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CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”

-Sun Tzu-

INTRODUCTION

1. War is as old as mankind and, in spite of all his advances, man has not yet learnt to live
without it. The causes of conflict are many, varied-territorial greed, the just for power,
ideological conflict, and self-preservation are but a few.

2. The most peaceful nation must be prepared to fight as a last resort if it wishes to remain
independent. Every nation has interests which it regards as vital, such as preservation of the
homeland from invasion or the fulfilment of obligations under treaties provoking mutual
protection. In September 1939, Britain again went to war, this time because Germany had
invaded Poland to whom Britain had pledged support six months earlier. In 1991 USA declared
war on Iraq to protect its interests in Kuwait.

3. Any nation, which finds itself involved in a clash of interests may be forced to apply
pressure or to react to pressure in order to further its national policy. Rational governments
normally use the machinery of diplomatic exchange in the first instance. This is a method of
setting differences through discussion and negotiation, and negotiation, during the course of
which concessions may be made by both sides. Beyond this state, by a process of escalation, the
situation can become progressively more serious. For example, if first attempts at negotiation
fail, propaganda may be used to expose the ulterior motives of the other country to rally support
to influence a change of mind. If the situation deteriorates till further, it may result in the
breaking off of diplomatic relations and, if the issues at stake are important enough, a threat of
war may follow.

4. In the last resort, when all other means have failed, armed force may have to be used to
compel an opponent to come to terms. It may be the exception rather than the rule for the events
to follow such a logical pattern, and deviations will undoubtedly occur. For example, if a
country knows that the attainment of surprise is essential to the success of an attack, it may resort
directly to force on a trivial pretext or even without warning.

PROMINENT THEORISTS OF WAR

5. To have a comprehensive understanding on the meaning and conduct of war, a study of

the important writings on the subject through the ages is necessary. Not only do we get a better
idea on various forms of warfare from conventional to guerrilla but also the unifying and
fundamental principles in them all, which have not changed through the ages.

6. It should also be remembered at the very onset of the study of Air Power that Air Power
is part of the nation’s total war effort and should not be considered in isolation. A clear

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understanding of the basic ingredients of war will reveal the strengths and limitations to the
application of Air Power in war.

7. Clausewitz on War. War is a collective enterprise, aided by the available technology.

General Carl Von Clausewitz defines war as “an act of violence intended to compel the enemy to
fulfil out will”. War has its root in the political objective of the nation and this political objective
will guide the conduct of war. Clausewitz further states that war itself could be the political
objective. At other times the political objective is modified by the limitations of the military
strength. A nation’s policy is therefore interwoven in the entire fabric of war and must exercise a
continuous influence upon it.

8. Sun Tzu and the Art of War. In marked contrast to the style of writing of
Clausewitz is the book on the art of war by the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu of the sixth century
BC. He viewed war not only from the view of a general but also from the viewpoint of the
sovereign of the nation. In Sun Tzu’s view army is the instrument of power which delivers the
‘coup de grace’ to the enemy, previously made weak by other instruments of power. The
prerequisite to victory is to make proper preparations in the enemy camp so that the result is
decided beforehand. A victorious army attacks a demoralized and defeated army.

9. Kautilva’s Arthashastra . Kautilya in his famous book Arthashastra, wrote eight

chapters on war. Apart from a chapter which contain practical instructions on the conduct of
war, a vast portion of his writings deal with forming alliances against an enemy, use of
deception, subterfuges and the utilization of space, time and numerical strength for the conduct
of war.

10. Mao Tse Tung and Guerrilla Warfare. Mao was strongly influenced by Sun Tzu’s
thoughts. He measured military potential by standards different from western or even Soviet
norms. In the west military effectiveness is chiefly equated with weapon systems, Logistics and
trained manpower. Mao, faced by the absence of these three commodities claimed that the
revolutionary military effectiveness had to be measured in political terms. Accepting war as a
form of politics, the decisive factors, according to Mao are the will (the political morale of the
society), time, (which will exhaust the superior resources of the sophisticated society) and space
(essential for the exploitation of time and will)

THE NATURE OF WAR

11. War has certain essential characteristics. The recognition and intelligent exploitation of
these characteristics are fundamental to the successful use of armed force in support of political
objectives. The characteristics are as follows.

a. War is an Instrument of Policy. Success in war is not measured by the number

of casualties inflicted or the amount of territory occupied but by the achievement of
political objectives. Therefore, the character of the political objectives shapes military
goals and the scope and intensity of military operations.

b. War is an Act of Violence. War is distinguished from the other instruments of

policy by its use of organized violence. The use of violence injects elements of emotion
and improbability into war, and this can undermine reason on both sides and impede the

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pursuit of a purely rational course of action. Recognizing this is essential if the damaging
effects of war are to be minimized.

c. War is the Province of Uncertainty. Man wages war, and human frailties
and irrationality make the course and outcome of war uncertain and unpredictable. The
fog of war, when combined with danger, friction and physical stress, can make apparently
simple operations unexpectedly difficult. Fog and friction are always present in war, but
their effects can be mitigated by sound doctrine, leadership and training.

d. War is of the People. Groups of people wage war, and group passions,
cohesion and determination affect the conduct of war. A significant or effort cannot be
sustained by a democratic state in the face of public hostility or difference.

e. Leadership is Crucial in War. Man is the central element in war, and

leadership is the critical factor in shaping human effort. Leadership inspires and
persuades men and women to help a commander achieve his objectives in spite of
adversity and danger. Leadership is an exercise of character far more than an
application of management skill.

TYPES OF WAR

12. A clear understanding of the type of war a nation is likely to be engaged is crucial since it
is based on this premise that the important aspects of force structuring and equipping force
levels, training and deployment would be addressed. War occurs at different levels and each
demands specific preparation and response. However, though the types of war are distinct, it
also needs to be viewed from the point of view of the combatants. The USA may have viewed
Vietnam War as Limited War whereas for the North Vietnamese it could hardly be called limited
both in terms of objectives or effort. Basically there are three types of war, each being distinct,
the purposes are decidedly different and the means and methods vary Significantly. These are: -

(a) Total War

(b) Limited War

(c) Low Intensity Conflict

13. Total War. The objectives of total war are to destroy the means and will of the
adversary and to eliminate his existing political structure. The means are unrestricted and can
include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Historically, total war has resulted in the
mass mobilization of the respective economies and population, but the possible use of weapons
of mass destruction in future wars make such efforts impossible. In the conventional sense, the
strategy for total war is quite straightforward. The primary military aims are to eliminate the
military capability and potential of the enemy, destroy the relevant economic capability,
particularly the war supporting capacity, and neutralize the ability of the political infrastructure
to wage war. In short, the goal is to destroy the adversary as a functioning political, economic
and military entity by using both conventional means.

