lead us in both thought and of knowledge, which has left its mark across the
deed. Therefore, the main objective of Loyola’s whole of modern epistemology, can already be
method for the exercitant is that he learns as noticed in Loyola’s proposal.
soon as possible to delve inside himself, learn-
ing to interpret the language of God through the
21.4.4 Disciplining Experience – On
emotions and affections rooted in his experience
Giving Someone “The Way and
(Hormaza, 2010). This is the reason why Loyola
Order”: The Development of
could then be fairly seen as a “logo-technician,”
Subjectivity Through the Rhetoric
in other words, as founder of a language of inte-
and Fractal Structure of the
riority (Barthes, 2000).
Exercises
The Ignatian method is, therefore, a practice
that produces a profound psychological density The Ignatian praxis by which the exercitant
among exercitants, since it involves them car- shapes his inner world is far from an arbitrary
rying out a fine observation and scrutiny on or confusing process. It involves a regulated pro-
themselves with respect to their internal states cedure that carries a specific conception, a logic
to deal with psychological subtleties which are on the development of the inner life. Due to their
enormously complex. It is a work that involves condition as a method, the Spiritual Exercises
the spiritual reading of the complex inner life, require a structure more than do other types of
which, for man, is a permanent endeavor of seek- texts (García Mateo, 2000), so much so that we
can even state that its meaning can be discovered his point of view, attitude and conviction (submit-
only by and through form. ting to reason). It is for this reason that commu-
For these reasons, we can consider the Igna- nicating with oneself implies, at the same time,
tian working model as less mystical than rhetori- fighting oneself with eyes set on this transforma-
cal (Fessard, 2010) because, just as in classic oration of the characterization of the world (Hadot,
tory, Loyola seeks to set rules to locate, pick up Davidson, & Palacio 2006).
and lay out the most proper arguments that allow However, to prevail in this struggle, exposing
the exercitant to establish a relationship with his the truth will not suffice; it is necessary to per-
“speaker” – and with himself as a third party – suade. Therefore, the purpose of the dialogue is
to obtain an answer from him. Loyola dubbed not as important as is the manner in which it takes
this capability of the exercises to regulate experi- place, the mediums seized to generate the solu-
ence as giving someone “the way and order” (dar tion (Kennedy, 1999; Billig, 1999). Herein lies
modo y orden) (Loyola, 1548/2010, para. 2). the importance of the rhetoric, seen in a sophis-
By order, Ignatius refers to a set of elements tic light, that Plato confronted, as a logography;
of content (reflective and affective) as well as to in other words, that its object is the plausible, the
psychological and material resources (moments illusion and worship rather than the truth.
during the day, places, climatological elements, As a result, attempting to reconstruct the ori-
body positions, etc.) set in accordance with the entation of those exercises through a method
principle and foundation (para. 23)8 and with it set forth by rhetoric – especially the delibera-
as a basis (Iglesias, 1989). The order would then tive genre, which focuses on advocating for that
involve the logical concatenation of the materi- which is useful and persuading against that which
als and meditations present within the exercises is detrimental – would be the way to learn how
(Loyola, 1548/2010, para. 2). In this regard, for the self-persuasion that will constitute the “voice
Ignatius, the order of the exercises would reveal of the conscience,” that the Spiritual Exercises
the order and logic of the spiritual life itself, the posit, is formally oriented.
grammar of interiority directed at the prosecution Loyola rhetorically organized his Spiritual
of “the End” (Salvation). The way refers to the Exercises around three formal units that delved
method itself, the technique that sets off the order into the densification of the conscience of the
(para. 3) (Iglesias, 1989). exercitant (exercise, day, and week). These three
As evidenced above, the basis of Ignatian spir- units are prone to be seen, not by chance, as part
ituality is the language, the grammar of the of a single fractal structure. This is a structure
thought (Barthes, 2000). Therefore, it is not that delves into the idea of a dynamic evolution
just that Loyola’s text is the result of a con- of the agency mediatized by certain technologies
scious application of the humanistic rhetoric of of the self that, due to their recursive nature
the sixteenth century over the world of Christian within the processes of meaning, allow for pro-
practices, as proposed by Rogelio García Mateo gressively increased levels of self-governance of
(2000), but rather that they constitute an elaborate the action.
theory of the bene dicendi scientia. To sum up: Thus, as discussed above, the exercitant pro-
the Spiritual Exercises do not apply a rhetoric, gressively adopts certain reflective guidelines
but are rather a rhetoric themselves.9 dealing with psychological states – emotions,
From this standpoint, any spiritual exercise is thoughts – which regulate their actions, delv-
dialogic because it involves a true exercise of ing into the mediational structure of the relation-
presence before oneself as a third party, forcing ship with himself, appearing, then, as a sort of
the subject to divide and allowing him to change “multitude” of viewpoints from which he should
distance himself and handle to face his reality set the working of psyche and the shaping of con-
through his choices. It is then that the dialogue- scious experience. The suspicion of the relevance
related aspect of the conscience of the exerci- of this influx stemmed from the historical attes-
tant takes hold as part of a dramatic action tation that the development of the main forms
that involves him performing on himself con- of organization and comprehension of public and
tinuous excisions that enable him to simultane- private life in Europe had grown under Christian
ously consider several viewpoints when acting practices as a set of cultural artifacts useful when
and knowing what to do (Hermans, 2001; see also providing the collective of the human experience
Chapter 13 and Chapter 15, this volume). with a moral sense.
The exercises thereby favor the creation of cri- We said that the emergence of such a stance
teria, methods, and guidelines for self-evaluation over the religious found its justification in the
that individuals should apply to their experiences. heart of a new anthropological concept that ques-
The whole life becomes a continued spiritual tioned the innate character of human psyche,
exercise, a continuous reflection about the self placing it within the domain of cultural objects
in which everything in the life of the exercitant and inside the historiography arena as a phe-
is a mirror that constantly forces him to look at nomenon embedded in a set of specific social
himself. relationships that shape it. In this regard, sub-
Therefore, the main contribution of the exer- jectivity would be conceived of as a process
cises is, as mentioned, enabling a system, pro- that emerges at the concomitance of individuals
viding a method that allows the exercitant to give with cultural artifacts through which they oper-
“the way and order” to his inner experience. They ate within a socially informed reality. Specifi-
can thus be considered a metalanguage of regu- cally, the Foucaultian hypothesis held that subjec-
lation that reveals (or recreates) the base syntax tivity would be more closely related to the use of
on which experience and the reflective process of those artifacts for which the main function was
self-control that – with the influence of the com- the management of interiority, of the conscience,
pany of Jesus starting in the sixteenth century in which the French philosopher dubbed “technolo-
conformation with most intellectual realms – will gies of the self.”
cause such a grammar to support varied scientific Thus, once the ontological symmetry was
and artistic projects and ends up becoming secu- established between the culturalist representa-
larized with the passage of time into fields such tion of religion and subjectivity, the conditions
as psychology (Martínez Guerrero, 2015). were open for the possibility that the psychol-
ogy of constructivist sensitivity would question
the realm of religiosity and the technologies of
21.5 Conclusions: Toward a
the self related to it as a psychologically fertile
Genealogy of Psychological
ground for the harvest of subjectivity in which a
Rationality
good measure of the image of the contemporary
The question that gave rise to our work was Western subject has been constructed.
related to the role that religion – and more specif- It is for this reason that, besides the psycho-
ically, Christianity – may have played in the way logical relevance we may give religion nowadays
and form in which individuals, at least in the in guiding the behavior of people, in our opin-
West, were capable of thinking about themselves. ion psychology should aspire to a more ambi-
This is a phenomenon we broadly dub “subjec- tious project, such as the genealogical one, which
tivity” and it influences the way psychology pic- seeks the foundations of its own rationale. In
tures psyche and the development of the way to other words, there was a “psychology” before
GENEALOGICAL APPROACH
Discursive construction
of the subject matter
Milestones of religion as an object that has
become psychologically outstanding
PRESENT
PAST
(Modern subjectivity)
Deconstruction of the
Milestones of a history of subjectivity
fundamentals of
from religious practices current rationality
Technologies of the Self + Activity system:

stabilized representation of the subject’s agency
(e.g. Spiritual Exercises)
Figure 21.1 An eternal obsessive loop. The genealogical relationship between religion and psychology.
“psychology” that imprinted its form, allowing us logical nature (psychotherapy, coaching, etc.),
to ponder the importance and relevance that cer- even though they were not devoid of a moral
tain religious practices acquired in the historical frame (see Note 1).
process of the present constitution of subjectiv- This is why the historical overview carried out
ity, specifically in the development of reflexive between Christianity and Western rationality, iso-
forms of self-control by employing technologies morphic in their foundations, is so intense that
of the self which have enabled the cultural con- it may lead us to wonder whether an epistemo-
struction of inner life, of the “spiritual life.” Such logical and disciplinary project such as psychol-
is the case we have seen in relation to emotions ogy would possibly be separated from the cul-
and the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola. ture forged in the West. As demonstrated by many
The Christian individual is therefore a fundamen- studies in light of this revelation, the conceptual
tal precursor of the modern individual on whom and anthropological dependency that the social
he is based. sciences – all of them with European roots – have
Psyche, vested as soul by religio, abandoned in regards to Christian rationality is so intense
that old garment but still holds many of its ele- (structure of the inner world, causes of the action,
ments in current times. This is the reason why formation of agency, explanatory dualisms, time
many philosophical and religious practices would irreversibility, causality of the action) that any
turn, after their Christian transformation, into attempt to study the human action separated from
introspective techniques such as confession or its conceptual frame could result in its mean-
the Spiritual Exercises which, at the origins of ing getting lost. If religion such as Christianity
modern subjectivity, would enable techniques, was the only valid discourse for over 1000 years
already secularized, of an institutionally psycho- for explaining itself and reality in the European
continent, belief in this hypothesis is not so far- tion of what a human being is and what he “should
fetched. be.”
Therefore, we can infer that a close relation- 2 While the significance of other confessions is also
ship exists between religio and psyche as cultural relevant, the fact remains that the concept of reli-
objects which have developed in parallel. As seen gion itself was based on the Christian faith taken
as a conceptual and historical model for its def-
in Figure 21.1, exercising this metaconscience
inition during the nineteenth century. This thesis,
implies simultaneously considering that religion
which does not hide its ethnocentrical nature, cannot
is revealed in the socio–historical–cultural per-
be defended from any other religion (on this matter
spectives as a discursive process that is progres- see, for example, Fierro, 1979; Smith, 1991; Hick &
sively self-conscious of its dimension or psycho- Knitter, 2005).
logical relevance (arrow that goes from the past 3 In fact, its link to culture today is such that several
toward the present). On the other hand, psychol- authors have considered them perfectly symmetrical
ogy, stemming from the contemporary configu- notions (Tillich, 1974; Smith, 1991).
ration of that same subjectivity, at the same time 4 The chronotope concept, from the Greek kronos
delves into the importance and relevance that cer- (time) and topos (space), references the insoluble
tain religious practices and technologies of the intertwining of the temporal and spatial dimensions
self-obtained during the historical process of its that comprise the organizational core of narrative
events. These have the role of shaping the meaning
current constitution (arrow that goes from the
of the cultural discourse. Bakhtin, who took the con-
present toward the past).
cept from physics, employed it as a methodological
The study of religion therefore allows for an
instrument with a double function: bringing to light
understanding of the conditions of feasibility the interior and the exterior of the discourse and,
through which psychology developed, while this at the same time, attesting to how, within the dis-
last one, at the same time, allows for the compre- course of the agents, such “historical-geographical”
hension of the psychological functioning of reli- knowledge is evidenced by the way it is expressed in
gious practices. Religio shows as a manifestation its psychological, aesthetical, moral, religious, and
of the working of psyche at the same time that other notions (Bakhtin, 1981).
psyche is the result of the shape conferred to it by 5 For a more detailed overview of this psychological
religious practices. approach to religion, visit division 36 of the APA:
For all this, the work scheme proposed by www.apadivisions.org/division-36/
6 This quote and subsequent quotes correspond to the
cultural psychology involves a new manner in
classic division of the text into paragraphs.
which to understand religion and psychology
7 The book of Spiritual Exercises is a text to be used
itself, which can be of great help when attempting
by the director, not by the person doing the exercises.
to understand phenomena as complex and elusive 8 The principle and foundation focuses on the anthro-
as these – where psyche and religio stand face pologic framework (what is man?) of the entire Igna-
to face and understand each other through their tian spirituality. It is thereby the guide that comprises
mutual reflection. the backbone of the purposes set forth by the exer-
cises which are continually repeated throughout the
whole experience. For this reason, it contains (1) a
Notes teleological – and theological – description of man
as a nature spontaneously oriented towards divine
1 Far from any axiological objectivity, the moral and transcendence; (2) the practical principle of this ori-
biopolitical dimension of psychology cannot be entation across all the environments of the individ-
overlooked because each of its theoretical orienta- ual (psychological, social, etc.) and, consequently,
tions provides a legalistic anthropological concep- its Nemesis, the criteria of disarray; and (3) the
fundamental attitude that will must have to achieve Belzen, J. A. (2010). Towards Cultural Psychology of
such an orientation. As is evident based on its reli- Religion: Principles, Approaches, Applications.
gious context of rationale, Ignatian anthropology New York: Springer.
is still a theomorphic anthropology because human Belzen, J. A. (2011). La perspectiva cultural en la
matters find in transcendence a model that is not psicología de la religion: estudio sobre la
accidental, but constitutive. espiritualidad “bevindelijke” a modo de ejemplo
9 The parts of the discourse present since antiquity [The cultural psychological perspective in
in asceticism are likewise found within the internal Psychology of religion: Research on
organization of the exercises, zealously abiding with “enlightened” spirituality by way of example].
the parts of the Ciceronian orations – exordium, nar- Estudios de Psicología, 32(1), 103–130.
ratio, argumentatio, and peroratio – present within Billig, M. (1999). Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical
the different units of formalization of the training Approach to Social Psychology. New York:
(exercise, day, week, month). Cambridge University Press.
Blanco, F. (2002). El cultivo de la mente. Un ensayo
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Part VI
Practices and Artifacts for
Imagining Identity
22 Imaginative Processes and the
Making of Collective Realities
in National Allegories
Luca Tateo
Magdalene to Jeanne D’Arc, from Ronald Rea-

22.1 Introduction gan to Donald Trump, religions and ideologies
In our contemporary troubled times (but what have built on these profoundly ambivalent nar-
times in human history haven’t been troubled?), ratives of conversion. Actually, they are exactly
some striking events are questioning psycholog- the process of conversion and the ambivalence
ical knowledge about the way intangible con- of motives that make possible any kind of moral
cepts affect people’s actions. I always wonder system in a given culture. Doing wrong actions
how it is possible that human beings can kill for the sake of “noble motives,” “merry-gone-
thousands of their fellow humans or devastate wrongs,” “sacrifice,” and “redemption” are all
the environment in the name of intangible con- specific signs that regulate individual and collec-
cepts such as “faith,” “progress,” “free market,” tive conducts with respect to the ambivalences
“homeland,” “freedom,” “democracy,” “truth,” of power relationships. Without the availabil-
“protection of life,” “security,” “stability,” or ity of these kinds of signs, the person and the
even “world peace.” Sometimes, one looks for group would not have the possibility of construct-
the “false consciousness” beyond these motives, ing, maintaining and demolishing meanings.
attributing these evil behaviors to more mundane Indeed:
goals such as profit, power, money, and so on.
When, instead, those intangible concepts drive the complex social activities in the field of
communication are commonly based on the
people to altruist, idealistic, or artistic actions,
inherent tension and ambivalence of the complex
then we tend to praise the inherent nobility of
systems of meaning that constantly develop new
human spirit. On the other hand, prototypical fig-
elements in the fuzzy field of quasi-truth, that can
ures – like the “hero” who kills to right a wrong, feed either into “lie” or “truth.” (Tateo, 2016a,
the “martyr” who dies for the good, the “pop p. 445)
star” who does art for money, or the “self-made
man” who is the hero of the free market – look The point is that, despite the fundamental philo-
like counterfactuals to the common sense idea sophical and existential questions about the ori-
of idealistic versus opportunistic motives. Human gin of good and evil in human life, we still do
cultures are very good at producing extremely not have a complete understanding of the way
inspiring stories of “conversion” from one con- these highly ambivalent and evasive concepts and
dition to the other. The self-made man turns ideals, that we cannot touch, smell, or see, that
into a philanthropist, the pop star turns into a we cannot throw, eat, steal, or give to our off-
religious activist, the hero turns into a politi- spring to survive, have, however, the capability to
cian. From Moses to Siddhartha, from Mary affect our lives as if they were concrete objects,
400 lu c a tateo
provided with their own reality outside the realm versa (Tateo, 2016b). The biggest part of individ-
of thinking. ual life in the context of the collective is pop-
Extended killing, social exclusion, and suicidal ulated by these kinds of objects: “The cultural
behaviors under the flag of “faith” or “nation” are umwelt is a collective act of imagination, reg-
still waiting to be fully understood, both at the ulated by reason but not composed of reason”
individual and collective level, by social sciences (White, 1976, p. 668).
in general and by psychology in particular. I will support my argument by examples
related to the phenomena of “nation,” “national-
These deaths bring us abruptly face to face with the ism,” and “national identity” and how these con-
central problem posed by nationalism: what makes
cepts, basically imaginary abstractions (Ander-
the shrunken imaginings of recent history (scarcely
son, 2006), are elaborated in psychic life through
more than two centuries) generate such colossal
imaginative processes. I will refer to basic pro-
sacrifices? I believe that the beginnings of an
answer lie in the cultural roots of nationalism. cesses of abstraction from experience and cre-
(Anderson, 2006, p. 7) ation of metonymical representations of abstract
concepts, exemplified by the very common alle-
Exactly one century ago, Sigmund Freud, con- gorical personifications of “nation-states” that
fronted with an explosion of violence and death emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. These
never seen before World War I, wrote: processes have been, for instance, scrutinized
from the perspectives of discursive practices
It is, to be sure, a mystery why the collective
(Billig, 1995), of social representations (see
individuals should in fact despise, hate and detest
Chapter 7, this volume), and of collective mem-
one another – every nation against every other –
and even in times of peace. (Freud, 2001, p. 302) ory construction (Jovchelovitch, 2012). Besides,
the relationship between verbal and iconic
A few decades later and after a second world dimensions of the discursive productions have
bloodbath, some of the most innovative works been jointly analyzed through different methods
in social psychology emerged from the need to of semiotic analysis (Liu & O’Halloran, 2009;
account for the motives and processes related Lonchuk & Rosa, 2011; Ma, 2014).
to human violence (Becker, 1968; Lewin, 1948), Though these works address a number of com-
including a “more general concern about author- plex phenomena and processes, they have in com-
ity” (Milgram, 1977, p. 92). mon a persisting separation between the rep-
My purpose in this chapter is to develop a the- resentational and the semiotic dimensions. On
oretical reflection about some psychological pro- the one hand, social representation theory, as a
cesses involved in human actions related to and theory about knowledge and communication, is
led by abstract and intangible concepts, such as still lacking a theory of meaning and semiosis.
“nation,” “love,” “faith,” or “freedom.” On the Signs are not “out there” (Tateo, 2016a) ready
other hand, I would like to reflect on the process to be used, but are produced by the direction-
through which very concrete objects and peo- ality of the interpretant. Something becomes a
ple that we meet in everyday experience become sign when something else moves toward it, be
allegorical representations of those abstract con- it a footprint in the wood for hunting an ani-
cepts. My argument will be that in these psycho- mal or a complex political message for a citizen
logical phenomena, imaginative processes play a (Lonchuk & Rosa, 2011). The question of direc-
major role, understanding imagination as a higher tionality, reads “intentionality,” of the interpre-
mental function that enable us to treat concrete tant is crucial in understanding the semiosis: “the
objects as if they were abstract concepts and vice sign-interpretant relationship is characteristic of
Imaginative Processes and the Making of Collective Realities in National Allegories 401
intersubjective action” (Ma, 2014, p. 379). A sign lation of instincts, etc.). Vico claimed that there
is what denotes something for someone, it is is a relationship between the phylogenetic devel-
“connected with its object by virtue of the idea opment of the human mind and the historical
of the symbol-using mind, without which no such development of culture. That is, mind and cul-
connection would exist” (Peirce, 1998, p. 9). ture develop together through the mediation of
On the other hand, the studies on the mul- artifacts (e.g., language, tools, ideas, images, and
timodality or complementarity between verbal social institutions). Human existence is medi-
and iconic language are still considering the two ated by signs and, by general agreement, verbal
channels as separate, though mutually reinforcing language is the most powerful and flexible sign
and being the vehicle of mainly conceptual (the system:
verbal) and affective (the iconic) contents. The
understanding of collective knowledge, identity, a man is properly only mind, body and speech, and
memory, and movements would benefit, in my speech stands as it were midway between mind and
body. Hence the certitude of law began in mute
opinion of a more integrated contribution from
times with the body. Then when the so-called
the study of semiosis (Rosa, 2007). In particular,
articulate languages were invented, it passed to
I will explore the relationship between the mul- certain ideas or verbal formulae. (Vico, 1744/1948,
tiple modalities within a sign, that is, the inter- p. 353; emphasis added)
twining of linguistic, iconic, echoic, and so on,
dimensions of the sign. Though I will mainly He also maintained that if we look at prehistoric
focus on allegorical representations, this process men, the origin of the historical development of
is not limited to the images but can involve any mind and culture must necessarily start from the
kind of sign. As Wagner, Rämmer, and Kello human being’s self, from the own body:
(Chapter 7, this volume) show, the religious expe-
rience is a good example of how the directionality Because the human mind was at first unable to
of the interpretant can be a sort of impalpable, form abstractions, it used metaphors involving the
body and the senses. Because of this, Vico held that
collective, and affective atmosphere for which
the first perceptions of all cultures were structurally
the religious setting of the temple is purposefully
consistent, a means of thinking through things
built. But let me begin with a 270-years “jump (bricolage, as the anthropologist Claude
back” in history. Lévi-Strauss would call it). (Kunze, 2012, p. viii)
The idea that the relationship between mind and

22.2 Vico’s Axioms
culture is basically egocentric and embodied was
In the seventeenth century, the Italian philoso- clearly expressed in some of the axioms that Vico
pher Giambattista Vico first tried to systemat- placed as principles of his “new science,” namely
ically outline a theory of the historical devel- the science of human civilization. I will refer
opment of human epistemology through culture here to three among these axioms that represent
(Tateo, 2015a). He stated the general laws of an insightful starting point for the discussion of
development of the different forms of knowledge the process of formation and use of abstractions
and civilization and how they are connected with and personification in the human experience of
the psyche. His intuition was that the historically “nation.” The very first axiom of Vico’s “new sci-
situated cultural forms are, fundamentally, solu- ence” states: “Because of the indefinite nature of
tions that human beings collectively developed to the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance,
solve, for account, and cope with the phenomena man makes himself the measure of all things”
of existence (natural powers, birth, death, regu- (Vico, 1744/1948, p. 54).
402 lu c a tateo
Vico’s idea was that the leap of primitive Every nation, according to him, whether Greek or
human beings to the condition of cultural beings barbarian, has had the same conceit that it before
happened through an act of imaginative anthro- all other nations invented the comforts of human
pomorphism of natural phenomena (Granatella, life and that its remembered history goes back to
2015). In other words, they imagined the cause the very beginning of the world. (Vico, 1744/1948,
p. 55)
of overwhelming natural events (thunder, storm,
light, and darkness, etc.) in the form of an
and
enormously powerful anthropomorphic being:
the imaginative universal form of divinity. This
To this conceit of the nations there may be added
incredibly original invention allowed the spring that of the scholars, who will have it that whatever
of cultural phenomena and the human capability they know is as old as the world. (Vico, 1744/1948,
to use these “imaginatively abstract” concepts to p. 55)
regulate individual and collective behavior.
At the collective level, the historical differentia-
They make possible a model of concept formation tion of local cultures, distinctions, and relation-
where imagining is not simply an alteration of ships take the form of cultural continuity and
ordinary thought, but it is a different process of discontinuity: “as enculturated human beings we
thinking in which the reference to concrete human indeed can and commonly do interpret the words
experience is brought together with the need to find and conduct of the others ‘by our own lights’”
concepts both universal and shareable. (Granatella, (Norton, 1996, p. 44–45).
2015, p. 191) The more a collective of people builds a sys-
tem of ideas, institutions, and artifacts, working
A set of distinctions and relationships of “oth- for the continuity of the cultural transmission,
erness” appeared for the first time together the more distinctions are co-generated (Tateo,
with human history. For instance, the distinction 2016a). At the same time, distinctions call for
between “human” and “nonhuman” arouse from relationships, so that human collectives cannot
the first imaginative act of divinity, and it was help to establish “otherness” without relating to
a distinction as well as a relationship between it, whether in the form of communication, mar-
the realm of egocentric experience and the realm riage, war, killing, or superstition. Besides, the
of allocentric phenomena, that could include a co-generative movement of psychological devel-
wide field of experience and meaning. What is opment and cultural development leads to a well-
not-human can be either “divine,” “natural,” but known process in which the development of cul-
also “quasi-human,” “quasi-divine,” and “quasi- tural artifacts allows for richer social interactions
natural.” This field of productivity for human and possibilities of exploring the world, thus hav-
sensemaking was, according to Vico, fundamen- ing more possibilities of establishing new dis-
tal for the development of human civilizations. tinctions, based on praxis and technology, and
At the same time, this complementary process richer relationships in a complementary form.
of distinction and relation led to a progressive Vico’s initial intuition of a co-development of
differentiation of local solutions to the existen- imaginative processes and artifacts in the rela-
tial problems. Thus, the different communities tionship between mind and culture has later on
of humans, who were spreading around differ- been developed in different forms by Cattaneo
ent environments, developed diverse “traditions.” (Tateo, 2015b), Wundt and Moscovici (Tateo &
This led to further domains of distinctions and Iannaccone, 2012), and developed in the concept
relationships, as Vico states in two other axioms: of crystallized imagination (Vygotsky, 2004).
Abstraction: it is “romantic love,” therefore

abstraction reification
Conceptual distinction: It is a kind of...
Affective distinction: I feel good/bad or probably both
Experience: I feel that I Future experience: I feel

“feel something for that I “feel romantic love
another being” for another being”
Figure 22.1: Abstraction and reification.
From the collective action, some objects of tive resource. But we treat things as if they were
individual experience are elaborated in the form abstract concepts and concepts as if they were
of more abstract concepts. They then become real things (Tateo, 2015c). So, “romantic love”
available to the community once detached from is something and can cause events in the real
the contingent conditions of their creation (Tateo, world. People can regulate their own conducts
2015c). These “externalized” or “crystallized” by inhibiting or promoting specific actions and
forms are then used as frameworks to make by attaching specific meanings to those conducts.
sense of the future experiences. Following the The constant renovation of the social world is
semiotic principle that all human psychologi- made possible through the complementary move-
cal life is mediated by signs – that are con- ment of abstraction and reification that are fea-
structed, maintained, and demolished as they tures of language. So, the concept of “roman-
form dynamic hierarchies (Valsiner, 2014) – one tic love” is not only used to frame and guide
can see how this process of abstraction/reification future experience (it is “romantic love,” there-
occurs through specific signs, that are both lin- fore . . . ), but it is also provided of a “body,”
guistic and iconic (Tateo, 2015c). For instance, so it is reified in a range of artifacts and prac-
once that the concept of “romantic love” is cre- tices (cupids, chocolates, valentines, songs, rings,
ated out of experience, it becomes collectively movies, honey moons – you name it). To observe
available to guide the sensemaking of I–Other the dramatic power of this complementary move-
relationships and self-regulating the future course ment of abstraction and reification one can eas-
of action (Figure 22.1). ily visit any public place (shops, restaurants, ball-
What is crucial here is the fact that “romantic rooms, cruise boats) on Valentine’s Day to see
love” (as well as “fatherland” and “holiness”) is what a huge range of very mundane and concrete
a specific sign which is produced as abstract gen- economic activities flourish around this abstract
eralization of a specific experience, later acquir- concept and how quite ordinary objects (like
ing its own ontological status of “reality.” We can chocolate and flowers) become the reification of
historically trace back the moment in which this this concept so I can actually give and receive
sign has been created1 and has become a collec- romantic love.
404 lu c a tateo
I argue that the psychological process allow- considering a concept slightly more trivial than
ing the creation of the concept of “romantic love” “romantic love”: the concept of “nation.”
(initially probably by an anonymous bard of the
high Middle Ages and today by the massive
industry of chocolate!) and the reification of it (so 22.3 National Identity and the
that a normal chocolate becomes a “Bacio Perug- Imagined Communities
ina”), is of the same nature of Vico’s imagina-
One of the most “vichians” among contemporary
tive universals (Granatella, 2015; Tateo, 2015c).
scholars is probably Benedict Anderson. In his
This is a process regulated by a particular form of
seminal work he adopts an original perspective to
imaginative and affective logic that:
account for the origin, development, and histori-
primarily uses metaphor “conveyed by analogy of cal meaning of “nationalism.” He clearly echoes
physical properties to designate abstract mental Vico’s idea of the study of civilizations when he
operations.” Metaphor therefore is the original states:
form of raising the particular to the universal by
means of pictorial representation to achieve an
nationness, as well as nationalism, are cultural
immediate revelation of the whole . . . In the logic
artifacts of a particular kind. To understand them
of imagination, the “example” acts as the first form
properly we need to consider carefully how they
of the coordination of ideas, and this “example”
have come into historical being, in what ways their
which, as Vico puts it, “contents itself with a single
meanings have changed over time, and why, today,
similar thing” and belongs to the domain of the
they command such profound emotional
logic of imagination assumes the same function as
legitimacy. (Anderson, 2006, p. 4)
induction does in rational logic. Vico explicitly
distinguishes rational induction, “which needs
several similar things” from the “example,” which Anderson’s main claim is that the concept of
requires only one similarity in order to convince. “nation” is the historical product of a collec-
(Grassi, 1976, p. 568; emphases in original) tive construction, namely an imaginative produc-
tion, that emerged at the edge of nineteenth cen-
In this sense, the imaginative and affective logic I tury and developed in contemporary word, going
am outlining here, on the basis of Vico’s insight, through several transformations while keeping its
works as a process of inductive abduction, that nature of cultural artifact. A very important ele-
leads to the creation of abstract signs (e.g., love, ment in the historical process leading to the con-
homeland, etc.) working as affective universal struction of this cultural artifact is the progres-
concepts (Valsiner’s hypergeneralized signs, sive detachment from the individual characters
2014). Several questions now arise from this of kings and heroes. Rancière (1994) shows how
first argument. Who (and how) has the power to the conception of history slowly moved from the
create these abstractions? Who (and how) has “chronicles” and “genealogies” of royal families
the power to create these symbolic resources to a more collective and abstract conception:
(Zittoun, 2007)? How do these imagina-
tive processes work in collective life? How
a new history of things is possible only on the
the complementary processes of distinction/
condition that we hold fast to the reality of names
relation, continuity/discontinuity, and abstrac- and particularly to those names that succeed the
tion/reification can be used to understand the name of the king – France, the native land, the
kind of individual and collective phenomena nation, those “personified abstractions” denounced
related to intangible concepts? I will try to pro- by the empiricist routine of the chronicles.
vide some initial answers in the next section by (Rancière, 1994)
Figure 22.2 The Triumph of Henry IV, Peter Paul Rubens, oil on wood (ca. 1630), Metropolitan
Museum Online Collection, New York. http://images.metmuseum.org/CRDImages/ep/web-large/
DT5154.jpg.
Both Rancière (1994) and Anderson (2006) point diate feeling into the observer. First, the body
to the affective relationships established by peo- is put in a higher position on a golden coach,
ple with their rulers and their collective subjects. on the model of ancient Romans. Then, the king
The ideal of the collectivity was literally person- is holding an olive branch, reminding the com-
ified and embodied by the “body” of the king. mon depictions of the triumphal entrance of the
This was a sacred body that was kept apart from Christ in Jerusalem. The crowd is depicted like a
public exposure, from the corroding gaze of the tide which is lifting the coach toward the shore,
mob. It was carefully exposed in very few and emphasizing even more the figure of the king,
solemn events, that confirmed the sacredness of who is meanwhile crowned with laurel by the
that personification exactly through their rarity allegory of lofty Victory.
(Figure 22.2). During the eighteenth century, things started
In this oil sketch Rubens depicts king Henry to change, until they culminated in the sacri-
IV (1553–1610) entering Paris in an ancient legious act through which that very same tide,
Roman triumph style. It is a preliminary sketch who had previously raised the king’s body, ended
of a painting that is located on the end wall of the up beheading the very same body. Yet, what
east gallery of the Palais de Luxembourg in Paris, can replace the body of the king? How can
among a cycle of twenty-four canvases illustrat- people establish a different affective relation-
ing the life of Henry IV. In this powerful draw- ship with a collective of fellows? Anderson
ing, it is very evident how the “body of the king” (2006) claims that a different imaginative product
is depicted as a sacred object. Several elements started to emerge at that moment: the concept of
concur to establish this kind of affective imme- nation.
406 lu c a tateo
It is imagined as sovereign because the concept

was born in an age in which Enlightenment and
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the
European- Non-European born
divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. born ruling
Coming to maturity at a stage of human history class (Creoles, indigenous,
when even the most devout adherents of any mestizos, etc.)
universal religion were inescapably confronted with
the living pluralism of such religions, and the
allomorphism between each faith’s ontological
claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of
being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage Non-American born American-
and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state. born ruling
class
(Anderson, 2006, p. 7)
The collective life was changing as fast as the

Figure 22.3 Changing configurations of
technological and economical innovations were
distinctions and relationships.
establishing new forms of social distinctions and
relationships. Namely, Anderson (2006) argues
that the modern idea of nation began to spread tion was also establishing a relationship of com-
in the colonies overseas among an indigenous munality between all those American-born that
middle class in the English colonies on the were indeed provided with a different form of
east coast of North America and in the Spanish mutual relationship. For a certain period at the
and Portuguese dominions in Central and South beginning of nationalist movements in South
America that was gaining influence. The rea- America, indeed, also the indios were some-
son for that primacy was originated by the dis- how to be included as citizens of the national
tinction between European-born, Creoles, and state, though with a subaltern position. Accord-
indigenous, that the ruling class of Continental ing to Anderson (2006), there were three main
origin had established in those societies. These factors that determined this reversal of distinc-
distinctions (Figure 22.3) implied that European- tion/relationship structures in favor of the emer-
born ruling class could have access to the higher gence of national states: (a) the fact that a com-
functions in connection with the Continental gov- mon national language was accidental, derived
ernments (for instance becoming viceroy), while from the colonizers; (b) the development toward
relying on the Creoles (born in the colonies from capitalistic colonial economy, so that a central-
European families) to become the lower admin- ized state administration required a large num-
istrative functionaries, traveling the country and ber of local functionaries traveling the coun-
aspiring to finally land in the capital city. The try; and (c) the diffusion of print media, that
indios were instead the lower or slave workforces, became a form of imaginative relation between
at the margin of the state but fundamental as people. Literate middle-class citizens were imag-
number. inarily united every morning by the same gesture
The distinction between European and non- of opening a newspaper and feeling a sense of
European born, in which the former is a closed abstract and affective familiarity with anonymous
set, while the latter is a potentially infinite set, thousands that were supposed to do the same.
was instrumental for the colonizers to mark These elements led to the transformation of
a power structure, and to naturalize a domi- the national versions of the colonizers’ language
nance relationship. But this very same distinc- (an administrative tool for large and diverse
territories) to language as a prius, an element an imagined political community – and imagined

of distinction and a feature of originality. This as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is
also led to a progressive reification of the latter, imagined because the members of even the smallest
and a praxis becomes naturalized as a feature of nation will never know most of their fellow-
the national identity. Speaking the local version members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in
the minds of each lives the image of their
of Spanish, Portuguese, or English, and reading
communion . . . In fact, all communities larger than
newspapers run in the same languages became a
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and
sign of national identity, at the same time a rela-
perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities
tionship with thousands of anonymous fellow cit- are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/
izens and a distinction from the non-Americans genuineness, but by the style in which they are
(Anderson, 2006). imagined. (Anderson, 2006, p. 6)
One can believe the distinction/relation com-
plementarity to be a historically situated phe- Once the abstract concept of nation has been cre-
nomenon in the development of nationalism. It ated and collectively adopted, as we argued in
is instead a very current issue, for instance, the first section, it starts to guide the sensemak-
in the present debate in the United States. ing process and the orientation of future experi-
Goldstein (2015) shows how the same cultural ences. So, no difference, in psychological terms,
artifact (the American Constitution) can be at the between the two statements “I do X, therefore I
same time the grounding principle for establish- am Italian” and “I am Italian therefore, I do X.”
ing the relationship of mutual belonging for all Nevertheless, for the abstraction of “nation” to be
American citizens and the basis for discrimina- effective, it must go from the people experience
tion and advocacy of the use of political violence. back to the realm of objects, becoming reified in
order to “cause” something in the world. When
this model of nation became an active political
If the Constitution defines who we are, it equally
defines who we are not. Constitutional nationalism
movement that led to the emergence of national-
has long provided a neutral, patriotic language for states – in America first and later in Europe – the
expressing restrictive ideas about who is and who is concept of “nation” required a body. This kind
not a real American. (Goldstein, 2015, p. 5) of imaginative and affective logic is surprisingly
similar to the conduct of schizophrenic patients:
In his study on the development of constitu- Another characteristic that I described in the
tional movements and militias in the United schizophrenic is the concretization of the concept.
States, the very same struggle for the defini- What in a normal person is conceived of in an
tion of what is “American” immediately evokes abstract way assumes a concrete, perceptual, or
the complementary distinction of what is “non- quasi-perceptual representation in schizophrenic
American.” Thus, the very core of “American thinking. Vico described similar processes in
creed” becomes the starting point either for social ancient people . . . Thus concepts become
inclusion of minorities or for violent action of personified, anthropomorphized. In some mentally
deliberate killing (like in the Oklahoma City ill patients, particularly the schizophrenic, the
abstract idea is translated in to a perception, in the
bombing in 1995) and “martyrdom” (the death of
form of a hallucination, fantasy, or delusion which
76 in the Branch Davidian compound in Waco,
is mediated by images (Arieti, 1976, p. 748)
Texas).
The concept of nation, is thus an abstract nat- Although in this kind of patients the process
uralization of a set of distinctions and relation- that links abstract and concrete levels seems
ships, it is: to short-circuit, it still gives us a hint into the
408 lu c a tateo
process itself. Some kind of hallucinatory nuance Yet, allegorical personifications were already
seems to characterize the individual experience available (Whitman, 2003) and used in the con-
in the context of collective phenomena such as struction of political discourses long before the
those described by Wagner, Rämmer, and Kello birth of the modern concept of nation, drawing
(Chapter 7, this volume) or any form of collective on the infinite repertoire of classical mythology
ritual (political gatherings, musical events, foot- (Figure 22.4).
ball matches) that aim at promoting the perfor- Rubens’s canvas Consequences of War was
mance of the individual into the collective con- painted during the Thirty Years War between
text (externalization) as well as the performance Catholics and Protestants in Europe. It is an
of the collective into the individual (internaliza- allegorical representation of the devastation pro-
tion) (Valsiner, 2014). voked by the long conflict on a global scale. Its
message was so powerful that Pablo Picasso draw
directly from it his inspiration in the conception
22.4 In Search of a New Body of Guernica 300 years later. Europe is represented
in the left part of the painting as a woman in
The new abstract concept of “nation” needs a new
a black dress to show grief and suffering. The
concrete body. It needs to be reified in images and
small angel to her immediate bottom left carries
metaphors that allow the establishment of affec-
a cross-topped globe that represents the Chris-
tive relationships. A repertoire of these images,
tian world. She is running from the Janus temple
or topoi (Rosa, 2007), was somehow already
with the open doors, that represents the war time
available since the Renaissance. For instance, the
according to the ancient Roman tradition. Rubens
Italian poet Dante Alighieri in the fourteenth cen-
was also a diplomat, and through this painting,
tury had already provided in his “Divine Com-
he tried to deliver his passionate message sup-
edy” the first vivid personalization of the con-
porting the end of the war, which involved Spain,
cept of “nation.” In the sixth canto of the Inferno,
France, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands,
he meets the soul of a country-fellowman and
Austria, Poland, the Ottoman Empire, and the
throws one of his famous poetic invectives:
Holy Roman Empire. What is relevant in this pic-
ture is the fact that even a more abstract concept
Ah, slavish Italy! thou inn of grief! at that time, namely Europe, could be represented
Vessel without a pilot in loud storm! through allegorical personification, in order to
Lady no longer of fair provinces,
raise an affective relationship with the observer
But brothel-house impure! this gentle spirit,
more powerful and expressive than any concep-
Even from the pleasant sound of his dear land
Was prompt to greet a fellow citizen
tual form.
With such glad cheer: while now thy living ones Personification and anthropomorphism of con-
In thee abide not without war; and one cepts was a very common feature of human civ-
Malicious gnaws another; ay, of those ilization, as we learn from Vico. They were a
Whom the same wall and the same moat contains. fundamental cultural artifact to create abstract
(Dante Alighieri, 1909–1914: generalizations from concrete experience, and
Canto VI, verses 76–85). then to build stable systems of sensemaking for
the future events (Granatella, 2015). At the time
In these tercets, Dante creates the personification in which Anderson (2006) places the emergence
of Italy as a lady, creating at once the first collec- and raise of the modern concept of nation, early
tive image of Italy as a nation and its first person- personifications in the Western world praised
ified allegory. the majestic nature and the unity of national
Figure 22.4 Peter Paul Rubens, Consequences of War, 1638–1639, Galleria Palatina, Florence.
communities, including Britannia, Germania, inscription on top that reads “concord.” There
Hibernia, Helvetia, Polonia, Italia, and Mother are the female personifications of France (Mar-
Russia (Figure 22.5 and 22.6). ianne on the left with a heart, [sic]), Russia
The poster in Figure 22.6 represents the “Triple (Mother Russia holding an Orthodox Cross), and
Entente” allies in World War I, with a Cyrillic England (Lady Britannia on the right with an
anchor). Other personifications of abstract con-
cepts, indirectly related to the concept of nations
are, for instance, the Statue of Liberty, Columbia,
or the Lady of Justice. The most parts of these
images where related to the original model of
the goddess Athena, as representation of the
most important democratic state of the antiquity.
Besides, it did not lack representations of collec-
tivity in the form of the every man or citizenry
like Deutscher Michel, Monsieur Dupont, Uncle
Sam, and John Bull (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2012;
Lonchuk & Rosa, 2011). Nevertheless, if we con-
sider that the active citizenship was attributed
only to men, it is not surprising that the person-
ification took the form of beautiful, curvy, and
Figure 22.5 Italia and Germania by Friedrich
somehow ambiguous women, reserving to the
Overbeck, 1811–1828, Neue Pinakothek,
female audience the privilege of striving for this
Munich, Germany. https://commons.wikimedia
ideal model of patriotic femininity (Figure 22.7).
.org/wiki/File:Friedrich_Overbeck_008.jpg.
410 lu c a tateo
Figure 22.6 Female personifications of France, Russia, and Britain in a 1914 Russian poster. https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Triple_Entente.jpg.
Sykes–Picot Agreement in 1916, in which two