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14. Limited War. The purpose means and methods of limited wars are restricted. Political
objectives are restrictive and intentionally limited (Self imposed or externally included) usually
few states are involved and the conflict is confined to a restricted geographical area. The
adversary’s will however remain the objective. But instead of crushing the enemy’s will, the
goal is to change it, thus suggesting a bargaining approach. The means employed in limited war
may similarly be restricted to keep the conflict under control. Only relevant portions of the force
structure are utilized, but all types of conventional capability may be used. The use of nuclear
weapons in a limited war would certainly escalate the conflict to total war. However, where
limited war really differs from total war is in its methods of force employment at the strategy
level. Although the focus would remain on the enemy’s military forces, economic base and
political infrastructure, the military objective may not be to destroy them. Instead, efforts
would be directed towards reducing the capability or potential of some or all of these elements to
function effectively.

15. Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). The concept of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) was
developed in the 1970s in an attempt to define a wide range of political-military activities which
were less intense than modern, conventional limited war, and which were expressly associated
with instability in the Third World. However, it is no longer restricted to the Third World LIC
includes several types of hostilities like war of national liberation, insurgency, revolution,
terrorism and guerrilla war. Each has its own means and methods and purpose with a fair
amount of overlap.

16. LIC can be defined as “Political-Military confrontation between contending states or

groups below conventional war and above the routine and peaceful competition amongst states.
One of the parties may not be a state as in a Counter Insurgency (CI) campaign. LIC frequently
involves a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies. LIC ranges from
subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing
political, economic, informational and military instruments. It is also referred as No War No
Peace situation (NWNP)

(a) Internal Security.

(b) Counter Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism

(c) Peace keeping Peace Enforcement and Peace making.

17. LIC operations would always have to be conducted within the bounds of legality. This is
especially applicable to the armed forces, which will have to operate under strict legal
constraints, extensive media coverage and an increasingly close watch by Human Rights
Organizations.

18. Unlike in total or limited wars, it is the ground forces that are primary instrument to
contain low intensity conflicts. However, air power can play a very significant role in aiding and
increasing the effectiveness of ground forces. Normally, the main roles of air power would be in
providing mobility and agility to ground forces and in aerial surveillance. However, given the
requisite political will, air power can be used effectively in offensive roles.

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NATIONAL MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

19. Every student of military affairs should appreciate the importance of those resources of a
nation, which together determine its military effectiveness. Nowadays, when the prime object is
the prevention of war, preparedness is the key factor. No matter what spiritual and material
resources a nation may posses, it will be unable to play its part in deterring a war unless it is
militarily prepared and has balanced forces in being.

20. National Morale. The national morale or will power of a nation is the basis of its
military effectiveness. Since it is only by the will of the people that a government can draw fully
on all its resources. A nation can be defeated without a fight if its people or government lack the
will to face the possibility of war. For example, the dislocation or destruction of the industrial
economic system by internal civil dissension or the collapse of morale at the prospect of being
over whelmed by a superior power could bring about defeat before the armed forces have been
beaten or even engaged in battle. High national morale is, therefore, the most valuable asset a
nation can possess and is the foundation of its power to resist aggression.

21. The Armed Forces. The armed forces are the instrument by which a nation’s
government brings pressure to bear on an enemy. The armed forces must be maintained in
peacetime at a high state of operational readiness, and their survival in the face of a surprise
attack must be assured.

22. Industrial and Economic Strength. International influence depends upon economic
as well as military strength, and no country can be rated as a major power unless it has behind its
armed forces a strong economy based on an assured supply of raw material and an efficient
industry. The provision of effective military forces can be a heavy drain on a nation’s resources
especially in these days of expensive weapons. Therefore a strong industrial & technological
base and associated infrastructure is important to sustain a nation’s military forces.

23. Weapons. Although the application of rapid advances in science and technology to
weapons, aircraft and equipment will undoubtedly make them more effective, it will not reduce
the need for skilled manpower.
A nation must train its manpower and distribute it in peacetime as economically as possible
between the competing demands of the fighting services and the defence production on the one
hand, and the need of a healthy economy on the other.

24. Research and Development. A nation’s ability to deter its enemies from aggression
and the efficiency and strength of its armed forces will be largely determined by the quality of
the equipment and weapons it possesses. A nation must, therefore, keep abreast of scientific
research and technical development. However, it may not be possible for any single nation to
exploit the whole range of possibilities in this era of immense technological complexity.
Interdependence between nations will play its part.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

25. The principles of war are the most fundamental form of doctrine, and they represent the
basic guiding elements of warfare. They are not separate and distinctive items from which a
commander selects when employing his forces, nor are they a checklist. They are interrelated

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and interacting elements designed to provide a better understanding of warfare. Different nations
define the principles of war in different ways. Those recognized by the United Kingdom are as
follows.

a. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

b. Maintenance of Moral
c. Offensive Action
d. Security
e. Surprise
f. Concentration of Force
g. Economy of Effort
h. Flexibility
j. Co-operation
k. Administration

26. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. In the conduct of war, and therefore in all
military activity, it is essential to select and define the aims with absolute clarity before
operations start. The ultimate aim may be absolute (e.g the overthrow of a hostile government)
or more limited (e.g the recovery of occupied territory) Once the aim is decided, all efforts must
be bent on its attainment until a changed situation calls for a re-appreciation and consequently
for a new aim. Every plan of action, on whatever level must be tested by the extent to which it
contributes to the attainment of the military aim at the next highest level of command, and
ultimately to the overall military and hence political aim. Thus:

a. Governments must be quite clear about their military objectives.

b. Commanders at all levels must know exactly what they are required to achieve,
must make that quite clear to their appropriate subordinates, and must not be led into
expenditure of effort which does not contribute directly or indirectly to the attainment of
their aim

27. Maintenance of Morale. Successes in all forms of war depend more on morale than
on material qualities. Morale is a mental state, but it is very sensitive to material conditions. It is
based on a clear understanding of the aim, on training and discipline and is immediately
responsive to good leadership. It is adversely affected by inferior or inefficient equipment. It
also depends to a marked degree on sound administration. Outstanding leadership will sustain
high morale when all the other factors are against it, and success in battle is the best stimulant of
morale.