almost anonymous functionaries of the British
and France foreign affairs designed the new sta-
tus quo of the Middle East simply drawing a
straight line (Figure 22.8) on a map (Barr, 2011).
This historical document is the map, showing
Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria, and western Per-
sia, that was used to define the areas of control
and influence agreed between the British and the
French after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The
Figure 22.7 Demonstration against same-sex map is signed in the bottom right corner by Mark
marriage in Paris on January 13, 2013, photo by Sykes and François Georges-Picot and dated May
C Marie-Lan Nguyen/Wikimedia Commons, CC 8, 1916. It clearly shows that we are in the pres-
BY 2.5. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki / ence of a different kind of imagined territory, the
index.php?curid=23849328. abstract representation of the map on which one
of the most long-lasting wars of the last century
Although the process of personification can was created by drawing “a line from the ‘e’ in
also take place through the use of metaphorical Acre to the last ‘k’ in Kirkuk” (Barr, 2011, p. 18).
language in political discourse (Leith & Soule, The affective landscape and the conceptual ter-
2011), at least since the recurring metaphor of ritory are both equally imagined, suggests Ander-
the body-state from classical antiquity, there is a son (2006). Usually they do not overlap, suggests
specific power in the construction of a “body” of history. Nevertheless, they co-define, together
the nation. I argue that this special affective rela- with the fuzzy linguistic communality, another
tionship is based on an imaginative process that set of distinctions and relationships.
links the abstract concept to its reification. Yet,
The nation is imagined as limited because even the
before moving ahead to further theoretical elab-
largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion
orations, I have to mention another kind of reifi-
living human beings, has finite, if elastic,
cation and embodiment of the concept of nation.
boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No
The body of a national state is also its territory nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind.
with its affective correlate: the landscape. (Anderson, 2006, p. 7)
If politics is the art of possible, then possibilities The interplay of territory and landscape cre-
for legitimacy include appeal to the earth itself, to
ates, and is created by, the construction of imag-
the aesthetics of landscape, the native (in the sense
ined boundaries. Rivers, planes, straits, and high
“one born in”), and to autochthony. Failing nations,
grounds are existential and practical points of ref-
then, the land is sacred. (Thornton, 1996, p. 153)
erence that at the same time establish the dis-
The administrative national territory becomes continuity and the continuity of the experience –
an abstraction of the real land, through census both unite and divide (Marsico, 2016). While
and cartography is build a representation that only colonial functionaries can be passionate for
become malleable matter in the hand of the cre- a map in 1916, it is a matter of fact that a hun-
ators of nations (Anderson, 2006). We are still dred thousand people felt so passionately for a
suffering today from this lack of consistency landscape to be able to kill or die for it.
between the imagined territory and the lived one. Two very interesting examples of the affec-
A very famous example is that of the so-called tive embodiment established in landscape come
412 lu c a tateo
Figure 22.8 Map of Sykes–Picot Agreement. Source: Royal Geographical Society, The National
Archives (UK). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement#/media/File:
MPK1¶426_Sykes_Picot_Agreement_Map_signed_8_May_1916.jpg.
from a recovered and a lost land. The former is are imagined geometries of landscape. South
accounted by Thornton (1996) as follows: Africa, the country, is a geometry for conflict and
accommodation, but above all it is a landscape.
On 9 May 1994, Nelson Mandela addressed the Looking out over the bay to Robben Island on the
people of South Africa on the occasion of the horizon, he spoke of his own imprisonment and
opening of the new Parliament. He did not speak subsequent freedom. With a few gestures to the
of “the people” or “the nation.” As he stood on the landscape, he thus summed up over 350 years of
balcony of the Cape Town City Hall with the history as one might sum up the shape of jelly by
majestic Table Mountain as his backdrop, he pointing to its container. (Thornton, 1996, p. 153)
pointed to the landscape on which the “beginning
of the fateful convergence” of Black and White had In Mandela’s discourse, it is the landscape that
begun. If nations are, as Benedict Anderson as “imagines” the nation, as it fills with his affec-
argued, “imagined communities,” then countries tive consistency the abstract conceptualization of
A = closed
set = homeland Non-A = open set = foreign land
Buffer zone
Figure 22.9 The imagined land.
a new and somehow nonexisting community, like the people, our fellow . . . villagers. My answer is
the scattered and multiform South African pop- that it’s the people and the houses and fields – all
ulation. But there is another possibility, while in together” (cited in Loizos 1981:131). (Jackson,
one case the landscape can define the collectiv- 2002, p. 66)
ity (e.g., the highlanders in Scotland), in another
case is the collectivity (understood as a network The two examples define a complementary rela-
of affective relationships) that defines the land- tionship between the landscape as a lived by
scape. This latter case is exemplified by Michael experience, an intersubjective context for mean-
Jackson’s account of the experience of refugees: ingful event to happen, and at the same time
an abstract concept that guides the affective
relationship of the dwellers. Any landscape is
Second, just as ego and alter are implicated in any
conception or sense of who one is, so there are anthropized, both in the sense that can be shaped
seldom fixed or impermeable boundaries between by the human activity (e.g., the unmistakable
the worlds of persons, words, ideas, animals, and atmosphere of the hills of Tuscany or the fields
things. Accordingly, ancestral homelands, family of Ireland is the outcome of millenary dwelling),
graves, family dwellings, spoken words, personal and in the sense that it a cultural construction
names, material possessions, spirit entities, and of the observer. Once the specific identity of the
significant others may figure severally, equally, landscape is abstracted (it becomes the English,
and actively in the field of the intersubjective. French, or Italian landscape), then it constitutes
Experientially, all these elements merge with and the frame for the imagined dweller (the John Bull
become indispensable parts of one’s own being; one
or the indigenous). The map and the landscape
cannot live without them. As such, subjectivity is
are the two ways in which the concrete affec-
not really a fixed attribute of persons, but the
tive experience of the place can be turned into
product of any purposeful and committed activity
we enter into with those we love and the things we the abstract concept of the “homeland,” which,
value. This view is poignantly captured in the once created, frames the future experience of the
words of a Greek Cypriot refugee, pining for home. “homelander” in return. The kind of distinction/
“You ask me, what is the essence of the village, if relationship it establishes is depicted in Figure
it’s the fields and the houses, which we’ve lost, or 22.9.
414 lu c a tateo
The creation of the imagined land begins with out, the situation is stuck and Remus can only
a very simple act of drawing an affective border perish.
that immediately evokes an affective distinction Cultural psychology is just the discipline inter-
and requires a new form of affective relationship. ested to the forms of tension, hybridization,
The generally received version of the myth of the and marginality that dwell in the buffer zones,
foundation of Rome is a very nice example of this and whose symbolic and material potential can
process. The very simple act of digging a trench lead to development over time (Tateo, 2016a).
around the Palatine to define the city boundary, The contemporary world is full of these kinds
turned Romolus and Remus into a citizen and a of buffer zones (e.g., Crimea; Golan Heights;
foreigner. The imagined homeland immediately Malvinas/Falklands Islands; Senkaku/Diaoyutai
evoke the foreign land and its dwellers. Even the Islands; Guarani Indios demarcated lands on the
kinship must succumb to the powerful distinc- Brazilian territory; Alsace/Lorrain), in which all
tion of imagined boundaries (Marsico, 2016) and the different categories of homelander, foreign-
must be replaced by a new form of relationship. ers, immigrants, refugees, nomads, and so on, are
But the myth of Romulus and Remus does not dynamically set as A–non-A in the different con-
tell us the whole story. It tells us that our rela- ditions over time, probably always dwelling the
tionship with the other is inevitably both ego- buffer zone, but changing as soon as the bounded
centric and ethnocentric. We are self-centered in region is expanding or constricting (dotted circles
exploring the world and our embodied perspec- in Figure 22.9). The example of the American
tive goes toward the inner-outer direction, while Constitution is extremely clear (Goldstein, 2015).
the complementary perspective of the world is The co-definition between the closed set “legiti-
oriented according to the outer-inner opposite mate American citizens” and the open set “non-
direction. So, our boundary making, the sign of Americans” (potentially the rest of the world) has
the homeland, must necessarily create a closed set been sensibly changing over time in relation to
(Figure 22.9). the directionality of the interpretant: who estab-
lishes the view point and is also locating herself
The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a in the “A” position. It is exactly in the buffer zone
day when all the members of the human race will
where potentialities for social inclusion and civil
join their nation in the way that it was possible, in
rights movements can be express. But every def-
certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a
wholly Christian planet. (Anderson, 2006, p. 7)
inition of a new form of inclusion is at the same
time the definition of an exclusion, so that the
The complementary region that coexist with the same buffer zone can be a space for the devel-
bounded region is instead an open set of infinite opment of racist and segregationist movements.
possibilities, as we saw above. This is apparently
The special virtues, as well as particular values and
only a binary opposition. The three elements
qualities, of the nation are established alongside the
(A; non-A; and their boundary zone), indeed,
rejection and denial of those who do not share these
coexist and codefine each other (Marsico, 2016).
attributes – who are seen as outsiders, excluded
Besides, the bounded region (A), though remain- from the national community of values. While such
ing a closed set, can dynamically expand or con- “others” may well be foreigners, they may also be
strict over time in the relationship with the open conationals and as much a physical part of the
set (non-A) in the buffer region, corresponding nation as anyone else. The process of construction
to the marginal instances of a given collectivity. of national identity is therefore inherently divisive,
Without this ternary system, no development is a process based as much on inclusion as on
possible(Tateo, 2016a): when there is only in and exclusion. (Lambert, 2006, p. 30)
Figure 22.10 Exotic at home and homeness in the exotic. Source: Photo by
Luca Tateo (2013).
This complementary distinction is not geograph- the abstract concept of “nation,” that denotes
ical but symbolic. We can establish and main- an imagined and somehow nonexisting cul-
tain the complementarity between homeland and tural object, out of an affective distinction/
foreign-land almost everywhere, even in a “typ- relationship. The same imaginative processes, I
ical” Thai restaurant in a small Danish town have argued, allow to reify the concept again into
(Figure 22.10). an embodied image to which an affective rela-
People can go to an exotic restaurant in which tionship can be established (Tateo, 2017). The
a small fraction of a foreign land is reconstructed next question is then: how is it possible that such
and find it perfectly normal to have national flags imaginative processes are internalized and exter-
everywhere. On the other hand, it is exactly the nalized in everyday life, leading to actions like
meaning of being “at home,” signaled by the killing or dying for that intangible concept? How
Danish flags, that makes the restaurant “authen- is it possible that:
tically” exotic. They co-define a comfortable
buffer zone, in which it is possible to be “at regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation
home” and “exotic” at the same time. that may prevail in each, the nation is always
Thus, the homeland and the foreign land, the conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible,
body of the nation and its counterpart, dynam-
over the past two centuries, for so many millions of
ically co-define each other in the same way
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for
that the “body” of the national personification such limited imaginings. (Anderson, 2006, p. 7)
and the “foreign” body co-define each other
(Figure 22.11). There is a last type of “body” that is related to
So far, I have tried to show how the imag- the reification of the nation. It is in a certain sense
inative processes work in concrete to construct the “absent” or “anonymous” body of the average
416 lu c a tateo
(a) (b)
Figure 22.11 World War I propaganda posters advocating intervention. https://commons.wikimedia
.org/wiki/File:Danza_trieste_italia.jpg and https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Harry_R._
Hopps,_Destroy_this_mad_brute_Enlist_-_U.S._Army,_03216u_edit.jpg.
citizen, the one who can be anyone of us exactly We are asked to keep the memory of the unknown
because is not really none of us, a product of the soldier’s sacrifice for the nation in the very same
modern mass warfare: the unknown soldier. The moment in which we can only “imagine” him.
psychoanalyst Richard Koenigsberg writes: According to Anderson (2006), what is buried in
these cenotaphs are not the unidentifiable remains
In war, the body and the blood of the sacrificed of unfortunate soldiers, yet rather the ghostly
soldier give rise to the reality of the nation. Killing images of a nation. By a lack of knowledge
and dying substantiate the idea that nations exist.
(many of the actual identities of the buried, scat-
The sound and fury of the battle function to
tered bones) a certainty is created (what else
convince everyone that something profound and
they can be if not heroes, what identity they can
real is occurring. Warfare testifies to the existence
of nations. Battle – the bodies of dead and wounded have if not Italian, French, Argentinean, Amer-
soldiers – anchors belief in material reality – ican, etc.?) (Anderson, 2006). The unknown
persuading us that countries are more than social soldier memorials (but also the collective memo-
constructions. Surely, we reflect, human beings rials that read thousands of names, losing the
would not – could not – kill and die in the name individuality of the name in the anonymous
of nothing. (Koenigsberg, 2009, p. 66) crowd of the slaughter) show how the abstraction
of the concept of “nation” is built on the concrete the construction of the collective historical narra-
bones of the war victims, and the victims them- tives, corresponding to the transformations of the
selves become “heroes” only in function of the society. But, as Vico himself claimed, not all the
existence of the abstract concept of the nation. rhetorical figures have the same affective power
Besides, the abstract concept of the “unknown and emotional involvement.
soldier” (a nonexisting object, to the extent that The theory of social representations, in so far
every soldier was formerly known at least by as theory of collective knowledge, has focused
some of his kin) is originated by framing the war on the figurative core of the metaphor (Wagner,
casualties into the concept of nation. Elejabarrieta & Lahnsteiner, 1995). So far I have
Needless to say that the function of this aid to described several examples of allegorical per-
collective memory is not made for remembering, sonifications that fall under the mechanism of
but to guide the future actions of citizens toward metonymical substitution. Allegorical visualiza-
the repetition of that “heroic” behavior. In this tions (e.g., Rubens’ Europe, the Marianne, the
sense, the “unknown soldier” is a sign analogous Statue of Justice, etc.) personify abstract ideas
to the “newspaper” (Anderson, 2006) in the con- by relating the concrete image and the intan-
struction of the intangible concept of “nation”: gible concept in an affectively loaded relation-
it links anonymous and distant people exactly ship. All iconoclastic movements were, and still
because of its impersonality. We imagine a col- are, aware and afraid of the immense epistemo-
lective gesture without knowing who actually is logical and communicative power of metonymy
performing it, without possibility of refutation. (Kibbey, 1986). The human reception of the shift
from text to figure, and from figure to text, is
affective. For instance, in Islamic culture (which
22.5 How Abstraction and
is icono-phobic) calligraphic art is the sense of
Reification are Constructed in
the infinite potential within the word that gives
Collective Action
rise to something else in the iconic representation
In classical rhetoric, there are different figures of (Marks, 2010, 270). Verbal meaning and patterns
substitution: metaphor, allegory, and metonymy. are interchangeable!
The role of metaphor in the construction of expe- The existence (or destruction) of the image – as
rience has been widely discussed (Lakoff & John- well as of the “word,” like in the case of damna-
son, 1980). Allegory is considered as a form tio memoriae – is an immediate affectively loaded
of extended metaphor, in which the relationship action on the idea itself. But the metonymical
established between two fields of meaning is substitution is at the same time a relationship of
unfolded through storytelling, like in the case identity and distinction. The concrete object is
of Plato’s allegory of the cave. Metonymy is the not the idea itself, allowing the use of metonymy
rhetorical trope in which one name is replaced to avoid the direct censorship to block the rep-
by another. Differently from metaphor, in which resentation of the idea in explicit form. As both
the replacement is made by creating a short cir- distinction and relationship, metonymy could be
cuit of meaning and in analogy in which two a considered general form of which metaphor and
different objects are put together by similarity, analogy represent special cases.2 In the imagi-
in metonymy the two ideas arbitrarily stand for native processes that I have outlined above, the
each other. In Hayden White’s interpretation of things that establish a metonymic relationships
Vico (H. V. White, 1976), the tropological trans- are the concrete and the abstract, as shown in the
formations of speech figures, from metaphor, to example of the so-called “umbrella revolution” in
metonymy, to synecdoche to irony, play a role in Hong Kong, September 2014 (Figure 22.12).
418 lu c a tateo
Figure 22.12 Abstraction/reification in “umbrella revolution.”
During the fall of 2014, an “Occupy Cen- of the concept of “revolution.” This abstract con-
tral” movement started in Hong Kong to protest cept is reified in return into a creative collective
against the attempt of the Chinese central gov- action detached from the original cause (using an
ernment to exert a stronger control over the umbrella as a way of manifesting and writing slo-
local elections. Protestors used symbolic arti- gans on top of them), and it is again abstracted
facts, including the yellow umbrella, to pro- in a symbol of the “umbrella revolution” at a
duce aesthetics experience that compressed higher hierarchical level (Figure 22.12 from left
messages about complex ideologies or reform to right). At this step, a “life-form” (Simmel,
initiatives into pictorial symbols and performa- 1918/2010) of the “umbrella revolution” has been
tive sessions (Lim, 2015). The individual action collectively established, and any new individual
of using umbrellas as shields from police’s tear action of protest and resistance will be framed
gas is repeated and spread until, once detached into it. Once imagination has created a symbol
from immediate experience, becomes a symbol that represents the cause of an event or a plan
of resistance. The human activity creates a gen- of future action, detaching it from the immedi-
eralizable abstract representation of life, start- ate experience of its presence, it can be used
ing from very situated individual acts. Such to self-regulate the behavior in different condi-
institutionalized representation, which is at the tions and can be communicated to other peo-
same time epistemological, ethical, and aesthet- ple in different situations (Valsiner, 2014). This
ical, becomes a tradition, within which the mean- process has been at work in several moments of
ing of the experiences to be make sense in history. The aesthetic experience by metonymi-
return. The “umbrella” becomes then the image cal substitution, once established as collective
abstraction, framed in return the following events We are often the audience of the enactment and
(e.g., Tea Parties, Prague Spring, Carnation Rev- embodiment of abstract concepts like “nation,”
olution, Jasmine Revolution, etc.) up to the most “patriotism,” etc. We attend to public demon-
recent “Arab Spring” (Awad & Wagoner, 2015). strations, parades, theatrical performances that
build powerful affective reifications of the ideals
(Kruger, 1992).
22.6 Conclusion But we often forget that we are also “actors”
rather than mere “spectators.” In her study on the
In this chapter, I have outlined a theoretical
Ghana school system, Cati Coe brilliantly shows
argument about the relationship between abstrac-
how the public enactment of traditions in schools
tion/reification and distinction/relationship in
can be used to build a collective sense of belong-
imaginative processes. I have shown how they
ing (Coe, 2005). She writes:
can help us to understand the psychosocial
dynamics through which collective experience,
in Ghana schoolchildren have been turned into
artifacts, and intangible concepts can establish performers in national events. Through their
affective, aesthetic, and ethic totalities that can performances, culture as drumming and dancing
lead to even extreme collective actions. The case has become part of their bodily, habitual
of “nation” is an example of this process through experience. Those performances have helped
which an abstract concept is created and used the schoolchildren to internalize a new set of
to frame in return the future oriented meaning- assumptions about themselves and their world, to
making. The realms of ideals and everyday life gain a new subjectivity that makes sense within a
situation are put in relationship through several world they see as natural and real. (Coe, 2005,
practices of ritual collective action (Mendonsa, p. 54)
1982, p. 12). Michael Billig (1995) analyzes, for
Of course, Coe (2005) demonstrates how con-
instance, the construction of “banal nationalism”
cepts like “traditional” and “national” are them-
in the everyday discursive practices. I suggest
selves artifacts, imaginative abstractions, that are
that there are more arenas in which the imag-
used by the different powers of Ghanaian soci-
inative processes are at stake in the creation,
ety (government, churches, tribal chefs, etc.) to
elaboration, maintenance, and destruction of the
distinguish and gathering people according to
affective relationships regulated by the kind of
their conception of the society to be. But what
symbols that I have described above.
is crucial here is that the process of abstraction
The intangible concepts, like “nation,” are not
and reification takes place through active con-
only internalized and externalized through dis-
ducts. People internalize abstract concepts by act-
cursive practices. They are rather “enacted” in
ing them, typically in the school context. Sur-
several public and private everyday ritual actions.
prisingly, this is an overlooked research topic.
Goldstein provides us with some hints:
Despite the fact that these kind of activities
From an early age, in picture books, the daily are widespread (e.g., school plays for Christ-
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, history mas, Thanksgiving, celebration of national his-
textbooks, and countless other ways, Americans are torical events, etc.), their role in the internaliza-
taught that what unites us is a shared devotion to tion and externalization of social values has not
ideals found in the Constitution. We are also taught been stressed enough (Figure 22.13).
that these ideals are worth fighting for and worth Yet according to the imaginative processes I
dying for. (Goldstein, 2015, p. 5) have sketched above, this is one of the most
420 lu c a tateo
Figure 22.13 Schoolchildren rehearse for the Empire Games in New South
Wales, 1938. State Library of New South Wales. https://commons.wikimedia
.org/wiki/File:Empire_Games_rehearsal,_c._1938,_by_Sam_Hood_
(5423632955).jpg.
interesting forms of reification through personi- tive logic that leads to the creation of abstraction
fication: we “become” the abstract concept our- through inductive abduction, and the metonymi-
selves. We internalize the concept by enacting it, cal substitution of the abstract concept with the
and reify it by personifying it through our body. concrete object in return.
In the first part of this chapter, I have tried Finally, I have proposed that the next step
to outline the basic imaginative process through should be the study of those everyday rit-
which, according to Vico, we create abstract uni- ual events in which we enact this process, for
versalistic concepts starting from concrete expe- instance, in the schoolchildren school rehearsals.
rience. In the second section, I have described the We still need a better understanding of the pro-
complementary process of reification, through cesses through which we create abstract concepts
which we give a body to abstractions, and I have from everyday collective experience and then use
applied it to Anderson’s (2006) concept of “imag- those cultural artifacts to guide our future con-
ined community.” Though I have used mainly duct. Only in this way can we come to account for
examples based on iconic representations, the those sometimes astonishing phenomena through
same analysis can be conducted on different sym- which nonexisting and intangible ideals (like
bol complexes, such as national anthems (Lauen- “nation,” “tradition,” “love,” “freedom,” “gods,”
stein et al., 2015). My main point is that the etc.) can become so “real” to exert an effect on
relationship between linguistic and iconic dimen- people’s real life. I have tried to outline a the-
sions is constitutive of every type of symbol. In ory of imaginative processes that could play a
the case of allegorical personification, it is easier small part in this process of discovery by hope-
to show the work of the imaginative and affec- fully fostering more research idea(l)s, in which
the complex forms of human activity return to Freud, S. (2001). Thoughts for the times on war
be the focus of the psychological sciences (Tateo, and death. Standard Edition of the Complete
2017). Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (vol. 14,
pp. 273–302). London: Vintage.
Goldstein, J. A. (2015). To kill and die for the
Notes constitution: How devotion to the constitution
1 This is the sense for instance of the use of the ety- leads to violence. Roger Williams University
mological and philological methods in Vico’s New Legal Studies Paper no. 158. Retrieved from
Science (Vico, 1744/1948). http://ssrn.com/abstract=2570893.
2 Interestingly, also Jacques Lacan identified Granatella, M. (2015). Imaginative universals and
metaphor and metonymy as the two fundamen- human cognition in The New Science of
tal mechanisms through which the unconscious tries Giambattista Vico. Culture & Psychology, 21(2),
to foil the censorship constituted by the symbolic 185–206. DOI: 10.1177/1354067X15575795.
order’s established categories of language and avoid Grassi, E. (1976). The priority of common sense and
the payment of the symbolic debt (Bracher, 1999). imagination: Vico’s philosophical relevance
today. Social Research, 43(3), 553–580.
Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (2012). The
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childhood. Journal of Russian & East European Cambridge University Press.
23 National Identities in the Making
and Alternative Pathways of
History Education
Mario Carretero, Floor van Alphen, and Cristian Parellada
History education strongly influences the con- with fostering national identities. On the other
struction of national identities through so-called hand, it proposes that alternative pathways can be
myths of origin. Taught and subsequently appro- developed aimed at historical contents other than
priated by students these myths play an important national histories and territories. Such pathways
role in most educational systems and practices. consider the student as more than just a national
This chapter is concerned with how this happens. subject. They form a new and dynamic field of
For this purpose a number of studies will be ana- research open to sociocultural investigation.
lyzed focusing on the interdisciplinary relation
between a sociocultural framework and research
in learning and representing history. Most of
23.1 Historiography and History
the latter has been carried out in the field of
Education Fabricating National
history education, analyzing textbooks and cur-
Identities
ricula, and in a cognitive, developmental, and
instructional psychological vein. However, more The dramatic changes in academic thought on
recently social and cultural psychological studies nation toward the end of the twentieth cen-
have made significant contributions. This chapter tury have much influenced current ideas about
aims at developing a reflective view on what his- national identities. Anderson (1983) and Hob-
tory education could offer as an area of interest sbawm and Ranger (1983/2004) had a deci-
for sociocultural research, particularly through sive role in the debates about nations as either
the analysis of two cultural tools employed in essential or constructed political entities. In his-
constituting national identities in terms of their toriography the concept of nation is generally
historical contents. Both master narratives and approached in two ways: from a romantic and a
historical maps are symbolic supporters of the modernist point of view. The former, also known
national identity construction process, enabling as perennialist, characterized historiography dur-
the appropriation of particular representations of ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From
history by students from a very young age in for- this viewpoint the nation is understood as a natu-
mal and informal learning environments. Even ral reality and the national sentiment is seen as
though there are various studies about the mas- spontaneous and innate. National identities are
ter narrative tool (Alridge, 2006; Straub, 2005), considered to be permanent and rooted in the
work on historical maps is still very scarce. The remote past. Modern nations are placed on a
current chapter on the one hand reflects on this continuum with earlier communities established
pathway of history education, mainly concerned within the same territory or even viewed as the
National Identities in the Making and Alternative Pathways of History Education 425
same timeless object, unaffected by the changes inclusion of social sciences contents in history
taking place through the centuries (Smith, 2002). curricula, as early twentieth century educational
In the second half of the twentieth century the thinkers already foresaw (Dewey, 1915; Piaget,
modernist approach to national phenomena was 1933). Nevertheless, this explicit goal of provid-
developed confronting this romantic approach. ing a critical view on past and present social
National identities came to be seen as artifi- issues through history education is very recent. In
cial inventions, directed by political interests many Western countries it did not appear before
(Gellner, 1978). The national sentiment is thus the 1980s and in a number of countries it is con-
supposed to be developed by schooling, and sidered to be very innovative.
through other cultural and political artifacts such Researchers today generally agree that the his-
as military service, in contrast with the natural tory curricula from diverse countries are still full
character that was presupposed in the romantic of nationalist contents, which do not coincide
view.1 with contemporary historiographical research on
The essential role of state education in the pro- nations and their origins (Foster, 2012; Rosa &
cess of the social, cultural, and political con- Brescó, 2017). It is acknowledged that national
struction of nations has been investigated and frameworks strongly determine school history
acknowledged by many historians (Hobsbawm, contents. We think that the persistence of such
1997). Most educational systems around the contents is not merely an educational anomaly.
world were initiated about 200 years ago, includ- Rather, it clearly reflects the prevalence of
ing history as an important subject matter. The two parallel objectives of history education
appearance of history as a professional and aca- (Carretero & Bermudez, 2012). On the one hand,
demic activity and of history as a school sub- the aim to provide students with the means to
ject are almost synchronical: at the middle of achieve a disciplinary and critical understanding
the nineteenth century (Berger, 2012). The main of past and present social and political realities.
and almost exclusive objective of history edu- On the other, the implicit and explicit aim to
cation has been the indoctrination of students contribute to the construction of national iden-
via the transmission of an invented national past. tities through intellectual and emotional experi-
Another coincidence between history writing and ences and representations related to the national
history education is therefore their shared goal past. To some extent this distinction can also
of fabricating national identities among the citi- be applied to history as an academic discipline,
zenry. History education was severely criticized as seen in the opposition between perennial-
in the decades between World War I and World ist or nationalist historiography and contempo-
War II, because of its saturation with nation- rary modernist or transnational historiography
alism and stereotypical views of other nations, (Berger, Eriksonas, & Mycock, 2008). Current
nationals, and their pasts, particularly of neigh- discussions about the complex relation between
boring countries (Carretero, 2011). The enor- historiography and collective memory studies can
mous human and political catastrophe of World also be interpreted in these terms (Carretero &
War II demonstrated that blind nationalism was Van Alphen, 2017). In the history education con-
real and unfortunate. Since the 1970s and 1980s text, these two different kinds of educational
the field of history education has increased its aims – related to different ways of accessing
interest in providing students with a critical view the past developed over time – are not always
of the social and political issues of different soci- acknowledged as such (Carretero, Castorina &
eties in the past. One important factor contribut- Levinas, 2013; Lee, 2012). This is probably
ing to this improvement has been the gradual because history education research has focused
426 m a r i o c a r r et e ro, f loor van al ph e n, a nd c ristian pare llada
mainly on the development of historical thinking concern national history and the other half relates
skills, that is, a progression toward a disciplinary to world history.
understanding of the past. However, we think that Applying the distinction of “official” versus
national identity formation and maintenance has “unofficial” histories, related to the nation and
continued to influence how young students and the history told from its perspective, the work
future citizens represent history in and out of the by Wertsch (1998, 2002) has been important for
school, as it will be further elaborated below. developing sociocultural research into the realms
of history education. This distinction already
appeared in one of the first critical comparative
23.2 Sociocultural Views on
studies about the “use and abuse” of school his-
Imagining History
tory contents in different countries (Ferro, 1984).
The distinction between the production and con- The contributions by Wertsch and his collabora-
sumption of cultural tools (see Wertsch, 1998) is tors have played a central role in introducing a
useful for indicating historical contents aiming sociocultural point of view on history learning.
at cultivating national identities on the one hand This work has been inspired by both Anderson
and the process of appropriation among students (1983) and Hobsbawm (1997), clearly demon-
and citizens on the other. Such production and strating how historiography and sociocultural
consumption processes have mostly been studied research and theorizing can fertilize each other.
separately. The extensive research related to text- Wertsch and Rozin (2000, pp. 41–42) recognized
book and curricula production (Foster & Craw-
ford, 2006) has not been related to the studies “three basic functions of an official
about students’ learning and representation pro- history . . . first . . . a kind of cognitive function
cesses. To some extent, the innovative approaches having to do with cultural and psychological tools
to history education that are currently influen- required to create what Anderson (1983) has
termed “imagined communities,” especially
tial (Seixas & Morton, 2013; Wineburg, Martin
nation-states . . . without instruments such as print
& Montesano, 2011) were developed taking the
media, maps, and texts about history, it may be
cognitive and instructional studies about how to
impossible to imagine communities or to “think”
teach and learn history into account (consump- the nation . . . a second function of official histories
tion). Yet, they do not necessarily bear on what to is to provide citizens of nation-states with some
teach (production). The critical analysis of how sense of group identity . . . the third related function
school historical contents are consumed by stu- of official histories is to create loyalty on the part of
dents and citizens in general and the implications citizens to the nation state.”
this has for the construction of national identi-
ties – that is, the typical production process – In other words, a sociocultural framework pro-
has not been initiated until very recently (Van vides empirical and theoretical support for the
Alphen & Carretero, 2015; Epstein, 2009; Freed- historiographical argument that history edu-
man, 2015). Furthermore, the theoretical debates cation as a cultural artifact basically develops
on whether national contents should or should “imagi-nations” (Carretero, 2017).
not be the focus of history curricula in global- Adopting the term used by Wertsch (2004),
ized, reflective and democratic societies are quite national narratives become a kind of schematic
recent (Grever & Stuurman, 2007; Seixas, 2012). narrative template – more abstract and generic
This is an important issue, related to production narratives that are socially shared – which is
and consequently consumption, because in most fundamental when building specific historical
countries half of the history curriculum contents narratives. For example, in the case of the United
States, there are two schematic narrative tem- investigating the understanding and representa-
plates present in the vast majority of national tion of history is basically a meaningful psy-
narratives, based on the concept of progress and chological effort to analyze in detail how human
that of liberty. Students use these schematic nar- beings imagine the past of national communities,
rative templates to explain past events (Barton & as was postulated by Anderson (1983) and other
Levstik, 2008). Consequently, the resistance of theorists of nationalism.
Native Americans when facing waves of Euro-
pean colonists is seen as an obstacle in achieving
23.3 Approaching National
progress and the Vietnam War is justified by the
Identity in History Education
need to bring freedom to that country. Sociocul-
tural analyses of school history contents have The historiographical work instigating a change
shown how closely these are related to official from an essentialist to a socially constructed con-
narratives that purposefully seek to determine ceptualization of nation also propels a chang-
subjects’ representations of the past. A nation’s ing view on national identity. If the nation has
past, present, and future are organized in offi- been imagined or invented then the same goes for
cial versions of the so-called “nation’s history” its corresponding identity. Nevertheless, in the
distributed at school. These official accounts field of history education it seems that histori-
display an argumentative continuity in which the cizing national identity is even harder than de-
identitary “us” is constituted, and the nineteenth essentializing the concept of nation. In the fol-
century conception of the “nation” as a commu- lowing, we reflect on how national identity has
nity of destiny (Berger, Eriksonas, & Mycock, been approached in history education by educa-
2008; Smith, 1991) is transmuted into imagined tors, researchers and ultimately students. First the
communities. Hobsbawm (1997) defined this as changing educational aims and means are scruti-
the nation’s programmatic mythology. nized. Then ongoing research on students’ iden-
Indeed, school history accounts unite stories tities in relation to their representations of history
with different degrees of importance and a clear is discussed. And recent sociocultural research on
hierarchy in a long narrative chain, thus linked how students appropriate national historical nar-
by virtue of the role they play in the construc- ratives is presented before we move on to con-
tion of what we might call the nation’s “saga.” sider other means for national historical repre-
According to these sagas, designed by a teleolog- sentation. In the changing approach of national
ical historiography, destiny is already contained identity, the coincidence between critical histo-
in the origins, and knowledge of the “roots” riography and sociocultural studies again plays
of a nation is indispensable for knowing how an important role, this time in conducing from
to act in the future. This is not surprising if a rigid and singular to a dynamic and multi-
we take into account that the teaching of his- ple national identity conception. This is greatly
tory emerged at the end of the nineteenth cen- enabled by distinguishing students as agents from
tury with marked identity purposes, connected the national historical cultural tools they appro-
to nation building, and therefore with the pur- priate in different degrees. A sociocultural move
pose of decisively contributing to reaching the that, as we will argue later on, also opens up alter-
aforementioned goals (Boyd, 1997). This type native pathways of history education and their
of narrative substantially influences the way in investigation.
which students understand and analyze informa- As we have seen, incorporating history as
tion about the past (VanSledright, 2008). In short, a school subject was not meant to make stu-
we think that the sociocultural contribution to dents understand the problems of historiography
but rather to awaken love for their country inclusive and active civic identity (e.g., Tutiaux-
through knowledge of their nations great his- Guillon, 2012), however, this is not unproblem-
torical events. History education was considered atic (Tutiaux-Guillon, 2017). A more historicized
indispensable for the development of a national or dynamic notion of collective identity could
identity (Berger, 2012; Carretero, Asensio, & still bear more heavily on the issue of what his-
Rodríguez-Moneo, 2012). Nowadays this educa- tory to teach (see also Rosa, 2012), as will be
tional objective is disputed and the strong rela- developed further on. As we will see, in much
tion between history education and developing research carried out with students a traditional
a sense of national belonging has been called and essentialist notion of collective identity,
into question (Barton & Levstik, 2008; Barton, whether it be national, social, ethnic or cultural, is
2012; Epstein, 2009). Not only critical reflections still quite common and only gradually changing.
on nationalism and its devastating consequences
have contributed to this but also the development
23.4 Continuities and Changes
of other disciplinary aims, as discussed above,
in History Education Studies
and the extensive research on textbooks, curric-
ula, teaching and learning over the last decades. When looking at the empirical research done
Specifically, history education researchers have among students, focused on how the different
drawn attention to the fact that significant parts aims and means of history education affect them
of the population tend not to be represented in or on how they encounter and understand history,
the official histories focusing on an exclusive two tendencies immediately draw our attention.
and naturalized or ethnic national identity. It has First, the historical contents used for different
been argued that history teaching needs to take studies, even those assessing the students’ histori-
the existing diversity of identities into account, cal thinking, reading or reasoning ability, are still
for example, through teaching a more global or in line with traditional history education objec-
universalist history (Grever & Stuurman, 2007; tives in terms of their contents. They are typically
Grever, 2012; Tutiaux-Guillon, 2012). In this part of the national history of the countries in
ongoing debate, also known as the “history wars” which these studies are carried out. The research
on what history to teach and for whom, not that that has been done in the United Kingdom by
much attention is paid to the challenge for history Peter Lee and colleagues uses material on the ebb
education that comes with changing approaches and flow of the Roman Empire in Britain (e.g.,
toward national identity. Because middle and Lee, Dickinson & Ashby, 1997). The research
late twentieth-century historiography enabled the done in the United States by Sam Wineburg and
development of a critical and historicized concept colleagues uses specific parts of US history (e.g.,
of national identity, the latter can now be under- Wineburg, 1991, Wineburg, Martin & Monte-
stood as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon sano, 2011). This informs us about how cur-
that is constantly changing and never permanent ricula still mainly include national history, but
nor exclusive (Barton, 2001; Terzian & Yeager, also about how researchers may take for granted
2007). The change from an essentialist, rigid, and that learning history is learning national his-
naturalized national identity to its socially con- tory at least in comparison with other possi-
structed, dynamic, and contextualized conception ble historical contents. Second, students’ identi-
seems to have influenced history education to ties (not only national identities, but also gender
some extent, as its focus has been redirected in identities and ethnic identities) have often been
some countries from constructing an exclusive independent variables and (implicitly) conceived
and passive national identity toward fostering an as essential and time-transcending characteristics
that includes them in some group and excludes with the national narrative of freedom, progress,
them from others. Thus, how students relate to and glory. They tend to reject this national his-
historical contents, represent or learn them, has tory, arguing that it does not sufficiently represent
been found to vary according to their collective the contributions and experiences of people of
identities. Often without considering how these color (Epstein, 2000, 2009). Similar research in
identities and a sense of belonging develop and the United Kingdom on how adolescent students
change, and that they might be the explanan- from ethnic minority backgrounds approach
dum instead of the explanans.2 The investiga- history found that some prefer the narratives they
tions among students in the field of history hear at home or in their ethnic group over the
education are, however, diverse and some devel- national narratives learned at school (Hawkey &
opment in the approach of collective identity can Prior, 2011). These studies on students’ (lack of)
be observed on reviewing them. identification have given much support to a more
Studies over the last decade have indicated inclusive framing of history education beyond
that students’ national, ethnic, political, and national confines. In studies carried out with
religious backgrounds all play a role in their Canadian students, their ethnic identifications
interpretation of the meaning and significance of were found to play a central role in determining
history (Barton, 2012). In relation to students’ both the narrative template(s) they employ and
various identities, it has been primarily inves- the criteria they use to select events to build
tigated what histories or parts of history they a specific historical narrative of the Canadian
find important, that is, which historical events past (Peck, 2010). Also, students’ narratives
they judge as significant. Various studies empha- indicated different affective connections to the
size that both national and ethnic identities are Canadian nation (Lévesque, Létourneau, & Gani,
explicitly or implicitly related to what history 2013) and the stronger students feel they belong
students consider important (Epstein, 2000; to a particular (sub)national community, the
Grever, Pelzer, & Haydn, 2011; Levstik & Groth, more their specific narratives presented militant
2005; Liu et al., 2012). Their cultural and ethnic orientations (Lévesque, 2014). Ongoing inves-
identities particularly relate to the representation tigations in different countries therefore suggest
of history (Epstein & Schiller, 2005; Goldberg, that students’ cultural and ethnic identities and
2013, Peck, 2010). A study in Northern Ireland the form and content of their historical narra-
indicated that young adolescents were most tives are strongly related. Particularly regarding
likely to identify with parts of history, presented the relation between history representation and
to them in pictures, that related to their national, national identity, it has been found that Spanish
religious, and cultural backgrounds (Barton & students represent Spanish national history in a
McCully, 2005). This study does not merely different way than Greek national history, even
approach identity as a categorical entity but though the national historical narratives of those
rather looks at students’ active identifications two countries are very similar (López, Carretero,
and also explicitly entertains a sociocultural & Rodríguez-Moneo, 2015). In the case of the
approach. Research looking at how students Spanish Reconquest, their narratives make a
relate to history in the United States found that clear territorial claim and demonstrate moral jus-
while Caucasian high school students identification: the Spaniards were taking back what
tify with the nation’s history and situate family was rightfully theirs. This was not the case when
experiences within a national framework, African they reflected on the end of the Ottoman Empire
American high school students are critical toward and Greek independence: they rather described
US history. Their accounts do not exactly align a process of historical change. This raises the
question whether national identification affects (Barton, 2008; Epstein, 2000). And, in terms of
historical understanding, because lacking this a burden, recent studies have shown that even
identification with the Greek national history the university students understand national identity
students were able to construct a more critical as a timeless essence, rather than a constructed
historical account. sense of belonging or as related to citizenship
Apart from the relation between student’ iden- (López, Carretero, & Rodríguez-Moneo, 2015).
tities and what they find historically significant In this particular study, national identity becomes
as well as how they represent history, the relation something that students implicitly construct in
with historical understanding has been an impor- their narratives instead of an independent vari-
tant research subject. In this vein, students’ iden- able. As their narratives reproduce the great
tities and moral values have been considered both stories of the nation it is not surprising that stu-
a resource for history learning and an impedi- dents develop naturalized or essentialist under-
ment for developing disciplinary historical understandings of national identity. To account for both
standing (Bellino & Selman, 2012; Goldberg, resistance and reproduction of historical narra-
2013; Kolikant & Pollack, 2009; Straub, 2005). tives and at the same time study national identity
Typically, learning is easier when the historical in action Wertsch’s sociocultural approach is par-
content is (made) meaningful or significant to the ticularly well suited.
students, hence the studies on historical signifi-
cance. If historical contents are not meaningful or
23.5 Master Narrative
positively connected to students’ collective iden-
Dimensions and Their
tities teachers can encounter resistance in trans-
Persistence
mitting them. In a general sense, collective iden-
tity has been recognized as both a burden and a Through adapting a sociocultural approach
benefit in history education (Hammack, 2010). national identity can be conceptualized and
It is a burden “particularly with regard to social investigated differently in relation to history
processes of reproduction. In this frame, youth learning and representation, that is, both as a
are conceived as relatively blind appropriators of narrative construction and as a matter of degree
a status quo of narrative stalemate, thus unwit- of narrative appropriation. In line with Wertsch,
tingly participating in the essentialism and reifi- national histories and myths of origin have
cation of identity” (Hammack, 2010, p. 174). On been conceptualized as master narratives, pro-
the other hand, collective identity provides indi- duced and disseminated by nationalist histori-
vidual meaning and collective benefit “particu- ography and history education as to construct
larly for youth who are members of low-status national identities, and mastered or appropriated
groups. In this frame, emphasis is placed on col- by students and citizens (Alridge, 2006; Car-
lective identity as a tool for social change and retero & Van Alphen, 2014; Van Alphen & Car-
liberation from oppression” (p. 175). Indeed, in retero, 2015). Based on an extensive theoretical
terms of benefit, history learning studies indicate and empirical review, Carretero and Bermudez
that students can resist historical narratives that (2012) proposed that the master narrative is char-
they do not consider to be their own, that is, when acterized by (a) a homogeneous unified his-
they consider them as oppressive and rivaling torical protagonist, (b) simplified teleological
accounts of other social groups. They also con- or monocausal historical events, (c) an essen-
tribute perspectives to the history classroom, par- tialist concept of nation and timeless national
ticularly when their collective voice is excluded identity, (d) an implicit identification with the
from the official historical contents and accounts national protagonists and their goals, (e) a moral
justification or positive evaluation of the events, even assuming a time transcending national bond
and (f) a heroic exemplary status of the people between the people then and now. This gives an
involved. These master narrative characteristics idea of how they conceptualize national identity:
have been found in the narratives that Argentine as a historical example, as a (future) goal, and as a
high school students construct about the histori- continuous entity or belonging. Overall, the his-
cal event that symbolizes the origin of the Argen- torical understanding of May 25th seems to be
tine nation (Carretero & Van Alphen, 2014). constrained by the master narrative even in 16-
Historical research draws another picture about year-olds that have received more detailed history
events such as the Boston Tea Party in the United education on the matter.
States and the Cabildo Abierto in Argentina, but
through years of politically using these histories
23.6 Representations of Nations
they have assumed the form of a national myth
and Their Historical Borders as
of origin or master narrative (see Chiaramonte,
Cultural Tools
2013). Most students, instead of considering the
specific people involved in the events on May Master narratives were traditionally meant to
25, 1810, in Buenos Aires, that is, the politi- foment national identity in people and at the same
cal and economical colonial elite with different time they construct a particular kind of national
ideas about the future of the Viceroyalty of River identity that is time transcending and exclusive
Plate, narrate about a homogeneous and timeless toward others. As recent studies have started to
“people” that they even identify with as they talk analyze, not only the appropriation of master
about “us” or “we.” These people did not quar- narratives but also other essentialist tools con-
rel about what to do with the political vacuum tribute to (re)presenting national identity as time-
existing at the time, but, in the majority of the less and unique vis-á-vis other nations, specif-
students’ narratives strove together for Argentine ically the borders of a national territory drawn
independence from Spain (referred to as “them”; on maps. Throughout different societies, history
“they”). The narrative protagonists either were or textbooks include maps, which often do not prop-
wanted to be Argentine, according to the majority erly indicate the historical changes of the terri-
of 13-year-olds that were interviewed. Sixteen- tory. On the contrary, they represent the national
year-old students mostly admitted that Argentina territory as if it has always been just so. Ander-
nor the Argentines could have existed at that son (1983) specifically counted maps among the
time, yet their narratives are predominantly about cultural tools producing the imagination of com-
a homogeneous group looking for a common munities, even though he was probably referring
goal, similar to the master narrative character- to geographical maps representing the territory
izing the events as a revolution toward indepen- in a specific moment of history. It is no coinci-
dence. Appropriation of such a master narrative dence that every public school setting typically
suggests that the students have, or rather feel, includes a national map. It seems that the way
something of a national identity, even though dif- current geographical maps are presented, sepa-
ferences in identification or feelings of belonging rating countries or territories, constitutes the ter-
exist and the master narrative can also be resisted ritorial boundaries of a nation as an image of
(Van Alphen & Carretero, 2015). The relation its own, deep in people’s minds (Lois, 2014).
between the national past and the present, con- National identity is therefore more likely to be
structed in the narratives by the students, is typi- understood as an inclusive and collective “we,”
cally that of the master narrative: idealizing the sharing a common national history. This “us” in
past, teleologically relating it to the present or opposition to “them” is observed in the students’
Figure 23.1 Map of the Iberian Peninsula around Figure 23.2 Map of the Iberian Peninsula around
710. 721, about ten years after the arrival of the Arabs.
1212. 1491, about one year before the expulsion of the
Arabs by the Catholic Kings.
Source: Adapted from García de Cortazar, Atlas de Historia de España. Barcelona: Planeta, 2005.
narrations on the nation’s past in Argentina as Kosonen, 2008). In some cases they are included,
well (Carretero & Van Alphen, 2014). Their nar- however, not in a very precise way. This particu-
ratives echo the national master narrative, which lar way of producing historical imagery might be
emphasizes the shared past of those inhabiting responsible for essentialist representations of the
the territory, situating them as members of a nation.
nation and presenting a national continuity from Focusing on what can be further investi-
past to present to future. gated as part of a process of appropriating
We are referring to historical maps, usually national imagery, a study among Spanish univer-
compiled by historians in historical atlases, rather sity students demonstrates that they represent or
than to geographical maps when considering imagine the territory to be essentially national
that just a few researchers have discussed how and are typically unaware of the historical
and why the former type of maps is usually changes of the territorial boundaries (López, Car-
absent from history textbooks (Kamusella, 2010; retero, & Rodríguez-Moneo, 2015). The Iberian
710, completed by a university student. 721, about ten years after the arrival of the
Arabs, completed by a university student.
1212, completed by a university student. 1491, about one year before the expulsion of the
Arabs by the Catholic Kings, completed by a
university student.
Source: Adapted from López, Carretero, & Rodríguez-Moneo (2015).
Peninsula had been invaded by Arab forces by by historical research. In the investigation, uni-
the year 711. They took complete control over versity students were asked to draw the bor-
the whole territory in less than 10 years. Their ders corresponding to these dates on a map
presence in this territory lasted until 1492. Dur- of the Iberian Peninsula. As can be seen in
ing these eight centuries a number of both Figures 23.5, 23.6, 23.7, and 23.8 the maps fill
Christian and Arab kingdoms competed for the out by the students tend to plot the current bor-
same territory. These fights implied dramatic ders of Spain, Portugal, and France as perma-
border changes over the centuries. In Figures nent since as early as the eighth century. They
23.1, 23.2, 23.3, and 23.4 borders of 700, 721, tend to represent present borders as if they were
1212, and 1491 can be seen, as established always there. For example, the border between
what today is Portugal and the Castilian territo- have seen, in history education national identity
ries suffered a number of changes from the sev- construction is no longer an exclusive aim. Civic
enth century to the fifteenth century (see Figures identity or more inclusive and dynamic notions
23.1, 23.2, 23.3, and 23.4) but students repre- of national identity have been introduced. Do
sented in an ontological way as if those terri- master narratives also lead the way to civic
tories were the same as they are nowadays (see identities, civic identification, or civic agency?
Figures 23.5, 23.6, 23.7, and 23.8). This can also In the sense of civic education replacing national
be observed in relation to the borders of the education, the way is already being paved the-
different Iberian kingdoms such as Castile and oretically (Haste & Bermudez, 2017; Carretero,
Aragon. In the same study, the students expressed Haste, & Bermudez, 2016) and the challenge is
their idea that the medieval “Spaniards” – even to figure out whether and how master narratives
though at that time they considered themselves might enable civic identities, that is, dispositions
Castilians, Aragonese, or something else – had toward certain actions as group members or in
the right to expel the Arabs from “their terri- favor of the group, and what other cultural means
tory,” as if it had always been a national prop- might be involved here. Even though the concept
erty. This study demonstrated that most of the of agency has been drawing attention in history
university students have an essentialist view of education research, both as a characteristic of
this historical process and they labeled it “The historical narratives (Peck, Poyntz, & Seixas,
Spanish Reconquest.” This view agrees with the 2011) and as something that can be fostered in
traditional Spanish nationalist point of view, even students (Barton, 2012), how this might happen
though it is not taught at school anymore. Most and how both are connected is a matter still open
of the current Spanish textbooks present this his- for investigation. So is the question whether mas-
torical period in terms of feudal times instead of ter narratives and other symbolic and instructive
Spanish Reconquest. Nevertheless, their are other tools such as maps have a constitutive role in
cultural influences, for example, the material and the student’s national identity. Do they actually
symbolic heritage presented in terms of Christian contribute to the student feeling that she/he
as opposed to Arab culture. Summer festivities belongs to the national group? Students’ previ-
based on rituals fights of “Moors against Chris- ous identities and identifications, or viewpoints
tians” are very common in southern and eastern developed in the passage through collective
Spanish towns. frameworks, might have a more active role in
the appropriation of master narratives or other
kinds of tools provided by history education by
the time they reach high school. Polman (2006)
23.6.1 Alternative Pathways of investigates the students’ identity development
History Education as Matters of and history learning as parallel processes, based
Sociocultural Investigation on the work by Erikson (1968) on the one hand
The research thus far raises various questions and by Wertsch on the other. Before or instead of
for further investigation in a sociocultural vein, assuming a constitutive relation between the two
particularly along pathways of history education processes they are rather supposed to be interme-
that remain under-explored. First and foremost, diated by narrative cultural tools or other national
how is the construction of the students’ col- symbolic means. Other means of access to the
lective identities related to different types of past that are not strictly national might very well
history education with different purposes? As we intervene.
Furthermore, master narratives and a disci- students’ active and dynamic role can be much
plinary understanding of national history are further explored in relation to the idea of an
often opposed to each other. However, do repre- individual agent as an irreducible feature of the
sentations based on these different outlooks on mediated action of appropriation (see Wertsch,
history contradict each other or do they coex- 1998) or to the idea of the active construction or
ist in the minds of students? From the point navigation of identity (see Bamberg, 2011) or,
of view of social representations theory, it has indeed, the passage through different collective
been suggested that different and even contradict- frameworks (see Halbwachs, 1992).
ing representations or narratives about particu- An alternative pathway of history education
larly polemic past events cognitively coexist, or worth further consideration has been developed
that hegemonic representations agreeing with the by Rüsen (2004). He has greatly inspired the field
dominant or victorious social group’s viewpoint of history education with his notion of students’
make alternative interpretations of the past disap- narrative competence and call for a “com-
pear into nothingness (Barreiro, Castorina, & Van prehensive psychology of historical learning”
Alphen, 2017). Does this also mean that different (p. 81) to study the development of historical
ideas about national identity coexist or engage in consciousness in students, which is related to
semantic struggles for power? how they construct historical narratives. Rüsen
As we have seen, sociocultural psychology subdivides this “competence concerned with
has given much insight into formal and informal making sense of the past” in terms of form,
history education processes through focusing on content, and function, that is: (a) a competence
cultural devices such as master narratives. One of historical experience, involving “the capacity
other important theoretical as well as empirical of learning how to look at the past and grasp
development in the research field is changing the its specific temporal quality, differentiating it
focus from static “identity” to complex, active, from the present”; (b) a competence of historical
intersecting, or layered identification processes. interpretation, involving “the ability to bridge
Theoretically various suggestions have already time differences between past, present, and future
been made (Bamberg, 2011; Barton, 2012; De through a conception of a meaningful temporal
Fina, 2003; Grever & Ribbens, 2007; Valsiner, whole comprising all time dimensions”; (c) a
2012; Van Alphen, 2012): identification is a fluc- competence of historical orientation, involving
tuating process in which students have an active “guiding action by means of notions of temporal
role, they can change identity niches from time change, articulating human identity with his-
to time, navigate their identity constellations, or torical knowledge, and interweaving one’s own
this constellation is in itself dynamic in engag- identity into the concrete warp and woof of his-
ing with the environment. Students’ layered or torical knowledge” (Rüsen, 2004, pp. 69–70). He
intersecting identification processes, in which theorizes a progression through different types
local, ethnic, cultural, social, national, religious, of historical consciousness that offer different
and global identities are combined, might play an temporal orientations: from a traditional type of
important role in their interpretation of the mean- historical consciousness emphasizing the origins
ing and significance of history and construction and the repetition of social obligations, through
of historical narratives. In the existing research an exemplary type emphasizing general timeless
among students a tendency toward considering rules or principles of conduct, and a critical type
their dynamic identifications can be observed providing “counter-narratives” and deconstruc-
(e.g., Barton & McCully, 2005). However, the tions of pre-given temporal orientations, to a
genetic type emphasizing that change gives sense (Egan, 1997; Wertsch, 2002). Perhaps Umberto
to history and that transformation or develop- Eco was (1980) one of the first to realize how
ment of life patterns allows for maintaining their crucial an ironic orientation on the past is for
(dynamic not static) permanence. Investigating the development of citizenship in present global-
how these temporal orientations develop or might ized societies, even though he developed his ideas
coexist in students is of great interest for both in a medieval setting in Il nome della rosa. Per-
sociocultural analyses of how people represent haps Maurice Halbwachs (1992), asserting that
the past and for history education. Both Rüsen the passage through or communication between
(2004) and Wertsch (2002) entertain an idea of collective frameworks of memory enriches the
progression in temporal orientation or outlook on outlook on the past, already made an early step
history, toward a genetic historical consciousness in this direction, even though this outlook is
and away from an official history with no irony shared rather than individual. The educational
at all. As it is further detailed below, theoretical and psychological theorist Kieran Egan describes
and empirical elaboration in this vein would not ironic understanding in terms of a high degree
only enrich the research on the students’ notions of metacognition about the conceptual resources
of nation and national identity but could also that we have at our disposition to understand
contribute to a change of these notions. the world. For our purposes, we can maintain
that this capacity involves developing a criti-
cal reflection on the explanations of past events,
23.7 Toward an Ironical and
and the narrative tools relied on. Ironic under-
Dialogical Understanding of
standing can thus be understood as a reflexive
Nation and National Identity in
capacity involving sufficient cognitive flexibil-
History Education
ity to recognize that certain mechanisms of vig-
In this chapter, we have argued that a sociocul- ilance and self-regulation operate in knowledge
tural paradigm stands in close dialogue with find- in daily life. Thinking and narrating about a past
ings from historiographical research. This dia- event depends on how particular knowledge and
logue further enables analyzing and historicizing memories are combined with others and how
the national frames of reference that are operat- the individual negotiates this. In ironic compre-
ing in history education. In this context, we think hension different stories about the past become
that alternative pathways of history education are alternative perspectives. These are not necessar-
enabled by the de-essentialization of nation and ily in opposition to each other. Some may be
national identity and openly discussing their con- valued more than others. Yet, what characterizes
structed and historical character. This involves ironic comprehension is suspending one singu-
making the actual institutional – culturally medi- lar narrative or vision of the past as the “true
ated – construction of identities more explicit, account.” This suspension of the “truth” does not
and recognizing as well as analyzing the social lead to naïve relativism, but rather enables the
dimension of constructing knowledge about the recognition of the multifaceted world and polit-
past. In this vein, developing an ironical under- ical character of knowledge and, moreover, nar-
standing of nation and national identity pro- rative. It would demonstrate that the construction
vides a future perspective for (re)thinking edu- of historical knowledge and narrative already is
cational interventions as well as investigations in political, through its intrinsic connection to the
the interdisciplinary framework presented. The nation-state, as has been revealed by late twenti-
notion of ironic understanding has been devel- eth century historiography (Lorenz, 2008; Rüsen,
oped by sociocultural and narrativist approaches 2004).
Thinking about educational interventions from the contributions made in a cognitive psy-
based on research is a complex matter, because chological vein, well consolidated in the his-
history education is a practice where many tory education field, aimed at developing histor-
educational objectives and even more identities ical thinking (Wineburg, 1991). However, based
of students, understood as values or shared on Bakhtin’s ideas (1981) about the nature and
orientations, are at play. Nevertheless, apart from importance of dialogue, they think that histori-
generating research that actively de-essentializes cal expertise is not only based on individual cog-
nation and national identity, sociocultural studies nitive operations, such as the sourcing, corrob-
can help analyze history education practices oration, and documentation related to historical
that aim at overcoming these static notions and text inquiry. For them it is also essential to con-
singular outlooks on the past. The irreducible sider dialogical activity, mostly in relation to mul-
tension between individual agency and the tiple views on both historical narratives and con-
historical, social, and cultural dimension mate- cepts. They therefore confront students in the
rialized in mediational means such as national classrooms with a number of dialogical activi-
historical narratives (Wertsch, 1998), allows ties in which they have to compare and evalu-
for thinking more profoundly about developing ate different views on the same historical issue.
ironic understanding in students. Carretero and This issue is considered not just a topic but a
López (2012) suggest both to consider students’ problem asking for diverse answers and discus-
identities and to foster their historical thinking in sions of the related concepts and justifications.
the educational process by addressing national Ultimately, developing ironic understanding in
identity and the narratives of nation explicitly as history learning implies not only recognizing
cultural tools. The awareness of these historical alternative takes on history, but also critically
constructions and their functions might increase reflecting on and comparing this knowledge (see
the student’s agency in handling them. Empha- also Carretero & Van Alphen, 2017). As an alter-
sizing the complex social and dynamic character native pathway of history education the ironic
of national identity is crucial for overcoming understanding of nation and national identity
essentialist conceptions as well as augmenting means recognizing that there is always a per-
the student’s critical agentic role, which is not spective, or a cultural tool being employed, to
only an idealized aim of history education. be aware of rather than to never be reflected
One possible way to do this would be critically on. Thus, we may suggest directing the inter-
reflecting on the collective narrative and the disciplinary exchange between critical historio-
national identity it constitutes together with stu- graphical work and sociocultural studies on his-
dents, implementing insights from sociocultural tory learning at genetic historical consciousness,
analyses. from a rigid and singular to a dynamic and mul-
For example, Van Boxtel and Van Drie (2017) tiple national identity and a perpetually reimag-
have developed a fruitful instructional initia- ined nation. In an attempt to answer the ques-
tive through a dialogical framework, relevant to tion what history to learn, in terms of irony and
developing ironic understanding in educational change we could say that history learning can be
environments. They consider learning as entering about the nation when it is reflected on in compar-
into a community of practice (Lave & Wenger, ison to other possible perspectives on the past and
1991) and achieving specific concepts and pro- treated as inherently historical, that is, changing.
cedures. From this point of view the historians’ This way, “what” and “how” to learn when fac-
practice is also based on a dialogical activity. ing the past may eventually become intertwined.
The work by Van Boxtel and Van Drie stems An alternative pathway of history education is
thus both enabled by sociocultural studies and understanding in Northern Ireland and the United
constitutes a most interesting field for further – States. American Educational Research Journal,
applied – research. 38, 881–913.
Barton, K. (2008). Research on students’ ideas about
Notes history. In L. Levstik & C. A. Thyson (Eds.),
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be considered, such as the ethno-symbolic paradigm. constructing identities: Implications of research
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24 The Politics of Representing
the Past: Symbolic Spaces of
Positioning and Irony
Brady Wagoner, Sarah H. Awad, and Ignacio Brescó de Luna
Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past.
George Orwell, 1984
In 1984 Orwell depicted an extreme totalitarian which the words of the authority are appropriated
society in which all information was in the hands and mocked. Irony is a highly illustrative exam-
of the regime and citizens had few degrees of ple of how propaganda does not reach a passive
freedom in how they were to behave. A cen- audience but can even be actively transformed
tral component of information control concerned into its opposite. Orwell’s other famous work Ani-
how the past was to be remembered. The famous mal Farm – where farm animals overthrow the
quotation above describes in no uncertain terms farmer only to be later ruled by the pigs – is
how the past is used to move toward a partic- itself a wonderful illustration of irony as a tool of
ular future by the ruling regime. Moreover, it critique.
highlights that this is an issue of power: those To elaborate on these politics of represent-
at the top control the resources for imagining ing the past we present two case studies: the
the past in the present. In this chapter, we will Basque conflict and the conflict between groups
follow Orwell in exploring the political uses of in the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian revolu-
memory and their past–present–future dynamics. tion.1 In addition to the direct use of violence
However, we will argue that in any society – and protest, both cases involve the development
regardless of how strong the presence is of offi- and use of symbolic weaponry, in the form of
cial and/or partisan discourses about the past – narratives and images, that function to construct
there are always free spaces for alternative ideas a past and present social reality in which it is
and interpretations to develop. Even in totalitar- not only acceptable, but also a duty, to under-
ian regimes most people do not simply believe take actions to defend the rights of one’s group. In
the official story told by the authorities but learn these examples, we see how the use of symbolic
to keep their opinion private to avoid stand- tools also positions a person within the landscape
ing out (Moghaddam, 2013; Wertsch, 2002). of a conflict. The analysis of the Basque conflict
When those in power suppress ideas they sim- foregrounds the interplay between different nar-
ply go underground and later resurface in pub- ratives constructed from particular political posi-
lic through unconventional channels. In this way, tion, while the Egyptian case focuses on position-
social movements are often creative in finding ing vis-à-vis images in public space (namely, the
new means of expressing their vision of social graffiti of social movements and government bill-
reality. This is frequently done through irony, in boards). Images can be understood as condensed
444 b r a dy wago ne r , sarah h. awad, a nd ig nac io bre scó d e lu na
expressions of a particular position and work to Thus, people remember both from a certain
trigger various narratives circulated by the groups position and with the use of a group’s shared cul-
to which one is a member. In both cases we point tural resources. This creates a dynamic in which
out the importance of positioning and irony as a conflicts and memory are often two sides of the
symbolic means of reflection and distancing on a same coin, seamlessly feeding into each other
situation. But before jumping into the two cases, (Wagoner & Brescó, 2016). It is not uncom-
we will first theoretically elaborate our main con- mon to hear statements like “they wronged us,”
cepts of symbolic tools, positioning, and irony. “we have not been respected by them,” “we have
acted in good faith, while they have responded
with violence,” and so on. Warring factions typi-
24.1 Theoretical Framework:
cally deploy a wide range of symbolic weaponry
Symbolic Tools, Positioning, and
in order to define the conflict’s origin and thus
Agency
legitimize their respective positions in light of a
As already mentioned, narratives and images of set of supposed rights and duties (Harré & Van
the past are approached in this chapter as sym- Langenhove, 1999). In this way, narratives – as
bolic tools through which people position them- symbolic tools for interpreting the past, present,
selves in conflicts. These tools create a sym- and future – simultaneously underpin and are
bolic space for representing reality that develops underpinned by the position held by each actor.
together with the space of action and events but Conflicts then unfold within a symbolic and argu-
is not reducible to it. An act of representation mentative context (Brescó & Wagoner, 2016)
involves symbolic mediation using these tools, saturated by different partisan narratives. These
which in turn shapes what is being represented narratives are in turn the symbolic tools or
into a given cultural form, rather than as operat- meditational means (Wertsch, 1991) through
ing as a faithful copy of reality. Mitchell (1990) which people come to give sense to conflicts and
aphoristically describes the process as “no rep- build a position accordingly. In such divided and
resentation without taxation.” Moreover, these multivoiced contexts, the possible standpoints
symbolic tools are social rather than individual on the conflict are constrained by warring fac-
in origin (Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). Different tions’ discourses and voices, which people tend
groups within a society provide their members to appropriate and make their own. Even in those
with varied symbolic tools, such as narratives, situations in which a window for peace seems to
which necessarily select particular events, omit emerge, alternative approaches tend to be over-
others, provide valuations of them and fit them shadowed by partisan ways of interpreting reality.
into a broader context of interpretation. As Burke In the differentiated modern societies, where
(1969) puts it, “any selection of reality must, in different positions and narratives are at play,
certain circumstances, function as a deflection of remembering becomes a dialogical process
reality” (p. 59). This is not to say there cannot be (Märtsin et al., 2011), where multiple versions
better or worse accounts of the past. But how to of the past compete and respond to each other
understand the meaning of an event, its place in in giving an account. In this way, individuals
history, and its use is open to different interpre- take an active role within the collectives that pro-
tations. Whether a person is a professional histo- vide them with symbolic tools of remembering,
rian (with disciplinary standards of scholarship) in order to manage different perspectives. Col-
or a member of the lay public, an interpretation lective memory can thus not be treated as a uni-
of the past is achieved through the use of varied tary process, where all members of the group
narrative resources. remember in unison. As Bartlett (1932) famously
The Politics of Representing the Past 445
put it, remembering is done in a group not by months of tension during which the main political
a group. Although the symbolic tools borrowed actors devised different accounts to justify their
from a group are essential to remembering, they own positions vis-à-vis a process understood as
are actively appropriated, transformed, and put the “democratic process,” “peace process,” or a
into dialogue with other groups’ tools. It is in “trick process.”
these spaces of dialogue that new ways of repre- Thus, following the attack, different ways of
senting a situation can be constructed and human understanding that process were consolidated by
agency comes to the fore. Agency can be found means of various opposing accounts; accounts
in both the production and reception of symbolic that also acted as tools by which people could
material. It is not so much about freeing one- interpret, recall, and draw conclusions from the
self from social influences, but playing them off ceasefire depending on the extent to which they
one another. As such, agency becomes a situated identified with the main figures involved. This is
process of distancing and reflecting on action not to say that agency vanishes amid warring fac-
with the symbolic tools available at hand, under tions’ narratives and voices. That is, people do
the definite constraints of a given sociocultural not simply reproduce those discourses provided
milieu. by warring factions in a completely passive way.
However, they do not produce new discourses out
of the blue either. Rather, people’s accounts are
24.2 Narratives About the Past:
mediated by those previous discourses available
The Case of the Basque Conflict
in a particular social setting. Agency is, in this
The Basque Country conflict in Spain – now on sense, distributed between those cultural tools or
the way to being resolved – is a clear example mediational means people have at hand – in this
of this.2 After fifty years of violence, the armed particular case, the public narratives about the
group ETA (acronym for Euzkadi ta Azcatasuna ceasefire period provided by warring factions –
or Basque Country and Freedom in English) and the specific way in which these resources are
announced a permanent ceasefire in March 2006, used in each particular occasion – namely, the
an announcement surrounded by controversy way they are used by individuals as a tool for
since the very beginning. On the one hand, ETA reconstructing the past. Action is thus irremedia-
regarded the ceasefire as the first step to negoti- bly mediated and therefore shaped by “the inher-
ate the independence of the Basque Country from ent tension between mediational means and their
the Spanish State. On the other hand, the Spanish unique instantiation” (Wertsch, 1994, p. 206). In
government (headed at that time by the Socialist Bakhtinian terms this implies different forms of
President José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero) consid- multivoiced authoring (Bakhtin, 1981; see also
ered the ceasefire as an opportunity to initiate a Wertsch & O’Connor, 1994) in that different
peace process and to eventually reach a solution voices (in this case, those pertaining to the main
to the conflict. By its part, the main opposition figures involved in the conflict3 ) would be appro-
party (the right wing People’s Party) deemed the priated and adapted to individuals’ own inten-
ceasefire as a “truce-trap” and accused the gov- tions in different specific contexts. Such a per-
ernment of having secret deals with the terrorists sonal appropriation of social discourses on the
and surrendering the country to ETA. In Decem- part of lay individuals may take different degrees
ber that year, ETA planted a bomb in a car park at of agency and authorship, ranging from repro-
Madrid airport, causing two deaths. That attack – duction and acceptance, on the one hand, to entire
justified as a response to the supposed govern- rejection on the other (Brescó, 2016; Wertsch
ment’s passivity – was the culmination of nine & O’Connor, 1994). However, in polarized
contexts saturated with partisan discourses, it is Definition of the Basque conflict: “It is a conflict
often the case that the rejection of one implies between an oppressed nation and two oppressor
embracing some other. It is in these particular states (Spain and France) which refuse to recognize
contexts – such as the Basque conflict – where, the right all democratic states have: the right to
in the absence of alternative resources, personal self-determination. This situation has led to an
armed conflict.”
appropriation of these discourses in the form of
irony or satire becomes a way of resisting – and Account of the ceasefire period: “ETA declares a
even mocking – the warring factions’ militant truce and ceases all its actions. The government
discourses saturating the public sphere. says that it is willing to meet with ETA. Batasuna
expresses its willingness to negotiate the future
of the Basque Country. The Spanish state keeps
24.2.1 Three Case Studies imprisoning, torturing, and oppressing the Basque
people, especially Batasuna and its supporters.
Drawing on previous works (e.g., Brescó, 2016), Given the course of events and the government’s
this section aims to compare different versions inability to move forward, ETA decides to send out
of the abovementioned ceasefire period stemming a warning to the government by planting a bomb at
from three subjects identified to varying extents Madrid airport. The government doesn’t react and
with the main political actors involved in that the truce comes to an end. Then, ETA returns to its
Basque conflict: (1) the Spanish Socialist govern- armed struggle.”
ment, (2) ETA and its political arm Batasuna, and
(3) the right-wing People’s Party (see Note 2). Green clearly takes Batasuna’s position and
These three cases form part of a broader study makes it his own, thus defining the conflict as one
in which a total of 16 participants – from the caused by the oppression of the Basque People by
Autonomous University of Madrid and the Uni- both the Spanish and French state. In light of this
versity of the Basque Country – were asked to standpoint, this participant justifies and delegit-
define the Basque conflict and to provide an imizes the actions of the main figures involved
account of the 2006 ceasefire period by using 23 in the ceasefire period. According to his version,
short documents extracted from different Spanish despite ETA’s good intentions, the Spanish gov-
newspapers.4 Of particular interest here is show- ernment failed in its democratic duty by not lis-
ing how these three subjects appropriate and use tening to the Basque people, thereby causing ETA
different narratives of the truce period in light of to exercise its right to resume the armed struggle.
their respective identification with the main fig- It is also worth noting that in order to support his
ures involved. Along these lines, results include, version of events, this participant omitted all doc-
on the one hand, two versions reproducing the uments (included among the material handed out
story line provided by two of these figures, and to the subjects) referring to ETA’s violent activ-
on the other hand, a version characterized by a ities during the ceasefire, and instead used the
more personal, critical, and ironic appropriation news article from Gara (see Note 4) which spoke
of these narratives. of arrests and torture concerning Batasuna and
Participant 1: Green5 is an 18-year-old male its supporters. Here, it is the government that is
who studies psychology at the University of the responsible for the truce’s failure by not respond-
Basque Country and who identifies with Bata- ing to ETA’s warning in the form of a bomb
suna’s position. The following is Green’s defini- attack. This is a peculiar way of constructing the
tion of the Basque conflict and his account of the peace-making process; one in which violence is
ceasefire period: seen as a form of dialogue.
Participant 2: Blue is an 18-year-old female ing to ETA’s claims” and also some of the
who studies psychology in Madrid and sympa- news referred to ETA’s terrorist activities dur-
thizes with the right-wing People’s Party. She ing the truce period included in the material.
sees the conflict and the ceasefire period as Blue’s words also echo a People’s Party mem-
follows: ber statement, included in the material provided,
through which ETA’s ceasefire announcement
Definition of the Basque conflict: “There is a group
was linked to Zapatero’s previous set of conces-
of people from that region who don’t feel Spanish
sions to that group. From Blue’s perspective, the
so they use violence.”
position taken by the People Party’s throughout
Account of the ceasefire period: “Thanks to a series the ceasefire period is not regarded as failure, but
of secret agreements between ETA and the
as a patriotic duty against a prior immoral agree-
Socialist Party, with many concessions made by the
ment. Additionally, Blue explicitly mentions the
latter, a truce was achieved. During the supposed
terrorist attack and the two resulting casualties –
truce period, the government was completely
willing to hold talks with the terrorists while they an attacked depicted in one of the pictures pro-
kept on committing terrorist acts. Thousands of vided. Interestingly, her comment on this tragic
Spaniards marched, demanding that Zapatero stop outcome, which she referred to as ETA’s only
yielding to ETA’s claims. In turn, the People’s Party way of understanding dialogue, echoes Green’s
split with the government due to Zapatero’s version in which the attack was a mere warning.
erroneous strategy. This event ended with the This would further prove the uselessness of dia-
terrorist attack on Madrid Airport, which caused logue with the terrorists in line with the People
two casualties (this is, in fact, the only way ETA Party’s position against the government’s attempt
understands dialogue). After this attack, we are still to reach a peace agreement with ETA.
supposed to believe that the government has
Participant 3: Gray is a 23-year-old male who
dropped negotiations with ETA.”
studies psychology in Madrid. He sympathizes
Blue identifies the violence exerted by a sup- with the Socialist Party and Izquierda Unida
posed anti-Spanish faction as the origin of the (United Left), a party to the left of the former
conflict, thus somehow assuming a connection which also supported the peace-making process.
between not feeling Spanish and resorting to vio- Gray’s view on both the conflict and the truce
lence; a standpoint that precludes dialogue as a period is as follows:
way out of the conflict. In examining Blue’s ver-
Definition of the Basque conflict: “This is a
sion of the events, we can see how this participant
somewhat fictitious conflict. I don’t think that it’s
takes the People’s Party’s stance on the cease-
about the Basque people’s claim for independence,
fire period, and in accordance to that, tends to or at least, it’s not just about that. I believe that both
use those newspapers closer to that party (see sides feed off each other’s positions and live off
Note 4). Thus, unlike Green’s version, she keeping the conflict alive to some extent.”
assesses the truce in quite a negative light, even
Account of the ceasefire period: “On the 22nd of
going so far as to describe it as a “plot” between
March three gentlemen wearing hoods and fancy
the Socialist government and ETA, pretty much
dress appear on TV announcing a truce. They
in line with those newspapers and politicians who pledge not to kill for a certain period of time
supported the conspiracy theory along the truce whereas the government undertakes nobody knows
process. For instance, Blue makes use of one what. Everybody is very happy about what is
of the pictures provided which features numer- deemed the beginning of a peace process and
ous people “demanding that Zapatero stop yield- because the end of violence is thought to be near.
Immediately afterwards, all the political and media on the stage (in this case, on television) of the
machinery is set in motion. The politicians start to three members of ETA announcing the ceasefire
calculate every move in terms of electioneering and the activation of all the political and media
benefits. On the one hand, the People’s Party, in machinery, which continues to operate until the
order to discredit the Socialists, insinuates that attack on Madrid airport. This way of recon-
ETA’s and the government’s interests are basically
structing the peace process moreover underscores
the same. On the other hand, the Socialist Party
the fictitious nature of the position of the actors
does everything in its power to prevent the process
involved, actors whose “performance” is aimed
from getting out of hand, trying to please
everybody with promises. As for the Basque more at making their respective audiences happy,
extreme nationalists, they try to appear as the that is, not losing popularity among their voters
champions of peace in order to obtain greater and supporters, than at having their claims sat-
support among the people and thus reinforce their isfied – be it achieving independence, reaching
presence in the institutions. The constant attacks an agreement through dialogue, or defending the
and innuendos launched by the People’s Party end unity of the Spanish state.
up undermining Zapatero’s popularity, thus leading
the government to adopt a tougher line against
ETA. At the same time, the members of ETA who 24.2.2 Militant Discourses and
are not interested in giving up the struggle manage Militant Irony in the Basque
to impose their strategy which finally results in the Conflict
bomb attack at Madrid airport. With this tragic
As we can see, participants Green and Blue
episode, both the peace process and the cheap farce
set up around it come to an end.” identify themselves with the position of cer-
tain political actors (ETA and the People’s Party,
Gray’s stance is removed from the position of respectively), thus assuming and to some extent
the actors in the conflict as he sees the conflict as reproducing their corresponding versions of the
something fictitious, fueled by the actors them- truce period, including the claims, criticisms, and
selves. From this standpoint, the claims deriv- justifications contained in such versions. As a
ing from each position become meaningless inso- result, we have two militant accounts in which
far as they constitute a resource for nourishing a each participant seems to accept and adopt the
conflict that all sides wish to keep alight. Such voice of one of those actors and make it their own.
a critical distance is reflected in the way the From a Bakhtinian perspective, we could say that
truce period is narrated. Thus, from the very first the actors’ voices speak through the participants’
sentence (“On the 22nd of March three gentle- accounts, or stated another way, that participants
men wearing hoods and fancy dress appear on have been to some degree talked – or ventrilo-
TV announcing a truce”), this participant makes quized – by those actors’ voices.
clear his resistance to take seriously what the Contrary to Green’s and Blue’s acceptance of
actors involved in this episode claim to be doing – such voices, Gray’s critical stance on both ETA
in this case, the content of the picture provided in and People’s Party positions is reflected through
the material in which three hooded ETA mem- a clearly ironic, even satirical, narrative style by
bers are announcing the ceasefire. This ironic which this participant criticizes the absurd logic
stance on what is considered a fictitious conflict that characterizes these actors’ conduct. This is
is further reinforced by his explicitly likening the carried out by means of a certain way of using the
peace process to a “cheap farce.” Along these voices of the actors themselves – those associated
lines, the whole episode is narrated as if it were with the Socialist government, the People’s Party,
a play, one that starts off with the appearance and ETA – in order to highlight their absurdity
during the peace process. This resource, linked 24.3 Images About the Past: The
to irony, is close to the Bakhtinian concept of Case of the Egyptian Revolution
“double-voicedness,” “refer[ring] to the use of
someone else’s words in order to express one’s In parallel to the analysis of how the different
own intentions and meanings that are hostile to discourses in the public sphere, where appropri-
others’ words” (Marková, 2003, p. 63). We can ated by participants according to their social posi-
see examples of this at the beginning of Gray’s tions of the Basque conflict, we look here at the
account, when he speaks ironically about both appropriation of the narratives of the past through
ETA’s ceasefire (“they pledge not to kill for a images in Egypt after the 2011 revolution.
certain period of time whereas the government Similar to Mr. Jones in Orwell’s Animal Farm,
undertakes nobody knows what”) and the gen- the Egyptian former president Mubarak was suc-
eral optimism and faith in relation to the truce cessfully uprooted by the Egyptian revolution in
and the end of the conflict (“everybody is very 2011 only to be followed by similar autocratic
happy about what is deemed the beginning of a system setup with other leaders taking power. In
peace process and because the end of violence is the short interval of time between 2011 and 2014,
thought to be near”). the Muslim Brotherhood president was elected in
Here we find a greater degree of agency in 2012 followed by a coup, then a military backed
reconstructing the truce period compared to the regime in 2014, both of which claimed to act
cases of Green and Blue. Thus, whereas in the in the name of the very Egyptian revolution but
last two cases the participants’ words expressed ended up repeating the same authoritarian strate-
the view of the main political actors on the truce gies as the old regime. The high expectations of
period – as they were transmitted through the an idealized democratic future of “bread, free-
media – in Gray’s case the words of those political dom, and social justice” were quickly put down
actors are used to express the participant’s more by the reality of the subsequent governments.
personal view of it. In this regard, Gray’s satiri- This left the revolutionaries with a rupture, see-
cal and distant stance is not incompatible with the ing their newly found agency being forcefully
adoption of his own positioning on the episode in repressed by military and police forces.
question. As Frye (1957) points out in his work, Since the beginning of the revolution in 2011,
Tropics of Discourse, “satire is militant irony: its many activists resorted to proclaiming and utiliz-
moral norms are relatively clear, and it assumes ing public space to communicate their ideas to the
standards against which the grotesque and absurd wider public as well as to authority. This resulted
are measured” (p. 223). This moral dimension in the blooming of revolution street art and graf-
related to the use of tropes and genres is fur- fiti, which became effective tools for expressing
ther developed by the philosopher of history Hay- opposition to the government, mobilizing peo-
den White who argues that the narrative forms ple for the revolutionary goals, documenting the
used in reconstructing the past inevitably convey memory of the revolution, and honoring those
a moral content (White, 1986). In the particular who lost their lives in protests (Awad & Wag-
case of irony, this author considers this genre as a oner, 2015; Awad, Wagoner, & Glăveanu, 2017).
meta-trope, a trope related to self-consciousness This form of expression, however, paralleled the
in the use of language when talking about the progression of the revolution: after its peak in
past. In White’s own words, “[irony] represents 2011, it slowly declined as despair spread among
a stage of consciousness in which the problemat- activists and as the security measures over free-
ical nature of language itself has become recog- dom of expression tightened with every succeed-
nized” (White, 1973, p. 37). ing government. On the other hand, authority also
utilized its power over public space by erasing regime. Second, images produced by authority in
the revolution street art and graffiti, and adding the form of billboards, posters, and wall paint-
its own images through billboards advocating its ings of government buildings and public schools,
own official narrative. communicating the official narrative; advocating
Following certain images in the public space for the military as the main protector of the peo-
informs us about the different narratives at play; ple in two revolutions: the 2011 one overthrowing
in this context, the image becomes a sign in a Mubarak, the 2013 coup overthrowing the Mus-
specific narrative, a communicative device that lim Brotherhood, and calling for people to unite
poses a certain argument in opposition to another with the military to fight terrorism and economic
(Lonchuk & Rosa, 2011). As will be seen in the struggles. In the following, we will focus on two
examples below, not only is the production of examples: the first tackles one graffiti artist’s rep-
an image of interest, but also its social life: that resentation of the events from 2011 to 2015. Our
is, its transformation, interpretation, reconstruc- analysis here concerns how the image was contin-
tion, and possible destruction. The understand- ually reconstructed to reflect the progression of
ing of the social life of images helps analyze the events. The second example draws out the differ-
dialogue and tension happening in the society at ent interpretations that citizens have of an image,
large between the different narratives of the past produced by the military, according to their social
and the power relations between those narratives. position.
For example, what images get to stay in public
space and how are they perceived versus what
24.3.1 Irony in Images:
images communicate a narrative that is not tol-
Representing Authority Figures
erated by authority or general public and how is
it refuted or erased (Awad, 2017). Many of the graffiti murals that started with
Drawing from previous research (Awad, Wag- the revolution have been reproduced in different
oner, & Glăveanu, 2017; Awad, 2017), we look places and reconstructed to parallel the progres-
here at the production, interpretation, and recon- sion of the events as they unfolded. Figure 24.1
struction of images in the public sphere as depen- depicts an example of this: the authority faces in
dent on different social actors in the society, these this mural have been changing in every recon-
social actors include the producers as well as the struction of it, reflecting how they are all different
consumers of those images. The examples below faces of the same problem (See Awad & Wag-
will show different social actors as they position oner, 2015; Hamdy & Karl, 2014). The first ver-
themselves through images of the past: revolu- sion of this mural was painted by an Egyptian
tion graffiti artists as they produce certain rep- graffiti artist known as “Picasso” in Mohamed
resentations of the past, authority campaigns as Mahmoud street in the Tahrir Square area, rev-
they respond to the graffiti images with oppos- olutionary graffiti’s central location. The initial
ing narratives, and citizens as they interpret and version was of a face that is half Mubarak (the
appropriate the images in their city space. The ousted president) and half Tantawy (the chairman
images used for this research are those related of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, who
to two specific narratives about the recent past was in charge after Mubarak), expressing that
events since 2011. First, the narrative represented the first was removed, only for a similar author-
in many of the revolution graffiti: the revolution ity to replace him. Then other faces were added
shortly succeeded in overthrowing Mubarak’s to the painting triggered by the local author-
30 year regime, but that was followed by military ity erasing it. During the first election after the
and Muslim Brotherhood dominance, progress- revolution it included two candidates who were
ing to a current counterrevolution authoritarian considered part of the old regime. Later as the
Figure 24.1 Street art on the presidential palace wall in Cairo, June 2013.
Source: Street art by Omar Fathy (Picasso); photo credit: Walls of Freedom.
Muslim Brotherhood took power, the faces of ing the elected president. The confusion between
Morsi (the elected Muslim Brotherhood presi- the artist’s feelings of relief and hopefulness that
dent) and Badei (the supreme guide of the Mus- the Muslim Brotherhood are removed accompa-
lim Brotherhood) were added. nied by fearful and cautious feelings of a “coup”
Figure 24.1 is a reproduction of the mural unfolding is expressed in how the artist modi-
painted by the same artist two years after the first fied the painting the following day by removing
version, but this time by the presidential palace the beret from the image. This was a response to
where protests were growing against Morsi in the celebrations taking place by the presidential
July 2013. The painting reflects a critical time palace after the removal of Morsi and an opti-
when El Sisi (back then chief of Armed Forces) mism for a future with a leader that is not iden-
announced the removal of Morsi and assigned an tified as betraying the people, namely, Mubarak,
interim government. The text underneath reads military, and Brotherhood (Hamdy & Karl, 2014,
“He who delegates authority has not died,” trans- pp. 234–235). The visual simplicity and clearness
forming an Egyptian proverb that expresses how of the series of images of this mural tell the story
children resemble their parents so in a way par- of this revolution (as well as many others) and
ents never die. Similarly the graffiti puts the faces predicts a future yet to come.
of Mubarak, Tantawy, and Morsi, but this time
adds the expected new ruler of Egypt, as an
24.3.2 Citizen Interpretations of
unknown silhouette with the beret of the military.
Images Produced by the Military
The heading of the painting reads “Down with
all those who betrayed, Mubarak, Military, and The artist’s feared future scenario came true:
Brotherhood.” El-Sisi resigned from his military post and ran
The transformation of this image expresses the as a presidential candidate. Since El-Sisi was
irony of the many new faces rising to power sworn into office in June 2014, there has been an
after the revolution only to be copies of the same unprecedented crackdown on freedom of expres-
kind of authority that the revolution has aspired sion, while the state utilized media channels, pub-
to remove. The latest version adds yet another lic space, and school curriculum to advocate for
anticipation regarding who is next, after the mil- the official narrative mentioned earlier. In a pre-
itary has gone to the front line again by remov- vious study (Awad, 2017), 25 participants who
Not for me or you, this is naive advertisement, but

it works with the general public, they need to feel
attached to and protected by the army now.
Sherin, a 38-year-old who works in social devel-

opment and is a mother of two, communicated
her position against the government through an
ironic interpretation of the image:
See . . . like why are the people in diapers? When I

first saw this poster I joked with a friend that the
army and their supporters had an affair and this
child is the outcome . . . He doesn’t even look
Egyptian . . . But it is a true portrayal of how they
see the public: immature and incapable infants that
need parenting, it goes along with the patriarchal
presidential speeches we get . . . This as well as
their other posters are everywhere in the city, they
want to make it clear that they own and rule every
inch of the city. And if I don’t agree with them,
then I don’t love my country and I am a terrorist.
For Lobna, a 34-year-old who identifies herself