28. Offensive Action. Offensive action is the chief means open to a commander to
influence the outcome of a campaign or operation, and almost no military operation can be
brought to a successful conclusion without it. Many defensive actions may have to be fought,
but ultimately success must depend on the offensive use of available force.
Offensive action embodies a state of mind, which brings the determination to gain and hold the
initiative: it helps to create confidence and to establish a moral ascendancy over the enemy. In
warfare the aim must be to wrest the initiative from the enemy, and to take offensive action at the
earliest possible moment. Offensive action is needed not only to achieve victory, but also to
avert defeat. As Napoleon pointed out “He who remains in his trenches will be beaten”

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29. Concentration of Force. To achieve success in war, it is essential to concentrate

superior force against the enemy at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not
necessarily imply massing forces in one place, but rather disposing them so as to be able to
deliver the decisive blow, or to counter an enemy threat, whenever and wherever required.
Concentration of sufficient force to achieve what is the decisive or most important task at the
time is perhaps the cardinal principle in the employment of armed forces in war. This may well
entail the use of all force available. It may be said that the art of war is to decide the aim, then
decide the tasks needed to achieve that aim. Then to concentrate the required forces into those
tasks needed to achieve that aim, and then to concentrate the required forces into those tasks until
the aim is attained.

30. Economy of Effort. The corollary of concentration of force is economy of effort. It

is impossible to be strong everywhere, and if decisive strength is to be concentrated at the critical
time and place there must be no wasteful expenditure of effort where it cannot significantly
effect the issue. In the narrower sense, economy of effort implies the correct use of weapon
systems, a sound distribution of force and a careful balance in the allocation of tasks with the
object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.

31. Security. A degree of security by physical protection and information denial is

essential to all military operations. Security should enable friendly forces to achieve their
objectives despite the enemy’s interference. Active measures include the defence of bases and
entry points. The principle of concentration of force, economy of effort and security are all
closely interrelated.

32. Surprise. Surprise is a most powerful influence in war, and its moral effect is very
great. Every endeavour must be made to surprise the enemy and to guard against being surprised.
Results can be obtained out of all operations to the effort expended; indeed, in some operations,
particularly when other factors are unfavorable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise
can be achieved strategically, operationally, tactical or by exploiting new technologies, material
or techniques. Its elements are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and speed.

33. Flexibility. Although the aim may not alter, a commander may be required to exercise
judgment and flexibility and modify his plans to meet changing circumstance, take advantage of
a fleeting chance or shift a point of emphasis. Flexibility demand trust, good training,
organization, discipline, staff-work and above all that flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision
on the part of commanders and their subordinates which ensure that time is not wasted. It also
calls for degree of mobility, which ensures that new dispositions can be adopted and
economically. This poses an inherent danger because air power is the most flexible from of
military force; thus it may be diverted indiscriminately from the main aim. Although diversion
may be necessary in crisis, all demands should be critically examined in the light of the overall
strategic situation before diversionary tasks are undertaken. Unless this examination is unbiased,
air power may be frittered away in secondary tasks with consequent to the overall aim.

34. Co-operation. Co-operation is based on team sprit and entails co-ordination of all
activities to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. It is a means of attaining
concentration of force with economy of the aim. Above all, good will and desire for co-operation
at all levels, not only one Service, but also between the separate national Service and between
allies. Only by full co-operation between the Service can the right balance of force be achieved
and join Service plants are made to provide effective defence.

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35. Administration. Sound administration is the per-requisite for success in the any
operation. Logistic considerations are often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of any
operation. A clear appreciation of logistic constraints is as important to a commander as his
ability to make a sound estimate of the operational situation. No tactical plan can succeed
without administrative support commensurate with the aim of the operation: it follows that a
commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan proportionate to the
degree of his responsibility for the operation. Scarce resources must be controlled at a high level.
Administrative arrangements must be designed to give the commander the maximum freedom of
action in executing the plan. Every administrative organization must be as simple as possible.
The operational commander must have a clear understanding of the administrative factors, which
may affect his activities. He must control the administrative plan, which supports his operational
plan.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

36. The application of the principles of war must be continually examined in the light of new
technical and scientific developments. Evaluation of new weapon systems can tend to emphasize
the importance of some principles, while obscuring that of others. Although the relative
importance of the principles of way vary with scientific progress it must be remembered that the
art of war is a current application of the principles considered in combination, and with due
regard to the circumstances. The conflicting claims of the various principles can often be
balanced by applying the principle of economy of a force structure capable of providing the
maximum deterrent to aggression. Should the nation become involved in war, the application of
the principles of war will be an aid to the most affective employment of military power in
national or multi-nation defence.

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CHAPTER 2

AIR POWER AND ITS EVOLUTAION

WHAT IS AIR POWER?

1. The expression ‘Air Power’ was used in connection with manned aircraft in the early
twentieth century, soon after the Wright Brothers made their hesitating hop in the first heavier-
than-air machine. Since then, Air Power has been defined in many ways as there have been many
authors on the subject. In 1945 General Hap Arnold defined Air Power in a relatively precise and
practical manner as “Air Power includes a national’s ability to deliver cargo, people,
destructive missiles, and war-making potential through the air to a desired destination to
accomplish a desired purpose. Air Power is not composed alone of the war-making
components of aviation but is the total aviation activity, civilian and military, commercial and
private, potential as well existing”.

2. With aerial warfare being extended into space, the term Air Power could now be replaced
by a more appropriate expressing ‘Aerospace Power’. A working definition of Aerospace Power
would be “The ability to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension
above the surface of the earth. By combining the above two definition, it can be implied that
“Air Power is the ability of a nation to assert its will through the medium of air.

3. Air Power is not a matter concerning strength in terms of aircraft and personnel alone. To
support an air force there must be an elaborate and comprehensive infrastructure to provide a
verily of skills (both on ground and in air) which are required for an operational front line air
force. For depth and resilience the nation must provide its own resources, such as the required
skills, funds and air mindedness, since the ability to project a credible Air Power cannot be
developed on imported attributes.

4. Today, most air power thinkers take a middle course and tend to treat air power as a
purely military concept. The definition now accented by the RAF is that air power is the ability
to use platforms operating in or passing through the air for military, purposes. The means of
exercising air power are many and include any system which can be used to wage warfare in the
air; for example manned and unmanned aircraft, guided missiles, balloons and space vehicles.

EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER

5. In the long history of human conflict, the application of Air Power is a recent
phenomenon. In fact, it was the last to arrive on the military scene. The first time a fixed wing
aircraft was used in the strike role was in 1911 by an Italian Officer, Gavotti throwing few shells
from his reconnaissance aircraft on Turkish troops in Libya.

6. By the beginning of the First World War, military aviation had begun to get organized,
but it was in its nascent stages, and was unable to exercise any decisive influence. During this
war, aircraft were used for reconnaissance and as observation posts for directing arty fire.

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Progressively, mutual interference between opposing aircraft led to the development of aerial
combat.

7. The importance of strategic offensive operations were first appreciated only towards the
end of the First World war. These operations were experimental in natural and ineffective, as
either side could bring the necessary weight to bear on the enemy.

POST FIRST WORLD WAR

8. After the First World War, the emphasis on independent application of Air Power
increased. The doctrine of ‘strategic offensive’ was supported by persons of eminence such as
Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of Air Staff, RAF and General William Mitchell of the USA; though
the latter was court martialed for his criticism of government policy. Nevertheless, the doctrine
of strategic offensive did find favour with Britain and the USA, as was evident in its employment
during the Second World War.

9. Other Air Force developed on somewhat different lines. The Luftwaffe was built in
keeping with the Clausewitzian concept that the primary objective in war was the destruction of
the enemy’s armed forces. Hence, it was equipped to contribute to the German philosophy of
‘blitzrieg’. The Japanese Air Force did not develop as an independent entity. It was subjugated to
Army and naval control. In Italy, General Giulo Douhet strongly advocated the strategic use of
air power. Though he was court martialled during the First Word War for being over critical of
the use of military aviation, his book ‘Command of the Air’ published in 1921, did must to focus
attention on the future role of Air Power.

10. The First World War not only influenced doctrines but had a profound effect on
development of weapon, as a mere two decades later, the world was to witness the tremendous
destructive power and flexibility of aerial weapons.

SECOND WORLD WAR

11. Air Power emerged as the dominant factor. The Germans employed Air Power most
effectively to further the land battle, whereas the Allies vigorously pursued the doctrine of
strategic offensive with air defence for the attainment of air superiority. On account of the low
power of the weapons and poor bombing accuracy of those days, the number of aircraft required
to achieve air superiority by a strategic offensive was large. Thus, it took the Allies several years
to establish lasting air superiority over the homeland and areas of operation.

12. The prolonged strategic offensive by the Allies not only contributed to air superiority but
helped exert direct pressure on the enemy’s capacity and will to wage war.
Although the efficacy of the allied strategic offensive has been the subject of much controversy,
the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the awesome potential of Air Power
through nuclear weapons.

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POST SECOND WORLD WAR ERA

13. During the period 1945 to 1995 several wars have been fought wherein Air Power has
made a significant contribution. While it was used extensively in Korea, it made a modest
contribution in the colonial wars, as in Indo-China, Malaya, Algeria and Kenya. The wars in
Vietnam, the Middle East, and the Falklands and in the Gulf region have brought into focus the
impact of Air Power.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

14. The introduction of nuclear weapons has served to revive the concept of strategic
offensive on account of overwhelming destructive power of such weapons as compared to
conventional weapons. Total defence against a strategic nuclear attacks either by offensive or
defensive means is not possible. Strategic Air Power with nuclear weapons, therefore, would
serve to deter a potential enemy against a nuclear misadventure. Thus, the concept of ‘Defence
through Deterrence’ that nations with nuclear capability have achieved is stable so long as parity
or near parity is maintained.

TECHNOLOGY

15. Rapid strides in technology have widened the scope of Air Power. The jet engine
provided far greater speed and mobility. The advent of surface launched missiles added a new
dimension to the offensive capability of nations, but the manned aircraft has not been replaced,
nor is it likely to be in future. The necessity for quick reaction and dispersal stimulated the
development of vertical-take-off-and-landing (VTOL) aircraft and of the helicopter as an
offensive weapon system. Developments in the field of electronics and avionics, which include
sensors, computers, guidance systems and warheads, have made possible new tactics and
enhanced flexibility in the application of Air Power. On the other hand, they have also
introduced the potential for high levels of attrition. Electronic Warfare is now as important as
any primary weapon system and has become an integral part in the exercise of Air Power.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER

16. To understand the application of Air Power and exploit its full potential, it is important to
study its main characteristics as well as its limitations.

17. Flexibility. The term includes both the ability to adapt and quickly to change
circumstances and the ability to use combat power in ways suited to the situation. It also means
that the same weapon platform can be used for a variety of missions.
A linked characteristic of versatility indicates that the number of such missions can be very
large. For example, a good multi-role aircraft like the Mirage 2000 can be used for interception,
EW, escort and for offensive support.

18. Mobility. The unique ability of aircraft to manoeuvre freely and swiftly in three
dimensions gives it the speed and the range to apply military power where it is needed, over a

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very large area. Aircraft have very important applications in the rapid movement, support and
resupply of forces, with the emphasis being on rapid.

19. Responsiveness. Air Power can be used to demonstrate quickly, the national
resolve, by deployment or increased states of readiness, and when required it is the most readily
available means to apply combat power.

20. Shock Effect. An important characteristic of aircraft when used offensively is shock
effect. It is an effect that goes beyond surprise and can cause confusion and psychological
disorientation. It is brought about by the aircraft’s ability to concentrate firepower and deliver
with little or no warning.

21. Concentration. The flexibility and responsiveness of air power allows a

commander to quickly concentrate force. This is of vital importance especially in a fluid to
technical situation. Concentration refers obviously to offensive power but it can also be
appliance other areas, for example, to deliver land forces in a concentrated form to the point on
the battlefield where they can have the maximum effect.

22. Offensive Action. Only air forces have the ability to carry offensive action deep into
enemy territory while operating from secure bases. Defensive actions may prevent defeat, but
wars can be won only by offensive action. Offensive capability provides the best defence. It
changes one’s stance form reactive or active and allows one to take and hold the initiative in
operations.

23. The potential to apply air power offensively is a positive contribution to deterrence. It
forces a potential aggressor to look at his own vulnerabilities and divert resources to their
defence. Air power can raise the costs of war and impose penalties that would be unacceptable
to the potential aggressor.

LIMITATIONS OF AIR POWER

24. Sustainability. The sustainability of air forces is frequently limited by logistic

factors, which could become critical in a long drawn-out war. Air forces consume large amounts
of resources; infrastructure demands are extensive and expensive and training takes considerable
time.

25. Base Dependency. Air power operates most effectively from permanent bases,
although rotary wing aircraft can operate away from fixed facilities. This dependence on a large
supporting infrastructure is a negative characteristic of air power. It results in air power assets
becoming concentrated at readily identifiable points where they become vulnerable to attack.
This dependency can also limit the effectiveness of air power in a particular area if suitable
airfields are not available.

26. Cost. Air power is expensive to acquire, operate and maintain. Training a pilot is a
costly business. High technology equipment inevitable costs more than simple equipment.

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27. Sensitivity to Technology. Air Power is a product of technology and hence, it tends
to be more sensitive to technological changes than the other two services. Even small
technological innovations can have a major impact on air power effectiveness.

28. Vulnerability. Besides being vulnerable in the air, air power assets are high value
targets when on ground. Protective measures such as Hardened Aircraft Shelters, reduce the
vulnerability, but are expensive. Aircraft, by their very nature, are fragile and cannot withstand
too much of battle damage.

29. Impermanency. This limitation relates to air power’s inability to hold ground. As
such, air power is an impermanent form of military force. The effects it creates are transient, and
to sustain these effects, operations have to be repeated.

30. Payload. Aircraft carries limited payloads as compared to ships or land vehicles.
However, due to its speed, range and responsiveness, small payloads deployed quickly may be of
far greater value in stabilizing a critical situation than larger payloads deployed later by surface
means.

31. Situational Limits. Two other limits are conflict intensity and geographical setting.
Aerial attacks are more effective in high intensity conflicts. In hilly or mountainous terrain,
effectiveness of offensive and defensive operations could be hampered. Weather too can hamper
air operations more than it does surface operations. Air operations are more demanding and
difficult by night than by day. Effectiveness of most combat aircraft depends upon advanced
avionics and aids for navigation, acquisition and targeting.

APPLICATION OF AIR POWER

32. Air power is the sum total of nation’s aviation and related capabilities. It comprises of
national aviation assets usually described as air forces, air arms and civil aviation, along with
their associated organizations, infrastructure, logistics and personnel. The use of spaces, either
independently or in support of air power, is on the increase and consequently the term Aerospace
Power, is often used in lieu of air power. However, in this chapter, the application of Air Force
Air Power alone will be discussed.

33. The distinct and specific characteristics of air power lead in to distinct and specific
applications. Growing effectiveness of air power over the years has tended progressively to
widen its applications.
Air power today, can offer decision makers and unprecedently wide range of options to
prosecute defence and security policy objectives during peace, crisis and war situations.

PEACE TIME APPLICATIONS OF AIR POWER

34. Preserving Peace. A well-balanced air force with credible operational capability to
exact rapid retribution constitutes and effective deterrence, thereby preserving peace. The Air
Force can also be used to help avert threats to peace by exploiting the third dimension for

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surveillance purposes. A potential aggressor would know that any threatening moves would be
detected and the intent discerned.

35. Disaster Relief. When disaster strikes in the form of floods or earthquake, speed of
response is vital. The speed of air power helps to play a key part in alleviating suffering.

36. Sustaining Ground Forces. The Indian Army is deployed in some of the most
inhospitable terrain and weather conditions in the world. Lack of surface communications makes
air the only practical means of sustaining the army in these areas. On an average, approximately
50,000 tones of load per year in air delivered air dropped to sustain these forces deployed in
inhospitable terrain. The combat troops deployed in Jaffna peninsula is a another classic
example for sustaining ground troops by air.

37. Sustaining Civil Population in Inhospitable Terrain. The IAF delivers

approximately 10,000 tones of supplies per year to sustain civil population living in inhospitable
terrain where surface communications do not exist or get cut off during adverse weather periods.
Air transport re supply broke the blockade of Berlin in 1948 and may have saved Israel from
defeat in 1973.

APPLICATION OF AIR POWER IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

38. Punitive Air Strikes. In crisis situations, air power can be used for punitive air
strikes, short or full fledged war. This could be as a response to attacks by state sponsored
guerrillas or terrorists. Such operations are reactive rather than proactive. Possible enemy
reaction leading to an escalation of conflict and adverse international opinions are factors to be
considered before conduct of such operations.

39. Supporting Friendly Foreign Governments. A crisis management application of

air power is to provide timely moral and physical support for friendly governments, thus
strengthening their resolve in times of tension. The airlift of Indian troops to Maldives in 1988,
in response to a request by their President to put down and attempted coup by mercenaries is an
example of the use of air power to support a friendly foreign government. Support extended by
the SLAF to Maldivian government (though it was not materialized) in countering the insurgents
is an example for this.

40. Evacuation of Own Nationals from Crisis Zones. Air power can be used to mount
rescue operations in crisis situations. The evacuations by IAF aircraft of thousands of Indians
from the Gulf countries after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the evacuation of Indian
nationals from Kabul in 1987 are examples of such usage.

WARTIME APPLICATIONS OF AIR POWER

41. Reconnaissance. Air Power’s unique capability to exploit the third dimension allows
it to make a major contribution in monitoring enemy activities and deployments and thus
discerning his intentions. Recce provides the basis for planning targeting and successful
execution of military operations. The intelligence gathered by strategic and tactical

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reconnaissance has been useful in conduct of various operations since the beginning of First
World War.

42. Destruction. The ability to concentrate firepower with a high degree of accuracy over
extended ranges gives it an enormous potential destructive power. At sea, the destructive
potential of air power became evident as early as in 1942, when five Japanese aircraft carriers
were sunk as a result of air attacks during the battles of Coral Sea and Midway. In the Gulf War
of 1991, air power destroyed nearly half the Iraqi armour and artillery before the start of the
Allied Lank Offensive.

43. Denial. Air power can be used to deny enemy the ability to employ his air, surface
and maritime forces effectively. During the Gulf War the Multinational Forces (MNF) did not
allow Iraq to use her Air Force effectively. This was achieved by intelligence are of Superior Air
Force of MNF.