as apolitical, the image was of interest as she
recalled her reinterpretation of it as she saw it in
Figure 24.2 Government poster in Cairo,
the city at different times in the past years:
February 2016. Text reads: “The army and the
people are one hand.” Source: Photo taken by You know this photo reminds me of how things are
author. changing so fast. When this photo was first spread
in 2011 it was very true. Army did stand by the
reside in Cairo were shown different state spon-
people against Mubarak and the appearance of
sored images including the image in Figure 24.2
tanks in Tahrir Square was a relief, it meant
and asked about their interpretation of them.
protestors are finally safe. And families would go
Below are three examples of different interpre- to Tahrir square with their children and give their
tations of the image by citizens from different child to the soldier on the tank to take a picture
political positions and how they appropriated the with him and that is exactly what is portrayed in the
recent past as presented by the image.6 picture. When I first saw it in 2011, I was very
Nour, a 34-year-old entrepreneur, was critical touched by it. But later when those same tanks
of the naivety of the poster, even though he sup- started killing protestors, I felt the photo is not as
ports the government and its campaigns: idealistic as I had thought. Seeing the photo again
made me feel disappointed, it was a painful
The poster is a portrayal of reality. Army protected reminder of those who died.
people not once but twice, that’s what an army
should be to Egyptians . . . they did mistakes but
they had to, we’re not in an easy time and priority 24.3.3 Irony as a Mode of
now is security. Resistance
When asked if he sees the image as an effective The above data presented examples of the agency
promotion of the government, he said: of each actor as they positioned themselves in
relation to the past: the graffiti artist through the native outlets utilize irony in a way that reaf-
serial reproduction of his painting, the govern- firms the activists’ denied freedom and the sanc-
ment through its poster, and the citizens through tion on any kind of opposition to the president,
their interpretation of that poster. The three cit- by flipping this power relationship temporarily
izens’ quotes, similar to the case of the Basque using humor. This is seen in caricatured images
conflict, took different degrees of authorship over of authority figures, who in other media outlets
the image: from reproduction and acceptance to would be untouchable, as well as using the presi-
rejection and sarcasm. The appropriation varied dent’s official speeches as material for countering
by their political position, stance on the past their messages. While these symbolic tools may
events, and emotions toward the visual represen- provide relief for the actor putting their voice out
tation of the soldier and the child. The interpreta- in public and symbolically challenging the pow-
tion process here is an argumentative one where erful by positioning them in a funny and demean-
the viewer enters a dialogue with the meanings ing manner, it also reaffirms the helplessness of
suggested by the image and produced through the actor having only symbolic power through
the image’s counterarguments as well (Lonchuk these tools for resistance.
& Rosa, 2011). In the city space, images are perceived and
While power plays a role in controlling the remembered according to perceivers’ own cur-
resources for representing certain narratives of rent opinions and orientations, so it is doubtful
the past that orients toward a particular future, that a graffiti image would make a government
the examples emphasize the diverse ways through supporter change his mind, or an image promot-
which people appropriate that past based on ing the government would make activists recon-
their political positioning and personal memo- sider their opinions. It has been argued that pro-
ries of the revolution. Even within repressive paganda in dictatorships functions not so much
atmospheres where only the official discourses to gain believers but mark off what can be pub-
or “public transcripts” gets exposure in the publicly said (Moghaddam, 2013; Wertsch, 2002)
lic sphere, individuals do create social spaces and produce a city space atmosphere of power
where they communicate their “hidden tran- and domination (Awad, 2017). Getting alterna-
scripts” challenging the authority’s power over tive versions of reality into this public space is an
discourses (Scott, 1990). act of resistance that challenges that conformity.
The use of irony has been one of the main This presence reflects the dynamics between the
themes in the opposition narrative (as seen in the powerful narratives versus the alternative narra-
graffiti image and in Sherin’s comment on the tives, with the alternative narratives reaffirming
authority’s image), being often used to ridicule for the activists that their voice is still there and
the dramatic contrast between what the revolu- promoting a sense of solidarity.
tion has called for versus the current reality. Irony
was used by the participant, Sherin, as a means of
24.4 Concluding Thoughts:
reflection and distancing from the situation, in a
Symbolic Action and Reaction
way resisting the dominant discourses. As men-
tioned earlier, the use of irony shows how govern- This chapter has presented narratives and images
ments’ propaganda is not received passively, but as symbolic tools that both position their audi-
can even be actively transformed into its oppo- ence as actors in political conflicts and provide
site. The silencing of opposition from traditional possible means of reflection and agency. Using
media outlets has triggered wider use of social examples from narratives in the context of the
media for opposition. Expression in those alter- Basque country conflict as well as images created
in the public space after the 2011 Egyptian rev- suggests an element of variability and freedom.”
olution, we illustrated how these symbolic tools This leads us to the question of agency raised
prescribe certain orientations and actions to be above and to highlight the fact that human beings
conducted according to a particular group’s goals. are not only influenced by the symbolic mate-
Narratives are objectified in images and pro- rials they encounter but are also constructive in
vide the interpretive background to understand- reshaping them as they continue to live, creating
ing them. Both images and narratives remind us new orientations to the future (Wagoner, 2017).
of what happened, what the current situation is, If this were not the case, no new visions of soci-
and thus point to what people are expected to do, ety would emerge and social change would be
as a function of their placement in the plot of the impossible. The meeting and conflict of perspec-
narrative for a depicted scenario. Taking Schank tives and material can be a great stimulus to social
and Abelson’s (1977) terminology, we can say change (Bartlett, 1923).
that these cultural tools provide individuals with In highlighting the active nature of audiences,
a kind of script; a script that once internalized we do not wish to downplay the importance of
might be formulated as follows: “we know this power. Clearly certain groups have more influ-
story, and we know its awful outcome, and we ence over which messages get communicated and
also know what must be done in response to it” can create an environment in which alternative
(Tölölyan, 1989, p. 112). However, people are voices are not tolerated. As already mentioned,
also active in interpreting and appropriating these this tends to create general public conformity, in
messages based on their own social and personal which people learn to keep their perceptions of
background; in other words, we cannot read the social reality private (Moghaddam, 2013). Social
reception of some material from an analysis of movements, however, may find ways of navi-
its content or its intended use. Thus, people have gating prohibitions to advocate an alternative
agency in making use of the material as a func- stance, putting new voices into the public sphere.
tion of their own background and motivations. For this reason protests are not tolerated by
The metaphor as a cultural tool is appropriate dictatorships – they demonstrate that many oth-
here in that narratives and images can be used ers share a perspective on social reality, and thus
in different ways by different people for different overcome a society’s pluralistic ignorance (i.e.,
purposes. Narratives and images have typically the belief that “others do not share my alterna-
been employed to establish loyalty to a particu- tive belief”), as well as challenge the dominance
lar group (e.g., historical accounts of the nation of the authority over visual representation in the
as good, or flags as symbols of national unity), public space. The interplay of perspectives can
but they can also provide a means of reflecting be highly generative for reflecting on the current
on one’s position and constructing it anew (e.g., situation and material circulating about it, giv-
being confronted with an alternative version of ing people tools for neutralizing or countering
events through a different story or an ironic take the argument of certain narratives of images. This
on the existing one). The same material that is was particularly clear in the examples of people’s
used to construct social reality and one’s place in uses of irony.
it can also function to distance oneself from that We need to, however, be careful not to overly
very construction when it is put in dialogue with praise irony as a symbolic weapon of less pow-
another perspective. As Wertsch (2017) points erful groups for two reasons. First, irony can
out, “narrative tools do not mechanistically deter- function to tame and familiarize images and dis-
mine human discourse and thinking. Instead, the courses that nonetheless go against the project
very notion of a tool implies an active user and of one’s group. This was pointed out during
Trump’s presidential campaign statements (often tionary graffiti (such as Figure 24.1). The social
racist) and scandals, which were widely satirized power-based dialogue becomes one of selective
in memes and by comedians. Yet, their ironic censorship on the one side and ironic mockery
repetition may have been a key factor in nor- on the other.
malizing them. Second, whether irony alone can
lead to social action is questionable. More often
Notes
than not it functions more as a displacement of
action. Those involved in a conflict of extreme 1 Some have argued we would do better to speak of
violence would rarely display irony toward it. By a “potential revolution,” because the fundamental
contrast, irony tends to encourage a distanced changes to society were never achieved.
rather than engaged stance toward social real- 2 The Basque Country is a region situated in the north-
ity, as can be seen in Gray’s narrative on the ern part of Spain endowed with specific cultural
characteristics (e.g., the Basque language) and a
Basque Country issue above. Distancing implies
high level of political autonomy. Due to the strong
establishing one’s own individuality from others’
sense of identity of this region, a significant num-
symbolic tools and what they represent (Werner
ber of people in the Basque Country do not feel part
& Kaplan, 1963). In so doing it might not only of the Spanish nation and would like this region to
detach us from action but also from collective be an independent country. This scenario is strongly
solidarity under a common cause. With distanc- marked by the presence of the Basque terrorist group
ing we become more aware of the arbitrariness ETA which, since its first action in 1969 (at the
of representation, that narratives and images are end of Franco’s dictatorship), has caused nearly 900
attached to positions in society and are not neu- casualties, including civilians, politicians, and mili-
tral or natural. tary men. For the last ten years, ETA has been losing
In this way, irony can be used as a resource strength in terms of both its operational capacity and
aimed at preventing individuals from naturaliz- social support. In October 2011, ETA announced the
definitive cessation of its armed activity. However,
ing certain versions of the past. Taking Kieran
the conflict has still not been definitively resolved as
Egan’s (1997) concept of ironic understanding
the Spanish government is waiting for ETA to relin-
when consuming historical narratives, we would
quish its arms.
agree with Blanco and Rosa (1997) in stating 3 There are several actors involved in the Basque
that “perhaps it would not be a bad goal to look Country issue: political parties of different ideolog-
for an ironic citizenship, but an irony based on ical orientation and positioning regarding the inde-
reflection and informed dialogue, not cynicism” pendence of this region, institutions such as the
(p. 15). From this perspective, the ideal scenario Spanish government and the Basque Autonomic
would consist of guiding actors to become reflex- region, and different associations, including, on the
ive authors endowed with agency to co-construct one hand, the so-called Association of Victims of
their own versions of the past in internal debate Terrorism (mostly formed by those injured by ETA,
with themselves and in open dialogue with oth- as well as their families), and on the other hand, the
association of relatives of prisoners of ETA (Etx-
ers. Of course, power asymmetries between dif-
erat). In this study we will focus on those actors
ferent social actors mitigate the possibilities of
that had a major role during the ceasefire period:
achieving this. It is rare that different groups’ nar-
(1) the Spanish socialist government, who defended
ratives are given equal space. In such a situation the legitimacy of the peace-making process; (2) ETA
irony may function more as a means of mock- and its political arm Batasuna, who advocates for
ing the words of partisan and powerful actors, the independence of the Basque Country and legit-
and symbolically pull them down as authorities, imizes the armed struggle; and (3) the right-wing
as can be seen in some of the Egyptian revolu- People’s Party – the main group of the opposition at
that time – who delegitimized the peace-process by Blanco, F. & Rosa, A. (1997). Dilthey’s dream:
accusing the government of making political conces- Teaching history to understand the future.
sions in exchange for keeping the peace. International Journal for Educational Research,
4 Participants were allowed to use the documents in 27(3), 189–200.
any way they wished (e.g., only using those already Brescó, I. (2016). Conflict, memory and positioning:
supporting their views, omitting those others they Studying the dialogical and multivoiced
found irrelevant or conflicted with their views, and dimension of the Basque conflict. Peace &
adding whatever extra information they reckoned Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 22(1),
appropriate). The documents – all of them dated 36–43.
and arranged chronologically – were composed of Brescó, I. & Wagoner, B. (2016). Context in the
five pictures, ten broadsheet headings and eight brief cultural psychology of remembering. In C. Stone
extracts of statements delivered by some political & L. Bietti (Eds.), Contextualizing Human
actors. The selected sources were: El Mundo and Memory (pp. 69–85). London: Routledge.
ABC (centre-right wing newspapers, close to the Burke, K. (1969). A Grammar of Motives. Oakland:
People’s Party), El País (centre-left wing newspaper, University of California Press.
close to Zapatero’s Socialist Party), Gara (newspa- Egan, K. (1997). The Educated Mind. Chicago:
per close to Batasuna – ETA’s political arm), and La University of Chicago Press.
Vanguardia (a Catalan centre-right newspaper). All Frye, N. (1957). The Anatomy of Criticism: Four
sources were balanced in order to obtain an evenly Essays. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
distributed view regarding the Basque issue. Press.
5 Participants’ names have been changed. Hamdy, B. & Karl, D. (2014). Walls of Freedom:
6 For anonymity, names used do not correspond to real Street Art of the Egyptian Revolution. Berlin:
names of participants. From Here to Fame Publishing.
Harré, R. & Van Langenhove, L. (Eds.). (1999).
Positioning Theory. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Lonchuk, M. & Rosa, A. (2011). Voices of graphic art
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25 Beyond Historical Guilt:
Intergenerational Narratives of
Violence and Reconciliation
Giovanna Leone
25.1 Intergenerational
The aim of this chapter is to discuss social and
Narratives Support Individual
psychological theories exploring the role played
Recollections and Positive
by intergenerational narratives in the processes of
Family Identities
intergroup reconciliation. Apart from their differ-
ences, all theories reviewed deal with the issue While observing real-world situations, we may
of if and how the old generation presents young notice that, starting from infancy, new members
members of a community, born after the end of of a community are exposed to “an avalanche”
extreme violent episodes or wars, with this con- (Brescó de Luna & Rosa, 2012, p. 300) of inter-
troversial past of their group. The core idea of generational narratives that insert their own lives
this chapter is that intergenerational narratives of into the lives of groups in which they happen
historical pasts play a crucial role in the com- to be born. These narratives – which will later
plex web of social and psychological processes develop to include recollections of the past of
involved in slowly building new intergroup rela- “imagined communities,” such as the national
tions after the ends of conflicts. Many empiri- memory (Anderson, 2006) – begin very early
cal works show how biased narratives of past in life, when adults recollect small episodes of
violence are crucial for the social production of their children’s lives involving the lives of their
contemporary intergroup hatred (see, e.g., Das, family and friends (e.g., remembering when they
1998). However, while they sometimes fuel old visited the grandparents’ home or when they
hatred toward past enemies, making these hatreds received birthday presents). Owing to contempo-
feel real and present again, at other times, inter- rary advances in videotaping technologies, recent
generational narratives about past history may real-world research has observed this kind of
enhance reconciliation. This chapter focuses on communicative interaction between children and
these last kinds of communication. adults. Moreover, a longitudinal perspective has
We cannot address the discussion of reasons often been taken, comparing these conversations
why intergenerational narratives can cause such at different points in children’s lives and taking
opposing reactions if we do not consider, as a the development of their speaking and cognitive
starting point, the very basic issue that social abilities into account.
conversations about the past support individual Among these studies is an important one by
memories. Reese, Haden, and Fivush (1993; see also Fivush,
Beyond Historical Guilt 459
2008), which compared four repeated obser- in the family’s past. Although knowing them by
vations of mother–child conversations about heart, members of the family always listened
past episodes, taken from when children were to this repeated social sharing of overnarrated
40 months old, i.e., when they were just begin- memories with evident pleasure and cherished
ning to participate fully in conversations about them as a kind of family treasure. Interestingly,
the past (Eisenberg, 1985), to when they were these same episodes, so often rehearsed in fam-
70 months old, i.e., when they were becoming ily conversations, were not shared with strangers
competent in narrating autonomously (Hudson (Halbwachs, 1925/1992).
& Shapiro, 1991; Peterson & McCabe, 1983). According to Halbwachs, these family memo-
Such a comparison showed that first conversa- ries were chosen to be repeatedly shared in daily
tions played a fundamental role in shaping the conversations because they conveyed to all mem-
basic format of the episodic autobiographical bers of this little social community a basic pos-
memories of children. When they become able itive impression of the nucleus in which they
to give their own spontaneous autobiographi- were born. In his seminal books, Halbwachs
cal recalls, children of highly articulate parents (1925/1992, 1950/1980) proposed, therefore, that
assume their parents’ rich narrative format, while repeated family memories supported the per-
children of less articulate parents produce sim- sonal positive identity of young generations.
ple, practical memories (Reese, Haden, & Fivush, By repeatedly sharing family memories that were
1993; see also Fivush, 2008). These data sug- not told to strangers, families were giving to their
gest that intergenerational narratives of the fam- younger members a positive image of the nucleus
ily past lend scaffolding support to the first for- from which they originated and therefore of the
mation of children’s personal reminiscing. fabric of which all of the family members were
Many years before videotaping technolo- made: an “emotional armor” aimed at protecting
gies could support observational research, and them in the future, when they needed to cope with
when sophisticated distinctions between differ- life’s difficulties.
ent facets of human memory (semantic, episodic,
procedural, etc.; for a description of all memories
that can be observed in experimental and ecologi-
25.2 From Autobiographical
cal contexts, see Neisser & Winograd, 1995) were
and Family Memories to
not yet assessed, the French sociologist Maurice
Historical and Cultural
Halbwachs had already focused scholars’ atten-
Knowledge
tion on the importance of family narratives of
the past. In his pioneering studies, however, he Halbwachs noted that contents of these fam-
highlighted a very specific aspect of this phe- ily recollections sometimes referred to memories
nomenon linked to his original theoretical claim of historical events as well as to memories of
that individual memories were impossible if not past ways of living as experienced by the older
inserted in the frame of concrete social practices generations but subsequently gone. Quoting the
(Halbwachs, 1925/1992). Halbwachs noted that, example of narratives related to grandchildren
in the more intimate setting of their face-to-face when staying in their grandparents’ home, Halb-
conversations, families showed a social practice wachs defined these special periods spent liv-
of remembering used only when interacting with ing with grandparents as the first trip of children
the family’s members. In these kinds of conversa- not only in space but also in time. The rich and
tions, specific episodes were repeatedly narrated, affectively loaded interactions with grandparents
chosen from among several that had occurred made an earlier period of the community’s past
460 giovan na l e o n e
understandable to children living in a completely how family narratives can be linked to social ones
different historical situation. may be seen in the Russian case of the so-called
These nuances of the phenomenon of repeated Bessmertnyi Polk. On May 9, 2015, impressive
family memories, first highlighted in Halb- parades of the Russian “Immortal Regiment”
wachs’s books (1925/1992, 1950/1980), are easy (Bessmertnyi Polk) that fought in World War II
to observe in everyday life interactions. For were organized, in which purportedly millions of
instance, European baby boomers have usu- Russian citizens marched with pictures of their
ally been exposed to grandparents’ memories relatives who had served in World War II.
of major events from World War II as well as But social narratives and family narratives do
narratives of the way their grandparents had to not always tell the same story. To give another
live in order to cope with all threats, difficulties, example, two focus group discussions of young
and shortages during times of war. Using Halb- Italian people were confronted with four other
wachs’s very words, we could say that the func- focus group discussions: two involving young
tion of this specific kind of family memory is to Italian participants who in their youth lived
present young people with a “living” image of during World War II and two involving baby
history. boomers born immediately after the end of the
In a similar vein, many years later, Assmann war. Focus groups were invited to recall personal
(1992, cited in László, 2003) proposed to call memories of moments in which they happened
communication memory the collective memories to think about the historical framing of their
of a community that appeared in a vivid and lives. All focus groups spontaneously recalled
“lived” way to young generations, since they Italian Fascism as an issue that they thought
received them through interpersonal communica- about. However, older participants evoked mostly
tion from older generations. These kinds of col- their autobiographical memories (fear when their
lective memories extend back for about a cen- cities were bombed, food shortages, but also sol-
tury of the community’s history, that is, over three idarity and courage). In contrast, young partici-
generational changes. Collective memories about pants evoked narratives received both in history
the in-group past that took place before this time classes and during family conversations (László
span instead reach the young generations only & Ehmann, 2012; Jovchelovitch, 2012; see also
as a semantic knowledge. Therefore, Assmann Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Interestingly, when
(1992) proposed to call them cultural memories, these narratives conveyed a conflicting mean-
in order to distinguish them from communication ing of these times (for instance, when grandpar-
memories received through the intergenerational ents claimed that Fascism did something good
narratives of those who witnessed consequential for Italy, providing, for instance, social assistance
events of the collective past or lived in historical for poor children or new infrastructures), young
situations subsequently gone. people actively avoiding taking a clear stance
Interestingly, communication and cultural between the different points of view received
memories can sometimes overlap when seman- from school and family narratives, trying not to
tic contents conveyed through cultural artifacts negatively judge their grandparents’ witnessing
(statues, names of streets and squares, movies of the historical past (Leone & Curigliano, 2009).
and books, museums, commemorations, public We cannot discuss at length in these pages the
speeches, etc.) referred to episodes that hap- fascinating problem of how different historical
pened in the time span of three generations and narratives, coming from different sources, could
were also presented in interpersonal witnessing be integrated into a tentative cognitive polypha-
or family remembering. A concrete example of sia (Jovchelovitch, 2012). We limit ourselves to
signaling how, referring to cultural memories and For the aims of this chapter, we focus only
their possible clash with communicative ones, on this last set of intergenerational narratives.
a crucial set of intergenerational narratives is Before discussing the complex role of these kinds
offered to students through history books. Schol- of narratives in reconciliation processes, how-
ars’ opinions on these issues appear somehow ever, we must first consider what may drive
controversial. youths to get acquainted with their historical past
On one hand, when narratives included in his- and to listen to older generations narrating it.
tory books concern the past of “imagined com- It is common to think that young people are
munities” (Anderson, 2006), first of all national indifferent to history and somehow embedded
ones, they support a positive image of the nation- only in the present. In the following section, we
state where students are born (Liu, Onar, & review important theoretical proposals claiming
Woodward, 2014). Narratives with a similar the opposite: that youths want and need to be
aim are also received during family conversa- acquainted with their historical past.
tions or through literature, media, and fiction
(László, 2003). On the other hand, however,
25.3 “What Is the Use of
sometimes history books are sharply different
History?” Why Youths Need to
from these other kinds of intergenerational nar-
Understand Their Historical Past
ratives, since they are meant to convey knowl-
edge about the past, linked to scientific research. A first valuable insight into the meaningfulness
When historical events happened that challenge of historical narratives for young people could be
the positive image of the group, either morally or taken from the classic little book by Bloch, The
socially, history books cannot avoid also teaching Historian’s Craft or Apology of History (1954).
these aspects of the past to students. Moreover, Bloch (1886–1944), perhaps the most important
owing to globalization, classrooms are increas- European historian medievalist of his time and
ingly multicultural, and using history teaching as cofounder with Lucien Febvre of Annales (1929),
a technology of the nation-state (Liu, Onar, & wrote this unfinished meditation on the writing
Woodward, 2014) often seems inadequate. Cur- of history shortly before being executed in 1944
rently more than ever, history teaching stands as a leader of the French resistance. In the very
apart from other kinds of intergenerational nar- first pages of this posthumously published book,
ratives, since – at least in democratic regimes – Bloch remembered that, as Paris was taken by the
its specific role is to seriously support both his- Nazi troops and French culture knew all of a sud-
torical knowledge and cultural memory. When den its étrange défaite, his 12-year-old son asked
considering their social aims and psychological him, “What is the use of history?” The whole of
effects, therefore, a dividing line has to be drawn this classic book is an answer to this question, and
between studies in history books and studies on it is touching that Bloch, one of the most promi-
other kinds of historical narratives about cultural nent historians of his time, introduced this issue
memory (Leone, 2017). by recalling a question that had occurred during
Summing up all these studies and empirical a family conversation instead of referring to his
observations, we may conclude that intergenera- teaching or academic activities.
tional narratives support individual recollections, As if replying to his son, Bloch explained
from the more intimate and concrete set of auto- historical accounts not as a matter of advice
biographical and family memories to the more or strategic counseling but as a basic law of
collective and abstract set of historical and cul- the human mind and of its “instinctive need of
tural heritages. understanding.” From his original point of view,
historical facts were inextricably merged with als. In these works, the need for both continuity
psychological processes. Certainly, Bloch and discontinuity between generations became
accepted that historical facts, either sublime apparent.
or brutal, are linked to situational forces, but
he stressed that their action “is weakened or
25.4 Continuity and
intensified by man and his mind.” By repeatedly
Discontinuity: Natality and
narrating the history of their group, conver-
Human Historical Preexistence
sations between generations take part in this
never-ending collective effort to give meaning to Referring to the issue of continuity, in his clas-
past events and, because of this activity of human sic book on the revolt of the masses, Ortega y
mind, contribute toward shaping their impact on Gasset (1930/1957) pointed out that the “strange
present days (Sweeny, 1993). condition of human person” is “his essential pre-
By discussing the function of history as a ful- existence,” that is, the fact that lives of humans
filment of a basic psychological need of under- do not begin with their birth but are pre-shaped
standing, Bloch claimed that it is impossible by the history of their community. However, at
to disentangle historical facts from the way in the very moment in which he described our lives
which they are “weakened or intensified” by as historically founded, Ortega y Gasset argued
their human understanding. Therefore, when lis- that the past of the community in which a per-
tening to older generations sharing their knowl- son happens to be born “instead of imposing on
edge and experiences with them, young people us one trajectory . . . imposes several, and con-
are also exposed to older generations’ interpre- sequently forces us to choose” (Ortega y Gas-
tation of historical facts and more generally to set, 1930/1957, p. 31; emphasis added). Refusing
their viewpoints of the world, to their Weltan- any positivistic attitude, in his theoretical frame,
schauung (Kansteiner, 2014). However, this close Ortega y Gasset described intergenerational his-
intertwining between facts and interpretations, torical narratives as basic tools for young adults,
between past narratives and Weltanschauung of enabling them to grasp their starting points in
the historical period narrated, raises a crucial life. Therefore, his theoretical stance considers
point concerning a basic ambivalence of inter- past in-group history not in a deterministic way
generational narratives. On one hand, they assure but as a cultural instrument allowing young peo-
a continuity among generations, making new ple – made aware of their historical past – to make
ones aware of the history that preexisted their wiser decisions about their own futures.
birth. On the other hand, each generation opens On the other hand, referring to the issue of
up to new viewpoints, to a renewal of Weltan- discontinuity, Arendt proposed intergenerational
schauung orienting the social life of the group. narratives to be a source of knowledge but not
Both these points were strongly addressed dur- a prearranged inheritance, forcing descendants
ing the past century, when European scholars to assume the same historical destiny as their
struggled to understand the dramatic social sit- ancestors. The opening sentence of the preface
uations in which they were living – situations to her book Between Past and Future (Arendt,
eventually leading to the traumatic collapse of 1977) is a quote from French poet and resistance
European democratic governments, to totalitarian fighter René Char: “notre héritage n’est précédé
regimes, and finally to the world wars. Although d’aucun testament,” which she translated as “our
very different from each other, all these scholars inheritance was left to us by no testament.” In
conducted seminal studies on the importance of fact, although she described the intergenerational
narratives of in-group history to young individu- narratives as a bridge over the inescapable gap
between generations, in her book, Arendt also story about them.” Therefore, in Arendt’s essay,
stressed how young people were not passive Benjamin is presented “like a pearl diver who
receivers of previous generations’ narratives but descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate
elaborated these contents according to their own the bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose
original points of view. Assuming this theoreti- the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral
cal stance on discontinuity, Arendt incorporated in the depths and to carry them to the surface”
in her thoughts Walter Benjamin’s lesson on one (Arendt, 2001, p. 203).
of the most awful consequences of the violence Commenting in such a way on Benjamin’s
of World War I: “It is as if something that seemed work, Arendt turned his sad awareness of the
inalienable to us, the securest among our posses- end of intergenerational storytelling about expe-
sions, were taken from us: the ability to exchange riences of war violence into a new possibility for
experiences” (Benjamin & Zohn, 1963, p. 81). social advance and change. This inspired inter-
Arendt wholeheartedly agreed with Ben- pretation was linked to two innovative insights
jamin’s idea that the unbelievable violence of produced by Arendt’s theoretical stance: her deep
World War I – not to mention the atrocities of understanding of transformative effects of story-
World War II – disempowered any possibility telling and her new concept of natality (Arendt,
of direct communication of traumatic experi- 1958). Introducing the new idea of natality at the
ences between generations. In her essay on Ben- very core of the description of intergenerational
jamin, Arendt fully recognized his concept of narratives, Arendt argued that the real source of
the experience of war endlessly losing its value. novelty in social life is linked to the fact that each
However, Arendt added to the work of Benjamin birth represents a new beginning for the com-
a further step. Although she accepted his insight munity – since, once born, each human being
of a profound change of intergenerational story- may start something unexpected and new. By the
telling, she conceived it not as an end of this kind notion that she called natality, Arendt recovered
of communication but as a transformation of it. for our understanding of social changes the les-
To make this shift clear, she commented on son she learned from Augustine, to whom she
Benjamin’s work by quoting some lines from devoted her doctoral dissertation at the Univer-
Ariel’s famous song in Shakespeare’s The Tem- sity of Heidelberg under Karl Jaspers’s supervi-
pest, in which Ariel describes how the sea turns sion in 1929: “Initium ergo ut esset, creatus est
relics or drowned bodies into “something rich or homo” (Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, 21).
strange,” as corals or pearls. Arendt used this Both theoretical proposals of Ortega y Gas-
same image to describe the intellectual work of set (1930/1957) and of Arendt (1958, 1977)
Benjamin. According to her, he was not only give us important insights into the dual role of
the scholar who described how intergenerational intergenerational narratives about the commu-
communication came to an end because of lit- nity past, jointly developing both continuity and
eral incommunicability of war violence after the discontinuity between generations. This intrinsic
world wars. According to her, Benjamin was ambivalence performs a crucial function, espe-
also the thinker who revealed how storytelling cially when narratives deal with traumatic or con-
may use any fragmented experience as a pearl, troversial historical experiences.
thus showing how the human mind can oper- The first insight refers to the idea of histori-
ate surprising transformations on hopeless mis- cal preexistence of the human mind (Ortega y
eries. Quoting the great Danish writer Isak Dine- Gasset, 1930/1957). According to this theoret-
sen, Arendt reminded us that “all sorrows can ical perspective, intergenerational narratives on
be borne if you put them into a story or tell a past historical crimes are offered to descendants
of perpetrators because these stories are, in spite Daniel Bar-Tal and colleagues call the societal
of all, cultural tools needed by young genera- ethos of conflict. The start of intergroup violence
tions to understand their current social positions. is announced and promoted by a shift to a con-
By these narratives, in fact, older generations flict ethos, that is, a change in societal norma-
enhance the historical awareness of the younger tive assumptions, based on the emergence of the
ones about their in-group past, enabling them to idea that the other group is an enemy, and there-
act better in the social arena. fore intergroup relations have to be conceived as
The second insight refers to the notion of a threatening zero-sum game that can come to an
natality. In this other theoretical perspective, end only when one of the players is completely
intergenerational communication is described defeated (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). Only according to
as a never-ending process of coping with the this new societal ethos is it possible to perceive
inescapable gap between generations – being violence not as a behavior to be refused, sanc-
aware that this gap is the essential driver for tioned, or barely accepted but as a heroic way
social change (Arendt, 1958, 1977). to protect the in-group from being defeated and
Taken together, both ideas allow us to better destroyed by its enemies.
grasp the reasons why narratives about the in- Bloch’s idea that historical facts cannot be
group historical past must be explored not only severed from their perception and understanding
from the perspective of older generations but also explains perfectly the practical consequences of
from the intrinsic novelty introduced by the ways this societal shift to a conflict ethos. The shift
in which younger generations can receive and to a conflict ethos triggers the perceiving of the
elaborate these difficult contents. In this sense, other group as an enemy, consequently implying
the gap between generations requires a narra- that violence against the enemy is the right way
tive bridge, but it will never be totally reduced to stay loyal to one’s own in-group, a terrible yet
by narratives. On the contrary, it is precisely the valiant choice. Violence against and the death of
inescapable difference between older generations out-group members are suddenly perceived not as
and new ones that may open up real opportunities shameful actions but as heroic ones, and narra-
for intergroup reconciliation as well as the sur- tives vary accordingly.
prising renewal of old hates fueled by memories However, when conflict settlement is finally
of an apparently remote past, suddenly switched achieved and agreements are negotiated between
on again in the social discourse. One of the main leaders through peace treaties, a new intergroup
reasons why intergenerational narratives on past situation arises where social and psychological
violence are sometimes tools for reconciliation, processes turn completely. In this new intergroup
while at other times they renew old hatreds, may balance, the perception of the other group as an
be because of the influence of a societal ethos of enemy has no room anymore, since reconcili-
conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2012) on these accounts ation instead of violence is becoming socially
of the past. expected. Reconciliation processes, therefore,
may be essentially seen as a slow marginaliza-
tion of the idea of the enemy from the way in
25.5 Intergenerational
which ordinary people think in relation to their
Narratives of Violence: Building
own social identities (Kelman, 2008). It means
Up and Marginalizing the Ethos
that removing the idea of an enemy from the core
of Conflict
of one’s own social identity rules out violence
Intergroup violence cannot be explained or from the set of plausible strategies to use when
understood without taking into account what facing the other group. Evidently, it changes both
representations and narratives concerning inter- and also refusing to see killings as heroic acts.
group relations. However, the idea of an enemy, When peace treaties are set up and new cooper-
once accepted, is hard to put aside, and it thus ation with former enemies emerges, the point of
remains hidden as a potential collective memory view of these active minorities suddenly becomes
(Halbwachs, 1950/1980), ready to be used again functional to the new state of affairs, and those
as a prearranged way of perceiving the other who privately appreciated that uncommon atti-
group if new opportunities for violence arise in tude toward the out-group, but kept it silent
intergroup contacts. because of social conformity, can finally openly
Again, if we take seriously the theoretical point change their minds.
made by Bloch (1954), changes of social situa- Observing, after a long period of intergroup
tions, on one hand, and of social perceptions, on reconciliation, how heroism can no longer be
the other hand, cannot be neatly disentangled, nor used to account for past violence against for-
reduced to a simple deterministic explanation, mer enemies makes it evident how active minori-
since narratives vary according to the external sit- ties deeply influenced and eventually changed
uation of intergroup relations (conflict vs. con- the general orientation of historical narratives.
flict settlement), but intergroup relations are also In fact, after the turning point of conflict set-
legitimated or challenged by the way in which tlement (Kelman, 2008), the innovative point of
they are narrated and understood. Intergenera- view of active minorities refusing to adhere to
tional narratives could therefore be seen both as a the dominant ethos of conflict is suddenly able
consequence and as an enhancement of ongoing not only to grasp another viewpoint on social life
intergroup processes. but also to transform the way in which majori-
However, this tension between narratives ties look at this violent past. Similarly to all
revolving around the threats of enemies and nar- social representations that describe the current
ratives marginalizing this idea may be observed state of affairs between groups, the ethos of con-
from two different temporal perspectives. On one flict is not “a quiet thing”: it changes inasmuch
hand, longitudinal changes can be appreciated, as society changes its grasp on reality (Howarth,
showing either progress toward marginalization 2006).
of the image of an enemy when reconciliation However, marginalizing the ethos of conflict
advances or regressions to a conflict ethos when (Bar-Tal et al., 2012), although crucial, is only
intergroup violence arises anew. On the other a first step toward intergroup reconciliation. The
hand, a set of simultaneous processes may be image of an enemy, in fact, is essential to justify
observed, where one group is ready for a con- violence – either before or after enacting it. But
flict ethos while at the same time another group is the image of an enemy is not enough to explain
refusing it. As Serge Moscovici (1976) convinc- violence. The search for the meaning of past vio-
ingly argued in his classic work on social influ- lence requires simultaneously taking into account
ence, social representations and social discourse the roles of perpetrators, of victims, and of apa-
observed at any given point in time – either thetic bystanders. A triadic structure, seen in any
during wartime or after peace treaties – cannot experience of direct violence, becomes particu-
be reduced to the dominant point of view of larly important for scholars to describe massive
majorities. violence and killings (Staub, 2001), although, of
This means that when the dominant social course, it has to be seen as a research tool describ-
discourse on intergroup relations fuels a con- ing experiences that are much more fluid and that
flict ethos, there are still some active minorities cannot be completely captured in dangerous enti-
refusing to see the other group as the enemy tative terms (Vollhardt & Bilewicz, 2013).
Having marginalized the enemy image is not onciliation Commission in South Africa. Here,
enough to narrate past violence in a way that in the presence of the local community and
could sound bearable for all protagonists, and its authorities, the narratives of violence were
their descendants, of these dramatic events. overtly negotiated between those who experi-
These elaborate narratives are told down the gen- enced the violent times, including victims, per-
erations to protect the need for an acceptable petrators, and bystanders. Leaders who suggested
social and moral image of the in-group (Allpress this very dangerous move agreed that the highly
et al., 2014), so that when violence is justified, possible reenactment of violence after the sign-
it reinforces the historical understanding of vio- ing of the first settlement of this bloody conflict
lence, acknowledging the loss of moral and social had been avoided mainly thanks to these social
virtues (Vollhardt, Mazur, & Lemahieu, 2014). activities (Meiring & Tutu, 1999). However, it
Social denials have shaped narratives for a long is very hard to understand what made the dif-
time to fit the image of the in-group rather than ference here from many other situations, when
supporting the true facts. silence and denials immediately took place after
the settlement of the conflict. Many suggestions
have been advanced, although only as a matter
25.6 Biases in Historical
of speculation. For instance, Nadler and Shnabel
Narratives: Violence as Seen
(2008) proposed distinguishing between recon-
from the Point of View of
ciliation meant to re-create harmony between for-
Victims, Perpetrators, and
mer enemies, to enable them to live together in
Bystanders
the same community, and reconciliation meant
Immediately after the end of violence, perpe- to enable former enemies to set apart old con-
trators, as well as victims and bystanders, use flicts to live in two distinct communities that, hav-
silence when among former foes as a first implicit ing settled their conflict, have no further reason
communication concerning past events. This first to interact. Many times, these two kinds of rec-
silence helps to restore a sense of “normality” onciliation are needed at the end of a conflict
to everyday life and enhances initial viable local internal to a group, for reconciliation meant to
life, allowing perpetrators, apathetic bystanders, reinstate harmony, or at the end of an intergroup
and victims to live side by side and to continue conflict, for reconciliation meant to establish a
their unavoidable social exchanges (Eastmond & complete separation between former enemies. In
Selimovic, 2012). the case of South Africa, a relevant case of a con-
However, after this first, protective silence, and flict dividing a national group, the search for har-
because of the need to adapt quickly to the joyful mony was reached through a risky yet successful
but also startling declaration that war is finally rise of internal communication of members of the
over, a new struggle will break out between same community in front of their own authorities.
old protagonists to safeguard the image of each Another speculative reason that is often quoted
other’s own group. to explain the success of truth and reconciliation
On very rare occasions, this symbolic compe- committees in South Africa is linked to the par-
tition between former enemies is quickly solved ticular culture of these communities, based on the
through an overt and clear acknowledgment of idea of ubuntu, that is, of the importance of sav-
atrocities committed. If successfully managed, ing and recovering social unity as a paramount
this risky communicative move is used as a key value that orients everyday life and that has been
element for consolidating the end of direct vio- invoked to support this reconciliation strategy.
lence, as it was in the case of the Truth and Rec- It would suggest that truth and reconciliation
committees could not be used as a sort of suc- Referring to the first point, Cohen (2001) pro-
cessful recipe to solve the conflict in the after- poses that denial may occur at different degrees
math of violence in all cultural contexts if they in the social discourse as an active refusal: to
do not refer to this same cultural expectancy of admit the historical reality of violent facts (lit-
evaluating unity and social support of the com- eral denial), to recognize the moral responsibil-
munity as intrinsically important aims for public ity of the in-group for these facts (interpretive
actions (Murithi, 2009). denial), or to assume the practical consequences
We do not have enough room in these few of acknowledging one’s own responsibility for
pages to discuss such an interesting and chal- past violence (implicatory denial) (Cohen, 2001).
lenging research question. We simply want to Referring to the second point, until now, schol-
stress that the choice of clear and straightfor- ars’ attention has focused mainly on the perspec-
ward communication between perpetrators and tive of perpetrators and victims, while the social
victims regarding violent facts is extremely rare. and psychological aftermath of the apathy of
Quite often, many years have to elapse and sev- bystanders has somehow been neglected. Refer-
eral generations are needed before trust and open ring to the perspectives of victims and perpetra-
communication between groups can be estab- tors, a well-consolidated theory foresees differ-
lished. In these situations, before reaching the ent social and psychological needs for these two
difficult goal of trust – that is, a goal and a pro- groups. In particular, according to this theory,
cess of reconciliation at the same time (Bar-Tal perpetrators need to avoid social exclusion due to
& Bennink, 2004) – intergenerational narratives their cruel misdeeds, while victims need to regain
on past violence keep showing subtle signs of control over their own lives and destinies (Nadler
social denial at work for many years after peace & Shnabel, 2008, 2015). Narratives could be
treaties. During this long period, the need for nar- biased to ameliorate the impaired dimensions of
ratives to protect a good social or moral image the identities of both groups: the agency dimen-
of the older generations is greater than the need sion of identity of the victims’ group and the
to take into account the different perspectives moral and social image of the perpetrators’ group
of all groups involved in the violence, which (Nadler & Shnabel, 2015).
would have enabled young generations to under- However, other biases could be traced in narra-
stand what really happened in the in-group’s tives about past violence involving the in-group.
past. For instance, even many years after violent inci-
According to some scholars (see Kelman, dents, narratives may allow interpretations based
2008), when narrating violence that threatens the on a conflict ethos (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). These
in-group image, a biased perspective is always narratives do not deny facts but present descen-
to be expected, although building trust between dants of former enemies with a story stressing
groups requires the construction of narratives that how both groups were engaged in a struggle
sound acceptable to all descendants of violence for survival, thus justifying the violence used by
actors – perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. the in-group as legitimate self-defense. An inter-
However, to consider this controversial issue in pretive denial may in this case allow descen-
more depth, two aspects have to be taken into dants of perpetrators to avoid the full acknowl-
account. The first refers to the very notion of edgment of moral responsibilities of their group.
social denial, which could affect narratives about Similar interpretive shortcuts are offered by nar-
the historical past in different ways. The second ratives based on competitive victimhood, when
refers to the different perspectives of victims, per- interpretation of past crimes is based on the idea
petrators, and apathetic bystanders. that perpetrators reacted because they too were
victimized (Noor et al., 2012). There are also tion (Campbell, 2006); the social amnesia about
mixed situations in which groups were at once the Italian colonial crimes perpetrated during the
victims and perpetrators; we may say that this is occupation of Ethiopia (Leone & Sarrica, 2014);
actually the case in many conflicts (SimanTov- the rhetoric of official discourses on Thanksgiv-
Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). Moreover, while ing Day, when US presidents neglect to mention
accepting the need to acknowledge moral respon- the role of Native Americans in episodes com-
sibility for violence that took place in the past, memorated by this special day (Kurtiş, Adams, &
perpetrators’ descendants may listen to narratives Yellow Bird, 2010), to name only a few. Instead of
that try to diminish the moral responsibilities of well-organized manipulation, historical denials
the in-group, for example, by presenting the past are often simply the result of “a gradual seep-
behavior of the group as legitimate (Baumeister, age of knowledge down some collective black
1997) or minimizing the severity of the inflicted hole” (Cohen, 2001, p. 13). In these social situ-
harm (Bandura, 1999). ations, reconciliation is therefore linked to every
This huge corpus of scholars’ observations intelligent effort performed to oppose such an
takes into account the cognitive and affective easygoing and generalized seepage, choosing to
functions of narratives, which allows linking narrate violence to younger generations instead
of different pieces of information into a well- of letting it disappear down those overwhelming
organized schema, leading to meaningful sense “black holes” – especially when direct witnesses
(Bruner, 1990). Using the definition of social are about to disappear and communication mem-
denial provided by Cohen (2001), all these biased ories are close to being substituted by cultural
narratives could therefore be enlisted as inter- ones.
pretive denials, or as implicatory denials if they Despite the efforts of active minorities strug-
imply also a refusal to accept consequences stem- gling to reinstate the historical truth about vio-
ming from old violence. lence – especially when victims are too weak or
But all these biases, and their practical conse- socially isolated and cannot make their voices
quences in present-day situations, where social heard – literal denial of violence often take places
representations of the past could act as histor- in the social arena and goes on for a long time
ical charters (Liu & Hilton, 2005) for promot- across the subsequent generations.
ing future intergroup relations (either fueling new The present-day European collective memo-
aggressions or opening up to a new trust), are ries of colonialism give us insightful examples
very different from literal social denial, when of current consequences of the different kinds
knowledge itself of historical facts is not made of social denial Cohen (2001) described. Some-
available to descendants. times it is possible to observe implicatory denials
related, for instance, to the difficulty of adopt-
ing political decisions that take into account the
25.7 Down the Collective Black
economic consequences of long-lasting exploita-
Hole: The Literal Social Denial
tion of resources of colonized countries; at other
There is no need to invoke some obscure manipu- times, an interpretive denial may be observed
lation, or even conspiracy, to recognize the banal- among descendants of colonizers, still represent-
ity of the phenomenon of literal social denials, as ing the colonial past of their countries not only
we may see them today in many examples: the as a systematic exploitation but also as a kind of
prohibition to speak about the Armenian geno- civilization; and finally, when victims have not
cide (Hovannisian, 1998; Bilali, 2013); the cover- gained enough power to impose on the research
ing up of French collaboration with Nazi occupa- agenda the study of the history of violence they
have suffered, a denial of facts could also be seen, years after the crimes took place (Cajani, 2013;
as in the case of collective amnesia of war crimes Leone & Mastrovito, 2010). Nevertheless, when
committed by the Italian Army during its colo- exposed to narratives of these crimes, extracted
nial invasions, or in the case of the long-lasting from currently used historical textbooks, young
silence concerning Belgian atrocities in Congo Italian university students use facial expressions
(for a review of these different kinds of sociopsy- (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 2013) that clearly
chological aftermaths of colonialism in the col- show their initial reactions of surprise or doubt
lective memories of descendants of colonizers, (Leone et al., 2018).
see Volpato & Licata, 2010). In fact, intergenerational narratives shared and
Denials of in-group crimes affecting narratives received in this situation of literal social denial –
meant for descendants of former colonizers until if not of hegemonic historical myths fully contra-
recent times show how it has taken years for dicting past historical facts – have to face serious
atrocities to be overtly recognized and officially interpersonal and social obstacles to reinstate the
narrated to descendants of perpetrators’ groups truth. Referring to the specific case of historical
(Leone & Mastrovito, 2010; Cajani, 2013; Leach, narratives addressed to a young generation that
Zeineddine, & Čehajić-Clancy, 2013). Moreover, break a long-lasting literal social denial and/or
when literal social denial lasts from one gen- challenge a widespread historical myth, we agree
eration to the next, sometimes historical myths with the theoretical proposal of Foucault (1983)
can replace factual knowledge, fulfilling some- that a clear distinction has to be drawn, distin-
how the young people’s need to learn about guishing these demanding historical narratives
their group’s historical past (Ortega y Gasset, from other kinds of truth-speaking ones. In fact,
1930/1957). when intergenerational narratives are biased by
This was the case in the myth of Italians as social denials, as is often the case, narrative shift
soldiers full of humanity and incapable of any restoring factual information about the past may
war crimes. This myth – well known in the his- ameliorate the impaired dimensions of the iden-
torical and sociopsychological literature as the tities of groups involved in past violence. How-
myth of Italiani, brava gente (Italians, good fel- ever, as we have already seen, social denials may
lows) – has only recently been proven to be be literal (i.e., avoid stating facts), interpretive,
widespread in the social discourse of the Ital- or implicatory (Cohen, 2001). We think that lit-
ian community (Mari et al., 2010). Opposing eral social denials, which make the knowledge of
this myth, a few Italian historians (e.g., Labanca, historical facts unavailable, are the more danger-
2002) arrived at this conclusion after in-depth ous among all states of social denials. Therefore
studies into the evidence of serious war crimes we have proposed (Leone, 2017) to set apart the
committed by the Italian Army during its colo- study of the intergenerational narratives breaking
nial invasion of Africa. Despite these important a literal denial, because we assume that knowing
advances in historical research, the public debate historical facts is the first step toward meeting the
has continued to express doubts concerning these different needs of descendants of both perpetra-
facts, and until now, the historical myth of Ital- tors and victims, that is, the agency dimension of
ians as good fellows is difficult to challenge identity of the victims’ group and the moral and
in the Italian social discourse (see Del Boca, social image of the perpetrators’ group (Nadler
2005). & Shnabel, 2015). We proposed to call these spe-
Along the same lines, a frank narrative of cific kinds of intergenerational narratives about
these facts has only recently been found in Ital- the in-group’s past parrhesia (Leone & Sarrica,
ian history books, that is, more than seventy 2014; Leone, 2017).
25.8 Breaking Down Literal p. 19). It means that, apart from the reaction
Social Denials: The Dangerous of receivers, which cannot be fully predicted in
Game of Parrhesia advance, parrhesiastes are able to express of their
own accord their will to act in a decent way, pro-
According to Foucault’s original taxonomy of tecting at least their own moral integrity. There-
various forms of truth speaking (Foucault, 1983), fore, their frankness may also be seen as a kind
we propose to define parrhesia as the intergener- of self-enhancement or, to use Foucault’s very
ational narratives that dangerously expose those words, an act of cura sui (Foucault, 1983).
who clearly and fearlessly speak to young people Finally, those who speak with parrhesia are
about an inconvenient historical truth formerly implicitly showing their confidence in their
denied in the social discourse about an in-group’s receivers’ strength and moral judgment (Fou-
past (Leone & Sarrica, 2014; Leone, 2017). Par- cault, 1983). By choosing to tell them an uneasy
rhesia is a classic Greek notion, which Foucault truth, they are declaring an implicit trust in their
brought to our attention, proposing that this old receivers’ capacity to cope with this difficult
idea could help us to distinguish a specific kind knowledge. Speakers will not be completely clear
of truth speaking that at the same time holds con- on past atrocities of an in-group if they sus-
siderable risks for speakers, but also empower- pect that descendants of the social groups that
ment for receivers. Uncertainty of the trade-off were involved will react negatively to their mes-
between risks for speakers and empowerment for sage (Gross, 1998) and will regulate and eval-
receivers disentangles this specific way of com- uate the usefulness of information before pass-
munication from other kinds of truth speaking, ing it on. But of course, this is only an intention
conveying, for instance, a technical truth or an based on hope, since speakers obviously cannot
existential wisdom. On the other hand, during fully predict the effect of their communication on
parrhesiastic communication about a collective receivers. Therefore its risky features single par-
past, speakers are guided by empowering inten- rhesia out from all other kinds of truth speaking
tions, since presenting receivers with a hurtful about historical in-group crimes, making it not
truth enables them to better understand their cur- only a narrative but a real “communication game”
rent situation. These intentions distinguish par- (Foucault, 1983) between generations.
rhesia from aggression. When using parrhesia to A parrhestiastic communication will be suc-
convey inconvenient information about past in- cessful depending on how both older speakers
group crimes, it is not to damage or humiliate and younger receivers play this game. To play
receivers but to give them a realistic understand- it, the older generation’s move is to choose what
ing of their own historical preexistence (Ortega y and how to narrate, and the younger generation’s
Gasset, 1930/1957). move is to acknowledge their ancestors’ nega-
Furthermore, by confronting receivers with a tive behaviors and to adopt a stance to them. By
truth that was denied before, but that could enable frankly speaking about the role of ancestors dur-
them to better understand historical debts inher- ing past violence, parrhesia opens up new com-
ited by previous generations, parrhestiases (i.e., munication strategies, once the avoiding strategy
those who speak about dangerous topics with- has been discharged. On one hand, the decision to
out fear of the negative consequences they could speak frankly enables young descendants of the
encounter because of their words) choose “frank- social groups involved in past violence to better
ness instead of persuasion, truth instead of false- evaluate the impairment of the social and moral
hood or silence . . . the moral duty instead of image that has characterized their historical pre-
self-interest and moral apathy” (Foucault, 2001, existence, thus allowing them to better judge
current intergroup relations. On the other hand, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), research on group-
this historical knowledge threatens their basic based emotions of perpetrators’ descendants has
need for a positive social identity. To explore recently shifted attention to the sociopsycholog-
how frank intergenerational narratives contribute ical need of young generations so that the social
to the general unfolding of intergroup reconcilia- group, where they happen to be born, may reach
tion processes, therefore, it is essential to observe some basic levels of moral decency (Allpress
how young people cope with the unsettling truths et al., 2014). This shift has made our theoreti-
they are told by previous generations. cal models concerning moral group-based emo-
tions more complex. We are in fact passing from
the fascinating yet somehow elusive notion of
25.9 Pragmatic Consequences
“collective guilt” (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004),
of Historical Truth: The Crucial
expected in descendants of perpetrators because
Role of Group-Based Moral
of past in-group wrongdoings, to more precise
Emotions
observations of the wider emotional set enacted
For understanding if and how intergenerational by young generations when facing a narrative of
narratives ease reconciliation processes, espe- past historical crimes: not only guilt but, prior
cially in the case of parrhesia, we have to observe to it and sometimes instead of it, also anger,
them first of all by referring to basic characteris- contempt, surprise, doubt, social shame, moral
tics of the narrative format (László, 2008), but we shame, and so on. According to recent devel-
must also consider the pragmatic consequences. opments in this burgeoning field of research, it
In fact, intergenerational narratives contribute to has been proposed that focusing mainly on the
reconciliation processes not only in the way in reactions of historical guilt of young descen-
which they are told by the older generations but dants of perpetrators is not enough to understand
also in the way they are received by the younger how they are able to turn the page on the his-
ones. This implies that our attention has to focus torical crimes of their ancestors. On the con-
not only downward, on the information old gen- trary, it has been suggested that we have to pay
erations choose to share with younger ones or to attention to the more general set of group-based
hide from them (Leone & Sarrica, 2014), but also emotions due to the acknowledgment of histor-
upward, on emotional reactions and subsequent ical evidence of in-group violations and crimes
judgments expressed by young adults about the (Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013).
past inherited from their ancestors (Leone, 2000; Interestingly, a similar focus on multiple emo-
Leone et al., 2018). tions and their change in time could be observed
According to this point of view, the role of also from the point of view of descendants of
group-based moral emotions of young receivers victims. As we have already stressed in previous
of historical narratives becomes crucial. pages, the main emotion attributed to victims and
Certainly it is not possible to fully review in a their descendants has been shame for past help-
few pages all empirical works that contributed to lessness. Therefore empowerment is supposed to
this new field of research. Nevertheless, it is inter- be the main social and psychological need of
esting to note how these kinds of contributions victims, since it allows them to regain a sense
shifted their research’s focus in the last decade. of control over their lives as opposed to the
From the point of view of descendants of shame of having been unable to defend them-
perpetrators, after focusing for a long time on selves (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008, 2015). How-
the classic issue of biases protecting the need ever, in an intriguing article about the chang-
for a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, ing themes in psychological theory with regard
to post-traumatic effects of the Holocaust on its ratives or even covering it all up by meaning-
survivors, Nadler (2001) points out that in the ful social silences – descendants of social groups
first place, clinicians focused mainly on the ques- involved in past violence are faced with different
tion of who survived. In the second place, the emotional challenges. Our studies could greatly
main question was if survivors were psycholog- profit from the theoretical choice to pay atten-
ically healthy or sick. Finally, the main question to both directions of intergenerational narra-
tion concerning clinical studies has shifted again tives about the historical past: downward, to see
to a focus on understanding whether the post- if older generations kept silent or told a never-
traumatic effects have extended beyond the sur- ending story of conflicting self-victimization and
vivors (e.g., to their families). It is clear that retaliation or eventually tried to evolve toward
these different research questions imply that dif- more inclusive and complex points of view, but
ferent sets of moral emotions are to be expected also upward, to see if younger generations are
from survivors and their families, contributing expected to carry the weight of responsibility
to different semantic nuances of the concept of that this difficult historical preexistence put on
shame. Another important research line, referring their shoulders or if they can express their his-
to moral emotions of victims and their relatives, torical uniqueness, judging the actions of their
refers also to the issue of resentment – starting ancestors from the perspective of those born after
from the pivotal work of Jean Améry – which the crimes and therefore assuming their historical
could not too easily be reduced to a “negative” responsibility as new citizens, free at last from
emotional reaction (Klein, 2011). any direct moral charge.
Finally, rare but interesting research has con- Research and studies reviewed in these pages
centrated on the moral emotions of bystanders suggest that for intergenerational narratives
and their descendants. In this somehow under- addressed to descendants of all protagonists of
developed field of study, a recent work of Woj- violence – perpetrators, victims, bystanders –
cik, Bilewicz, and Lewicka (2010) has shown that knowledge is necessary, but it is not enough. To
descendants of bystanders born in communities finally turn the page and prevent past violence
where massive violence occurred were eager to from arising again, younger generations have to
learn the history of their town. Classic theoreti- be allowed not only to know but also to judge the
cal perspectives expressed by Bloch (1954) and history inherited from previous generations.
Ortega y Gasset (1930/1957) could greatly con- Emotions of self-awareness based on narra-
tribute toward explaining these data. tives about the in-group past, such as guilt and
Taken together, these developments allow us to shame, meaningfully signal a sense of continuity
move from group-based moral emotions to a self- between generations, because of the need for a
awareness, which allows for more detailed moral historical entitativity of the group (Sani, Bowe,
emotions expressing a judgment of the older gen- & Herrera, 2008). According to this theoreti-
eration’s behavior. In this sense, the centrality of cal perspective, group-based emotions of self-
the notion of historical guilt is now challenged by awareness, shown by young people born long
more comprehensive approaches also taking into after crimes perpetrated or suffered by their
account emotions brought on by other condemn- ancestors, powerfully demonstrate how social
ing processes (Haidt, 2003). representations of the past literally weigh on the
According to the communicative strategies present day (Liu & Hilton, 2005).
used by older generations – to narrate past in- However, sometimes younger generations,
group crimes more openly or to avoid the more when presented with narratives of historical vio-
difficult aspects of the past by using elusive nar- lence lived by previous generations, show not
only emotions as a result of self-awareness, such uncritical cognitive capabilities resembling those
as guilt, moral, or social shame, but also emo- of a submissive child” (Deutsch & Kinnvall,
tions as a result of other condemning processes, 2002, p. 17). Social denials meant to present an
such as those contained in the triad of contempt– idealized narrative of the in-group past could be
anger–disgust – especially contempt (Bartels more useful for political regimes that treat their
et al., 2015). When historical narratives break citizens as submissive children than for democra-
down literal social denials, emotions linked to cies where citizens are expected to know their in-
the loss of a positive self-image, such as sadness, group past, not only to judge it, but also to under-
as well as immediate reactions of disgust could stand current in-group and intergroup situations.
be observed (Leone and Sarrica, 2014; Leone In reconciliation processes, which are the main
et al., 2018). These different group-based emo- focus of the chapter, the first illusion about the
tions signal how natality (Arendt, 1977) opens past that mature adults have to get rid of is the
the way for the judgment on previous genera- conflict ethos (Bar-Tal et al., 2012) that justifies
tions’ choices, as natality allows for the discon- violence against enemies. Similarly, after peace
tinuity of the group. treaties, when leadership has forbidden the use
of violence against the other group, the image of
the enemy – along with states of social denial
25.10 General Conclusions
(Cohen, 2001) that serve the image of the in-
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to group and, indirectly, the self-image – remains
sum up its main points. First of all, the basic role for a long time. Very often these denials are
of intergenerational narratives for supporting per- passed down through the generations and can be
sonal reminiscing as well as the protective aim traced in the way that violence is narrated, either
of presenting young people with a positive image by failing to confront the moral responsibilities
of the community in which they happen to be of the in-group or refusing to acknowledge “the
born have been stressed. These supporting func- psychological, political, or moral implications
tions and the conveying of a positive image of that conventionally follow” (Cohen, 2001, p. 8).
one’s own group are so important that all social- But, even before these interpretive or implica-
izing agencies, starting with the family, offer self- tory denials, the literal denial of violent facts that
serving and group-serving narratives to young happened in the past history of the in-group is a
people. However, the tendency to relate a positive predictable process, especially when victims are
bias of the past competes with the need of youths weak, socially marginalized, and despised.
to know the history of their group to become able Nevertheless, when all intergenerational narra-
to act in the social and political forums as self- tives about the in-group choose to ignore a vio-
aware citizens. There is a very strict link between lent past, historians and history teachers have
the knowledge of one’s own “historical preex- to deal with these facts. That is the reason
istence” (Ortega y Gasset, 1930/1957) and the why – since the seminal work of Halbwachs
adult civic participation that is expected in demo- (1950/1980) on collective memory – a theoreti-
cratic societies. Therefore, for the study of inter- cal proposal has been advanced to draw a divid-
generational narratives of violence, we are some- ing line between narratives aimed at improving
times confronted with the processes that we are our historical knowledge and narratives aimed at
observing to “foster the development of the intel- constructing a social representation of it. When
ligent, autonomous, reflective, active characteris- history teaching breaks down a widespread social
tics of mature adults, whereas others encourage denial in all other intergenerational narratives of
the development of immature, passive, dependent the past, a dangerous communication game is
exposed between generations – a communication emotions), the label of “negative” should not be
that we propose to call parrhesia (Leone, 2017; taken at face value. Despite possible backlashes,
Leone & Sarrica, 2014), according to the theoret- well-regulated (Frijda, 1986) negative reactions
ical distinction of Foucault (2001) regarding dif- to the collapse of biases and social denials may
ferent kinds of truth speaking. enable young descendants of perpetrators to dis-
Directly observing the reactions of young Ital- entangle past historical facts from any egocen-
ian participants when presented with a frank nar- tric need to assert one’s own positive social
rative of in-group colonial crimes, denied in the identity.
social discourse, as well as their self-assessment Looked at from a pragmatic point of view,
of a list of emotions, showed not only the pres- studies of narratives of the historical past focus-
ence of group-based emotions of self-awareness ing only on threats to the moral and social
usually expected for perpetrators’ descendants, image of the group could hide the crucial point
such as shame or guilt, but also other condemn- that young people are protected only when they
ing emotions, such as contempt, emotions linked are told the historical truth. The awareness that
to the loss of a positive self-image, such as sad- knowledge of history cannot be severed from its
ness, and immediate reactions of disgust (Leone interpretation, however, cannot be extended to
and Sarrica, 2014; Leone et al., 2018). Taken the idea that all interpretations have the same
together, these emotions and reactions may be impact. Ignoring relevant facts of one’s own his-
seen as signals that the new generations are tory makes it impossible, for a young person, to
distancing themselves from older ones and are judge both on decisions taken by previous gener-
finally judging them. ations and on decisions her own generation will
According to these data, a frank narrative of take in the future. It means that, also in intergen-
moral shortcomings of the in-group may cause erational narratives of intergroup violence, the
uneasiness and even sadness to young people risky choice to convey frankly a difficult truth
receiving it. At the same time, however, these may be fruitful, being “not a matter of exposure
reactions to the dangerous communication that which destroys the secret, but a revelation that
unveils difficult truths on past in-group responsi- does justice to it” (Benjamin, 1977, p. 31).
bilities could also allow young people to express
at last their own third-part morality (Rozin et al.,
1999), which steps back from any confusing over- Acknowledgment
tones sometimes hidden in the very concept of
The writing of this chapter was facilitated by
collective guilt (Arendt, 1945).
the research opportunities offered to the author
We may conclude that all intergenerational nar-
by her participation in the ISCH COST Action
ratives of past violence that break down self-
IS1205 Social Psychological Dynamics of His-
serving illusions and convenient social denials
torical Representations in the Enlarged European
are exposed to the danger of provoking negative
Union.
group-based emotions for young people discover-
ing difficult truths. Similarly, in the field of study
of intergenerational narratives the issue of truth is
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present-day historical narratives of Italian Nadler, A. & Shnabel, N. (2015). Intergroup
colonial wars. International Journal of Conflict reconciliation: Instrumental and socio-
and Violence, 4(1), 11–27. emotional processes and the needs-based model.
Leone, G. & Sarrica, M. (2014). Making room for European Review of Social Psychology, 26(1),
negative emotions about the national past: 93–125.
An explorative study of effects of parrhesia Neisser, U. & Winograd, E. (1995). Remembering
on Italian colonial crimes. International Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional
Journal of Intercultural Relations, 43, Approaches to the Study of Memory. Cambridge:
126–138. Cambridge University Press.
Liu, J. H. & Hilton, D. J. (2005). How the past weighs Noor, M., Shnabel, N., Halabi, S., & Nadler, A.
on the present: Social representations of history (2012). When suffering begets suffering the
and their role in identity politics. British Journal psychology of competitive victimhood between
of Social Psychology, 44(4), 537–556. adversarial groups in violent conflicts.
Liu, J. H., Onar, N. F., & Woodward, M. W. (2014). Personality and Social Psychology Review,
Symbologies, technologies, and identities: 16(4), 351–374.
Critical junctures theory and the multi-layered Ortega y Gasset, J. (1930/1957). The Revolt of the
nation–state. International Journal of Masses. New York: W. W. Norton. (Originally
Intercultural Relations, 43, 2–12. published as La rebelión de las masas.)
Mari, S., Andrighetto, L., Gabbiadini, A., Durante, F., Peterson, C. & McCabe, A. (1983). Developmental
& Volpato, C. (2010). The shadow of the Italian Psycholinguistics: Three Ways of Looking at a
colonial experience: The impact of collective Child’s Narrative. New York: Plenum.
emotions on intentions to help the victims’ Reese, E., Haden, C. A., & Fivush, R. (1993).
descendants. International Journal of Conflict Mother–child conversations about the past:
and Violence, 4(1), 58–74. Relationships of style and memory over time.
Meiring, P. & Tutu, D. (1999). Chronicle of the Truth Cognitive Development, 8(4), 403–430.
and Reconciliation Commission: A Journey Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999).
through the Past and Present into the Future of The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between
South Africa. Vanderbijlpark, South Africa: three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust)
Carpe Diem Books. and three moral codes (community, authonomy,
Moscovici, S. (1976). Social Influence and Social divinity). Journal of Personality and Social
Change. London: Academic Press. Psychology, 76, 574–586.
Murithi, T. (2009). An African perspective on peace Sani, F., Bowe, M., & Herrera, M. (2008). Perceived
education: Ubuntu lessons in reconciliation. collective continuity: Seeing groups as
International Review of Education, 55(2–3), temporally enduring entities. In F. Sani (Ed.),
221–233. Self Continuity: Individual and Collective
Perspectives (pp. 159–172). Hove, UK: Wojcik, A., Bilewicz, M., & Lewicka, M. (2010).
Psychology Press. Living on the ashes: Collective representations of
Shepherd, L., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. (2013). Polish−Jewish history among people living in the
“This will bring shame on our nation”: The role former Warsaw Ghetto area. Cities, 27, 195–203.
of anticipated group-based emotions on
collective action. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 49(1), 42–57. Further Reading
SimanTov-Nachlieli, I. & Shnabel, N. (2014). Feeling
both victim and perpetrator: Investigating duality Absolon, K. E. & Absolon-Winchester, A. E. (2016).
within the needs-based model. Personality and Exploring pathways to reconciliation. Consensus,
Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 301–314. 37(1), art. 2.
Staub, E. (2001). Genocide and mass killing: Their Erikson, E. H. & Senn, M. J. E. (1950). Growth and
roots and prevention. In D. J. Christie, R. V. crises of the “healthy personality.” In E. H.
Wagner, & D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, Conflict, and Erikson & M. J. E. Senn (Eds.), Symposium on
Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century the Healthy Personality (pp. 91–146). New York:
(pp. 76–86). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation.
Sweeny, R. C. (1993). Time and human agency: A Gibson, J. L. (2006). The contributions of truth to
re-assessment of the Annales legacy. Left reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa.
History, 1(2). Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(3), 409–432.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity Lickel, B., Hamilton, D., Wieczorkowska, G., Lewis,
theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & A., Sherman, S. J., & Uhles, A. N. (2000).
W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Varieties of groups and the perception of group
Relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson Hall. entitativity. Journal of Personality and Social
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., Psychology, 78, 223–246.
& Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the Liu, J. H. & László, J. (2007). A narrative theory of
Social Group: A Self-categorization Theory. history and identity: Social identity, social
Oxford: Oxford University Press. representations, society and the individual.
Vollhardt, J. R. & Bilewicz, M. (2013). After the In G. Moloney & I. Walker (Eds.), Social
genocide: Psychological perspectives on victim, Representations and Identity: Content, Process
bystander, and perpetrator groups. Journal of and Power (pp. 85–107). London: Palgrave
Social Issues, 69(1), 1–15. Macmillan.
Vollhardt, J. R., Mazur, L. B., & Lemahieu, M. (2014). Nadler, A., Malloy, T., & Fisher, J. D. (Eds.). (2008).
Acknowledgment after mass violence: Effects on Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation:
psychological well-being and intergroup From Violent Conflict to Peaceful Co-existence.
relations. Group Processes & Intergroup Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Relations, 17(3), 306–323. Sen, R. & Wagner, W. (2005). History, emotions and
Volpato, C. & Licata, L. (2010). Collective memories hetero-referential representations in inter-group
of colonial violence. International Journal of conflict: The example of Hindu–Muslim relations
Conflict and Violence (special issue), 4(1), in India. Papers on Social Representations, 14,
4–10. 2.1–2.23.
26 Psytizenship: Sociocultural
Mediations in the Historical
Shaping of the Western Citizen
Jorge Castro-Tejerina and José Carlos Loredo-Narciandi
It is eminently clear that there is no psychology the subject and psychological expertise, and psy-
that is not connected to a more or less explicit chology as an institutionalized discipline cannot
conception of what a human subject is and what be understood if its connection with the govern-
that subject should be. In the Western world, we ability exercised by modern states and the conse-
can trace anthropological arguments about what quent need to produce good citizens are forgotten
it is and what should be at least as far back as (Rose, 1998).
the texts of Plato and Aristotle. However, it was In recent writings, we have used the neologism
not until a much later period, between the mid- “psytizenship” to refer to this intricate connec-
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that an tion that has been constitutive for both psychol-
alliance of deep psychological and political con- ogy and for the Western political agenda up to the
sequences was established around that connec- present (Castro-Tejerina, 2014, 2015; Cabanas,
tion. At that time, psychology was “founded” as 2016). Of course, its vicissitudes have been many
a scientific discipline and, at the same time, its and diverse, and they arrive on the current scene
functions were closely tied to the design and con- interwoven with global, multicultural logics that
struction of political subjects or, to put it more incorporate highly complex, accelerated and
precisely, citizens in the modern sense. As Bruno “liquid” individual and social transformations
Latour (1999) pointed out, the modern pact estab- (Kymlicka, 1995; Bauman, 2005; Ong, 2006).
lished the agreement that political agendas were We will analyze this scenario from the stand-
separate from natural realities, which neverthe- point of a sensibility located halfway between the
less ensured that the former could be justified genealogical and the historiographical arenas of
through the latter. knowledge. It is a sensibility that aspires to out-
The idea that is central for our chapter is line the historico-cultural conditions on which the
that the alliance between the psychological sub- modern age configured the relationship between
ject and the political subject led to the emer- psychology and citizenship through the idea of
gence of an intricate and diffuse theoretical and self-government. Following that, we will resort
practical domain. In this sphere, psychological, to a cultural perspective to analyze the current
philosophical, biological, ethical, anthropologi- construction of a political subject that would vary
cal, and social ideas converge to justify norma- between the psychological heritage received from
tive projects of a political and moral nature. It is the modern age and the sociocultural conditions
thus difficult to distinguish a “scientific” program that typify postmodernity. Finally, we will offer a
for psychology from a “political” program for the possible outlook to understand the technological
West: modern citizenship does not seem conceiv- agenda of today’s psychology, bearing in mind
able without dimensions relating to the design of that current psychology is already handled in
480 jorg e c astro -t e j e ri na and j os é ca rlos lo re d o -narc ian di
many parts of the world as a privileged medium modern citizenship (a more ample and precise
for solving the current subject’s problems and discussion of this historico-genealogical frame-
crises. Whatever its theoretical or applied orien- work can be consulted in Castro-Tejerina, 2015).
tation may be, psychology explicitly or implic- These two paths have to do, on one hand, with the
itly becomes an inevitable mediating device when project for constructing the self-governed subject
extracting the sense of the subject’s experience in the West, and, on the other hand, with the com-
in the world. Let it be said before proceeding plementary domain of its possible alterities.
that, when we speak here of the “citizen sub-
ject” – and its premodern, modern, and postmod-
26.1.1 Psychogenesis and
ern avatars – we are speaking of ideal types in the
Modernity
Weberian manner. We have no doubt that the con-
trast between these ideal models and what spe- The first of the two paths aims, from the early
cific individuals do and say in their daily lives modern age, at the ideal configuration of a
will impugn the more generalist aspects of our self-governed subject that we may identify with
proposal. Be that as it may, our proposal should the modern “citizen.” This would be a political
be understood as a mere outline of historico- subject able to interiorize the normative codes
genealogical paths that will make it possible to that characterize the Western liberal, democratic
profile general trends. They would serve as a nation-state, thus distanced from the normative
framework for the discursive and practical play of codes typifying the premodern formulas of the
the relations between psychology and citizenship ancien régime.1 Through historic episodes such
up to the present. as the independence of the United States and
the French Revolution, the concept of citizen-
ship gradually acquired density, extending itself
26.1 Historico-genealogical
throughout the populational mass and taking on
Approach to the Self-Governed
a growing importance. Also fundamental in the
Psytizen
process were the devices for producing the notion
Psychological discourse invaded the interpreta- of the social administered by the elites of the
tion of social reality long before the role of nation-states, particularly through the universal-
the professional psychologist as we understand it ization and homogenization of education and
today emerged. From the middle of the nineteenth government intervention in subjectivizing and
century, the psychologization of culture – and, socializing practices characteristic of the fam-
as a consequence, of groups and individuals – ily nucleus (Anderson, 1983; Rose, 1996; Castel,
advanced in the Western world with the aid of 1997; Donzelot, 1997).2 Among other purposes,
doctors, teachers, journalists, politicians, and all the function of these devices would be to pro-
sorts of reformist intellectuals. Most of them mote the subject’s ability to handle coexistence
thought of their populations in organic, malleable (life with others), social responsibility, and his or
terms, as a kind of social mass awaiting the right her own self-government. In contrast to the pre-
agents and social technologies to set the machin- modern scenario, the technical objective for that
ery of order and progress characteristic of the self-government is to operate beyond the classic
modern nation-state in motion. With this in mind, devices of control and punishment, whether they
what interests us as we continue is simply to out- are internalized – religious morality, guilty con-
line two historico-genealogical paths that we conscience, sin-based guilt, fear of punishment after
sider indispensable for understanding the rela- death, and so on – or external – repression by
tionship between psychology and the ideal of public authorities, torture, the death penalty, and
Psytizenship 481
so on (Rose, 1998; Foucault, 1991, 2007). Finally, nally influenced, stabilized by learning, and so
the values and normative codes that characterized on. Beyond their politico-ideological motivation
the “imagined community,” shaped by the new- and independently of their theoretical diversity,
fangled nation-state, came to replace or overlay3 most of the important psychologies of the twenti-
the type of community link sustained by values eth century would undoubtedly assume this sup-
and normative codes of a religious nature, typical position. Based on that supposition, it will be
of the ancien régime. obvious that, at the end of the psychogenetic pas-
Although this process was not exhausted in sage, the good citizen emerges – that is, the adult
them, all the great psychological agendas through who is master of himself/herself when assum-
which modernity was deployed, from Wundt’s ing responsibilities with his or her fellow citizens
original work and its immediate corollaries (the or is, at least, fully adjusted to them. However,
Würzburg school, the psychology of the act and the assumption of an ability to self-govern in the
phenomenological psychology, gestalt, function- individual in a full political sense – the sense of
alist psychology, etc.), accomplished the natu- the highest degree of direct participation of each
ralization of this new type of citizen subject. and every citizen in sociopolitical decisions – was
The scientific enterprise aimed at revealing the not immediate, not even a desirable thing in the
“true nature” of the human being, a project that origin of the liberal democracies of the West.4
finally assumed that it was possible to show how Perhaps the most appropriate approach would be
the good citizen’s psychological gears worked to speak of a sort of self-government that was
(Loredo-Narciandi, 2012a). configured with variable degrees of restriction
In fact, at the beginning of the twentieth from the end of the nineteenth century and, of
century, some of the great psychological theo- course, distributed in multiple and different ways
ries were expressly linked to social engineering according to the diverse nation-state projects. The
proposals that included reflections on the sub- arc of self-government would thus extend from
ject’s adaptation to the supposed social normal- a pole where individuality is synonymous with
ity, when not to the very concept of citizenship freedom of action and personal decision – full
(Castro-Tejerina, 2015). A paradigmatic case is self-government, as awareness of the ability to
that of John Dewey (1922), whose functional- participate actively in the design of the social
ist conception of human nature was inseparable project – to a pole where individuality is syn-
from the justification of liberal democracy. All in onymous with singularity and the ability to sub-
all, beyond specific cases, the crucial aspect of mit or adjust oneself to the appropriate place in
practically the entire psychological project had to the social fabric – restricted self-government, as
do with a generalized agreement centered on a conscious assumption of one’s own aptitudes and
basic supposition: the psychogenesis of the per- limitations.
sonality and the psychological functions, or at In this way, self-government was progressively
least the idea that the psychological architecture implemented as the technology of the subject,
of the human being is composed of an assem- and enabled most of the population to take its
bly of strata that include virtually everything “natural” place in the social design; “nature” that
from the most basic mental and behavioral oper- nuanced the very right to vote given to the citizen,
ations or processes – physiological, automatic, or rather, “proto” or “pseudo-citizen” (Castro-
instinctive, unconscious, immediate, contingent, Tejerina, 2015). Thus, if under the ancien régime
and so on – to the most sophisticated and com- there was a tension between disciplinary power
plex operations and processes – tied to think- and free will, the purpose of the latter being to
ing, self-controlled, cognitive, conscious, exter- ensure the subject’s submission to Church and
monarch, in the modern age of the nineteenth as 1984 or Brave New World. The paradigmatic
century the tension arose between the citizen’s case is surely depicted in B. F. Skinner’s Walden
freedom and the need for a certain degree of Two, where the logic of the aims and the com-
personal sacrifice (normally expressed in terms munal – not state – functioning are superim-
of responsibility) for the benefit of the national posed on the supposed freedom and happiness
community. of the particular individual, or at least are made
With the progressive growth of the consuming to coincide with it. In general, since Watson’s
middle classes throughout the twentieth century, time, behaviorism also contributed to the trends
self-government gained more and more terrain toward restricted self-government by taking each
for autonomy, personal decision, and the rational- individual as a particular, unique subject and
ization of life – including emotional life (Illouz, attempting to guarantee his/her adjustment in
2007) – which characterizes today’s Western the social fabric. Even in the absence of a con-
democracies. Psychology accompanied this tran- cern for or acceptance of the upper processes of
sition and persevered in its intention of constantly consciousness, associative and learning programs
supporting and protecting the design of the sub- demanded the involvement and development of
ject demanded by modernity. It accomplished expertise or specialization by the subject – even
this, moreover, not only through psychotherapies in his or her supposed natural tendencies, all in
centered on the client and his or her individ- line with some specific social objectives.6
ual demands or motives. Even principles such What interests us here with respect to the
as “democratic rationality” could be scientifically horizon of development of this first historico-
legitimized by subsuming them in a human nature genealogical path is the possible convergence of
that had to precede the political agenda. Along psytizenship with a “Western subject” mode who
these lines, Jürgen Habermas’ recourse (1976) to is aware of his/her self-regulating potential. In
the work of Jean Piaget to prop up his defense any case, it is a question of a subject that has
of ideal communication situations as a guaran- also progressively become disconnected from the
tee of democracy based on universal rationality social contract which, with greater or lesser con-
(López, 1998) is well known. In a similar sensi- cessions and personal sacrifices, had been estab-
bility, we can also point to the invocation made by lished between the subject and his or her nation-
Martyn Griffin (2011) of Lev Vygotski’s thesis to state. As Nikolas Rose (1996, 1999) and Richard
justify deliberative democracy. Another example Sennett (2000) have demonstrated, approximately
comes from Richard Sennett (2012), who founds during the years following the Cold War, the
his communal conception of human relations on nation-state began to withdraw from the perfor-
supposed facts discovered by scientific psychol- mance of individual life in the West. The West-
ogy, thus naturalizing his political commitment ern liberal democracies are no longer directly and
to cooperation.5 actively accompanying, protecting, or guarantee-
Parallel to the democratic and liberal models, ing the structure and basic milestones of its citi-
especially restricted versions of self-government zens’ life cycle. To some extent, this has brought
also had their own deployment in the West under about a situation in which all those born within
the totalitarian regimes represented by the fas- the logic of government characteristic of the last
cisms or the Soviet bloc. Of course, psychol- two-thirds of the past century, based on psycho-
ogy also contributed to the design of these social genetic conceptions of life and centered on the
projects and the model of the ideal subject they power of the nation-state, have been condemned
demanded. Psychology went so far as to dream to uncertainty. However, this does not mean that
of its own utopias of restricted self-government, psychology has renounced its classic functions of
occasionally impugned by literary dystopias such promoting the “adjustment” between the citizen
Psytizenship 483
subject and the new ways of life. We will return the cultural and national collectives. As Glenda
to this matter later. Sluga (2006) has clearly shown, after World War
I and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the
psychological identification that welded maturity
26.1.2 Alterities in Modern
to self-government justified Western domination
Citizenship
of the countries of the so-called Third World.
The second historico-genealogical path that we Further, the apparently just and cordial slogan
announced above would be related to the figures “the self-determination of peoples,” a represen-
of otherness that are defined with respect to the tation of self-government understood in the psy-
idealized or normalized citizen presented in the chogenetic sense, was the perfect alibi for neo-
first path. Such figures must be understood both colonialism. It legitimized the virtual control by
in a temporal sense, as previous images of the the new Western powers (France, England, and
subject that are set against each other but which the United States, above all) of extensive regions
can also be mounted, hybridized, or assembled of Asia and Africa as long as, supposedly, these
on the new function of self-government – which regions did not reach the state of maturity to be
is the case of figures characteristic of the ancien able to govern themselves.
régime, such as the subject, the serf, the parish- Entering the postmodern age, and having sur-
ioner, and so on – and in a topological sense, passed even the relevant criticisms of the post-
as images that concur within the same territory colonial studies of the acceleration of global-
and living space occupied by the typical national ization and delocalization, the progression along
citizen – migrants from other latitudes, social this path shows us a doubly “altered” alter-
minorities, and individuals who are excluded for ity. Apart from its geopolitical and economic
all sorts of reasons, and so on. The naturaliza- motives, the neocolonial determination to “civi-
tion of the human essence and, with it, of the lize” the Third World generated collectives that
good citizen, accomplished from the Western eth- were reflective with respect to their supposed
nocentric standpoint, scarcely left a chink for an cultural “identities.” It empowered – symboli-
interpretation of those alterities apart from their cally and materially – subjects who were capa-
“infantilism” or “immaturity,” in the best cases, ble of claiming the “right” to their “singular-
or their “maladjustment” and “dangerousness,” ity,” subjects who became aware of the concepts
in the worst cases. of independence and self-determination before
It is here where the role of psychology has being introduced to the principle of individual
called for within the social engineering domains self-government understood in the Western man-
of the modern age is best detected, as well as its ner. And this was not limited to the international
pretension of scientifically backing the psycho- sphere: the alterities of standardized citizenship
genetic nature of the citizen. The task of psy- that existed within the very borders of the West-
chology would then be to give impetus to, and to ern nation-state – the excluded groups, minori-
rechannel the citizen’s development and adjust- ties, or marginalized people – had also been in the
ment through technologies such as psychope- process of recognizing themselves for some time
dagogy, clinical psychology, criminology, pro- as legitimate figures and ways of life. From the
fessional orientation, or, in acknowledgment of end of the nineteenth century, for example, work-
today’s usage, coaching. What is more, the psy- ers and anarchist movements had taken charge of
chogenetic imperative affects not only the model their voices and education as political subjects.
citizen of the Western democracies. Since it was In short, self-government promoted the appear-
based on a universalist conception of human ance of alternative ways of being in the world that
nature, it was capable of being extended to all competed with the ones ideally envisioned by the
Western social elites. They showed that the model symbiosis between the functions of psychology
advocated by those elites was not the only possi- and the liberal nation-state project is exhausted.
ble one, nor was it the standard or reference from Beyond the psychologist’s important facet as a
which to establish the supposed politico-social liberal professional, many of the most important
normality. official organizations in Western countries – in
Strictly speaking, even the “standardized” and such areas as health care, security, education, and
reflective Western citizens – whom we can asso- so on – contemplate the figure of the psycholo-
ciate with the middle and bourgeois classes – gist on their staff. However, in recent years the
became progressively aware of the point to social functions of psychology have undergone a
which their right to administer their freedom and reconfiguration as the modern idea of the nation-
directly negotiate the model of coexistence and state entered in crisis. We can summarize in three
government with the state powers was arriving. points the most important aspects of the transfor-
Indeed, the difference between that group of citi- mation and the appearance of psytizenship on the
zens and their alterities – international or intra- postmodern horizon.
national – is that, for the latter, the empower- The first of these points would have to do with
ment produced by reflecting on identity was not making invisible the close relationship between
necessarily accompanied by an interest in read- the design of the self-governed subject of the
justing the model of ideal self-government and modern age and the project of psychology as a
perhaps not even to the model of liberal govern- discipline. In a sense, this project, explicit in the
ment in the broad sense. That accounts for the work of the reformists of late nineteenth cen-
fact that identities and ways of life can conflict tury and the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
with the agreements of the liberal Western social tury, “died of success” at the point at which the
pact (Rose, 1999; Ong, 2006). With the twenty- self-governed subjects began to see themselves
first century well under way, with the strength- as consubstantial with the West, and even with
ening of the migratory flows and communication the human species itself, apart from specific cul-
technologies, the citizenship scenario proves to tural engineering efforts. At the same time, the
be even more complex. The classic cultural alteri- psychological domain, which the same reformist
ties of the traditional Western citizen enter into an intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twen-
especially close contact with the liberal democra- tieth centuries had interwoven with the sociopo-
cies of the so-called First World. Thus, they con- litical agenda of the liberal nation-state, was stan-
front cultural codes of government, coexistence, dardized in the form of a technico-scientific dis-
and social responsibility that, as we have already cipline with an explicit health care and regulat-
remarked, are themselves subject to a profound ing mission. Psychology became specialized and
transformative process. attained recognition as a profession – requestable
on demand – and even as a discipline aspiring
to be the foremost in the “hard sciences” (see
26.2 Post-modern Transitions of
Castro-Tejerina & Rosa, 2007; Castro-Tejerina,
Psytizenship
2016). Perhaps as a consequence of this, such
What the historico-genealogical drift that we concepts as citizenship, so completely assimi-
have just outlined delivers to the current scenario lated by that technico-health care device, almost
are psytizen formulas that must be readapted to completely disappeared from the explicit agenda
new sociocultural conditions. These are hybrid of contemporary psychology, although in recent
transition formulas in which, logically, functions years they seem to have returned, hand-in-hand
and conceptions characteristic of modernity per- with critical stances (see, for example, Con-
sist. In fact, it is surely premature to assert that the dor, 2011). However, these stances are distant
Psytizenship 485
from the systematic, comprehensive ambition of extent, this was already happening in parallel
foundational psychologies such as those of John with the logic of the development of the eco-
Dewey, for example, inextricably bound to a nomic model of the liberal democracies progress-
social reform agenda based on principles of polit- ing for decades, above all at the point where
ical philosophy. “progress” began to depend as much on the pro-
The second point has to do with a more techni- ductivity of the population as on its capacity for
cal, applied, or interventional aspect: the preser- consumption. What we see here are the two sides
vation of the objective of adjustment between the of the same coin, which have become obvious
subject and the ideal model of coexistence, gov- in the so-called European welfare state. How-
ernment, and responsibility. The historical loyalty ever, the equivalence between personal happi-
to this objective observed by the great majority of ness and social welfare also begins to weaken
the schools of psychology – with few exceptions, with the changes in the economic structure of
such as some tendencies of antipsychiatry, criti- the late modern nation-state. In the postmodern
cal psychology, or the postcolonial approaches – scenario, companies move their production out-
has been perfectly compatible with the promotion side their national borders – affecting the intra-
of a strong disciplinary and professional iden- national economic circuit that linked productivity
tity. Indeed, both things have operated as con- and consumption, and governments begin priva-
ditions of mutual possibility: the technical ends tizing public services – affecting citizens’ guar-
demand disciplines with experts who understand antees in basic aspects such as health care and
them and the disciplines provide “objectivity” to education. According to some analysts (see, for
those same ends. It is not surprising that cur- example, Balibar, 2013), in this scenario demo-
rently, in the terrain of basic research, the aim of cratic rationality itself, based on equality and par-
the thriving neuroscience field remains the forg- ticipation, suffers for the benefit of a mercan-
ing of relations between psychological functions tile exchange system. This would revolve solely
and cerebral processes, where it seems that the around individual happiness and in detriment to
researchers continue to pursue the ultimate secret any idea of common good. In fact, if this logic is
of the supposed adjustment between organisms taken to its limit, it gives rise to the paradox that
and their environment, which, the more biolog- this happiness is both a sort of natural condition
ical it is, the more natural it is considered to be of the subject, as proclaimed by so-called posi-
(see Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). Similarly, in the tive psychology, and an objective that the indi-
realm of applied psychology, it would be difficult vidual himself or herself is obligated to achieve
to justify the social need for a psychology that, and administrate independently. In view of this
in line with the adjustment imperative, would outlook, psychology continues to capillarize soci-
renounce constituting a technical and specialized ety and diversify itself into a movement that
application. A different matter is the current con- wavers between loyalty to its traditional technico-
ception of that adjustment, which is more atten- health care mission linked with nation-states and
tive to the demands of private individuals and the the production of self-realized subjects who are
managerial functioning of clinical, pedagogical, simultaneously the cause and consequence of that
and occupational devices than to directly serving is commonly defined as neoliberalism. Above all,
the needs of a nation-state.7 within the latter possibility we could understand
The third point has to do with the shifting of the emergency affecting such psychological vari-
the classic responsibility imperative – and even ants as coaching, organizational citizen behavior,
the imperative of personal sacrifice – in the inter- or the previously mentioned positive psychology
est of collective prosperity aiming toward the (see Cabanas & Sánchez, 2012; Castro-Tejerina,
imperative of individual happiness. To a great 2015; Cabanas, 2016).
All things considered, in the same way that contents that can be symbolic or material –
the uncoupling of self-awareness from self- contents and processes that frame the subject’s
government took place, in the postmodern activities in the world. As Michel Cole (1996)
period the disconnection affects the relations stated some time ago, speaking of the limitations
between self-government and the model of coex- of Vygotskian thought, it is not possible to estab-
istence, government, and responsibility originally lish where a basic or psychophysiological process
designed by the nation-state. In the next sec- ends and a historico-cultural process begins. Both
tion, we will attempt to delineate some psycho- converge contextually and idiosyncratically in the
cultural keys that will help understand this activity through which the subject enculturates in
process. his community – or communities – of reference
throughout his life. For this reason, a type of self-
governed consciousness like the one required by
26.3 Postmodern Citizenship
the modern Western agenda should not be con-
from a Psycho-cultural
sidered as a natural outcome of psychogenesis.
Perspective
Rather, it should be understood as a sophisti-
Understanding the relationship between the mul- cated tool or mediating artifact that emerges and
tifaceted postmodern subject and the concept of is reconfigured with new functions in a certain
the typical modern citizen involves rethinking the sociohistorical scenario. In fact, according to this
idea of psychogenesis and the nature of the sup- viewpoint, any individual or social behavior is
posed higher and lower psychological processes. intrinsically mediated by historico-cultural arti-
To this end, in the following paragraphs, and facts, to the point that, without them, it would
assuming a reader with a predominately psycho- be meaningless even to discuss activity (Blanco
logical education, we will establish a series of & Sánchez-Criado, 2009; Sánchez-Criado, 2008;
distinctions regarding (1) the conception of the Cole, 1996; Engeström, 1987, 1990).
reflective capacity and modern self-government It can be considered that the self-governed sub-
as a cultural artifact, (2) the surpassing of the ject, as we understand him/her in the West, is
idea of adjustment according to a given theory not a consequence of preexisting psychological
of activity, (3) the reconceptualization of the psy- universals. It is, rather, a product or historical
chological subject within the idea of an influ- result of the work of psychology itself in conver-
enced life project, and (4) the understanding of gence with other artifacts and technologies of the
citizen alterity as an experimental space for iden- subject – the massive spread of literacy, expo-
tity play. sure to new communication media, official artic-
ulation of group or class identity discourses, and
so on. It is not, therefore, a “discovery” or an
26.3.1 Modern Reflective Capacity
abstract or ahistorical object captured by sci-
as a Cultural Artifact
ence. Modern reflective capacity is an artifact
In contrast with the ethnocentric association that appeared relatively late and was concocted
between psychogenesis and the self-governed according to certain cultural demands which it
subject that we have presented in our historico- helps transform in turn: the demands that typified
genealogical outline, we believe that it is essen- the modern Western nation-state. However, as we
tial not to lose sight of the fact that the emer- will see under the next heading, the design of an
gence of any process or content of those called artifact does not guarantee the control of all its
psychological is interwoven, constitutively and performative possibilities and, consequently, its
indistinguishably, with sociocultural processes or potential for construction of types of subject.
Psytizenship 487
by or reduced to precursory components occur-

26.3.2 A Theory of Activity as a
ring earlier in time, as, for example, would occur
Means of Surpassing Adjustment
with the germinal psychological or cultural struc-
We have already suggested that an unforeseen tures assumed by authors such as Freud or Lévi-
effect of the sociopolitical undertaking of the Strauss. Artifactual mediations do not have to be
modern age was that the potentiation of the considered as something that functions according
reflective capacity did not automatically entail to an intrinsic logic or a previous meaning under-
its interlocking with the self-government ideally lying the system; rather, they may be understood
demanded by the agenda of the Western nation- as arising contingently and with constant sur-
state. According to the logic of the reflective passing instances in the manner of agencements
modernity that Ulrich Beck pointed to (1994; see (Deleuze & Guattari, 1975; Castro-Tejerina &
also Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), the very Loredo-Narciandi, 2015).
development of modernity transformed and even Apart from that, it is not a question of denying
destroyed, at times, the conditions of its exis- in absolute terms a certain organicity or continu-
tence. In this regard, it is evident that the very ity in the course of an activity or in the develop-
aim of self-government was surpassed because, ment of an action; that is, certain borderline ten-
among other things, of the same type of reflective dencies or structures that impede any artifactual
consciousness that it helped to promote. Thanks mediation at any time. Obviously, the spectrum
to it, there were changes in the possibilities of the of predictable results of activity is never infinite,
experience lived by the subjects who, in one way although it is indefinite or indeterminate, with
or another, had made contact with the modern diverse ranges of predictability according to the
project. In a certain sense, the symbiosis between contexts and situations – what can be expected of
that reflective consciousness and the complexity the daily activities of a cloistered nun is not the
and acceleration of the modern world multiplied same as what can be anticipated of those of a bon
or at least transformed the conditions of expe- vivant given to adventure. Nor is it a question of
rience (Connerton, 2009). It revolutionized the denying the specific effects derived from the bag-
alternatives between those that the subject had gage of experiences and a specific human being’s
to or could decide on, beyond the imperative of ability to make sense of his or her activity – a
the sociocultural adjustment demanded and legit- matter we will return to further on. The ques-
imized by the psychogenetic perspective. tion is that what one can and cannot do, including
Actually, that effect is nothing more than an the degree of complexity or expertise entailed, is
awareness of the manner in which the human not exclusively determined by the level of sophis-
being configures activity and the meaning of his tication attained by the subject’s internal opera-
or her life, always under the opening of pos- tions; above all, insofar as these operations are
sibilities to surpass the standardized practices supposedly the result of a progressive deployment
and systems designed and stabilized by the cul- of human nature. In line with the neopragmatism
ture. From this standpoint, one can question an of Richard Rorty (1989), for example, one could
idea of psychogenetic development that predi- conceive activity from a more experimental or
cates the subordination of supposed higher stages trial-and-error viewpoint, considering its assem-
of development to lower stages. The mediating bly and reconfiguration in the development of the
circumstances and artifacts that burst into onto- activity itself.
genetic courses are fully substantive and con- The main psychologies (humanistic, psy-
stitutive of the emergence of new situations. In choanalytical, cognitive-behavioral, positive,
no case can these configurations be explained etc.), on the contrary, have worked more to
guarantee and control the stabilizations and their This situation has developed in parallel with the
logical, progressive deployment than to wonder multiplication of alternatives to give meaning to
about and try to understand the mechanisms of life itself, something that would seem to have
surpassing and contextually reconfiguring them. opened a sort of identity market where the sub-
Hence, probably, their historical fidelity to the ject can choose, in a more or less structural or
cliché of adjustment and self-government. It is strategic way, among different possibilities, even
not banal that psychology has generally tended in correlation with specific situations. Indeed,
to see novelty and creativity through the prism of relational (Gergen, 1991), dialogical (Hermans,
exceptionality or genius. And that in most cases, 2001), positional (Harré & Moghaddam, 2003),
since it is well known that it has also constantly and liquid psychosociological theories (Bauman,
had recourse to the concepts of anomaly, or at 2005) have addressed the multiplicity of alterna-
least neurophysiological peculiarity, as a way of tives or positions that the same subject can take in
explaining the surpassing of adjustment. Nev- his or her daily life, proceeding as far as to induce
ertheless, from our perspective, the possibility the crisis of the very concept of the self as the
of invention or novelty appears whenever, to resort that guarantees the purposiveness and con-
a greater or lesser degree, the openness and tinuity of experience. Thus, it could be said that,
versatility of the courses of the culturally pos- where the most popular psychology has remained
sible activity and signification mesh with the bound to the idea of adjustment, other perspec-
specific subject’s singular experience (Blanco tives have addressed its crisis and the postmod-
& Castro, 2005; Glăveanu & Gillespie, 2015, ern polyphony, observing how the subject’s expe-
Castro-Tejerina & Loredo-Narciandi, 2015). rience exploded in a thousand scattered, nearly
In line with the above, it is clear that what autonomous pieces.8
we define as historic moments of crisis, accelera- However, those pieces, which cannot be
tion, or radical change of the meaning systems, reassembled by themselves within a supposed
practices, mediating artifacts, and sociocultural universal psychogenetic architecture, and are not
structures that frame subjects’ lives are especially exactly options among which the subject simply
sensitive for the dynamics of resignification, sur- chooses freely, nor are they mere structural affili-
passing, and personal and cultural recomposition. ations determined by the situation. The postmod-
The process of transforming the subject of the ern subject is not only the yuppie who becomes
ancien régime into the subject of today’s nation- saturated and fragmented by dealing with a thou-
state was surely an example of that, in the same sand tasks at once (Gergen, 1991): he or she is
way as the tension and mutation being imposed also the immigrant who is torn or falls to pieces
on the modern subject by the current logics of as the result of having to leave his or her entire
globalization, multiculturalism, neoliberalism, or world behind to cross a border on the other side
cyberspace is. of which another world awaits that is not always
understanding and welcoming (Bathia & Ram,
2001; Bathia 2002). Sometimes the subject must
26.3.3 Experience Beyond Decision
take charge of his or her life or, worse, has to
and Fragmentation
suffer from seeing how something takes it apart,
The possibility of reflective and identity empow- truncates it and dramatically transforms it into
erment enjoyed by many of the faces of the post- something else. In a more or less reflective way,
modern subject, unforeseen in the agenda of the according to the mediating instruments available,
citizenry of the modern age, is a sociohistorical he or she is, in a sense, always the same being –
result of the dynamics of surpassing adjustment. or the same organism if we prefer – the one
Psytizenship 489
that is the leading actor, if only in a biographi- selves entangled in citizens’ acts without premed-
cal sense. The subject accomplishes this, more- itation, almost out of pure dramatic performance.
over, through a previously accumulated life bag- In the section below we will see to what extent we
gage that constantly questions him or her and can identify this with respect to citizen dynamics
necessarily meshes with the subject’s manner of and grammars characteristic of the postmodern
confronting experience and making sense of it scenario.
(Boesch, 2007a, 2007b; Valsiner, 2013). The sub-
ject, therefore, is not detached from constructing
26.3.4 Empowered and Dissolved
the meaning of his or her life, but fully partici-
Psytizens
pates in the signification process, although mate-
rial artifacts and the culturally available mean- As regards the possibilities of the postmod-
ings mediate in that process in a decisive way ern subject or subjects, the opening of alterna-
(Rosa, 2007a, 2007b; Salvatore, 2013). In these tives of action and signification, together with
terms, there are plans to make a life from a life the progressive dissolution of the classic func-
plan, to subject life to a discipline, passionately or tions of the nation-state, may mean a great vari-
impotently. ability in the ways of resolving the misalign-
The consequences of taking charge of life are ments between reflective self-awareness and self-
not exhausted in the supposed intentional use of government. Now, the self-governed, responsi-
artifacts by humans. Artifactual realities do not ble citizen, who had internalized the norms and
passively aspire to see the agent take charge of guarantees of democratic coexistence imposed by
them. They function as specific conditions for the nation-state, must become an entrepreneur,
activity that are enormously versatile, variable, a manager of himself or herself; a subject who
and dynamic. Further, it is not sufficient to think would seek to maximize his or her symbolic
of them in terms of broad cycles or historico- (Bourdieu, 1998) and emotional capital (Illouz,
cultural contexts, although we ourselves are 2007). Thus the game of affiliations to the nation-
assuming that perspective to some extent in this state loses strength in the benefit of other games
text. The specific progression of activity, the that are faithful only to the self – in the full sense
micro-genesis and morphogenesis of practices, of neoliberal individualism – or to the links of
are constantly establishing realities to which the solidarity established voluntarily with the com-
human being submits himself or herself. To munity that the individual recognizes as truly
express it in an almost aphoristic manner, what close or immediate (Rose, 1999; Vázquez, 2006).
we do makes us do and be. For that reason, on Far from implying an aberration from a sup-
most occasions the generic act of signification – posed anthropological standard or from human
the fact of doing something that is difficult to nature,9 these new mediations and ways of life
specify exactly or contextualize a priori – pre- are a sample of recomposition of the self-
cedes the act that we could consider character- government artifact bequeathed by the nation-
istically a citizen’s act, one coherent with the state of the modern age, because the nation-
established model of citizenship. That act only state abandons its commitment to look after the
becomes a citizen’s act once it is contextualized life cycle of its citizens. This is the case, for
and acquires meaning in a given situation (Isin, example, of the practices of community solidar-
2008). As in what happened to Rosa Louise Park ity and the forms of charity and mutual aid that
when, in 1955, she refused to get up from her Andrea Muehlebach (2012) has ethnographically
seat on the bus at the request of a white Ameri- recorded in northern Italy. There the traditional –
can citizen, we sometimes unexpectedly find our- or premodern – practices of charity linked to the
Roman Catholic culture have been assembled in a competent way and to articulate, manipulate, and
model of virtuous citizenship that, in the absence make explicit our requests for legitimacy, excep-
of the public authorities of the state, puts disin- tional status, or the singularity of our identity
terested help and volunteering in the foreground. within the supposed system of general norma-
In those two activities, paths are defined to happi- tive citizenship. But not only that. The hybrids
ness and personal fulfilment that are inseparable through which we resolve dilemmas opposing
from the commitment to the community. Actu- identity – as a priority of group or cultural affilia-
ally, the state has not disappeared, but has trans- tion (and citizenship) as a set of rights and duties
formed its classic function of meeting “social” self-assumed by all legal inhabitants of a terri-
needs. In accordance with an impeccable neolib- tory – are multiple and unpredictable. For exam-
eral logic, its objective is now the promotion and ple, far from the resistance offered by certain
administration of virtues of empowerment that cultural minorities to being marginalized, there
take as their objective the private individual or are processes afoot in some countries classified
small communities. Explicitly governmental ini- as emerging (for example, in Southeast Asia)
tiatives, such as the Big Society promoted by con- where certain migrant groups are beginning to
servative British Prime Minister David Cameron, surpass native citizens in social and even national
with an explicit psychological base in the theories rights (Ong, 2006). The reason is their profes-
of Robert Kegan, constitute another clear exam- sional expertise and their optimum adjustment
ple of this (Rowson, Mezey, & Dellot, 2012). to the logics of economic and productive devel-
As we remarked at the beginning, the clas- opment demanded by the governments of such
sic alterities of citizenship have also reconfig- countries. Finally, such a circumstance is used by
ured the reflective consciousness of the modern these governments to warn their own native citi-
age. Among other things, they have become con- zens of the change in the nature of the condition
scious of the fact that their identity agenda is cul- of citizen and its subjection to global logics (Ong,
turally legitimate and can be carried out. Such 1999, 2006; Ong & Collier, 2005). Once again,
alterities are thus positioned before the alterna- these are examples that transcend the idea of the
tives of assuming or resisting the standardized nation-state to begin to revolve around globalized
norms of coexistence, government, and respon- entrepreneurship.
sibility assumed by the Western self-government Postmodern psytizenship invites us to think
model. But we are not speaking of a mere struc- of the very dissolution of what, originally, the
tural, passive, or “maladjusted” resistance, typi- Western project referred to with the term “citi-
cal of the “expectable” in an alterity of modernity. zenship.” In fact, since the 1990s authors such
The awareness of the contrast between normative as John Shotter (1993) have avoided defining
systems can be perfectly clear; it can strengthen beforehand what citizenship is (or should be),
the identification and contra-identification of the preferring to subordinate its study to the con-
subject with respect to different systems and can struction of people’s specific acts of identifica-
permit a strategic use of the situation. Our reflection in daily life. Shotter, moreover, emphasizes
tive capacity would thus enable us to abstract the the possibility that, in view of the absence of an
experience of the original culture or the group ultimate (psychological) foundation for identity
to which we belong, or to put it between quota- of the citizen or of whatever type, the very sub-
tion marks, and promote planned uses of iden- ject who exercises acts of identification acquires
tity self-recognition. At the most, distancing our- a sort of meta-reflective awareness of his or
selves from our own culture would enable us, her identity commitments. However, as we have
for example, to handle its referents in a more attempted to argue, not even that sophisticated
Psytizenship 491
reflective act can be thought of beyond the socio- new forms of personal construction around the
historical conditions generated and provided for domain of the citizen that shows its irreducibil-
a very specific cultural space: the liberal Western ity to natural psychogenetic structures – that is, a
space. psyche predisposed to citizen virtue or to delib-
Be that as it may, that reflective act not only erative democracy – and the impossibility of sub-
enables acts of “hybrid” affiliation or withdrawal jecting it with any guarantee to social engineer-
like the ones to which we have referred. At least ing procedures. Since this is the norm, is the
in theory, we could also leave the door open alternative then to accept the critical and rela-
to suspending all the well-defined identity poli- tively widespread idea according to which psy-
cies in order to pursue a paradoxical activity that chology is a mere device for oppression and
would consist of a constant exercise or game of depoliticization, perchance an accomplice of late
identity deconstruction. It would be a sort of for- modern gentrification and neoliberal individual-
ward flight – perhaps an extenuating one – bound ism (Rendueles, 2004)? We believe that the ques-
to a permanent creation of ourselves as works of tion is much more complex. Beyond power con-
art (Foucault, 1984), a narcissistic recreation of spiracies and asymmetries, what the psytizen-
the self that would remotely evoke the recreation ship project has bequeathed us is an antecedent
performed by the dandies of the late nineteenth and much more problematic urgency: the conflict
and early twentieth centuries (Loredo-Narciandi, between identity self-awareness and citizen self-
2012b). In any case, with this effort we would not government.
be escaping from reflection, but rather, in the best This conflict has had many and very diverse
case, taking it to its extreme and entering a new forms of resolution, some of which are terribly
sort of properly postmodern hyper-reflective state dramatic. For that reason, without losing sight
(Pérez, 2003). What we would indeed seem to be of its vanishing points, excesses and surpassing
discarding along this path is any ontological or of practices and meanings, it would seem that
substantive conception of both “citizenship” and Western culture – or, more precisely, Westernized
“cultural identity,” although surely the analysis of culture – cannot renounce mediating instruments
these matters as signifying activities and acts of that ease adjustment or readjustment between
identification would remain an indispensable task the subject and the different available models of
to understanding the transitions and sociohistori- coexistence, government, and responsibility. In
cal crises of today’s subject. this regard, the technologies of the subject char-
acteristic of the modern and postmodern world
are inevitable, in the same way that other his-
26.4 Psytizen Carnivalization
torical periods and other cultures also needed
After everything that has been discussed here, it theirs. For better or for worse, psychology has
seems difficult to think of a mother rock inside contributed and continues to contribute to shap-
the subject from which progress could be made ing our ways of understanding ourselves and of
until a model of citizenship could be founded. understanding the world in the West or in the
And there is no question of thinking of that Westernized countries. Actually, to refer to “types
mother rock that guarantees the citizen’s virtues, of subjects” in the plural is by no means triv-
when it is not even very clear what it is that we ial, since it is a matter that affects psychology
should understand today by the term citizen, to itself or, more accurately, psychologies. The plu-
say nothing of good citizen. With respect to the rality of psychological approaches and practices,
project of modernity, postmodernity has certified far from representing a transitory or paradigmatic
the surpassing of that ideal model. It has offered stage awaiting a future scientific unification that
would finally put true human nature under exami- chology offers in experimental terms and in the
nation, probably responds to the very multiplicity opening of possibilities, in the production and
of ways of life, although obviously not in a biuni- performance of types of subject and ways of life.
vocal way (Blanco, 2002; Ferreira, 2001; Ferreira Further, if it seems impossible today to con-
et al., 2012, 2013). As in the modern age, ways ceive the eradication of psychological techniques
of life affect and are affected by psychology and as pertinent tools when administrating the transi-
many other techniques that increasingly share the tion between the modern and postmodern subject,
same culture medium, although this often takes it also seems difficult to imagine a postmodernity
the form of relations of rivalry or competition, without reflective capacity and plurality of iden-
as could be the case of philosophical consulting tities. Where self-government or citizen govern-
or therapy with Tibetan bowls. The interaction ment stands in this entire scenario is an impor-
between the psychological artifact and the sub- tant problem that will have to be solved, perhaps
ject falls within the domain of a heterogeneous as the result of a new pact that, through global-
set of practices applied to produce certain types ization, might induce a crisis in the very idea of
of subject or, if the reader prefers, subjectivities multiculturalism. In all this, the reflective capac-
(Bradley, 1989; Ferreira, 2011; Latour, 2012). ity that modernity bequeathed us will inevitably
Strictly speaking, from its founding, scientific play a crucial role. However, after the postmod-
psychology was always interwoven with other ern period, there seems to be no space left for a
techniques involving the subject, many of which, scientific revelation of the true, necessary, or just
such as religion, are premodern (Castro-Tejerina, social reality, nor for a psychological engineer-
2016). Perhaps the differential historic aspect is ing that would cooperate in its exhumation with
the fact that the function of psychology is sur- exquisite neutrality. Being a psytizen is a condi-
passing the commitments of the Latourian mod- tion or a way of being in the world, not a per-
ern pact as a tool for the construction of good cit- fect meshing of gears supervised by watchmakers
izens. From the disciplinary standpoint, it would who are experts in the human soul.
seem that, in recent years, the longing for an
alleviating theoretical unification has been dwin-
dling, since we seem to have succeeded in pro- 26.5 Concluding Remarks
tecting a disciplinary terrain of our own with From an eminently historico-genealogical and
professionalizing and expertise-backed fences. sociocultural sensitivity, in this chapter we have
Without question, being recognized in engineer- asserted that Western citizenship is the product
ing and scientific expertise continues to provide of a series of sociocultural mediations articulated
psychology with great benefits in the form of through specific practices and devices. Among
sociotechnical influence. But if these last institu- these, psychology and related disciplines have
tional walls were to fall or be displaced, psychol- had a crucial function, very particularly for West-
ogy could probably be comfortably recognized in ern culture. Specifically, we have suggested that:
the tradition of the spiritual exercises and clas-
sic technologies of the construction of the sub- 1 It is difficult to conceive of a psychology that
ject (Foucault, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2016; Hadot, is not explicitly or implicitly linked to a given
1998, 2010). In this regard, authors such as Bruno model of what a human being is and should
Latour (2012) have pointed out that practices be, to include ethical and political dimen-
such as those used in psychotherapy make it pos- sions. Considering the context of the modern
sible to appreciate, with relative independence of age, as this term is understood in the West-
the general theories on human nature, what psy- ern and Westernized world, we could call that
Psytizenship 493
connection the psytizen condition, a condi- psychological fundamentation of those mod-

tion that is substantivized particularly through els. The postmodern fragmentation of ways of
the alliance between psychology as a disci- life reveals this psychological diversity even
pline and an ideal model of the self-governed, more clearly.
responsible citizen. 5 In conclusion, psychology could be understood
2 However, that very inextricable union joining as a device for producing subjectivity that nec-
subjects’ activity and the sociocultural frame- essarily includes ethical and political aspects.
works in which that activity goes forward gen- But this does not exhaust the citizen condition
erates overflows of that ideal model. The cul- characteristic of Western or Westernized coun-
tural discourses and practices through which tries. Citizenship reflects a space for the per-
the subject configures his or her life contin- manent negotiation of what we are and what we
ually impugn the suppositions of “adequate can be in common (Stengers, 2008); a space for
adjustment” and human “true nature” that are practices that, necessarily, already surpasses
sorely missed by foundational psychology and the objectives of any social engineering and
its ethical and political implications. rationalization project.
3 Particularly, the shift toward what in recent
decades has been called postmodern life and
reflection includes, as a dislocation of modern Acknowledgment
psytizenship, many unforeseen effects. They This work was done with the financial support
are courses of activity that intertwine with of the European project titled “Between the Rep-
cultural diversity, identity politics, and even resentation of the Crisis and the Crisis of the
the very psychologization of society derived Representation.” This project has received fund-
from the scientific-institutional standardization ing from the European Union’s Horizon 2020
of psychology and the knowledge and practices research and innovation program under grant
associated with it. Strictly speaking, with the agreement no. 649436.
advent of postmodernity psychology has been
fully incorporated into the heritage of available
tools enabling each subject to think of himself Notes
or herself as such today. 1 As Gilles Deleuze (1984) emphasizes, following
4 All in all, psychology is not what it was dur- Foucault, it could be considered that the first connec-
ing the modern age. Postmodernity is forg- tion between citizenship and subjectivity occurred in
ing a re-psychologization of the subject that classical Greece. The circumstance that the best had
is necessarily conflictive and plural. Conflic- to govern by virtue of the principle of isonomy –
tive because there is an evident competition and therefore those who knew, above all, how to
with practices and discourses that concern sub- govern themselves – gave rise to the emergence of
jectivity but are not institutionally recognized the very experience of subjectivity. Thus, an idea of
“interior” would be configured that acquired onto-
as psychological. And plural because, in fact,
logical autonomy with respect to the domains of
from the same modern origins until today,
knowledge and power, although it derived from and
different institutionalized psychologies coex-
was defined on the basis of knowledge and power.
ist. Our thesis is that this disciplinary plu- An important difference established by modernity is
rality is constitutive, structural, not conjunc- that that interior or subjective domain is no longer
tural, and has to do precisely with the rela- understood as derived and facultative, but as primary
tionship between the different models of the and obligatory. Being a subject is foundational, and
human being (or citizen) and the attempts at modern citizenship, the concept that is linked to the
nation-state, and the rationalization of society then the modern individual embraces in his or her daily
must directly address that type of subjectivity. As we life.
will see, it is a matter of subjectivity or interiority 4 In the purest sense, it is not either of those things
considered natural and, above all, universal, consub- today: even the most progressive viewpoints do
stantial to the entire population. not assume the democratic logic of suffrage and
2 It should be noted that we are speaking of con- representation, a mechanism based on the delega-
structing the notion of the social because we do not tion of decision making and political responsibil-
assume that society constitutes an ahistoric or peren- ity. The parliamentary formulas and so-called direct
nial reality existing before the cited devices or apart democracy – as a concept of full political partici-
from them. The ways in which some humans relate pation by the citizen – only appears in some forms
with others and with other nonhuman entities are of local government and in a very restricted man-
innumerable and, contrary to what some psychoso- ner. On the other hand, the conflicts that arise when
cial theories seem to assume, they do not necessar- intentionally and extensionally defining citizenry are
ily pass through the archetypical model of Western still tied to exclusions of sectors of the population
society. In any case, the last’s specific ways are the whose rights are not recognized, or are recognized
ones we take as a reference here. conditionally (Ong, 2006).
3 The citizenship associated with the nation-state 5 “Cooperation becomes a conscious activity in the
assumes subjects that internalize normative codes fourth and fifth months of life, as babies begin to
and apply them of their own volition and convic- work with their mothers in breast-feeding; the infant
tion. As internalized principles that guide behavior, starts to respond to verbal cues about how it should
they can have a moral sense similar to the sense that behave, even if it does not understand the words,
the observance of a religious principle would have. for instance responding to certain tones of voice
But a fundamental difference lies in the fact that the by snuggling into position to help. Thanks to ver-
religious principle depends on an immovable truth bal cueing, anticipation enters the repertoire of the
revealed by the divinity, while the codification of cit- infant’s behaviour. By the second year of life infants
izens’ behavior is subject to the possibility of vari- become responsive to each other in a kindred way,
ation, consistent with the idea of progress and his- anticipating each other’s movements. We now know
torical change that characterizes the social project that such cued behaviour – the stimulations of antic-
of the modern nation-state. This introduces a certain ipating and responding – helps the brain activate
distance with respect to what must be respected or previously dormant neural pathways, so that collab-
not at each historic moment, and even from one cul- oration enables the human infant’s mental develop-
ture to another. Modern self-government is consub- ment” (Sennett, 2012, p. 9). Significantly, however,
stantial with this relativization of the norm, in such the psychological theming of the mother–child rela-
a way that the subject’s decision to avail himself or tionship in didactic terms (by such authors as H.
herself of the norm assumes respect for the social Rudolph Schaffer, 1984) dates back not much more
covenant or the community agreement more than than three decades.
submission to a transcendental truth. For the West- 6 In Walden Two Skinner writes:
ern case, this is something that is clearly reflected in
the constant revision and reinterpretation of judicial, “But as the child grows older,” I said, “doesn’t he
legislative, professional, or ethical codes, in contrast naturally single out particular individuals as objects
to the immobility of the revealed word in the reli- of interest and affection? // That’s exactly what we
gions of the book. In any case, the fact that both Intend,” said Frazier. “It may happen because of
types of principles, the religious and the civic, are common interests: the artistically inclined will natu-
guides to behavior, evokes the appearance of dialec- rally be attracted to artists, the potential farmer will
tics and hybrids in the determination of what the sub- like to hang around the dairy. Or it may arise from
ject “must and must not do” and “why.” Although a similarity of character or personality. In the fam-
not only these normative hybridizations become per- ily, identification is usually confined to one parent or
fectly evident in the moral and personal codes that the other, but neither one may have characteristics
Psytizenship 495
suitable to the child’s developing personality. It’s a the development of modern subjectivity and/or make
sort of coerced identification, which we are glad to assumptions about it that we could call universalist
avoid” (Skinner, 1948/2005, pp. 134–135). or abstract. Among the second set of perspectives
7 It is advisable to bear in mind here the distinc- are those of Gilles Lipovetsky and the genealogi-
tion between the classic liberal nation-state and the cal approaches of Michel Foucault, Nikolas Rose,
current idea of neoliberalism. By contrast with the and Mitchell Dean. Vázquez also emphasizes the
ancien régime, the liberal nation-state, in its nine- contributions to the sociology of individualization
teenth century conception, would be associated with made by Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and Pierre
the free circulation of ideas and beliefs (or freethink- Bourdieu, who highlighted the way in which dif-
ing), of people between social classes or countries, ferent subjectivities are intrinsically bound to social
of economic capital beyond its concentration in oli- practices. These are authors who also underline the
garchies, and so on. But all of these considerations reflective (and self-reflective) nature of certain vari-
would remain under the strict vigilance or obser- ants of modern subjectivity.
vation of customarily protectionist national govern- 9 In consonance, for example, with the conception of
ments, in the economic, cultural, social, and so on, neoliberalism that David Harvey seems to suggest
sense, still distant from the global free market the- (2005).
ses and the capitalism that today’s neoliberals wield.
Nor does this mean, of course, that today’s state will
stop being interventionist, but it is in another sense.
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Part VII
Experiences Make the Person
27 The Human Experience: A
Dialogical Account of Self
and Feelings
João Salgado and Carla Cunha
The basic claim of a dialogical perspective is as dialogical perspectives on psychotherapy (see

that, in order to better understand human activ- Leiman, 2011, 2012; Martinez, Tomicic, &
ities, we need to assume that the basic founda- Medina, 2014; Seikkula, Laitila, & Rober, 2012),
tion of human life is social relatedness. Every the use of dialogical influences on the socio-
human agent, every ego, is always in relation and cultural approach to psychology (see Salva-
responding to an alter (a virtual and/or material tore, 2016; Valsiner, 2007, 2012a, 2012b, 2014;
audience) about a certain object (Marková, 2003) Zittoun et al., 2013), the articulation between the
by using semiotic means. theory of social representations and the dialogi-
There is no consensual definition of what con- cal perspective by Marková (2003), and so many
stitutes a dialogical perspective, but six basic other examples.
common principles have been outlined (Salgado, In this chapter, we will take those impor-
Cunha, & Bento, 2013; Salgado & Gonçalves, tant developments as the general background to
2007; Salgado & Valsiner, 2010). It starts by explore a specific question: How can we describe
assuming the primacy of relations over entities the human experiential mind within a dialogical
(relationality). Therefore, life in general, and perspective? In our view, a dialogical perspec-
human life in particular, calls for a look that focus tive may help psychology in better explaining one
on human-life-in-relations; these relations are of its core elements: the constitution of human
dynamic (dynamism), mediated by signs (semi- experience and the consequent human subjective
otic mediation), implying an Other (alterity), sense of having a mind. Dialogically informed
with whom each and every one establish dialog- perspectives replace the overarching ego of its
ical relationships (dialogicality) within a socio- foundational position. However, this does not
cultural context (contextuality). It is assumed that eliminate consciousness and self-awareness of
psychological actions entail all these features this inquiry. As Jacques (1982/1991) claimed,
simultaneously. “consciousness is no longer the architect of
The dialogical perspective has been success- the communication relation, but its inhabitant.
fully applied in several fields of psychology It realizes and accomplishes itself during the
and in varied ways. For example, it originated semic building blocks available for communica-
the dialogical self-theory, developed by Hubert tion within an organized community” (p. 216).
Hermans (Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans Thus, the human and self-aware mind needs to
& Hermans-Konopka, 2010), which still stands be framed within a dialogical perspective.
as the most popular branch of the dialogical- In previous works, in collaboration with sev-
Bakhtinian approach to psychology. There are eral colleagues, we have developed different
also some other important developments, such aspects of a dialogical model of our subjective
504 j o ã o sa lgad o and ca rla c unh a
processes (Salgado & Ferreira, 2005; Salgado, description of what can count as the “human
Ferreira, & Fraccascia, 2005; Bento, Cunha, & experiencing mind.” Actually, it may be argued
Salgado, 2012). This chapter is another step in that he was far from original, since his descrip-
that direction by exploring the role of feelings in tion was previously set by the German look of the
the constitution of a dialogical perspective of the nineteenth century at “experience.” Nevertheless,
mind. it has become a very popular point of departure
for Western psychology and it is coherent with
our following arguments.
27.1 Taking Some Lessons
His point of departure is the following: the
from James
main subject of psychology is our “consciousness
This endeavor revolves around the very basic of thought.” In his words: “The first fact for us,
ground of psychology. To look for a dialogi- then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some
cal description of the human mind touches some sort goes on. I use the word thinking . . . for every
of the foundational questions of this science. form of consciousness indiscriminately” (James,
What is the object of psychology? What are the 1890, p. 225).
phenomena involved? In what phenomenological His option is to take the whole field of con-
grounds we come to agree that there is such a sciousness as the main point of interest, instead
thing we call “psychology”? We are not oblivious of those supposedly more basic elements, such as
to the sociohistorical background of our appar- sensations. Thus, he is clearly escaping the atom-
ent intuitions, but none of us doubts that what we istic perspective, adopting a holistic position:
coin as “psychological” refers to specific aspects
of our life, and these are highly dependent on Most books start with sensations, as the simplest
our constant subjective experiencing. Thus, we mental facts, and proceed synthetically, construc-
will start by stating that psyche or the human ting each higher stage from those below it. But
this is abandoning the empirical method of
mind has in its phenomenological awareness of
investigation. No one ever had a simple sensation
human experience one of its key distinctive fea-
by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a
tures. As Brentano (1874/1995) argued long ago,
teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and
mental phenomena need to be distinguished from what we call simple sensations are results of
physical phenomena. Following Brentano’s sem- discriminative attention, pushed often to a very
inal work, in which he reintroduces notions from high degree. (James, 1890, p. 225)
scholastic medieval philosophy, this distinction is
based on the “intentionality” of the mind: mental In this last excerpt, it is important to clarify that in
acts are always “about” something, they always the context of James’s nineteenth century German
have an object beyond itself, something that does background, “empirical” is synonym of “experi-
not apply to physical phenomena, at least with- ential,” and therefore he is clearly denying the
out the intervention of beings capable of original atomistic orientation of the positivistic philoso-
intentionality. Thus, the intentional mind is capa- phy. To him, to be empirical meant to be close to
ble of “experience” and the definition of this fea- the phenomena as these are actually experienced
ture lies at the very core of the birth of psychol- by the person. We do not have perceptions in an
ogy as a scientific discipline (see Valsiner, 2012a, isolated way: our experience comes in the form
for a more detailed historical account). of integrated totalities or gestalts.
But how to describe this mind? Up to this point, he is clarifying what should
Our point of departure here will be William be the matter of primary concern to us, psycholo-
James. We believe he gives a very accurate gists. Psychology studies human conscious minds
The Human Experience 505
that we all are aware of having and our mind is a sensuous base, as it becomes even clearer in the
experienced as a totality. following passage:
Then, he goes on to ascertain some other
features: When we read such phrases as “naught but,”
“either one or the other,” “a is b, but,” “although it
How does it go on? We notice immediately five is, nevertheless,” “it is an excluded middle, there
important characters in the process . . . is no tertium quid,” and a host of other verbal
skeletons of logical relation, is it true that there
1 Every thought tends to be part of a personal is nothing more in our minds than the words
consciousness. themselves as they pass? What then is the meaning
2 Within each personal consciousness thought is of the words which we think we understand as we
always changing. read? What makes that meaning different in one
phrase from what it is in the other? “Who?”
3 Within each personal consciousness thought is
“When?” “Where?” Is the difference of felt
sensibly continuous.
meaning in these interrogatives nothing more than
4 It always appears to deal with objects indepen-
their difference of sound? And is it not (just like the
dent of itself. difference of sound itself) known and understood
5 It is interested in some parts of these objects in an affection of consciousness correlative to it,
to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or though so impalpable to direct examination? Is not
rejects – chooses from among them, in a the same true of such negatives as “no,” “never,”
word – all the while. (James, 1890, p. 226) “not yet”? The truth is that large tracts of human
speech are nothing but signs of direction in
James continues his chapter explaining these five thought, of which direction we nevertheless have
features. From his explanations, we will retain the an acutely discriminate sense, though no definite
following: sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever.
Sensorial images are stable psychic facts; we can
r Human normal consciousness is a personal hold them still and look at them as long as we like.
consciousness, meaning that it implies a first- These bare images of logical movement, on the
person state, and some kind of property. In contrary, are psychic transitions, always on the
other words, psyche always involves a feeling wing, so to speak, and not to be glimpsed except in
flight. Their function is to lead from one set of
of subjectivity and selfhood.
r Our consciousness is always changing and its images to another. As they pass, we feel both the
waxing and the waning images in a way altogether
main feature is its operation as an irreducible
peculiar and a way quite different from the way of
stream. their full presence. If we try to hold fast the feeling
r It has a sensible basis that establishes the feel-
of direction, the full presence comes and the feeling
ing of continuity. of direction is lost. The blank verbal scheme of the
r Consciousness always involve some intention- logical movement gives us the fleeting sense of the
ality or aboutness, i.e. toward an object of con- movement as we read it, quite as well as does a
sciousness. rational sentence awakening definite imaginations
r It is selective, and therefore, active about its by its words. (pp. 253–254)
momentary focus.
Thus, James introduces a distinction between per-
In this way, James takes the terms “stream of ceptions (sensorial images) and these “signs of
thought, consciousness, or subjective life” as syn- direction” embedded in our stream of conscious-
onymous (p. 240). At the same time, James is ness. We are unable to hold on to these feelings,
paving the way to admit that consciousness has since their transformation in sensorial images
would kill their movement. They are distinctive ever, it makes all the sense to claim that these
states of mind, felt elements, but not fully articu- feelings of tendency, the feeling of our movement
lated thoughts. James goes on in other directions from the present state to the anticipated future
throughout that essay, but he was opening the may be understood as a vital element of the self-
door to the notion that there is a strong connec- organization of our phenomenal field (see also
tion between our psychic life and our embodied Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). We are conscious
felt sense. More than clear elements in our mind, because we are constantly feeling what is hap-
we feel them as vague; they seem to be almost pening to us and centering it in ourselves (Damá-
pure dynamism, movement in itself, or the feel- sio, 1994, 2010; Salgado & Hermans, 2005). As
ing of the movement: Valsiner (2007, 2014) has stated: our psyche is a
felt mind. Thus, to have a conscious mind and to
Some will interpret these facts by calling them feel are intertwined in the creation of our sub-
all cases in which certain images, by laws of jective life: the phenomenological field created
association, awaken others so very rapidly that we moment-by-moment always comes with a self-
think afterwards we felt the very tendencies of the
referential bodily felt sense.
nascent images to arise, before they were actually
there. For this school the only possible materials of
consciousness are images of a perfectly definite 27.2 A Dialogical and
nature. Tendencies exist, but they are facts for the Sociocultural Look at the
outside psychologist rather than for the subject of
Human Experiencing Mind
the observation. The tendency is thus a psychical
zero; only its results are felt. Taking James’s view as the source of inspiration,
Now what I contend for, and accumulate as well as the Bakhtin heritage (see Salgado &
examples to show, is that “tendencies” are not only Clegg, 2011), and some suggestions from neu-
descriptions from without, but that they are among rosciences (Damásio, 2010), our proposal is that
the objects of the stream, which is thus aware of
human mind refers to the ability of having expe-
them from within, and must be described as in very
riences about something else simultaneously in a
large measure constituted of feelings of tendency,
self-referential mode and in an other-referential
often so vague that we are unable to name them at
all. It is in short, the re-instatement of the vague to mode.
its proper place in our mental life which I am so By “experience” we are referring to the mind-
anxious to press on the attention. (p. 255) ful or subjective constitution of an image of
something else. Beforehand, it implies a relation-
This rich description tells us something quite ship between an agent and an object. This latter
different from the modernist conception of the may be an ache in a stomach, or one’s arm, or
mind: each person feels one’s mind. Thus, in a something in the past, and so on. Within this
our opinion, James is not only pointing to the relationship, the agent is sensing and represent-
ambiguous features of our lives (that can be at ing (in a broad notion of representation) some-
the very core of our being; see Abbey, 2012; Fer- thing (in the environment, in oneself) – there-
reira, Salgado, & Cunha, 2006; Valsiner, 2007), fore, an experience is always something I am
but to the felt sense as a fundamental piece of our feeling “about” something else. If I am having
consciousness. He did not claim that as clearly as an experience of listening to music, it means
we are doing now, since he places these feelings that I am, as an agent, in a relationship with
in the middle of some other mental constituents this particular piece of music, which I am sens-
and not necessarily as a fundamental one. How- ing. The scenario is even more complex, since
human beings not only sense those “objects,” but 27.3 First, Second, and
they also sense them in a self-referential way Third-Person Perspectives
(what also may be termed as self-awareness): if Within the Human Mind
someone “experiences,” let’s say, the sound of
music, it implies that this person is feeling music Before us, we have a world that is felt as an
as “something happening to me.” Finally, and “object,” a kind of external entity that impinges
adding even more complexity to the puzzle of itself in our lives. However, every one of us feels
the human mind, all this interaction we have with these interactions with the segments of the world
the world is socially regulated. Every particular as private experiences. Finally, between these
object is socially rooted. Taking music again as two poles, the interaction between the human
an example: in a song, the specific “materiality agent and the object is rendered intelligible only
of the sounds” gets organized, performed, and within a socially organized world. Thus, and
shared in socially meaningful ways. Thus, even according to these distinctions, the person is not
if privately felt, any particular human experience only interacting with an object: by using social
is rooted in social practices, and its subjectivity is means in that interaction, the person is also in
always dependable on social codes. a social relationship with others – what we may
In synthesis, we will claim that the phe- call a dialogical relationship. Moreover, since
nomenological or experiential the human mind social and cultural life is embedded in the object
can be described in the following way: itself, the materiality of those objects is impreg-
nated with socially charged meanings, making
r The mind operates by the creation of gestalt or the object always a social and symbolic entity.
Therefore, within a single human experience, we
experiential fields.
r These states of mind are always in a process will always have an I interacting with an object
(an “it,” which may be a “him,” “her,” but also
of dynamic change, but in its regular normal
a “you,” a “me,” “us,” “we,” or “them”), and
processing, they are felt as continuous.
r This embodied sense of continuity, regard- this takes place within a socially embedded sit-
uation. In other words, there are three conflating
less the sense of discontinuity on the con-
perspectives within each single mindful experi-
tents of consciousness, implies self-referential
ence: a first-person (an I), a second-person (the
processes.
r We claim that the most basic level of explana- social audience), and a third-person (the object)
perspective.
tion to such a process is the constant bodily felt
sense, by which, under normal circumstances,
the experiential fields are felt in an embodied
27.3.1 The First-Person Perspective
way.
r These felt self-referential processes will also This is the inward felt experience of the focal
be key elements to the emergent sense of sub- object and its surroundings, the perspective from
jectivity, centeredness, and agency. within. This may be understood as the “phe-
r Feelings, in themselves, involve some form of nomenal self-awareness.” It is the “feeling of
embodied response to some actual or potential what happens” (Damásio, 1999) and what gives
situation. a full subjective sense to any experience – it
is the felt origin of the “self.” It may be use-
The remainder of this chapter will explore in ful to distinguish within this first-person perspec-
more detail this general picture. tive two layers: on the one hand, we have the
phenomenological awareness with a referential external social world that is given to us. At the
function, by which the person is representing an same time, by this necessary social articulation,
“external” segment of the world – for example, the mind appropriates this external world, mak-
I may be hearing a piece of music, while looking it part of the mind itself. Thus, everything
ing through a window to this forest; on the other that happens in the mind has a social nature. For
hand, all this process is also self-referential, and example, if you are talking with someone else,
the person becomes self-aware. The referential you are coordinating with that someone; if you
function comes with the ability of sensing and are alone, writing a letter, the addressee of your
representing something “outside” – the intention- message is invoked; if you are just thinking about
ality of the mind. The mind needs a content and something, you are still using socially acquired
the content is always about something. However, means (semiotic tools) in order to develop your
this representation comes also with one of the thoughts and, more importantly, you are address-
most extraordinary capacities of the human mind: ing at least one or more virtual others that some-
the self-referential feeling. The person knows that how shape the course of your thoughts. Meaning,
“this” event is happening to me and that it is in terms of human affairs, has always these social
affecting me. Without this kind of implicit and roots, since it always involves the coordination
embodied knowledge, there would be no subjec- between at least two agents.
tive feeling of the experience: the mind would Social organization starts from the very begin-
be only a matter of representation and automatic ning of life, in the relationship between care-
action. With this feeling, mental contents become takers and the baby: their mutual coordination
subjected to self-awareness and to a feeling qual- is crucial for the global safety, well-being, and
ity that will be vital to human affairs. As we will development of the infant. We live in a social
argue later, these feelings will be the most basic world that organizes itself in different ways: con-
grounds of human motives for action. ventions, routines, habits, activities, each one
It may be argued that there are moments involving coordination between social actors and
in which the person is deprived of this self- between different settings. Sleeping and feeding
awareness – like in sleep or during crisis of are socially marked, but also the pattern of proto-
epilepsy. However, these are exceptions to the dialogues by which the infant is brought to the
basic functioning that only show the dramatic world of human communication. Thus, newborns
dependence we have on self-awareness for our are right there introduced to a social world that
usual daily functioning. constrains the possible pathways of development.
Moreover, from a certain point on, human beings
are socialized into symbolic forms of commu-
27.3.2 The Second-Person nication, by which they become able to coordi-
Perspective nate with others (and, consequently, in a self-
This is the social dimension of the human mind referential way, with themselves) in more com-
and the one that dialogical perspectives have been plex forms. In other words, the mind becomes
highlighting. There is, simultaneously, an exter- semiotic, since it starts using semiotic means to
nal and an internal dimension to this social qual- represent “objects” and also to coordinate with
ity of the mind. Our world is materially and sym- the social world in subtler and more complex
bolically socially organized, and therefore, our ways.
mental contents are also socially organized and From a dialogical point of view, as part
addressed. Thus, we develop our mind within that of the family of sociocultural psychological
theories represented in this volume (see also Sal- lation of symbolic signs. “Sign” can be defined
vatore, 2016; Valsiner & Rosa, 2007; Valsiner, as some sort of “sensorial object” (visual, audi-
2012b, 2014; Zittoun et al., 2013), this sociogen- tory, olfactory, taste, and tactile) that stands for
esis of the mind will always be a core dimension. something else. The smell of a rose announces its
The human mind is always a matter of meaning- existence, the perfume of a loved one reveals her
ful social coordination with others. Such social presence, footsteps in the snow denounces the
coordination involves communication with oth- solitary walk of a human being. Likewise, the
ers and, therefore, creates meaning. At the same vision of these printed words before your eyes
time, social coordination is dependent on the use also create sentences in your mind that enables
of semiotic tools: two coordinated agents need to you to read and follow this reasoning. Human
use signs and a semiotic shared system. Verbal beings have developed highly complex semiotic
language is the clearest case of the use of signs, systems based on verbal signs in which the mean-
but there are also some possible others: for exam- ing of a sign is dependent on the relation it estab-
ple, you may see tears in someone’s else eyes as a lishes with other signs within socially created
sign of sadness, or a smile as a sign of happiness. semiotic systems. These interconnected networks
Thus, the relational nature of the mind, previ- are vital to the most complex activities of the
ously highlighted in the description of the first- human beings.
person perspective, has a socio-relational layer. Signs are socially articulated and addressed,
Most of the theories in this volume share this but they also allow to refer to something else
view, but it is still frequently forgotten in psycho- (see Rosa, 2007 or Salvatore, 2016 for more elab-
logical theories. orated accounts on semiosis). By representing
and substituting the referred objects, signs and
sign-mediated activities, in some sense, become
27.3.3 The Third-Person impersonal or supra-personal – thus, they may be
Perspective shared with third parties socialized in the specific
The third-person perspective refers to the more semiotic code in use. Of course, when brought
“externalized” properties of the mind. What hap- to life in the mind of someone else, signs also
pens in the mind, happens to me (first-person), become lived experiences and, therefore, become
and convokes a social background in which it is personal and social. But semiotic productions
embedded (second-person); yet, it is also “about may gain some material independence, such as
something else” (third-person). The “aboutness” happens in books, DVDs, or chess boards. At the
or “intentionality” of the mind (in the philosophi- same time, they are vital elements for the human
cal sense of intentionality, meaning that the mind world of meaning, since meaning is always rooted
is referring to something beyond itself), previ- in these semiotic elements and activities.
ously described, is the core element for this third- The contents of our mind refer to “it,” and
person perspective. this semiotically mediated “it” becomes part of
This is rendered possible through, first, by the the mind. These objects are always represented
perceptual abilities of the mind, but in the case objects, and representation that initially is only
of human beings, it is much further developed by sensorial and motoric becomes later symbolic.
the symbolic semiotic ability of the mind. In our Thus, the “semiotic objects” of our mind become
stream of experiences, we not only have percep- analyzed, fragmented, compared, put in logical
tions or images that map the world – we also have and dialectical relations with other signs. Thus,
complex forms of thought that involve manipu- the inner feeling of, let’s say, a melody may
become an explicit (and not only implicit) object nitive operations or cognitive contents become
of our awareness. We are not only aware of our connected with an embodied feeling. The con-
experience, we also create verbal descriptions nection between the cognitive and the felt expe-
of our life. We build narratives, for instance, in rience gives a phenomenological background to
which we describe personal experiences within abstract ideas. Notions, concepts, ideas, they have
a time frame. We formulate plans for the future. meaning through this connection (rather unsta-
And we engage in self-reflection. This involves ble, sometimes) between those three poles (per-
not only a felt experience and a succession of sonal, social, and abstract). Take, for instance, the
events; it also implies the possibility of cod- notion of “past”: this notion is not only a matter
ifying those moments into a symbolic system of taking the logical or “purely” cognitive prop-
that treats all these experiences as “objects” or erties of the past; it carries a “way of feeling
“things.” Moreover, it also implies the develop- things” – largely developed in a social medium.
ment of abstract notions (e.g., causality, laws, In this case, we are discussing time, but the same
etc.) and the possibility of situating personal may be applicable to any kind of concept. That
episodes within a specific time frame (e.g., “This is why, we propose, that concepts are far beyond
happened yesterday”; “The game is about to the “words” – paradoxically, concepts involve the
end”; “Tomorrow I will go to the zoo”). preconceptual embodied feeling in themselves!
We must highlight that these three perspectives Within this framework, the human mind may
co-occur simultaneously and feed each other. be described as composed by these three distinct
Starting with the third-person perspective, its but highly interdependent layers or perspectives.
connection with the second-person perspective is We have a layer of subjective self-centered expe-
clear in the social rootedness of our language: riences (first-person), which are socially orga-
we are only able to develop a language through nized, developed, and addressed (second-person),
the social guidance of others and the semiotic referencing something else through signs embed-
systems are introduced by a given sociocultural ded in specific semiotic systems (third-person
background. The other way around is also true: it perspective). Figure 27.1 aims to describe these
is only by referencing to the world through signs three interconnected perspectives of the mind. A
that we dialogically coordinate and communicate person looks to the clock (a socially organized
with others – that is, signs enable our communi- event) and realizes that it is later than expected,
cation with others. The same applies to the rela- creating a feeling of alarm and the verbal account
tion between feelings (first-person) and the semi- “Gee, I’m late!.” All these three layers make this
otic accounts (third-person). We can only refer to a meaningful experience to the person, but also to
something that somehow is experienced – even potential audiences: if we were witnessing this in
if we are talking about fictional objects, such as an airport and watched the person immediately
dragons or Lilliput, we have some sort of “expe- starting to run right after hearing her say “Gee,
rience” of that fiction (imaginary, in that case). At I’m late!,” we will guess that the person is late
the same time, every feeling is a potential event for a flight.
for semiotic description. Finally, as we will be In a certain way, psyche is this social and
elaborating later, every felt experience is actu- embodied world of “ideas” or “concepts.” We
ally also socially rooted and addressed, some- also believe that this picture may bridge some of
thing that demonstrates the connection between the long quarrels between idealists and empiri-
the first- and second-person perspectives. cists traditions of thought. But this also may
It is important to notice that in this view, explain why pure sign-operating machines, such
what has been frequently treated as pure cog- as computers, do not have a mind – and therefore,
Figure 27.1 The three layers of the human mind: first-,

second-, and third-person perspectives.
why pure cognitive sciences are only touching a are implicitly invoked by this position – the previ-
part of the elephant, even if a very significant one. ous relations that now enable this experience and
position at this moment. Thus, I have a felt expe-
rience, but this experience is already socialized,
27.4 Putting the Mind in it is guided by previous dialogical articulations.
Motion: The Notion of Position The virtual other is the addressee of my thought
Taking this perspective as the general back- (thinking is generally conceived here as an
ground, our inner subjectivity may be described inner-directed chain of utterances). Those inner
as an experiential field in which our feeling of audiences are not “objects” in themselves, but
being in the world (a first-person experience, “patterns of relating with” that are relevant to the
composed by our general felt and perceptual situations (e.g., all my social experiences around
organization of the lived moment) is semiotically observing nature). Thus, we have the responsive
articulated within a dialogical and communica- and purposeful action of the person (the posi-
tion relation with others (present or absent). For tion assumed) toward the object (a relation that is
example, I see a tree at this moment while feel- mediated by signs); through this position toward
ing a sense of beauty in the movements of its the object, that has an experiential side (the felt
branches and leaves. The tree, then, becomes my quality of the experience), the person assumes a
focal object, that fills my awareness as the main position toward others (present or absent). Then,
matter of my present moment. This sense of the we may distinguish between the addressed others
tree and the accompanying thought constitutes a (virtual or real); and internal audiences, somehow
general field of experience; the position assumed involved in the meaning-making of the situation.
toward this focal object also socially situates the Then, one person comes in, and I can share
person. Nobody is here to listen to my thoughts, this moment and feeling. A new addressee, a
nobody but a virtual other. Beyond this virtual real person comes to the scene and the utter-
other, I also have other internal audiences that ance is externally expressed. She understands the
pose that the energetic quality of human life is

embedded in and fed by our affective life.
27.5 A Dialogical Account of

Feelings
Figure 27.2 The triadic structure of a dialogical To establish this sort of perspective places feel-
position. ings as vital elements of a subjective life. For
some, this may seem a retreat to egological mod-
els, and contradictory to the dialogical founda-
situation and validates it – “yes, it is really a beau- tions of our proposal. That would be true if we
tiful movement.” A dialogical dance between I would be unable of rendering a dialogical account
and Other starts, in which her agreement means of feelings and affectivity. However, we believe
more than a mere identification. In this case, her that feelings are not only vital elements to unite
agreement may mean that a feeling of mutual body and mind, but a promising door to the dia-
and reciprocal understanding arises; a sense of logical conceptions of subjectivity. Thus, if we
excitement may be brought to the situation by this want to better develop our notion of a subjective
sudden mutual contact; and so on. Her response mind we need to have a better hold on good the-
calls for a response from me. In sum, we may ories about feelings and emotions.
say that at each moment, a person is always Feelings have several dimensions that should
assuming a position toward the world and toward be carefully decomposed, even if they take place
others. simultaneously. As several researchers in this
In order to depict this notion of position we area have been claiming for a long time (Green-
may use the following diagram (Figure 27.2), berg & Safran, 1987) each feeling has:
largely borrowed from Karl Bühler (1934/1990;
see also Salgado & Valsiner, 2010), which shows r an inner and bodily sensuous quality;
its triadic nature. At the same time, this diagram r an aboutness – it is always about something,
implies the three layers of perspectives previously that is, it has a referent;
presented. r a responsive directionality – it assigns value to
In other works, we have developed this notion different courses of action and consequences;
of self-position, since we believe that this notion in other words, it involves some evaluation of
can represent an excellent unit of analysis for the past, present and future referent, and there-
our dialogical studies (see Salgado, Cunha, & fore, it presents itself as a tendency of action or
Bento, 2013). Here, we will only briefly describe response to it (e.g., avoidance/approach);
this notion. It is argued that the agent is always r An expressive and communicational value,
assuming a personal position (which may be since we do not only feel in our body, but we
also representative of a group, community, etc.) also express it to others.
toward specific addresses about an object. Thus,
a position involved what may be called, in In our view, the conjugation of these features
a Bakhtinian perspective (Bakhtin, 1929/1984), allows us to establish a dialogical account of feel-
“double-directedness”: the position is simultane- ings as shown in Figure 27.3.
ously directed to the object and to an audience. Thus, feelings (and emotions, as their
Every position has also a responsive and evalua- counterpart) have three simultaneous dimen-
tive nature based on affective processes. We pro- sions, which correspond largely to the three
“say” something, even if not with words. It

is not contrary to our purposes to claim that
some of these emotions seem to be clearly bio-
logical prewired, since this does not exclude
communicational and dialogical properties. It
only means that our own biological features,
such as our emotional abilities, are also dialog-
ically based: they were selected, at least, par-
tially, because of their communicational value.
Evolutionary perspectives seem to endorse the
vital importance of the expressive and com-
municative value of emotions in the pro-
cess of natural selection (see Damásio, 2010).
Thus, emotions involve also a communica-
tional action toward a social world.
Figure 27.3 A dialogical conception of feelings.
The final picture portrays feelings and emotions

aforementioned dimensions of the experiential
as involved in several simultaneous processes:
mind (first-, second-, and third-person).
in the instrumental actions toward the world, in
r An inner dimension: This includes the sensu- the communicational actions toward social oth-
ous flux of changes taking place here-and-now ers, and in the personal feeling of being a subjec-
in the body-in-action. The obtained feeling tive agent.
creates a sense of subjectivity, a first-person or Our claim is that the expressive communi-
personal consciousness. cational dimension associated with feelings is
r A responsive dimension: The feeling is inte- essential to make the bridge between I and oth-
gral part of the response to the lived situation. ers, but also between I and oneself. Let’s say that
As James argued, we feel the movement of our one person feels sad. On the one hand, this per-
consciousness and these feelings are signs of son is feeling sadness, and this is inwardly com-
direction. They carry a tendency of action, they municated, allowing the person to become aware
move the person in certain ways toward that of her or his present state; on the other hand,
something – the current task. Through feelings, this sadness may be expressed through the body,
the person is moving to a specific position- which may call for a response from others – com-
ing toward her or his experience. Usually, this passion, for instance. Indeed, the constant back-
feeds an instrumental action toward the world ground feelings that go with every moment of
(e.g., feeling something like “I want more of our consciousness are communicated from one-
this” while holding an apple and biting it). self to oneself. In fact, emotional expression is
Meanwhile, since this positioning is also felt not only something to call attention from others,
as a first-person experience, this positioning is but also contains some crude or general recipro-
a personal positioning. cal expectation (crying expects help, expression
r An expressive and communicational dimen- of rage expects fear, and so on). Throughout our
sion: Feelings and emotions are expressive infancy, the kind of social regulation that these
and embodied responses. Thus, they link a situations ignite is vital to what will happen next.
communicational agent to a real or potential For example, what is the child supposed to con-
addressee. Through emotions, we express or trol autonomously and what are the situations in
which the child will be appeased by others? The “Don’t worry, Daniel. I’ll remember for both of
kind of dialogical articulation started by each felt us.” (Ruiz Zafon, 2001/2004, pp. 1–2)
moment socializes that very feeling, instituting
new expected answers; and from the moment that First, we have the absence of his mother, revealed
a feeling originates those expectations, it allows by the feeling quality of the silence – not yet sti-
a new form of answer to the felt situation. fle with words. He longs for her, she is not there
Overall, we are arguing that feelings come for him, and this contact between the agent and
to acquire meaning in this dialogical engage- the physically absent addressee creates a need to
ment with others. They operate as signs, directed be fulfilled. Thus, Daniel, driven by this need,
inwardly and outwardly. However, it is in the seeks for contact (the action tendency) and, as
articulation between expression of the agent and a child, freely uses his imagination to talk with
answer of the addressee that they will acquire her, letting him feel “her radiance and warmth.”
their full life. Feelings expect something from Thus, his feeling of sad “absence” leads him
others. And therefore, even in their inward ori- toward an imaginative world where he recre-
entation, they also are marked by this distinc- ates her presence and contact, letting him feel
tion between agent (the one who expresses) and her response that comes in the form of mater-
addressee (the one who interprets and reacts to nal love. Thus, the need for real contact and the
the expression). response of absence feeds an imaginative form
The following passage from the novel The of connection, which is reciprocated. Daniel’s
Shadow of the Wind may illustrate this complex complex subjective felt mind takes the form of
dialogical dance of feelings. The narrator, Daniel, a complex play between him and her mother.
tells us that he lost his mother when he was four In parallel, his father witnesses all this inter-
years old and how that affected his daily life play and Daniel’s feelings, which are also exter-
throughout his childhood: nally directed, make him feel deeply sad, crying
alone. This in turn makes Daniel aware of the real
Six years later my mother’s absence remained in
absence of his mother. However, in that day of
the air around us, a deafening silence that I had not
June, when Daniel becomes unable to recall her
learned to stifle with words . . . As a child I learned
face, his cry for help is immediately responded
to fall asleep talking to my mother in the darkness
of my bedroom, telling her about the day’s events, to by his father, who holds him and appeases
my adventures at school, and the things I had been him with those beautiful words – “I’ll remem-
taught. I couldn’t hear her voice or feel her touch, ber for both of us.” They are united in their dra-
but her radiance and her warmth haunted every matic loss. Thus, there is simultaneously an inter-
corner of our home, and I believed, with the nal and external drama driven by strong feelings
innocence of those who can still count their age on and needs, which leads the agent toward specific
their ten fingers, that if I closed my eyes and speak positions and forms of living through the current
to her, she would be able to hear wherever she was. situation.
Sometimes my father would listen to me from the As such, feelings share the Janus qualities of
dining room, crying in silence.
signs, since they are deeply involved in the rela-
On that June morning, I woke up screaming at
tion between ego and alter (Marková, 2003),
first light. My heart was pounding in my chest as
they differentiate an agent and an addressee. Ini-
if my very soul was trying to escape. My father
hurried into my room and held me in his arms, tially, these feelings act as basic tools of social
trying to calm me. communication (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001):
“I can’t remember her face. I can’t remember in fact, in the early phases of life, the very
Mummy’s face,” I muttered, breathless. possibility of starting joint action is dependent
My father held me tight. on these emotional expressions. These relational
patterns, with emotions as their basic currency, ied feelings play a core role (first-person). The
seem deeply important to establish a kind of phenomenological perception of what happens is
sensuous knowing-how of being in the world – always mapped against that simultaneous embod-
borrowing from Ruiz Zafon, not yet stifle with ied felt sense. Thus, the perception of the world
words. From then on, progressively, complexity and the perception of oneself are two faces of the
will be increasingly higher: the child will learn ongoing conscious interchange with the world.
to name feelings, to coordinate feelings with spe- This creates a basic self-feeling, which is the
cific contextual demands, and later to articulate basic ground for what we usually name as the
the felt quality of abstract thought with fuzzy sys- “self.” These feelings, and the corresponding
tems of values and ideals. At that point, we will basic sense of self, also assign explicit value to
have a full dialogically engaged agent in a socio- the current lived situation, which is highly impor-
cultural world. But the heart, even when solitary, tant to determine future courses of actions or
will remain in-between. to future eventual introspective reflections. We
also believe that this corresponds globally to the
notion of I-as-subject from James.
27.6 Conclusion: Where Is the
In what sense, then, is the self “dialogical”?
Self Then?
All this takes place within a social background,
In this chapter, our aim was to contribute to which regulates the events taking place and their
the clarification of what we mean by “human meaning. In other words, that basic self is largely
sense of experience” when following a dialogi- regulated by this social and dialogical dimension
cal perspective. That started a travel throughout (second-person). As we have argued, the person
some basic questions in search for a description is always assuming a position toward social audi-
of our phenomenological sense of being in the ences, which are constitutive of the position in
world. We ended up with a proposal that distin- itself. Thus, the position of the self is always
guishes three basic interconnected layers for the social and dialogical. Finally, the self has also
human mind: a basic felt sense, a social and dia- a third-person dimension, related with the semi-
logical field in which the person assumes posi- otic abilities of the mind. All that happens is
tions toward the world, and a semiotic compo- not only felt, but also has content and becomes
nent that allows symbolic actions and reflections. explicit, and by being explicit it becomes possi-
We then explored a little further the affective ble to create narratives about oneself. We believe
side of the mind, since the subjective basis of that this last layer corresponds to the “Me” from
our minds calls for more attention to this basic James. Taking together these three layers, the self
layer. becomes then a matter of creating meaningful
We also believe that this may help us to better narratives and other forms of semiotic accounts
configure an answer to the following somewhat that may guide the person through life’s endeav-
intriguing question: “Where” is the self within ors, rooted in specific patterns of dialogical self-
a dialogical perspective? Based on our proposal, positions and pursuing basic values and needs
we may argue that “self” refers to a multilay- related with one’s well-being.
ered process, in which the first-, second-, and
third-person perspectives conflate. First, the basic
Acknowledgment
sense of self involves an embodied felt sense,
from which self-awareness and self-centeredness This article was supported by the Portuguese
are derived. This is the subjective feeling, the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT)
level where the agent feels that “this is happen- Grant PTDC/MHC-PCL/1991/2014, POCI-01-
ing to me.” At this first-person level, embod- 0145-FEDER-016840.
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28 Knowing Ourselves: Dances of
Social Guidance, Imagination, and
Development by Overcoming
Ambivalence
Seth Surgan, Aurora Pfefferkorn, and Emily Abbey
All development is a future-oriented process of the present and what we imagine would be the
based on overcoming the ambivalence between case in the future (Abbey, 2007, 2012). As out-
what is known now, and what might be the case in lined in those papers, all development is based on
the next moment. As people stand in the present our continued attempts to overcome this ambiva-
they are always looking toward the future provid- lence between what we know of the present and
ing themselves with imaginations for what could what we imagine would be the case in the future.
be the case in the immediate or not so immedi- This chapter aims to extend beyond those
ate next moment (Josephs, Valsiner, & Surgan, papers, and the first edition of this volume by
1999). Imaginations guide us as we go through- closely linking the person and his or her process
out our day, week, or any period of time. For of meaning construction with the environment
instance, as one wakes up, the mind immedi- in which that meaning making takes place. The
ately fills with speculations of the day ahead. human–environment relationship is one of inclu-
These are vague but provide a guiding frame- sive separation (Valsiner, 2000). In accordance
work as we rise from bed and begin the day. Not with co-genetic logic (Herbst, 1995), people and
so different from this, the jazz musician plays the environment are distinguishable from one
and improvises while moving through a series of another but each comes into being on the basis of
chord progressions knowing something about the the other and exists in relation to each other. From
present with the idea where he is going that will the clothing we wear to the things we can talk
only be determined as the music actually emerges about and the things we can never mention, the
from his fingers. The reader of a paper or journal romances that are allowed and the ones that are
knows something about the writer’s message or forbidden, and so on; society structures our daily
has some ideas of its connection to other scholar- lives, reaching deeply – sometimes too deeply –
ship but does not know where the paper will end into our lived experience. Given how intimately
or the fruitfulness of those scholarly connections. humans are tied to their social worlds, it’s impor-
Humans can know quite a bit about the present tant to extend the analysis in the first edition
but only have vague ideas of the unknown future. of this Handbook (Abbey, 2007) to include a
These two aspects of meaning are simultaneously focus on society, broadly conceived. This chap-
present at every moment, given there is no same- ter first explores how society and the individ-
ness in human lived experience (Bergson, 1913). ual interrelate in the processes of overcom-
There is an ambivalence between what we know ing ambivalence through McGinty’s Becoming
Knowing Ourselves 519
Muslim (2006) and then by looking at Germany

before, during, and after World War II, as ana-
lyzed through Günter Grass’s memoir, Peeling the
Onion (2007), where he expresses deep regret
about his participation in activities surrounding
the holocaust. Through Grass’s words it is pos-
sible to see how an individual can experience
sometimes very strong levels of ambivalence,
while at other times suppress it altogether through
the use of circumvention strategies. It will con- Figure 28.1 The openness of the sign to future
clude with some remarks that try to link what is meaning.
learned in this analysis with the previous ones.
As such, the sign speaks to both a
representational sense of the world as it is,
and pre-presentational starts to guide the person
28.1 Ambivalence
to what might emerge in the unknown future. The
Human thought, feeling, and emotion are orga- representational sense of the sign is somewhat
nized by shifting fields of meaning that link known, and this is depicted as “what is” in
the individual to the collective cultural sphere Figure 28.1. That said, the pre-presentational
as well as his or her past and future. As we sense of the sign is always vague and diffuse and
make meaning, we use tools (signs) that have more a sense of “what could be.” Described in
been created historically within particular inter- Lewinian terms (Lewin, 1936) then, the person
pretive communities, transformed as they are who is making meaning is doing so from within
shuttled across social and historical contexts, some ambivalence. Ambivalence is in this sense
and inflected through their use and transforma- characterized by at least two vectors pulling the
tion within an individual’s life history. The flex- meaning maker in different directions and/or
ible relationship between a sign and its mean- intensities (Abbey, 2012). A vector is simply
ing allows for both the soaring freedom of the a psychological force that promotes a change
human mind (e.g., through aesthetic creations from the current state toward or away from
and experience) and the opposite (e.g., through possible future states. In order to understand
social guidance of what is thinkable and unthink- how the notion of vector can be helpful for our
able). As human beings, we have been blessed understanding of meaning making, meaning
with the ability to come to terms with the past, itself (and the process of meaning construction)
make sense of the present, and imagine the future. must be conceptualized in such a way that it
We have also been cursed with the struggle to do revolves around the relationship between current
exactly that. and possible future states.
One of the fundamental characteristics of the People make meaning to come to terms with
human struggle for meaning is the ambiva- events and manage one’s own feelings and actions
lent relationship between what we know of the (or those of others), participate in the perilous
present, and what we know could be the case in process of communication, and so on. Meaning
the next moment (Abbey, 2007, 2012). As people seems to be the tool of choice for our species
make meaning, they are situated on the boundary (along with violence, which itself is regulated by
between the barely known immediate moment meaning; see, for example, Capezza & Valsiner,
and the unknown future. 2008). Our success in these endeavors hinges
520 seth surgan, au ro r a p f e f f e r ko r n, and emily abbey
on the ability to create meanings that meet the promoting movement from the null state toward
demands of the present circumstances and allow the stipulation of an initial attempt at meaning
us to prepare for the possibilities of the coming making – as the starting point (and motivation
and uncertain future. We do this by using signs for) the meaning-making process.
of different kinds. In the moment before a sign is The person moved beyond the null state by
used, there is only a need or a perceived lack of introducing a sign, which is intended to serve as
understanding, control, communication, and so an anchor for the developing meaning. However,
on. This feeling or awareness provides an implicit inserting this sign into the current context (i.e.,
direction for thought and further meaning mak- contextualizing the sign) brings with it more than
ing. Simply put, this is a vector promoting the its lexical or dictionary meaning. In Vygostky’s
move from a condition of non-meaning (the famous (and often-quoted) words:
“null condition”) to the first attempt at meaning
construction. A word’s sense is the aggregate of all the
psychological facts that arise in our consciousness
The driving force of lack (e.g., lack of sat-
as a result of a word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and
isfaction, lack of understanding, lack of resolu-
complex formation which has several zones that
tion, etc.) was an important factor in the psychol- vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of
ogy of thinking (Denkpsychologie) at the turn these zones of the sense that the word acquires in
of the twentieth century. Consider this example the context of speech. In different contexts, a
from Karl Bühler’s (1908/1951) study of think- word’s sense changes. In contrast, meaning is
ing, where participants were given the task of a comparatively fixed and stable point . . . The
understanding complex sayings: actual meaning of the word is inconstant. In one
operation, the word emerges with one meaning
(Do you understand?) “We despise everything that in another, another is acquired . . . Isolated in the
can be explained.” – Yes (6 seconds) – “The slogan lexicon, the word has only one meaning. However,
‘The charm of the mysterious’ (internally spoken), this meaning is nothing more than a potential that
came immediately. I know that this can eliminate can only be realized in living speech, as in living
the paradox. Yet a residue of dissatisfaction speech, meaning is only a cornerstone in the
remained. Then I remembered the period of edifice of sense. (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, pp. 275–
Enlightenment and my attitude toward it (I find it 276)
bad taste to want to explain everything). But there
still remained a discomfort. Then suddenly came Vygotsky paints a complex picture of the psycho-
the shift: to explain means to master, what is logical life of the words that we use so fluently
explained is mastered and thereby settled. Only this every day. At any moment in time, the full sense
game me a satisfying comprehension.” (Bühler, of a word entails a wide variety of “psychological
1908/1951, p. 56; emphasis added) facts” that may exist at different levels of aware-
ness. Stretching this complex structural account
Here, the participant (at the researcher’s request) across the arrow of time, we might claim that the
actively strives for understanding (i.e., “to elim- sensemaking process (begun with the use of the
inate the paradox”) and he explicitly states how first sign) continues with the working-through of
his (largely unarticulated) process of thinking a potentially wide range of “psychological facts”
was driven by a lingering lack of satisfaction. that arise with each attempt to use a sign to fur-
Although the realities of thought – including ther specify the developing sense-in-the-making.
the volitional aspects of thinking – have fallen This process is a potentially complex one, as each
out of the spotlight in contemporary psychology zone of sense will reveal its own set of “psycho-
(Surgan, 2012), we take this felt need – a vector logical facts” once it is brought under the focus
of attention. For example, take Bühler’s partici- INTERVIEWER: You gotta unpack that for me.
pant, who only found satisfaction after travers- What is Bucharest and that lifestyle?
ing both “the charm of the mysterious” and its P: Oh God, that’s the speedy, uh, capital, kind of
opposite, “the tiresomeness of over-explanation.” rather superficial, lifestyle. To make it all, I don’t
Although this process was productive over a short know, it’s it’s a bit, uh, yes, it’s Bucharest is yeah,
very, very, um . . . uhhh, trying to think of how
span of time in this example, it can just as eas-
to describe it. It’s very dynamic, but still quite
ily go on ad infinitum – unless stopped somehow
superficial sometimes, and it’s a different world
(e.g., through circumvention strategies; Josephs
because um um people talk differently, people
& Valsiner, 1998). behave differently than in Transylvania, usually.
After the initial sign (A) is used, a field of asso-
ciated “psychological facts” is immediately cre- In this excerpt, the participant makes quite an
ated. We call this field non-A. Driven by the feel- effort to try to find a “satisfying comprehension”
ing of incompleteness, the thinker may attempt to and eventually accomplishes this by systemati-
clarify or elaborate by exploring aspects of non- cally relating different zones of sense, each of
A. These may include typical associations, such which emerged under shifts of attention. Each
as synonyms, antonyms, or phrase completions shift of attention, in turn, was motivated by a
as well as more idiosyncratic associations rooted feeling of incompleteness – a vector promot-
in memories, one’s narrative framing of events, ing a move from one zone of the non-A field
emotional state, or imagination. By bringing the to another. Being Transylvanian, for the partici-
original sign (A) into a dialogical relationship pant, is primarily understandable by contrasting
with one or another specific feature of non-A, the it with Romanianness. In this first step, the field
full significance of the sign may be clarified or of non-A is specified and the identity talk pro-
transformed. ceeds within this Transylvanian–Romanian com-
In this stage of the meaning-making process, plex (and the artificially enhanced ambivalence
where the meaning of the initial sign (A) is brought about by the researcher’s probing). It is
being transformed through its dynamic interac- from within the space “in between” those two
tions with various features of the non-A field, we concepts that a satisfying comprehension will
can see how multiple vectors can be established eventually emerge. Almost immediately, the par-
within the sphere of meaning within which the ticipant focuses on one aspect of Romanianness:
individual is operating, which provides the basis “Bucharest.” With this elaboration of the non-A
for ambivalence and further attempts at mean- field, the participant begins in earnest to expli-
ing construction. As an example, consider this cate the gist of what makes Romanianness diffi-
excerpt from an interview study on immigration cult for him to identify with: “capital,” “superfi-
and identity. The participant is in his twenties and cial,” “dynamic.” All of these specifics not only
came to the United States for his doctoral work. give us a sense of the participant’s impressions
He is discussing why he tends to present him- of life in Bucharest but, by extension, his per-
self as Transylvanian (as opposed to Romanian) sistent feelings toward Romanianness in general.
and why, as a political science student, thinking Perhaps most importantly, all of these elabo-
of himself as Romanian is “very strange”: rations allow everyone involved in the interac-
tion (both the participant and the interviewer)
PARTICIPANT: It’s more difficult for me to to understand what is valuable and desirable
associate myself to what Romanianness means, about Transylvanianness through its “contrapun-
like Bucharest and a certain sense of lifestyle tal” specification vis-à-vis Romanianness. Once
than what a Transylvanian life means. this has been established, the speaker returns in
a more satisfying way to his position as Tran- 28.1.1 Extending the Model of
sylvanian and establishes Romania, once and for Development Through Overcoming
all, as “a different world,” thereby bringing to an Ambivalence
end the potentially infinite process of meaning
As it exists, the model of development through
construction.
overcoming ambivalence (Abbey, 2007, 2012)
We can see the initial denial of ambivalence:
provides useful insights into the driving role
the participant portrays himself as Transylva-
of ambivalence within the meaning-making pro-
nian, while thinking of himself as Romanian
cess. It orients attention toward how people use
would be “very strange.” In Abbey’s frame-
signs to modulate their own experienced levels of
work, this “very strange” would be considered
ambivalence and how different patterns of mean-
a strong sign. Strong signs set out a particular
ing making (e.g., ambiguity-denying strong signs
relation that is rigid and is not open to mod-
and the erratic flow of weak or fragile signs) tend
ification (i.e., dichotomized, Frenkel-Brunswik,
to appear under different circumstances.
1949). The function of strong signs is to reduce a
The model, however, is missing one com-
dynamic and dialogical interaction to one which
ponent that may make it an even more use-
is monological. The process of this reduction is
ful addition to contemporary cultural psycholo-
quite straightforward: first there is an attempt to
gies. Although the model helps us conceptualize
split that which is ambiguous into two “pure”
the dynamics of ambiguity and meaning-making
opposites. Then, there is an act of dichotomiz-
on the personal (psychological) level, there is
ing, during which those “opposites” are separated
no clear connection between the individual-level
from one another, and where only one is accepted
meaning construction process and social or his-
into the meaning-making process.
torical aspects of meaning making. This is impor-
Prompted by the researcher, the participant
tant to highlight because the meanings that we
leaves behind the strong sign (and the simple
use in personal, idiosyncratic ways, even in our
dichotomization/ambiguity denial strategy that
most secret thoughts, are inherently social –
was being offered) and moves into a more deli-
saturated with a social history and first encoun-
cate attempt to meaningfully distinguish what it
tered in social contexts. Consider Bakhtin’s well-
means to be Transylvanian from what it might
cited reminder:
mean to be Romanian. In this context, the partic-
ipant introduces several fragile signs – ones that The word of language is half alien. It becomes
partially and insufficiently reflect the speaker’s “one’s own” when the speaker inhabits it with his
goals of representing both himself and others in intention, his accent, masters the word, brings it to
particular ways. In this context, new meanings bear upon his meaningful and expressive strivings.
emerge and new oppositions form the basis for Until that moment of appropriation the word is
continued meaning making. The erratic attempts not existing in neutral and faceless language (the
to wrangle a fully satisfying idea are characteris- speaker does not take the word from a dictionary!),
tic of fragile signs and a mild to moderate level of but [it exists] on the lips of others, in alien contexts,
in service of others’ intentions: from here it has to
ambivalence (as the participant struggles to vali-
be taken and made into one’s own. (Bakhtin, 1981,
date the previously absolute and clear distinction
pp. 293–294)
between being Transylvanian and being Roma-
nian). In the end, another strong sign (“a whole The signs that we use in the process of mak-
different world”) is brought in to eliminate the ing meaning exist within a social history beyond
ambiguity and allow the participant to return to the lives and minds of any individuals that might
the null state. find them useful. They exist as parts of widely
accessible social representations, popular dis- mitted. Existing sociocultural patterns are vio-
courses, and so on – all of which form part lated by formal education. Individual “students”
of a densely polyphonic collective culture in are discouraged from continuing the traditions
which the individual is constantly immersed and of their local communities in favor of required
from which one may “appropriate” messages and modes of thought and belief. Schools like this
meanings for one’s own purposes. tear communities apart across generational lines.
As the individual is attempting to master words Formal education is a tool of cultural extermina-
that have been appropriated from the lips of tion/colonization. Professors are cultural agents
others, those lips are simultaneously forced on of the state and no better than any other agents
us, like the lips of an overeager grandmother. of state-mandated extermination.
Although Bakhtin’s famous quote is often used Yet another passer-by might see the classroom
to highlight the social nature of human subjectiv- in action and be inspired by the revolution in the
ity and the creative potential of individual mind, air. Education, after all, is a revolutionary act –
we can also see in it a reminder of the power of one that tears down previous knowledge systems
“the lips of others.” Existing meanings, identity in order to build new and progressive ones that
categories, and other kinds of representations (as make it possible for all learners to become pros-
those are circulated through various means and perous, employed, reproductively successful, and
within various relationships, institutions, and so contribute to the creation of a better tomorrow.
on) form the social field within which the indi- These three representations of formal educa-
vidual may attempt to create one’s own personal tion (self-improvement, cultural extermination,
identity. This creates a range of possible matches and revolutionary act) are all easily available
and mismatches between personal and collective within the collective cultural sphere. One does
representations, which can set the scene for ten- not need to seek out a small, secretive, isolated
sion and ambiguity within the meaning-making interpretive community in order to hear these
process. kinds of talk. At any moment, any of these rep-
Consider, for example, a professor at a local resentations (or others, or a combination) may be
university. One day, a passer-by wanders past a attributed by a passer-by to a professor leading
class in session and catches a glimpse of the a class. Such ideas may be propagated through
activities. Perhaps the passer-by leaves with a the popular media, organizations promoting par-
desire to return to school and complete the degree ticular types of education reform, parent–teacher
they never finished: Education is a process of associations, labor unions, and so on. This is
self-improvement, an education will help you get the complex cultural and institutional landscape
ahead in your own life and help you live with within which individual professors may work to
others in a kinder, more intelligent, humane way. create their personal identities as professors (e.g.,
Education is our attempt to make the world a bet- by accepting and personalizing certain ideas,
ter place, one person at a time. This is a pop- rejecting others, and/or creating new ones).
ular vision of what a formal education is – and In the case of the professor, the identity con-
one that is promoted by educational institutions struction process most likely reaches a relatively
in various ways (and on many occasions). stable state quickly and without much turmoil
Even though this is a popular portrayal of what or ambivalence. The most self-serving notion of
an education and educators are, it is far from what it means to be a professor (i.e., a benev-
the only representation that is available. Another olent educator) is also the most popular repre-
passer-by might look into the classroom and won- sentation – it is the dominant discourse in this
der at how such an act of violence can be per- domain, where both formal education and those
who provide it are highly valued. There is an looked at myself in the mirror and thought, “What
easy match between the individual’s self-image the hell do I look like! Is it possible to look that
and the (hypothetical) society’s dominant way of silly?” I looked at myself and thought that I really
representing people in that particular position. didn’t look quite right in the head . . . For many days
In some cases, however, the social positions I sat home and finally I went outside [with the veil
on]. I was very nervous looking at everybody.
that individuals move into for their own per-
(McGinty, 2006, p. 128)
sonal reasons may not be highly valued within
a particular society. This can set the scene for Here we can see Marianne’s initial shock at
considerable tension and ambiguity within the her own veiled appearance being articulated into
individual’s efforts to make sense of oneself, as suspicion of her own sanity, and finally gen-
he or she may be constantly confronted by the eralizing into a nervousness within which she
gaze of others who powerfully attribute mean- encountered others on the street. This conflict –
ings and motives that do not correspond to the between Marianne’s own core values-based iden-
individual’s sense of him or herself. In these tity as a Muslim and the popular gaze – is here
situations, the individual’s self-understanding happening in private, based solely on internal-
happens through nondominant representations, ized versions of public representations of Muslim
leaving him or her to constantly struggle against women. Although Marianne’s devotion to Islam
pervasive and privileged meanings in an effort to is not shaken, her identity as a Muslim woman is
define himself/herself both publicly and privately. shrouded in ambivalence, given the disparity in
Consider, for example, the situation of a power between her personal representation and
Swedish woman who converts to Islam (McGinty, the meanings that will be ascribed to her by the
2006). In the Swedish context, negative stereo- interpretive community in which she lives. The
types regarding Muslims are prevalent and the representations circulating on “the lips of oth-
environment can be generally hostile (p. 183). ers” will, in a very real way, create Marianne’s
Moving into such a social position is not as easy – everyday lifeworld. Marianne’s self-commentary
or as supported on the collective cultural level – continues later, when catching sight of her own
as taking a teaching job at the local university. reflection in full Muslim dress in public:
One woman, Marianne, chose to make this dif-
ficult move within the context of her relation- Then I can think, “is that me who looks like that?
ship with a Muslim man and on the basis of her That looks that strange? Why have I done this?” It
desire for self-development (p. 180). Although still strikes me how wired [sic] I look with the
veil. I look strange [laughs a little]. It is another
Marianne’s conversion to Islam was of great per-
personality that I’m startled by. “Is that me?” I
sonal significance, she quickly became aware of
don’t think of myself as a Muslim all the time. I
the popular gaze through which she would be
see, ugh, how obvious it is. (McGinty, 2006,
understood within everyday life (the “General- p. 129)
ized Other” in Mead’s [1934] terms) and the fact
that her new position would look different from There are many ways to interpret Marianne’s
the outside than it does from the inside. She claim that she “doesn’t think of [herself] as Mus-
recalls an encounter with the generalized other lim all the time.” We offer the interpretation that,
that came when first practicing with the veil at through the gaze of the dominant representations
home: within Swedish society, wearing traditional Mus-
lim dress implies a (perceived) thorough commit-
I remember standing in front of the mirror trying ment to all aspects of Muslim life, which is sure
the towel [like a veil] after I had showered. And I to elicit not only presumptions, but also reactions
from others. Marianne seems a little surprised at pretive community within which her self-identity
how “obvious” her new position as Muslim is – and other people’s image of her are naturally
how vulnerable to others’ preconceptions she will aligned. Marianne explains:
be.
I don’t belong anywhere but among converts,
This judgment by others quickly becomes a
among Swedish converts. That’s the way it is. I can
reality for Marianne. She recalls being teased
never feel totally at home with them [her husband’s
by childhood friends when they see her for the
relatives]. But with converts I feel like I can be 100
first time after her conversion. Although Mari- percent myself . . . To be able to totally be yourself.
anne’s commitment is strong enough for her to I don’t think it is particularly Islamic what they are
assume the role of an “outsider” in relation to her doing [her husband’s relatives]. I have converted to
childhood friends, she still values her Swedish Islam and not to their strange culture. (McGinty,
background for allowing her to “see a lot that I 2006, p. 137)
think Muslims often are totally blind to.” In other
Marianne continues to describe the comfort
words, Marianne is, in some sense, both Swedish
she feels while surrounded by other Swedish
and non-Swedish – this ambivalence defines her
converts:
relationship with her old friends, her childhood
home, and herself. we are totally flipped out when we converts meet.
Marianne simultaneously describes her discon- We laugh tremendously and are amused by
nection with “very Arabic” women (who she ourselves. With the ones I know, we have some
feels are “very much meshed in their culture and rather coarse banter. And that we can only have
who haven’t taken in much of what is Swedish” inwards, within the group; because see outwardly
and who are “so damn boring”) and how she we are enormously pious. But together we can
purposely maintains this disconnection by not relax. If I had been with the Arabic women like
learning to “speak their language.” In this way, I’m with them, they would have found me awfully
immoral and doubted me being a believing
although Marianne strongly identifies as Muslim
Muslim. We [the converts] know who we are, what
(e.g., stating that she believes being Muslim is
background and positions we have. We can let out
“the best”, and citing her “fantastic life as a Mus-
so many other sides that we hold back in other
lim” [McGinty, 2006, pp. 135, 136]), there is a contexts, since it seems too strange if you are
reciprocal ambivalence in her identity as Mus- totally . . . I mean there are many who believe that I
lim, especially in relation to the Arabic segment can’t joke because they perceive me, as Muslim, as
of that community in Sweden. so very serious. Maybe I live up to that image to
Through this brief glimpse into the life of Mar- give the impression of being so very serious. It is
ianne, a Swedish woman who has converted to only with converts that I can relax . . . I can imagine
Islam, we can see how the process of meaning that if I was totally flipped-out with Swedes, they
construction (in this case, identity construction) may think, or maybe I think they think so, that I’m
can be catalyzed through ambivalence created not a real Muslim if I’m like very ironic, the way I
can be sometimes. Maybe I think that they think
within the tension between personal representa-
that I’m not really a believer if I act that way, being
tions and publicly available ones. In this situa-
ironic about my own religion. When the converts
tion, the person works with available represen-
meet, we are very ironic at our own expense, both
tations (e.g., being “Swedish,” “Muslim,” etc.) about religion and Muslims in general. That is what
in an attempt to create an understandable image we joke about since it is so charged; that we are
of oneself. The vectorial (driving) nature of this supposed to be so goody-goody, that Islam is so
ambivalence becomes clear when Marianne dis- nice and then we see how the reality is . . . we hate
cusses the importance of finally finding an inter- those damn Arabic old men. We can sit and talk
shit and that we would never do in front of Swedes

or other Arabs. (McGinty, pp. 142–143)
28.2 Weimar Germany and the
Rise of Nazism
In these passages, we can hear Marianne describ- How could this happen? This is the question
ing the difficulties caused by the different kinds uttered with regard to Nazi Germany and the
of mismatches caused by her “being 100% her- reign of Adolf Hitler. It is a question asked with
self” in different contexts. Whether the audience disbelief, with condemnation, and with desper-
is Swedes or Arabs, her performance would vio- ation. Though this is an incredibly complicated
late different expectations in different ways, lead- question, it can be partly answered by examin-
ing to different anticipated consequences – and ing the relationship between the individual and
Marianne is aware of this (i.e., she “thinks they society. The transformation of the democratic
think so”). In front of Swedes, she would be Weimar Republic into the Third Reich, led by
afraid of giving the wrong impression of Islam. Adolf Hitler, was swift and thorough. It is imper-
In front of Arabic women, she would be afraid ative to establish the societal context in which
of having her status as a believing Muslim ques- Nazism emerged and to tease out why individuals
tioned. In these situations, behaviors must be were willing to embrace drastic societal changes.
strategically deployed, in light of the assumptions Nazism was born and fostered in an environ-
and expectations within which they will be inter- ment of creation and chaos. Weimar Germany
preted. Among the community of Swedish con- was a liberal haven; expanded and comprehen-
verts, the ambiguity – between being able to live sive welfare programs were offered, such as old
within the vision Marianne has for herself and age pensions and better unemployment benefits
having to live within the vision others are pre- (Evans, 2003; Weitz, 2007). Women achieved
sumed to have of her, between acting authenti- suffrage in Germany before women in Great
cally and strategically, between being Swedish or Britain or the United States. Berlin was home to a
Muslim – disappears and Marianne can return – large openly homosexual community. Metropoli-
happily and after a long journey of negotiating tan centers, like Munich, attracted writers and
the tension between personal and public repre- artists; expressionist and modern art – which
sentations, but only temporarily – to the “null was met with disdain in Great Britain – thrived.
state.” Germany also experienced the phenomenon of
The next section of the chapter further deep- “consumer culture” and with it the appearance
ens the historical context of the analysis to see of new department stores. With advancements in
more clearly how social structures can work to technology, Germany was transforming from an
guide the individual’s modulation of ambigu- agrarian society to an industrial economy (Weitz,
ity and uncertainty in the environment. It will 2007).
explore Germany pre-, post-, and during World Yet the country was still grappling with the
War II, noting how Adolf Hitler rose to power, psychological, economic, and political conse-
focusing on how he gained popular support quences of their defeat in World War I (Weitz,
though a double-sided approach of strong pop- 2007, p. 2). The defeat had been a shock to the
ular support with deft use of propaganda and German people due to the purposeful release of
then last focusing on the well-known memoir, untrue information and the country struggled to
Peeling the Onion, by Günter Grass which out- find national pride and a group identity. Weimar
lines one person’s ambivalent (at times) experi- Germany also suffered a devastating economic
ence interacting with a very domineering social crisis. The poorly structured reparation pay-
structure. ment scheme coupled with the American stock
market crash and rampant unemployment rav- and anti-communist sentiments. As the Third
aged the German economy. The government Reich rose, the Nazis did try to revive the econ-
struggled to provide pensions to nearly 800,000 omy and provide financial relief. In 1933 plans
disabled soldiers, 360,000 war widows, 900,000 for the autobahn were unveiled, which was pre-
fatherless or orphaned children, and the elderly dicted to create 600,000 job opportunities. The
population. The unemployment relief system was construction project did employ 125,000 men by
also overtaxed with an unprecedented number of 1935, however, this was much lower than the ini-
men out of work – by 1933 nearly six million peo- tial calculation (Evans, 2005). Credits were made
ple were registered as unemployed and three mil- available for public-works programs and money
lion had disappeared from employment statistics was spent in developing rural and agricultural
(Evans, 2003, p. 141). Many of those who were areas. Young couples were offered interest-free
working had temporary jobs or received reduced loans if wives would refrain from entering the
wages. Taxes were raised to 17 percent in 1925 to work force; this loan could be reduced with each
cover the mounting cost, however, this too failed child the couple had (Evans, 2005).
to raise enough funds. To reduce costs, more In the 1932 Reichstag elections the Nazi party
stringent means-testing was imposed for various received 37 percent of the popular vote and that
welfare programs and staff was reduced at wel- number rose to 44 percent in the 1933 elec-
fare instructions. In desperation the government tion (Seidman, 2008). Although, as a party, the
began printing more money, which led to devas- Nazis received the most support in the elections –
tating levels of inflation compounding the finan- the Social Democratic Party received the sec-
cial crisis (Evans, 2003). ond most support with 22 percent of the vote –
Historian Eric Weitz (2007, p. 2) writes, the Nazis still did not receive majority support
“Weimar Germany conjures up fears of what from the German population. If the majority of
can happen when there is simply no societal Germans did not support the Nazi party, why
consensus on how to move forward and every were so many individuals complicit in the rise
minor difference becomes a cause of existen- of the Third Reich and the atrocities committed
tial political battles” The economic crisis com- by the Nazis? Though this is a complicated ques-
bined with political instability created societal tion, and it can be partially answered by examin-
chaos. While the country had been democra- ing how the Nazis used propaganda to transform
tized after World War I, the older order ruled society.
by traditional elites remained largely unchanged
which produced remarkable tension. This period
28.3 Propaganda and the Cult
was marked by political chaos, indecision, riots,
of Hitler
protests, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism.
It was in this climate that Adolf Hitler began Although the Nazis did not solve the unem-
speaking at beer halls and Nazism evolved into ployment crisis, propaganda was continuously
a legitimate political movement. The Nazi party, released celebrating the economy’s revival,
which had first emerged in the 1920s, gained a “boasting that the battle for work was being
noticeable following in the 1930s due to their won” – and this claim was supported by fal-
economic promises (Evans, 2005). Amid the sified unemployment statistics (Evans, 2005,
street riots and frequent Reichstag shut-downs p. 333). Those who had previously doubted the
Germans were craving economic and social sta- Nazi party’s financial promises were won over
bility. The Nazi party criticized the wealthy Ger- by this new “proof” and this sense of success
man elites and encouraged growing anti-Semitic “pumped new euphoria into the Third Reich’s
supporters” (Evans, 2005, p. 333). The Nazis reels were shown prior to movies in the cine-
transformed societal institutions and attitudes mas, and by 1939 all newsreels were produced by
through a masterful use of propaganda. the Reich Ministry of Propaganda (Evans, 2005).
Adolf Hitler himself became almost god-like, Even films, regardless of genre, were made to
his birthday was celebrated as a national holi- conform to Reich Film Chamber standards, and
day as early as 1933. Hitler became not just the had to support Nazi ideology and values. Many
face of the party, but the face of Germany. The films glorified Nazi leaders and depicted Bolshe-
“cult of Hitler” was carefully constructed and cul- viks and Jews as villains in what were “otherwise
tivated by propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. apparently unpolitical dramas” (Evans, 2005, p.
Bavarian Minister of Education, Hans Schemm, 132).
described the Führer as, “the artist and master Newsreels in particular were extremely influ-
builder whom the Lord God has given to us ‘cre- ential for young Günter. Before the movie
ating’ a new face of Germany, which gave the would begin, Günter recalls what the newsreels
people its final shape” (Evans, 2005, p. 122). would show: “Germany surrounded by enemies,
While completing Reich Labor Service in 1943, valiantly fighting what had been defensive battles
sixteen-year-old Günter Grass had complete faith abroad – on Russia’s endless steppes, in the burn-
in Adolf Hitler as a man, a soldier, and a leader. ing sands of the Libyan desert, along the protec-
Günter Grass (2007, p. 92) described Hitler as tive Atlantic Wall, at the bottom of the sea – and
a powerful and imposing figure, with a “steady on the home front,” there were “women turning
gaze, ready to meet every eye, his field gray uni- out grenades, men assembling tanks a bulwark
form free of flashy medals.” Günter felt as if against the Red Tide. The German folk in a life-
Hitler was “impervious to attack” protected by and-death struggle” (Grass, 2007 p. 70). Though
some divine power (Grass, 2007, p. 92). This Günter understood there was a violent war being
“cult of Hitler” was quite effective, Hitler always fought, newsreels repeatedly showed only victo-
remained one step removed from the problems rious soldiers returning home from battle, being
of the Reich or controversial actions – such as celebrated with grand bands. This type of propa-
the “Night of Long Knives.” Hitler was pack- ganda kept home-front morale high, encouraged
aged and sold to the German population as the young men to enlist, and reinforced the notion
perfect soldier, a humble everyman, and also that Germany and the Führer were undefeatable.
a “many-sided genius with a sense of destiny” The numerous newspapers in Germany were
(Evans, 2005, p. 122). Rituals like the Heil Hitler also controlled by the Reich, though at times to
salute “cemented the formal solidarity of the varying degrees. Günter recalls reading the news-
regimes’ supporters” and these societal practices paper in 1939, “I had been properly appalled by
reinforced support for the Führer (Evans, 2005, the “Bromberg Bloody Sunday” horror stories
p. 123). Every moment of Hitler’s public appear- that were plastered all over the local Nazi daily,
ances were carefully scripted and planned. The Danziger Vorposten, which made all Poles out to
roaring crowds, the songs and parades by Hitler be treacherous murderers, and I perceived every
Youth boys, the seemingly invincible wall of German deed as justifiable retribution” (Grass,
Storm Troopers, and Hitler’s thundering voice 2007, p. 35). Newspapers were trusted sources
left no room for doubt. for information and Günter, like so many oth-
In 1938 Günter Grass (2007, p. 19) was just ers, were influenced by the rising tide of nation-
11 years old, and he was in awe of what he saw alism to accept what was printed as fact. The
in the movie theatres, writing that, “The Third insidious nature of Nazi propaganda cannot be
Reich glittered in the newsreel spotlight.” News- overstated. Newspapers, newsreels, film, radio,
pamphlets, posters, music, children books, chil- ulously crafted an image of a soldier for young
dren games, school curriculums, illustrations, men to inhabit, and kept any possible sources of
packaging, fine art, books, and magazines all doubt hidden. These strong signs accomplished
spoke with one voice, which encouraged or rein- their purpose – they monologized the meaning-
forced the same Nazi approved message. making process, diffused any tension, and pro-
One of the most infamous pieces of propa- vided a meaningful path forward (in this case, for
ganda is the anti-Semitic children’s book The Poi- young Germans eagerly into war).
sonous Mushroom. Not all pieces of propaganda
were so strongly anti-Semitic or so clearly iden-
28.4 Society and the Individual:
tifiable. It would have been virtually impossible
The Third Reich and Günter
to completely shield oneself from propaganda.
Grass
Germans were constantly bombarded with Nazi
ideology – some pieces of propaganda were Historians will often opine something along the
forcefully obvious; others were far subtler. These lines of “we are all products of our historical
messages supported the Nazi virtues of “blood context.” This golden phrase reminds historians
and soil,” encouraged loyalty to the Reich, demo- that individuals are influenced by society – by
nized Jews and political dissenters, created new the social, political, and cultural environments
notions of “manhood” and “femininity,” and cel- of their lifetimes. To examine the relationship
ebrated obedience and sacrifice. All of this in turn between the individual and society, we return to
informed feelings and actions of the general pop- Günter Grass – who was mentioned in the pre-
ulation. For example, the newspapers and news- vious section. Günter was born in 1927 in the
reels Günter saw as a boy informed his concep- Free State of Danzig – present day Poland – in
tions of normalcy, manhood, and national pride. the town of Langfuhr. In 2006, after numerous
The images provided by the Reich functioned fiction publications, Günter published his mem-
as strong signs amid the national ambivalence oir Peeling the Onion,1 which recounts his expe-
about the future of Germany (as seen in the pub- riences during World War II and his life just
lic protests and riots – erratic attempts at meaning after the war’s end. Günter is filled with doubt,
making played out on the social level). Germany’s regret, and shame as he recalls his own actions
difficulties were portrayed as being caused by and feelings during the reign of the Third Reich.
enemies from all sides, including from within by With each episode remembered, Günter questions
specific segments of the population. Against this himself: Why did he not have doubt as syna-
threat, German males fulfilled their heroic poten- gogues burned? Why did he not speak up as
tial by defending the Fatherland, guided by an friends vanished? Why did he voluntarily enlist?
inspiring and invincible leader. Under the care- Many of Günter’s own questions can be answered
ful control of a centralized propaganda machine, by using his memoir to examine his relationship
popular media did not convey images or reports with society, and how social institutions influ-
of the ordeals suffered by German soldiers (or ences or informed his decisions and feelings.
their targets). There was no open discussion of
the politics or wisdom of the nationalist agenda
28.4.1 Uniforms and Propaganda
and no portrayal of the humanity of those who
would be exterminated – nothing that could pos- Many of Günter’s decisions and feelings were
sibly spark or fuel doubt about what the ideal path influenced by his idealized image of war. At the
for young German men (including Günter Grass) age of 10 Günter voluntarily joined the Jungvolk,
would be. The Nazi propaganda machine metic- a youth organization for boys which fed into the
Hitler-Jugend – the boy’s division of the Hitler position was compulsory, rather than voluntary,
Youth. It was the uniform that initially attracted Günter recalls that he and the other boys enjoyed
Günter to the organization, however, the cama- the freedom that came with living at the Kaiser-
raderie was also a strong lure. The Hitler Youth haften battery. In the Luftwaffe auxiliary the boys
became a feared organization. Children in the were free from school, from the constraints of the
Hitler Youth experienced propaganda during a Hitler Youth, and parental supervision. Günter
key moment in their development and were more was glad to be out of the cramped two room flat
susceptible to accept the radical messages. These that he shared with his parents and younger sister
children were indoctrinated early and empowered where there was no room for personal space or
by the uniform. Historian Richard Evans (2005) growth. Once again it was the comradery and the
notes that adults often feared being reported by “spiffy” uniforms that endeared the boys to the
children. A Hitler Youth leader threatening to position. Günter remarks, “The way we boys saw
report his 60-year-old school teacher for failing it, our uniforms attracted all eyes” (Grass, 2007,
to remove his cap in the presence of the Nazi flag p. 65). Danzig was not the target of heavy bomb-
was not an uncommon occurrence (Evans, 2005, ings, so Günter did not see much action. “We
p. 281). got our eight-point-eight guns only two or three
Günter (Grass, 2007, p. 35) writes about his times, when a few enemy bombers were sighted
participation in the Hitler Youth, “As a member in our air space in the beam of the searchlights.
of the Hitler Youth I was, in fact, a young Nazi. It looked very festive” (Grass, 2007, p. 65).
A believer till the end. I kept pace in the rank and It is telling that Günter describes his military-
file. No doubts clouded my faith; nothing subver- esque service as freeing, and uses the word
sive like the clandestine distribution of leaflets “festive” to describe the search lights. Social
can let me off the hook; no Goring joke made elements, like newsreels, Hitler’s speeches, and
me suspicious. No, I saw my fatherland threat- newspapers, laid in place the groundwork that led
ened, surrounded by enemies.” During the earli- Günter to embrace his position as a Luftwaffe
est years of the war, Günter’s only criticism or auxiliary.
disdain was aimed at the local party “bigwigs” Here we can see clearly how successful the
who “had wormed their way out of active duty at Nazi propaganda campaign was in directing Gün-
the front.” Günter – and his school friends – were ter toward military service. Günter indicates no
fascinated by military action. The soundtrack to ambiguity – he was a “believer till the end”
his childhood was the Führer’s speeches, talk and “nothing clouded [his] faith.” Although there
of blitzkriegs, submarine heroes, and ace pilots were potential sources of ambiguity – leaflets,
(Grass, 2007, p. 30). It is clear society played a jokes, and so on – the framework that Günter
major role in Günter’s perception of war. As an had internalized by this point prevented those
adolescent society demonstrated to Günter that to messages from penetrating beyond his surface
serve in combat was a duty and an honor. Com- awareness (Level 1 in Valsiner’s [1997] lam-
bat was something exciting, which gave ordinary inal model of internalization). Günter’s non-
young men an opportunity to become heroes. He ambivalence was also supported by the perceived
admired the men in uniform, idolized in Nazi social benefits of being a soldier. Through the
newsreels and newspapers. dominant discourse installed by the propaganda
At the age of fifteen Günter served in the Luft- office, service in the Nazi army was clearly asso-
waffe auxiliary. When he was a younger boy in ciated with heroism and manhood and Günter
the Jungvolk he admired the older boys wearing believed that appearing in uniform “attracted all
their Luftwaffe auxiliary uniforms. Although the eyes.” These eyes, in contrast to the ones that
gazed on Marianne in her Muslim dress, presum- Jungvolk. His national pride and sense of cama-
ably approved of and admired Günter’s trajectory. raderie was fostered in the Hitler Youth, as he car-
ried flags, marched in parades, and loudly sang
Reich songs with the other boys. The Luftwaffe
28.4.2 Adolescence and War
auxiliary service kept Günter in uniform, and
Günter (Grass, 2007, p. 65) writes, “What is lack- separated him from his family; this cemented his
ing are the links in a process no one stopped, an relationship with his male peers and gave him a
irreversible process whose traces no eraser can false sense of maturity. His time as a Luftwaffe
rub out. It is clear: I volunteered for active duty. auxiliary also normalized military life – he lived
When? Why?” He makes sure to clarify for the and slept in barracks, practiced drills, and han-
reader, and perhaps for himself, “What I did can- dled weapons.
not be put down to youthful folly. No pressure Günter was rejected for service at the age of
from above. Nor did I feel the need to assuage a fifteen; first he had to complete the mandatory
sense of guilt at, say, doubting the Führer’s infal- Labor Service. “Not even enlisted men could get
libility, by my zeal to volunteer” (Grass, 2007, out of Labor Service. That’s where you do your
p. 65). While Günter’s parents or teachers may rifle drills. And learn what real army discipline
not have pressured him to enlist, the “pressure” means” (Grass, 2007, p. 73). Günter traded in his
came at him “sideways” through social institu- Luftwaffe auxiliary uniform, for a Labor Service
tions or social elements. When Günter was home uniform. During Labor Service boys and girls (in
on weekend leave from the Luftwaffe auxiliary, separate units) devoted their time and talents to
he would picture himself as a “ship’s mate dur- better the Fatherland and the Reich. Günter had
ing a stormy tower watch, swathed in oilskins, previously met a young woman named Lili who
covered with spray, spyglass trained on the danc- fulfilled her Labor Service by teaching art at his
ing horizon” (Grass, 2007, p. 69). Like the hero school. Since Günter had artistic talent he was
of a fiction book, Günter imagined himself eas- given the task of painting watercolor landscapes
ily “returning home from victorious campaigns” to decorate the mess hall.
welcomed by “brass band and all” (Grass, 2007, Günter recalls the ceremony during which the
p. 69). Günter had seen scenes like this on the boys were presented with pistols, “It goes with-
newsreels which played in the cinemas. Soldiers out saying: every member of the Labor Service
were triumphant, soldiers were celebrated, idol- was to feel honored by the touch of wood and
ized, and revered. Absent from the newsreels and metal, the butt and barrel of the carbine in his
newspapers were the stories of submarines who hands. And we boys did in act inflate ourselves to
sank, killing every man aboard (Grass, 2007, men when we stood at attention with our guns by
p. 35). Günter finds himself sitting in a recruit- our sides” (Grass, 2007, pp. 82–83). Social insti-
ment office at the age of 15, an age at which tutions informed Günter’s conceptions of “man-
most individuals seek identity, purpose, and hood.” Günter’s previous time in uniform as a
independence. boy, combined with the instruction of the Labor
Günter seems confused by his decision to vol- Service, and reinforced by propaganda, taught
unteer for submarine service and attempts to him that “manhood” was reached or earned with
string together possible reasons, however, his successful military service. These images were
decision to voluntarily enlist was a natural pro- turned (by Günter) into fantasies for himself,
gression given the social environment in which which only further buffered him from any pos-
he grew into a young man. He began wearing sible ambivalence. Günter yearned for the chance
a uniform at the age of 11 after joining the to serve aboard a submarine and escape from his
home life. No matter how comfortable or loving ence with the boy’s religious institution which
that might have been, glory and manhood were predated the Reich.
not within reach. He saw no reason to delay – “The image that had been crystal clear in
boys were drafted, while men volunteered to fight. the sixteen-year old Labor Serviceman’s mind
until then was turning fuzzy around the edges.
Not that it had become alien, no. But my uni-
28.4.3 Doubt
formed self seemed to be slipping away. It had
During his time in the Labor Service there was given up its shadow and wanted to belong among
one boy that caused Günter to experience a brief the less guilty. There were plenty of people
moment of doubt. Günter describes the boy as like that later on, people who ‘were only obey-
quiet and dedicated to his Labor Service tasks, ing orders’” (Grass, 2007, p. 91). Günter may
but he refused to participate in rifle drills or even have begun doubting the Nazi ideology; how-
hold a pistol. Each time the gun was put into ever, these doubts did not lead him to alter his
his hand the boy refused to clasp it, letting the actions. After Günter was dismissed from the
sacred item fall to the ground. The boy was pun- Labor Service, he heard stories of peers who
ished with chores, which he did without com- had dodged the draft and went “underground.”
plaint. When he continued to be insubordinate, The Edelweiss Pirates were a group of similarly
the entire unit was punished, which caused the aged boys, “who were shaking people down in
boys to turn against the dissenter. When asked bombed-out Cologne” (Grass, 2007, p. 95). Gün-
why he would not take the gun, the boy always ter did not go “underground,” nor did he join a
replied, “We don’t do that” (Grass, 2007, p. 86). resistance group – he instead waited restlessly at
Günter remembers, “He stuck to the plural . . . It home for two months until his induction letter
was as though he had if not an army then at least arrived. Despite his mother’s grief, Günter took
a goodly battalion of imaginary insubordinates the train to the Reich headquarters in Berlin to
lined up behind him ready to repeat the phrase fulfill his position as a soldier. Günter does not
after him. Four words fusing into one: Wedont- remember feeling fear or doubt as he traveled
dothat . . . His behavior transformed us. From day to Berlin. The induction letter gave Günter pur-
to day what had seemed solid crumbled” (Grass, pose and direction again; he was leaving behind
2007, p. 86) the home he found cramped and strange for
The other boys began to admire “Wedont- the familiarity of barracks and the comfort of a
dothat” and discipline began to deteriorate. uniform.
Finally the boy was taken away, likely sent to a During this episode, Günter encounters some-
concentration camp. Günter admits, “I was if not thing not described before – disobedience. The
glad, then at least relieved when the boy disap- actions of the “Wedontdothat” seem to have been
peared. The storm of doubts about everything I motivated by some set of beliefs that Günter can-
had had rock solid faith in died down, and the not articulate, but he describes the power of the
resulting calm in my head prevented any fur- boy’s behavior itself. It creates the first seed of
ther thought from taking wing: mindlessness had doubt. Günter reports that “discipline began to
filled the space” (Grass, 2007, p. 88). The boys deteriorate,” while he himself had “storms of
speculated that the dissenter had been a “Bible doubt about everything I had rock solid faith in,”
nut” or a Jehovah’s Witness (Grass, 2007, p. 87). and even that his “uniformed self seemed to be
“Wedontdothat” boy was not as susceptible to slipping away.” The protest by “Wedontdothat”
society’s influence. The social elements of the demanded an interpretation from the group as a
Third Reich were forced to compete for influ- whole. The other boys attempted to make sense
of “Wedontdothat” by speculating about his reli- Günter is assigned to a Waffen SS unit to be