44. Diversion. Air power can be used to divert enemy forces in order to delay or destroy
tem. At the strategic level, it can be achieved by concentrating attacks against sensitive enemy
targets, compelling him to divert forces and resources from offensive to defensive duties. At the
tactical level, diversion can be achieved by selectively attacking choke points such as bridges.

45. Delay. Delay in wartime effect of air power caused due to effects of dislocation,
destruction or diversion. In defensive situations, imposing delays on the enemy allows friendly
forces to regroup and strengthen defences in offensive situations, it allows friendly forces to
prevent the enemy’s escape. For example, in 1971, an air borne assault at Tangail cut off the
Northern approaches to Dhaka, thus delaying the concentration of Pakistani forces for its
defence.

46. Demoralisation. One of the important effect that air power can create is
demoralization. Air attack has always had a particularly sapping effect on morale, irrespective of
the damage inflicted. The precision air strike by IAF aircraft at the Governor’s residence in
Dhaka in 1971 demoralized the government machinery in East Pakistan to the extent that they
sought an immediate end to the war, despite thousands of troops being available to defend the
capital.

47. In sum, the following hold true in the application of modern air power:-

a. Air Power is primarily offensive in nature and inherently a strategic force.

b. The essence of Air Power is targeting which in turn depends on intelligence.

c. Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the

dimension of time.

d. Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war

simultaneously.

e. Air Power’s unique characteristics necessitate that professional airmen

centrally control it.

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f. Technology and Air Power are integrally and synergistically related.

g. Air Power includes not only military assets, but also nation’s aerospace
industries and commercial aviation.

h. Air Power is an important asset to maintain peace, disaster relief and aid to
civil power in crisis situation.

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CHAPTER 3

AIR STRATEGY

AIR STRATEGY – DEFINITION

1. Air strategy is defined as the overall employment plan for air force in a war.

AIR STRATEGY – STRUCTURE

2. Air power, thanks to its unique characteristics, has a very wide potential in military
strategic application. Those fall essentially into three areas.

a. Counter Air Action. Counter-air action is defined as the use of air power to
deter. Contain or defeat the enemy air force. The strategic aim of counter-air action is
to achieve the desired degree of control of the air.

b. Anti-Surface Force Action. Anti-surface force action is defined as the use of

air power, in co-operation with friendly surface and sub-surface forces to deter contain or
defeat the enemy army and or navy. The strategic aim of anti-surface force action is to
deprive an enemy of the military power needed to occupy territory or exploit sea space.

c. Strategic Air Offensive. Strategic air offensive action encompasses the use
of air power in precision operations to destroy or damage an enemy’s war-making
capacity. The strategic aim of strategic air offensive action to undermine the enemy’s
ability and will to continue with his aggression.

AIR STRATEGIC COMPONENTS

Air Strategy

Counter-Air Anti-Surface Strategic Air

Action Force Action Offensive

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AIR STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

3. Each conflict will generate its own air strategic priorities. However, when facing an
enemy who is capable of exercising air power, priority in air strategy must be given to achieving
the required level of control of the air. Experience has shown that unless this is achieved, all
other types of air, surface and sub-surface operations become increasingly difficult, and often
impossible to sustain.

AIR CAMPAIGNS

4. To prosecute each of the military-strategic applications of air power, specific types of

operational-level and tactical capabilities are required. These capabilities can only be fully
effective if they are brought to together in cohesive, dedicated air campaigns.

DEFINITION

5. The term air campaign is defined as a coordinated series of air operations designed to
achieve a specific air strategic objective.

AIR CAMPAIGN STRUCTURE

6. The three air campaigns are complementary, rather than alternative, strategic instruments
in most major conflicts have been prosecuted concurrently, However the proportion of total air
effort that different nations have devoted to each air campaign has varied considerably, reflecting
their differing strategic priorities. This has been true not only for different conflicts but also for
different phases of the same conflict. For example, during the first two days of the 1967 six-day
Arab-Israeli war, Israel devoted virtually all of her air force to the counter air campaign. The
remaining four days the Israelis switched the bulk of their air effort into the anti-surface force
campaign. Similarly during the first three days of the 1991 Gulf War, the overwhelming weights
of the Allied air effort were devoted to the counter air and strategic air offensive campaigns.
Thereafter it was shifted progressively into the anti surface force campaign.

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AIR STRATEGY

Counter Air Anti-Surface Strategic Air Combat Support

Campaign Force Campaign Campaign Operations

Offensive Defensive
Nuclear Ops Conventional Ops
Counter Counter
Air Ops Air Ops

Air Surveillance EW Search

Active Air Passive Air tpt Ops & Recce & Rescue
defence defence
Air to Air AEW
Re-fueling

Land/ Maritime LICO

Air Ops Air Ops

CATEGORIES OF AIR OPERATIONS

7. Air operations fall into two broad categories combat air operations and combat support
air operations.

8. Combat Air Operations. A combat air operation is defined as an interrelated group

of air power combat capabilities designed to achieve a specific air campaign objective. The
combat air operations required to prosecute the counter air anti-surface force and strategic air
offensive campaigns are examined in Chapters 4,5 and 6 respectively.

9. Combat Support Air Operations. Combat support air operations are defined as those
air operations designed to enhance or support the effectiveness of the combat capabilities of air,
surface and sub surface force. They are examined in chapter 7.

AIR ROLES

11. Each of the combat and combat support air operations consists of a number of specific air
power roles. An air power role is defined as a tactical-level function of air power. Air roles are
prosecuted through tasks, mission and sorties. Tasks are undertaken to achieve a specifically
defined objective. A mission is defined as one or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one
particular task. A sortie is defined as one flight by one aircraft.

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CHAPTER 4

THE COUNTER AIR CAMPAIGN

AIM

1. The aim of the counter air campaign is to achieve and maintain the necessary degree of
control of air. These operations are directed against the enemy’s air power either in air or on
ground with the objective of preventing the enemy from using his air power effectively against
friendly forces, yet permitting own use of air power against him.

DEGREES OF CONTROL OF THE AIR

2. The three classical degrees of control of air are:

a. Air Supremacy. Air supremacy exists, if the enemy air power has been
incapacitated to the extent that it is incapable of any air interference. This is characterized
as: firstly, not being limited by time and space and secondly, being representative of the
highest degree of ‘control of air.’

b. Air Superiority. Air superiority can be defined as a high degree of

dominance in air, which permits the conduct of land, sea and air operations at a
given time and place without prohibitive interference from the enemy air force. This
condition is said to exist when, firstly, aircraft of all types can operate in all types of roles
at a given time and place without serious interference from the enemy and secondly, it
can limit the enemy’s air operations. Further, this provides the additional advantage of
information superiority due to own ability to execute desired reconnaissance missions,
while preventing the enemy from doing so.

c. Favourable Air Situation (FAS). FAS is limited by time and space to a much
greater extent and it assures a lower degree of control of the air. Therefore, a higher
degree of enemy air interference can be expected. The level of control of air is such that it
enables the exercise of specific capabilities or conduct specific operations. An example of
FAS is when one acquires just the required degree of control of air in a localised area by
executing SEAD, airfield attacks and offensive sweeps to permit a friendly break out of
armour at the desired time.

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ACHIEVING CONDITIONS FOR CONTROL OF AIR

3. The degrees of control over air are intangible. While air supremacy, can be easily
discerned, it is not so in the case of air superiority and favourable air situation. In the case of the
latter, the achievement of the said condition is known only after it is achieved and exploited.
These realities imply that in the campaigns carried out to achieve the conditions for control of
air, effort must be made to achieve it with a higher degree of assurance.

PRIMACY OF THE COUNTER AIR CAMPAIGN

4. In most major wars, all three air campaigns (counter air, anti-surface force and strategic
air campaign) historically have been pursued simultaneously but in case the enemy has a
powerful air force, priority must be given to the achievement of control of the air so that the
enemy air force’s ability to interfere with own surface force action is blunted. However, this does
not mean that no other campaign is to be undertaken till air superiority is achieved. Instead, it
means that no other operations be commenced, if they are going to jeopardize the attainment of
air superiority, or are going to use up the resources required to attain or maintain air superiority.
At the same time, temporary emergencies may arise when such resources have to be diverted to
other tasks.

5. To be fully effective, the Counter Air Campaign requires a wide range of air and ground
combat support operations. There are also important interactions between the counter air
campaign, other air campaigns and surface campaigns. Surface campaigns depend on control of
air, but they can also effect the outcome of counter air battles. For example, a rapid advance by
friendly land forces may force the enemy to withdraw his EW RADAR, or even temporarily
vacate a forward airfield, which works to the benefit of own counter air campaign. One normally
thinks of attaining air superiority through a combination of aircraft, missile and guns. These
elements would definitely play a key role but by no means the only role. Ground forces and even
naval surface forces can and have made major contributions to achieving air superiority.
However the contribution of land naval forces can be even greater only if they are consciously
integrated in to the counter air campaign, and train accordingly in peacetime. Take for example
the Gulf war of 1991. The opening shots of war, 21 minutes before h-hour were hellfire missiles
fired from US Army Apache helicopters against Iraqi acquisition RADAR controlling for fighter
bases. This provided the safe corridor for F-15Es. Twelve minutes later, a single F-117 destroyed
ADDC/GCI and proceeding thereafter to hit a second target in western Iraq 20 minutes later.
Similarly, there attacks helped blind Iraq’s air defence cripple key control nodes, thus laying the
foundations for a successful counter air campaign.

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COUNTER AIR CAMPAIGN

6. The counter air campaign comprises of two distinct but complementary operations;
offensive counter air and defensive counter air (Air Defense) operations. The components of the
counter air campaign are as shown below:

Counter Air Campaign

Offensive Counter Air Operations Defensive Counter Air Operations

(OCA) (DCA)

OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR OPERATIONS

7. Offensive counter air operations or OCA are aimed at destroying, disrupting or limiting
the enemy air power as close to its source as possible. Air superiority is hindered by aircraft and
ground based weapon systems which are supported by RADARs, other sensors, communications
and intelligence. Not directly related to combat, but nevertheless essential, is the infrastructure
that supports these combat systems - ammunition, fuel, airfields and aircraft servicing areas.
Attacks on some or most of these target systems may be necessary to achieve air superiority.

INTELLIGENCE

8. Intelligence is a vital input for planning and executing OCA operations. During
peacetime, targets need to be prioritised depending on how vulnerable the enemy would be to
their individual and/or collective destruction. Prior to commencement of hostilities intelligence
agencies should be clearly aware of the intelligence required by the operational air commander
and his intent, so that information gathering systems are put in place. An additional requirement
during war would relate to Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA).

FORCE PACKING

9. OCA missions are likely to include a package of attack aircraft supported by other
combat support elements such as AAR and EW, SEAD and AD aircraft. The coordination of
such packages is demanding and requires training and practice in peacetime. Operational
effectiveness should be achieved by saturating defences through spatial and temporal
compression of the attacks carried out.

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ROLES OF OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR OPERATIONS (OCA)

Offensive Counter Air Operations

Suppression of Airfield Fighter Escorts

Enemy Air Attacks Sweeps
Defence (SEAD)

10. Successful OCA operations require:

a. Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD).

b. Airfield attacks.
c. Fighter sweeps.
d. Escorts.
e. Helicopter and Transport aircraft.

SUPPRESSION/DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCES (SEAD / DEAD)

11. The early seventies proved to be a critical watershed inthe history of air warfare. During
the opening stages of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Syria and Egypt so dominated the skies over
the Golan heights and Sinai respectively with an integrated network of surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) and anti-aircraft-artillery (AAA) that they succeeded in imposing - at least temporarily
“air denial” on the Israel Air Force. In the first three days of war, the Israelis experienced
attrition of over 4 per cent. So grave were the losses that Israel had to temporarily suspend
operations over the Golan Heights till the SAMs and AAA had been neutralised by ECM and/ or
physical attacks. The importance of electronic warfare and the need for specialist aircraft and
munitions to suppress, degrade or destroy enemy ground-based air defences was brought into
sharp focus during this war.

12. SEAD/DEAD can be defined as activity which neutralises, destroys or temporarily

degrades enemy air defence systems in a specific area by physical attack (hard kill) and/or
electronic warfare (soft kill). SEAD can significantly reduce attrition and help sustain offensive
air action against an enemy who has a strong air defence network. Specialised weapons, tactics
and training play a particularly important part in SEAD. Targets to be attacked would include
RADARs and other types of sensors, SAMs and AAA sites, and communication systems/nodes.
The inherent weaknesses of each component of the AD system would have to be identified and
targeted to produce results, which is where Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Communications
Intelligence (COMINT) and other means of intelligence gathering would play a vital

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role. The major role in SEAD will invariably be played by the air forces, but the contribution of
surface forces should not be overlooked. Special Forces, artillery and naval support have been
employed successfully in past conflicts to help suppress enemy air defences.