gious background – an erratic effort at mean- a gunner on the eastern front, and travels with
ing construction, which – if successful – could his unit to the Bohemian Woods for training.
provide the boys with a way of short circuit- Günter’s only complaint about training was his
ing the influence of the protesting boy. Without assigned daily chore of bringing the troop leaders
a stable meaning to alleviate the ambiguity, the their coffee. This task took up most of his allotted
boys were unable to either fully stand behind breakfast time and continually made him late for
“Wedontdothat” or enforce the status quo. The morning roll. He was punished for his tardiness
relatively high level of ambiguity was perceived by being made to run up and down a hill wearing
as a threat by the Labor Service, who removed a gas mask and a heavy pack. Günter eventually
“Wedontdothat.” Following the disappearance, decided to exact revenge each morning by peeing
Günter reports a decrease in ambivalence and into the coffee. “We may assume that my repeated
corresponding relief: “the resulting calm in my revenge, my regular morning gesture of futility,
head prevented any further thought from taking helped me to endure the drills, and even the worst
wing: mindlessness had filled the space.” The tortures, with an inner grin. Just before one of
disappearance of “Wedontdothat” was not sim- those punishment drills, a recruit in the company
ply the removal of a disruptive force. It was a next to ours hanged himself with the strap of
strong sign – a zero signifier (Ohnuki-Tierney, his gas mask” (Grass, 2007, p. 114). Although
1994) from the Labor Service inserted into we know nothing about the boy who committed
the space where “Wedontdothat” had been that suicide, the argument can be made that his rela-
eliminated ambivalence and restored the status tionship with society was less stable than Gün-
quo. ter’s relationship with society. Günter feels it is
When Günter arrives in Berlin his life as a unfair that he has to complete the coffee chore,
soldier begins. It is here that he has his first but he does not have complaints about the overall
real contact with the war. Berlin had sustained training experience. “Otherwise, I did everything
heavy bombing, and as Günter arrived an all- I was ordered without a second thought. Shooting
clear had just sounded. Even though buildings moving targets. Night marches with combat pack.
were burning all around the city the people of Knee bends with rifle held at arm’s length. It was
Berlin seemed uninterested as, “fires were con- all supposed to make a man out of me” (Grass,
sidered normal by then” (Grass, 2007, p. 107). 2007, p. 114). This demonstrates Günter’s posi-
If the destruction gave Günter pause he cannot tive relationship with society – the social institu-
remember it, “I can picture my fellow recruits tions that have influenced his life have taught him
jabbering. We are curious, as if on an adven- that this experience is necessary for his growth
ture. We’re in a good mood” (Grass, 2007, and development so Günter is eager to complete
p. 108). When he receives marching rations, this task.
including cigarettes, Günter trades them for When Günter’s unit is transferred to Dres-
marzipan potatoes, a treat reserved for Christmas. den, he witnesses an event that, in retrospect, he
Society has taught Günter that war is an adven- believes should have signaled to him the immi-
ture, that it is the coming of age trial that will nent defeat of the Third Reich. As the boys trav-
establish him as a man. He believes he is standing eled to Dresden by train they saw, “charred bun-
on the precipice of adulthood, about to achieve dles piled one on top of the other between the
greatness. The propaganda has established this tracks and in front of torched facades. Some
belief and the boys feed each other’s excitement claimed to have seen shriveled corpses, others
and reinforce these beliefs in this group setting. heave knows what. We covered up our horror then
by quarreling over what had happened” (Grass, over the bodies of the less fortunate and issuing
2007, p. 119). Günter realizes now this moment orders), he appears “ridiculous” in Günter’s eyes.
is horrifying and should have caused him distress Heroism through warfare is no longer an option
or doubt, but does not recall his younger self real- for Günter – nor is it for anybody else.
izing this. Doubt, at that moment as he travels to Despite Günter’s fear and doubt during his first
the front lines would have been far too distress- encounter with the enemy he does end the war
ing for the 16-year-old soldier to accept. As Gün- by following his marching orders, to the letter.
ter was about to face the enemy to defend Ger- After being separated from numerous units, hav-
many, with only his comrades to rely on, doubt ing watched comrades die violently – Günter was
would have been catastrophic. Günter realizes he briefly lost in the woods and then traveled with a
“covered up” his horror, and did so because had new companion, both boys move westward car-
he acknowledged his doubt, a distressing ambiva- rying their fear of being arrested for desertion
lence would have resulted. (because they had no marching orders) and their
Günter’s relationship with society begins to fear of being killed by the Russians. While eat-
deteriorate with his first encounter with Russian ing breakfast one morning Günter is wounded
soldiers and his first lesson in fear. When his unit by a grenade. He endures a hellish journey by
is attacked by Russian tanks, Günter and a higher train in a dark freight car with other wounded sol-
ranking soldier hide beneath their tank until the diers, many of whom did not survive the journey.
Russians move on. Günter recalls the other sol- At the overcrowded hospital he learned he had a
dier who was “the very picture of a newsreel hero piece of grenade lodged in his shoulder and leg.
such as we schoolboys had been fed from the His wounds was deemed “non-serious,” “They
screen for years” was also terrified, teeth chat- did not deem me worthy of an operation, nor did
tering, and looked “ridiculous” afterward when they waste a tetanus shot on me” (Grass, 2007,
he issued orders, stepping over the broken crum- p. 154). He finally received new paper, ordering
bled bodies of the dead and injured (Grass, 2007, him to report to Marienbad. He does not remem-
p. 125). Günter admits he is grateful to this ber how he traveled over the mountains only that
soldier because he “completely undermined the he became feverish and was cared for briefly by a
image of the hero” that he had cherished for so couple whose son had perished at the front.
long and admired (Grass, 2007, p. 125). Gün- The couple offered Günter new clothes, and
ter realizes for the first time that the images he they offered to shelter him until the war was over,
has been shown are not realistic. His relation- but Günter refused. “I didn’t stay. I wanted to
ship with society becomes strained, and his is go where my travel papers ordered me to go, to
concerned now with survival more so than being cross the mountains in my own trousers” (Grass,
heroic or earning “manhood.” 2007, p. 157). Despite his doubts, despite all the
At this moment, close to death and seeing a fear and chaos of war, Günter wanted to com-
soldier of the kind he had been trained to idolize plete his orders and officially finish his service,
and emulate being more concerned with individ- which society had trained him to do his entire
ual survival than with defending the Fatherland, adolescence. Feverish and weak Günter made it
Günter’s ambivalence reaches its highest levels. to Karlsbad where he collapsed in the street.
The story of the heroic soldier clashes with the He was taken by a policeman to Marienbad, as
image of a man scared for his life. Not only does instructed by his marching orders, and it was here
a second image appear on the scene, but it comes the war ended for the 16-year-old soldier. With
to dominate. When the scared man attempts to the defeat of the Third Reich all the social institu-
act in the role of the heroic soldier (by standing tions – like the Hitler Youth and Nazi newsreels –
fell away, and Germans, like Günter, were forced him. If it was because of his own objection to the
to defend and reconcile their choices and feel- idea of potentially killing another human being,
ings without the corresponding influential soci- then it calls into question important aspects of his
etal elements. Despite carrying a pistol, rile, and story – he was not as brainwashed by the Nazi
machine gun at various points, Günter (Grass propaganda as he claims to have been and must
2007, p. 144) writes, “I never looked through a accept more personal responsibility for his deci-
sight, never felt for a trigger, and thus never fired sion to become a Nazi soldier than he seems will-
a shot” The fact that he never fired his weapon ing to accept. Despite the apparent strength of
is the one thing that alleviates some of Günter’s this sign, it is not enough to grant Günter (in con-
shame. trast to Marianne) a peaceful return to the “null
When Günter awoke from his fever he learned state.”
that Adolf Hitler was dead. “His departure was
taken as only expected. He was gone as if he had
28.5 Conclusions
never been, had never quite existed and was not
to be forgotten, as if you could live perfectly well The model of development through overcom-
without the Führer. By the same token, his ‘heroic ing ambivalence represents not only the dual-
death’ was lost in the mass of individual deaths ity of meaning construction, but also its tem-
and was soon no more than a footnote” (Grass, poral embeddedness. As humans go about the
2007 p. 160). The Führer, whom Günter never process of making meaning, that process is nec-
doubted, who was “above death” and the model of essarily influenced by time, and the relationship
a perfect soldier simply vanished from Günter’s that the person has with the uncertainty that con-
life. Günter had been socially directed to revere stantly lies before him or her. The aim of this
Hitler; social institutions like the Jungvolk built chapter has been to expand the model by con-
loyalty to the Führer, social programs endeared sidering the social context of the meaning mak-
people to Hitler and fear of the Gestapo kept ing process through McGinty’s Becoming Muslim
potentially conflicting voices silent. With the end (2006) and by looking at Germany before, dur-
of the Third Reich, without the influence of soci- ing and after World War II, as analyzed through
ety, Hitler became an ordinary man, his death of Günter Grass’ memoir Peeling the Onion (2007)
no real consequence to Günter Grass. where he expresses deep regret about his partic-
Like many others in his position, Günter is ipation in activities surrounding the Holocaust.
left looking back on his service and questioning In the examples presented in this chapter, we
how he could have become part of the Nazi war saw that “social others” are more than ready
machine and the implications for his understand- to help the meaning maker in his or her pro-
ing of himself. Was he a good person caught in cess of meaning construction. We saw the goal
terrible circumstances? Was he weak while oth- of social others is often to have their mean-
ers, like “Wedontdothat” were strong? Through ings, rather than the person’s own emerging ones,
his process of meaning construction, Günter finds used in meaning making. We also saw that the
a way to forgive himself, at least partially, for his individual – be it Günter or Marianne – can make
contributions to the Nazi regime by reminding these interventional efforts of social others func-
himself that he never fired a shot as a soldier. We tional by accepting the meanings and allowing
do not know if this claim is true and, if it is, how it to organize their relationship with the world
this might have happened. If it was because of (for example, as Günter did in many instances
circumstances beyond Günter’s control, then the with Nazi propaganda). The individual is equally
fact that he never fired a shot does not vindicate able to reject the meanings social others present,
and this is why we see the extreme redundancy ing where they continue to engage in the ongoing
of social suggestion as social institutions all try process of coming to know themselves.
hard to avoid this outcome (e.g., the case of
over-proliferation of Nazi propaganda in Günter’s Note
story.)
Judging from the over-proliferation of mes- 1 Peeling the Onion was written in German and pub-
sages from various social institutions which all lished in 2006, the English translation which was
used for this chapter was published in 2007 and
function in redundant manner to communicate
translated by Michael Henry Heim.
the same message, we can see that rejection is
the usual state of affairs when social others aim
to intervene in our meaning constructive pro- References
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29 Personal History and Historical
Selfhood: The Embodied and
Pre-reflective Dimension
Allan Køster and Ditte Alexandra Winther-Lindqvist
If we succeed in understanding the subject, this will not be in its pure form, but rather by looking
for the subject at the intersection of its various dimensions.
Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 433
In the seminal first volume of this Handbook, cal terms (Scribner, 1985). However, the same
the editors wrote in the preface: “Sociocultural theoretical sensitivity to history is often forgot-
psychology cannot leave aside anything that is ten when it comes to the person participating in
human; its challenge is to address its complexity these cultural settings and social practices, some-
and provide tools for its explanation and under- times to the extent that the person is reduced
standing” (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007, p. ix). This to an empty placeholder. Although this omis-
is a grand ambition of sociocultural psychol- sion holds true for the general sociocultural land-
ogy, and we wish to contribute to that project scape, it should be recognized that there is an
by theorizing the phenomenon of the personal emerging body of studies of the personal dimen-
as an embodied historical process. We contend sion in sociocultural psychology and that one
that both the personal dimension as such, and of the founders of the sociocultural approach,
individual existence as something historical, have Vygotsky, did suggest terminology for the per-
been significantly omitted in sociocultural theo- sonal dimension of experience in the distinction
rizing (González Rey, 2008; Smolka, De Goes, between sense and meaning. “Meaning” denotes
& Pino, 1995; Valsiner, 1998). This tendency to the conventional, general, and collective under-
neglect the personal dimension is not only char- standing of a word, whereas “sense” is reserved
acteristic of sociogenetic approaches in psychol- for the inherently personal meaning making,
ogy, but has also been identified in other dis- which is affective-volitional, fluid, and change-
ciplines concerned with cultural practices and able (Leontiev, 1978; Valsiner, 1998).1 Though
processes. For instance, Jackson and Piette it is impossible to provide a full account of this
(2015) recently argued that such a lack exits in research here, two principal directions should be
the field of anthropology, where “there is a ten- emphasized. The first explores the person as a
dency to shift vitality, power, consciousness, and semiotic sense-maker, and the personal dimen-
will from persons to the transpersonal realms of sion as a semiotic process of sensemaking (often
abstract ideas, global forces, historical processes, on a sub-personal or a formal level). Valsiner’s
genetic patterns, social structures, and discursive (1998) seminal work, The Guided Mind, is a
formations” (p. 4). Sociocultural theories usually cornerstone of this approach, and has inspired
account for cultural practices, institutional set- others to further explore the semiotic land-
tings, norms, values, and discourses in histori- scape of the personal (Salvatore, 2012). Second,
Personal History and Historical Selfhood 539
alongside, and sometimes integrated with this ontogeny, selfhood, as the embodied, personal
semiotic approach, is a growing body of work on being-in-the-world, remains a fundamental and
micro-genetic and life-course studies that theo- continuous dimension of experience throughout
rize how the person develops across time through life.
participating in various institutional settings. The In the following sections, we contribute to
study of the narrative, the (self)-reflective, active theorizing the pre-reflective dimension in socio-
person participating in sociocultural practices cultural psychology by proposing a conceptual
through which s/he develops auto-biographical framework of what we term “personal history”
memory, goals, motives, engagements, commit- and “historical selfhood,” respectively. With
ments, likes/dislikes, dreams, fears, and fantasies these concepts, we specifically target the pre-
is also a dimension of personal history cur- reflective and embodied level of personal exis-
rently being theorized (Hedegaard, 2011; see also tence, and therefore these terms should not
Chapters 10, 14, and 30, this volume). How- be seen as replacing existing frameworks, but
ever, where these approaches provide rich and as supplementing the semiotic, narrative, and
indispensable analysis and conceptual tools for activity-based understandings already theorized
understanding personal development as it unfolds in contemporary sociocultural theory. Whereas
and the way in which it is embedded in socio- the term personal history specifies the broader
cultural practices, they almost entirely fail to ontogenetic and existential process through
address our embodied and pre-reflective expe- which somebody continuously becomes the per-
riences. The preverbal, pre-reflective embodied son s/he is, the term historical selfhood specifi-
landscape of experience is a blind spot in the cally refers to a person’s embodied, present style
sociocultural tradition, from its founding to the of being as a result of this.
present day. This absence is unwarranted, and we
suggest that the pre-reflective dimension should
29.1 A Turn to Phenomenology
be considered a field open to further theoriz-
ing, rather than a denied ontology. The princi- In order to theorize this pre-reflective dimen-
pal reason is that this level of embodied and sion, we propose a synthesis of sociocultural
pre-reflective experience is deeply saturated by psychology and the phenomenological tradition,
sociocultural influences, and thus rightly belongs based on both classical (e.g., Husserl, Heideg-
to the domain of a sociocultural psychology ger, Merleau-Ponty) and contemporary (e.g.,
proper. Waldenfels, Zahavi, Fuchs) sources. The reasons
In order to separate the pre-reflective and for turning to phenomenology are many – we
the more reflective dimensions of the personal, believe that sociocultural psychology has much
we employ a distinction sometimes made in to gain from a dialogue with phenomenology,
phenomenology between the “Self” and the since both traditions share a range of fundamental
“Person.” Whereas the self designates the pre- assumptions, such as prioritizing practice, study-
reflective, embodied, and personal being-ining existence as an ongoing unfolding of life, and
the-world, the person refers to the “autobio- understanding existence as essentially always
graphical actualization of the self”; the per- being-with-others in sociocultural, historical
son is a self “whose identity has achieved practices, and so on. Furthermore, the phe-
expression” (Nathanson, 1970, p. 17). There- nomenological tradition is, if not the only, then
fore, we reserve the term selfhood for the pre- the most obvious source of theorizing the pre-
reflective and embodied dimension of personal reflective personal dimension, since it is rooted
existence. Irrespective of the paramount impor- in the first-person perspective. There is a con-
tance of language and language acquisition in sistent fit between the usual unit of analysis for
540 a llan kø ste r and d i tte al e xand ra w i nth e r -lind qvist
sociocultural theorizing “person-in-context” rary debate where positions vary greatly, defin-
(from a third-person perspective) and the phe- ing selfhood as narrative, dialogical, postmod-
nomenological unit of analysis theorizing “being- ern, enactive, minimal, embodied, and so on
in-the-world” (from a first-person perspective). (Gallagher, 2011). Within this broad palate, the
Our suggested shift in perspectives is indicated pre-reflective historical selfhood we are address-
by the term “personal history” as it evokes two ing is an extended concept of embodied selfhood.
conceptual horizons: that of the personal and the In order to make this clear, a few initial distinc-
historical. First, we use the term “personal” in tions need to be made. By a “pre-reflective self”
contrast to the concept of a “person.” Whereas we intend a dimension of selfhood that is pre-
person usually is taken to refer to the abstract predicative or prelinguistic, in the sense that it is
and reflective individual member of cultural and always already in place when we start to articu-
moral communities (Martin & Bickhard, 2013), late experiences. Though richly examined in phe-
the personal specifies an experiential dimension, nomenology, this embodied dimension of self-
articulated within existential phenomenology as hood has so far not attracted much attention from
my particular perspective as an individual situ- a sociocultural psychological perspective. As we
ated in these cultural communities and practices have argued, we consider this a blind spot, since
(Waldenfels, 2000, p. 248). As we will make the influence of sociocultural processes does not
clear throughout our contribution, addressing the stop and start with language, but also seeps into
personal in this way is impossible outside of, and saturates the pre-reflective, embodied level of
or when devoid of, participation in historical, selfhood.
societal, cultural institutional, and material set- Within the phenomenological tradition, pre-
tings. However, participating in shared practices reflective selfhood is sometimes characterized
is also always already ontogenetically specific. as an experiential self (Zahavi, 2014). This is
No one grows up in a generic family. I grew up not done to reduce experience as such to this
in my specific family, with my parents with their pre-reflective level, but to accentuate the phe-
idiosyncrasies, strengths, shortfalls, warmth, and nomenological fact that consciousness struc-
whims. I may live in a standard house, but it turally implies an experiential dimension in the
is my home with its particular things, smells, sense that experiences are always presented with
and atmospheres in my neighborhood, and so a sense of “mine-ness” or “for-me-ness” (Zahavi
forth. Second, with the term history we broadly & Kriegel, 2015). For instance, there is no
refer to the idea of historicity as it is used in such thing as an experience of pain that is not
the phenomenological-hermeneutical tradition of somebody’s pain. Experiences always have their
Heidegger and Gadamer. In contrast to a general datives, and even our most primitive conscious
tendency to equate history and narrative, the experiences present themselves characteristically
concept of history used in this tradition is con- as belonging to me. There is something it is like
sidered to be much broader, a matter of facticity, to undergo conscious experience, and hence self-
or of how “the past is present in the present” awareness is integral to the very intentionality of
(Schatzki, 2003). consciousness itself (Zahavi, 1999, 2014). Inso-
far as there is awareness of something, there is
simultaneously self-awareness. Having an expe-
29.2 Historical Selfhood as
rience implies that there is a self that has that
Embodied
experience.
Conceptions and models of the self are diverse, It is only through the body’s affective capaci-
and there is little consensus in the contempo- ties that something like an experiential dimension
of mine-ness may arise in the first place. There- without myself. There is no primacy of awareness
fore, the body is the basis of pre-reflective self- of oneself over awareness of an outside world.
hood. In turn, this makes pre-reflective experi- (Straus, 1958, p. 148)
ence profoundly open to sociocultural shaping. In
order to see this, we need to promote two rather From a phenomenological point of view, there is
complicated points. First, it is of paramount therefore no such thing as a closed-off self that
importance to not construe pre-reflective, embod- can engage in pure introspection and worldless
ied selfhood as a self-contained, worldless, self-exploration; self-awareness is something that
Cartesian interiority. Rather, pre-reflective self- accompanies my fundamental relationship to the
awareness is based on what is sometimes world.2 Second, whereas the notion of hetero-
referred to as “hetero-affection” (Waldenfels, affection motivates the basic reason that pre-
2000; Zahavi, 1999). This means that though the reflective, embodied selfhood is radically open
structure of embodied experience is inherently to enculturation, this point becomes more sub-
self-affective, it is equally dependent on being stantial when we consider the nature of embodi-
affected by an otherness. In effect, self-awareness ment. Within the phenomenological terminology,
only emerges when affected and initiated by a distinction is traditionally drawn between the
something external to the self. This notion is German words “Leib” and “Körper.” Whereas
lucidly captured by Merleau-Ponty when he Körper refers to the “body as object,” or how
says, the body is represented within the causal frame-
work of the natural sciences (a thing among
Consciousness only begins to exist by determining
other things), Leib denotes the body as the
an object, and the phantoms of an “internal
pre-reflective subject, or simply embodied sub-
experience” are only themselves possible by
borrowing from external experience. Thus, jectivity, which is usually the topic of phe-
consciousness has no private life. (Merleau-Ponty, nomenological investigations. It is important to
2012, p. 30) emphasize that understood as Leib, I am my body
in a deeply personal way, as it is my perspective
This is not to indicate that all pre-reflective self- and point of contact with the world. This fact is
awareness is object intentionality, but rather that often overshadowed by a tendency in language to
there is a reciprocity between the auto-affective present the body as a vehicle for the person, as
capacities of embodiment and hetero-affection. though we are merely embodied or incorporated,
In this way, the embodied self only appears to and not body all the way through (Waldenfels,
itself when it relates to something else (Zahavi, 2006). This emphasis on the body should not be
1999, p. 123). One might therefore say that the seen as a favoring of nature over culture; rather,
phenomenon of a pre-reflective self is possible embodiment is inherently sociocultural. In the
only when based on an initial self-differentiation philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, this is expressed
in which the pre-reflective self is dependent on, through a focus on the far-reaching plasticity of
and penetrated by, an alterity from which to set the human body. From what one might call our
itself apart (Waldenfels, 2000, p. 283). This anal- pre-intentional openness to the world, the struc-
ysis is also proposed by Erwin Straus when he ture of our embodied experience is characterized
states, through establishing generality in our lives by
In sensory experience I always experience myself prolonging personal acts into stable dispositions,
and the world at the same time, not myself directly rather than being imposed on by our instincts
and the Other by inference, not myself before the (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 147). Merleau-Ponty
Other, not myself without the Other, nor the Other famously analyzed this with examples of how we
habitually dilate our being-in-the-world by adapt- time: (1) habituation, (2) incorporation, (3)
ing our body-schemes and incorporating instru- inter-corporeity, (4) hermeneutic repertoire, and
ments (p. 145), such as when a blind man inte- (5) affective repertoire. Our use of the Heidegge-
grates his cane into his basic body scheme, or rian term, “existentials,” emphasizes that we are
an organist gradually adapting to a new organ addressing the very structure of our being, and
(p. 144). These are mere examples of the more that although we are able to distinguish them ana-
general tendency of embodiment to move beyond lytically, they are inseparable moments of expe-
the body’s skin by continuously dilating into rience. In describing five embodied existentials,
its sociocultural and material setting.3 In this we wish to demonstrate that these do not express
way, the basic pre-reflective sense of self vitally any transitive hierarchical order of organization
depends on the sociocultural context into which or priority (neither in importance to a socio-
one is born, and will always remain embedded in. cultural psychology of the personal, nor with
Our instincts or current constitution seldom take regard to their origin in ontogenesis); instead,
any other form of manifestation than those of cul- they are what Heidegger called “equi-primordial”
tivated and habituated dispositions. Emphasizing (gleichursprünglich) (Heidegger, 2001). In order
this point, and drawing on Husserlian terminol- to unpack the particular characteristics of each
ogy, Waldenfels (2000) has recently described the existential, we provide an example of a five-year-
body as the “point of transfer” (Umschlagstelle) old boy and his teddy, a case taken from everyday
between nature and culture, in the sense that the life, rather than from a formal empirical investi-
body is never unambiguously determined by one gation. Each existential is illustrated with refer-
or the other. ence to this case, but when other examples illus-
The above-described level of pre-reflective trate the particular dimension even more clearly,
embodied selfhood, constituted by hetero- we supplement with those, the purpose being
affection and dilated into the sociocultural and solely illustrative of theoretical points that we
material world is exposed to an extensive pro- take to be general. However, using the same case
cess of historical becoming, which we suggest throughout emphasizes the everydayness of what
terming historical selfhood. Historical selfhood we are aiming for, namely, that in every encounter
is the result of both sociocultural practices and and situation, the personal, embodied past plays a
a deeply personal life trajectory. Hence, in an role in the present unfolding of experience. This
individual, embodied history, sociogenesis and past, even when it is the short one of a young
ontogenesis meet. The body becomes a living child, is expressed in the present as a particular
display on which the history of both societal style of being-toward-the-world. Keeping in mind
structures and individual experiences are con- that there is no hierarchical order among them,
tinuously inscribed, preserved, and enacted to we present each existential in turn.
constitute a particular personal style of being
(Køster, 2017).
29.4 Case Example
Peter, a five-year-old on his way home through
29.3 Existentials of Embodied
the streets of Copenhagen cries out that he has
History
forgotten his teddy at day-care. Knowing the
Drawing on Fuchs (2012) and Køster (2017) importance of the teddy, his father and older sis-
in particular and the phenomenological tra- ter turn their bicycles around to fetch the teddy.
dition in general, we suggest five analytical Upon the retrieval of the teddy at day-care, Peter
existentials that preserve personal history over fastens it to the rear rack of his bicycle, and they
resume their journey home. Peter brings his teddy personal habitat. One might say that the teddy
everywhere, carrying it around in his hands. He has become integral to his sense of self. The
takes great care to never forget or misplace it, teddy may be seen as part of a particular way
particularly when moving between his two homes in which Peter builds a home for himself, one
and day-care. As is often the custom in Denmark, that he is able to bring with him across physi-
divorced parents divide the care of their children cal locations. This mobility of habitat is impor-
between them on alternating weeks, which means tant, owing to the particular circumstances of his
that Peter spends seven days at a time at each par- having lost his first home, and now inhabits two
ent’s house. As a baby, he used to a have a security homes. Separation from his teddy implies a tem-
blanket (a soft cloth with a teddy’s head), which porary loss of habitat, and to some degree, of
he found soothing and comforting. This object self. Habituation is a continuous process, wherein
was his constant companion until his interest in habits and habitats are established, sustained, and
it finally ceased (owing to an increasing demand reconfigured.
from his surroundings to break this habit). His
current habit of always having his teddy nearby
developed after his parent’s divorce, which cre- 29.4.2 Inter-corporeity
ated a rupture in his life.
From the perspective of inter-corporeity, first
introduced by Merleau-Ponty (1964), my embod-
29.4.1 Habituation ied existence is inherently social, in the sense
that my own body is never isolated from others.
By habituation we point to the fundamental pro-
Rather, as an embodied being, I am deeply inter-
cess through which we move from our pre-
twined with others – what I feel, perceive, and do
intentional openness to the world to inhabiting
is interwoven with what others feel, perceive, and
the material world in a personal way. This pro-
do. In this way, embodiment is not only dilated
cess involves adaptation and dilation of our basic
into physical spaces and objects through habitua-
body schemes when we interact with our sur-
tion, but also into intimate others who we in a cer-
roundings – spaces, objects, artifacts, and so
tain way inhabit and are inhabited by.4 Integrating
on. Though each case is ontogenetically specific,
the idea of inter-corporeity with embodied mem-
from the outset this process is socioculturally
ory, and drawing on Daniel Stern, T. Fuchs spec-
shaped, since our environment is culturally and
ifies inter-corporeity in the following way:
historically pre-structured. Although this pro-
cess starts with the establishment of basic phys-
ical habits through repetitive practices, habitua- From birth on, the infant’s procedural memory
tion immediately and unnoticeably merges into a incorporates an extract of repeated, prototypical
experiences with significant others, thus acquiring
sense of having a habitat – I start to inhabit my
dyadic patterns of interaction, or schemes of
world, with its familiar smells, shapes, forms, and
being-with, for example, Mamma-feeding-me,
functions. In a sense, it may be said that I am
daddy-playing-with-me, etc. This results in what
the places that I have inhabited; that my sense of Stern has called implicit relational knowing – a
self vitally depends on its distribution into place. bodily knowing of how to interact with others, how
As Jacobsen (2015), suggests: “We have a sense to have fun together, how to elicit attention, how to
of self, because we build a home for ourselves” avoid rejection, etc. it is a temporally organized,
(p. 32). musical memory for the rhythm, dynamics, and
In Peter’s case, his habit of carrying about undertones inaudibly present in interactions with
his teddy has become a constitutive part of his others. (Fuchs, 2012, pp. 14–15)
In Peter’s case, the teddy may be understood as a baby uses a security blanket and a big boy does
placeholder for the physical experience of being not always carry a teddy about). However, both
cared for by his parents. Whereas in one sense when complying with and transgressing these
the teddy has been a symbolic manifestation for general norms, they become personally incorpo-
the inter-corporeity of caring others since he was rated. Because he carries his teddy almost all the
a baby, it now fills the particular role of stabil- time, Peter’s hands are largely occupied, which
ity. With the erosion of the original configuration constrains his zone of free movement (ZFM) and
of the inter-corporeity of the family, Peter must participation in zones of promoted action (ZPA)
now become used to new modalities of inter- (Valsiner, 1997). Sometimes, insisting on carry-
corporeity that imply the absence of one parent ing the teddy is a convenient excuse allowing
when he is with the other. In this configuration, him to refrain from participation in ZPA/ZFM; at
we suspect that the teddy comes to serve as a other times, it is just an impractical, inhibiting,
form of inter-corporeal substitute for the absent and unwarranted constraint on his participation.
parent. Therefore, if he loses his teddy, Peter The incorporation of the teddy as a personalized
loses an aspect of his persistent sense of self, cultural artifact shapes Peter’s particular mode of
insofar as the teddy connects him to the absent being-toward-the-world.
parent.
29.4.4 Hermeneutic Repertoire

29.4.3 Incorporation
By hermeneutic repertoire we refer to a his-
The term incorporation comes from Fuchs’s work torical shaping of the very structure of per-
(2012), to make the embodied aspect of encul- sonal intentionality (Køster, 2017). Within a phe-
turation explicit. Incorporation designates the nomenological context, the concept of inten-
basic way in which we in-corporate sociocul- tionality broadly refers to what could be called
tural norms, expectations, resources, and atti- “pre-predicative sense formation” (Tengelyi,
tudes into bodily habits. Incorporation may be 2004) and not as having a motive or the voli-
broadly understood as the civilization of our bod- tion to act.6 More specifically, it refers to the
ies: how we incorporate gender, how we handle processes of sensemaking through which some-
artifacts such as the appropriate use of cutlery thing reveals itself as something, that is, a certain
(fork goes in the left hand), and so forth.5 How- mode of specificity and differentiation: this cylin-
ever, incorporation is also ontogenetically spe- drical object as a candle, this facial expression
cific, since my personal life has its own path of as sadness, and so on. This is not to be under-
enculturation: for instance, how my commitment stood as if we first perceive the cylindrical object
to particular activities is preserved in embodi- and then recognizing it is a candle, or seeing the
ment (e.g., the ballet dancer as opposed to the pure facial expression and then interpreting it as
typical academic’s bodily posture) or how the sad, but rather, the phenomena presents them-
mimicry of parents is taken up in the physiog- selves directly to perception as what one might
nomy of the children. call “gestalt units,” where sense and reality can-
When Peter is sad or unsettled, and is offered not be set against each other. Through the vari-
a security blanket or a teddy bear, this is a culti- ous experiences of my personal history, the struc-
vated, caring parental response, mediated by this ture of my intentionality is gradually shaped and
particular artifact’s canonical affordance. In this reshaped to constitute my particular hermeneu-
case, the incorporation reflects a response to typ- tical repertoire. This denotes a particular expe-
ical, appropriate, gender, and age norms (only a riential horizon with anticipatory features that
determine how things appear to me, as a gen-

29.4.5 Affective Register
eralized and embodied tendency to perceive in
a certain way. This personal structure of inten- Finally, we suggest an affective register as an
tionality is fundamentally the result of my socio- integral part of pre-reflective personal existence
cultural embeddedness, practices, and semiotic (Køster, 2017). Drawing on Heidegger’s work,
sensemaking (Valsiner, 1998). However, there is we would like to emphasize that personal exis-
also a distinct personal aspect to the hermeneu- tence is always affectively attuned. In his existen-
tic repertoire, vitally shaped by my personal his- tial analytics, Heidegger specifies this fundamen-
tory. Drawing on Leontiev’s concept of “personal tal dimension of human existence through the
sense,” Mammen identifies this as the historical concepts “Befindlichkeit” and “Stimmung” (Hei-
depth of our relations with particular objects and degger, 2001). Whereas Befindlichkeit – a neol-
others (Mammen, 2002). ogism derived from the German reflexive verb,
The above-described, dual double relation is “sich befinden” (which both refer to “where” I
evident in Peter’s use of his teddy bear. Ted- am physically located and to the affective dimen-
dies are part of the toy industry, and a teddy is sion of “the way I find myself to be”) – refers
a human artifact with an impersonal or canon- to the phenomenological fact that my existence
ical affordance of collective, objective meaning announces itself to me through affects, and there-
(Costall et al., 2013). Many children use ted- fore is an inescapable dimension of personal exis-
dies for comfort, but not all five-year-old boys tence, Stimmung refers to the particular mood
relate to their teddy in the way that Peter does. in which I find myself. When we take up this
The way Peter uses his teddy, handles it, and idea through the notion of an affective regis-
keeps it with him wherever he goes, relates to ter, we aim to retain the musical metaphor of
his particular history with this object, and to his resonance present in the concept of attunement
current situation. Peter perceives his particular (Stimmung). Therefore, an affective register is
teddy as comforting, which also implies home- to be understood as referring to the particu-
liness and a dilation of parental caring practices lar modes of embodied attunement and moods
(inter-corporeity). That the teddy appears as com- through which a person resonates or reverberates
forting to Peter is not determined by its canoni- with the world affectively. Again, the existential
cal affordances alone, but relies on the fact that of an affective register is not to be conceived of
Peter, throughout his personal history, has been in isolation from sociocultural influences, such
offered a teddy by his parents when in need of as child-rearing practices and norms of conduct
consolation. Thus, the teddy activates intentional (Röttger-Rössler et al., 2013). Instead, moods
threads that point back to his first encounters with and affects are socialized in culturally specific
the security blanket (also resembling a teddy). We ways where certain affects are connected to cer-
speculate that Peter saw his security blanket as tain enacted virtues, values, events, and customs.
comforting and soothing, long before he could Coming to know the normative practice of moods
articulate it verbally, and that his prelinguistic is a requirement for skillful cultural participa-
experience of his teddy as comforting is a way tion and social acceptance, which in turn requires
the past persists in the present. Based on this, one comprehensive training and normative correc-
might suggest that the reason that Peter has had tion (Baerveldt, Verheggen, & Valsiner, 2012;
a renewed interest in his teddies in his new life Holodynski, Friedlmeier, & Valsiner, 2012).
circumstances (living in two homes) is a height- The shaping of expressing moods is partic-
ened need for his pre-reflective repertoire of self- ularly visible in public (religious) rituals and
consolation. at social gatherings (a funeral, at a cemetery, a
wedding, a birthday party). Showing up in a grim pating in various activities. Owing to Peter’s per-
mood at a wedding is unsuitable and expressing sonal history, a particular tenor of Unheimlichkeit
energetic joy and light-heartedness at a funeral has become part of his affective register.
is inappropriate (only toddlers are forgiven). The
affective register, which one develop throughout
29.5 Sedimentation of
ontogenesis, is highly dependent on the reper-
Pre-reflective Experiential
toire of emotions promoted and sanctioned by my
Structures
important others, in the communities of practice
and sociocultural settings of my everyday life. Starting from the above-mentioned considera-
Nonetheless, there is also a fundamental personal tions, we now face the question of how our
dimension to my affective register, resulting from embodied personal history comes into existence
my particular experiences and personal history. over time. As already stated, we are concerned
Inseparable from the development of the other with the part of our personal being that pre-
four embodied existentials, this register of affects cedes narrative order, which imposes the need
and moods is gradually shaped and forms how for a supplementing metaphor to account for
I tend to find myself affectively in particular processes of becoming and the preservation of
situations. our pre-reflexive, embodied personal history. We
Peter’s habit of using his teddy and finding it would like to propose metaphors taken from
as comforting has made it part of his habitat, geology to account for the structuring of per-
and thereby elicits an affective state of feeling at sonal becoming as a process of sedimentation
ease and at home. Playing on Heidegger’s char- (Køster, 2017). Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have
acterization of anxiety as a state of “Unheim- already made extensive use of metaphors such as
lichkeit” (referring to both a state of “anxiety” ground, underground, and sedimentation in their
and “not feeling at home” in German), one may attempts to describe the structures of our life-
speculate that when his teddy is missing, Peter world and embodied subjectivity (e.g., Husserl,
finds himself anxiously attuned. It is important 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Our use of geologi-
for Peter to retrieve his teddy, and until he has cal metaphors should be seen as a heuristic device
it with him again, he feels unsettled. However, it that provides a way of accessing embodied self-
seems reasonable to assume, that there is a gen- hood as historical, although we are fully aware
erality to this mood of Unheimlichkeit and anx- that no metaphor can ever exhaust or adequately
iousness as part of Peter’s personal existence at illustrate the richness of this phenomenon.
present. In the transition of adjustments into new The geological metaphor of sedimentation
inter-corporeal practices in his new homes, Peter provides imagery for how stable, synchronic
finds himself more often unsettled, and Unheim- structures gradually emerge throughout a funda-
lichkeit becomes a general way he resonates with mentally contingent and diachronic process. It
the world during this transition. This is expressed suggests how the structure of personal experi-
particularly clearly in the way he approaches and ence may be seen as having both depth and sur-
responds to others (especially strangers), and how face: a patent surface of susceptible and fluctu-
he relates to new situations in his environment. ating manifestations resting on more latent depth
It governs his attunement as somehow reluctant, structures less susceptible to change. Here, it is
hesitant, and vigilant, which is also expressed in important to be aware that processes of sedi-
his incorporation of his teddy (always having it in mentation take many shapes, from solid, layered
his hand), enhancing a restricted way of partici- rock formation to the fluctuation of a seabed
landscape. Although the connotation of a certain the altered structure of sedimentation. A given
kind of inertia is certainly intended when using sedimented structure is not dictated by a previ-
geological metaphors, our aim is not to allude to ous sedimented layer, but nonetheless its particu-
the very static imagery of unilateral and gradual lar shape is inconceivable without it. This, in turn,
build-up. Instead, by employing the metaphor of accounts not only for vital aspects of what we
sedimentation, we wish to emphasize that we are call the depth structure of experience, but also for
not invented anew or “starting over” whenever we the very individuality of our personal structure of
find ourselves involved in new activities, places, experience. In this way, the process of sedimenta-
practices, or relationships. Our embodied subjection reflects life as lived in its particularity, and its
tivity is historical and socioculturally shaped in formation is only gradual and steady to the extent
ways that prevent such flux. We literally embody that the person’s experienced lifeworld is steady
our past experiences in ways that are constitutive and stable.
of how we encounter and respond to our immedi- In Peter’s case, there has been a discontinu-
ate surroundings, the present situation as well as ous yet consistent sedimentation (in all the exis-
our immediate future. tentials) of his relationship to his teddy through-
Not all experiences have the adequate gravi- out his life, but he will presumably not remain
tas to actually deposit and sediment into personal as integrated with his teddy as he is at present.
experiential structures. Processes of sedimenta- As with the security blanket, he will soon be met
tion are results of responses to external forces with increasing demands to break his habits. This
of adequate gravitas: some are engraved through we find plausible, as the normative pressure of
the gravitas of repetition (e.g., when I incorpo- his surroundings will pull him toward soothing
rate a piano keyboard through daily practice, or practices that are more in line with the standards
incorporate the shape of my spouse in sleeping of his sociocultural context (a school boy should
positions), whereas others are imprinted through not always carry a teddy around with him). How-
their significant impact (e.g., a traumatic experi- ever, since Peter’s way of relating to his teddy
ence). This dual emphasis on both repetitive and has nevertheless sedimented with some gravitas,
significant impact is supported by recent research he will probably protest these demands on him
into risk and resilience, which warns against priv- to give it up, and the way in which this process
ileging the impact of single (traumatic) events, of change play out will further sediment into his
and reminds us to emphasize the significance of personal history. His parent’s divorce caused a
repetitive exposure to routine patterns of inter- rupture with a profound impact on his personal
action of various practices, places, relationships, existence (involving changes in all existentials,
and activities (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006; most profoundly in his habitat, and patterns of
Schoon, 2006). Those experiences that have sed- inter-corporeity with his parents), which proba-
imented tend to stay with me. Again, this is not bly explains the patience of people around him
a claim that a sedimented structure is static, but with respect to his use of the teddy. The point is
that in changing, new sedimented layers inte- that the old sedimented layers persist in the new
grate with older ones, in much the same way ones, and although he may come to see his teddy
that Hegel saw experience as characterized by as contested and conflictual, these new affects
“definite negation” (bestimmte Negation) (Hegel, and understandings of the teddy are only com-
1970). Old or past sedimented layers do not dissi- prehensible against the background of the pre-
pate into abstract nothingness and disappear, but ceding historical threads that join Peter to his
become part of the designation (Bestimmung) of teddy.
29.5.1 Sedimented Experiential foundation of consciousness” (p. 131). Instead,

Dispositions sedimentation manifests the way the past is
present in the present. The way in which experi-
As we have tried to illustrate, existential struc-
ences are preserved by sedimentation (also when
tures continuously undergo sedimentation of
deeply inscribed) emerges as an embodied readi-
varying gravitas and in various tempi. This his-
ness for participation and particular response to
torical process leads to a relatively stable arrange-
my immediate lifeworld. My personal history
ment of dispositions, or what Aristotle called a
announces itself in and through my embedded,
Hexis (Aristotle, 2014). The ambiguous ontolog-
intertwined relations with my sociocultural envi-
ical status of such an existential notion of dis-
ronment. My readiness and particular openness to
position, as fundamentally historical, singular,
the world are ways in which my history is present
and contingent, is described clearly by Merleau-
in the present.
Ponty:
But in fact, here again, we must recognize a sort of 29.6 Agency as Responsiveness
sedimentation of our life: When an attitude toward
The question we face is where this emphasis on
the world has been confirmed often enough, it
becomes privileged for us. If freedom does not the sedimentation of my personal history leaves
tolerate being confronted by any motive, then my the concept of agency. What kind of conceptu-
habitual being in the world is equally fragile at alization of agency is consistent with a strong
each moment, and the complexes I have for years focus on the way in which the past is present in
nourished through complacency remain equally the present? Inspired by contemporary German
innocuous, for freedom’s gesture can effortlessly phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels, we sug-
shatter them at any moment. And yet, after gest that the notion of agency needs to be under-
having built my life upon an inferiority complex, stood from an ontology of responsiveness. In ref-
continuously reinforced for twenty years, it is not erencing Waldenfels, we do not aspire to give
likely that I would change . . . It’s “unlikely” that I
a comprehensive account of his very complex
would in this moment destroy an inferiority
philosophy, but to use elements of his respon-
complex in which I have been complacent now for
sive phenomenology to elaborate on our current
twenty years. This means that I am committed to
inferiority, that I have decided to dwell within it, question.
that this past, if not a destiny, has at least a specific
weight, and that it is not a sum of events over there, 29.6.1 Humans as Responsive
far away from me, but rather the atmosphere of my
Beings
present. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 465–466)
According to Waldenfels, any adequate under-
What Merleau-Ponty spells out in this passage standing of the human condition needs to begin
is that sedimented dispositions are characterized with the fact that, although I am always already
by a principal contingency, which is always sus- involved in the unfolding of my life, it is nei-
ceptible to being shattered. Yet it persists and ther as a privileged author nor as a self-initiating
retains its gravity on my reality by having become agent proper (Waldenfels, 2006, p. 73). Rather, I
privileged to me, and therefore it is not likely find myself responding to events that affect me,
to change. Furthermore, as Merleau-Ponty spec- and that I did not initiate. As human beings, we
ifies in both this passage and elsewhere, sedi- always start from elsewhere; we are essentially
mentation should not be thought of as a “sum responsive, and thus historical, beings. Reading
of past events,” or as “an inert mass at the from the perspective of sociocultural psychology,
this strong emphasis on responsiveness may with which we may be more familiar (Walden-
appear unsettling, since it may evoke associations fels, 2008, p. 130). The term “pathic” refers to
of an undesired return to the mechanical-causal the event that something affects me, strikes me,
framework of behaviorism. However, Walden- or demands something of me, and to which I need
fels’s phenomenology of responsiveness is in no to respond. I am never self-initiating in the truest
way to be understood along these lines. The sense of the word, but as an embodied and situ-
best way to draw out this distinction may be to ated individual, I am literally initiated by being
point out that Waldenfels’s preferred term for affectively requested by a demand by my mate-
response in German is “Antwort,” literally mean- rial and sociocultural worlds (Waldenfels, 2006,
ing “answer” (Waldenfels, 1994). In turn, this p. 45). These considerations lead Waldenfels to
should not be interpreted as turn-taking of giv- suggest a general logic of response according to
ing answers and replies in a concrete dialogue. which we start from the pathic, and from there
Rather, what Waldenfels is pointing to is what respond to the demands with which we are con-
he calls responsiveness in a “widened sense,” fronted. Though it may be tempting to interpret
as an ontological structure of human existence this in causal terms, it is important to empha-
(Waldenfels, 1994, p. 193). In order to illustrate size that this is not the intent. Rather, between
what is meant by this, Waldenfels often refers the antecedence of the pathos and the deferment
to double binds (recognized as semiotic traps in of the response, there is a characteristic time-lag
cultural psychology), such as when somebody (Zeitverschiebung), which Waldenfels refers to as
says: don’t listen to me! Before actually being “diastasis” – an originary splitting apart. How-
able to attend to the propositional content of the ever, this is only an analytical distinction between
sentence and “not listen,” we are already being being struck by the impact of the demand, and
demanded to listen, and hence to give a response, responding, which must not be misinterpreted as
which may be to refuse to listen. Paraphras- a causal or even diachronic sequence. Pathos and
ing Watzlawic’s famous axiom of communica- response do not appear as two events, but as “one
tion, Waldenfels sums up this fundamental con- and the same experience shifted in relation to
dition in the ontological imperative: “I cannot, itself” (p. 50). Hence, it makes sense to speak
not respond” (Waldenfels, 2006). I may choose of a pathos-response event, as one and the same
to respond in this or that way, but the demand experience, but in which each instance cannot be
to respond is absolute. Hence, responding is not reduced to the other, and where the response is
something I choose, but I am a homo respondent open, not predictable from the demand.7
(Waldenfels, 2015). Within the context of sociocultural psychol-
The claim that human existence is a respon- ogy, this analysis should resonate with an ecolog-
sive existence is rooted in a phenomenological ical perspective, which Waldenfels also explic-
analysis of what one might cautiously call the itly discusses with, in reference to the gestalt
primacy of the pathic dimension. According to psychologist Kurt Lewin, among others (Walden-
Waldenfels, experience is characterized by the fels, 2000, p. 373). In ecological psychology the
priority of passivity, of that which affects me, focus on humans as responsive beings is also
stings me, or even violates me, and the deferred implied insofar as it is emphasized that human
(Nachträglich) character of that with which we existence always involves exposure to what we
respond (Waldenfels, 2002a, p. 10). In his use are in the midst of, materially, socially, cultur-
of the term “pathic,” Waldenfels draws on the ally (Bang, 2008). We are affected by our situ-
original Greek meaning of the word, which in ated place in the world, and called on to respond,
Latin was translated to “affectus” or “emotion,” both through our interactions with our natural
environment, as presented in Gibson’s (2014) something to which we attribute certain definite

relational concept of affordances, and through characteristics, roles, and rights, and therefore
our interaction with artifacts and their canonical exceeds the level of the articulated (Waldenfels,
affordances (Costall et al., 2013). Our response 2002b). This should not be misconstrued to sug-
is ontogenetically specific, as in the famous gest that my historical, pathic existence is readily
example of a child approaching a lighted can- accessible to me in full self-transparency. To the
dle differently after having been burned (Heft, contrary, Waldenfels emphasizes that the embod-
1989). Hence, the concept of affordance affirms ied self is split-self (gespaltenes Selbst) that is
an understanding of human beings as primarily defined by varying degrees of familiarity and ali-
pathic and always responsive. enness (Fremdheit) to itself, and involves several
levels of self-distancing (Waldenfels, 2004).8 In
this way, personal history may have sedimented
29.6.2 Responsiveness and to form a historical self, but that does not imply
Personal History that the intricacies of my sedimented structures
How does this relate to the phenomenon of per- are directly accessible to me. Instead, I may expe-
sonal history and the concept of agency? In a rience myself through increasing degrees of ali-
sense, what Waldenfels refers to as the pathic enness (Waldenfels, 1997, p. 35), of being and
dimension of human existence can be understood doing something that I do not quite understand,
along the lines of what we call personal history. but that is nevertheless part of my experiential
As Waldenfels often states, we are “born out of reality, both pathic and responsive. These expe-
pathos” (Waldenfels, 2006, p. 82), and: riences may range from purely neurologically
based physical twitches, to excessive nail biting,
Everything that happens to us, right up to the limit sudden surprising outbursts, or existential experi-
events of birth and death which are repeated in our
ences of being increasingly anxious without quite
life in different ways, may be called pathos, which
knowing why. Through all this, the pathic dimen-
is to be understood as what in German is called
sion remains the very place from which I start
Widerfahrnis. (Waldenfels, 2007a, p. 45)
to achieve an understanding, to narrate, to judge,
The pathic dimension encompasses the entire to reject, or to affirm (Waldenfels, 2002a). I find
unfolding event of what happens to us from birth myself in a certain way, and needing to respond.
until death. The German term “Widerfahrnis” has In this sense, personal history is the time-place
connotations of friction and impact (wider) on from which we respond, and though my way of
something that is beyond the agent’s control, and responding is not predetermined, it also does not
the concept of experience itself (experience is merely grow out of the present, but is vitally
Erfahrung). Based on this, the pathic dimension determined by my personal past. As Waldenfels
may be seen as closely related to the structuring states, “The presence is not nothing – as a good
of experience through personal history, insofar many postmodern total dissipaters believe – but
as the pathic – the dimension of being struck by it is not satisfied with itself. Responding takes
something – bears a resemblance to what we have place here and now, but it begins from else-
addressed as sedimentation through the impact of where” (Waldenfels, 2007b, p. 31).9 This all-
varied experiential gravitas. Furthermore, in this pervasive historicity of personal being is perhaps
passage, Waldenfels alludes to what he calls the most profoundly experienced in the phenomenon
pre-, post- and depth-history of the self (Walden- Freud originally termed “Nachträglichkeit,” or
fels, 2006, p. 54); that the self has a history, “afterwardsness” (Freud, 2001). Whereas in the
and that, from the beginning, it is more than phenomenology of Waldenfels Nachträglichkeit
connotes a general characteristic of respon- ductive mode of response, where responses fol-
siveness, one quite different from a Freudian low established, culturally patterned “answer-
understanding, Waldenfels’s phenomenology still models,” and a more productive, innovative, or
allows for pathological qualities, as in the case creative mode of response (Waldenfels, 2006, p.
of trauma, where the traumatizing event is only 67), where the response does not follow any par-
recognizable by its deferred effects. Embodied ticular normative rhythm or rule, but breaks the
experiences of Nachträglichkeit reveal to us our established order. In any case, our contention
personal being as historical, in the sense that is that responses do not emerge ex nihilo, but
a seemingly innocent present experience evokes grows out of a complex intra-action between
sedimented structures from past personal expe- my personal history, as a register of response,
riences, making it present in the present once and the specific demands of my particular
again. This is to be understood in embodied situations.
terms, as enrooted dispositions, and not as a To sum up, as responsive beings we are
return to a Freudian ontology of the unconscious. not endowed with spontaneous beginnings, but
Furthermore, this indicates the convoluted struc- always find ourselves initiated from elsewhere.
ture of time implied by embodied personal his- To be a responsive being is not to stand in a
tory as not being simply chronological (like a causal relation – as described by behavioristic
typical narrative structure), but rather messy and or cognitive psychology – but to be a being that
highly dependent on being evoked by present responds to the demands of the situation. In this
contexts and events. In Peter’s case, the renewed way, the perspective of responsiveness outlines
preoccupation with his teddy may be seen as a position beyond the traditional divide between
such an example of Nachträglichkeit, insofar as a purely passive notion of causal determinism,
past sedimented structures are evoked through and the (Kantian) phantoms of a spontaneous,
the stress of his current situation. self-initiating, intentional agent. Personal history
plays a vital role in this context as rooted in our
pathic dimension. This implies that our under-
29.6.3 Sedimented Response
standing of agency needs to be readdressed as a
Registers
matter of responsiveness. In closing, and with-
In order to more concretely integrate our out being able to expand on it, it may be worth
notion of personal history with the concept of remarking that this focus on responsiveness ties
responsiveness, we suggest the term sedimented us vitally to the ethical dimension. The German
response registers (Køster, 2017). Sedimented term “Antwort” converts into “Verantwortung,”
response registers refer to the specific mode and similarly, the English “response” slides into
of experience and style of response character- “responsibility.” As responsive beings, we are
istic of an individual as the result of the sedi- able to take responsibility for our responses. As
mented structures of personal history. It is “the both Francois Raffoul (2010) and Judith Butler
style through which an individual engages in and (2005) has recently argued, this perspective por-
resonates with the world and which, to vary- tends a change in focus in ethics, from an inter-
ing degrees, persists throughout shifting con- pretation of responsibility as the accountability of
texts, practices and relations” (Køster, 2017). an autonomous subject, to a much broader under-
As already discussed in the section on sed- standing of phenomenological responsiveness as
imentation, this is not intended as a strictly rooted in the experience of not only having to
static structure. Importantly, we need to distin- respond, but also having to respond in the right
guish between a primarily repetitive or repro- way.
29.7 Concluding Remarks Lastly, we would like to point out a pending

and promising line of inquiry for future research,
In this chapter we have addressed what we iden- namely, the transitional processes between pre-
tify as a blind spot in sociocultural psychol- reflective ways of experience and how these
ogy, noting that our pre-reflective and embodied dimensions connect with more semiotically
dimension of selfhood is equally socially, cul- mediated, reflected, and narrative dimensions.
turally, and materially saturated, and should be Understanding the intra-action between these
considered a central field of enquiry for socio- dimensions is largely unexplored at the present,
cultural psychology. We have argued that in the but achieving an understanding of this has great
endeavor to study this important field, a synthe- potential in both educational settings and in
sis between sociocultural psychology and phe- interventions in social work and psychotherapy.
nomenology is both obvious and pertinent. More Køster (2016) has recently commenced this work
specifically, we propose a conceptual framework by giving an account of how the pre-reflective,
for addressing a rich notion of historical self- embodied dimension relates to personal narra-
hood at the pre-reflective level, shaped through- tives, but much work is needed in developing
out personal history, as embodied, historical self- research strategies and methods that capture the
hood is the point of transfer, not only between pre-reflective dimension. Such work would be
nature and culture, but also between sociogene- exciting to further expand our understanding of
sis and ontogenesis. In order to account for this personal history, and modes of responding in
process, we suggest five embodied existentials by enacted encounters of micro-genesis.
which historical selfhood is continuously shaped,
and an accompanying principle of sedimentation
to account for the preservation of experiential Notes
structures. Finally, we have outlined the impli-
cations of this view with respect to the concept 1 For a discussion of Leontiev’s further development
of agency, insofar as it has to be rearticulated of Vygotsky’s meaning–sense distinction of the term
“personal sense,” see González Rey (2008).
within the framework of responsiveness. This we
2 Exceptions to this position in the phenomenologi-
find entirely consistent with the basic insights of
cal tradition can, arguably, be found in the work of
sociocultural psychology, emphasizing the socio-
Michel Henry and Hermann Schmitz. For a detailed
cultural embeddedness of the individual. From a discussion on this see Zahavi (1999 ch. 7) and
sociocultural perspective, there should be little Waldenfels (2000).
conceptual space for allusions to the Kantian idea 3 That the self can dilate into the social and material
of a spontaneous beginning by a self-positing, surroundings is an idea well known to sociocultural
self-initiating I. What I am, what I want, and psychologists, through both the legacy of William
what I do, are always responses to demands of James, in his ideas of the self, and in Kurt Lewin’s
the sociocultural facticity and the existential situ- dynamic theory of personality.
ation in which I am situated. This in no way dis- 4 Bowlby (1998) voiced a similar idea when he
misses the possibility of the individual’s capacity attempted to describe the impact of a permanent loss
of attachment figures in childhood. He compared the
to initiate creative responses, and to participate
psychology of grief with a physical wound; a cut into
in processes of social change, but only emphasiz-
the flesh creating a lasting scar on the bereaved.
ing the existential fact that we always start from
5 In sociology, this dimension is thoroughly theo-
a historical, cultural, contextual somewhere, from rized by Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel
which we are called to respond. Foucault.
6 Though the phenomenological concept of intention- Yearbook of Education 2009, pp. 161–181): New
ality has its roots in Brentano’s work, it was imme- York: Routledge.
diately developed by Husserl, who understood that Bowlby, J. (1998). Loss: Sadness and Depression.
intentionality had a much broader philosophical sig- London: Pimlico.
nificance. Since Husserl, intentionality has not only Bronfenbrenner, U. & Morris, P. A. (2006). The
referred to the object-directedness of consciousness, bioecological model of human development. In
implying that consciousness in not a container wait- R. Lerner (Ed.), Handbook of Child Psychology.
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Weizsäcker’s notion of “Der Gestaltkreis.” In P. Graves-Brown, R. Harrison, & A. Piccini
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not be rooted in my past history, although this is our memory. In S. Koch, T. Fuchs, M. Summa, &
concern here. The demand for a present response C. Müller (Eds.), Body Memory, Metaphor and
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gloomy, dark, or grim moods experienced when Benjamins.
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fearing the loss of a loved one from illness (Winther- Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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30 The Development of a Person:
Children’s Experience of Being
and Becoming within the
Cultural Life Course
Pernille Hviid and Jakob Waag Villadsen
moved in other directions, away from a devel-

30.1 The Development of opmental perspective that included the personal
Persons in Developmental level. In addition, perhaps society in general was
Psychology simply not interested in or ready to accept and
It is somewhat surprising that developmental psy- understand all human beings – ethnic minorities,
chology has existed for more than 100 years and women, and children – as persons? Would that
still there is no firm theoretical and methodolog- be the case today? It makes a huge difference to
ical grip on children’s development as persons. understand conflicts with a child as a “passing
We believe this would have surprised giants of phase” rather than as something the child resists
the early developmental psychology. More than a out of a personal concern. How different would
century ago William Stern expressed great hopes our relationship with children not be, if we did
for this emerging subdiscipline of psychology not interpret children in the middle of something
(Lamiell, 2009a, 2010). It would probably have age-appropriate or – inappropriate, but as per-
disappointed James Mark Baldwin as well, who sons pursuing and generating goals like every-
during the same period strived hard to create body else?
the foundation of a genetic psychology (Baldwin, In either case, the work of Stern and Baldwin
1930). is rarely made use of in the field of developmen-
Stern and Baldwin both contributed greatly to tal psychology. Yet, their work is original and
the development of a genetic psychology of the promising. In this chapter we will include parts
developing person, but they also shared the fate of their work in a conceptualization of a cultural
of being passed by in silence by the scientific life-course perspective, and this will guide our
society. Some might argue that this had some- analysis of children’s experiences of their lives
thing to do with their personal biographies; mis- and their development as persons.
takes they made that upset the scientific soci- Neither Stern nor Baldwin was optimistic. In
ety (Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2000) or their fact, they demonstrated sharp analytical eyes on
bad timing in geographical transitions (Krepp- what might be obstacles in the future of psychol-
ner, 1992). It could also be argued that these per- ogy, as it already showed in their time. We begin
sonal facts and events came timely to a scientific by pointing out some of their major critics fol-
society which, under the social guidance of the lowed by addressing some of their major contri-
larger society (Danziger, 1990; Valsiner, 2012), butions. In taking such an approach we intend
The Development of a Person 557
to synthesize the perspectives laid out by Stern test scores are fundamentally false. (W. Stern, cited
and Baldwin, primarily with respect to placing in Lehmann-Muriithi, de Resende Damas Cardoso,
the person and her relationship to her sociocul- & Lamiell, 2016, p. 216)
tural environment as an inseparable unit of anal-
ysis. Following that, we present an analysis of Elementarism is overly common in today’s devel-
our empirical investigation of 13-year-old chil- opmental psychology and in psychology in gen-
dren’s personal experiences with developing and eral. It builds on a logic in which research pro-
growing – as persons. Our wish is to stretch the ceeds from the study of elements to the study
perspective of Stern and Baldwin to include a of more holistic structures in a simple, additive
broader conceptualization of the collective level way, implying that phenomena of higher order
in the developmental analysis, which makes it (personality for instance) are already existing as
possible to overcome the traditional dichotomy germs in more basic processes and functions and
between the collective and personal dimensions will appear in such an additive approach and, if it
of developmental processes. does not, is irrelevant. One could claim that the
research agenda here operates at the collective
level of meaning-making by investigating func-
30.1.1 Challenges to the Study
tions, attainments and skills that are considered to
of the Developing Person:
be of developmental importance within the given
Elementarism and
societal context. As such the assessment of func-
Nondevelopmentalism
tions is meaningful in regard to the cultural orga-
Stern and Baldwin unanimously articulated the nization of human life, but this does not neces-
concern that the particular logic of elementarism sarily reflect any meaningfulness in relation to
was picked up from the natural sciences and the personal life and development. By neglecting
applied in psychology. Baldwin stated: personal life as a context for the assessed func-
tions, the only possible explanation left is either
The . . . quantitative method, brought over into
some global environmental stimuli or internal
psychology from the exact sciences, physics and
maturing factors. In this sense, Baldwin was very
chemistry, must be discarded for its ideal consisted
in reducing the more complex to the more simple,
precise in saying that the elementaristic logic
the whole to its parts, the later evolved to the eliminates the whole idea of a developing sys-
earlier-existent thus denying or eliminating just the tem. Regretting this tendency Stern had a vision
factor which constituted or revealed what was truly for psychology; “ [a] new psychology where the
genetic. (Baldwin, 1930, p. 7; emphasis added) guiding idea will no longer be the multiplicity of
psychological elements, but whose leitmotiv will
Stern wrestled at that time; on the one hand with
instead be the concept of the unified multiplicity”
naïve personalism – a folk-psychological belief
(Lamiell, 2009a, p. 114). In this perspective, the
in the personality as an independently existing
personal experience is always an experience of
thing, a by-product that needed no further expli-
something, and it is this relatedness of personal
cations (than God maybe) – and on the other
being that provides the conditions for the trans-
hand, psychological impersonalism, the elemen-
formative processes of the whole.
taristic approach where the person is nonexisting
As the quotation of Baldwin marks,
and not needed.
a consequence of elementarism is non-
A human being is not a mosaic, and therefore developmentalism, meaning that we are left
cannot be described as a mosaic. All attempts to oblivious to how the child in focus arrived at
represent a person simply in terms of a sequence of his or her particular developmental situation or
558 pe rnille hviid and jakob waag villadsen
what could be possible future situations for him as well as what do not turn out as vulnerabili-
or her. Today, the most widely applied strategy ties, are not given attention. We might notice that
for how to arrive at a general knowledge of children’s responses vary on “same level” Piage-
functions is moving from sample to population tian tasks, but without looking beyond the exper-
through the application of statistical procedures imental task itself and into the sociocultural life
(Valsiner, 2015). Within this frame, an ele- of the child, we are left to name deviations from
mentaristic approach strives for objectivity by the average performances as decalage; a kind of
studying more and more elementary “pieces” accepted categorical “instability” (Rogoff, 1990).
in the aim of arriving at the “true” state of a Surprisingly, much of developmental psychol-
given function. Following this line of objectivity, ogy is nondevelopmental due to its preoccupa-
this approach correlates particular environmen- tion with the “true state” of a given age, thus
tal and psychological/behavioral factors in the neglecting the very processes generating the var-
search for predictive relationships of significant ious states (Valsiner, 1997).
p-values. Yet, such correlations can only – and Baldwin and Stern set out to conceptualize
at their best – give hints about the dynamic the developing interdependent dynamics. Stern
nature that makes such functions meaningful did so though conceptualization of a human life
(and functional) to the living person. In statis- where experiences marked a central level, and
tical approaches dynamics cannot be explained, played a crucial part in the development of the
since the functionality that makes the function person, and Baldwin in making persistent imita-
meaningful to the person does not coincide with tion and sembling the motor of personal devel-
collective objectified appointment of the function opment. We will present selected aspects of their
as being important. In terms of developmental theoretical contributions in the following, one
evaluation of the individual the whole statistical after the other.
procedure remains a puzzle, since what is true
for the mean of the sample (at different ages)
is not necessarily true for any single individ- 30.1.2 Stern and the Experiencing
ual (Lamiell, 2009b; Borsboom et al., 2009; Person
Lundmann & Villadsen, 2016). What we, along To Stern a psychological investigation of the
with Baldwin and Stern suggest, is not to reject human life must focus on experience: “experi-
a collective level of meaningfulness in favor of ence develops out of and into life” (W. Stern,
the personal level, since this would only indicate 1938, p. 72). A person’s experience is dynamic,
a shift from one platonic universe to the other interdependent, and very different from a percep-
(Vygotsky, 1927; Hviid & Villadsen, 2014). tive “measurement” of the objective world. Expe-
Instead we suggest that an understanding of the riences evolve between the unique biographical
personal level can only be accomplished through person, impressed by the environment and teleo-
understanding how the person, through her active logical or teleogenetic urges by that person to act
relation to this collective level of meanings, and modify tensions in his or her relations to the
cultivates her life course in a meaningful way. world. Thus, experience “ties” human beings and
In nondevelopmental examinations it might be environment together, while at the same time cul-
discovered that infants – on average – are vulner- tivating this relationship, producing meaning at
able to maternal depression, or that teenagers – the personal and collective levels.
on average – are fragile to divorcing parents, but
theoretical notions of the developing person that The “person” is a living whole, individual, unique,
can account precisely for these vulnerabilities, striving towards goals, self-contained and yet opens
to the world around him; he is capable of having demands of the personal state of tension, so that
experience. (W. Stern, 1938, p. 70) the proportions are altered, the reflected light is
strengthened, weakened or extinguished. (W. Stern,
Through convergent experiencing of the socio- 1938, p. 77)
cultural environment and oneself, a level of intro-
ceptive understanding emerges as an intuitive
recognition of a personal sense of being-in-the- 30.1.3 Baldwin and Personal
world. Introception is a process by which human Development Through Persistent
beings strive to understand the complexity of Imitation
being a person, having engagements, dedications,
Baldwin too considered experiences of human
goals, and value orientations – either in one-
beings central to the development of a sense of
self or the other (Lehmann-Muriithi, de Resende
a personal living and conceptualized these in a
Damas Cardoso, & Lamiell, 2016). The process
context-inclusive fashion.
of introception seems close the Baldwin’s notion
of “sembling,” to which we will soon return. All experience as such is . . . a sembled meaning;
Stern’s notion of experience represents a rela- it is not only context it is also experiencing inner
tion to particular aspects of the world, but does life. (Baldwin, 1908, cited in Tudge, Putnam, &
not mirror the world in totality in any objective Valsiner, 1996, p. 198)
fashion. It is on the one side the particular per-
Building on the concept of experience as an
son’s experience but it is also always an expe-
interdependent dynamic Baldwin developed the
rience of something. Moreover “experiences are
notion of imitation. A distinction between sim-
both something of having and acting” (W. Stern,
ple imitation and persistent imitation is impor-
1938, p. 79), and thus operate as an ongoing
tant. Simple imitation appears first in ontogene-
dynamic between being and becoming. To Stern,
sis. Here, the copy does not move beyond what
the subjective, experienced world is fragmented
the “echo-metaphor” connotes; it does not mutate
(incomplete) in comparison with the objective
or vary.
world as such, but “this fits perfectly into signifi-
cant and purposeful connections of personal life” He first imitates movements, later sounds,
(W. Stern, 1938, p. 76). Experiences point toward especially vocal sounds . . . He hears his own voice
tensions or unevenness in the person’s relation to and imitates it . . . He does not improve, but goes on
the world. Such experienced imbalances require making the same sounds with the same mistakes
the person to reorganize her relationship with the again and again. (Baldwin, 1899/2007, p. 78)
world; either in shape of reorganizing her under-
Through these processes of simple imitation
standing of herself in the world and vice versa, or
more persistent forms of imitation emerge. The
(possibly) to act in a way to create a more mean-
subject creates her own conditions for develop-
ingful convergence with the experienced world.
ment trough imitation and persistent elaborations
In a developmental perspective, experience rep-
over the imitated. In other words, the child selects
resents a process of self-maintenance and self-
volitionally what has been an impressive experi-
development in a dialectic relationship with the
ence (mostly pleasurable experiences or move-
world. This process endures as long as life is
ments from painful to pleasurable situations),
lived. Experience is:
which she then imitates, thus recreating the sit-
an elastic envelope of many folds about the person, uation that caused the impressive experience in
reflecting, with its wrinkles and hollows, tangles the first place (instead of waiting for it to reoc-
and variations of form, in accordance with the cur). This is a feed-forward process where the
child becomes co-producer of her own develop- a process of feeling-into, evolves. Baldwin gives
mental situation. The developmental logic is thus an example of such a process in a situation where
to Baldwin that man “is in his greatest part, a child imitates his father’s reaction to being
also someone else” (Baldwin, 1902, p. 96). As stuck by a pointed object, for example, a nail.
is shown here, the notion of persistent imitation Upon the father’s exclamation of pain (“Ouch!,”
goes far beyond the common sense “echo/mirror” withdrawing the hand, and maybe throwing the
understanding of the word. pointed object on the floor), the child imitates.
Not only does he enact his father’s actions, he
Imitation to the intelligent and earnest imitator is
feels the pain and experiences what “was inside
never slavish, never mere repetition, it is, on the
contrary, a means for further ends, a method of
the father’s mind, the pain and the motive of
absorbing what is present in others and of making the action . . . the act of his father has now
it over in forms peculiar to one’s own temper and become his own” (Baldwin, 1899/2007, p. 88).
valuable to one’s own genius. (Baldwin, 1911, Knowing the feeling of pain from being stuck by
p. 22) a pointy object, the child “reads this back” into
his father, as his psychological situation.
Baldwin devoted special attention to what he
referred to as personality suggestions (Baldwin, The child is now giving back to his parents,
1899/2007), which was directly related to infants’ teachers, etc., only the material which he himself
attention to and capacity for recognizing persons. took from them. He has enriched it, to be sure; with
Persons in the child’s environment became per- it he now reads into the other persons the great fact
sons in the child’s life – a base from which to of subjective agency; but still whatever he thinks of
become a person(ality). Such persons, mothers, them has come by way of his thought of himself,
fathers, and siblings, behave irregularly; some- and that in turn was made up from them. (Baldwin,
times they comfort the child, sometimes they do 1899/2007, p. 90)
not. Sometimes they play, respond, or hand over
Interestingly, several aspects of Baldwin’s con-
objects – and sometimes they do not. Baldwin
ceptualization of the subjective and intersubjec-
emphasized this irregularity as the source of con-
tive abilities of infants are extensively validated
tinued curiosity to the child. On this basis the
by modern infant research (e.g., see Hviid & Vil-
child gets a first sense of personal agency (Bald-
ladsen, 2015; D. Stern, 1985; Beebe, 2006). Con-
win, 1899/2007). He starts to see other human
trary to the work of Baldwin, this line of research
beings more as holistic entities and comes to
has occupied itself with the question of which
understand that persons are more and less reg-
functions are needed in order to participate in the
ular in their irregularities, and this guides his
intersubjective processes – while neglecting what
development.
it means for the infant to be a subject, experi-
He behaves differently when the father is in the encing the world and how these experiences, as
room. He is quick to obey one person, slow to obey they become meaningful for subject, feed into the
another. He cries aloud, pulls his companions, and meaning-making of the baby’s life course (Hviid
behaves reprehensibly generally, when no adult is & Villadsen, 2015).
present who has authority or will to punish him. Despite having only touched on a few dimen-
This stage in his “knowledge of man” leads to
sions of the extensive production of Stern and
very marked differences of conduct on his part.
Baldwin, it seems clear that a developmen-
(Baldwin, 1899/2007, p. 86)
tal approach to the developing person requires
Through such processes the child’s self- changes or at least complements to the analyti-
consciousness and her social feeling or sembling, cal attention to what a child can/cannot with the
question of understanding what it means to be a living and developing as persons. As the notion:
child for the person, being a child. “The idea of “Your development as a person” is quite abstract,
purpose is the very key to the true understand- we thought from the onset that the children would
ing of personal being” (Stern in Lamiell, 2015, be in need of some kind of guidance.1
p. 169), and here children are no exceptions. This was attempted by making the spaces
Thus, children’s meaning-making processes are children live (Muchow & Muchow, 2015) more
in dialogue with the cultural arrangements they concrete and present. By this is not meant
live with and through – as well as the meaning- a mathematical-geographical representation, but
fulness by which they guide their lives and direct refers together with Muchow’s elaboration of life
their orientation, and thus become inevitable foci space to the central places children spend and
to this developmental perspective. make their lives. Since the investigation dealt
The personal level of meaningfulness is not a with their past, present, and future life, it would
pre-given or static phenomenon, nor is it just fluid not be easy to re-space their lives in order to
and ever changing – it always operates dynam- call out for experiences (e.g., by visiting places).
ically between maintenance and the emergence Actually, any attempt to pre-mould their life
of novelty. Children act in their environment – spaces would risk producing unsuitable limita-
for better or for worse – to make life meaningful tions, since each child’s configuration of life
in accordance with their experiences. They pur- space is just as unique as they are as persons.
sue their engagements, work to sort out tensions The children were offered big pieces of paper and
and attempt to create what, they imagine, could all kinds of drawing materials and asked to select
be better (future) conditions. This is an interde- and draw their life spaces and from thereon “step
pendent and persistent constructive process that inside” these (by imagination) and describe their
leaves traces of meaning-making acts in the very experiences. Michael explains the first outline of
same environment that the child takes as her liv- his drawing, where three tenets emanate in paral-
ing conditions. Through such mutual processes lel from the centre, formed as a heart (his birth):
of cultivation (Simmel, 1997; Fuhrer, 2004) the
MICHAEL POINTS TO THE INSTITUTIONAL
child projects her own life into a future on the
TENET: This is my . . . what you have to go
basis of the past experiences (Hviid & Villadsen, through in life; after-school centre, school and
2015). In the section that follows, we attempt to kindergarten. It is the necessary stuff, things that
transform these basic, theoretical notions into a must happen.
methodological framework. INTERVIEWER: What Denmark2 wants to
happen?
MICHAEL: Precisely. Precisely. And the after-
30.2 A Concrete Case of school centre became the youth club. And the
Investigating Children’s school will be college. It will continue. It is not
Development as Persons mine at all. (Michael points at his leisure time-
tenet): This is what I want to happen, it’s all
30.2.1 Design and Central mine . . . And the family (the tenet in the
Concepts middle) . . . that is my life. It’s a mixture.
The project conducted included five 13-year-old The children’s experiences of these places and
children. They were each interviewed at their practices were examined. In doing so the
leisure time activity centre three-four times for researcher cannot take convergence for granted,
approximately 1.5–2 hours per interview. The on what e.g. “a school,” “a recess,” “a lunch box”
focus of the interviews was their experiences of or “summer holiday” mean. The children were
explicitly encouraged to correct the researcher, we asked; she was somehow the “sage of the
when sensing being misunderstood. We believe kindergarten.”
they had the courage to do so, because they were INTERVIEWER: So she liked children posing
told that research would otherwise turn out bad questions?
(and they wanted to help). When the researcher EVE: She did! She said that otherwise we would
not come to know anything. She loved questions
was guided; efforts were praised (“I am glad that
where she could give really long explanations . . .
you say the Harry Potter Universe, because that
in the end one felt like: “Thank you thank you, I
makes me think that you have understood it.”)
have understood now . . . ” (Laughs) She loved it
and mistakes forgiven (“Many people get this when we asked.
wrong – it is complicated”). Still, keeping cate-
gories open in order to study personal engage- This was a surprising interpretation indeed,
ments and tensions with the sociocultural world which only underlines that there are infinite ways
is, we suspect, one of the greatest challenges in of making sense of cultural objects. Eve’s way of
this particular perspective which can be demon- making sense did not only promote the curiosity
strated with the following example. and curious questions of the children but also
Eve (13 years) explained how fond she had Tutter’s position as a “sage of the kindergarten.”
become of her pre-school teacher, Tutter. Tut- Dynamics appeared in conducting the
ter taught her to read, and reading was one of drawings-interviews that are worth mention-
the most important discoveries and resources in ing. When the children found a beginning form
Eve’s life and in her imagination of her future. for their representation, they invented symbolic
Tutter was, next to her parents, one of the most demarcations of personal importance like: “this
important persons in her life. But to the sur- line is made thicker, since starting nursery care
prise and initial disquiet of the interviewer, Eve this is more than the dream of going to Africa”
said that Tutter often read the book “Questioning- or “this is my motor road” when drawing family
Jorgen” [Spørge Jørgen] to the children in the life. Moreover, they added symbols, names,
kindergarten. Now, Questioning-Jorgen is a Dan- persons and events, and hereby made the repre-
ish children’s book written in verses. The story sentation richer – like a scrapbook in progress –
is about a boy, Jorgen, who asks and asks and and during this work, particular evaluative
asks and asks . . . more or less sensible questions. moments became apparent. Since a lot more was
In the end his father has had enough; Jorgen gets said than drawn, we were often in an evaluative
spanked and is put to bed. In bed, Jorgen contin- situation where they were asked: “Should what
ues asking: “Why didn’t I get pancakes? Why am you are telling me now be put on the drawing?”
I not allowed playing? Why does my bum hurt? – or when they inferred “this is for the map” or
I will never ask silly questions again.” Today, explained: “nursery-care will not be put on the
educationalists and the Danish society as a whole map since it was just a bump on the road.”
would consider the message of the book outdated The children thus evaluated the importance
and damaging. Admittedly, so did the interviewer. and meaningfulness of particular experiences
However, Eve made a different sense out of it. in relation to their introceptive understanding
of their being. The map-making thus promoted
INTERVIEWER: Why do you think she read that several processes; an “ordering” of their lives, a
book? process of sharing their experiences in life and
EVE: It is because: There are answers to of introceptive evaluations of these experiences
everything! I believe she read it because we in relation to their personal worlds (W. Stern,
asked her about everything . . . It was always her 1938) as human beings:
the world that the person brings near to himself, research and how they approached this particular
because he possesses receptivity and sensitivity for context in order to make it meaningful to them-
it and to which he also seeks to give that form, selves (Hviid & Beckstead, 2011). Based on these
which is appropriate to his essential nature. analyses the two developmental themes are pre-
(W. Stern, 1938, p. 89) sented. We propose these to have general value
Whereas some children recommended more in human development, although of course, the
interviews (which is a comment to the discussion cultural and personal variations of these particu-
of validity) (Hviid & Beckstead, 2011) Michael’s lar issues are varied and handled in infinite ways,
evaluation of his map was: “Yeah, this is my life.” and have different degrees of salient presence in
Unfortunately, only he could see it the way he saw each child’s lifeworld. The analysis also shows
it, as his life, although we worked on understand- their interdependence. Along with the presenta-
ing his way of living. The children named their tion of the developmental themes we discuss the
maps as “my life-map,” with “life-limits,” and kind of knowledge such a perspective can pro-
showing “life-habits.” These were their words duce, especially in comparison with traditional
invented along the work. developmental psychology.
30.2.2 Analysis 30.2.3 Timed and Untimed Living –

A Question of Convergence
The analyses are interpretative and the goal was
to work as closely as possible to an understanding The personal life course becomes cultivated
of the lifeworld of the (other) person, while main- through the experience of the social world in
taining a discussion on a theoretical level (Hviid, which the cultural organization of time and space
2008). In this chapter, two themes are selected gives rise to the personal life space and life
from the analysis: one is timed and untimed life time. Life time (Stern, 1938) and life space are
and another one is persons to copy – or being not considered separate entities in the experi-
copied by. As an analytical prerequisite to this ence of human living, but as ways of experienc-
thematic presentation, the data from each child ing oneself in relation to different dimensions of
has been analyzed separately. According to a the world. Baldwin’s notion of persistent imita-
life-space dimension questions have been: Where tion precisely demonstrates how the child’s co-
have they been, where are they, and where are construction of its own environment creates his
they heading? Moreover, strong engagements (as or her future, and that space and time thus are
dedication or resistance) over time have been interwoven.
examined, along with tensions and questions of In traditional developmental studies, time is an
how they maintained and changed more or less objective system of chronological units: years,
in convergence with their surroundings. In addi- months, hours, and seconds. These entities are
tion, we have asked for important persons in the put into use in order to investigate changes
children’s lives; persons that meant something to in functional capacities, as either progress or
them in sharing, supporting, needing or block- decline. Results of such analyses are often dis-
ing ways. We have tried to work out what was cussed in relation to normative societal standards,
central to their existence, maybe most clearly which promote and constrain children’s activities.
expressed as an insistence to maintain oneself, However, such standardized timescales do not
and not give in to changes proposed or enforced work (alone) in a cultural life-course study, where
on them (Hviid, 2012). Moreover, we have exam- the person’s experience of him or herself in a
ined their articulated experiences of taking part in sociocultural world is at the center of the analysis.
Chronological time is not irrelevant to human as small, they had “nothing to say.” Eve shared
experiences, our lives are heavily structured by her experiences transiting from nursery care to
chronological time, and so are the children’s con- kindergarten at the age of three, which had a huge
crete lives (Hviid, 2008). But as personal experi- influence on her possibilities to act.
ences, time is related to purposes like: “being late
for school,” “waiting for teachers to help,” “too Eve: Now they were very much bigger than the
short recesses,” “waiting an eternity for dinner,” biggest in the nursery care. They were six years
old, right? You could see it, because they were
“bedtime is much too early,” and so on. Time-
the ones riding two-wheeled bikes. We did not
structured childhood landscapes makes children
ride on those bikes. We could not even get near
re-experience who they are.
them! They were also the ones that played
football with the adults. We didn’t. We only
MICHAEL (13 YEARS): You are big and small,
played with “My little Pony.”
big and small. Last year in nursery, you are big,
right? Then you get very small in kindergarten.
It is a bit of a personal change to move from
Then you are big the last year in kindergarten.
being “kings of the kindergarten” to being a
And then you are really small in school.
Therefore, you are big and small, big and small, “grade zero – pupil,” but this is nevertheless a
big and small . . . frequent reality for most children in the world.
INTERVIEWER: When you went from big to During such cultural changes, children experi-
small, it almost sounds as if you lost something ence themselves anew, but not as new (meaning
there? “other”) persons. This is precisely the point of
MICHAEL: I did. We all did. We all came from Stern’s (1938) and Bergson’s (1907/1915) con-
being the biggest to being the smallest ones. We ceptualizations of personal time: that personal
were the smallest ones in grade zero.3 time has duration. Life is not minutes, hours,
INTERVIEWER: Yes . . . but in developmental and years. Bergson characterized duration as a
theories. They often describe a movement that
“continuous progress of the past which gnaws
goes up, up, up. (Draws a staircase in the air)
into the future and which swells as it advances”
MICHAEL: But actually, it goes up–down,
(Bergson, 1907/1915, p. 4). In other words:
up–down, up–down, up–down (draws zigzag in
the air). present experiences can only be experienced in
INTERVIEWER: Yes, that is how you move. relation to what one has already experienced, past
MICHAEL: Yes it is. All the time you get bigger – experiences are only meaningful in relation to
on the paper – so to speak. You grow older, but present ones, and the anticipated (and pursued)
to your surroundings, you get bigger and smaller future can only be anticipated on some basis of
and bigger and smaller. what one has already experienced; no-one can
INTERVIEWER: It must feel anticipate something from nothing. These contin-
somewhat . . . turbulent, to be moved around in uous and simultaneous constructive-destructive-
that way? reconstructive processes stretch out and weave
MICHAEL: Yeah, next year we are small, right?
together “what was,” “is,” and “what could be.”
INTERVIEWER: Why are you small?
As Stern was occupied with convergence between
MICHAEL: Because we begin 7th grade. That is
collective and individual meanings (here: tem-
the smallest grade on the big level. Next year we
have nothing to say. poralities and pace), so was Bergson, who con-
sidered the process as a creative adaptation
To Michael (and the other children) movements (Bergson, 1907/1915).
to the next place did not make children experi- Sociological investigations of age-appropriate-
ence themselves as bigger, but as smaller, and ness (Neugarten, 1996) quite unanimously points
to difficulties in life when not following local Michael considered himself “older than I am.”
social norms of age appropriate behavior (see This meant that he primarily chose company
Elder & Shanahan, 2006, for an overview). Adap- among older children, and they chose him. In this
tations to such norms would, it seems, make life way, he was “out of time” with societal expecta-
so much easier. Yet, human beings do not do so, tions, he was “ahead of time.”
at least not with the same social purposes as the
I can’t play with someone who is younger than I
norm possesses. Rather correspondence between
am. I have always been with those who are bigger,
social norms and personal living signifies that
so it has become a life-habit to me.
the person finds meaningfulness in life, living in
accordance with the norms. Hence, the meaning A “life-habit.” A life-habit seems to point to
of the social norm and personal life are never some recurring phenomenon over a lifetime that
identical. makes up the “habit,” a timeless or fluid issue
This difference between norms and the per- that nevertheless grows and becomes a pattern
sonal level of relating to the norms tends to by which Michael knows himself as being in the
become “naturalized” to the point that children world. Life-habit was his word; it does not exist
“live” the norm. Here the personal level disap- in Danish language. Where did those experiences
pears from sight and is thus left out of the devel- come from and why did Michael recreate this
opmental explanation, only to reappear when kind of experience in new contexts and relations
children’s behavior fall outside the norm. Hence, over time? Why was that important?
the personal aspect of a developing person is It definitely pointed back to his relationships
most often restricted to an explanation in the case with his two older brothers. Michael admired
of failure (Mammen, 1996) – usually articulated them deeply and loved being with them. They
as a developmental disorder residing in the devel- played ice hockey, football, and computer games.
oping person. This does not mean that the per- He learned from them, was taught, trained, and
sonal dimension is nonexistent in norm(al) devel- protected. They taught him of what was to come,
opmental processes, but it requires a closer ana- for example, that school would only get harder,
lytical attention, and such attention could prob- although he could not really imagine that. He
ably also inform us on the case of “un-normal” also knew of kindergarten life, long before start-
development beyond the level of disorder. ing, as they informed him. In addition, the three
Traditional developmental psychology would brothers shared difficult matters. When their par-
investigate untimed life (development) as a ques- ents recently divorced, they got closer and were
tion of individual maturity, clustering perfor- Michael’s greatest source of comfort. One day
mances of different functions. However, from in their company was particularly important to
a psychological life-course perspective – how him. He remembered the year and the event
could such mismatches be understood? As pre- very clearly. It was that day, when they (to him)
sented, Michael and Eve experience tensions stopped paying attention to the fact that he was
when following institutionalized trajectories. In younger; that day when he was taken as a player
the following, we take a closer look into process- of football on equal terms with them. That trans-
es that involve the issue of age-appropriateness formed his status from “a little brother” to a
on a local collective level in the children’s lives “team player” and he had dreamt of that as long
in dialogue with family members and peers. The as he could remember. To Michael, life with his
presentation is regrettably simplified, but we must brothers caused the “life-habit” and in his tran-
be brief here. Michael and Eve have been intro- sition to kindergarten at three years old, he was
duced already; they are 13 years old. already big.
It was because of my brothers. We played children. I have friends in 4th, 5th, and 6th grade –
Dungeons and Dragons, and I knew a lot about it so I have no problems being with them at all. But
I was cool, right? So I was included among the big many consider it outsider-like to be with younger
ones, because I knew such cool things that the ones. My friends say: “Honestly, are you going
really big boys played, because my brothers down to be with 6th and 5th graders?” It’s absurd;
played it. they don’t have the right to say: “Do you want to
be with us or with the small ones?” This is hard,
Through the resources taught by his brothers, because they are my best friends with whom I can
Michael could “get near” to what Eve could not giggle and gossip. But the younger ones are those I
get near when she started in kindergarten. This can have fun with: play football and so on. I said:
meant that he overcame the “becoming small- “Then I choose them, because they do not force me
phase” rather fast. As seventh grader he still to choose.” But it’s hard . . .
preferred spending time with older children, his
Eve put herself in a difficult situation, and risked
friends were older than he was, and he did things
losing her relationship with close friends by
older boys do. Trans-positioning his lessons from
doing so. What was the attraction in making such
home to kindergarten, imitating his brothers the
a dangerous move? The fact is, she did not “just”
best he could when they were not around, and
like to be with the small ones, she liked to do
watching the positive feedback when doing so,
what they did. They played and Eve loved play-
must have supported his admiration for his broth-
ing, imagining other worlds. And here begins a
ers and his continuous need for being close to
long story of Eve’s imagination, which she had
them. They were his source of future develop-
never shared with any adult, a story of Eve’s life
ment and he recreated that outside the family.
with Harry Potter. Long before Harry Potter was
Striving to be “ahead of time” mostly made life
translated into Danish, her British-Danish aunt
good for Michael, but he must have put some
read it to her and Eve was mesmerized.
effort into it, since judgments of his “social age”
was in the hands of the others to decide, as his If you saw my room, you would think: “Freak, let
brothers once did. me get out!” Harry Potter is everywhere. I am
The cultural organization frames – but does not dying for the universe this figure lives in. The
determine – the life course of a single child. He or phenomenon “Harry Potter” is absolutely fantastic.
she will always have the possibility to construct it If I am sad, I sit in my room surrounded by Harry
in a way that makes it meaningful to him or her. Potter. All my posters look at me. I lock myself into
We assume however, that it is nevertheless more it. I have a copy of Harry Potter’s bed, with a red
velvet curtain; I sit behind that with my necklace
challenging to “lack behind” the age-appropriate
and my picture of my best friend. Then I become
than to strive ahead. But before turning to that,
absolutely happy inside. So wonderful that Harry
aspects of Eve’s life are presented. Potter is created (Eve looks seriously at inter-
Eve was not only striving to become bigger, viewer). It can be hard to understand . . . He opened
she appreciated a variety of activities regardless my eyes to: There is something better than the real
of their age-appropriateness. She had same-age world. I know the story is about evilness, but there
friends with whom she talked and had fun, and is something to conquer the evil. He also taught
she had younger friends with whom she played. me: Maybe you feel bad – but eventually something
good happens.
I still have a lot of imagination, I play roleplay. All
my female friends have left that long time ago . . . I “There is something better than the real world,”
have always fairly well liked smaller children, I Eve said. Eve loved to imagine being in
have been good at making friends with younger other worlds and this is what one does when
playing. Her big idol (to imitate) was of course J. ories of apprenticeship (Lave & Wenger, 1991;
K. Rowling. At 12 years old Eve started writing Rogoff, 1990), but rarely examined as develop-
her own (now 300 pages) novel, and she made an mental dynamics. However, it is well known in
arrangement with a publishing company to do her children’s worlds and personal accounts of their
school-related obligatory trainee work with them. own development. As incidences of imitation are
She imagined her future filled with such imagina- frequent in the data, we will build on the personal
tion. Her aim was to convince her parents to sup- histories already presented (Eve and Michael)
port literature studies in Oxford. In this sense she and only introduce little new. Maria (13 years)
was indeed ahead of time, maybe even too much had experienced imitation all her life:
ahead of the timescales of a 13-year-old Danish
girl. MARIA (13 YEARS): Every year, when the new
ones start [at youth-club] you think: “Oh no, now
My biggest dream is to become a writer. Like the small ones are arriving.” I also think back on
Rowling, I want to write a book that can do the when I started. My God, we were annoying. We
same as Harry Potter once did for me. looked so much up to the seventh graders, right?
INTERVIEWER: Yes.
The redundancy of imagination in Eve’s life- MARIA: In 4th grade, you talk a lot about the big
world, seeing it “swelling as it advances into ones. Today I consider them [the small ones]
the future,” as Bergson describes makes us cer- quite annoying, and the big ones must have
tain that this touches on something very cen- thought the same about us, right? But back then I
tral to what it means “being Eve.” Her search thought: “God they are nice!,” because they were
for co-imaginative players is very logical from the big ones.
this point of view. Yet she felt strapped in an INTERVIEWER: Is it like that everywhere?
unreasonable developmental straightjacket push- MARIA: Yes, it is like that in school. Yes, it is like
ing her to converge with societal standards of that in kindergarten. Yes, it is also like that in
nursery care. In 3rd grade, I thought of the 7th
age-appropriateness, requesting her to stop play-
graders as the really big ones. But now I consider
ing, and even though it hurt deeply, it did not
myself very small. I think it is quite natural that
make her stop. This strongly underlines a gen-
people look up to each other, the smaller one is.
eral existential premise; that personally engaged INTERVIEWER: I see. The next step: do you feel
life cannot simply obey cultural standards since like that with regard to adults?
such life would no longer be personal – even con- MARIA SMILES: Not the same way.
fronted with pain, punishment, sometimes death. INTERVIEWER (TEASING): But being 13 years
The tensions promoted her to think about the val- old, don’t you today look up to people like me –
ues she wanted to live by. Before discussing this who are beyond 50?
further, we would like to bring attention to the MARIA: To be honest, no. (Shared giggle)
next developmental issue of persistent imitation. INTERVIEWER: Maybe you look up to the
18-year-old ones?
MARIA: Yes, that is true, now it’s like that.
30.2.4 Someone to Copy – And
Being Copied by As with “becoming smaller” in institutional tran-
sitions, “being bigger” has a practical side to it,
The phenomenon of imitation deserves to our which is closely linked to power to access and
opinion much more attention than already given define contexts.
in the field of developmental psychology. Nev-
ertheless, imitation is often implied in tutorial MICHAEL (13 YEARS): Mikkel and I – we were
teaching and learning (Schön, 1983) and in the- kings of the kindergarten. If there were anybody
playing in the “rough-and-tumble room,” we everything! She has an enormous cardboard box
could say: “Leave! It’s ours, we have reserved it.” only containing editions of the first chapter!
Then we took it.
INTERVIEWER: So the eldest . . . We do not want to underestimate the importance
MICHAEL: They had the power. When the small of this relationship, or the worshipping of her
ones were sad, we comforted them, but we held idol. But it was not entirely fulfilling, in that
power. the process of “giving back” to the imitated was
impossible, as she was absent. This process of
Moreover, small ones lack, to the elder, skills and “giving back” is, we assume, not just a “side
knowledge effect” of persistent imitation, but it is founda-
tional to a developmental relation. Eve felt alone
EVE: They enter the workshops [at the
with her engagement and it took years before her
leisure-time club] and they are newcomers, but
peers knew what she was talking about.
they want to sew everything! It’s like [in
high-pitch voice]: “Can I finish this big I had two good friends but we still couldn’t talk
fashionable coat if I start today?” [normal voice] about the thing that meant most of all to me – next
“NO, you can’t, it takes three weeks if you work to my parents. People thought I was crazy when I
in this workshop every single day!” – They ask said: “This reminds me of the Snitch.” “The
the strangest questions. Snitch!!? You are weird!!”
In the children’s lifeworld we are first of all Out of her desire to share “what meant most of all
presented with what could be considered as to her” she introduced the story to younger chil-
“classical” persistent imitation, meaning imita- dren – who happened to love playing, and found
tion where the children imitate valuable others. it interesting. They acted out the storyline as well
In Michael’s life, his brothers served as much as they could and “little Agnes,” her neighbor’s
inspiration for imitation in a very straightforward daughter, was especially dedicated and willing to
sense. But as all the other children interviewed, make herself part of this fantasy universe; and to
Michael had other idols, quite many in fact. There become a little version of Eve.
was Niklas, for instance, a young friend of the
Eve: She likes Harry Potter because of me. She
family, who inspired Michael as a professional looks for some reason very much up to me
ice hockey player, and taught him all he knew in (smiles). She does the same things as I do. It’s
this respect. “I will try to become just as good, like . . . we are each other.
and do the same, yes,” Michael said.
Eve deeply respected many persons in her life- “We are each other,” Eve said. This is not a com-
world: Tutter, her parents, the English teacher, the mon Danish phrase, it does not exist in Danish
leader of the Youth Club, her godfather, a young language – it is Eve’s way of expressing some-
man in the youth club who, to Eve, could han- thing going on between her-Agnes-and-the-story.
dle “almost anything.” However, when it came to It seems important to address, since it expresses
her deepest engagement she had no one close to experiential dynamics of persistent imitation –
her, to imitate, because the community of Happy but from the imitated person’s point of view.
Potter readers had not bloomed in Denmark yet. Being imitated can, to our suggestion, be per-
Off course she had someone in the distance, so to ceived as a personal consolidation, and such a
speak. “double-up” can act as a confirmation of, or add
value to, one’s being in the world, using Stern’s
How can she? [Rowling] It has taken her five years terminology. This seems to be the case of Eve and
to write the first Harry Potter. She wrote on Agnes. However, the outcome does not always
follow this case when imitation is at work, and to read, her joy of the English-teacher at school,
here we enter the intricate question of whom to her beloved British aunt, her playfulness and
imitate and the consequences of doing so. Oppo- imagination, Harry Potter, her periodic tension
site to Eve’s accepting “we are each other,” the with same-age female friends, her relationship
rhyme: “Copycat, copycat – who do you think you with little Agnes, her novel, her trainee period at
are looking at?” expresses the imitated person’s a publishing company, her imagined future stud-
rejection of being imitated by that “copycat,” as ies in Oxford, and her ideas of becoming a writer.
if these imitations damage or distort the values of These are interconnected and redundant in the
the imitated. light of meaningfulness. It is as if the meaning-
fulness is repeated and elaborated – in many vari-
30.3 Intermediate Summary of ations. These aspects have a very long duration
the Cases in such a young person’s short life – they stretch
from her 4th or 5th year of age and into adult-
The analytical framing of the analysis is built
hood – and they are weaved together of experi-
on central concepts from Stern concerning the
ences crisscrossing a broad variety of different
personal level of meaning making, and Bald-
contexts in her life-space. Taken together it gen-
win’s genetic focus on the sociogenic foundation
erates a pattern where the redundant process, that
(exemplified with concept of imitation) for per-
at first leaves an impression of conservative rep-
sonal development, as well as a broader cultural
etition, cultivates Eve’s life course and provides
perspective relating these processes to the collec-
direction. In this process, engagements poten-
tive organizations of cultural production. Based
tially transform in their meaningfulness along
on this analytical frame, a pool of data has been
with the emergence of novel meanings of herself
analyzed with a special emphasis on how chil-
in the world, the world in her and the life course
dren’s experience of living, growing, and devel-
of future world–self relationships.
oping can be understood as personally meaning-
By incidence we know that Eve today studies
ful in relation to the sociocultural contexts in
literature. In that sense the cultural organization
which they live. We have focused on two themes
developmental time caught up with Eve’s being
in the convergence between children and their
ahead of time, and the meaningfulness at the per-
sociocultural environment: their experience of
sonal and collective level converge, yet remain
timing within societies’ temporal organization of
as personal and collective in their configuration.
development and their experience of persistent
But even if she had not done so, we still believe
imitation over their life course.
that we have a fairly strong idea of what mattered
being Eve, when we met her – and that this would
30.3.1 Duration and Redundancy
still matter – had she chosen other directions in
in the Development of the
her educational life course.
Personal Life Course
When trying to conceptualize the importance
Embracing the richness of the interconnections of redundancy in the developmental experi-
that the engagements in children’s lives gener- ences, Michael’s notion of “life-habits” is exem-
ate, a dynamic and redundant picture of children’s plary. Here, there seems to be repetitions-with-
development appears which deviates markedly variations at least in terms of: (1) directing atten-
from the classical, linear developmental curve of tion to/from specific incidences; (2) specific ways
child psychology. When looking at Eve’s life, it of approaching/retreating from opportunities; (3)
could be argued that there are relations between investigating something’s potential/uselessness;
her preschool teacher, Tutter, her ability and will and (4) whom to relate to/withdraw from and
how. All these variations in Michael’s way of reiterations, the storm and stress of the
relating to an ever-changing environment indi- accommodation of life to the world, a few great
cate that there is not one, two, or three functions, relief points begin to stand out in consciousness.
which, added together, ensure the developmental They recur, they satisfy, they stand together, they
progress of the next “new.” Where the statisti- can be found when wanted. (Baldwin, 1892, p. 406,
emphasis added)
cal analysis of children’s development most often
approach this kind of variance in factorial man-
Investigating such patterning – empirically – not
ner, evaluating the predictive power of each fac-
only in their construction but also in their recon-
tor in relation to outcome variation on its own,
structing, destruction, and fading away is abso-
it becomes clear that this additive handling of
lutely of great importance in a progression of
elements is insufficient in ensuring the develop-
knowledge of the development of persons.
ment to the concrete person. The most relevant
With Michael’s articulation of “life-habits”
question of how the detected functions integrate
this was explicitly the case. But could there
into a functional whole, which ensures sustain-
also be other life-habits in imitation, like life-
able and meaningful development in a constantly
habits of whom to be imitated by? The issue
changing environment, is never asked (Valsiner,
of being imitated as a developmental motor is
2015). Within the ever-changing and unpre-
implicit in Baldwin’s work, but ought to have
dictable sociocultural environment that generates
a more prominent position. Children are imi-
an infinite number of developmental possibilities,
tated (almost) just as early as they imitate. Selby
the only way to ensure developmental progress in
and Bradley’s (20013) empirical investigation of
personally meaningful ways is through simulta-
infants’ interactions and dialogues shows an 8-
neous and complementary efforts, which operate
month-old girl’s rejection of a 6-month-old girl,
as a dynamic whole – the unitas multiplex of the
when being imitated by her. Children are imi-
personal being. In that sense Michael is an exem-
tated just as much as they imitate, although “just
plary case of a general process, yet uniquely con-
as much” signifies an average postulate, and says
figured within the concrete conditions that make
nothing about specific children’s specific experi-
up Michael’s life and provide resources (as well
ences, where an enormous variation is assumed.
as constraints) for the construction and cultiva-
Potentially this represents a key to understanding
tion of his future life course.
human beings’ development as persons in that it
contains a witnessing of the imitated child’s exis-
30.3.2 Multifunctional Imitation in tence, an implicit recognition of this living and
the Life Course therefore a possibility of adding value to the per-
sonal being, using the terminology of Stern. Of
Based on the analysis, we propose self-persistent course, this is an empirical matter, but the data
imitation to be one of the many processes operat- points our attention in this direction.
ing within such a multiplex in which the person’s
being in the world both constitutes and emerges
as patterns of new configurations. Baldwin hit the 30.4 General Conclusion:
same nerve describing this process in the flow of Cultural Life Course and the
experience, where Development of Children as
Persons
pleasures and gratification be succeeded by pains
of want, let impulse seek its end, finding it here Based on the above, the main question within
and losing it there; and amid the contradictions and the presented cultural life-course perspective is
how different collective spheres of meaning- organized activities. In addition to this perspec-
production in the person’s life-space and life- tive, the cultural life-course perspective empha-
time become meaningful parts of his or her sizes that it must mean something to be a living
life and resources for the construction of a per- being, taking part in the cultural (re)production
sonal cultural life course (Villadsen & Hviid, and that these meanings, as they are experi-
2016a). We have in other publications examined enced by the person, become the basis for his
this perspective in relationship to play (Hviid & or her future participation in the cultural pro-
Villadsen, 2017), education (Hviid, 2015; Hviid duction (Villadsen & Hviid, 2016a). By empha-
& Villadsen, 2014; Villadsen & Hviid, 2016a), sizing this dimension, cultural life-course stud-
developmental situations of uncertainty (Dalgård ies seek to build a base from where the personal
& Hviid, 2016; Pultz & Hviid, 2016), and in life course can be investigated and conceptual-
more general methodological terms (Villadsen & ized as a general process in which the person –
Hviid, 2016b; Hviid & Villadsen, 2016; Lund- in the company of others – co-construct her life
mann & Villadsen, 2016). course, in a personal as well as collectively pur-
In this chapter, we have applied this perspec- poseful and meaningful manner. Hence the cul-
tive and developed it in relation to the question tural life-course perspective aims at bringing the
of children’s becoming as persons while empha- notion of person and purpose back in the center of
sizing the dynamic processes of children’s trans- psychological inquiry at the level of general the-
forming engagements. Through the investigation ory. This telos is neither unique nor new in psy-
we have pointed out general dimensions of the chology and the works of thinkers like Stern and
process of living, which we found in concrete Baldwin have been excellent in constructing the
and uniquely configured forms at the level of question which psychology hundred years later
each child’s personal life. Therefore a standard- still has to answer.
ized approach – in terms of methods and ana-
lytical tools – to the development of children as
persons generate a barrier to the recognition of
the dynamicity and variety of processes, which Notes
cooperate in making the (develop)mental pro- 1 The empirical investigation was conducted by first
cesses meaningful to the living person. The over- author, Pernille Hviid. We will, however continue
all conclusion of the analysis in this chapter is the chapter in a “we”-format for the sake of dissem-
that knowledge on the development of persons ination.
and their construction of a personal cultural life 2 All societies establish childhood arrangements for
course must be built from an idiographic method- their children (Cole, 1996) but I said “Denmark” try-
ology (Hviid & Villadsen, 2016; Salvatore & ing to make my question a bit more contextual than
saying “societal.”
Valsiner, 2010). Hence the cultural life course
3 “Grade zero” is in Denmark the first grade in ele-
perspective abandon the objective perspective of
mentary school. The historical reason for the awk-
the sample average and starts its inquiry at the
ward name is related to the transformation of the
everyday life of the person in her sociocultural educational practice from a pedagogically designed
world. “institution-introductory grade,” especially for chil-
The notion of everyday life have tradition- dren who had not previously attended preschool,
ally added to the conceptualization of children’s to an ordinary school grade with educational aims.
development in terms of the child’s progres- Children normally are not aware of this his-
sive adaptations and internalization of collective tory, and properly reads “zero” as signifying their
meanings through participation in institutionally position.
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31 The Construction of the Person
in the Interethnic Situation:
Dialogues with Indigenous
University Students
Danilo Silva Guimarães and Marília Antunes Benedito
Because I come from the wilderness, from the cerrado,1 from the country, in the woods, from the
ranch in the caatinga,2 I hardly go out, I have almost no friends, I can hardly bare staying in the
city without being upset.
Lamento sertanejo,3 song by Gilberto Gil and Dominguinhos
The aim of this chapter is to discuss psy- This idea of the evidence of the I and the
chological processes involved in the construc- non-evidence of the others, that presided at the
tion of the person in interethnic situations. birth of our modern metaphysics, is the exact
The main conceptual reference discussed here opposite of the indigenous metaphysics, according
is the semiotic–cultural constructivism in psy- to which it is in fact the I who is at risk. One is
never sure who one is, because others might have a
chology (see Simão, 2010), a theoretical–
very different idea about it, and manage to impose
methodological perspective concerned particu-
it on ourselves. (Viveiros de Castro, 2007)
larly with the investigation of personal devel-
opment. The observation of relational processes Our research originally aimed to compre-
involving I–other differences and the efforts they hend what the indigenous students think about
originate toward the construction of meaning are being Indian today, by identifying the symbolic
considered central to the understanding of sym- resources (see Chapter 10, this volume) used by
bolic transformations in the cultural field. From them to support their ethnic self-identification in
this framework, we argue in favor of the use of the urban context and how they evaluate the pos-
the notion of person in opposition to the notion sible differences between their worldviews and
of subject, because, as Cornejo (2015) stated, the those of elder people from their communities
notion of person addresses an empirical instance, of origin. We performed semi-structured inter-
and “inhabiting definite portions of a real space views with five indigenous university students.
and of a real time” (James, 1890, p. 183). The interviews were filmed and transcribed for
The person constructs his/her self through posterior analysis, with the free and clarified
dynamic processes of differentiation/dediffer- consent of all participants, in accordance to the
entiation/new differentiations from others norms required by CONEP/Brazil.
(Guimarães, 2016a). Therefore, the Amerindian While discussing the obtained results, we
construction of the person can never be established interdisciplinary articulations with
fixed on a static identity, although the self’s information originated from anthropological,
ethnic-affirmation is central in the interethnic historical, and socio-demographic studies. We
situation: liaised also with discourses expressed by
576 dan ilo silva g ui m a rã e s a nd m a rí l i a a ntune s be ne d ito
organized indigenous movements and other stud- of their indigenousness, that is, by presenting
ies concerning indigenous conceptions on basic letters from the communitarian chiefs asserting
and academic education in schools and at the their belonging to the ethnic group and/or official
university. The interpretative analysis of the data documentation from the National Indian Founda-
was conducted according to a specific dialogi- tion – FUNAI, Brazil.4
cal approach, combining a descendent analytic For ethical reasons, the names, ethnic group,
trajectory with an ascendant interpretative tra- and university of the participants were omitted,
jectory (Guimarães, 2016b). That is, we first besides other information that could compromise
organized a systematic evaluation of the focused confidentiality.
theme-field (Spink, 2003). We then mapped some
antinomies related to this theme-field, uttered in
the speeches of the interviewed participants, and 31.1.1 Participant A, Belonging to
identified the expressive aspect associated with an Ethnic Group from the Brazilian
them. Finally, we rearticulated the selected utter- Northeast
ances with our aim of study, creating a new, sup- Many peoples of the Brazilian northeast, espe-
posedly more elaborated understanding of the cially those who lived on the banks of the San
whole situation. Francisco River, intensely resisted the colonial
From the selected discussion presented here, enterprise, aimed to reduce mobility between
we expect to make clear that the dedifferentiation/ neighboring villages and communities, assem-
differentiation process is a cultural resource of bling people in common settlements adapted to
the Amerindian academics to cope with the open- the farming culture and introduced in a rigid
ended transformations of the environment, social power structure. Since the 1950s, a great number
relationships, and personal aspirations, allowing of indigenous people from the northeast migrated
conviviality with the difference instead of author- to São Paulo in a process of ethnic reterritorial-
itatively directing it. ization:
Initially there was a flow of men only, who left the

31.1 Between Forest and City: indigenous area to work for short periods in São
The Discourse of Indigenous Paulo, as a form of balancing the home budget
University Students in years of drought or in emergency situations.
Without integrating themselves to the city, they
We selected from the answers of each participant
always returned as soon as immediate necessities
the excerpts we considered most significant to
were covered or when a good winter announced
address the tensions experienced by the students itself. (Arrutti, 2005)
between what they understand as the way of life,
the conceptions, and the ethnic-cultural values of Participant A was born and raised in the area of
their communities of origin and those that con- traditional occupation of his people. He reported
cern life in the urban context and academic edu- opting, after having concluded high school seven
cation. All participants resided, at the time of the years ago, coming to São Paulo where his sib-
interview, in the urban context and were enrolled lings already lived to attend university. The par-
in higher education at two universities of the state ticipant said that, once this goal is fulfilled, he
of São Paulo. Their admission occurred by means intends on going back to his community. In spite
of affirmative policies implemented by these uni- of the opportunities of knowledge and employ-
versities. It is relevant to take into consideration ment the city offers, he states feeling “impris-
that to participate in these affirmative policies the oned” and that his “mind is there [in the village].”
students needed to present substantial evidence When questioned about the differences he sees
The Construction of the Person in the Interethnic Situation 577
between his people’s traditional form of knowl- ational link between the person, the previous gen-
edge construction and the form proposed by the erations, and the future ones:
university, he points to the issue of work:
A: So, after you spend a long time here, the people
that . . . when you left there you already knew,
A: . . . here either you work or you starve to death, relating with them is much easier. Now, to relate,
there you don’t . . . the first thing my father to get in touch with those that have been born
always taught me there was how to hunt, to work, and that don’t remember is much harder.
not how to work as an electrician like that, to Because, since they don’t remember even they
work during a part of the day. At night we went can know that I’m not an indigenous person,
to school, but they always taught us the rituals, isn’t it? But it is very hard, that’s why I want to
the toré.5 . . . go back there, I want to live with them, to me
Researcher: And when you come here how do it is very important. Here I feel like I know
these issues sound to you? nobody, it is very hard. You know people from
A: There you have those prayers, you have another everyday life, from work, you spend more hours
view on things, you feel free as a bird. Here you at work than at home, you know them, but it’s not
don’t, you feel caged, living in these like with people from our place.
apartment[s], there is no space for us to sing, to
have our toré, our dance, it’s very difficult. If you We highlight, from the interview, some anti-
do it at one of those apartments, people start nomies identified by participant A: the contra-
bothering, annoying us . . . then you have to stop. diction between ritualized practices of his peo-
Here . . . we still do it, but still you have to pick ple and the everyday practices of work in the
a spot. Not there. There if we want to do urban context; the relation between the body and
something we do it at our own house, or instead the earth, brought by the possibility of stepping
in a yard . . . It has to be a big yard . . . there has to on the earth versus the impossibility of doing
be a very big space, because it’s a lot of people. this in the paved ground of the cities; the rela-
Now here we have no means of doing that . . . tion between ethnic recognition and conviviality,
here I feel very imprisoned. I always say I don’t
emphasizing the difficulty in getting to know peo-
want to get old here, I want to finish my
ple profoundly with the fragmented forms of con-
graduation and go back, because my goal was to
viviality and neighborhood life provided by the
come here to study, that’s it. But work, I’m an
electrician, I’ve already had some dangerous urban context. There is additionally a considera-
jobs . . . but that’s that . . . Around here is really tion about being in the open space opposed to life
different from the village, because here when in small apartments, characteristic of the urban
you step on the ground you step on what? There context. The last situation does not allow free-
you walk on the land, there you have land to your dom of movement, dancing, and other ritual prac-
heart’s content. Not here, here you walk on tices, leading the participant to differentiate him-
cement and to begin with if you’re going to do a self from the citizens,6 frequently reaffirming that
dance there, you do it on dirt, and here, where in the city he feels “imprisoned.”
would you do it?
31.1.2 Participant B, Belonging to

During the interview, A reports the relevance of
an Ethnic Group Originally from
conviviality in the community as a form of recog-
the Brazilian Northeast
nition of his ethnic belonging; this includes the
possibility of performing rituals which usually The second participant interviewed was a woman
depend on the presence of other people and an born in a county in the state of São Paulo. She
adequate space. Therefore, for him, presence in reported that her grandparents came to the city
the community allows establishing a transgener- where she lives, she being therefore the second
generation born in the urban context. Even was very difficult, both to assume internally and
though she thinks her family is isolated from the transmit to others, because there is still that
rest of the relatives, she stated keeping in touch stereotype that the indigenous person walks
with the village by means of constant visits to the around, you know, naked. You say that in school,
native land of her grandparents: imagine that, in high school, I would ever say I
was an indigenous person. I always had contact,
B: So, actually, I wasn’t born in the village, my because . . . my cousin who graduated here, I had
dad was born here too, in São Paulo, my an aunt who was really involved as an activist,
grandparents were born in the village, they were like, of the indigenous issue, so they were always
raised there, and I think my grandmother came taking us to the events, so . . . I remember giving
here to São Paulo when she was about fifteen, an interview to a local newspaper when I was
together with my grandfather basically because very young, so I always had a contact with the
of work. Then they constituted a family here, indigenous issue, but it was kind of distant
even here in São Paulo, so, and I’ve always had because at that time I didn’t recognize myself
contact with the village, because, as is the [as an indigenous person], so it was always a
custom of even my grandfather, you know, of not conflict, you know. Then, when I became older,
losing the rituals, of the contact, of showing us you know, in the second, third year, I began to
where they came from, of giving strength to the research university courses, and then I saw
indigenous culture. We are always visiting the the [program of selection and follow up of
village, so, like, once a year, we usually went indigenous university students], talked to my
there to visit, so, I know the village, I’ve been cousin and began to refine that idea. Still I felt
there many times, but I never lived there. apprehensive. How will I access something that I
didn’t see as my right? You know, because until
In spite of the interest and the efforts toward an then I didn’t see myself as an indigenous person.
ethnic self-affirmation, the family’s arrival at the So I didn’t have the right to the program, and that
urban context left marks in her process of sub- was little by little, with me talking to my cousin,
jectivation, which made her question herself for reading a bit about it [program of selection and
some time as an indigenous person. According to follow up of indigenous university students],
searching the internet, the desire, of course, of
her report, the doubt persisted until she obtained
attending [a quality] university, you know?
support from her relatives and felt herself valued
Taking a course here, so, then all this began to
in her indigenous ethnic belonging through the
motivate me to go after and pursue, and really
affirmative policies destined to promote admis- try to pass the exam . . . So, then, to me it was
sion of indigenous persons at the university: a conquest, even with the scholarship, even
knowing my entrance may have been made easier
B: I confess that to me it was very strange,
because of it. And not in the sense that “oh, they
thinking that for the fact of me not be . . . that I
gave me this,” I now understand it is a right, even
was not born in the village, you know, I . . .
because of the access denied to my father, of him
sometimes I found myself in the conflict: “but
not being able to, of my grandparents not being
am I an indigenous person?” “I’m not an
able to. So today I, you see, can do it paying for
indigenous person, you see, because I wasn’t
what they . . . being compensated for what they
born in the village, I don’t have the customs
couldn’t do. So, today I have this understanding.
they have.” And it was something that here . . .
together with other colleagues that we . . . that
I recovered this in me, that I truly am an The ambivalence of being or not an indigenous
indigenous person. I have to recognize myself, person expressed by the participant is renewed
you know, and reaffirm myself as an indigenous in a singular manner in the psychological sphere.
person, which was something that up until then The same happens in a social dimension to her
ethnic group, not only in the urban context, but in the Enchanted, aren’t they? They don’t worship
their original lands, to the extent that the colonial only . . . one God, you know? The Holy Trinity,
process introduced changes in the ways of life no. They believe there are other deities, and so,
of the entire population. Political participation, that the indigenous people . . . can make this link,
affirmative policies, and positive discrimination of Catholicism with their own rituals, and that
later on I found this very beautiful. So, because
have an important role in the process of elabora-
even if there was an influence that I think that,
tion of such ambivalence, allowing a novel eth-
there’s no way, they resisted in some way, I think
nic differentiation to emerge, after a conflictive
maintaining the rituals is a form of resistance.
process of dedifferentiation. The efforts in Showing that, in spite they were opened and
the direction of articulating distinct historical- many characteristics of the ethnic group were
cultural trajectories happen at different levels of lost, the ritual is a powerful thing. Like the
the experience of ethnic self-affirmation and pro- language, we don’t have . . . the language, but,
duce cultural hybrids: then, in the songs some words show up, some
things that are proper . . . So it is a form of
resistance, you know? In spite some were lost
B: So, actually, it’s what I said to you the last time,
along the way because of this influence, but I
it’s like that to me still, before it was very
think this union of both things is important, and
confusing, because at the same time the Catholic
achieving this in the city, I think, it’s still more
Church is very present at the village. As I said,
difficult, because it is seen with . . . with eyes,
there’s a church at the center of the village, the
you see . . . always negative, isn’t it? Everything
center of the village is a catholic church, so the
that is not from the dominant church is always
very name of the village is [a name with a
very negative. The matter of the Enchanted, the
catholic reference], isn’t it? I think there’s even a
matter of there being those, you know? As I told
historical issue which I don’t completely master
you, there are, the clothes the Enchanted use . . .
to say why it is called that way, but I believe
And at home we have the images of the
there’s an influence, you know, in the issue of
[Enchanted]. So, if suddenly someone comes
Catholicism and so you can see it’s remarkable
home and sees that, they will at once say it is a
that all indigenous people worship Catholicism a
negative thing, they at once associate it to other
lot, but they didn’t lose their own rituals . . . As
religions which are also seen as negative. So,
I said, my grandmother for example and my
I think it is really important to show that the
grandfather, they are fervent Catholics. They go
dominant church is not the only religion, all are
to church every Sunday, my grandmother is
and deserve respect, even if they are opposite
involved in pastoral care, has always been, even
things. If those indigenous people managed
in coming here to the city, but at the same time,
to . . . unify these two things and be well,
my grandfather, he never stopped chanting the
continue worshiping . . . what they believe in,
songs, when someone comes to talk about the
I think that is important.
indigenous people, he gets his maracá7 and
sings. And when they go there, they participate Participant B brings, among other themes, the
in the rituals . . . There are some rituals that are
issue of conviviality as a condition for ethnic
particular of this ethnic group. The toré itself,
recognition and self-affirmation and indicates
which is common to other ethnic groups, which
the existence of a process of internalization of
is a dance, and they do it, they participate. And
it’s like that, to Catholicism, I think it is a point socially experienced conflicts in this scope. On
of some conflict, isn’t it? If a priest for example, one hand, the experience of situations of preju-
sees a catholic doing . . . participating in the dice and, on the other, the possibility of having
rituals, he will say the person is not a catholic, one’s ethnicity valued leads to a tense process
because they are rituals of those who believe in that tends to reach a solution with the encounter
with a descriptive narrative of the historical pro- collecting production for the market, performed
cess of the life trajectories of their ethnic group under the command of the Jesuits during the first
and of their relatives – and also through an decades of contact, they passed to self-organization
aesthetic fruition of the culture to which one of the production and commercialization of rubber
belongs or aims to belong. Finally, we note the in the 1980s, through an internal cooperative,
organized in consonance with their form of social
effort of integration and coexistence with two
life. (Arruda, 1998)
ontologies: one that pursues identity and non-
contradiction, distinctly expressed in the religion
Participant C aims to take back to his commu-
of Judeo-Christian origin and the indigenous pos-
nity some of the knowledge from his academic
sibility of coexisting with the opposites by means
education after graduating, when he intends on
of a religiosity capable of encompassing the
returning to his land of origin. In the interview,
diverse.8
he comments on the contrast he lives when cir-
cling between these two worlds:
31.1.3 Participant C, Belonging to
an Ethnic Group of the Brazilian C: Look . . . when I’m in my community, they . . .
Amazon don’t receive me in a university kind of way.
Arriving there I say . . . “I’ll be like the
Participant C was born and raised in the area
indigenous people who left here and came back
of traditional occupation of his people, in a ter-
the [same] way.” Only the way we work is
ritory that until half of the twentieth century different, you know? In this case, you arrive with
was little known to the Brazilian government, in some knowledge . . . , you try to clarify for them
terms of the ethnic groups inhabiting that specific how it is, and then they understand, you know?
Amazonian region. Nowadays, in the Amazon, So, they see that we are pursuing something, and
some dozens of indigenous peoples are isolated wanting, well, some help, then . . . It’s like I say,
and protected from contact with the surrounding it’s completely [different] from living in the city,
society. This is a right secured by the Brazilian where many times you live somewhere, let’s say,
legislation, due to the pernicious consequences well locked, where you don’t try . . . If you have a
of the occupation of their territories, which fre- neighbor close by, many times you’re not usually
going to the house. Now, inside the community
quently led to the almost complete decimation of
no, you’re free, you know? You can go wherever
some peoples.9 Only recently, has the missionary
you [want]. Then you go to a colleague’s house,
enterprise modified itself and strived to attenuate
a friend’s, your sister’s house, your aunt’s,
the authoritarianism with the recognition of the you . . . there’s no special time for this, you
right of the indigenous peoples to their own cul- know? Anytime you’re going: “I’m not going
ture. The history of the colonial process leaves just to stroll around or take a walk.” So . . . like,
inevitable marks in the ways of life of these pop- you’re at the same time there around the house,
ulations, that: but you’re trying . . . seeing what’s happening in
the community.
On the other hand, incorporate a great number
of merchandise and utensils produced by the
In his report, ethnic belonging indicates a pos-
surrounding society, with which they maintain
commercial relations, obtaining monetary income sibility of transit seen as more free inside com-
in the last years mainly with the production and munity life. The borders are more permeable or
commercialization of rubber, nuts, and handcraft less noticed in a familiar situation, allowing him
(their feather art is one of the most beautiful among to make the interethnic mediation of the “knowl-
the tribal groups of Brazil). Of the agricultural and edge” acquired in the academic environment:
C: Maintaining them and keeping up with both, times, it is presented as a parallelism that does not
because . . . It’s like, many time[s] [someone] achieve any synthesis (see Guimarães, 2016a).
says “oh, today the native is not like in the old
days,” that time is already gone, isn’t it?
Previously, they already know how it is. Because
many time[s] . . . there are [people] that, [speak] 31.1.4 Participant D, Belonging to
in the interview “oh, but do natives walk around an Ethnic Group of the Brazilian
naked inside the village?” People, that’s long Amazon
gone!
Participant D was born and raised in the area of
The effort of Amerindians who come to the uni- traditional occupation of his people, in the Ama-
versities in the urban context points also to the zonian northwest, where the history of contact of
possibility of hosting difference in the forms of certain ethnic groups with the “white man” dates
knowing the world. The interethnic mediation back to the eighteenth century, when their lands
of knowledge produces impacts on people and where occupied first by religious Jesuits and later
communitarian life. In this sense, hosting alterity by merchants and collectors:
becomes a necessary condition to give strength to
ethnic self-affirmation and depends on a sophis- Long migrations were concluded by the natives
ticated capacity to deal with the multiplicity of due to the escapes, certainly related, among other
perspectives present in interethnic situations: reasons, with the super-exploration by the
merchants. What seems certain is that there were
C: So we say this: since time is, since technology
population downfalls in all the groups of the Içana
is advancing and we are trying to keep up too,
and Xié in this period, propagating among the
because if we don’t keep up who will [do it] for
natives, in a deep and lasting manner, the horror in
us too, you know? It’s difficult. I say this: in
seeing any white man approaching their villages.
general, I think we’ll try, to keep up, right? We
In this sense, these reports reinforce the hypothesis
see it this way. We’re trying to make it happen.
that violence in both sides of the frontier caused the
Like in my community, I’m . . . going, following
downfall not only of the indigenous population, but
both, right? Neither leaving the culture, nor the
their compulsory migration first to Brazil then to
other side. So, I’m following my rhythm.
Venezuela. (Meira, 2002)
We highlight, from the interview with participant
C, the necessity of establishing a plan of coex- Parallel to this context of violence, some intereth-
istence between traditional knowledge from his nic marriages caused the miscegenation of the
ethnic group and the knowledge acquired through population in this region, creating bonds of kin-
academic scientific education. This conciliatory ship and interethnic intermediation. Participant
effort is similar to that portrayed by participant D, in his turn, affirmed that before coming to
B when she affirms the capacity of her culture to São Paulo he lived in the indigenous county of
conciliate the Catholic religiosity and the belief São Gabriel da Cachoeira, where about 74 per-
in the enchanted. The capacity to let coexist, or to cent of the population self-declares as indige-
“carry on both,” as the interviewee says, is pos- nous, divided in distinct ethnic groups, accord-
sible by keeping one’s own rhythm of attention, ing to the IBGE (2012b). He reports yet that after
allowing an autonomously regulated interchange concluding his academic education he intends on
between conviviality in the urban and commu- returning to his land of origin to develop projects
nitarian context.10 Sometimes, it ends up in a related to education, since he considers education
sort of syncretism and hybridization (dediffer- to be a “strong weapon” in the indigenous plight
entiation between the self and the other); other for their rights.
When asked, D reports a significant aspect of historical-cultural process that allows the recon-
his experience of moving to the urban context in struction of the ways of life of his ancestors, the
the state of São Paulo: possibilities and limits lived by his contempo-
raries.
Researcher: And do you remember the first time
When questioned about the reason that led him
you came here? How did you feel here?
to enroll in a course at the university, he answers:
D: So, actually, I had never left the state [Amazon],
you know? I had been to Manaus to spend a D: Yes. What motivated me was the meetings I
week, just that, but there as we are used to seeing went to, the young natives’ meeting, that one
many indigenous peoples in Manaus and all, we touched me a lot. Because at the meetings, in the
feel normal. The difference is [because] we see a social movements, we study history, we study
lot of buildings, a big pollution, lack of structure who suffered, how it happened, in other cities it’s
in the city, and other things most states have. like this, who died, we tell history, the stories of
So . . . and then, I came . . . when I was admitted our grandparents, you see, it touches us and our
at the University . . . When I got here, everybody conscience . . . our view on things . . . it changes,
said, “oh, there’s a native from the Amazon, how you see?
cool, so, the Indian is coming naked.” If you talk
about the Amazon, especially of the frontier with The participant therefore highlights some aspects
Colombia, people talked to me, and when I got already pointed by the first participants: the
here I suffered prejudice for being indigenous . . . importance of conviviality with indigenous per-
for being an indigenous not-indigenous person, sons in their comprehension of the historical pro-
that is, for being a native who is not naked, who cess that justifies the current condition of their
doesn’t know how to speak, who doesn’t
communities of origin. He highlighted, still, the
have . . . you know, autonomy. Then, I had just
relevance of political engagement for the con-
arrived here and I was interviewed for the
stitution of a meaning for the pursuit of aca-
TV . . . So, they also asked all this, everybody
asks and then I explained that the original demic knowledge, redirecting their presence in
peoples, for them to be able . . . for us to live in the urban context to a protection of people and
the white society, we have to benefit from all the values they bring from their communities.
possible structures, so we can learn too and
afterwards take it back to our community, do
you understand?
31.1.5 Participant E, Belonging to
an Ethnic Group of the Brazilian
Society’s expectation of a stereotyped image of Amazon
the Amazonian indigenous person is lived as
Participant E was born and raised in an area of
prejudice, as is the search for an ethnic belong-
traditional indigenous occupation in the Ama-
ing supposedly pure and unchangeable through-
zonian northwest, where peoples living mainly
out time. Despite these conflictive experiences of
on the banks of the Uaupés river constitute an
people and their own ethnic self-affirmation, D
intricate hierarchical articulation between differ-
affirms the importance of recognition of the his-
ent ethnic groups (cf. Arapaso, Bará, Barasana,
tory of the indigenous peoples and the strategies
Desana, Karapanã, Kotiria, Kubeo, Makuna,
they used in order to persist existing as a distinct
Miriti-tapuya, Pira-tapuya, Siriano, Taiwano,
ethnic group and culture, despite the inevitable
Tariana, Tatuyo, Tukano, Tuyuka, and Yuruti):
transformations suffered throughout time (see
Chapter 23, this volume). More than any objec- The history of the contact of the peoples of the
tive characteristic that could identify his eth- Uaupés with the non-indigenous is very old, much
nic belonging, to him it is relevant to know the older than the heyday of rubber at the turn of the
twentieth century. It sends back to the massive little house apart, he didn’t live in the maloca
incursions of the Portuguese in search of slaves in anymore. Then it began, each one of them: my
the first half of the eighteenth century. In spite of uncle, my aunt, each one had their corner, with a
the impact these kidnappers produced and the small straw house and all . . . Then they began to
traumatic and lasting contact with the rubber live on the river banks. Then the . . . the priest[s]
collectors, these merchants were more interested themselves went there, they divided: from here
in the bodies of the natives than in their souls; in on, this little ranch will be called Our Lady of
religious terms, and maybe in social terms also, the Fatima, the other we’ll call . . . the other little
missionaries produced the greatest transformations. ranch up there will be called Saint John, Bela
(ISA, 2002) Vista, Saint Luzia and there off, you see? So my
relation with the elder[s], before I didn’t have
Born and raised in his community of origin, the much . . . like, I didn’t give much value to it, I
interviewee reported having learned Portuguese was too young, so . . . you understand? Since my
at the age of 16. Yet he pointed to some conse- father was . . . is . . . educated in the standards of
quences of the colonial process in his family and, the Catholic religion, my father didn’t give me,
you see, the biggest support: “son you need to
consequently, in his education as a person belong-
learn to bless, to dance, and so on.” So there was
ing to an indigenous ethnic group:
a bit of a . . . distancing from the culture and the
elders, but later I saw, that really . . . I need . . . the
Researcher: How is your relation with the elders,
indigenous culture, you see? But to speak, to
the people who stayed at your village . . . how is
speak [the language of my people], I speak it
it?
fluently, I speak with the elders, you see? So they
E: When I was born . . . my parents and
think I’m a caboclo15 from the region who
grandparents, mostly my parents were
doesn’t speak [the indigenous language]. Then
civilized . . . according to standards of the
I . . . I say this: “do you speak it [the indigenous
Catholic religion, you see? Because in . . . 1945,
language]?” “Yes.” “So speak [in that language]
around that time, most indigenous people lived
and it will be more . . . interactive,” you see?
in malocas,11 a big oca,12 where everybody had
Then I speak [in my language], you see? My
their place, there reserved space to be with their
relation with the elders has become more
little girl, their little boy, their family, you see?
interesting . . . But, since I lost my father early, I
Then there was a specific place. Then . . . what
didn’t have the . . . proximity with the . . . with the
happened: . . . the priest[s] went there, got there,
elders to try to learn blessings, the dance, our
saw that according to the religion, that was not
origin, you see? But, after I . . . I saw I was losing
adequate, it was not acceptable . . . by the God, I
a lot of important things, then I began to search
don’t know, something like that. Then they said:
for, you see? Now, I have a lot of interest, more
from now on you will have to . . . you will stop
respect for . . . my ethnic group, my origins.
using the tanga,13 you will . . . stop . . . dancing,
doing the pajelança14 and blessings, you see? Despite considering the knowledge acquired in
Then they began restricting. Then a bit his higher education should be taken back as a
disappeared: you get sick, the relative who is sick
contribution to his community, the interviewee
was not blessed anymore, it has to be according
realizes there is a great difficulty in expressing his
to the medicine of the non-indigenous people.
culture in the urban context and at the university.
Then it began . . . then there was a little . . . you
see, the culture . . . it didn’t continue evolving. Contrasting his way of life to the urban/academic
There was a regression, let’s put it this way, way of life, he was able to reflect on the pro-
because it was restricted, but . . . then we lost a cesses of dedifferentiation historically imposed
little . . . only that later, my dad, when I was born by the religious missions and consider his present
my dad [and] my mom . . . my dad already had a conflictive opportunity to construct himself as a
person who reveals a novel differentiation articu- nous meanings connected to it. The movements
lated to his ethnic belonging: of resistance to this process, however, persist in
the singular pursuit of the Indigenous university
Researcher: How do you feel the fact that being
students to reclaim the ancestral knowledge in the
in the city transforms your relation with your
traditional culture?
dialogue with those who keep the memories from
E: Well, that is a bit complicated, because you the old days.
don’t have a place for you to . . . a proper place
to do a dance, expose . . . domestic utensils,
you don’t have . . . you don’t have space, you 31.2 Migration to the Urban
feel . . . your surrounding is completely different. Context and the Search for
You don’t have a space to express yourself, to Academic Education
manifest yourself, dance, do other things, so, it’s
a totally separated world, you’re here, your world
Being an indigenous person is not a question of
is small, but you’re there, you’re a native. Only if
feather cocar,16 urucum,17 and bow and arrow,
there was space to manifest, to show the dance,
something apparent and evident in this stereotyping
then it would be an environment where you
way, but a question of “state of the spirit.” A way of
could even show where you came from, who you
being and not of appearing. Actually, something
are, here you’re in a place that is totally closed to
more (or less) than a way of being: Indianness
you, you understand? You see, here, there’s not
designated to us a certain way of becoming,
one indigenous person doing presentations,
something essentially invisible but not less
saying . . . that I’m an indigenous person, I’m
effective: an infinitesimal incessant movement of
from that and that ethnic group, you don’t have
differentiation, not a massive state of “difference”
that . . . this channel to show, you see? So you
anteriorized and established, that is, an identity. (It
stay in a closed environment, which doesn’t give
would be good if anthropologists would one day
you any opportunity to come like, hey, I’m an
stop calling identity difference and vice versa.) Our
indigenous person, let’s dance, let’s do this and
struggle was, therefore, conceptual: our problem
that demonstration, there isn’t, you see? This, in
was getting the “still” of the common sense
the condition of indigenous person, you see?
judgment “these guys are still indigenous people”
This is lacking.
(or “not anymore”) not to signify a transitory state
Participant E resumes central themes from the or a stage to be overcome. The idea was that the
previous interviews, concerning the restrictions indigenous people had “still” not been won, and
that they never would be. They never concluded nor
to perform their rituals and the contrast between
would conclude being indigenous people, “even if
two forms of spatial organization, in the com-
still” . . . Or precisely because of it. In short, the
munity and in the city, where in the urban con-
idea was that being “indigenous” could not be seen
text the possibility of giving visibility to the as a stage in the ascending march to an enviable
indigenous way of life seems restricted due to state of “white” or “civilized.” (Viveiros de Castro,
the division/allotment of space. This same type 2006, p. 3)
of division has been imposed on communities
in their original territories as a form of coloniz- The comprehension of the processes of
ing thought and the traditional ways of life, as differentiation/dedifferentiation/new differentia-
is pointed in the disorganization of the malocas tions from the others emerged in our research as
and the settlement in residences for each nuclear an alternative to face the limitations of the notion
family. The process of naming communities of identity articulated to the notion of property
with religious names also semiotically forced an (Guimarães, 2016a). On one hand, our prelimi-
appropriation of the territory and of the indige- nary studies discussed the articulation between
the notions of self and identity as problematic repression and truth speaking. Repressing the
to the understanding of the construction of the indigenous traditions, considered as examples of
person in non-Eurocentric cultural contexts (see bad manners, signs of evil, and saying the truth
Guimarães, 2013). On the other hand, it is rele- about the malignity of the native customs, which
vant to say that the construction of a rigid cri- should be substituted by the good customs,
expression of knowledge of the true faith.
terion to define Amerindian identity is an aim
Evidently, all of this process was supported in
of the Brazilian State, so as to determine the
teaching, in education. (Costa, 2007)
coverage of public policies (cf. Viveiros de Cas-
tro, 2006). This usually produces aberrant classi- Until the second half of the twentieth century,
fications in the fluid, processual, and imperma- the political project of whitening and miscegena-
nent Amerindian processes of self-affirmation. tion of the Brazilian population aimed to pro-
Considering the complexity and diversity of mote, in a violent manner, the oblivion of some
the notions of identity in contemporary stud- versions of history, languages, and millennial cul-
ies, including the non-essentialist versions of the tural practices characteristic of the diverse origi-
term, it is relevant to stress that a careful dis- nal peoples:
cussion on it is not presented in this chapter.
Nevertheless, this topic is a thorn in the side of After independence, the new Brazilian imperial
researchers that aim to collaborate with the com- state faced the challenge of creating a nation and its
plex contemporary political scenario, in which corresponding people, until then inexistent. It was
the demarcation of ethnic identity is a device with necessary to build a territorial, political, and
ideological use in the elaboration of public poli- ideological unity, producing a collective memory
that could unify the populations under a single
cies for Amerindians in Brazil.
identity. The ethnical and cultural plurality, now
Currently, 36 percent of the population who
highly valued, had no place at that time, and the
self-declares as indigenous in Brazil lives in
ideology of the new Brazilian state was founded on
urban areas (IBGE, 2012a). The indigenous European values of modernization, progress, and
presence in the cities is not recent, but as the first the superiority of the white man. (Almeida, 2012)
Brazilian urban settlements were constructed in
territories traditionally occupied by the indige- Education, as always, has an important role
nous peoples, in the same place or close to where reproducing the Eurocentric ideology, but it is
there communities were, these cities benefited also a source of transformation of such ideology
from the indigenous knowledge and workforce, through the promotion of critical reflection in the
including slave work, for their development population (see Moura & Guimarães, 2013). It
(Monteiro, 1994). In many cases, the reorganiza- was only with the 1988 Federal Constitution of
tion of the ways of life of the indigenous people Brazil that “the rights to their own social orga-
in settlements, as rural or urban workers, led to nization, customs, languages, beliefs, and tradi-
a process of concealment of their cultural bonds, tions, as well as the original right to the lands they
objectified in the acts of religious missionaries traditionally occupied, where recognized, com-
and, later, of the Brazilian state: peting to the union the duty to demarcate them,
protect and guarantee respect for all their assets”
The systematization of the pedagogical procedures (Brasil Constituição, 1988/2012, p. 130). From
elaborated by the Society of Jesus in the sixteenth juridical recognition to the effectuation of the
century . . . materialized themselves . . . from the indigenous populations’ rights, however, there is
missionary experiences, from the realities a great distance. In this sense, the current migra-
experienced by the Jesuits in their work of tion of indigenous people to the cities can only
be understood as part of a colonial and postcolo- tual movements with intense indigenous partic-
nial historical process, which involves the rela- ipation (Almeida, 2012). In this context, formal
tion between the Brazilian society and the differ- education is, although growing, still low among
ent original peoples. On the other hand, little is the indigenous population in the urban context:
known of what these displacements meant from only 2 percent of the participants interviewed in
the point of view of the migrators. Venturi and Bokany’s research (2013) received
A study performed with 402 indigenous peo- higher education.
ple residing in five Brazilian cities (Venturi & Among the indigenous populations there seem
Bokany, 2013) showed that 68 percent of them to be two expectations in relation to academic
claimed the reasons for leaving their communi- education: on one extreme, attending university
ties were economical (search for work, money, a signifies acquiring knowledge that is valued by
better life, access to food, etc.). Social and famil- the Eurocentric society to use it as an instrument
iar reasons, such as the reunion with relatives or in favor of their own communities. Other posi-
marriages, were also significantly mentioned, as tions in the indigenous movement claim, still,
well as the search for medical treatment, the exis- a higher education guided by the intercultural
tence of internal conflicts, or conflicts surround- dialogue:
ing the land. However, one of the strongest rea-
sons for migration, claimed by 27 percent of the The post-contact historical movement forced
participants, was the demand for education (32% our peoples to innumerous adaptations to the
of the indigenous persons affirmed this was one “knowledge of the whites,” the inverse never
happened. Our knowledge is treated as cultural
of the best things offered by the city); access to
heritage, as if all those who have this knowledge
the university stood out as one of the goals of this
were extinct, they talk about the contribution of the
population (Venturi & Bokany, 2013). indigenous peoples to the constitution of the
Community leaders and indigenous move- Brazilian culture, but limit these contributions to a
ments feel it is necessary to have forms of few words from the native languages incorporated
activism that act inside the representative and in the vocabulary of the Portuguese language. The
operational governmental agencies. To this end, universities contribute the perpetuation of this
the Eurocentric origin is still upheld as being movement when they treat the indigenous issue
important and dominate not only the language, only in the anthropology, history, linguistics,
but also mathematics, technical-scientific knowl- and ethnology classes. Medicine school has also
edge, social sciences, and law, among others. much to learn with the knowledge of our peoples
The pursuit of academic education stems from a in the prevention, treatment, and cure of illness,
engineering, agronomy, pedagogy, architecture
need to take control of territorial management,
and so many others could also learn, in a plural
to strengthen the autonomy of the communities,
exchange. But it is easier to silence and ignore
to legitimate their own conceptions of develop- than to learn from the different, who is treated in
ment, and potentialize the indigenous capacity of Brazilian culture as the inferior. (Fernandes, 2007,
social intervention inside and outside the com- p. 11)
munity (UFRGS, 2013, pp. 129–130).
Parallel to the construction of discourses and We therefore note that the indigenous peoples
images that contribute toward removing the also strive for a reversal from the uneven posi-
Amerindian peoples as historical subjects, the tions in the Brazilian society, by means of a
communities are slowly moving from an invisi- redefinition of the criteria for authorizing the
bility built along the nineteenth century to a pro- said scientific knowledge. Until then, this pro-
tagonist role reclaimed by political and intellec- cess of reversal was focused predominantly in the
confrontation with the religious discourse pro- ment of the communities in the definition of
fessed by the missionaries who tried to convert goals, evaluation, and execution of academic
the Amerindians to the Christian cosmovision, as actions, revising the pedagogical conducts and
seen in some of the excerpts from the interviews traditional theoretical contents so that they dia-
presented in this chapter. More recently, however, logue with the indigenous knowledge without
another issue surfaced: it is the pretentious sci- these being subjugated (Fernandes, 2007). The
entific discourses that need to be appropriated connection between knowledge and power is
and reversed in order not to exert a destructive being discussed in many academic forums, espe-
colonialist role in the historic conceptions of the cially because scientists have historically appro-
indigenous traditions. priated the Amerindian knowledge to develop
Consequently, indigenous students organized their “findings” without acknowledging them
in student movements are building narratives that (see Von Lewinsky, 2004; Zanirato & Ribeiro,
orient the form of relating and the dialogue with 2007). Another issue, focused by the indige-
the universities that they attend: nous academics is related to the social valua-
tion of their knowledge as fiction in opposition to
We have to highlight the importance of this
the supposedly reliable scientific knowledge (see
meeting [1st National Meeting of Indigenous
Students] as a form of giving more visibility to
Guimarães, 2011; 2012). The indigenous aca-
the indigenous students inside the schooling demics present this problem as a sort of reedition
institutions. This allows not only non-indigenous of the imposition of Christianization, now with
students and professors to get to know and the flag of science.
recognize the existence and the presence of these It is also due to psychology, as a science and as
students in the academic space but also allows an a profession, to reflect on its role in the reproduc-
increment in the fronts of support to the demands tion and critical transformation of the multieth-
of the indigenous peoples. Since one of the points nic spaces of our society, aiming to produce less
accorded at the end of the meeting was the need of hierarchical and more dialogical spaces among
decolonization, the occupation of the academic people, culture, and knowledge (see Guimarães,
space (not only with the presence of indigenous
2012).
students in their courses, but also with the
occupation of the physical spaces of the university
provided by this meeting) is a very important step
toward the decolonization of an ambience that is 31.3 Ethnic Diversity in the
fundamentally elitist and marked by a pretentiously Urban Context: Implications to
superior and excluding knowledge. Psychology
The universities need to start getting in touch
with the indigenous peoples of Brazil’s reality When He made this earth, the whole world, He
and open themselves to the indigenous knowledge didn’t say, this part is for the white people, this is
and wisdom, understanding them not only as for the black, this one is for the blue, this for the
“popular knowledge,” but recognizing the indigenous people, and this one I don’t know who it
foundations of this knowledge and its validity, even is for. He didn’t say this. It wasn’t made only for
if not proven by the academic science. (ENEI, the indigenous people, no, this land was made for
2013, p. 21) everybody. For everybody to live in. But in this
land we keep fighting. (Speech by indigenous
The scientific knowledge is, therefore, seen as leader Carlito de Oliveira, Guarani Kaiowa, in
knowledge that perpetuates colonization. The an interview in the documentary “À Sombra
university is another space to be decolonized by de um Delírio Verde”; Baccaert, Navarro &
means of a greater participation and involve- Um, 2011)
In cultural psychology, the notion of self is under- Amerindian perspectivism refers to how the
stood as a psychological field that covers the mul- American Indians perceive the world and relate
tiplicity of social positions singularly internal- themselves with it: a point of view over the
ized from a person’s experience in a wider socio- Indigenous point of view. Viveiros de Castro
cultural context that includes other people and presented an innovative reading of the relationship
between indigenous people and nature, founded
the life world. The self could then be consid-
in ancestral knowledge shared in a millennial
ered the place of the diverse in the person, a field
diachronic development. According to the
of occupation and cultivation of culture, with its
Amerindian perspectivism, the identities of the
semi-permeable frontiers to dialogue. But how to subjects brought into relation are deeply
understand the relations between the internalized determined by the alterities to which they relate, as
positions that live within the self – which are they are positioned in a vast network that unites
at times conflictive – and their frontier with the all beings and assemblages of multiple natures
others and the world? (people, other animals, natural phenomena, gods,
The distinct positions in dialogue produce etc.) and only allow the subject to know one’s own
tension in the frontiers between distinct appre- identity when contrasted to the alter with which it
hensions of the socially represented objects, relates. The intersubjective asymmetry we referred
which dynamically transform at the same time to paragraphs above, if observed at the contact
between an indigenous and non-indigenous, is
as the participants in the dialogue are trans-
radical: while we distinguish one nature of many
formed (Marková, 2006). The culture’s symbol-
cultures, for the indigenous there is a cultural form
ism develops with the articulations between sub-
that varies little, a type of relationship with
jective connotations and consensual denotations, multiple natures or supernatures. (Nigro &
which people build about the world, theirs and Guimarães, 2016, p. 252)
others’ (Boesch, 1991). The relations of the per-
son in the world with others leave vestiges that The multinaturalistic ontology expressed in the
establish themselves, in the long term, in cul- Amerindian cultural practices and conceptions is
tural traditions with specific historical trajectories a vector of cultural shock:
from distinct societies. These traditions guide, This reshuffling of our conceptual cards leads me
in a relatively stable manner, the cultivation of to suggest the term multinaturalism to designate
persons, forms of knowledge, and symbolisms one of the contrasting features of Amerindian
(Boesch, 1991), which find resonance in diverse thought in relation to modern “multiculturalist”
spheres of life, personal and collective actions, cosmologies. The latter notion rests on the mutual
and not always ensuring the articulation of these implication of the unity of nature and the
spheres as a whole with meaning (see Guimarães, multiplicity of cultures – the former guaranteed by
2013). the objective universality of bodies and substance,
The dialogue between psychology and Amer- the latter generated by the subjective particularity
of spirit and meaning. Contrary to this, the
indian perspectivism (see Guimarães, 2011;
Amerindian concept would suppose the unity of
2016a), in its turn, has developed around the
spirit and the diversity of bodies. Culture or the
peculiar forms in which the Amerindian tradi-
subject would here take the form of the universal;
tions conceive and practice the I–other–world nature or the object the form of the particular.
relations, in distinction to the cultural concep- This inversion, perhaps too symmetrical to be
tions and practices common to the traditions of more than speculative, must be developed into a
naturalistic foundation and the structure of psy- phenomenologically rich interpretation of
chology as a science and profession: Amerindian cosmological notions, capable of
determining the constitutive conditions of the context, who find themselves in an uncomfort-
contexts which might be called “nature” and able zone between distinct cosmological matri-
“culture.” Thus we must reconstitute these notions ces, which at this moment are not fully possible to
only to then desubstantiate them, since in integrate. The university finds itself, in this sense,
Amerindian thought the categories of Nature and in a position similar to the one the Christian mis-
Culture are not only different in content but also
sionaries occupied in the past and still occupy in
do not possess the same status as their Western
diverse fronts of evangelization.
analogues; they do not indicate domains of being
but rather relational configurations, mobile
perspectives, in sum – points of view. (Viveiros de
Castro, 2005, p. 37)
31.3.1 Psychology,
Multinaturalism, and the
Therefore, from a multinaturalistic ontology, it Construction of the Person
is possible for the Christian, the scientific, and Psychology, as a field of research and reflec-
the Amerindian tradition to coexist without sub- tion, is challenged to comprehend how the pos-
suming one into another. It is possible to have a sibilities and limits of the interethnic dialogue
church in the central square of a community and are configured between antagonist cultural tra-
keep performing Amerindian rituals as much as it ditions. For this, it is necessary to focalize the
is possible to become a scientist carrying on the historical processes linked to the psychosocial
ancestral Amerindian knowledge. Such possibil- impact of the encounters between distinct peo-
ity of coexistence is also expressed in the words ples as well as develop consistent concepts capa-
of Carlito de Oliveira introducing this subsection, ble of describing the personal process of elab-
about the coexistence of differences in the land. oration of tension “in the perpetual return of
The multinaturalistic ontology of the indigenous the encounter” (Krenak, 1998/2000). The multi-
university student guides a way of relating to naturalistic ontology, in its turn, emerges as a
knowledge production in diverse urban and aca- mode of existence that allows and potential-
demic forums, to the extent that the indigenous izes the coexistence of the diverse. The man-
knowledge includes the naturalistic ontology typ- ner in which the indigenous university students
ically found in the scientific disciplines as an encompass the dialogical multiplicity in their
instance of a broader multinaturalistic existence. subjectivation processes – when they describe
It therefore allows finding a common ground for the articulation between the Christian religios-
possible dialogues with the universities, in the ity and the indigenous rituals and between the
dialogical sense of the term (Guimarães, 2014; traditional and the scientific knowledge – seems
2016a). to us especially enriching to the comprehension
In the opposite direction to the dialogue, of the psychosocial processes that allow host-
modern sciences have historically taken further ing the diverse in oneself. The cultivation of
the division between myth and logos (Gadamer, difference in the social field unravels itself in
1954/2010, 1981/2010) and relegated certain the processes of construction of the self of the
myths to the condition of fables while others person:
remain as fundamental references to scientific
development (cf. Stengers, 2002). This distanc- Every individual self within a given society or
ing between the Amerindian ontologies and those social community reflects in its organized structure
professed at the universities produce suffering in the whole relational pattern of organized social
the indigenous university students in the urban behavior which that society or community exhibits
or is carrying on, and its organized structure is cern the fractures in the field where they were
constituted by this pattern; but since each of these socialized.
individual selves reflects a uniquely different aspect When dealing with the socialization processes
or perspective of this pattern in its structure, from that imply the social construction of objective and
its own particular and unique place or standpoint subjective realities of a person, Berger and Luck-
within the whole process of organized social
mann (2003) mention at least two moments in
behavior which exhibits this pattern – since, that is,
which socialization happens, distinguishing them
each is differently or uniquely related to that whole
through the notions of primary and secondary
process, and occupies its own essentially unique
focus of relations therein-the structure of each is socialization. The role of primary socialization,
differently constituted by this pattern from the way in its turn, would be crucial to configure a per-
in which the structure of any other is so constituted. son’s belonging to a determined cosmovision:
(Mead, 1934, pp. 201–202)
Only when he has achieved this degree of
On the one hand, Mead emphasizes an impor- internalization is an individual a member of society.
tant part–whole relation in the comprehension The ontogenetic process by which this is brought
of the multiple possibilities of developing one- about is socialization, which may thus be defined as
self, establishing a particular focus that covers the comprehensive and consistent induction of an
simultaneously the totality of the social field of individual into the objective world of a society or
the community in which the person develops. a sector of it. Primary socialization is the first
socialization an individual undergoes in childhood,
On the other hand, a psychological comprehen-
through which he becomes a member of society.
sion centered in the individual or one that frag-
Secondary socialization is any subsequent process
ments the person in terms of psychic proper-
that inducts an already socialized individual into
ties without reintegrating them into their action- new sectors of the objective world of his
able whole would be limited and insufficient to society . . .
comprehend the relevance of conviviality, of the It is at once evident that primary socialization is
forms of cultural expression and its relation with usually the most important one for an individual,
territory, songs and dances, and so on, pointed by and that the basic structure of all secondary
the indigenous university students. socialization has to resemble that of primary
Reflecting on the social field depends on the socialization. (Berger & Luckmann, 2003,
person’s possibility of interacting with the par- pp. 150–151)
ticipants in their community, incorporating new
images (i.e., terms, voices, or subjectivities) by When secondary socialization does not find
means of the selective internalization and exter- a continuity with the primary process of social-
nalization departing from their singular posi- ization, the person may live experiences of
tion. This happens at the same time the social intense ruptures, understood as a cultural shock
sphere transforms itself by means of a com- in which the stability of that which constituted
municative process in the culture–person–culture itself as reality is questioned. In the expression
relation (see Boesch, 1992). In this comprehen- of the indigenous university students that we
sion, the individual would not be an a priori interviewed, the cultural shocks brought by the
category, but one that can emerge in societies displacement to the cities are evidenced, for
where it is relevant to understand the person as example, in the sensations of imprisonment in
an individual. The person always develops elab- the concrete and conceptual divisions of the
orating in a singular way the divisions that con- urban context and the academic disciplines.
Roy Wagner (1981) indicates that anthropol- dation of alterity to preconceived formats). The
ogy invents the cultures it finds by means of forms of resistance have, in these cases, taken
the experience of cultural shock and the sub- place due to the possibility of distancing oneself,
sequent creative elaboration of meanings about of not putting in dialogue certain aspects that are
the indefinable distance between the margins meant to be preserved.
of each culture, surrounding what would be
the other’s culture and what would be our own.
31.3.2 Self as the Space of
The constructions that emerge from this process
Circulation of Subjective Agencies
are always misguided, when the search is for a
pretense identity between the images of the other The personal self, as we are proposing here,
mirrored in oneself and those images mirrored is a result of active processes of internalization
in the external observer (see Viveiros de Castro, and externalization that transform in a singular
2004); to the extent that the researchers must use way the experiences lived by a person in the
themselves as an instrument in the elaboration social field. In the transformative intrapersonal
of knowledge. The socialization of the person dialogue, the person must handle a multiplic-
who produces knowledge is a condition for their ity of discourses (ideologies, master-narratives,
possible insertion and meaning construction in a myths) present in the social field in which they
diverse cultural field, from where new reflections live. Many of these discourses are constituted as
may be built. systems of belief, justification, and explanation
The construction of the person and of the of lived experiences, constructed by determined
other happens in an infinite space of creativity, social groups (see Boesch, 1991), among which
although this space is not completely free. We are those we can consider as distinct cultures. The
dealing here with the notion of restricted inde- systems of belief, justification, and explanation of
terminacy (Valsiner, 1998). These considerations diverse ethnic groups are not always fully conver-
allow us to conceive the notion of the personal gent, being many times contradictory and others
self through the metaphor of a house or as the not finding a plan of sharing to allow the elabora-
territory of communitarian life, in opposition to tion of syntheses.
a notion of the self dependent on the concept The persons who wander in the nebulous fron-
of identity and property (see Guimarães, 2013): tier of interethnic relations see themselves in the
As long as the doors or frontiers of the land/self difficult task of translating, or rather, transduc-
are open, all who circulate can enter the territory ing (see Viveiros de Castro, 2004; Morais &
and compose it. In this case, the self would then Guimarães, 2015) the belief systems from one
be the space for the life of “all,” as was empha- ethnic frontier to the other.18 This process does
sized in the words of indigenous leader Carlito de not take place without mistakes, since the fil-
Oliveira. On the other hand, many times the self ters, assimilations, and transformations of dis-
becomes a territory of violent, authoritarian colo- courses in the transit between different systems
nization, or of disputes between asymmetric posi- of belief always imply variation. That is, the
tions, especially when the communitarian per- construction that the indigenous university stu-
spective internalized by the person is not capable dents make of the city and scientific knowl-
of hosting diversity in a dialogical manner (for edge demands a recreation of the academic
example, the non-acceptance by the missionaries space and elaboration of new knowledge, which
of the traditional indigenous ways of life and con- points to directions still not processed by the
ceptions, leading to an authoritarian accommo- university:
Today it is undoubtedly commonplace to say that with the urban context, the university, and the so-
cultural translation is our discipline’s distinctive called scientific knowledge.
task. But the problem is knowing what precisely is,
can, or should be a translation, and how to carry
such an operation out. It is here that things start to 31.4 Psychology and the
become tricky, as Talal Asad demonstrated in a Construction of the Person in
noteworthy article (1986). I adopt the radical Interethnic Situations
position, which is I believe the same as Asad’s, and
Born in the heart of cultural traditions millen-
that can be summarized as follows: in anthropology,
comparison is in the service of translation and not nially affected by intense conflicts, which at the
the opposite. Anthropology compares so as to same time affirm peaceful ideologies without
translate, and not to explain, justify, generalize, any perspective of truly reaching peace, psychol-
interpret, contextualize, reveal the unconscious, say ogy can benefit from and contribute to possible
what goes without saying, and so forth. I would add escapes from the blind alley in which modern
that to translate is always to betray, as the Italian societies find themselves. It seems to us promis-
saying goes. However, a good translation – and ing to search outside the Eurocentric tradition, in
here I am paraphrasing Walter Benjamin (or rather built and highly sophisticated cultural resources
Rudolf Pannwitz via Benjamin) – is one that directed to the production and maintenance of the
betrays the destination language, not the source
diversity of the living species and ways of life.
language. A good translation is one that allows
As a science and profession, psychology
the alien concepts to deform and subvert the
needs, therefore, to be capable of opening itself
translator’s conceptual toolbox so that the intention
of the original language can be expressed within theoretically and methodologically to the plu-
the new one. (Viveiros de Castro, 2004, p. 5) rality of forms of knowledge originated from
distinct ethnic matrices as foundations of sophis-
ticated meanings and forms of knowledge, pro-
The translation model defended by Amerindian duced in forums of dialogue unknown until now.
perspectivism supposes, as a theoretical formu- The indigenous people who reach university are
lation in the field of anthropology, a transduc- those who currently also graduate as psycholo-
tion, that is, it supposes the nonidentity between gists (among other professions) and are those to
the terms of the dialogue in a creative process whom psychologists begin offering services, be
of signification, which presupposes equivocation it in the communities or in the urban context.
and difference. The process of transduction sup- Psychology, therefore, must be prepared for the
poses a redirecting of meaning through its being inevitable transformations that these consistent
passed by the body of significance of the other fields of comprehension and ethical intervention
culture, which establishes the basis for the culti- demand.
vation of the terms it incorporates. In this sense, The indigenous university students have per-
the notion of self, extensively developed in psy- formed the difficult task of transiting between
chology, suffers transformations while passing the cosmovisions of the Western traditions at the
the Amerindian systems or bodies of significa- universities and the cosmovisions from their dis-
tion. We begin to understand that the construction tinct ethnic origins, without synthesizing them in
of the person involves ritualized practices, which a dialectic manner, which overcomes contradic-
concern the body – singing and dancing, hunting tion. In this circulation, they managed to organize
and feeding from the forest, and so on – advanc- within their self multiple possibilities of being
ing in the comprehension of diverse specificities available in interethnic situations. They have
inherent to the relation of the indigenous people included, in a proper way, the foreign cultural
practices and knowledge in their cultural frame, an entire political-cultural process of creative
at the same time making visible their contem- adaptation which generates the possibility
porary way of being in the urban context where conditions of a field of interethnic negotiation
they carry out their ancestral ethnic belonging. To where the colonial discourse may be bypassed or
cope with this complex, conflictive situation, they subverted. The cultural intertextuality of the
contact is nurtured both by this discursive
developed strategies of differentiation, dediffer-
ethnopolitics and by the rhetorical forms (negative
entiation, and novel differentiation, available in a
or positive) by which the white people build the
multinaturalistic, transductive communication.
“Indians.” However, it is not limited only to the
With the violent approaches from the Euro- reciprocal images of Indians and whites. The
centric societies that have aimed for more than self-definition of each protagonist feeds not only
500 years to impose their cosmovisions and on the representation built of the other, but also
forms of social organization over the Amerindian of the representation this other builds of him: self-
traditions, resistance many times happened by the representation of interethnic actors builds itself in
denial of dialogue, by gaining distance. When the crossroads of the image he has of the other and
that is not possible, a subjective schism takes their own image mirrored in the other. (Albert,
place, along with the construction of collec- 2002, p. 4)
tive and personal symbolic spaces, which main-
tain exclusivity of ethnic belonging. Settled on Different from what was thought in the aca-
cosmovisions characteristic of their ethnic ori- demic environment in the nineteenth and twenti-
gins, the indigenous university students operate eth centuries about the supposed hermetic char-
a transduction, in which the knowledge acquired acter of the indigenous societies (Viveiros de
in the urban context and at the university serve Castro, 2006) – just as in European medieval
to feed and develop the forms of knowledge societies or the city-states of ancient times –
that are proper to their community, guaranteeing currently, the perception has grown that the
the maintenance and coexistence of the diverse ontologies of the indigenous societies point to the
characteristic of the multinaturalistic Amerindian construction of persons capable of self-affirming
ontologies. ethnically, at the same time as being able to
Cities are places in the contemporary world live respectfully with difference (see Macena &
progressively populated by people from distinct Guimarães, 2016). These are necessary charac-
ethnic origins. In receiving people from differ- teristics to the contemporary world, which is con-
ent cultural traditions, universities may become tinuously threatened by xenophobic fundamen-
a space of inclusion of epistemological and eth- talisms with their technologies for constructing
ical debates that contemplate these origins. For authoritarian personalities, whose consequences
this it is necessary to subvert the rhetorical logical affect all peoples.
proselytisms which persist in the academic world
in a manner similar to the religious missionary
assaults and open space for the emergence of nov- Notes
elty. In the academic environments open to diver-
1 The cerrado is a biome of the central area of Brazil,
sity, people actively look to give visibility to the
with savanna-like characteristics.
millennial knowledge and practices they inher- 2 The caatinga is a biome found in the northeast of
ited from their ethnic belonging, in a game of Brazil. It is a shrubland and thorn forest.
construction and reconstruction of images that 3 Translated from the original in Portuguese: Por ser
concern the very genesis and transformation of de lá do sertão, lá do cerrado, lá do interior, do
ethnicities, revealing: mato, da caatiga, do roçado, eu quase não saio, eu
quase não tenho amigos, eu quase que não consigo impossible translating a poem. What must be done
ficar na cidade sem viver contrariado. is a process of ‘transduction,’ in which the ‘expe-
4 FUNAI, Fundação Nacional do Índio, is a Brazilian rience’ of the poem crosses one’s body, providing
State Foundation created for the protection of the other routes of textual comprehension so that trans-
Indian interests and culture. lated words may gain meaning through feeling”
5 Toré is a ritual practice common to diverse ethnic (Morais & Guimarães, 2015, p. 142).
groups in the northeast of Brazil.
6 The notion of citizen is etymologically related to
the meaning of inhabiting a city. The notion of cit-
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32 Social Identities, Gender, and Self:
Cultural Canalization in Imagery
Societies
Ana Flávia do Amaral Madureira
Psychology needs culture to make sense of the human lives.

Valsiner (2012, p. 6)
Recently, I was at a beautiful beach in Brazil. 2012). On the other hand, the pre-Socratic Greek
Although I have lived far from the Brazilian philosopher Parmenides of Elea (around 530–460
coast, I have since childhood been fascinated bc) “maybe as a reaction to Heraclitus . . . tried
with the continuous movement of the sea. Dis- to prove that change is impossible and reality is
tinct from the movements of the ocean triggered unique, indivisible and homogeneous” (Stokes,
by mechanical forces, they are uniquely complex, 2012, p. 29). For Parmenides, the change is an
changing according to innumerous factors and illusion. These philosophical assumptions that
interactions. Beyond that, there are more species change is an illusion and that permanence is the
in the oceans than on all the continents. After all, essence of reality have deep implications for the
the sea is a life system! history of sciences, including psychological sci-
All life systems are complex and dynamic ence and its historical difficulty to adopt a devel-
(Fogel, Lyra, & Valsiner, 1997; Mahoney, 1998; opmental and systemic perspective in the studies
Valsiner, 2007a). Therefore, theoretical scientific of psyche.
models that do not recognize these fundamen- However, more recently, especially in the last
tal aspects of life systems are clearly limited. decades of the twentieth century, meaningful
The mechanical models that have developed – epistemological, theoretical, and methodological
since the emergence of the scientific revolution changes have happened in diverse scientific disci-
in Europe between the sixteenth and seventeenth plines. For instance, in the field of physical chem-
centuries (Marcondes, 2000) – are unsuitable to istry, Ilya Prigogine1 and Isabelle Stengers (1997)
investigating life systems through their different “discovered that the rational dialogue with the
levels, that is, biological, sociological, and psy- nature does not consist of the disenchanted flyby
chological levels (Valsiner, 2007a). of a lunar world, but the exploration, always local
This is a long history of philosophers in the and selective, of a complex and multiple nature”
West struggling to deal with the complexity and (p. 5). As a life system, we are part of nature. At
dynamism of life systems. More than 2,000 years the same time, we, humans, are creators and crea-
ago, on one hand, the pre-Socratic Greek philoso- tures of culture. After all, the fact that we are a
pher Heraclitus of Ephesus (around 535–475 bc) social species (biological sociability) was funda-
asserted that everything is in constant flux and mental to the emergence of culture (Pino, 2000).
that the tension between opposite forces is a con- As the image of the beautiful beach in Brazil
stant in the universe (Mahoney, 1998; Stokes, comes again to mind, it strikes me that the
598 a na flá v ia do am a ra l m a d ure i ra
continuous movement of the sea reminds me of 2004; Madureira, 2010; Oliveira & Madureira,
Heraclitus of Ephesus, while the big and sta- 2014; Segato, 2003).
ble rock that I saw on the beach reminds me of To analyze the complex relationship between
Parmenides of Elea. However, this metaphor is self and gender identity from a sociocultural
imprecise, as stable rocks are not static entities psychology framework, the following concepts
on our planet. The rocks only seem stable for us and their articulations are explored in this chap-
in our too short time of life. The rocks on Earth ter: (1) social identities as boundary phenomena;
have undergone profound changes over millions (2) cultural canalization of gender identities; and
of years. Certainly geographical time is much (3) semiotic mediation, especially the mediation
longer than historical time. The irreversibility of through visual signs created by human beings
time has a constructive role in nature, at different and, more precisely, visual representations (as
levels of analysis. Therefore, this principle should discussed by Santaella, 2012). It was not possible
be seriously considered in psychological science, to accomplish this theoretical discussion without
as Valsiner (2007a) emphasized. the deliberate transgression of rigid disciplinary
The goal of this chapter, from a sociocul- boundaries that separate psychology and other
tural psychology framework, is to analyze the sciences.
complex relationship between self, as a dynamic
and culturally contextualized system, and gender
32.1 An Overview of the
identity, as a meaningful social identity deeply
Central Assumptions of
connected within power relations in different
Sociocultural Psychology:
societies. The formulation of a gender concept
Culture and Psyche Together
illustrates the fertile dialogue between academic
production in human sciences and feminist move-
There is no such thing as a human nature
ments as social and political movements that have
independent of culture. Geertz (1989, p. 35)
a commitment to the transformation of hierarchi-
cal gender relations (Louro, 1998). In a world where people, social groups, and coun-
The concept of gender, as an analytical and tries increasingly invest in the construction of
political tool, seeks to reject the “explanations” of walls (in the denotative and connotative senses),
inequalities between men and women anchored we should instead channel our efforts toward
in biological differences (Scott, 1995). More- building bridges among people, countries, and
over, according to the historian and feminist different disciplines. The construction of bridges
theorist Joan Scott (1998), “when I talk about between different disciplines is an antidote to the
gender, I want to refer to the discourse on dif- historical tendency of modern science toward an
ference of the sexes. It does not refer only to increase in specialization of knowledge. In other
ideas, but also to institutions, structures, daily words, it is to learn more and more about less
life practices . . . rituals and everything that con- and less, as criticized by the Brazilian author
stitutes social relations” (p. 115). It is impor- Rubem Alves (2012) in his interesting, didactic,
tant to recognize that the differences between and poetic book that presents an introduction to
men and women – in diverse cultural contexts scientific philosophy.
permeated by sexism – are amplified in order When we seriously think about the complexity
to maintain inequalities in public and private of reality (in its diverse levels: physical, biolog-
domains from a rigid and hierarchical perspec- ical, sociological, psychological, etc.), it makes
tive, as has been discussed by various contempo- sense to extend our horizon of knowledge. To
rary authors (e.g., Bourdieu, 2005; Louro, 1998, do that, it is essential to transcend the rigid
Social Identities, Gender, and Self 599
disciplinary boundaries that separate the psy- dynamic systems thinking is all living systems
chologies of other sciences. More specifically, it are inherently developmental. Living systems are
is necessary to transcend the boundaries that sep- not rigid structures, but dynamically stable pro-
arate science and art (Madureira, 2016; Moreira, cesses.” Therefore, concerning the development
2011). From a sociocultural psychology frame- of human psyche, the processes of internaliza-
work, if we want to understand the complex relation and externalization of cultural meanings
tions between gender identities and self – which are not processes of mere reproduction from an
is the focus of analysis of this chapter – it is interpsychological domain to an intrapsychologi-
necessary to promote multiple interdisciplinary cal domain, and vice versa (Lawrence & Valsiner,
dialogues. But first, what are the fundamental 1993; Valsiner, 2007a).
assumptions of sociocultural psychology? It is therefore necessary to overcome the tra-
According to Valsiner and Rosa (2007a), the ditional dualism (exclusive separation) between
unity of sociocultural psychology comes from its individual mental processes and collective cul-
contrast with nonsocial ways of looking at human ture. According to the immanent perspective
beings. The emphasis on “social” permeates dis- (Demo, 2005) adopted in this chapter, culture is
courses about psyche, and the focus on language conceived as part of nature and not as a “tran-
is, frequently, considered as the basic human fea- scendental entity.” Throughout the phylogenesis
ture that is both the person and the social at the of our species, the complex interactions between
same time. In this direction, the semiotic medi- brain and culture were essential to the devel-
ation is a fundamental explanatory principle for opment of human consciousness (Geertz, 2001).
sociocultural psychology. After all, signs are cul- Human experience, as culturally organized, is the
tural artifacts that guide, in different ways, the result of a long phylogenetic history, as demon-
feelings, thoughts, and actions of each person in strated by the detailed analysis carried out by
the world (Valsiner, 2007a). A relevant principle Rosa (2007a, 2007b), coherent with an immanent
that presents meaningful methodological impli- perspective (Demo, 2005).
cations is the particular “forms of human psy- From a sociocultural psychology framework,
chological phenomena [that] vary across time, culture is a central construct that makes it pos-
persons, and contexts – but the ways they are sible to analyze the symbolic nature of human
organized are universal” (Valsiner, 2007a, p. 16). development. Culture is not simply an “influ-
From a broad theoretical and methodologi- ence” on human development. Instead, culture
cal perspective, there is a continuous tension constitutes the person and forms in a meaningful
between change and stability at different levels way through each person’s development (Bruner,
of analysis: (1) in the biological development of 1997, 2000; Cole, 1992; Rogoff, 2003; Shweder,
each species, (2) in the cultural development of 1991; Valsiner, 2007a). As Madureira and Branco
each society, and (3) in the psychological devel- (2005) emphasize, on one hand, culture makes
opment of each person. It reminds us of the ideas possible the transmission of a collective legacy
by the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Heraclitus through the generations, and on the other hand,
of Ephesus, previously mentioned. It is interest- culture is changed through the creative actions
ing to recognize the existence of deep connec- of individuals, social groups, and political move-
tions between scientific issues and philosophical ments (e.g., feminist movements).
assumptions, even when many scientists do not At the same time that culture is a structuring
consciously or explicitly make such connections. conceptual tool in sociocultural psychology, cul-
According to Fogel, Lyra, and Valsiner (1997, ture is a very difficult concept to define (Valsiner,
p. 3), “one of the more important aspects of 2007a). In social anthropology, the difficulties in
defining culture are widely recognized. Diverse orient our theoretical view in the analysis of dif-
anthropological perspectives define “culture” in ferent subjects (Bruner, 1997; Madureira, 2012;
many different ways. In this chapter, I con- Madureira & Branco, 2012; Rosa, 2007a, 2007b;
sider the interpretative anthropological perspec- Valsiner, 2007a; Valsiner & Rosa, 2007a, 2007b).
tive proposed by Clifford Geertz (1926–2006) as After this brief overview of the central assump-
a fertile way to define culture. More precisely, tions of sociocultural psychology, I focus on a
Geertz (1989) adopts a semiotic conceptualiza- specific subject: social identities as boundary
tion of culture. For him, “human behavior is seen phenomena that connect individuals and social
as symbolic action” (p. 8). Moreover, “this sug- groups. In other words, after clarifying our gen-
gests that there is no such thing as a human nature eral theoretical basis, we can “take off” toward
independent of culture” (p. 35). new specific landscapes.
This definition is coherent with sociocultural
psychology in its efforts to understand the con-
stitutive role of culture concerning the devel- 32.2 Social Identities as
opment of human psyche in an integrative and Boundary Phenomena: The
systemic direction. From the adoption of a semi- Construction of an “Affective
otic conceptualization of culture, Geertz (1989), Bridge” between Individuals
inspired by Max Weber, argues that anthropol- and Social Groups
ogy is a science that seeks interpretations about
the symbolic universe of culture. What makes My opinion is the same as yours . . . Yes, in fact,
Geertz’s interpretative anthropological perspec- the “identity” is only revealed as something to be
tive a fruitful interlocutor with sociocultural psy- invented, and not to be discovered . . . The fragility
and the eternally temporary condition of identity
chology and its central assumptions?
cannot be hidden. The secret was revealed. But this
Basically, the concept of culture “implies a
is a new fact, too recent. Bauman (2005, pp. 21–22,
constructive modification of the natural course author translation)
of affairs” (Valsiner, 2007a, p. 19). In our daily
lives, we deal with multiple cultural artifacts, Imagine a hypothetical world where everybody
such as clothes, shoes, glasses, computers, books, is identical, a world without any differences and
cars, bikes, smartphones, advertising (outdoors, ambiguity. In this dehumanized world, meaning-
television, Internet, etc.), art, science, and philo- making processes would be impossible without
sophical works. All of these introduce “construc- the tensions and ambiguities between sameness
tive modifications” of the natural course of life. and difference. More precisely, “human mean-
All of them integrate, in different proportions, ing, in that sense, is brought to being by differ-
two dimensions: the material and the symbolic ence, contrast, tension, disagreement . . . In other
(Pino, 2005). We ultimately live our lives in a words, meaning is always dependent on the
world saturated with cultural significance. As play between sameness and difference” (Ferreira,
Valsiner (2014) emphasized, we are compulsive Salgado, & Cunha, 2006, p. 28). An essential
builders of meanings. aspect of this theoretical discussion is if differ-
In sum, sociocultural psychology is a heteroge- ences are central to meaning-making processes,
neous “theoretical family” inserted in the broad boundaries would mark these differences.
context of sociogenic perspectives that defend the All cell membranes are boundaries that per-
social genesis of human psychological develop- mit (or not) the transposition of some chemi-
ment. Moreover, culture, semiotic mediation, and cal substances in our bodies (Valsiner, 2007b).
experience are structuring conceptual tools that Thus, in biological terms, boundaries work as
membranes. This metaphorical image is a permeable way – the differences between indi-
promising path to study diverse relevant phenom- viduals and social groups (in terms of gender,
ena for psychology, such as the construction of social class, sexual orientation, nationality, reli-
social identities (e.g., gender identities) and the gion, etc.). As Silva (2000, p. 82; translated by
related dynamics and tensions between in-group author) emphasizes,
and out-group, prejudices, and discriminatory
practices (e.g., sexism) as prejudices in action to affirm the identity means demark boundaries,
(Madureira, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Madureira & means make distinctions between what is inside
and what is outside. The identity is always
Branco, 2012).
connected within a strong separation and
More precisely, concerning the reproduction
distinction, supposes and, at the same time, affirms
of sexism – in formal institutional practices and reaffirms power relations. “We” and “they” are
and informal practices in daily life – a strate- not, in this case, only grammatical distinctions.
gic domain is maintaining rigid and hierarchi-
cal symbolic boundaries between what is cul- Some of these symbolic boundaries do not
turally associated with masculinity and what is present meaningful implications in social inter-
culturally associated with femininity (Madureira, actions, but others present deep and worry-
2010, 2012; Oliveira & Madureira, 2014). After ing implications at different levels of analysis:
all, there are continuous reproductions, and also macrosocial, interpsychological, and intrapsy-
changes, of cultural meanings that configure the chological. These different levels of analysis are
symbolic boundaries that delimit physical and dynamically articulated. To illustrate how sym-
social spaces destined for men and for women – bolic boundaries can present concrete implica-
as, for instance, bars for men and kitchens for tions for the lives of people, we can mention,
women. The sexism culturally works to main- again, the case of sexism.
tain these rigid and hierarchical symbolic bound- The reproduction of sexism in daily life prac-
aries between men and women, as if there were tices transforms semipermeable boundaries –
a “deep abyss” between them (Madureira, 2009, those that symbolically mark the differences
2010). between men and women – into nonpermeable
As the anthropologist Rita Segato (2003) has boundaries that mark the differences symboli-
discussed, the autonomy of women is frequently cally in a rigid way. More than simply marking
perceived as a threat to maintaining the status the differences, what emerges is a hierarchical
system in traditional societies, anchored in the understanding about masculinity and femininity.
criteria of gender and age. It is absolutely neces- The reproduction of sexism plays a strategic role
sary to overcome the simplistic analyses that cir- in the maintenance of status quo concerning the
cumscribe the social problem of violence against gender relations in private and public domains.
women as “individual pathologies,” restricted to Figure 32.1 presents a didactic image of the pre-
some men, without connection with beliefs, val- vious discussion on social identities as boundary
ues, and practices stimulated within the collective phenomena.
culture (Madureira, 2010; Segato, 2003). There- As is observed, there are deep and intri-
fore, public policies to combat violence against cate articulations between (1) identity processes,
women should not ignore the fact that these (2) stereotypes, (3) prejudices, and (4) dis-
issues have clear cultural roots. criminatory practices (Galinkin & Zauli, 2011;
Concerning the identity processes, along gen- Madureira, 2007a, 2012; Myers, 1995; Pérez-
eral lines, there are always symbolic boundaries Nebra & Jesus, 2011). Beyond that, to prop-
that delimit – in a semipermeable or in a not erly study the construction of social identities
Figure 32.1 Social identities as boundary phenomena: from differences to

inequalities, from inequalities to intolerance. Source: Based on Madureira (2012).
(including gender identities) and different kinds fortable sensation of security” (p. 93; empha-
of prejudice (sexism, racism, homophobia, etc.), sis added; translated by author). It is not sur-
it is fundamental to take into account their prising to see the existence of deep connections
historical-cultural bases and their affective roots between sexism and religious fundamentalism (in
(Madureira, 2007a, 2012; Madureira & Branco, different religious traditions). In other words, we
2012, 2015). should consider seriously the affective roots of
Several authors in recent years have empha- both identity processes and prejudices.
sized the cultural, social, and political processes When we talk about the construction of
that erode the traditional references that have social identities, we are talking about feelings
anchored identities, for example, religion and of belonging between individuals and different
nation (Bauman, 2005; Galinkin & Zauli, 2011; groups present in society. Metaphorically, we are
Hall, 1998, 2000; Sawaia, 2014; Woodward, talking about the cultural construction of “affec-
2000). These processes present different implica- tive bridges” that connect individuals and social
tions, such as an increase in religious fundamen- groups (Madureira, 2007a, 2012). The feeling of
talism. belonging to a specific group provides a secure
As Bauman (2005) affirms, fundamentalism and familiar basis to deal with the ambigui-
promotes “a feeling of certainty and eliminates ties present in ordinary situations in daily life
any doubt from the simple, easily absorbed code (Madureira, 2008). From the adoption of the prin-
of behavior that is offered . . . It transmits a com- ciple of irreversibility of time, we are always
confronted with the “unknown”: the future in our sexist societies – as is discussed in the next
(Valsiner, 2007a). section.
Surely there are many ways in which one faces
the “unknown.” However, in terms of general
32.3 Gender Identity and Self as
psychological processes, it is pertinent to men-
a Dynamic and Contextualized
tion the processes specified by Ernest Boesch:
System
(1) Heimweh (“longing for home” – striving
toward the secure and familiar) and (2) Fernweh
According to usage and conventions which are at
(“road to the unknown” – encountering adven-
last being questioned but have by no means been
ture and novelty, but also risks) (Valsiner, 2006). overcome, the social presence of a woman is
While the perception of dangers and risks is different in kind from that of a man. A man’s
related to the promotion of the Heimweh pro- presence is dependent on the promise of power
cess, feelings of curiosity and pleasure are related which embodies. If the promise is large and
to the promotion of the Fernweh process. As incredible, he is found to have little presence.
Joerchel (2007) affirms, The promised power may be moral, physical,
temperamental, economic, social, sexual . . . By
according to Boesch (1998) the relations between contrast, a woman’s presence expresses her own
“home,” secure and the “strange, unfamiliar” is a attitude to herself, and defines what can and
key element in developing a self system . . . Thus, cannot be done to her . . . One might simplify this
the self concept is comprised of both the familiar, saying: men act and women appear. Berger (2008,
the home environment, as well as of the strange pp. 39–41)
and unknown. It is within this tension that humans The conceptualization of identity processes as
develop a self concept: the secure home
boundary phenomena is coherent within the anal-
environment provides the base for the self
yses – carried out by diverse authors in the vast
confidence and self actualization, the strange and
field of human sciences since the 1990s – that
the unknown provides a platform for hopes,
dreams, and desires, for potential actions, and have criticized the essentialist view of identity
potential self concept as well as a platform for fears (Bauman, 2005; Galinkin & Zauli, 2011; Hall,
and threats to the self system . . . In this respect the 1998, 2000; Louro, 1998, 2003, 2004; Madureira,
construction of social barrier can be seen as 2007a, 2012; Moreira & Câmara, 2008; Pollak,
defense mechanisms in reaction to a perceived 1992; Rosa, Bellelli, & Bakhurst, 2000; Rosa &
threat to the self concept. (p. 257; emphasis Blanco, 2007; Sawaia, 2014; Silva, 2000; Wood-
added) ward, 2000). According to Pollak (1992), “iden-
tity construction is a phenomenon produced in
In sum, identity processes contribute, in mean- reference to others . . . Memory and identity can
ingful ways, to constructing “affective bridges” be perfectly negotiated, and they are not phe-
between individuals and social groups. Beyond nomena that should be understood as essences
that, identity processes offer cultural coordi- of a person or group” (p. 204). In other words,
nates that guide the construction of subjectivity social identities (i.e., gender identities, national
(Madureira, 2000, 2007a; Madureira & Branco, identity, social class identity, etc.) are not of
2007, 2012). Thus multiple social ties that con- essence at the “core” of individuals and social
nect us within diverse social groups have an groups; instead, they are cultural and historical
important role in the development of self-systems constructions.
during the course of each of our lives, as, for Gender identities occupy a prominent place
example, our gender identities. To be a man or among social identities that present meaningful
a woman is not a simple detail as we might think implications in daily life. From a sociocultural
psychology framework, the articulation between In this sense, Watzlawik’s (2009) study demon-
gender identities and a self-system is not only strates that the concepts of masculinity and femi-
an interesting theoretical subject but also a sub- ninity, based on oversimplification and overlap-
ject that presents relevant social and psycholog- ping between different levels of analysis, are
ical implications. For example, the anthropolo- extremely fragile in scientific terms. In other
gist Rita Segato (2003) emphasizes that the fight words, to be a man or to be a woman is not a
against gender violence is inseparable from the “natural fact”; instead, belonging to a gender is
change of constitutive affection present in gender a cultural construction permeated with relations
relations as to what many people consider “nor- of power, oppression, and resistance (Foucault,
mal.” According to the author, public policies on 1996).
gender issues are fundamental, but not enough to Concerning gender relations, in general, sex-
promote “the reform of affection.” ism corresponds to “an exclusive separation of
According to the historian and feminist the- genders, prioritizing one over the other, and asso-
orist Joan Scott (1995) in her classic article ciating dismissive meanings orientation to the
on gender issues, “gender is the social organi- ‘other’” (Madureira, 2007b, p. 228). However,
zation of sexual difference. The concept [gen- it is essential to recognize that in diverse soci-
der] is not a reflection of biological reality, but eties, as Bourdieu (2005) has discussed, prestige,
gender constructs the meaning of this reality” status, and autonomy are associated with mas-
(p. 115; emphasis added; translated by author). culinity. In other words, many “positive values”
It is important to mention that the development are socially associated with masculinity (e.g.,
of the gender concept expresses the relevant courage, rationality, objectivity, autonomy).
exchange between the scientific enterprise and Nowadays, it is not a coincidence that con-
the feminist movement, which, as a social and servative groups, in Brazil and in various other
political movement, has fought against the his- countries around the world, defend the mainte-
torical inequalities between men and women in nance of the “traditional gender role” anchored
different domains of life (Louro, 1998), as previ- in different versions of biological essentialism.
ously discussed in this chapter. If we are confronted with a “natural issue,” it
Gender, therefore, is a political and analyti- is not possible to promote any kind of cultural
cal tool (Louro, 1998). As a political tool, gen- or political change. Thus we should be content
der interdisciplinary studies seek to contribute with our “biological destinies” as women and as
to overcoming the historical inequalities between men. After all, we should respect the “laws of
men and women in public and private domains nature.”
of daily life. As an analytical tool, the concept As a reaction against the changes that have
of gender has contributed to developing a crit- occurred in gender relations in Western societies
ical understanding of diverse phenomena from since the second half of the twentieth century,
different fields in the context of human sciences some important conservative segments of Brazil-
over the last decades. Gender studies empha- ian society (although not only in Brazil) have
sizes the fundamental role of culture in the com- defended the return to a “harmony” anchored
plex and ambiguous process of becoming men in gender conventional standards. As Duncan,
and women. Moreover, gender studies has devel- Peterson, and Winter (1997) demonstrated, there
oped diverse critical analyses about the biological is a strong link between authoritarianism and
essentialism present in daily life and in traditional the maintenance of a hierarchical social struc-
Western biomedical models (Costa, 1999; Louro, ture, including the hierarchical structure of
1998; Madureira, 2010). gender. Nevertheless, it is extremely simplistic to
affirm that the inequalities in gender relations are the systemic approach to the issue of the self
just the “fault of men.” The maintenance of these (Branco & Madureira, 2008). Basically, the self
inequalities is sustained by a complex power sys- is a dynamic and cultural contextualized system.
tem that permeates all social instances (Foucault, However, it is a mistake to conceive of the self
1996). as a harmonic system. As Hermans (2004, p. 13)
Therefore men and women participate, even if has emphasized, “the different parts of the self
unintentionally, in the reproduction of sexism in [I-positions] are not only involved in commu-
daily practice. In the interfaces between gender nicative interchange, but also subjected to rela-
and sexuality, the “scornful talk among women tive dominance, with some parts being more pow-
about the sexual behavior of other women is, for erful or speaking with louder voices than other
example, a powerful informal social control strat- parts.”
egy concerning feminine sexuality” (Madureira, After all, power relations are present not only
2012, p. 585). Thus, in the studies on sexu- at social interactions between individuals and
ality, it is essential to pay special attention to groups but also in the intrapsychological level of
gender issues, permeated with cultural mean- analysis. In other words, some I-positions tend
ings associated with masculinity and femininity to dominate other I-positions. Sometimes this
(Blackwood, 2000; Madureira, 2007b). The par- dominance assumes a very rigid form, especially
ticular ways in which real people experience their when some I-positions have a meaningful func-
sexuality are mediated by “gender ideologies that tion in maintaining the status quo in our soci-
enable and structure differential practices from eties permeated by many prejudices. There are
women and men” (Blackwood, 2000, p. 229). deep connections between the social hierarchies
At this moment, perhaps the reader is question- present in collective culture and power relations
ing the relation between the previous discussion among different I-positions in the intrapsycho-
on gender and the self-system? What is the rel- logical level of analysis. For example, in cultural
evance of this discussion for research concerned contexts deeply permeated by sexism, it is rea-
with the sociocultural psychology framework? sonable to deduce that to be a “true” man and
First, it is pertinent to mention the useful- a “true” woman assumes vital importance, not
ness of the recent dialogues undertaken between only in ordinary social interactions but also in the
sociocultural psychology and dialogical self interactions between different I-positions.
theory (Branco & Madureira, 2008; Ferreira, In these contexts, many mechanisms of cul-
Salgado, & Cunha, 2006; Hermans, 2001, 2004; tural canalization reinforce the development of
Rosa, Duarte, & Gonçalves, 2008). As a “culture- the self in a coherent way within gender stereo-
inclusive” theory, dialogical self theory, proposed types. Thus “I as a man” or “I as a woman” tends
by Hermans (2001), was built on the ideas of to assume a dominance over other I-positions
William James (1842–1910) and Mikhail Bakhtin in the self-system, regardless of the price paid
(1895–1975). More precisely, the self is con- in terms of physical and psychological suffer-
ceived as a self-system, integrated by multiple I- ing. In this sense, it is pertinent to mention
positions that dynamically interact with the cul- that diverse authors nowadays stress that the
tural context into which the individual is inserted cultural construction of hegemonic masculinity
(Hermans, 2001). involves the constant “expulsion of oneself” of
This theoretical perspective is particularly pro- everything that can be associated with femi-
ductive, for it can very well fit into the dialogi- ninity and homosexuality (Bourdieu, 2005; Jun-
cal basis of sociocultural approaches. Moreover, queira, 2009, 2010; Oliveira, 1998; Welzer-Lang,
dialogical self theory is an insightful example of 2001).2
As previously discussed, the fight against gen- themselves (Madureira & Branco, 2005, 2012;
der violence is inseparable from the change Madureira, 2012; Valsiner, 2007a). To understand
of constitutive affection present in gender rela- how cultural canalization processes guide human
tions to what many people consider as “normal” experiences, a fundamental explanatory principle
(Segato, 2003). In a broader sense, in the promo- for sociocultural psychology is the principle of
tion of gender equality, as Segato (2003) has ana- semiotic mediation.
lyzed, public policies on gender issues are funda- From the sociocultural psychology framework,
mental, but they are not enough to promote a deep we consider that the semiotic processes are
“reform of affection.” In addition, sociocultural the basis of cultural phenomena – in both the
psychology can present relevant contributions for collective and personal domains. As there are
understanding culture and psyche in an integrated many possible combinations of icons, indexes,
way. Among other important issues to be investi- and symbols, verbal and visual signs present
gated, it is relevant to ask how gender stereotypes a hybrid nature that introduces great complex-
are promoted in ordinary cultural practice in our ity into meaning-making processes, which are
contemporary imagery societies. always immersed in the irreversible flow of time
(Valsiner, 2007a). In sum, signs are cultural col-
lective artifacts that play a fundamental role in
32.4 Semiotic Mediation and human psyche.
Cultural Canalization of Gender It is necessary to clarify that the defense of
Identities: The Power of Images the relevance of the signs, as cultural artifacts,
in Contemporary Societies in the research on typically human psycholog-
ical functioning does not necessarily imply the
In the art-form of European nude the painters and conception that the relation between individu-
spectator-owners were usually men and the persons als and the social world is a purely rational
treated as objects, usually women. This unequal undertaking mediated by signs expressed through
relationship is so deeply embedded in our culture verbal language. This conception reveals a lin-
that it still structures the consciousness of many guistic and rationalistic reductionism concern-
women [and men too] . . . Today the attitudes and
ing human psyche. First, because affect, cog-
values which informed that tradition are expressed
nition, and action form a complex unity that
through other more widely diffused media –
should not be overlooked by psychological sci-
advertising, journalism, television. Berger (2008,
p. 57) ence and second because verbal language is not
the highest level of semiotic mediation but an
As previously mentioned, human experiences intermediate level. The more abstract (and gen-
always happen in culturally structured con- eral) level of cultural mediation, related to per-
texts, permeated with historically rooted beliefs, sonal values and prejudices, transcends purely
values, and practices that canalize meaning- verbal language (Valsiner, 2007a). In summary, it
making processes, guiding, in different ways, is essential to transcend the conception that semi-
the thoughts, actions, and feelings of people. otic mediation concerns only verbal language and
When we use the concept of cultural canaliza- rational enterprise.
tion instead of cultural determination, we intend Concerning the identity processes in the flow
to stress the active role of people in the meaning- of everyday experiences, people use implicit cri-
making processes relative to the social world teria to include or exclude individuals in sym-
into which they are inserted and in relation to bolic boundaries of a particular group. These
implicit criteria are linked within the personal tials. In sum, images and words are complemen-
values system, which involves beliefs with deep tary “distinct realms”:
affective roots and presents a cultural genesis
(Branco & Madureira, 2008; Madureira, 2012). Far from being in front of a fight of titans – the
Therefore our personal beliefs are not simple verbal and the image – the linguistic expression
and the visual are distinct realms, with ways of
individual creations. Our personal beliefs (and
representing and meaning the reality proper of each
also our prejudices) are constructed from the
one. They are much more complementary, so that it
“shared field” of collective culture, which is
cannot entirely replace the other. (Santaella, 2012,
always informed by history. p. 13, translated by author)
In this sense, it is pertinent to mention that
there is recent interest in the relations between Throughout history, iconic signs have been
collective memory and identity (Pollak, 1992). used as powerful cultural artifacts to make more
After all, it is on the ground of shared memo- concrete concepts that are, in fact, extremely
ries of a specific social group that social identities abstract, such as “nation,” “love,” “faith,” and
are constructed and, continuously, reconstructed “freedom” (Chapter 22, this volume). To do
in daily life. As Rosa, Bellelli, and Bakhurst that, allegorical personification and anthropo-
(2000, p. 42) emphasize, “it is already com- morphism of concepts have been common fea-
mon sense that identity is impossible without tures of human civilization, according to Vico
memory.” Therefore, collective memory articu- and as discussed by Tateo (Chapter 22, this vol-
lates present, past, and possible future projections ume). Iconic signs – in an integrated way with the
(Halbwachs, 2004) and creates a “shared field” narratives – are also fundamental to the cultural
for social groups. The collective memory, shared canalization of how we organize our memories
by a specific social group, is constantly “fed by of the past, not as a simple “neutral and objec-
words and images” that permeate our ordinary tive” task but above all as a task with significant
lives. political implications (see Chapter 24, this vol-
Therefore, words and images are cultural arti- ume). As previously mentioned, there are mean-
facts that guide meaning-making processes by the ingful relations between collective memory and
active person in her/his life experiences. Actu- identity (Pollak, 1992). At the heart of this dis-
ally, the English art critic John Berger (2008) cussion, narratives and images can be used in dif-
discussed, seeing comes before words; the child ferent political ways for different purposes by dif-
looks before he can speak. Images and words – ferent people and social groups (see Chapter 24,
through the socialization processes of people – this volume).
create a “ground of intelligibility” concerning the Therefore, meaning-making processes involve
social word and themselves. a complex and dynamic hybridism between ver-
Thus words and images, as cultural artifacts, bal and visual signs. Beyond that, these are
are conceived as psychological tools provided embodied processes, understanding the body as
by collective culture (Madureira, 2016). On one “the intimate place where nature and culture meet
hand, as cultural artifacts, words and images are each other” (Nightingale & Cromby, 2001, cited
different psychological tools; on the other hand, in Araiza & Gisbert, 2007, p. 115; translated
they are often complementary. For instance, to by author). In other words, the meaning-making
develop a detailed work of analysis and interpre- processes are not guided only by cognition, by
tation of a specific image, like a painting, we need “disembodied minds” devoid of feelings (Bruner,
verbal signs and their particular analytical poten- 1997, 2000; Madureira, 2007a, 2012; Valsiner,
2007a, 2012). As Le Breton (2007, p. 7) claims, object is a cultural artifact produced to create aes-
“before anything, the existence is corporeal.” The thetic experiences.
study of meaning making as embodied processes For Santaella (2012), however, visual arts are
is, certainly, a complex challenge for sociocul- inserted into a wider visual territory: “the field
tural psychology. In this sense, Valsiner (2012) of images as visual representations. They cor-
affirms, respond to drawings, paintings, prints, photos,
film images, television images, and holographic
The question of boundaries between person and and infographic images (also called as ‘com-
environment has been actively disputed in the last puter images’)” (p. 17; translated by author). This
two decades. Of course, human beings live within “image field” (visual representations) is particu-
the boundary – circumscribed by their skin . . .
larly fertile for sociocultural psychology because
The roots of this new focus on immediacy are in
it integrates images as cultural artifacts produced
the resurgence of the centrality of the body in
in the narrower context of the artistic universe in
theorizing about human beings and its abstracted
corollary in terms of the processes of the same category as other images produced in
embodiment of the mental processes. (Valsiner, the broader context of everyday cultural prac-
2012, p. 9) tices, for example, the many photos that people
take with their smartphones in their daily lives
Concerning gender issues, “social control pen- or photos and drawings that appear in magazines
etrates in the mind through the body and its sen- and newspapers.
sations” (Madureira, 2012, p. 593). Therefore, we In the analysis on the historical roots of phe-
should properly consider the cultural process of nomena of interest by psychology and human
“education of vision.” For thousands of years, sciences, in a broader sense, it is necessary to
the visual arts have followed the historical devel- “educate our vision” to properly interpret cultural
opment of various societies around the world. meanings present between the lines of, or implied
The different artistic expressions in the domain in, visual representations (Santaella, 2012) pro-
of visual arts have formed and materialized duced by previous generations. In terms of gen-
the worldviews, beliefs, values, and feelings of der issues, cultural meanings – which delimit
people in different cultural contexts throughout what is socially expected of men and of women –
history. are immersed in broader meaning systems estab-
As Strickland (2004) discussed, art appeared lished historically. The feelings of belonging to
about 25,000 years ago. At some time during a particular gender are culturally constructed
the Ice Age, when our ancestors were still living from beliefs, values, stereotypes, and prejudices
in caves, “the Neanderthal’s mentality of making that delimit, in rigid or flexible ways, the sym-
instruments gave way to Cro-Magnon impulse to bolic boundaries of femininity and masculinity
make images” (p. 4). We are the unique specie (Madureira, 2007a, 2010, 2012).
on our planet that produces art. This particular- For instance, in a previous study (Madureira,
ity is deeply linked to the human being as an 2012), the historical roots of pejorative cultural
excellent symbolic animal. We are compulsive meanings associated with the body and sexuality
builders of meaning (Valsiner, 2014), as previ- of women were problematized from the analysis
ously mentioned in this chapter. According to the of some elements of medieval Christian iconog-
German critic and art historian Erwin Panofsky raphy, permeated by the misogyny characteris-
(2012, pp. 33–34), a work of art is an object pro- tics of the social imaginary of this historical
duced by humans that demands “to be experi- period in Europe. In the study in focus, it was
enced aesthetically.” In other words, the artistic possible to note the strong association between
femininity and demonic forces. Aside from the example, by messages sent through WhatsApp in
figure of Mary, mother of Jesus, women would be many countries around the world.
regarded as demonic beings, dangerous, because Concerning contemporary media, as Sabat
they alienate men from the “way of salvation” (2001) analyzed, the advertising exerts a kind of
(Madureira, 2012). “cultural pedagogy” that often has implications
Therefore, the bodies and sexuality of women for the delimitation of rigid symbolic boundaries
should be objects of strong social control to pre- between femininity and masculinity that, unfor-
vent the expression of the “demoniac potential” tunately, reinforce sexism. However, the images
underlying femininity. Surely there are many eco- broadcast by the media in Western societies cor-
nomic, social, and cultural differences between respond to updates of European painting tradi-
the medieval period in Europe and our Western tion that presents men as subjects and women as
contemporary societies. Nevertheless, “the social objects (Berger, 2008; Loponte, 2002). More pre-
imaginary in the contemporary Christian West- cisely, according to Berger (2008, p. 41), “men
ern societies are still marked, in different ways, act and women appear” in the European paint-
by archaic images about women . . . In some sense ing tradition. The visual representations of men
the moral dualism between Mary and Eve is still traditionally evolve to the incorporation of sym-
alive” (Madureira, 2012, p. 592). bols of status and power (Nogueira, 1986), while
Therefore, sociocultural psychology should be women are represented as an object of masculine
more attentive to the power of images in terms voyeurism (Berger, 2008; Loponte, 2002).
of cultural canalization of gender identities, espe- Note that objects are inanimate entities and
cially when we recognize their pervasive impact as such without desires, autonomy, thoughts, and
on contemporary societies. More precisely, when feelings – without life! For instance, it is common
we focus on the domain of images as visual rep- in advertisements of beer, widespread in Brazil,
resentations (drawings, paintings, photographs, to present women – according to hegemonic body
film and television images, computer images) patterns – as one more object to satisfy men’s
(Santaella, 2012), we can deduce that we are liv- desires. As if every man has heterosexual desires.
ing a true “invasion of images” in our daily lives. As if the unique sense of a woman’s life is to be
Since the nineteenth century, many technologi- an object, “property” of a powerful man to boast
cal inventions have improved the impact of visual in social relations in daily life.
representations in the ordinary lives of humans.
For example, (1) the invention of photography
32.5 Final Remarks
in the first half of the nineteenth century (Hack-
ing, 2012), (2) the invention of cinema at the
We are one – by being individually unique. Valsiner
end of the nineteenth century (Kemp, 2011), (3)
(2007a, p. 18)
the invention of television in the first half of the
twentieth century, (4) the expansion of the use This chapter is the result of an effort to integrate
of personal computers at the end of the twentieth knowledge produced in different areas beyond
century, and (5) the expansion of the use of smart- the disciplinary boundaries that separate psychol-
phones at the beginning of the twenty-first cen- ogy, other sciences, and arts. Particularly, ever
tury. Nowadays, smartphones have increasingly since I was a teenager, I have admired the genius
become extensions of the human body. People of intellectuals like Leonardo da Vinci (1452–
have become experts in articulating words and 1519) – intellectuals who break the rigid bound-
images (static and moving images) to express aries between science and art to create mean-
their thoughts and feelings, as illustrated, for ingful works that inspire new understandings on
relevant issues about nature, culture, and about way of contributing to the prevention of situations
ourselves. of violence and exclusion. In other words, it is a
Each of us is individually unique. At the same way of contributing to the promotion of health in
time, we are part of humanity. The biological a way that is coherent with the most important
unity of our species, on one hand, and the cultural ethical commitment of psychology as a scientific
diversity of human beings, on the other hand, discipline and professional field – the promotion
are fundamental for psychological science. The of everyone’s health and well-being.
particular and the general are deeply connected. To do so, psychology must overcome the tra-
Since the 1990s, sociocultural psychology has ditional individualistic and pathological perspec-
invested in the construction of a more integrative tives that, historically and still today, mark the
and systemic view on human psyche.Without the discipline. We need to identify and analyze the
establishment of interdisciplinary dialogues, this cultural mechanisms that promote violence and
effort would be in vain. Thus the present chap- suffering in many people all over the world.
ter is an invitation to continue investing in the We live in societies that, unfortunately, feed and
expansion of our knowledge horizons – more pre- inflict all sorts of human suffering. More pre-
cisely, our knowledge horizons on gender issues, cisely, promoting suffering is lucrative in the con-
culture, and self. temporary world. It is no coincidence that one
In this chapter, self is conceived as a dynamic of the most lucrative industries nowadays is the
and contextualized system. In research that pharmaceutical industry!
focuses on the development of self, it is essen- In the contemporary world, we observe a sig-
tial to consider the role of “feelings of belong- nificant expansion of discourses anchored in
ing” to specific social groups and their connec- hatred and intolerance toward diverse social
tions within political issues. Surely we are not on groups in terms of gender, sexual orientation,
neutral political ground. Therefore, the conceptu- nationality, ethnic belonging, religion, and so on.
alization of social identities (e.g., gender identi- Unfortunately, this social phenomenon is present
ties) as boundary phenomena, as previously disin several countries, including Brazil. Therefore,
cussed, seems a fertile way to accomplish theoret- sociocultural psychology should develop theoret-
ical and empirical studies within a sociocultural ical and conceptual tools to face the challenges
psychology framework. of our time, including this worrying social phe-
In the cultural contexts permeated by sexism, nomenon. Since the 1990s, sociocultural psy-
to be “a man” or to be “a woman” is not a detail. chology has pursued the construction of a more
Frequently, different social practices, values, and integrative, dynamic, contextualized, and sys-
feelings are culturally canalized to maintain the temic view about human psyche. This view has
rigid symbolic boundaries that split masculinity relevant social implications beyond the physical
and femininity. The transgressions of these rigid and symbolic walls that separate the academic
symbolic boundaries in daily life tend to trig- context from everyday life.
ger mechanisms of punishment against the trans- Knowledge can be a powerful tool to pro-
gressor. Critical analysis of these mechanisms is mote important social change. More precisely,
socially relevant, as, for example, in constructing to promote gender equality in diverse social
prevention strategies of violence against women. spheres, including interpersonal relations in
The issues focused on in this chapter are the private domain, it is essential to combat, in
inserted into the interfaces between education different educational contexts, the sexist verbal
and health. After all, the confrontation of sexism and visual representations of masculinity and
and other forms of prejudice in diverse educa- femininity present in our imagery contem-
tional contexts (school, family, media, etc.) is a porary societies. The study of images as
cultural artifacts, including their analytical, Araiza, A. & Gisbert, G. (2007). Transformaciones del
methodological, and educational potentials cuerpo en psicología social. Psicologia: Teoria e
(Madureira, 2016), as well as the study of visual Pesquisa, 23(1), 111–117.
arts history by sociocultural psychology, can Bauman, Z. (2005). Identidade. Rio de Janeiro:
offer some critical and insightful tools in this Zahar.
Blackwood, E. (2000). Culture and women’s
socially relevant direction.
sexualities. Journal of Social Issues, 56(2),
223–238.
Acknowledgments Branco, A. U. & Madureira, A. F. (2008). Dialogical
self in action: The emergence of self-positions
This chapter brought some contributions from my among complex emotional and cultural
PhD, my postdoctorate studies, and more recent dimensions. Estudios de Psicología, 29(3),
reflections that I have constructed from my pro- 319–332.
fessional experiences as a professor at Centro Berger, J. (2008). Ways of Seeing. London: Penguin
Universitário de Brasília – UniCEUB (Brazil). I Books.
want to thank the National Committee for Sci- Bourdieu, P. (2005). A dominação masculina. Rio de
entific and Technological Development – CNPq Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil.
(Brazil) – for the financial support of my PhD Bruner, J. (1997). Atos de significação. Porto Alegre:
Artes Médicas.
studies, including the period that I was a vis-
Bruner, J. (2000). Cultura da Educação. Lisboa:
iting student of the Psychology Department at
Edições 70.
Clark University (USA). I also want to thank
Cole, M. (1992). Culture in development. In M. H.
the National Committee for Academic Support – Bornstein & M. E. Lamb (Eds.), Developmental
CAPES (Brazil) for the financial support of Psychology: An Advanced Textbook (pp. 731–
my post-doctorate at Universidad Autónoma de 787). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Madrid (Spain). I am deeply grateful to Prof. Costa, J. F. (1999). Ordem médica e norma familiar.
Dr. Angela Branco (Universidade de Brasília, Rio de Janeiro: Graal.
Brazil), Prof. Dr. Jaan Valsiner (Aalborg Univer- Demo, P. (2005). Éticas multiculturais: sobre
sity, Denmark), and Prof. Dr. Alberto Rosa (Uni- convivência humana possível. Petrópolis, Brazil:
versidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain) for their Vozes.
relevant theoretical contributions and for their Duncan, L. E., Peterson, B. E., & Winter, D. G.
(1997). Authoritarianism and gender roles:
important role in my academic trajectory.
Toward a psychological analysis of hegemonic
relationships. Personality and Social Psychology
Notes Bulletin, 23(1), 193–200.
Ferreira, T., Salgado, J., & Cunha, C. (2006).
1 Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003) was awarded a Nobel
Ambiguity and dialogical self: In search for a
Prize for his scientific work on dissipative structures,
dialogical self. Estudios de Psicología, 27(1),
complex systems, and irreversibility.
19–32.
2 About the discussion on physical and psychological
Fogel, A., Lyra, M. C. D. P., & Valsiner, J. (1997).
suffering involved in the construction of hegemonic
Introduction: Perspectives on indeterminism and
masculinity, I suggest the documentary The Mask
development. In A. Fogel, M. C. D. P. Lyra, & J.
You Live In (dir. Jennifer Siebel Newsom, 2015),
Valsiner (Eds.), Dynamics and Indeterminism in
available on Netflix.
Developmental and Social Processes (pp. 1–10).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
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33 The Experience of Aging: Views
from Without and Within
Dieter Ferring
or, even better, prevent AD and other age-related

33.1 Introduction
diseases are high on the priority list across the
Aging has become a topic of public attention due globe. The social sciences as well as engineer-
to increasing life expectancies in the industrial- ing sciences include aging in their theory and
ized societies of Asia and Europe. United Nations research, while some disciplines also develop
data from 2012 show that nine of the ten old- specific approaches or even related disciplines
est populations of the world are from Europe: to focus on gerontological issues, for example,
while Japan has the highest proportion of elderly geropsychology, geriatric medicine, and a sociol-
people, Germany and Italy follow in the sec- ogy dedicated to the aging society. Aging, thus,
ond and third places – followed by Bulgaria, has become a transversal dimension in theory
Finland, Croatia, Greece, Latvia, Slovenia, and and research comparable to other summative con-
Malta. Combined with decreasing fertility, soci- cepts such as gender or the reemerging concept of
eties run the risk of over-aging, that is, the older social class.
part of the population are in the majority with All these efforts – be they disciplinary or inter-
children, adolescents, and adults in the minority. disciplinary – convey the specific meaning that
This has consequences at all levels of the socioe- age and aging represent an irreversible threat to
cological context including the individual expe- the individual and the society. The overall mean-
rience of aging, the effects on society, and the ing of both aging and the old person thus is not
macro context, most notably with respect to the a positive one. Nowadays the individual person
sustainability of public expenditures and the divi- may be afraid of age-related changes and moti-
sion and distribution of public resources. vated to prevent, compensate, or even “deny” all
All this has been stated quite often and sev- changes linked to aging. Several psychological
eral disciplines tackle the challenges associated models of self-regulation described below elab-
with human aging, in particular, age-associated orate on the various dynamics of adapting to the
diseases taking a prominent position. There are predominant negative age stereotype. At the soci-
losses in functional and physical status due to etal level several phenomena reflect such a view
lifestyles and genetic programming that consti- as well: the media build up scenarios of a war
tute part of each individual’s profile and there on the just division of resources between gener-
are several compensatory means provided by ations and policymakers as well as economists,
an assistive culture that help to adapt to these. demographers, and social scientists discuss dif-
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and other neurodegen- ferent scenarios of financing the welfare state
erative diseases show a heightened prevalence implying that aging of societies is one if not
owing to population aging of which not much the most important risk factor of public welfare
was known before the 1980s. Pharmacological (see some chapters in Albert & Ferring, 2013;
research on the substances that will help to stop Ferring, 2010). In this introductory statement,
616 dieter fer r i ng
I like to briefly highlight that such a view marks a 175 years, fathering his son at the age of 99;
change in the perception of elderly persons across his wife Sarah, being 10 years younger, moth-
human history. Being an “elder” or “elderly” ered Isaac thus at the age of 89, “for her age was
already indicates such a changed view. Agricul- as nothing to God” (Genesis 25:7–10). Homer
tural societies, especially, recognized the knowl- describes in his Hymns to Aphrodite, written in
edge and expertise of its older members in var- the seventh century bce, that Tithonos was the
ious domains, be it sewing or healing and cur- lover of Eos, goddess of the dawn, who asked
ing of diseases; decision makers were mostly Zeus to make her lover immortal. The wish was
“senior” as the Latin word “senator” stills con- granted but the goddess did not ask for eternal
veys. Whole societies depended on this “wis- youth, thus, Tithonos lived forever but was eter-
dom” or the lack of it. With the start of the indus- nally burdened by old age. The Pali Canon, dated
trialization the picture began to change, given that 300 bce, holds that old age, disease, and death
older people (now) seem to be no longer econom- are the three evils of suffering; aging is under-
ically productive and thus not contributing to the stood as a biological process affecting the human
common good. body and happening to everyone – even Buddha
who is reported to have died at the age of 80.1
These few examples taken out of different
33.1.1 New Perspectives
cultural heritages, show that aging is a topic of
So much has been written about aging that it historic and, certainly, prehistoric times. There
seems imperative to not repeat and produce more seems to be the need to explain the deterioration
of the same. This chapter bears the title “views manifesting in physical, functional, and mental
from without and within” and I will start with impairments with advancing age that happens to
the view from without highlighting some posi- all of us. Immortality or at least longevity have
tions taken in psychological theory and research. been desired goods – and might unrealistically
I will focus on the lifespan models, on mod- be granted by the (Greek) gods – but in the end
els analyzing aging and self-regulation, as well human beings are mortal and their lives have to
as conceptual “qualifiers” of aging. Following end. This motivated further myths such as the
this, I will get to the individual experience and “fountain of youth” that is a recurrent theme
present biographical data highlighting develop- in human history (see Olshansky, Hayflick, &
mental dynamics underlying the life course and Carnes, 2002). All cultures seem to consider old
offering insight into individual development. The age as an entity besides childhood, adolescence,
aim of this chapter is to present a synthetic and and adulthood, differing by their distinctive
comprehensive view on human aging combin- characteristics of competences, roles, and
ing findings from theory and research following responsibilities. Old age is distinct and different
a nomothetic quantitative approach, on the one qualities are attached to it. Older people receive
hand, as well as an idiographic view using quali- different evaluations in the examples given
tative methods, on the other hand. above. Tithonos may be considered the person
with the greatest suffering – to live forever
and age eternally. The biblical forefathers were
33.2 The View from Without
considered important and full of power; Sarah
was granted the gift of reproduction despite of
33.2.1 A Look at the Phenomena:
her age.
From Biblical Age to Senicide
While the aging process and its challenges
The Torah reports Methuselah to have reached seem to be equivocally perceived as mostly unde-
969 years of age. Abraham is told to have lived sired life conditions in our examples here, the
The Experience of Aging 617
picture of the aging person varies across time. other diagnoses (e.g., New England Journal of
One explanation for differing evaluations of older Medicine, 2013). Linked to this is a discourse
adults – and already mentioned in the intro- about what makes life worthwhile living or –
duction – is offered by Cowgill and Holmes on the other hand – which conditions may ren-
(1972) who link these differences to the transi- der a life no longer worthy to life and may thus
tion from traditional rural-agricultural to indus- justify ending one’s life. Both fatal as well as
trial and urbanized societies. According to these nonfatal diagnoses may lead to the decision to
authors, rural-agricultural societies value experi- seek assisted suicide as Fischer et al. (2008) find
ential knowledge since knowing when to plant in their analysis of assisted suicides in Switzer-
what and when as well as when to prepare the land. The distribution of assisted suicides across
harvest is crucial for life and survival. Conse- age groups shows that 252 persons out of 421
quently, bearers of such a knowledge are much deceased persons (and thus the majority) are
higher appreciated in traditional societies that older than 65 years. In their analysis of 611 of
combine family life and production. Industrial- assisted suicides from 31 countries all over the
ized societies focus on the capacities of produc- world, Gauthier et al. (2014) report a median
tivity (especially in the younger generation) and age of 69 years and underline this as marking
separate family and production of goods. Cul- an age at high risk of malignancy or chronic
tures of economy and production thus exert an disease.
influence on the positive or negative perception
of old age in such a view. But even in rural com-
33.2.2 On Aging, Death and Dying
munities, old aged persons may be considered as
a burden feeding on common resources, and seni- Aging always and unchangeably includes the
cide has been reported in several societies. notion of death and the early developmental
The Japanese word of ubasute stands – accord- models proposed by Havighurst, Erikson, and
ing to Ogawa (2008) – for the legendary practice Bühler mentioned below all include the adapta-
of abandoning older people who became unpro- tion to the finiteness of life as one developmental
ductive and a burden to their families and leave task of the later years. On the other side, there has
them to die. The author uses ubasute as a word been a considerable effort in psychological the-
metaphor that describes today’s “abandoning” of ory and research to arrive at and convey a positive
older adults into nursing homes separating them view on aging. Successful aging, plasticity, and
from their families. The phenomenon of aban- reserve capacity as well as adaptive mechanisms
doning older adults or the voluntary decision of of old age are key words that mark these endeav-
older adults to die when resources were scarce ors which are described in the following. Inter-
and the life of the younger community members estingly, the very effort of such a disciplinary
were at risk has been reported for several cul- discourse to create positive meaning of age and
tures. North American Indians are reported to aging signifies itself a way of adaptation to the
have practices of widow suicide, female infanti- finiteness of life. I will come back to this point
cide, as well as the willing abandonment of older below.
frail adults. The Hindu practice of Sati stands But first, I want to point out that – when talk-
for the voluntary or coerced death of the widow ing about the finiteness of living – one has to dif-
though independent of the widow’s age.2 fer between death and the process of dying. This
A further facet of today’s “senicide” includes may be illustrated by the following statement of
the phenomena of physician-assisted suicide and an older lady at the age of 83. When asked about
euthanasia. There are discussions of assisted sui- death she told me that she is not afraid of death
cide of patients diagnosed with dementia and per se – “when it [life] ends it’s ended” – but she
fears dying in a non-dignified way without any ened probability of losses in learning potential
form of controlling what is happening to her. This and cognitive plasticity and a heightened preva-
wish, which all people will certainly share, high- lence of neurodegenerative disorders and func-
lights the difference between the existential phe- tional impairments in general.
nomena of death and dying. When it comes to the The mortality concept that Smith (2002) links
discourse on dying, both within social sciences to “psychological mortality” in the fourth age
as well as life sciences, I like to highlight two implies death and dying. Smith highlights that
names here that changed or started this discourse. functioning in the fourth age shows a general
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross talked with dying persons decline in psychological well-being and intel-
and offered a book on dying and death developing lectual functioning and thus becomes “death-
a model of grief in 1969. Cecily Sanders initiated related” compared to age-related changes in the
and chaired the St. Christopher’s Hospice and third age. She connects this to the notion of termi-
founded the hospice movement. As Richmond nal decline – a phenomenon described by accel-
(2005) writes in Sanders’s obituary “more than erated decline and functional breakdown five to
anybody else, [she] was responsible for estab- seven years prior to death in very old age (e.g.,
lishing the discipline and the culture of pallia- Berg, 1996). While large data sets such as the
tive care. She introduced effective pain man- Berlin Aging Study allow for the approximate
agement and insisted that dying people needed and quantitative description of such phenomena
dignity, compassion, and respect, as well as rigor- (see also Smith & Baltes, 1993), a qualitative
ous scientific methodology in the testing of treat- analysis is missing. Therefore, I take the position
ments” (Richmond, 2005, p. 238). here that psychological theory and research on
Studying dying as well as establishing condi- aging has widely neglected if not to say “denied”
tions of dignified dying had become topics in dying and death as integral parts of the life
the postwar Western world when demographic course. This may be due to the focus of predom-
changes and over-aging were still phenomena inant models that underline the potential of “suc-
that were hard to imagine. The postwar Western cessful” aging reflecting the sociocultural need
society has been described as death-denying. As for positive framing which will be part of the fol-
Zimmerman and Rodin (2005) elaborate in their lowing section.
work on the denial of death, it seems that lay
public as well as clinicians have taken this phe-
33.2.3 Psychology and Aging
nomenon for granted, while it has been increas-
ingly questioned in the sociological literature (see I have described elsewhere in more detail the
Kellehear, 1984). Interestingly, death and dying sequel of theory building reflecting different
are not often objects of psychological theory and views on human development and aging (see
research on aging. Baltes (1997), for instance, Berg et al., 2008; Zittoun et al., 2013). Table
in his seminal paper on the “incomplete archi- 33.1 gives a selective overview of central con-
tecture of the human life span” never mentions cepts, models, and theories about human aging
death and dying, but he describes the percentage by listing authors, date of publication, and the
of dysfunctional inactive years of the remaining title or specific key words linked to the process
lifetime using findings by Crimmins, Hayward, of human aging. When qualifying these contribu-
and Saito (1996). He differentiates here between tions as central I refer to the echo that all these
the “third age” as a phase of comparatively less discussed models mostly stimulate psychological
impairments and deficits that may also be com- theory and research. Table 33.1 structures the dif-
pensated, and the “fourth age” as having a height- ferent contribution into lifespan models, models
Table 33.1 Overview of central concepts, models, and theories on human aging.
Author Year Label/title
Lifespan models
Bühler 1933/1959 The course of human life as a psychological problem
Erikson 1959 Identity and the life cycle
Havighurst 1961 Developmental tasks
Atchley 1972 Continuity theory
Baltes, Brim, Featherman, 1978–1990 Series on “lifespan development and behavior”
Lerner
Aging and regulation
Thomae 1970 Theory of aging and cognitive theory of personality
Atchley 1972 Continuity theory
Baltes & Baltes 1990 Selective optimization with compensation – a meta model
Brandtstädter & Greve 1994 Theory of assimilative-accommodative mastery
Heckhausen, Schulz 1995, 1996 Primary and secondary control – a lifespan model of
successful aging
Hobfoll 1988 Theory of resource development and conservation
Carstensen 1995 Theory of socio-emotional selectivity
Heckhausen, Wrosch, & 2010 A motivational theory of lifespan development
Schulz
Qualifying aging
Havighurst 1961 Successful aging
Cumming & Henry 1961 Disengagement theory
Lemon, Bengtson, & Peterson 1972 Activity theory
Butler & Gleason 1985 Productive aging
Rowe & Kahn 1998 Successful aging
Baltes & Baltes 1990 Successful aging
Moody 2002 Conscious aging
Tornstam 2005 Positive aging and gerotranscendance
Fernández-Ballesteros 2008 Active aging
Sherman 2010 Contemplative aging
Oerlemans, Bakker, & 2011 Happy aging
Veenhoven
Several authors Healthy aging
on aging and self-regulation, as well as models with respect to being “active,” “productive,” or
that introduce qualification of the aging process “successful” across the decades. They therefore
as “successful,” “active,” and so on. may serve as sociocultural guidance and change
The sequence of models ranges from “disen- the way that aging is perceived and evaluated
gagement” to “successful aging” if one uses their at the individual, the micro, and the macrolevel.
qualifiers and, thus, the message of the models or They may also reflect needs of the sociocultural
at least their summary become more “positive,” context in identifying ways to integrate the aging
that is, rendering a view on the potentials of aging experience in an increasingly aging society and
thus offer a positive frame. Suffering and dying highlighting the interplay of biological as well
and the reflection of one’s life and coming to as sociocultural factors in defining specific top-
terms with the finiteness of life are not reflected ics, crises, or tasks of advancing age. More-
in such a view anymore. over, they underline room for development and
in this reflect a phenomenologically valid reflec-
33.2.3.1 Lifespan Models and Aging tion of different aging profiles of their time.
One may start here with the early model pro- Here, one can also highlight Atchley’s (1972)
posed by Charlotte Bühler who divided life into approach which focuses development across the
five periods initiated by biological processes, the lifespan with respect to continuity. His funda-
last one marked by the end of reproduction. mental proposition is immediately and intuitively
Bühler postulated that even though age may evident: a person who has had an introverted
include physical and functional decline it may youth will keep this behavior and certainly not
also represent a “Periode der Werkvollendung” become an outgoing extrovert in old age (Zittoun
(p. 80), that is, a period where one accomplishes et al., 2013). A merit of this approach is that
his or her “work of life.” Following this, one aging is considered as part of the continuous
may list the model of psychosocial crises pro- individual development and not as a categorical
posed by Erikson and the model of developmen- rupture that renders a person of a certain age
tal tasks by Havighurst as further theories con- as “old.” Individual personality and development
sidering age as a specific period of human devel- have to be taken into account and this opens aging
opment. The tension between different tenden- to a biographical approach which I will pick up
cies characterizes psychosocial crises according later again in this section.
to Erikson asking for a solution to accomplish the But first, I would like to outline another con-
next step of development. Ego integrity versus tribution to lifespan development and aging.
despair describe the prototypical crisis of old age. These two interlinked topics became particularly
A person may thus look back on life and come prominent in the 1980s which is given some
to accept this as meaningful or despair about focus in the book series, Lifespan Development
it. Erikson as well as Bühler consider biological and Behavior, edited by Paul B. Baltes, Orville
change as well as culture as important dynamics Brim, David L. Featherman, and Richard Lerner,
underlying different developmental crises. Hav- with other authors between 1978 and 1990. This
ighurst follows this logic and outlines a set of series included 10 volumes focusing on theoreti-
developmental tasks across the life span that cal and methodological issues with a life-course
reflect biological and psychosocial demands in a approach elaborating on a development con-
given sociocultural context. Later maturity covers cept that underlines the multi-causal and multi-
the life time starting at the age of 60 in this model dimensional nature of human development. Such
and it includes other specific tasks (e.g., adapta- a conception of lifespan development clearly
tion to decreasing physical strength and health, differs from the conception of development in
the loss of loved ones, the preparation for the end early childhood and childhood as a unidirectional
of life). Havighurst highlights that old age allows process following the orthogenetic principle.
for significant learning experiences even though Consequently, this approach sets the frame for
this requires to detach oneself from old roles and theoretical models that elaborate the notion of
taking on new ones. plasticity in the aging process. P. B. Baltes and
All three models are in my view significant M. M. Baltes edited and published a volume on
markers of psychological theories dealing with “successful aging” in 1990 when the last volume
old age because they realize a lifespan approach of Lifespan Development and Behavior appeared.
This book presented several views on human of the older adult and on the other hand on
aging highlighting the potential of the age period the present socially shared stereotypes of old
described by resilience and reserve capacity (see age in a given society. The essential feature for
Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1993) as well life satisfaction is the balance between individ-
as its special mixture of gains and losses. Aging ual needs and perceived reality. Thomae differ-
therefore became again part of lifespan develop- entiated in later works between “aging styles”
ment as outlined by Bühler, Erikson, Havighurst, (“Alternsstile”) and aging as fate (“Altersschick-
and other authors not mentioned here. During sale”) both accentuating an active and non-deficit
the 1990s, human aging became a prominent view of the older person. The cognitive theory
research topic not only in psychological research of personality underlines the role that psycholog-
but also in socioeconomic and life sciences. ical processes (i.e., motivational and cognitive-
The essence of this research was metaphori- evaluative processes) have on human aging in
cally described by P. B. Baltes as the “incom- addition to biological and sociological contribu-
plete architecture of human ontogeny” reflect- tions (Thomae, 1970). This approach opened the
ing an interplay of biology and assistive culture discourse for the consideration and analysis of
described by an increasing demand for culture individual adjustment processes and Table 33.1
while the biological risks (i.e., deleterious genes gives an overview of some models proposed here.
and dysfunctional gene expressions) increase as The model on selective optimization with com-
well and render these compensatory efforts rather pensation (SOC) by Baltes and Baltes is pro-
fruitless (e.g., Baltes, 1997). This kind of disil- posed as a metamodel for the “study of success-
lusioning message was based on empirical evi- ful adaptation and development across the life
dence of the Berlin Aging Study showing the span” (Marsiske et al., 1995, p. 35) that may
heightened risk for multi-morbidity and depen- be used to describe adaptation processes in old
dence in the fourth age, qualifying the changes age as well as across the life course. Several
during this period as “death-related” compared to other models followed of which we can mention
the third age as already highlighted above. a few: Brandtstädter and co-workers describing
accommodative, assimilative, and immunization
33.2.3.2 Aging and Self-regulation strategies of the aging self or Heckhausen and
Starting point for theory and research on regu- Schulz’s proposition of a lifespan theory of pri-
lative efforts and aging is for me the notion of mary and secondary control based on the concep-
differential aging that was brought forward by tual elaborations proposed by Rothbaum, Weisz,
Hans Thomae, author of the Bonn Longitudi- and Snyder (1982). Both models incorporate the
nal Study on Aging. This study began in 1965 functional differentiation between “changing the
with two groups born in the years 1890–1895 world” and “changing the self” that Rothbaum,
and 1900–1905; survivors were followed for 15 Weisz, and Snyder offer. If changes occur that do
and 19 years, respectively. Thomae (1970) under- not allow for direct corrective actions and thus
lined in his theory on aging and the cognitive primary control or assimilative efforts, the indi-
theory on personality that the crucial factor in vidual will use secondary control or accommoda-
determining life satisfaction in old age – as one tive and immunization strategies to regulate and
crucial indicator for individual well-being – is change her/his needs, goals, and priorities. This is
not the objective but the interpretation and evalu- also reflected in Lazarus’s differentiation between
ation of age-correlated impairments and losses. problem- and emotion-focused coping. Accord-
The interpretation of changes depends on the ing to this concept, emotion-focused coping pre-
one hand on needs, motives, and aspirations dominates when stressful conditions are viewed
by a person as “refractory to change,” whereas and new goal engagement. The specific charac-
problem-focused coping predominates events teristics of this model lies in its action-theoretical
that are considered as “controllable by action” approach highlighting the agency of the develop-
(Lazarus, 1993, p. 239). It seems evident that sec- mental actor, clearly underlining the functional
ondary control, accommodative, immunization, priority and the individual preference for primary
and emotion-centered coping become more pre- control efforts.
dominant in self-regulation with advancing age
and heightened risks of irreversible losses. 33.2.3.3 A First Summary and
Carstensen and co-workers focused social Conclusion
interaction and networks in old age proposing At the core of all these models is, in my under-
a lifespan theory of socio-emotional selectivity standing, the phenomenon and dynamic of adap-
determined by the predominant motives of a life tation to the changed life situation and, thus,
period. Hobfoll’s theory on resource develop- the multiple ways people use to adapt. In this,
ment and conservation added further to aging. the models take an approach that is founded
Baltes (2004) underlined that these last psycho- in regulation theory and action theory, and in
logical models of proactive (adaptive) aging rep- this they show several common characteristics.
resent specific building components of the SOC First, all theories postulate a change in demand
model which he considered to be the holistic structures for the aging individual, mostly illus-
and integrative model. In 2010, Heckhausen, trated by irreversible physical and functional
Wrosch, and Schulz came up with a further inte- decline and losses. These may be real changes
grative model proposing a comprehensive the- or they may represent individual reproductions
ory of development and integrating several mod- of socially shared stereotypes about human aging
els mentioned up to here. The authors propose (Thomae, 1970). A person may thus experience
a motivational theory of lifespan development a restriction of mobility by a weakening of mus-
based on 15 propositions on adaptive develop- cles due to missing exercise; this weakening may
mental regulation that they group into four top- worsen if the person perceives this an irreversible
ics. A first class of propositions emphasizes the change due to aging as reflected in stereotypes
preference for and the advantages of primary about the slowly moving and clumsy elderly per-
control across the life course and, thus, under- sons. A person may thus accept this fate and not
lines the adaptive value of primary control. Fur- exercise anymore, which will worsen the condi-
ther propositions describe lifespan trajectories of tion. Second, all models postulate a motivated
primary and secondary control and thus “major change in action strategies motivated by changing
changes in the capacity to exert primary con- demands and challenges serving proactive aging.
trol that are based on fundamental biological One should, for instance, give up blocked goals,
and social changes in available resources (e.g., optimize given resources, and be selective in the
strength, vitality, income, social status, social choice of social partners. This implies a spe-
roles)” (Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010). cific functional rationality (i.e., Zweckrational-
A third thematic group of propositions concerns ität) underlying the specific behavior which is
the optimization of goal choice and appropri- linked to “success” criteria. The rationality used
ate use of control strategies, thus, describing the here is a bounded rationality and thus subject to
interplay between goal choice and disengage- individual information processing. In this sense,
ment and preferred control strategy. Finally, the rationality represents a “satisficing” and not an
fourth class elaborates the action phases of goal “optimal solution,” that is, for the sufficient solu-
choice, goal engagement, goal disengagement, tion to a problem or challenge under specific
circumstances (Simon, 1982). Third, nearly all list – is “disengagement.” Further notions are
models underline the importance or predomi- productive and healthy aging. All the concepts
nance of cognitive processes that serve the goal imply criteria that allow a qualification of the
of “changing the self” rather than “changing the aging process as “successful” or “productive” or
world.” This shows, that the subjective recon- “active” or “healthy” or “happy.” I will not go
struction of reality is leading in taking action into the details here, but like to underline the sig-
and is also the objective of adaptive efforts. nificance and the implication of these qualifiers
Accommodation and not assimilation is therefore as well as their sociocultural background.
central. This also shows that some age-related According to the Oxford English Dictionary,
changes are irreversible losses; approaches to “success” stands for the accomplishment of an
reestablish a status quo ante are fruitless here: aim or purpose signifying (a) the attainment of
the loss of a loved one cannot be re-done, and wealth, fame, or social status as well as (b)
also other regulative maneuvers, such as com- a person that achieves desired aims, or attains
pensation, reach their limits here – the loss of fame, wealth, and so on (OED, s.v. “success”).
a loved person cannot be compensated by lov- “Successful” thus stands for accomplishing a
ing another one. This underlines the notion of desired aim or result. The use of a term implicitly
satisficing and finding a sufficient solution as involves its antonym. In the denotative context of
the rationale underlying individual adaptation. success, this includes the term of failure where
Fourth, although all models do not neglect the it signifies (a) failure and poverty or (b) failure,
macrosocial and cultural contexts as a frame of flop, disaster, a nobody (with respect to a per-
aging, they do focus on the individual, especially son). Success implies achievements and may in
on cognitive processes serving adaptation. Emo- this be closely linked to protestant ethics standing
tional or affective needs of older adults mostly for the moral value of hard work and the fulfill-
represent outcomes of such processes although ment of one’s worldly duties as already described
they may impact or moderate cognitive processes by Weber (1905). Is aging thus to be equaled with
(see Ferring & Boll, 2010). Here lies further success or failure? Similar associations are linked
potential for theory building. Fifth, the models to the term of “productive” and “active” which
emphasize processes qualified as proactive and also convey a certain picture of an aging indi-
adaptive, that all will lead to successful, opti- vidual who is (still) active and productive and
mal, or (at least) normal aging. Pathological pro- thus how an aging individual “ought” to be. The
cesses cannot have a place in such a proactive normative implications of the qualifications as
conception although they represent a significant “successful” or “productive” are easily at hand:
part of human ontogeny as Baltes puts it. This last aging is an achievement and can, thus, be evalu-
point of being proactive in old age mostly indi- ated with respect to results defining this achieve-
cates a further – and maybe not intended – nor- ment. If you do not succeed you may be consid-
mative message of these models illustrated in the ered a failure, if you are no longer productive
following. you may no longer be a member of the produc-
tive community. Evidently, such a conception is
33.2.3.4 The Qualification of Aging individualistic and puts the focus on the individ-
Table 33.1 lists some central concepts used in ual neglecting the milieu and contexts of aging. It
the description of aging – successful aging is the may also lead to social stigmatization contrasting
term that appears several times in this list, fol- the “successful copers” within the group of older
lowed by the notion of activity and active aging. adults with those being ill and disabled and thus
An evident antonym – and the only one in this not “successful.” Such a view also promotes a
perception of “the old” as weak and feeble con- perceived on the one hand and motivational state or
trasted with the younger more successful and pro- structure at the other hand, we neither have to
ductive groups. superimpose an “ideal” or “normal” pattern of
This notion of “aging as a success” has not aging nor a classificatory system on the different
been without criticism (e.g., Moody, 2005). Other varieties.”
aging concepts and qualifications were put for-
This statement opens the floor for a conception
ward that may be considered as a counterac-
of aging that is linked to the individual construal
tion to the aforementioned achievement-oriented
of what is happening in one’s life. This view
approaches. Conscious aging underlines personal
not only underlines that development manifests
growth and consciousness expansion to achieve
in interindividual differences but it reflects intra-
meaning while aging (Moody 2005). There is
individual differences in need and motive pro-
the notion of contemplative aging that elaborates
files across the life course as well. Individuals
spiritual needs and aspects of aging closely linked
try to construct meaning from the experiences in
to the notion of gerotranscendence (Tornstam
their lives and in this they integrate experiences
2005) – another concept describing the spiritual
into their theory of the self and the world (e.g.,
aspect and cosmic transcendence of the aging
Ferring & Filipp, 2000). These individual the-
individual which is quite close to the worldview
ories depend on the experience of shaping and
of Zen Buddhism (see Jönson & Magnusson,
forming significant life events in family and
2001).
social history, and on the ability to adapt to
All these concepts show the motivation to
changed life situations that are integrated into the
describe and explain the various phenomena
individual’s behavioral program (Ferring, 2017).
associated with human aging on the one hand,
The individual adaptation and individual aging
while, on the other hand, the multitude of “qual-
can thus only be understood when taking the
ifications” shows that the discourse is not free
lifespan development into consideration. An indi-
of (implicit) evaluation and recommendations on
vidual’s biography in a given sociocultural milieu
how to adapt to aging in a socially accepted way.
constitutes the object of study in such a view, and
There are social values and norms involved in
I would like to illustrate this in the following with
these concepts. The phenomenon of “youthism”
some case studies.
and the need to stay young and attractive is
one indicator of this; corrective or compensatory
33.3 The View from Within
activities taken here include diets, exercises, cos-
metics, and even surgery are used to convey the
33.3.1 Life Events and Melodies of
picture of a still young and attractive person. The
Living
question that arises is: what is the answer to qual-
ifications of aging from a psychological point of In a first step, I will present here short sketches of
view? three life stories presented by older adults living
I like to quote Hans Thomae (1970, p. 8) here in a rural area during biographic interviews.3 All
in his work on a theory on aging linked to a cog- the stories illustrate that these persons structure
nitive theory of personality: their lives by a series of age- and history-graded
events as well as – and much more important –
“However no kind of classifying different ways of by non-normative events. All stories illustrate as
aging meets the great variety of interindividual well that their lives show central topics or, to
differences. Defining adjustment to aging by the put this metaphorically, show specific “melodies”
principle of balance between situations as it is (see Zittoun et al., 2013)
Jean was born in 1928. He grew up on his Gretchen, born in 1918, who lived to 85 years,
father’s farm; he took over the farm at the age presented herself as always being as “sly as a
of 26 at the end of the war and he and his grow- fox.” She lived with her husband in a house that
ing family lived from dairy products as well as she had built during the late 1970s in the small
producing beef and pork. Jean died at the age of village where she was born. She had no chil-
86 in 2014 being the father of four children and dren and worked as a cook in private house-
five grandchildren, leaving his wife a widow at holds in some larger German cities. Her pri-
the age of 78 years. When you asked Jean about vate motto was to be frugal, save money, and
what happened in his life, he told you several live a modest life. She stocked diverse conserves
things that came into his mind. He started with and preserved strawberries, cherries, pears, and
telling you that his “mama” died when he was plums in her cellar together with wine, beer,
seven years old. He continued with how proud he and strong liquor without drinking this herself.
was to have four children and beautiful grandchil- Gretchen wore clothes until they became thread-
dren, followed by stories about the war and his bare; she ate fruits from her garden and orchard
big family. He liked to reminisce about his fam- even though they might already show signs of
ily and the hard times they had during the war being rotten. She told that to have a “safe stock
emphasizing that they shared everything and had of alimentation” did her good having experienced
to be satisfied with food that no one would eat hunger and deprivation during the war; she added
today. He counted the losses that he experienced as well that “life taught her” to use clothing up
by telling you that all five his brothers had already to the last. Interestingly, she also used this to
died. Jean clearly was a family man. describe her view of men – “one should con-
Catherine, born in 1922, died at the age of 83 sume men as they are – you cannot change them.”
in a nursing home where she had moved at the Being very frugal in respect to herself and her
age of 79 when she could no longer live in her husband, she gave generous gifts of money to the
big house in a rural area. When asked about her younger members of her large family. “To be safe
life she would talk about her husband missing in and in control” was Gretchen’s “melody” of life.
action during the war leaving her to raise the two All these examples show that the three per-
boys. The insecurity of her husband’s fate influ- sons sketched here have predominant memories
enced – as she said – everything that she did in and apparently life themes that remain in their
her life and she kept waiting for his return sev- minds. In two cases, these are irrevocable per-
eral years before giving up hope. She never con- sonal losses – the mother and the spouse – expe-
sidered marrying again. One further significant rienced at different times of life. The case of Jean
story of hers was that she missed her house that who was the youngest of six brothers at the age of
she’d built with the help of her family after the 7 is quite dramatic and one might imagine what
war – she felt that she had abandoned it. A fur- this did to the family in 1935. Catherine shared
ther recurrent topic reveals ambivalent feelings her loss experience with other women of her age
toward her sons. On the one hand, she understood though she showed her own personal way of cop-
why she had to move to the nursing home, on the ing with this life situation. She did not remarry
other hand, she expected her sons to “pay back” but waited for her husband to return. The out-
all she had done for them throughout her life lines that I choose to present here also indicate
investing everything she had to raise them and see that the reconstruction of a life through biography
them “well-equipped to master life.” Catherine’s is guided by the individual event history and this
theme was about “being abandoned” losing her incorporates history- and age-graded normative
husband and losing her children. events as well as critical non-normative events
(see e.g., Hultsch & Plemons, 1979; Willis & to individual needs as well as the needs of the
Baltes, 1980). family. If an event frustrates individual and fam-
History-graded events allow for a differentia- ily needs, it instigates adaptive efforts of the per-
tion between birth groups and they describe the son and the involved system. This event will be
socioecological and cultural context at a given stored in individual memory following the simple
time. Age-graded events are those events that principle that only those experiences are stored
allow for a structuring of the individual life that are in some way linked to individual needs,
course in a given sociocultural context and in this be it that they impede, frustrate, or help to ful-
they represent developmental talks in the sense of fil needs. This applies as well to the family sys-
Havighurst’s propositions. These events are age- tem – family history is always a “shared experi-
correlated and reflect biological development as ence” between members of a family reflecting the
well as socioculturally shared conventions about adaptation to a given socioecological and cultural
roles and duties of the individual within soci- context at a given time (see Ferring, 2017).
ety. Baptism, communion, or bar mitzvah rep- A person confronted with critical, especially
resent such socially shared religiously motivated non-normative, events (such as unexpected diag-
events; school entry, marriage, entering work life, nosis and disease, divorce, loss of a loved one)
and child birth mark another class of biologically has to integrate the experiences associated with
motivated cultural events. The list of these events these events into his or her model of the world
differs between sociocultural backgrounds, but and the self and there is a broad domain of lit-
all societies structure the human life course by erature that elaborates several models and modes
a series of such age-graded events. Given this, of adaptation. Following the Piagetian differenti-
a new class of event arises: the “nonevents” – ation between assimilation and accommodation,
these are age-graded events that are missing in those experiences are assimilated, that is, inte-
an individual biography: a person may thus never grated, into the individual model of the world and
marry, have no children, do not enter a work the self on the one hand. On the other hand, if
life, not being christened, and so on. Depending the experience is novel and does not fit the indi-
on the perceived significance of a specific event, vidual frame, accommodative efforts aiming at
its nonappearance will require adaptive effort by the change of individual assumptions and con-
the individual, and it may mark in retrospect an cepts are required. This is elaborated by several
important event of individual development and models already mentioned in Table 33.1. Roth-
become part of an individual identity. baum, Weisz, and Snyder speak of primary and
secondary control, Heckhausen and Schultz take
this up in a lifespan perspective, and Brandt-
33.3.2 Conclusion: Toward a
städter and coworkers differ as well between
Person-centered Theory of
assimilation, accommodation, and immunization.
Culturally Guided Aging in Families
All these models indicate that the individual can
Baltes and others have highlighted the impor- change the world by some way of corrective
tance of the three event types for shaping human behavior or change the self by changing indi-
development as biocultural co-constructivism vidual assumptions about how the world func-
where the biogenetic program and the sociocul- tions (see also Janoff-Bulman, 1992, on “shat-
tural context interact in producing events that tered assumptions”). All these efforts serve the
impact individual development. I take the posi- function to establish meaning, which includes
tion here that the influence that these events exert both purpose and goals. Meaning can be recon-
on individual development depends on their link structed, causally explaining why something has
happened. Meaning is also teleological meaning an impact on the individual (see Sabat, 2002;
identifying the (positive) consequences associ- Ferring, 2015).
ated with a critical (negative) event. This last As a last point, I want to emphasize that both
form is always a cognitive effort and represents family and culture interact in forming develop-
a construction in a given sociocultural context. ment in general, including, in particular, life in
This notion underlines that culture may provide advanced age. We are born into a given family
tools and means to help in the construction of that is already defined by the specific adaptive
meaning. What is the implication for the aging experiences of the maternal and paternal system.
individual? The family members share meanings and values
First, the aging individual is not the “aging linked to these experiences and this sets a frame
individual” but a person with an individual biog- for further development. The way a family deals
raphy that reflects a continuous stream of expe- with an aging person clearly depends on the val-
riences integrated into the self and determining ues and “norms” of the family on how to deal
the view that a person holds on his or her life. In with “their” older adults. One may show solidar-
such an understanding, aging does not start at a ity, detach oneself, be ambivalent about support-
specific point of time, we rather live forward as ing or not, or have a conflict with the elderly per-
elaborated elsewhere (Zittoun et al., 2013). Sec- sons depending on prior and shared experiences
ond, events associated with aging pose the con- within the family (Ferring et al., 2009). Cul-
tinuous input that a person has to integrate in his ture sets a further frame since it provides addi-
or her view of the world. Here, one may empha- tional means of semiotic regulation and negoti-
size that the critical events associated with the ating reality that may be adapted or declined by
later life course imply both losses and gains and the family depending on their perceived adaptive
that there is an “increasing risk of decline and values. In such a view, solidarity between genera-
decreasing potential for growth across the adult tions may thus represent a culturally shared value
life span,” as Heckhausen, Dixon, and Baltes but it may not be adopted if the family did not
(1989, p. 109) report from their comparison have specific adaptive experiences with practices
of young, middle-aged, and old adults judg- linked to solidarity. In this, aging is a culturally
ing development throughout adulthood. These shaped process in as far as a family adopts cul-
authors highlight as well that “older adults turally shared values and practices about aging.
held more elaborate conceptions about develop-
ment throughout adulthood than younger adults” Notes
(Heckhausen, Dixon, and Baltes, 1989, p. 109).
This last finding in particular indicates the pro- 1 See Tilak (1989).
cess of constructing meaning in the face of the 2 Further examples of suicide or forced suicide – if
one may use this word – can be found at “The
specific life situation associated with aging since
Ethics of Suicide Digital Archive” at the Univer-
it may stand for accommodative efforts result-
sity of Utah, which provides reports and testimonies
ing in a larger “data base” used by the older
of suicide practices across time and cultures (http://
adults that allows to compare and to weigh dif- ethicsofsuicide.lib.utah.edu/).
ferent experiences. Third, most simple but most 3 Interviews were in part performed by students as
important, reality is always an individually con- part of their training in gerontology or done in a for-
structed reality communicated and negotiated by mer pilot research by myself. Jean lived in Luxem-
signs within a given cultural context. This holds bourg; he was interviewed in 2008; the two ladies
as well for those situations when a neurodegener- lived in Germany near the Luxembourg border; they
ative disease such as Alzheimer’s starts to have were interviewed at the age of 70 and 82.
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General Conclusion
34 An Epistemological Coda:
among the Sciences
its field of study, the rules for its practice, and

34.1 Psychology, What Is It
also the value and limits of the products it offers.
About?
Otherwise, it could not be accepted as a science
Psychology is about psyche.1 It produces knowl- of some kind. Sociocultural psychology is no
edge, methods for producing new knowledge exception.
(about psyche), and also technologies for profit- This Handbook is made up of contributions
ing from the working of psyches and for influ- that together offer a vista of what sociocultural
encing their outcomes. In addition, psychology psychology is like at the moment of its publi-
is also a science – an institution similar to other cation. We have reexamined the structure of the
social institutions. It is a set of corporations ideas reflected in the first edition back in 2007
with rules of trade and regulations about how to and made major alterations. The chapters gath-
carry out their businesses. Last – but not least – ered here present its key concepts; they show how
psychology is a sociocultural practice among they can be related among themselves when stat-
many others with whom to trade products and ing the phenomena for its concern and the kinds
services. of descriptions and explanations to be offered.
Psychology is far from having a clear figure The aim of this concluding chapter is to knit these
with definite boundaries; it is a variegated assort- elements together to sketch a figure of the kind
ment of discourses, methods, and practices that of science sociocultural psychology now is, how
overlap, crisscrossing the fuzzy borders divid- it relates to other disciplines, and the value and
ing its different subdisciplines. This means that, limits of the knowledge it offers.
despite whatever imperialistic claims are made,
no particular approach can realistically pretend
34.1.1 Psychology: A Liminal
to exhaust what is understood as the field of psy-
Science
chology. In addition, no one has either the author-
ity or the power to set the limits of what is to be It is a truism to say that psychology is a field
taken as psychology or to clearly demarcate its of knowledge hinged between the natural and
subdisciplines. social sciences and the humanities. Psychology
Psychology claims to be a science, even if at is about psyche, which is no other thing than a
times what is meant by that claim is not always way of referring to what happens when an organ-
clear. This makes it indispensable for any contri- ism and its immediate environment encounter
bution claiming to be part of scientific psychol- each other or, more restrictively, what the organ-
ogy, or of some of its subdisciplines, to clarify ism does during these encounters (behavior). This
Figure 34.1 Psyche: dynamic processes arising from a spiral of circular reaction cycles.
requires us to refer to whatever processes arise ence that not only presents challenges but also
in the body that contribute to shaping behavior raises interesting questions about its theoretical
and influence its outcome. Psyche is a word that and methodological development (for a discus-
does not refer to any kind of material entity but to sion, see Rosa, 2015).
processes interrelating material structures of dif- What an individual does is certainly a result of
ferent kinds: things in the environment and the the things he or she encounters but also of how he
assortment of organs that make up a living organ- or she is perceived at that particular moment, of
ism. Psyche is a Heraclitean creature rather than the state of activation of the agent, the task being
a Parmenidean being. performed at the time, the affections felt, and the
Psychology’s task is to study such an ethereal abilities acquired beforehand. This makes behav-
subject matter to help understand its actions, so ior not only something that shows as movements
that such understanding could be of some use in space but also a temporal process that involves
for improving its outcomes. In other words, psy- elements that cannot be exhausted by referring
chology is about psyche, but it aims to improve to spatial (material) changes in the environment
the efficiency of the outcomes of the workings of or in the body; it also has to include the dynam-
the psyches of psychologists when carrying out ics of their combined changes. Figure 34.1 shows
their business and of those of the public who may the virtual space where psychological processes
profit from the products of the work of psychol- appear and how circular reactions transform the
ogists. This makes psychology a reflective sci- shape of those interchanges in irreversible time.
General Conclusion: An Epistemological Coda 635
The dynamics of behavior, and their transfor-

34.1.2 Ordering the Epistemic Field
mation throughout time, can only be understood
of Psychology
if they are (1) described in such a way that they
are made to correspond with experiences of an The question, then, is how to arrange the
observer (the scientist) and (2) communicated resources at hand so that the matters to con-
to others through some kind of understandable sider could be made approachable for scien-
inscription (gestures, sounds, texts) so that such tific scrutiny. Figure 34.2 offers a closer look at
experience could be replicated and turned into the development of the dynamics of psyche: the
shared knowledge capable of producing meaning encounters between the structures of an organ-
in the addressed audience and so influence their ism and its environment (see also Chapter 1, this
behavior. Put differently, some kind of means of volume).
communication is needed for the sensorial aware- Psychology studies the relating of organ-
ness of phenomena to be gathered into subjective isms with their environment and, within that,
and intersubjective meaningful accounts of the gets an account of how behavior changes
experienced events, so that some kind of interob- throughout time. Behavior (solid thick arrows in
jective reality is made to appear (see Chapter 3, Figure 34.2) is understood as the observable
this volume). spatial movements the organism performs in its
Psychology, then, is not only about behavior – environment. Such movements affect both the
a vague concept declared to be “objective” by the structures of the environment and the ongo-
behaviorists – but about experience, communica- ing dynamics among the organism’s organs. The
tion, understanding, and knowledge construction affections received by the latter (dotted arrows
as well. It is concerned with how all these pro- in Figure 34.2) close the first cycle of a circu-
cesses work together when individuals act within lar reaction and start a second by triggering a
an environment, interact with each other, perform reaction in the form of a new movement. But by
social activities, work, play, and train themselves then, the inner equilibrium of the organism is not
or others in new abilities. Or they simply con- the same as before; these changes influence the
template when they enjoy or suffer for what they shape of the new movement, and so on in suc-
believe are the events they are living, when they cessive cycles. The organism is constantly under-
wonder about how to carry on with their lives, going change. The successive reiteration of these
plan their future, or think about the kinds of peo- processes makes the inner workings of the organ-
ple they or some others are and judge what they ism progressively increase its share in the agency
did, should have done, or shall do; and even how of behavior, even if, in the eyes of the observer,
sometimes they manage to gather the stamina to only little changes in overt behavior are notice-
put a resolution into effect – for good or bad. able. How much bigger this share could get to
So viewed, the task of psychology looks over- be obviously depends on the capabilities of the
whelming. No wonder, then, that to tackle such structures of the organism, which nevertheless
an endeavor, a whole assortment of approaches would only become functional if exercised. When
have been developed by combining psychology’s they are, a set of psychological functions unfolds
resources with others chosen from disciplines (irritability, orientation, sensitivity, learning, and
ranging from physics, chemistry, and biology to eventually higher psychological processes, such
history and ethics, passing through anthropology, as imagination, memory, thinking) that allows
sociology, economics, semiotics, linguistics, and the accumulation of experience and widens the
art criticism. Psychology is a science born of range of abilities for adjusting behavior to situa-
hybridizations. tional circumstances. The study of the dynamics
Figure 34.2 Epistemic overlaps in the study of the developmental dynamics of psyche.
relating organic structures, their psychological artifacts are used not only to operate on things
functions, and behavior is the field of work but also to influence how fellow members of the
of disciplines laboring in the biopsychological group behave, artifacts begin to act as inscrip-
domain. tions for the direction of others, as texts of some
These dynamic structural couplings not only kind, which in turn leave traces in the patterns
leave a trace in the workings of the organism’s of social interactions and in the social structure
structures; they also impact the structure of the of the group. Whatever the case, the structural
environment. The organisms rearrange, trans- features of the environment (whether natural or
form, and sometimes dismantle the elements that artificial, material or social) set constraints and
make up the landscape, with the effect that the conditions of possibility for acting. The study of
conduct has to continually readapt to the chang- these dynamics falls within the area of work for
ing environmental conditions. When, in one of the disciplines dealing with the ecological, social,
these cycles of mutual transformations, one par- and cultural domains and with their interactions
ticular environmental element merges with a par- throughout time.
ticular configuration of behavior, with the effect Behavior, then, arises within the possibilities
of producing a change on another environmental and constraints set by the couplings of organismic
structure, and such association becomes a perma- and environmental structures, which through-
nent pattern, it can be said that artifacts and cul- out time transform the inner dynamics of both
ture (the realm of the artificial) appear. When new kinds of structures and, consequently, change the
patterns of behavior. That is why research on can come to appear and be instrumental for shap-
behavior cannot ignore the structural features of ing behavior.
both the organism and the environment (and their The extensions. Semiotics (of a Peircean
changes) nor avoid the empirical consideration kind), when combined with a theory of action,
of how behavior changes throughout time. This offers formalisms useful for bridging the
means that an observer has to contemplate these explanatory gaps between the aforementioned
changes when they happen, record what he or she disciplines and the behavioral sciences. As Figure
then experiences, and finally produce some kind 34.2 shows, the affections resulting in structures
of text to communicate the observations made. of the organism produce a cascade of changes
Psychology, as any other science, could not exist in the intraorganismic dynamics that result in
without observers’ experiences and their accu- refracting the reactive response in each circu-
mulation throughout time. lar reaction, influencing the subsequent overt
The roots. Psychology was born as a science behavior. If these intraorganismic changes are
to explain the workings of experiencing. Its pri- considered as also having the capability of acting
mary task was conceived as the study of how a as a kind of sign (index, icon, symbol, argument)
biological structure could get to know what the of a value referred to something in the environ-
worldly things studied by natural sciences were ment (presence, form, permanence, and relation,
really like, that is, how experiencing works to proportion, structure, or reason), then it could
produce conscious phenomena as a result of the be said that psychological functions develop
inner workings of the structures of the observer’s as a consequence of the iteration of cycles of
organism, and also how those phenomena arrange semiosis actions (see Chapter 6, this volume),
themselves to produce the inner world of sub- which eventually produce concepts about what
jective experience. If empirical sciences studied it takes to have some kind of reality – objects,
worldly matters, the task of psychology was then events, situations, stories – with the consequence
to go into the intricacies of how empirical knowl- that sometimes the outcomes of those processes
edge appears in the consciousness of an experi- produce results that only have substance within
encer and how such an experience is capable of the subjective realm as a result of the fancies of
producing truth about the world, even if it also imagination. This makes semiotic formalisms
produces many other results. Consciousness and useful for modeling how conscious experience
experience appear, then, as matters for inquiry, arises, not only as an epiphenomenon, but also
not only for psychology, but also for some other as a resource for monitoring and managing
new disciplines. Phenomenology focuses on the behavior.
description of what phenomena of consciousness
are like and the kind of knowledge they produce;
34.2 Epistemology of
hermeneutics focuses on the interpretation of the
meanings of texts and lived experiences of dif-
ferent kinds; and semiology and semiotics focus Sociocultural psychology is concerned with how
on how things can be taken as signs able to pro- human behavior transforms the natural envi-
duce or convey meaning. There is little doubt that ronment, creating artificial elements and, by so
the approach taken by each of these disciplines doing, making new forms of social interaction to
offers knowledge worthy to be taken into account appear, new patterns of behavior to develop, and
for the description, understanding, and explana- new abilities to arise.
tion of how consciousness works and how sub- What distinguishes sociocultural psychology
jective, intersubjective, and objective phenomena from other psychological disciplines is that it
focuses on how artifacts transform social com- study, and the kinds of explanations offered. The
munication and activities, widening the field of rest of this chapter is devoted to presenting a pro-
experiences with phenomena referring to absent posal of how these three pillars can be conceived
(or imagined) entities produced by artificial to further the development of sociocultural psy-
means, or, more specifically, how artifacts can chology and make it a useful cultural artifact for
make new kinds of experiences (both socially improving human life.
shared and individually felt) to appear and how
these experiences affect behavior and its out-
34.2.1 Sociocultural Psychology
comes – changes in the environment and in the
Approach on Experience and
tool kit of artifacts capable of producing further
Meaning
structural transformations of experience, behav-
ior, and the environment. Experience ensues as a result of the cycles of
So viewed, the key issues of interest for socio- encounters between the organism and the mate-
cultural psychology are (1) to explore how arti- rial and social environments. Experience is also
facts play a role in shaping social interaction where what is taken as reality appears, where
and communication; (2) how this influences the its components acquire a conscious meaning,
development of individual symbolic experiences, and where the self feels concerned about what
abilities, and resources for shaping and manag- it feels and ponders what to do. Experience,
ing behavior; (3) to explore and record the vari- then, encompasses what an individual takes to
eties of experiences, behaviors, and abilities that be the domains of the subjective and objective,
show in groups and individuals with different cul- the world where the individual believes he or she
tural resources; and (d) how new artifacts, forms is living. Therefore experiences are always lived
of communication, social organizations, experi- in the first person; they are felt as mine. They
ences, and abilities arise as a result of these can also be reenacted by other people when com-
processes. All this together also produces rele- municated through semiotic devices of different
vant knowledge about the dynamics of histori- kinds – I may get to believe that I am feeling
cal changes. In sum, as the very name of the what you are feeling when we are doing things
discipline suggests, its focus is on the dynamics together. But experience is also a process to be
among the three apexes of the triangle of society– explained – it is to be described and explained in
culture–psyche, which displays many variations the third person, and it is an it to be taken as sub-
while keeping its basic gestalt. ject matter to be studied.
The task of sociocultural psychology is triple: Experience is a key issue for sociocultural psy-
(1) to record these varieties, (2) to explain how chology. It is not only the field where realities
the observed differences are produced, and (3) to are felt; it is also where they show as having
search for the general principles governing these a meaning, as having the capability of arous-
dynamics. This is hardly any news in science. ing for action, orienting attention, and producing
All sciences are built on three founding pillars attitudes, making one feel an inclination toward
that make up their basic structure: observation doing something or the anguish of not knowing
of phenomena, explanation of events, and formal what to do. Experience is made of transient and
explanatory principles. The difference between evasive phenomena of private consciousness that
one science and another is in what these pillars cannot be subjected to public scrutiny. To become
are made of, that is, the kinds of phenomena and something to be tackled by scientific study, it has
events they study, the formal explanatory devices to be disentangled in such a way that it is turned
chosen as suited for the empirical material to into a construct capable of having some kind of
stability (reliability and validity) supported by follow the same formalism and cause series of
phenomena accessible to observers. consecutive fractal structures to arise. Such struc-
Sociocultural psychology is interested in the tures are useful for modeling how different kinds
study of experience because it is the domain of signs appear, meaning develops, and action
where meaning appears, where it transforms the gets progressively canalized by these developing
inner workings of psychological processes and semiotic-cognitive structures (Chapter 6, this vol-
shapes overt behavior, which in turn transforms ume). The consequence is that behavior is shaped
the environment. Needed, then, is a model capa- and reshaped, producing the simultaneous devel-
ble of connecting these domains that, in addi- opment of psychological functions and experi-
tion, could also link the ecological and sociocul- ences. If at some point conflicting affects are
tural domains with the behavioral sciences. Such not able to produce a behavior that efficiently
a model should also be instrumental for suggest- solves the task, different previous patterns of the
ing the kinds of phenomena to focus on and the relation-affection behavior are combined in trial-
events to be observed, while also providing for- and-error attempts (enacted abductions – a form
malisms able to relate phenomena and events and of thinking in action) that end up producing a new
explain the regularities observed. pattern of behavior – an enactive argument.
This model offers formalisms able to explain
how the cycles of action affection (see Figure
34.2.2 Bridging the Gap between
34.2) get to produce semiotic mediators (signs
Behavior, Experience, and Material
such as indexes, icons, symbols, and arguments)
Culture: A Formal Model of How
able to give meaning to the encounters with ele-
Action Produces Meaningful
ments of the environment, to attribute value to
Experiences
them and make them instrumental for producing
The formalisms of Peircean semiotics, when feedback loops capable of monitoring and direct-
combined with a theory of action (González, ing behavior. This makes overt behavior the result
1997; Rosa, 2007a, 2007b), allow a conception of of semiotic processes and also susceptible to be
the dynamics of the relationships between envi- influenced by signs signaling the presence of
ronmental elements and the affections felt by the something. Objects can then be conceived as sets
organism as the ground on which experience and of signs connected among themselves within an
volition grow, making signs appear and mean- argument referred to a particular entity with some
ing develop. Such triadic relationships can be permanence. Arguments, then, are conceived as
conceived as sign-constructing actions, able to a kind of sign that compiles other signs into a
produce series of recursive cycles, which, when new pattern composed following the rules of a
reaching a stable triadic pattern (a chain of three semiotic grammar of action. So viewed, objects
successive semioses), can produce a legisign (a and behavioral patterns (habits) arise simultane-
sign capable of representing a regularity), which ously as a result of semiotic (enactive) arguments,
in turn can produce a stable pattern of behavior – which, once established, can also be evoked by
an actuation (Rosa, 2007a; Chapter 6, this vol- one of the other kinds of signs included in the
ume). The resulting configuration can be mod- argument (indexes, icons, and symbols).
eled as a tetrahedron (the form combining three This requires, first, exercising the capabilities
triangles in a three-dimensional figure made of of the body, rehearsing its movements and the
four triangular planes). As Peirce’s theory says, sensations they produce, to explore the joy or
semioses are recursive in that these structures are pain they produce and relate both, so that mon-
capable of triggering the rise of new ones, which itoring abilities can be developed and patterns of
behavior established, which in turn allows these tion from nature to culture and also from aware-
habits so developed to be constituted as semi- ness to consciousness. Gestures, voices, artifacts,
otic objects. It is on this basis that the most tokens, and inscriptions are now symbols able
primitive kinds of (unconscious enactive) signs to evoke meanings referring to absent objects
develop, setting into motion enactive thinking (legisigns). The consequence is that symbols are
(see Chapter 11, this volume) as the ground on now capable of guiding behavior and are also a
which instrumental operations and communica- means for producing (declarative) arguments and
tive gestures develop. This early development combining them into further arguments. Social
does not happen in a vacuum. The infant lives in communication, through symbols and arguments,
a sociocultural world full of objects, animals, and can then turn into argumentative (symbolic)
people. It is through dyadic joint actions on toys thinking once the individual learns to address
(play) that communication, objects, and abilities himself or herself, rather than another, when
develop together (Chapter 12, this volume). performing trial-and-error attempts on declara-
If stable objects and habits are themselves tive (rather than enactive) arguments. Following
arguments (a kind of sign), and arguments are Vygotsky (1934/1987), we could say that lan-
for compiling other signs into a new one, then guage (and any other kind of communicative
new (enactive) arguments (new sets of habits) are code) transforms (enactive) thinking into declara-
able to relate different objects within new (enactive argumentation and also makes consciousness
tive) arguments. If this is done in such a way appear as an internalized version of a social dia-
as to make one object serve the same purpose logue among arguments and social voices as well
in another, the consequence is that the mean- as a resource to manage behavior according to
ing of one object can be transferred to oth- social functions, rules, and purposes.
ers (metonymy). If such (enactive) symbols and Arguments, then, are the key kind of sign
arguments are conventionalized within a group, applied for the production of purposeful behav-
meanings can be shared when using these medi- ior, personal experience, and the development
ational means. When this happens, the environ- of culture as well as for the mutual production
ment in which the members of that group move of objective and subjective worlds. It is through
around is no longer only a natural ecological arguments that sociocultural knowledge, either
niche but also a cultured world populated with procedural or declarative, can be accumulated
socially meaningful objects, in which what one and transmitted – the first by learning and exercis-
does is felt as having a sense for others and ing habits, the second by engaging in social dia-
oneself. It becomes an Umwelt – as Jakob von logues mediated through symbolic inscriptions.
Uexküll called it. By then, the affections, the Argument is an elaborated kind of sign that is
qualities, the gestures and voices, and the trans- shaped throughout a process, as we have sketched
formed environmental elements (objects and arti- above and in a more detailed form in Chapter 6
facts) are able to become means of communica- (this volume). Figure 34.3 (detached and reelab-
tion capable of conveying meanings to others and orated from Figure 6.4 in Chapter 6, this vol-
therefore of producing shared experiences. The ume) presents a simplified version of the semiotic
consequence is that cultural symbolic communi- properties of arguments. Argument is there pre-
cation and inscriptions, rituals, and texts appear sented as the apex of a tetrahedron where formal,
and, with them, social accumulation and trans- aesthetic, and moral values intersect, at the same
mission of experience. time that they relate to other values forming the
Moving to convention. Social conventional edges of the bottom plane. Figure 34.4 unfolds
signs (symbols and arguments) mark the transi- the four planes of the tetrahedron delimited by
Figure 34.3 Argument: a semiotic sign compiling values arising from

action and producing experiences.
edges marked by the values shared by neighbor- ent kinds of cultural practices, social activities,
ing planes. and also epistemic fields, within which particular
These planes are framed by different kinds of experiences and patterns of behavior instantiate
values, which simultaneously delimitate differ- these values in particular arguments.
Figure 34.4 Fields of sense (and culture) arising from experience and
influencing behavior.
The axiological plane is framed by pragmatic, The fourth plane is that where actual experi-
moral, and formal values from where categories, ence is being felt in the first person. It is there
such as useful or useless, good or bad, arise in where reality (either real or fictional) is actually
relation to particular content and a particular con- experienced, desires arise, and actual behavior is
text (the objects and situation experienced and formed, where arguments (rational, sentimental,
the pattern of action then exercised), arranged or moral) shape experiences, desires, and behav-
according to a particular proportion of qualities ior – in addition to giving resources and provid-
and grammatical rules. It is in this plane where ing scaffolding for the creation of habits and the
proportions (ratio) and rationality, rules and laws, development of abilities. It is the meeting ground
duties and commands, are produced following where psyche brings to consciousness the results
the development of new ways of acting and also of the couplings between the body, nature, and
where habits and abilities are invoked and fos- culture, where interpersonal interaction and com-
tered to carry out different kinds of social tasks. munication happen and second person experi-
This is the plane of technology, ethics, law, and ences can be made to appear as well as the source
politics – the realm of rules. from which the other planes grow. It is where
The ludic plane is where the pleasurable or arguments are actually put into operation when
harming, the good or the bad, and the beautiful or actively performed or uttered and also the assem-
the ugly are combined to produce aesthetic sen- bling plant where they are combined with others
timental arguments (emotional episodes aroused to produce new semiotic structures that increase
by affects and moods; Russell, 2003), or, the the store of ideas that make up individual per-
other way around, where sociocultural arguments sonal culture.
are influential in producing those kinds of val- In sum, the formal figure of the tetrahedron is
ues in particular experiences, which in turn affect a model of how triadic semiosis flows along the
current action – either performed, perceived, or edges between planes, producing new semiotic
imagined – and the products that result (objects). formalisms capable of offering explanations
It is the plane of imagination, play, sports, and art. of how values, meanings, habits, experienced
The epistemic plane is the site for ideas refer- objects, events, abilities, and overt behav-
ring to what the world is believed to be like. It ior appear. Rationality – whether pragmatic/
is made from arguments arranging the propor- epistemic, epistemic/ludic, or pragmatic/
tion of qualities sensed (sensation and percep- aesthetic – is both a product of action and a
tion – formal value), the sentiments felt (aesthetic device that constrains and canalizes the pro-
values), and the ontological substances (either duction of rules of different kinds: formal
natural, supranatural, or fictional) believed to be epistemic-pragmatic rules on how to conceive
behind them. Epistemic arguments shape the con- the world and how to operate on it; norms of good
ceptions of objects, situations, events, stories, and taste, social manners, and canons of beauty; and
epistemic discourses of different kinds (myths, also rules of fair play and for producing novelty,
stories, symbolic tokens of entities either imag- joy or disgust, good or harm.
ined or believed real – gods, witches and fairies, Actual conscious experiences and conduct
mathematical functions, or scientific constructs). arise and can be explained through the produc-
It is the plane where social representations and tion of arguments. A particular performance or
cultural knowledge nourish personal experiences utterance can be judged as real or faked, use-
and also where personal beliefs develop. It is the ful or useless, beautiful or ugly, good or bad –
realm of myths, religion, history, and science – of categories that can also be attributed to argu-
theoretical ideas. ments. Arguments have connotations that spread
from one plane to another: no argument can avoid felt throughout time have been compiled into sets
having theoretical, pragmatic, or aesthetic fea- of arguments that together conceive myself as a
tures, regardless of the practice or activity from semiotic object elaborated through the same kind
which it originated. Arguments, either performed of semiotic-psychological processes that shape
or uttered, are always contextual; they are a prod- my experience of the world. Experience presents
uct of semiotic structures previously developed me as a repository of knowledge, as a joyful
but never exhaust the potential of those struc- and suffering being, and also as an agent capa-
tures. This makes any attribution of value to an ble of transforming elements of my environment
argument to be always a contextual judgment and myself – to some extent. I also appraise the
(another argument) arising from the compari- outcomes of my actions and my abilities to do
son of arguments of different kinds. The attri- so, what makes me able to represent, judge, and
bution of truth is no exception, as it happens improve what I am like, since I also feel good or
when relating declarative descriptions of obser- bad following the consequences of what I do.
vations (personal experiences) with hypothesis The experiences involving the self are sup-
(epistemic arguments) through the use of meth- ported on a thick accumulation of argumenta-
ods (pragmatic arguments) for validation. tive layers: experiences of objects and situations,
The tetrahedral model is itself a formal experiences of oneself as an object, experiences
argument setting the lines along which triadic of oneself in a situation, experiences about what
semioses link together, so that meaning com- the situation means to me, about what to do in
ing from received sociocultural arguments can the situation, and how I feel about what to do,
be instilled into subjective experience and behav- should do, or should have done. They appraise
ior (internalization – downward arrow in Figure my own feelings, but they also refer to something
34.3), and the other way around, how the results beyond my physical comfort: they also appraise
of individual behavior are able to produce new my degree of success when searching for social
arguments to be added to the public domain goals, how I played the rules, how others would
(externalization – upward arrow in Figure 34.3). assess me, what would happen to me afterward,
and how I may feel by then. These are experi-
34.2.2.1 Expanding the Model to ences that synthesize many others together and
Account for the Self-Management are better expressed by words that do not exist in
of Behavior English but do exist in German (Erlebnis) or in
And what about me? Am I just a stage where Spanish (vivencia), which could be dubbed by the
ideas dance? Am I something real or just a fig- expression lived experience: an experience sig-
ment of the imagination? Do I have something to nificant for the self that also provides a life les-
do or say about what happens to me or about my son. These kinds of experiences produce simulta-
doings? The answer to all these questions is crys- neously memory and the self, while feeding each
tal clear: yes, no, and both. The reason for such other (Chapter 14, this volume).
a bizarre answer lies in the possible responses to The development of the self parallels that of
another question: of what am I made? individual agency (Martin & Gillespie, 2010).
I, myself, am an experienced object conceived Without the operation of the system of the self,
as capable of experiencing the world and myself. an agent cannot be made accountable for his or
If I can conceive my body as an object, and her actions or the outcomes of those actions.
myself as something whose substance my body Lived experiences act as reflective and refract-
does not exhaust, it is because the body, the con- ing devices, as looking glasses in which the
sequences of what my body does, and the feelings agent looks at its own figure, but also to the
background, to ongoing performances and their onist of a story, and as a narrative self (Bruner,
efficacy, so that the image received shows an 2003).
actor when playing. The self results from pro-
cesses of reflection (Chapter 13, this volume). 34.2.2.2 Semiotic Boundaries and
The self is also a dialogical device – a contin- Growth of Meaning
uous conversation between an I (agent) and a you Arguments are semiotic outcomes that arise from
(myself as interlocutor), in which both are and behavior. They can be stored in sociocultural
refer to a me (object) and which together shape repositories, such as rituals, inscriptions, and
the trinitarian entity the self is. It is a conver- texts, and also in the shape of objects with differ-
sation in which commands, complaints, lamen- ent forms (tools, buildings, cities, or social insti-
tations, and arguments are exchanged when try- tutions) that produce the ideas a group shares –
ing to understand what happened to me and to the social representations about what things are
ascertain what I should do (internal speech and like (Chapter 7, this volume). Sometimes the
symbolic reasoning; Vygotsky, 1934/1987) when rules developed in these different realms have
moving from different I-positions (Chapter 27, some coherence, but many times, they show dis-
this volume). crepancies, causing one at times to feel con-
The operations of the system of the self within fused about what one is experiencing, ambiva-
subjectivity are not only influenced by the cul- lent about how to feel toward that, and doubtful
tural resources feeding them but are also unthink- about what to do or what one should have done
able without them. Cultural discourses provide (see Chapter 28, this volume).
stories, characters, plots, and literary genres that Culture has produced throughout time a large
present the perceived changes in the environ- repertoire of ready-made arguments belonging
mental landscapes as temporal sceneries where to many cultural practices, social activities, and
a drama is being performed in which one has to epistemic fields. But culture is not a homoge-
position oneself (Harré, 2012), so that the agent neous whole; it is irregular and fragmented by
turns into an actor playing a role or becomes an crisscrossing fractures and cracks resulting from
author when improvising performances and pro- historical change, which disconnects some of its
ducing new scripts. One may also go into the parts from others, at times even in contradiction.
effort of steering one’s own actions to improve Cultural practices and professions, social groups
one’s capabilities by using materials taken from and activities, spatial location (home or office),
the available sociocultural tool kit. When one clock and calendar time (morning or evening;
does so, or is capable of refraining from doing summer or winter), and age (infant, child, adult,
so, one can be taken as a fully accountable per- or senior) set boundaries to the cultural materi-
son (Rosa, 2016) – a dialogical process through als one accesses, or will be able to access, and
which psyche gains agency on its own shaping therefore to what one does, knows, feels, desires,
and turns into a moral agent as a result of his or enjoys. Thus one individual can only use a
or her personal participation in social life and in fragment of the cultural wealth stored in lan-
educational settings (Chapter 15, this volume). guages and codes, in texts and discourses, in
The self, then, is a virtual object and a steer- rites, sources of joy or suffering, social manners,
ing device that arises as an object with agency or abilities. All this leaves a trace on the habits
within the trajectories of experiences felt (Rosa & one acquires and the abilities to be developed or
González, 2013; Fernández-Cid, Kriger, & Rosa, acquired while moving through the sociocultural
2014, Rosa, 2016) and also as the result of a tra- landscape, and also on how one would conceive
jectory of life (Sato et al., 2007), as the protag- oneself, the life so far lived, or still to live – that
Figure 34.5 Crisscrossing boundaries of cultural, institutional, interpersonal, and subjective fields.
is, what and who one believes one should be or (Chapter 5, this volume). The shifting shape of
wants to be – and also what others are believed to interpersonal spaces within the institutional fields
be like. to which one has access allows one to expand the
Figure 34.5 shows how unconscious psycho- range of personal experiences, knowledge, and
logical processes (modeled by semiotic-enactive abilities, producing personal development (see
structures) arise from encounters with the envi- Chapter 16, this volume).
ronment and evolve into conscious experiences. These different fields can also be considered
This can only happen when elements of public as semiospheres (Lotman, 2005) and the bor-
culture are internalized and higher psychologi- ders between them as semiotic boundaries where
cal processes (new semiotic structures) develop. translations between different codes cause new
This development requires immersion in inter- meanings to arise and sometimes also new sym-
personal situations and institutions where dia- bols and arguments to be created (see Chapter 1,
logues and behavior perform the resulting diverse this volume). Cultural materials, their symbols
rules. It is through these dialogues that sociocul- and arguments, offer resources for the commu-
tural symbols and arguments become operational nication and constitution of experiences, which
within the personal domain, developing and pro- could take kaleidoscopic variations as a result of
ducing novelty and therefore leaving a trace in the the kinds of cultural resources accessed, of the
inner dynamics of the self – as in psychotherapy field and activity in which they are played, and
also how they are refracted when processed by tive cultural tools that are contextually available.
the semiotic-cognitive structures set into opera- This makes the border between the subjective
tion. Whatever the case, sociocultural semiotic and the interpersonal realms the ground where
resources set limits for understanding, experienc- semiotic-cognitive structures evolve and where
ing, and acting. Beyond them are only chaos and experiences grow according to the social institu-
disorder (Lotman, 2005). tional rules of the activities in which an individ-
ual participates.
34.2.2.3 Sociocultural Resources for Personal lived experiences result from the
Shaping Experiences and Behavior workings of these processes, which also set the
The boundaries between these domains are where dynamics of imagination and make its products
artifacts and signs are produced (Chapter 6, this to appear either as belonging to collective real-
volume) and become operational in systems of ities (Chapter 22, this volume), as transcendent
activity (Chapter 8, this volume); it is there categories or entities (Chapter 19, this volume),
where social representations develop and show or as religious beliefs (Chapter 20, this volume).
their operation (Chapter 7, this volume) and sym- Thus experiences can seem at first glance to
bolic resources are managed by individuals in sprout spontaneously from random encounters
the dynamics of their lives (Chapter 10, this with the environment, but they can also result
volume) and also where innovation is produced from crafted technologies that sociocultural insti-
(Chapter 9, this volume). tutions refined for their purposes. Art, rituals, dis-
It is in social interaction that actions, objects, courses, interpersonal dialogues, and individual
and artifacts are exchanged and where value is drillings, gathered together in carefully devised
attributed. Value, then, becomes a kind of semio- activities, are able to create religious beliefs and
tized object according to which things of many subjective realities capable of shaping individu-
kinds (material objects but also acts, feelings als’ selves and disciplining the behavior of indi-
and desires, and even people) can be rated and viduals. The study of the historical unfolding of
also related to one’s own self – as a property these kinds of technologies gives insights into
(a possession) of my own or someone else. The how symbols and arguments (taken from artis-
exchange of goods and favors is the ground on tic, religious, or military practices) have shaped
which social rules of fairness, justice, and moral- topics that later on turned into subjects for psy-
ity develop (Chapter 17, this volume) and also chological inquiry (Chapter 21, this volume).
where material artifacts, capable of acting as car- Art and literature (objects and texts of different
riers of value, arise. Money is a cultural tool that kinds) are material outcomes of behavior driven
not only carries economic value but is able to act by lived experiences, which are also part of the
as a means for the exchange of many kinds of val- environmental elements composing the cultural
ues, contributes to shaping many social activities, landscape. They provide arguments for shaping
and is also able to be employed for different pur- how individuals understand collective life and
poses – among them, socialization (Chapter 18, institutions and their changes throughout time,
this volume). and the position they take when interpreting how
The world one believes to be leaving arises as past events are currently portrayed and under-
real in consciousness when enactive, sentimen- stood (Chapter 24, this volume).
tal, and uttered arguments, together with feel- History and historical narratives are cul-
ings of selfhood, appear when encountering the tural devices that provide arguments about the
environment. Such arguments require the use of doings of a group throughout time and also for
cultural materials and symbolic and argumenta- producing aesthetic and moral feelings toward
different groups. These make history a profi- which current experiences are framed and behav-
cient tool for supporting feelings of collective ior is shaped (Chapter 33, this volume).
and personal identity, for internalizing aesthetic
and moral values, and therefore, instrumentally, 34.2.2.4 Capabilities and Limits of
for instilling ethnic and nationalistic ideologies This Model
or for fostering critical reflection on social life, The model presented above provides basic for-
as a defense against ideological indoctrination malisms able to account for how consecutive
(Chapter 23, this volume). It is the combina- layers of signs, psychological functions, and
tion of both narrative arguments and feelings of patterns of experience and behavior develop
identity that makes the cultural materials encoun- from the encounters between a human organism
tered at a particular moment familiar or foreign, and its environment (Maturana & Varela, 1992).
makes one feel at home or displaced, as enjoying These structural formalisms model the functional
what one feels is deserved, or missing something properties of the operation of psychological func-
one believes to be deserved (Chapter 31, this tional systems resulting from the development of
volume). This makes historical accounts volatile assemblies of organs within the structure of the
materials able to keep conflicts alive, unless their organism (Luria, 1969). The explanation of how
capability for producing feelings of superiority these functional layers are generated lies in a gen-
and grievance, guilt and vengeance, is defused. eral physical/biological principle: the capability
This requires building a narrative of reconcilia- of open systems for keeping their inner energetic
tion, which often needs to change the aesthetic balance through cyclic repetition of exchanges
and moral arguments on which the groups’ and with their entourage (Bertalanffy, 1976;
their members’ identities are conceived (Chapter Maturana & Varela, 1992).
25, this volume). Cultural materials, together These formalisms result from recursive com-
with the network of practices and institutions binations of triadic semiosis into more devel-
framing social life, provide the resources and lim- oped structures, which replicate the form of this
its within which personhood and citizenship can basic unit and produce fractal structures capable
be conceived and also the shapes individual expe- of reproducing themselves. These structures are
rience and behavior take within social and politi- virtual entities modeling the dynamic processes
cal settings (Chapters 26 and 32, this volume). of meaning making on which psychological func-
Whatever the case, neither cultural resources tions develop and increase their capability for
nor sociocultural institutions and activities can managing the course of behavior. The model is
exhaust the explanation of individual experi- also able to account for how both meaning and
ences and behavior. Each individual psyche is psychological processes appear as transient and
a dynamic system whose inner workings pro- contextual, while keeping the basic structural pat-
duce experiences about one’s own body, about tern (organization).
others, and about one’s own joyful or suffering The formal semiotic structures this model
feelings while living current events (Chapter 29, provides are tools for bridging the explana-
this volume). These self-reflecting experiences, tory gap between the environmental-social, bio-
when assembled with the workings of imagina- psychological, and experiential domains. These
tion on cultural material, are able to be turned structures are able to model how the chain of
into tools for shaping one’s own self by setting interorgan encounters going on when adapting
a life project (Chapter 30, this volume) or, when to environmental circumstances (the repeated
producing narratives, accounting for one’s past shaping and reshaping of biological processes)
life, which adds another layer to the structures on acquires semiotic properties as signs signaling
toward the psychological processes and the overt contextual, depending as much on the capabilities
behavior to follow. of the organism as on the social and material fea-
Semiotics cannot offer causal explanations of tures of the environment in a particular moment.
how structural couplings can change the coupling This makes the model suitable to account for
structures (which can only be provided by bio- individual developmental and (natural and cul-
chemical, anatomical, and physical causal prin- tural) ecological transformations.
ciples) but can model how these changes can The formalisms of this model allow both cul-
be read as signals announcing other changes to tural change and psychological development to
follow. This may seem trivial for the explana- be conceived as mutually related dynamic sys-
tion of biological functions, but it is crucial for tems. Both develop together, but without get-
understanding how the affections produced by ting scrambled into a blended mix. Each feeds
cultural artifacts, inscriptions, and texts are able the other, but each evolves on a different time
to act as signs unleashing bodily reactions as if an scale. Psychological development proceeds as the
environmental (absent) structure (or any kind of individual participates in different social settings,
semiotized object) were present. It is then when when joining activities carried out in particular
semiotic formalisms show their potential for cultural practices, and when moving from differ-
describing how biological and psychological pro- ent institutional domains. Psychological develop-
cesses and environmental (cultural) elements are ment is, then, an effect of social mobility through
capable of canalizing behavior and producing (social, institutional, cultural) semiotic bound-
conscious experiences, thinking, and delibera- aries. The sociocultural environment, in turn, is
tion – which together make the subjective realm – transformed when the traffic between different
and also how changes in the material and social activities produces new elements and the dynam-
environments resulting from human behavior ics of particular sociocultural institutional struc-
(artifacts, inscriptions, texts, social structures, rit- tures and those of the sociocultural environment
uals, practices, activities) can operate as extracor- at large transform – what is usually called histor-
poreal devices for storing knowledge, directing ical change.
behavior, and assessing its outcomes through the This model may be useful for producing for-
attribution of pragmatic, moral, formal, and aes- malisms able to describe how the workings of
thetic values. psyche create semiotic-affective-cognitive struc-
The virtual structures that this model provides tures capable of developing a sort of virtual oper-
are also formal explanatory devices for describ- ating apparatus (usually called mind) that medi-
ing how experiences leave a trace expanding indi- ates the production of behavioral responses and
vidual abilities. The semiotic structure under- is therefore able to decouple the inner workings
lying psychological constructs, such as habits, of the organism from the changes in the envi-
schemas, or scripts (Rosa, 2007a, 2007b), allows ronment (Chapter 2, this volume) and to pro-
these constructs to be conceived as flexible produce the rise of subjective experiences: the self
cesses rather than rigid sets of associations or and the will (Rosa, 2016; Rosa & González,
algorithms and is therefore able to adjust to pro- 2014).
duce understanding (new meaning) and direct The model presented above is able to offer
behavior when interpreting the particular situa- formal explanations, and therefore probabilis-
tions faced. tic forecasts, but it is unable to produce proper
This model conceives meaning, experience, causal explanations and accurate predictions. Its
and behavior as fleeting outcomes of trajectories potential resides in its capability for creating for-
of experience. This makes these processes highly mal constructs for modeling processes otherwise
inconceivable and also in suggesting avenues for vide can be developed. It is by fostering cross-
empirical research. It is by gathering empirical disciplinary hybridization that sociocultural psy-
evidence that flesh can be added to the bare bones chology can make itself useful.
of the structures the model provides. But there This is what the model presented above
is something else the model provides: a heuris- attempts to do. It offers heuristic devices able
tic device capable of pinpointing target areas for to address subjective meaning-making processes
research (semiotic boundaries) and suggesting as formal structures mediating understanding
how the relationships between semiotized objects and directing behavior, which can be useful in
(constructs, structures, explanations) could pro- explaining how constructs coming from other
duce some outcomes (hypothesis) so that empir- psychological disciplines (awareness and atten-
ical observations and experiments could be car- tion, learning and memory, speech and thinking,
ried out. In sum, whether this model is useful affection and emotion, desires and goals, attri-
for furthering psychological knowledge can only bution, identity, self, personality, schema, script,
be ascertained if it proves its capabilities when etc.) can arise and be operational for the direc-
put into operation for orienting and interpreting tion of behavior. It is by entering into dialogue
the results of empirical research, and also if the with other disciplines, while putting subjective
empirical research feeds the production of trans- experience and meaning making in the middle,
formations in its formalisms. that sociocultural psychology can generate tools
of knowledge for fostering psychological knowl-
edge. But this cannot be done without borrowing
34.3 Concluding Remarks:
phenomena and methods from neighboring dis-
Sociocultural Psychology among
ciplines, nor can it be done without taking into
the Sciences
account how causal explanations add empirical
Sociocultural psychology is the most hybrid validation to the formal explanations of the regu-
among the hybrid sciences gathered under the larities observed.
umbrella of psychology. It dwells in and thrives This chapter has focused on presenting a
on the fractures crisscrossing the sociocultural model of how psyche produces experience and
landscapes where humans live, having its rai- conduct, taking these to be described and
son d’être in exploring what happens to human explained in the third person. This is the stance
psyches when crossing the fuzzy boundaries nomothetic sciences take, and psychology is cer-
where meaning arises, conscious experience and tainly among them. But can it be only a nomoth-
ambivalence appear, and psychological processes etic science? Psychology is concerned with what
readjust their dynamics when shaping behav- human beings are like and why they do what they
ior. These are matters that in some way or do, but the knowledge it provides is for the ben-
another are also of interest for other disciplines – efit of human beings so that they can improve
semiotics, semiology, linguistics, phenomenol- their lives. That is why psychology should also be
ogy, hermeneutics, literary and art criticism, his- conjugated in first person singular. Psychologi-
tory, anthropology, sociology, and economics, in cal knowledge is not only for describing, explain-
addition to different psychological disciplines. ing, and managing the doings of psyches but also
Sociocultural psychology can profit from the for understanding individuals and providing them
knowledge and methods these disciplines offer with recourses for their own management. Psy-
and also be a ground on which transactional cat- chology cannot avoid being an idiographic sci-
egories and transactional codes relating to the ence as well. In fact, every nomothetic perspec-
tools of knowledge that these disciplines pro- tive begins from an idiographic one.
If meaning making and personal experience Martin, J. & Gillespie, A. (2010). A neo-Meadian
are the main matters of interest for sociocultural approach to human agency: Relating the social
psychology research, it cannot avoid being both and the psychological in the ontogenesis of
a nomothetic and ideographic science. Its tools perspective-coordinating persons. Integrative
of knowledge are suitable for fertilizing both Psychological and Behavioral Science, 44(3),
252–272. DOI: 10.1007/s12124–010–9126–7.
approaches and, by doing so, for increasing the
Maturana, H. & Varela, F. (1992). The Tree of
validity and reliability of methods and fostering
Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human
the development of psychological knowledge.
Understanding. Boston: Shambhala
Publications.
Note Rosa, A. (2007a). Acts of psyche: Actuations as
synthesis of semiosis and action. In J. Valsiner
1 We deliberately use this – somewhat poetic – term
& A. Rosa (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of
here, instead of the usual rationality-bound notions
Sociocultural Psychology (pp. 205–237). New
of “mind.” Psyche captures the unity of the biologi-
York: Cambridge University Press.
cal and the cultural, the social and the personal, and
Rosa, A. (2007b). Dramaturgical actuations and
the affective and the cognitive sides of human ways
symbolic communication: Or how beliefs make
of being.
up reality. In J. Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.),
Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural
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Index
abduction, 45, 195, 639 religious experience, 354–357

inductive abduction, 404, 420 transcendence within immanence, 357–360
aboutness of symbolic resources, 184–185, 188 wagering on the idea of transcendence, 351–354
abstract concepts affective action, 117
influence on human actions, 399–401 affective bridges, 602–603
abstraction affective grounds of sensemaking, 44–45
and thinking, 21–22 affective register, 545–546
constructed in collective action, 417–419 affects
abstractive generalization role in communication, 121
and intensionality, 37–39 affordances
actants, 105 creative action using material and cultural affordances,
action 172–174
actuations, 119–121 of objects, 107–109
and the nature of psyche, 103–104 of the environment, 107
bodies coupling with things, 107–109 age-appropriate behavior, 564–565
cultural landscapes as environment for, 29 aging
culture as product of, 103–104 adaptation to changes caused by, 622–623
dramatic actuations, 121 and self-regulation, 621–622
emergent properties, 118–121 assisted suicide, 617
intentional schemas, 118–119 biblical age, 616
production of innovation, 125–127 conceptual qualifiers, 623–624
semiotics of, 117–118 death and dying, 617–618
structure of, 117 differential aging concept, 621
activity as a means of surpassing adjustment, 487–488 effects of increasing life expectancy, 615
activity theory, 248 euthanasia, 617
actor network theory, 105, 154 factors influencing life-satisfaction and well-being,
actuations, 119–121 621–622
adaptation in living organisms, 19 health challenges associated with, 615
Adler, Mortimer, 281 life events and melodies of living, 624–626
adult–child interaction lifespan models, 620–621
pointing gestures, 235 methods of adaptation and coping, 621–622
triadic rhythmic interactions, 226–227 new perspectives, 616
use of objects, 233–235 perceptions of, 615–616
adult–infant social play, 219 psychology and, 618–620
aesthetic experience, 115–116 research related to, 615
aesthetic transcendence senicide, 617
defining transcendence, 351 toward a person-centered theory of culturally guided
ecstatic power of objects, 354–357 aging in families, 626–627
metaphor and standing forth in the world, 360–363 ubasute tradition, 617
music, 352, 358–359 view from within, 624–627
poetry, 359 view from without, 616–624
priority of the Other, 354–357 views of the aging person, 616–617
reimagining transcendence, 363 agencements, 487
Index 653
agency, 104, 105, 445 creative action in actor–artifact relations, 168–169

as responsiveness, 548–551 creative action in audience–artifact relations, 169–171
Alexander technique, 212 creative process, 109–110
alienness, 550 cultural elements, 183–184
allegorical personification, 607 socially constructed environments, 60
of a nation, 408–411 transforming things into, 109–114
allegory turning into tools for communication, 112–114
use to inspire collective action, 417–419 assisted suicide, 617
Almeida, M.R., 585, 586 Atchley, R.C., 620
alphabetical systems authoritarianism, 604
evolution of, 112–114 autism, 229
Alter, 503, 514 autobiographical memory
alterity, 503, 581, 591 emergence of, 265–267
in modern psytizenship, 483–484 experience space and its constraints, 262–264
Alves, Rubem, 598 meaning and memory, 263–264
Alzheimer’s disease, 615, 627 the self in, 267–271
ambivalence, 519–522 autobiographical self
development through overcoming, 518–519 construction of, 260
experience of a Swedish woman convert to Islam, meaning in the development of, 267–271
524–526 memory and, 260
Günter Grass and the Third Reich, 529–535 role of language in development, 260–262
social context of meaning making, 535–536 social and cultural context for development, 260–262
Amerindian identity, 584–587 autopoiesis, 18–20, 371, 373
Amerindian perspectivism, 588–589, 592 awareness through movement classes, 213
Améry, Jean, 472
anchoring, 131 Baby Signs Program, 231
ancien régime, 480, 481, 483, 488 bad me, 82, 90
Anderson, Benedict, 404–407, 416–417 Bainbridge-Cohen, Bonnie, 213, 215
Animal Farm (Orwell), 443 Bakhtin, Mikhail, 249, 283, 285, 287, 288, 289, 293,
anthropocentrism, 105, 106 374–376, 506, 512, 522, 605
anthropomorphism, 105–106, 408, 607 Baldwin, James Mark, 171, 307, 556–557
of natural phenomena, 402 challenges to the study of development, 557–558
anxiety flood of experience in the life course, 570
cause of distortion in meaning making, 80–82, 83 personal development through persistent imitation,
appraisal, 23, 80 559–561
Arab Spring, 419 sembling, 560
architecture Bar-Tal, Daniel, 464
interobjective architecture, 58–60 Bartenieff fundamentals, 212, 213, 215
socially constructed environments, 60 barter exchange, 333
Arendt, H., 462–463, 464 Basque conflict, 443–444, 445–446
arguments, 117, 121–123, 640–643 militant discourses, 448–449
Aristotle, 290, 479, 548 militant irony, 448–449
Arrutti, J.M., 576 three case studies, 446–448
art Bauer, P.J., 266
and play, 111–112 Bauman, Z., 600, 602
and the mind, 110–111 beauty, 14, 112, 115, 116, 246, 324, 363, 511, 642
artifacts, 104–106 Beck, Ulrich, 487
and instrumentality, 153–154 Befindlichkeit, 545
and the mind, 110–111 behaving and acting, 131–132
co-creation of, 171–172 behavior
coordination of complex constellations of artifacts, 159 described by an observer, 19–20
654 Index
behaviorism, 63, 65, 66–67 ordinary life on the border, 309

behaviorist view of psyche, 16 permeable borders, 305
belief and communicating, 131 relation to human activity, 302
Benjamin, Walter, 463 temporal border zones, 307–309
Bentley, Arthur, 69 theoretical aspects in cultural psychology, 305–306
Berger, John, 603, 607, 609 transcending function of education, 302–303
Berger, P.B., 590 Borges, Jorge Luis, 223
Berger, Z., 606 boundaries, 30
Bergson, H., 564 and regulatory processes, 90–91
Berlin Aging Study, 618, 621 boundary objects, 55–58, 151
Berlyand, Irina, 290 bounded indeterminacy, 313
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, 18 breath pattern, 214–215
bias in historical narratives, 466–468 Brentano, Franz, 15, 125, 504
Big Society initiative, 490 Brewer, M., 67
bilingualism, 30 bricolage, 184, 401
Billig, Michael, 72–73, 419 Bromberg, Phillip, 86–87
bill-splitting, 336, 342–343, 344 Bruner, Jerome, 217, 261
biocultural co-constructivism, 626 Buddha, 616
biological essentialism, 604 Buddhism, 275, 295
birth Bühler, Charlotte, 620
effects on movement experience, 213–214 Bühler, Karl, 512, 520, 521
bivalence, 39, 45 building information modeling (BIM), 149, 159
Bloch, Marc, 461–462, 464, 465, 472 shifting multiple functions, 157–159
body-mind centering, 212, 213, 215
Boesch, Ernest, 603 Cage, John, 295
Bogdan, R.J., 269, 270 Cameron, David, 490
bona fide borders, 306 Carr, Harvey, 66
Bonn Longitudinal Study on Aging, 621 Char, René, 462
Bonnefoy, Yves, 359 children
border irregularities, 29–30 aspects of social development, 329–330
border zone, 309 associative reciprocity, 324
borders, 55–58 institutional environment, 327–329
ambivalence created by, 304–305 ownership concept, 319–323
as thresholds, 305 possession conflicts among, 319–323
biological membranes, 305 progressive mastery of social norms, 327–329
bona fide borders, 306 social world of, 319
border zone, 309 strict reciprocity, 324
crossing social borders in development and education, understanding of exchange and reciprocity, 323–326
312–313 children and money
developmental perspective, 307 beyond children as individuals, 338–339
educational border zone, 309–311 children’s lives in a consumer society, 341
effect of delineating national borders, 414–415 collectivism vs individualism, 343–345
effects of creating, 304–305 cultural aspects, 343–345
effects of crossing, 305 East Asian children Pocket Money Project, 339–343
epistemological focus, 306 economic inequalities, 338–339
fiat borders, 306 economics and children, 337–338
from mereotopology to development, 307 friendship and money, 342–343
in the world and in the head, 305–306 money as a cultural tool, 345–346
in time during the life course, 306–307 mutual treating by children, 336, 342–343
institutional borders as social membranes, 311–312 parent–child relationships mediated by allowances,
line as the minimal border, 303–304 342
meanings of, 303–304 sociocultural use of children’s allowances, 339
Index 655
children’s development as persons implications of interpretative speculations, 376–377

cultural life course, 570–571 meaning of natural, 366–367
early work in developmental psychology, 556–557 Mikhail Bakhtin, 374–376
Stern and the experiencing person, 558–559 moving forward, 376–377
through persistent imitation, 559–561 non-reductive scientific naturalism, 369–374
work of Stern and Baldwin, 556–557 phenomenological naturalism, 366–367
children’s development as persons, investigation phenomenological naturalism and sociocultural theory,
analysis, 563 374–376
convergence between individual and collective meaning, religious belief, 367–369
563–567 rethinking religious cognition, 372–374
design and central concepts, 561–563 scientific naturalism, 367–368
duration and redundancy in development of the personal sociocultural cognition, 370–371
life course, 569–570 sociocultural theory and embodying language, 374–376
imitation, 567–569 William James and religious belief, 368–369
intermediate summary of cases, 569 cognitive theory of personality, 621
multifunctional imitation in the life course, 570 Cold War, 482
someone to copy and be copied by, 567–569 Cole, Michael, 260, 333, 486
timed and untimed living, 563–567 collective action
chimpanzees construction of abstraction and reification, 417–419
culture in, 235 influence of imaginative processes, 419–421
Christianity use of metaphor, allegory and metonymy to inspire,
source of technologies of the self, 382–383 417–419
toward a genealogy of psychological rationality, collectivism
390–392 children and money, 343–345
citizen Common Core educational standards, 281
definition, 480 common sense, 35, 37, 41, 43, 46, 87, 88, 255, 399, 461,
citizenship 560, 584
alterities in modern psytizenship, 483–484 communication, 4, 5, 17, 18, 20, 25–26, 28, 29
emergence of, 479 and belief, 131
emergence of the self-governing citizen, 480–483 intentional, 24, 25
psychological and political aspects, 479 symbols as a product of when acting, 22–23
role of psychology, 492–493 communication memory, 460
see also psytizenship communication tools
climate change artifacts turning into, 112–114
as social object, 136–138 competent baby paradigm, 226, 233
from science to communal discourse, 136–137 complex semiotic systems, 254–255
mass media, 138 compliance, 58, 321
political institutionalization and reified discourse, computer metaphor of the mind, 69–70
137–138 conceptualization
co-construction, 4, 5, 23, 87, 133, 563, 571 leading from perception, 21
co-creation of artifacts, 171–172 conflict ethos, 464–466
Coe, Cati, 419 conflict theories of self-reflection, 247–249
cognitive archaeology, 109 conformity, 58, 453, 454, 465
cognitive polyphasia, 55, 248 consciousness
cognitive psychology emergence of, 27–28
problems related to representationalism, 63–65 construction of the person
cognitive revolution in psychology, 16 in interethnic situations, 592–593
cognitive science of religion (CSR) constructivism
avoiding ethical violence in research, 376–377 approaches to subjectivity, 383
enacting psychology, 370–371 context
enactivism and the socio-material embeddedness of importance in interpersonal psychoanalysis, 92–93
cognition, 371–372 contextuality, 503
656 Index
continuity and discontinuity in intergenerational cultural psychology

narratives, 462–464 abstractive generalization, 38–39
Cooley, Charles, 247 approach to religion, 383–385
cooperation as the general theory of psychology, 45–46
and interaction, 132–134 as the science of sensemaking, 39–42
core–distal connectivity pattern, 215–216 contribution to a general theory of psychology, 35–36
corporeal turn in human sciences, 207–209 current developments in the field, 3
Costa, P.E.S., 585 dynamics of sensemaking, 42–45
creative cognition, 164–165 extensional and intensional categories, 36–37
creativity, 104 holism, 39
approach to the study of creative action, 174–175 immanent formal causation, 40
appropriation by audiences, 170 intensionality and abstractive generalization, 37–38
as a dialogic process, 171–172 mind is sensemaking, 41–42
co-creation of artifacts, 171–172 mind is the process of decoupling from the environment,
creative action in actor–artifact relations, 168–169 41
creative action in actor–audience relations, 171–172 mind is the psychological object, 40–41
creative action in audience–artifact relations, 169–171 organizational closure, 39–40
creative action using material and cultural affordances, processual ontology, 39
172–174 relationship to interpersonal psychoanalysis, 78–79
creativity complex, 168 sensemaking is inherently dialogical, 42
ecologies of creating, 168 cultural tools, 333
evaluation of artifacts by audiences, 170–171 historical maps, 431–434
five A’s framework, 166–174 cultural uses of objects, 236
four P’s framework, 166 culture
interpretation of artifacts by audiences, 170 as the field distribution of possibilities, 44
meanings of, 163 as the spirit of psyche, 28
mediational model, 167 attitudes to money, 343–345
role of sociocultural factors, 163–164 dialectical study of the meaning of money, 335–337
sociocultural approach to study, 165–174 historical development in relation to mind (Vico),
theoretical roots, 164–165 401–404
tradition of decorating eggs for Easter, 166 nature of, 103–104
user-generated content and objects, 171 relation to consciousness and personhood, 27–28
Crites, Stephen, 358–359 cyberspace, 488
cross-cultural psychology, 343, 344
crystallized imagination, 402 dance, 25, 103, 107, 112, 117, 133, 168, 208, 212, 213,
cultural affordances, 235 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 264, 352, 358, 512, 514,
creative action using, 172–174 577, 579, 583, 584
cultural canalization Dante, 408
of gender identities, 606–609 de Beauvoir, Simone, 188
of gender stereotypes, 605 de Oliveira, Carlito, 587, 589, 591
cultural elements death and dying, 617–618
use of, 183–184 defence systems, 80–82
cultural experiences Delpit, Lisa, 293
as symbolic resources, 183–184 Descartes, René, 14, 70, 368
cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT), 148–149 development
cultural knowledge crossing social borders, 312–313
from intergenerational narratives, 459–461 development of persons
cultural landscapes challenges to the study of, 557–558
environment for human action, 29 elementarism, 557–558
cultural life course and the development of children as nondevelopmentalism, 557–558
persons, 570–571 development through overcoming ambivalence, 518–519
Index 657
developmental psychology “Divine Will,” 387

corporeal turn, 207–209 domain-specificity of creative action, 174
future directions in movement studies, 220 Donald, Merlin, 260–261
shift toward the study of movement, 208–209 Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 287, 294
Dewey, John, 15, 66, 69, 103, 114–115, 154, 481 double binds, 549
double psychologizing of the educational curriculum, double psychologizing of the educational curriculum, 281
281 double-directedness of a position, 512
mutuality of mind and world, 73 Down syndrome, 229, 231
on creative perception, 170 dramatic actuations, 121
on creativity, 168–169, 172 dreams, 27, 83, 88, 180, 182, 353, 539, 603
on self-reflection, 246 driving force of lack, 520
dialogic pedagogy dualism
definition, 275–276 revolt against, 70
ecological non-instrumental dislogic pedagogies, tendency to return to, 70–73
294–296 Duncker, K., 64
epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogies, Dupré, Louis, 355–356, 357
282–283 Durkheim, Émile, 131
epistemological non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies, dynamic gestalt, 39, 46
287–291
growth of interest in, 274–275 early infancy
instrumental and non-instrumental education, breath pattern, 214–215
276–279 core–distal connectivity pattern, 215–216
instrumental dialogic pedagogies, 279–285 cultural influences on motor development, 207–208
non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies, 285–296 effects of emotional deprivation, 208
ontological non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies, experience and body awareness, 211–214
291 fundamental patterns of total body connectivity,
social justice instrumental dialogic pedagogies, 214–217
283–285 future directions in movement studies, 220
types of, 276–279 head–tail pattern of connectivity, 216–217
unresolved issues, 296–298 influence of social play, 207–208
dialogical account of feelings, 512–515 iterative movement experience, 209–211
dialogical nature of sensemaking, 42 study of motor development and movement, 208–209
dialogical perspective thinking in movement, 217–219
applications, 503 East Asian children Pocket Money Project, 339–343
approach to the human experiential mind, 503–504 ecological non-instrumental dislogic pedagogies, 294–296
definition, 503 ecological psychology, 549
dialogical self theory, 605 ecological theory of perception, 106–107
dialogical understanding in history education, 436–438 economic games, 325–326, 328–329
dialogicality, 503 economic inequalities, 338–339
dialogue economic tools, 333
aspect of creativity, 171–172 ecstasy, 358
concept in social sciences, 274 Edelman, Gerald, 209
dicent, 117 education
differential aging concept, 621 crossing social borders, 312–313
Dinesen, Isak, 463 portrayals of, 523–524
discourse analysis, 72–73 transcendent nature, 302–303
discourses, 123–124 educational border zone, 309–311
discursive practices, 400 institutional borders as social membranes, 311–312
dissociated experiences, 85–87 effectivities for action, 107
distanciation, 245, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256 Egan, Kieran, 436
divine, 355, 356, 360, 402, 528 Ego, 503, 514
658 Index
Egyptian revolution (2011), 443–444, 449–450 Evans, Richard, 530

irony as a mode of resistance, 452–453 executive functions
irony in images of authority figures, 450–451 functional use of objects in the pre-language stage,
pedestrian interpretations of images produced by the 230–233
military, 451–452 existentials of embodied history, 542
Ehrenfest, Paul, 289 affective register, 545–546
Ehrenzweig, Anton, 361 case example, 542–546
elementarism, 557–558 habituation, 543
embodied experience hermeneutic repertoire, 544–545
fundamental patterns of total body connectivity, incorporation, 544
214–217 intercorporeity, 543–544
somatic education techniques, 211–214 expanded mediational structure (EMS), 333–334
embodiment expanded self, 335
thinking in movement, 217–219 expansive learning, 248
embodiment theory, 209 experience, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20–21, 23, 24, 25–26, 28,
embodying language, 374–376 30–31, 103, 106, 108, 112, 114
emotion-focused coping, 621 aesthetic, 115–116
emotional reactions and body awareness, 211–214
role in communication, 121 meaning and memory in development, 260–262
emotions, 23 of the world and the self, 114–116
and religious development, 385–386 semiotics of behavior and, 116–125
enactive approach to cognition experience and meaning
socio-material embeddedness of cognition, 371–372 approach of sociocultural psychology, 638–639
enactive cognition theory, 18–20 experience space and its constraints, 262–264
enactive program, 211, 212 experimental psychology, 15
enactive semiosis, 118, 120 explanandum, 40
Engeström, Y., 153, 154, 248 explanans, 40
Ensminger, J., 328 extensional categories, 36–37
epistemic objects, 151
epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogies, faith, 6, 353, 356, 359, 385, 386, 399, 400, 406, 530, 585,
282–283 607
epistemological non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies, fantasy, 83, 88, 180, 183, 353, 407, 539, 568
287–291 Febvre, Lucien, 461
epistemology of sociocultural psychology, 637–649 Fechner, Gustav, 15
Erikson, E.H., 179, 620 feed-forward process, 559
Estonia feelings
building a nation, 138–140 dialogical account of, 512–515
collective memory work, 140–142 driving the mind toward reflection, 23–24
historical accounts and national identity, 133–134 Feldenkrais, Moshe, 208, 213
national identity, 138–143 Feldenkrais method, 212, 215
reifying national identity as a state, 142–143 Fernandes, Danilo, 586, 587
ethnic diversity in the urban context, 587–592 fiat borders, 306
ethnic groups field theory, 79–80, 85, 90–91
historical accounts and identity, 133–134 figurative schema, 131
ethnic identity first-person approach, 15, 28, 31, 388
relation to history education, 428–430 Flaubert, Gustave, 187
ethnic reterritorialization, 576 Fogel, Alan, 213
ethnic self-affirmation, 578, 581, 582 folkpsychology, 557
ethnic self-identification, 575 forms of vitality, 218–219, 220
ethos of conflict, 464–466 Foucault, Michel, 304, 381–382, 390, 470–471, 604
euthanasia, 617 four levels of semiotic mediation, 186–187
Index 659
fourth age, 618, 621 Grass, Günter

fragile signs, 522 adolescence and war, 531–532
Freire, Paulo, 281, 283, 284–285 doubts over the heroic soldier progaganda, 532–535
Freud, Sigmund, 91, 400, 550 growing up in Nazi Germany, 527–529
internalization, 249 Hitler Youth and beyond, 529–531
theory of fantasy (imagination), 180 propaganda and the cult of Hitler, 527–529
friendship and money, 342–343 questions over his involvement in warfare, 532–535
Fromm, Erich, 78 uniforms and propaganda, 529–531
Fromm-Reichman, Freda, 78 Gregory, Richard, 64
frontier, 30, 313, 581, 588, 591 Gricean maxims of good communication, 293
Fuchs, T., 543, 544 Griffin, Martyn, 482
functional, canonical use of objects by children, 225 group-based moral emotions, 471–473
functional permanence of objects, 226 guidance, 178, 181, 183, 189, 223, 255, 275, 279, 308,
309, 310, 380, 510, 519, 556, 561, 619
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 85 Guimarães, D.S., 588
Geertz, Clifford, 72, 358, 598, 600
gender Habermas, Jürgen, 482
concept of, 598 habits
gender equality development of, 119, 120
insights from sociocultural psychology, 609–611 habituation, 543
gender identities Hackney, Peggy, 213, 214, 215
cultural canalization, 606–609 Halbwachs, Maurice, 436, 459–460
semiotic mediation by images, 606–609 handicap, 135–136, 143
gender identity and self, 597–598 Hanna, Thomas, 212
as a dynamic and contextualized system, 603–606 Harré, Rom, 67
central assumptions of sociocultural psychology, Harry Potter, 562, 566–567, 568, 569
598–600 Havighurst, R.J., 620
social identities as boundary phenomena, 600–603 head–tail pattern of connectivity, 216–217
gender relations, 604–605, 606 Hegel, Georg
gender roles, 604–605 theory of self-consciousness, 247–248
gender stereotypes, 605 Heidbreder, E., 66
Geneplore model of creativity, 169, 173 Heidegger, M., 542, 545, 546
general systems theory, 18 Heraclitus of Ephesus, 597, 598
generativity of symbolic resources, 188–189 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 15
genetic psychology, 556 hermeneutic philosophy, 85
genuine dialogue concept, 286–287 hermeneutic repertoire, 544–545
geropsychology, 615 hermeneutics, 352, 637
Gessel, Arnold, 210 hetero-affection, 541
gestalt, 218, 247, 507, 549 heuristics, 327
gestalt units, 544 Hewstone, M., 67
gestures in young children Hexis, 548
use in self-regulation, 230–233 high culture
Gibson, James J., 71, 106–107, 108, 550 dialogue of, 286
affordances, 173 hippocampus, 267
gift exchange, 333 historical guilt, 471–473
globalization, 488 historical knowledge
God, 69, 130, 133, 139, 351, 352, 353, 370, 377, 385, 386, from intergenerational narratives, 459–461
387, 406, 528, 557, 579, 616 historical maps
Goldstein, J.A., 419 as cultural tools, 431–434
Goldstein, Kurt, 78 historical myths, 469
good me, 81, 82, 90 historical preexistence of the human mind, 463–464
660 Index
historical representation, 133–134 iconic signs, 112

historical selfhood as embodied, 540–542 icons, 117
historical truth identification, 121, 143, 252, 255, 256, 304, 429, 430, 431,
pragmatic consequences of, 471–473 434, 435, 446, 483, 490, 491, 512
historiography with Other, 254
fostering of national identity, 424–426 identity
history ethnic, 133–134, 142–143
need for youth to understand, 461–462 historical, 424–426
politics of representing the past, 443–444 influence of history education, 428–430
history education, 424 national, 133–134, 138–143
and identity formation, 428–430 identity construction, 140–142
approach to national identity, 427–428 ideographic, 650
fostering of national identity, 424–426 ideologies, 591
historical maps as cultural tools, 431–434 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, 386–387
ironical and dialogical understanding of nation and a book for building yourself, 387
national identity, 436–438 development of subjectivity through the rhetoric and
master narratives and their persistence, 430–431 fractal structure of the exercises, 388–390
myths of origin and their persistence, 430–431 disciplining experience, 388–390
relation to ethnic identity, 428–430 giving someone the way and order, 388–390
sociocultural investigation of alternative pathways, knowledge of the self, 388
434–436 realising and relishing things interiorly, 388
sociocultural views on imagining history, 426–427 illusion
history education studies and poverty of the stimulus, 67–68
continuities and changes, 428–430 images
Hitler, Adolf, 526 semiotic mediation of gender identities, 606–609
cult of, 527–529 imagination, 121
death of, 535 and spheres of experience, 181
holism, 39 as an integrative sociocultural concept, 181–183
Hollenback, J., 358 constraints on the use of, 192–194
holomorphic representation, 133, 135 future study directions, 195
homeland concept, 413 historical perspectives on, 180–181
Homer, 616 loop of imagination, 181–183
hospice movement, 618 plausibility in sociocultural situations, 183
human experiential mind relation to reality, 179
defining, 504–506 role in guiding the lifecourse, 179
dialogic and sociocultural perspectives, 506–507 role in sociocultural change, 191–192
dialogical account of feelings, 512–515 role in the life course, 189–191
dialogical pespective, 503–504 study methodological problems, 194–195
first-person perspective, 507–508 symbolic resources concept, 178
mind in motion, 511–512 theoretical problems, 194
notion of position, 511–512 imagination and creativity theory, 149–150
perspectives within, 507–511 imaginative processes, 402
phenomenology, 504–506 embodiment and reification of the concept of nation,
relation to the self, 515 408–417
second-person perspective, 507, 508–509 range of influence on human action, 419–421
third-person perspective, 507, 509–511 imagined communities
humans and national identity, 404–408
as responsive beings, 548–550 imagined landscape
viewed as not part of nature, 68 and concept of nationhood, 411–415
Hutto, D., 269 imagining history
hypergeneralized signs, 404 sociocultural views on, 426–427
Index 661
imitation interethnic situations

multifunctional imitation in the life course, 570 construction of the self, 575–576
personal development through persistent imitation, ethnic diversity in the urban context, 587–592
559–561 multinaturalism and the construction of the person,
someone to copy and be copied by, 567–569 589–591
user-generated content and objects, 171 psychology and the construction of the person, 592–593
immanent formal causation, 40 self as the space of circulation of subjective agencies,
implicatory denial, 467 591–592
incorporation, 544 intergenerational narratives
indexes, 117 bias in, 466–468
indexical signs, 112 breaking down literal social denials, 470–471
indigenous people building up and marginalizing the ethos of conflict,
ethnic diversity in the urban context, 587–592 464–466
indigenous university students, 576–584 contemporary effects, 458
challenges faced by, 589 continuity and discontinuity, 462–464
migration to the urban context, 584–587 forms of social denial, 467
search for academic education, 584–587 historical guilt of descendents, 471–473
individualism historical preexistence of the human mind, 463–464
children and money, 343–345 literal social denial, 468–469
inductive abduction, 404 memories of historical events, 459–461
inherent intentionality, 15 memories of past ways of living, 459–461
innovation natality, 463, 464
production through action, 125–127 need for youth to understand their history, 461–462
user-generated content and objects, 171 of violence, 464–466
institutional environment parrhesia, 470–471
influence on child development, 327–329 pragmatic consequences of historical truth, 471–473
institutionalization, 136 reconciliation processes, 473–474
instrumental dialogic pedagogies, 279–285 role of group-based moral emotions, 471–473
instrumental education, 276–279 scaffolding children’s autobiographical memories,
instrumentality, 153–154 458–459
coordination of complex constellations of artefacts, 159 scaffolding positive family identities, 458–459
failed remediation in oral health care (Finland), 155–156 violence from the point of view of victims, perpetrators
shifting multiple functions of BIM software, 157–159 and bystanders, 466–468
intangible concepts internalization theories of self-reflection, 249–251
influence on human actions, 399–401, 419–421 interobjective architecture, 58–60
intellectualism interobjectivity, 51–55
fallacy of, 69 in social research, 56
intensional categories, 36–37 interpersonal psychoanalysis
intensionality ability to deal with the unknown, 94–95
and abstractive generalization, 37–39 approach in the consulting room, 82–83
intentional action boundaries and regulatory mechanisms, 90–91
development of, 119 considerations for the therapist, 87–89
intentional communication, 24, 25 field theories, 90–91
intentional schemas, 118–119 goals and growth, 93–94
intentional worlds importance of context, 92–93
semiotic constitution of, 123–125 origins of, 78
intentionality, 15, 55, 110, 118, 120, 170, 269, 400, 504, relationship to cultural psychology, 78–79
505, 508, 509, 540, 541, 544, 545 role of language, 91–92
interaction and cooperation, 132–134 semiotic capacity of patients, 82
intercorporeity, 543–544 semiotic space in the therapeutic field, 89–94
interdisciplinary synthesis, 4 Sullivan’s modes of meaning making, 80
662 Index
interpersonal psychoanalysis (cont.) law, 334, 360, 366, 367, 368, 369, 373, 374, 401, 461, 506
systems of defence, 80–82 Lee, Peter, 428
work of Donnel Stern, 85–86 legisigns, 119, 123, 639, 640
work of Edgar Levenson, 83–85 Leonardo da Vinci, 609
work of Harry Stack Sullivan, 79–83 Leontjev, A.N., 148, 150
work of Phillip Bromberg, 86–87 cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT), 148–149
interpretant, 117 Levenson, Edgar, 83–85
interpretative denial, 467 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 401
intersubjectivity, 51–53 Lewin, Kurt, 79, 519, 549
iron logic of the universal necessity, 283 life course
ironic understanding in history education, 436–438 duration and redundancy in development of, 569–570
irony future-oriented nature, 306–307
as a mode of resistance, 452–453 multifunctional imitation in, 570
as a tool of critique, 443 role of imagination, 189
in images of authority figures, 450–451 role of symbolic resources, 189–191
Islam, 383 sociocultural perspective, 178–179
experience of a Swedish woman convert, 524–526 timed and untimed living, 563–567
lifespan models, 620–621
Jack, Daboma lifespan theory of socio-emotional selectivity, 622
incident in Malta, 50–51 linguistic turn in human sciences, 207
Jackson, Michael, 413 Linnell, Per, 295
James, William, 15, 78, 265, 354–355, 359, 361, 373, literal denial, 467
605 literal social denial, 468–469
human experiencing mind, 504–506 breaking down, 470–471
on religious belief, 368–369 literature, 193
Jefferson, Thomas, 288 Little Buddha, 186
Jones, J.W., 361 Locke, John, 321
Judaism, 383 London, Jack, 188
Jules et Jim, 186 loop of imagination, 181–183
Lorde, Audre, 293
Kant, Immanuel, 37 Lotman, Juri, 29
Kegan, Robert, 490 Lotze, Hermann, 15
kinesphere, 217 Lovejoy, Arthur, 70
kinesthetic, 207, 212, 213, 219 Luckman, T., 590
Klein, Melanie, 91 Luria, Alexander, 3, 152
Knorr-Cetina, Karin, 151
knowledge encounters, 55–58 machinations, 105
Koenigsberg, Richard, 416 machines, 104–105
Kübler-Ross, Elisabeth, 618 Madame Bovary, 187, 188
Madureira, A.F.A., 601–602, 603, 608–609
Laban, Rudolph, 212, 213 magnet effect, 226
Labaree, David, 278 Malafouris, Lambros, 109–110, 118
Lacan, Jacques, 247 Mamana, Silvia, 213
Lakatos, Imre, 287, 288–291 Mandela, Nelson, 412–413
language maps
embodying language, 374–376 as cultural tools, 431–434
emergence from social symbols, 24–26 market economy, 334, 335, 339, 341, 342, 344, 345
relationship to tool use, 151–153 market exchange, 334, 335, 339, 343, 344, 345
role in interpersonal psychoanalysis, 91–92 market value, 334
language game model, 22 marketization, 341, 344, 345–346
Latour, Bruno, 479, 492 Marx, Karl, 13
Index 663
mass media procedural memory, 543

role in the climate change debate, 138 reexperiencing, 265, 266
master narratives, 591 semantic memory, 265
and their persistence, 430–431 Meno dialogue, 282
material affordances Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 211, 360, 538, 541–542
creative action using, 172–174 sedimented dispositions, 548
material culture, 104–106 metacanonical uses of objects, 230
material engagement theory, 118 meta-knowledge, 133, 144
Material Me, 335 metaphor
material signs and standing forth in the world, 360–363
semiotic value, 114 use to inspire collective action, 417–419
Maturana, Humberto, 18–20, 371–372 metaphysical naturalism, 366, 369
McGraw, Myrtle, 210 metonymy
Mead, George H., 16, 68, 78, 589–590 use to inspire collective action, 417–419
concept of the significant symbol, 250 microgenesis, 104
on self-reflection, 246 migrants
theory of the social act, 251–252 effects of crossing borders, 305
meaning, 13, 17, 20–21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 37, Miller, Arthur, 137
42–43 mimesis, 261
and memory, 263–264 mimetic culture, 261
definition, 126 mind, 31
distinction from sense, 538 art and artifacts, 110–111
emerges from sensemaking, 43 as sensemaking, 41–42
meaning making as the process of decoupling from the environment, 41
distortion caused by anxiety, 80–82, 83 as the psychological object, 40–41
Sullivan’s modes of, 80 historical development in relation to culture (Vico),
mediation, 17, 38 401–404
as an epistemological barrier, 63 mind and body duality, 15
by signs, 148 mind of breathing, 215
four levels of semiotic mediation, 186–187 mirror theories of self-reflection, 246–247
mediationism model of how action produces meaningful experiences,
dominance in psychology theory, 63 639–649
getting over it, 73–74 capabilities and limitations of this model, 647–649
problems in mainstream cognitive theory, 63–65 self-management of behavior, 643–644
problems with, 63 semiotic boundaries and growth of meaning, 644–646
tendency to return to dualism, 70–73 sociocultural resouces for shaping experiences and
memory behaviour, 646–647
and meaning, 263–264 tetrahedral structure, 640–643
anoetic memory, 265 model of overcoming ambivalence by development,
autobiographical memory, 260, 263–264, 265–267 518–519
childhood (infantile) amnesia, 264–265, 360 extending the model, 522–526
collective memory, 29, 140–142, 143, 400, 417, 425, social context of meaning making, 535–536
444, 465, 473, 607 modeling systems, 29
declarative memory, 264–265 modern reflective capacity as a cultural artefact, 486
embodied memory, 543 modern subjectivity
episodic memory, 264–265, 266–267 conceptions of the self, 381–382
event memory, 459–461 genealogical approach to study, 382
factors influencing development, 260–262 psyche as an historical object, 381–382
family memories, 458–459 modernism, 72, 283
making memory, 260 monarchy
nature of early memory, 264–265 body of the king, 404–406
664 Index
money naïve personalism, 557

as a cultural tool, 333, 345–346 naming
as an economic tool, 333 and self-reflection, 245
bill-splitting, 336, 342–343, 344 narrative thinking, 217
dialectical study of cultural meaning, 335–337 natality, 463, 464
expanded mediational structure (EMS), 333–334 nation
polysemic nature, 334–335 allegorical personification, 408–411
See also children and money defined in the remembrance of those who died for it,
monologic pedagogy, 275 415–417
mood, 118, 119, 120, 121 effect of delineating borders, 414–415
affective register, 545–546 embodiment and reification of the concept, 408–417
role in communication, 121 ironical and dialogical understanding in history
moon, travel to, 182, 191, 192 education, 436–438
moral, 13, 25, 28, 49 relationship to imagined landscape, 411–415
Moscovici, S., 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 465 unknown soldier memorials, 415–417
motivation, 15, 16, 23, 36, 82, 87 national identity
motivational theory of lifespan development, 622 and imagined communities, 404–408
motor development approach in history education, 427–428
and iterative experience, 209–211 fostering through history education, 424–426
cultural influences on early development, 207–208 historical accounts of Estonia, 133–134
effects of early deprivation, 208 historical maps as cultural tools, 431–434
study of, 208–209 influence of history education, 424
movement ironical and dialogical understanding in history
body and perception, 107 education, 436–438
fundamental patterns of total body connectivity, master narratives and their persistence, 430–431
214–217 myths of origin, 430–431
future directions in developmental studies, 220 national identity (Estonia), 138–143
somatic teaching, 211–213 building a nation, 138–140
thinking in movement, 217–219 collective memory work, 140–142
Muehlebach, Andrea, 489 reifying national identity as a state, 142–143
multiculturalism, 488 nationalism
multinaturalism, 589 in history writing and education, 424–426
and the construction of the person, 589–591 natural
Murdoch, Iris, 353–354, 356 meaning in cognitive science of religion (CSR),
music, 352, 358–359 366–367
music therapy, 226 nature
Muslim women humans viewed as not part of, 68
representations of the veil, 56, 57 Nazi Germany
mystery, 68, 105, 352, 355, 359, 363, 383, 400 Günter Grass and the Third Reich, 529–535
mystical experience, 356, 358, 362, 363 propaganda and the cult of Hitler, 527–529
mysticism, 361, 386 rise of, 526–527
myth, 138, 139, 261, 589 negotiation, 30, 52, 94
challenging, 469 Nelson, Katherine, 230
foundation myth, 143, 414, 431 neoliberalism, 488
Italians, good fellows, 469 Neoplatonism, 386
mythic culture, 261, 267 networks, 105
myths, 591 Neuman, John von, 70
myths of origin and their persistence, 430–431 neuronal group selection theory, 209
neurophenomenology, 212
Nachträglich, 549 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 381
Nachträglichkeit, 550–551 Nigro, K.F., 588
Index 665
nomotetic, 8, 31 ontological non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies, 291

noncanonical use of objects by children, 225–226 ontopotentiality of symbols, 114
nondevelopmentalism, 557–558 operation, 13, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26
non-dialogic pedagogies, 275–276 ordinary life on the border, 309
non-instrumental dialogic pedagogies, 285–296 organization, 38
non-instrumental education, 276–279 organizational closure, 39–40
non-reductive scientific naturalism, 369–374 Ortega y Gasset, J., 462, 463–464, 470, 472, 473
normative mediator, 333 Orwell, George, 443
norms, 8, 105, 302, 340, 564–565, 575 ostensive gestures, 226, 231
not me, 90 Ostrom, Elinor, 154
not me experience, 82 Other, 30, 42, 143, 190, 360, 376, 503, 541
null state, 520 dialogical dance with, 512
number systems generalized Other, 524
evolution of, 112–114 I–Other relationships, 403
numerical use of objects priority in aesthetic transcendence, 354–357
development in young children, 233–235 priority of, 362–363
realm of, 360
object self-reflection via identification with, 254
of a representamen, 117 ownership
object construction, 151 understanding in children, 319–323
object of activity theory
uses in studying human activities, 149–151 Paideia proposal, 281
object relations theory, 86 Paley, Vivian, 281, 283, 284, 285
objectification, 51, 54–58, 59, 148, 154 Pali canon, 616
influence of sociocultural context, 55–58 Panofsky, Erwin, 608
objectivity, 51–53 parataxic thinking, 80
objects as a defence, 80–82
affordances of, 107–109 Park, Rosa Louise, 489
awareness of their functional attributes, 223–225 Parmenides of Elea, 597, 598
cultural uses, 236 parrhesia, 470–471
ecstatic power of, 354–357 pathic dimension, 549, 550
functional, canonical use by children, 225–226 Pavlov, Ivan, 246
functional permanence of, 226 Peirce, Charles S., 15, 92, 117, 303
functional uses and executive functions before language, on self-reflection, 245–246
230–233 Peircean Semiotics, 639
how children learn to use them according to their perception
function, 225–226 ecological theory of, 106–107
metacanonical uses, 230 leading to conceptualization, 21
noncanonical use by children, 225–226 perceptual action, 119
numerical use in young children, 233–235 person, 13, 15, 17, 31
protocanonical use by children, 225–226 personal agency, 560
relation between symbolic and functional uses, 228–230 personal development through persistent imitation,
rhythmic-sonorous uses, 226–228 559–561
self-regulation through, 230–233 personal dimension of experience, 538–539
use in child interaction with adults, 233–235 personal sense, 545
observer personality, 557
describing behavior, 19–20 personality suggestions, 560
Onfray, M., 382 personhood
ontic nature of objects, 118 emergence of, 27–28
ontogenesis, 104, 207, 247 personified abstractions, 404–406
in living organisms, 19 perspective-taking, 172
666 Index
pertinentization private gestures in infants, 231

ongoing process during sensemaking, 45 problem-focused coping, 621
phenomenological naturalism, 366, 374–376 processual ontology, 39, 46
phenomenology, 15, 637 propaganda and the cult of Hitler, 527–529
pre-reflective, embodied experience, 539–540 proprioception, 212, 213, 218, 219
Piaget, Jean, 209, 226, 228, 482 protocanonical use of objects by children, 225–226
on self-reflection, 246 prototaxic thinking, 80
planning capacitiy, 104 as a defence, 80–82
Plato, 14, 66, 249, 274, 417, 479 psyche, 633
Socratic Dialogic method, 282–283 Aristotelian view, 15
play as an historical object, 381–382
development of, 150 behaviorist view, 16
play and art, 111–112 biological basis, 15
Pocket Money Project, 339–343 conceptions shaped by psychology, 16
poetry, 359 culture as the spirit of, 28
Poincaré, Henri, 164 definition, 633–634
pointing gestures, 231 distinction from spirit, 14–15
political institutionalization division of, 14
climate change debate, 137–138 feelings drive the mind toward reflection, 23–24
politics of representing the past, 443–444 from biological processes to social behavior, 18–20
agency, 445 functionalism of the American pragmatists, 15–16
Basque conflict, 443–444, 445–449 genealogical approach of cultural psychology, 383–385
Egyptian revolution (2011), 443–444, 449–453 genealogical relationship to religion, 383–385
positioning, 444–445 influence of religion on the concept, 380–381
symbolic action and re-action, 453–455 nature of, 31, 103–104
symbolic tools, 444–445 ontology of, 13–14
theoretical framework, 444–445 role in the theory of evolution, 15
polysemic nature of money, 334–335 sociocultural psychology view, 16
possessions study of developmental dynamics, 635–637
polysemic nature, 334–335 turning things into objects, 106–109
postmodern psytizenship from a psycho-cultural psychoanalysis, 180
perspective, 486–491 theory on self-reflection, 247
postmodern transitions of psytizenship, 484–486 psychogenesis and modernity, 480–483
postmodernism, 72 psychological distancing theory, 248
power relations, 605 psychological impersonalism, 557
prejudice, 582, 602, 605 psychological knowledge
pre-reflective, embodied dimension of selfhood, 538–539 nature and origins of, 30–31
pre-reflective, embodied experience psychological rationality, 390–392
affective register, 545–546 psychology
existentials of embodied history, 542–546 as a liminal science, 633–635
future research, 552 as a science, 633–637
habituation, 543 behaviorism, 16
hermeneutic repertoire, 544–545 cognitive revolution, 16
historical selfhood as embodied, 540–542 conceptions of psyche, 16
incorporation, 544 explanatory extensions, 637
intercorporeity, 543–544 first-person approach to the study of, 15
sedimentation of pre-reflective experiential structures, fragmented state of the discipline, 35–36
546–547 functional approaches of the German and Austrian
sedimented experiential dispositions, 548 schools, 15
turn to phenomenology, 539–540 growth of the sociocultural perspective, 3
Prigogine, Ilya, 597 need for a general theory of psychology, 35–36
Index 667
ordering the epistemic field, 635–637 as product, 132–133

roots of, 637 holomorphic, 133, 135
third-person approach to the study of, 15 meanings of, 130–131
psychophysics, 15 vs. object, 134–136
psytizen carnivalization, 491–492 representationalism
psytizenship in social cognitive psychology, 65–70
activity as a means of surpassing adjustment, 487–488 problems in cognitive psychology, 63–65
definition, 479–480 resource development and conservation theory, 622
empowered and dissolved psytizens, 489–491 responsiveness and personal history, 550–551
experience beyond decision and fragmentation, 488–489 reverse action of signs, 250
historico-genealogical approach, 480–484 revolutions, 192
modern reflective capacity as a cultural artefact, 486 rhema, 117, 123
postmodern psytizenship from a psycho-cultural rhythmic-sonorous uses of objects, 226–228
perspective, 486–491 Ricoeur, Paul, 361–362
postmodern transitions, 484–486 Rogoff, Barbara, 370
psychogenesis and modernity, 480–483 Roman Catholic culture, 490
Rorty, Richard, 487
queuing, 49–51 Rosa, Alberto, 208, 599, 600
Rosch, Eleanor, 211
Rabbow, Paul, 386 Rose, Nikolas, 482
Rancière, J., 404 Ruiz Zafon, C., 514–515
rationalism of the Enlightenment, 283 rule configuration, 154
reality, 130, 134, 180 rule constellation, 154
relation to imagination, 179 runaway objects, 151
reciprocity rupture theories of self-reflection, 245–246
understanding in children, 323–326
reductionism, 106 Sanders, Cecily, 618
reflective modernity, 487 Santaella, L., 607, 608
reification Sapir, Edward, 78
constructed in collective action, 417–419 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 188
reified discourse satisficing, 623
climate change debate, 137–138 Scarry, Elaine, 363
relational psychoanalysis, 78 scenarios, 44–45, 191, 210, 224, 229, 231, 236
religion Schachtel, Ernst, 360
cultural analysis, 382–383 Schiffer, Brian, 67
cultural psychology approach, 383–385 School of the Dialogue of Cultures, 290
genealogical relationship to psyche, 383–385, 390–392 science
influence of conceptions of the self, 380–381 notion of, 13
technologies of the self, 381–383 scientific naturalism, 367–368, 369–374
see also cognitive science of religion (CSR) Scott, Joan, 598, 604
religious development scripts, 154, 155, 322, 454, 649
emotions and self-governance, 385–386 Searle, J.R., 327–328
religious experience second-person approach, 31, 208, 218, 220
aesthetic transcendence, 354–357 sedimentation of pre-reflective experiential structures,
religious extremism, 130 546–547
religious fundamentalism, 602 sedimented experiential dispositions, 548
religious violence, 130 sedimented response registers, 551
remediation, 155–156, 159 Segato, Rita, 601, 604
representamen, 117 selective inattention, 81
representation selective optimization with compensation (SOC) model,
as activity or process, 131–132 621
668 Index
self semiotic resources, 185, 646

and gender identity, 597–598 semiotic space in the therapeutic field, 89–94
as the space of circulation of subjective agencies, semiotic tools, 508
591–592 semiotic traps, 549
construction of the autobiographical self, 260 semiotic value of material signs, 114
historical selfhood as embodied, 540–542 semiotics, 4, 16, 17, 29, 106, 126, 152, 164, 169, 637, 648,
in autobiographical memory, 267–271 649
multinaturalism and the construction of the person, border irregularities, 29–30
589–591 of action, 117–118
production of, 26–27 of behavior and experience, 116–125
relation to the human experiential mind, 515 of self-reflection, 255
self-awareness, 540 Peircean, 639
self-consciousness theory of Hegel, 247–248 semiotization, 30, 126
self-esteem, 80–81 Sen, Amartya, 274
self-governance senicide, 617
and religious development, 385–386 Sennett, Richard, 482
self-management of behavior, 643–644 sense
self-reflection distinction from meaning, 538
complex semiotic systems, 254–255 sensemaking
conflict theories, 247–249 as inherently dialogical, 42
definition, 245 cultural psychology as the science of, 39–42
internalization theories, 249–251 mind as, 41–42
Mead’s theory of the social act, 251–252 sensemaking dynamics, 42–45
mirror theories, 246–247 affective grounds of sensemaking, 44–45
naming, 245 bivalence of meaning, 45
reasons for, 255–257 culture as the field distribution of possibilities, 44
rupture theories, 245–246 hyperdimensionality of the distribution, 44
semiotic mediation, 245 meaning emerges from sensemaking, 43
semiotic process underlying, 255–257 sensemaking is a field dynamics, 42–43
social representation theory, 248 sensemaking works through ongoing pertinentization,
two processes of, 252–254 45
via distanciation from the self, 253 significance in absentia (SIA), 45
via identification with Other, 254 significance in praesentia (SIP), 45
self-regulation transition among signs is a habit function, 43–44
and aging, 621–622 transition among signs is the unit of analysis of
through gestures and objects, 230–233 sensemaking, 43
self-states, 86–87 sensorial action, 117
self story, 266 sexism, 598, 600–602, 604–605
sembling, 560 Sheets-Johnston, Maxine, 207, 218
semiology, 637 Shotter, John, 490
semiosis, 3, 117–118 Sidorkin, Alexander, 291–292, 294, 295
semiosisaction, 639 Sigel, I.E,
semiospheres, 29–30, 645 psychological distancing theory, 248
semiotic boundaries and growth of meaning, 644–646 sign transition, 42, 43
semiotic–cultural constructivism in psychology, is a habit function, 43–44
575 unit of analysis of sensemaking, 43
semiotic mediation, 245, 503, 509 significance in absentia (SIA), 45
influence of images on gender identities, 606–609 significance in praesentia (SIP), 45
semiotic objects signs
constitution of, 123–125 as internalized mediators for interaction, 20–21
semiotic prism, 189–190, 192 reverse action, 250
Index 669
Simmel, G., 302 sociocultural change

Skinner, B.F., 482 role of imagination, 191–192
Skyfall, 187 role of symbolic resources, 191–192
Sluga, Glenda, 483 sociocultural cognition, 370–371
Smith, Adam sociocultural context
on self-reflection, 246–247 influence on objectifications, 55–58
Smith, Mark, 285 sociocultural frames of reference
social act Daboma Jack incident, 50–51
Mead’s theory of, 251–252 sociocultural phenomena, 123
social borders sociocultural psychology
crossing in development and education, 312–313 approach on experience and meaning, 638–639
social cognition, 51, 64, 67, 208, 218, 327 as a science, 633–637
social cognitive psychology central assumptions, 598–600
representationalism in, 65–70 current developments in the field, 3
social constructivism, 71, 72 definition, 16
social context of meaning making, 535–536 directions in, 8–9
social conventional signs, 640 epistemology of, 637–649
social denial features of the sociocultural approach, 16–17
forms of, 467 model of how action produces meaningful experiences,
social engineering, 283–285, 481 639–649
social exchange nature of, 31
gift exchange, 333 place among the sciences, 649–650
money as a cultural tool, 333 structural-systemic approach, 17–18
social identities as boundary phenomena, 600–603 view of psyche, 16
social influence, 58 sociocultural resouces
social justice instrumental dialogic pedagogies, for shaping experiences and behavior, 646–647
283–285 sociocultural theory, 148
social membranes Socrates, 274
institutional borders as, 311–312 Socratic Dialogic method, 282–283
social objects somatic education, 215
climate change, 136–138 somatic education techniques, 211
national identity (Estonia), 138–143 somatic teaching, 211–213
religious extremism, 130 somatics, 212
semiotic constitution of, 123–125 soul, 14
social representation, 134–136 South Park, 188
wheelchairs, 135–136 spectator theory of knowledge, 69
social representation theory, 130–131, 400, 417 spheres of experience, 181
behaving and acting, 131–132 spirit, 31
belief and communicating, 131 nature of, 14–15
individual and collective levels of analysis, 143–144 Spiritual Exercises. See Ignatius of Loyola Spiritual
interaction and cooperation, 132–134 Exercises
self-reflection, 248 split-self, 550
social objects, 134–136 statehood, 142–143
social symbols Steiner, George, 351–353, 356, 357
emergence and development of, 24–26 Stengers, Isabelle, 597
social virtual objects, 123 stereotypes, 582
social world of children, 319 Stern, Daniel, 218–219, 543
socially constructed environments, 60 Stern, Donnel, 85–86
socially shared reality, 181 Stern, William, 556–557
societal discourse, 131 challenges to the study of development, 557–558
Society of Jesus, 386, 585 the experiencing person, 558–559
670 Index
Stimmung, 545 symbols, 24–26, 117

Stoicism, 386 nature of, 112, 121
Storr, A., 357 product of communication when acting,
Straus, Erwin, 541 22–23
street art sympathetic magic, 132
diversity of interactions with, 56 syntaxic thinking, 80
strong signs, 522
structural coupling, 38, 106, 116, 124, 211, 372, 373, 636, Tai Chi, 215
648 Tannaim, 274
structural-systemic approach of sociocultural psychology, Tartu School of semiotics, 29
17–18 technologies of the self, 381–383
structure, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 terrorism, 130
subjectivity, 51–53, 106 texts, 29, 123–124
Sullivan, Harry Stack, 78 The Dreamers, 186
modes of meaning making, 80 Thelen, Esther, 209–211
systems of defence, 80–82 theology, 385
work on interpersonal psychoanalysis, 79–83 theoretic culture, 261
Sykes–Picot agreement (1916), 411 theory of evolution
symbolic action and re-action, 453–455 functions of psyche, 15
symbolic bricolage, 184 theory of mind, 65–66
symbolic gestures, 231 theory of the ideal, 150
symbolic nature of humans, 13 thinking in action, 117, 118
symbolic resources, 124, 575 thinking in movement, 217–219
aboutness, 184–185 Third Age, 618, 621
aboutness of, 188 third-person approach, 15
and theory of imagination, 178 Thomae, Hans, 621, 624
as a sociocultural concept, 183–189 Thompson, Clara, 78
concept of, 178 Thompson, Evan, 211, 371–372, 373
constraints on the use of, 192–194 time
cultural experiences as, 183–184 depiction of, 14
defining, 184–185 Tintin, 192
four levels of semiotic mediation, 186–187 tool use
future study directions, 195 relationship to language, 151–153
generativity, 188–189 tools, 25, 104–105
heuristic power of the concept, 178 and signs, 151–152
model for analyzing the use of, 185–189 creative process, 109–110
origins of the concept, 184 money
plausibility, 187–188 as a cultural tool, 333
role in sociocultural change, 191–192 Toomela, Aaro, 17, 18
role in the lifecourse, 189–191 torpedo touch, 282
semiotic prism, 189–190, 192 total body connectivity
study methodological problems, 194–195 breath pattern, 214–215
theoretical problems, 194 core–distal connectivity pattern, 215–216
time orientation, 186 fundamental patterns, 214–217
use of cultural elements, 183–184 head–tail pattern of connectivity, 216–217
symbolic systems, 183 totalitarian regimes
symbolic thought irony as a tool of critique, 443
development of, 150 totalitarianism, 283–285
symbolic tools, 444–445 transcendence
symbolic use of objects defining, 351
relation to functional uses, 228–230 within immanence, 357–360
Index 671
transition among signs, 42, 43 internalization, 249–251

is a habit function, 43–44 mediation by signs, 148
is the unit of analysis of sensemaking, 43 on communication, 230
transitions, 178, 184, 189, 191, 195 on creativity, 169, 171
translation, 29, 30, 256, 336 on imagination, 180–181, 182
trauma theory, 86 on the full sense of words, 520
Trevarthen, Colwin, 210 on the use of objects, 228
triadic rhythmic interactions, 226–227 psychological mediation, 184
Truth and Reconciliation Committees, South Africa, role of objects, 149–150
466–467 signs, 333
Tulving, E., 264–265, 266 theory of imagination and creativity, 149–150
theory of the sign, 249–251
ubasute tradition, 617 tools and signs, 151–152
umbrella revolution (Hong Kong, 2014), 417–418 zone of proximal development, 53, 306
Umwelt, 17, 31, 108, 111, 127, 400, 640
Unheimlichkeit, 546 Wagner, Roy, 591
unknown soldier memorials, 415–417 Waldenfels, Bernhard, 542
agency as responsiveness, 548–551
Valsiner, Jaan, 107, 187, 208, 313, 504, 530, 538, 544, Wartofsky, Max, 153
545, 558, 591, 597, 599, 600, 608, 609 Watson, J.B., 66, 68
value Weber, Max, 600
definition, 126 Weimar Germany and the rise of Nazism, 526–527
Varela, Francisco, 18–20, 211 Wertsch, J.V., 123, 184, 249, 274, 426, 430, 434, 435, 436,
Veblen, Thorsten, 296 437, 443, 444, 445, 453, 454
vectors, 519, 520 wheelchairs
Verne, Jules, 192 as social objects, 135–136
Vico, Giambattista, 180, 417 White, Hayden, 417
axioms on the historical development of the human White, William Alanson, 78
mind and and culture, 401–404 Widerfahrnis, 550
violence Will, 387
from the point of view of victims, perpetrators and Wineburg, Sam, 428
bystanders, 466–468 women
religious violence, 130 violence against, 601
vitality forms, 215 Wundt, Wilhelm, 15
Viveiros de Castro, E., 584, 588–589, 591–592, 593
volitional action, 117 Yoga, 211
volitive action, 119
Völkerpsychologie movement, 15 Zeitverschiebung, 549
von Uekküll, Jakob, 640 zone of free movement, 107, 544
Vygotsky, Lev, 3, 17, 18, 71, 148, 260, 482 zone of promoted action, 544
distinction between sense and meaning, 538 zone of proximal development, 53, 104, 306

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The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology

a l be rto ro s a is a professor of psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

List of Figures page ix

Part I Theoretical and Methodological Issues 11

Part II Action, Objects, Artifacts, and Meaning 101

9 The Sociocultural Study of Creative Action 163

Part III The Agent Rises a Reflective Self: Education and

Part IV Institutional Artifacts for Value 317

Part V Aesthetic and Religious Experiences 349

21 Psyche and Religio Face to Face: Religion, Psychology, and Modern

Part VI Practices and Artifacts for Imagining Identity 397

Part VII Experiences Make the Person 501

33 The Experience of Aging: Views from Without and Within 615

General Conclusion 631

22.7 Demonstration against same-sex marriage in Paris. 411

m a r i s o l ba s i l i o is a research fellow at the Faculty of Education of the University of Cam-

mar io c arretero is a professor at Autonoma University of Madrid, Spain, and a

a la n c o sta l l is a professor of theoretical psychology and deputy director of the Cen-

m a r k f r e e m a n is a professor and chair of the Department of Psychology and Distinguished

a l e x g i l l e s pi e is an associate professor in social psychology at the London School of

k at r i n k e l lo holds an MA in history and PhD in media and communications. At the time

j o s é c a r lo s lor e d o-narc iandi is a professor of the Department of Psicología Básica

a na f l á v i a d o a m a r a l m a d u r e i r a has a PhD in psychology from the Universidade de

g i u s e p pina m a r s i c o is an assistant professor of development and educational psychol-

luis martínez g uerrero has a PhD in psychology at the Universidad Autónoma de

e u g e n e m atu s ov is a professor in the School of Education at the University of Delaware,

r e ijo m iettinen is a professor emeritus of adult education at the Faculty of Educational

ana m oreno-núñez is an assistant professor of developmental psychology at Universidad

s a m i paavo la is an associate professor at the Faculty of Educational Sciences at the Uni-

s e rg i o s a lvato r e is a professor of dynamic psychology at the Department of History,

g o r d o n s a m m ut is a senior lecturer in social psychology at the University of Malta. He is

set h surgan is a professor of psychology at Worcester State University, Massachusetts,

n o b o ru ta k a h a s h i is a professor of school education at Osaka Kyoiku University, Japan.

f lo o r va n a l ph e n is a postdoctoral researcher at Autonoma University, Madrid, Spain.

jakob wa ag v i l la d s e n is a PhD fellow at the Copenhagen Center of Cultural Life Course

wol f ga n g wag n e r is a professor of psychology at the University of Tartu, Estonia, and

d i tte al e xa n d r a w i n t h e r-lindqvist, PhD, is an associate professor of developmen-

Real Interdisciplinary Synthesis

reader and the voices included in the text, acting,

Damasio A. R. (1989). Time-locked multiregional and the psychological in the ontogenesis of

further interpreted and developed according to namely, a metatheoretical framework providing:

a sign). In other words, the phenomenon is recon- representation of knowledge. Psychological

Clearly, there are numerous ways by which

Harré and Sammut (2013) have argued that these

Box 3.2 Interobjectivity in Social Research

example of a wall again, a focus on crossroads 3.5 Conclusions

Coelho, N. E. & Figueiredo, L. C. (2003). Patterns Moghaddam, F. M. (2010). Intersubjectivity,

Mediationism extends across two contrasting The considerable attraction of mediationism

1 Handwaving: insist that the problems will ulti- 4.2 Representationalism in

baum, 2015a; Levenson, 2002). More recently,

Stern, D. B. (2003). Unformulated Experience: From Valsiner, J. (2014). An Invitation to Cultural

The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural in developmental transitions. Culture &

be confused with anthropomorphism. Malafouris quences of behavior and environmental change.

piece of work is finished in a way that is tive. It is in operation whenever something is

Goals and ends

Figure 6.2 Semiotic structure of the intentional scheme.

1st Action OBA: Pre–semiosis

Figure 6.3 Actuation: Semiotic development of intentional action and objects.

7.1 Veneration and Violence

institutionalized representation that meets deviat- References

8.1 Introduction & Peim, 2009). The first, sociocultural theory,