AIRFIELD ATTACKS

13. Airbases have traditionally been crucial targets for offensive counter air attacks. Though
the importance of airfields as targets is on the decline, on account of rapid runway rehabilitation
systems and the shift of focus on effects based operations, but even so airfields being static
concentration centres would continue to contain densely packed high-value targets. Aircraft on
the ground at airfields are more concentrated and vulnerable than they are in flight. Experience
of the 1991 Gulf War has shown that even when aircraft on ground are protected by Hardened
Aircraft Shelters (Blast Pens as the IAF terms it), they are not sufficiently protected; because of
the precision attack and penetrative capability of PGMs. Apart from aircraft, the damage or
destruction of critical base facilities can also prove to be decisive.

14. When airfields are unable to provide landing, take-off or critical support facilities
(maintenance, fuel, ammunition), air forces are effectively grounded. Reducing the number of
enemy operable bases leads to the overcrowding and overtaxing of the available bases, making
them even more worthwhile targets. Airfield attacks were used to devastating effect by the
Israelis in 1967 war wherein, the Arab air forces were decimated on ground itself.

a. Operating Surfaces. Damage to runways and taxi tracks can only temporarily
close airfields. Modern runway repair equipment makes it possible to make an airfield
operational within a few hours. While this may be a worthwhile objective, to either assist
friendly ground forces to launch an offensive, or to deny enemy ground forces air support
to prosecute their offensive, it must be kept in mind, that the attrition suffered in repeated
airfield attacks against runways and taxi tracks could also subsequently render the
attacker too weak to counter the opposing air force. Another factor to be kept in mind is
the effort required to attack a well-defended airfield. During the 1991Gulf War, a
package of 38 aircraft needed 30 support aircraft to ensure that eight aircraft could hit a
target with a reasonable chance of survival, i.e. a ratio of support aircraft to strike aircraft
of 4 to 1.

b. Other Airfield Targets. Besides targeting operating surfaces, airfield attacks

must also target aircraft, personnel and the support infrastructure. However, detailed
intelligence would be required regarding the location of such facilities, their hardening
and redundancy. Key facilities are likely to be hardened and concealed and target
acquisition would be difficult. At the same time, the collateral impact on the morale of
the local commander and his administration because of intense pressure of bomb
disposal, casualty evacuation and treatment, fire fighting and base recuperation, cannot be
over looked.

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FIGHTER SWEEPS

15. These are operations mounted to seek and destroy enemy aircraft in the air in an
allocated area of operations. Mission success depends on two factors. Firstly, the availability of
friendly RADAR cover in the area of the sweep (supplemented by on board hi-tech AI
RADARs), and secondly, the willingness of the enemy air forces to oppose the sweep. Fighter
sweeps are best conducted by modern air superiority fighters, which have higher loiter times,
excellent AI RADARs, IFF integration and long range BVR capability. Their potency is
significantly enhanced by AWACS/Aerostats support. The offensive sweeps also help generate
dynamic air control in the enemy air space. In case, enemy air power refuses to engage, then the
aircraft could carry air to ground armaments and attack high value targets in a role termed as
‘Intimidation’. This combines the offensive sweep role with the attack function.

ESCORTS

16. This role involves the assigning of fighter aircraft to protect friendly strike aircraft during
a mission. Their purpose is to act as counter threat to the enemy air defence fighters, and by
doing so, enable friendly missions to proceed unhindered to their targets and back. Fighter
escorts are usually provided to strike aircraft, ECM aircraft and photo recce aircraft. They could
also be provided to transport aircraft involved in combat enabling or support missions.

DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR OPERATIONS

17. Air defence (AD) involves the employment of a combination of passive and active
measures to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy aerial attack or a hostile
ballistic/cruise missile attack. Air defence, by itself, cannot achieve a lasting favourable air
situation, since it is reactive. A military strategy which is based solely on AD operations
concedes the timing, scope and tempo of air operations to the enemy and entails considerable
military risk. AD operations have little scope of exploiting surprise, initiative and offensive
action. AD operations should always be complemented by OCA operations to retain the initiative
and authority in air.

18. Effective AD depends upon the integration of sensors, weapon systems, secure
communications and the real-time transfer of data. A centralised command and control
infrastructure must be overlaid to provide both direction and co-ordination for the many elements
of an air defence system including those from other armed forces, especially in an integrated
battlefield scenario. The effectiveness of an AD system is heavily dependent on its surveillance
and early warning systems to provide time in which to react. This response usually entails
committing a range of weapon systems against the threat via the medium of the control system.
In practice, both surveillance operations and control systems utilise a common system known as
Control and Reporting (C&R) system.

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19. The success of AD operations depends largely upon factors such as the quality and
timeliness of intelligence, the assurance of detection, response times of weapon systems and the
ability of AD elements to remain operational while absorbing battle damage. The degree of
reliability and redundancy in the air defence command and control system is a critical factor.

PRIORITIES IN AIR DEFENCE

20. The aim of AD is to suitably defend relevant airspace and assets, and in this process, also
inflict maximum attrition on the enemy. Should this be achieved, the adversary’s capability to
concentrate effort in subsequent raids would be reduced and he would be dissuaded from
carrying out future attacks. Consequently, the damage sustained by friendly forces and facilities
would also be reduced. This then should guide the force structuring and related operational art.
The emphasis should be on causing maximum attrition by means of an active air defence
network.

21. Principles of AD. The four employment principles applicable when planning for active
AD are: mass, mix, mobility and integration. The control and reporting (C&R) structure must be
able to effectively handle a number of AD units, i.e. “mass”, and also a “mix” of airborne and
ground-based weapon systems. The C&R system should be at the same time responsive to the
changing tactical situation, which involves “mobility” and “flexibility”. Finally, all the elements
need to be integrated to provide a layered and in depth coverage.

22. Airspace Control. Airspace control is a combination of airspace organisation and

planning procedures to achieve effective control and coordination minimise risks and permit
efficient and flexible use of airspace by all the elements involved in joint air, land and sea
operations. While airspace control promotes greater flexibility of operations, the authority to
approve, disapprove or deny combat operations is vested in only one operational commander.
This would significantly reduce chances of fratricide.

METHODS OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

23. There are two basic methods of exercising airspace control:

a. Positive Control. Positive airspace control employs electronic elements for the
positive identification, tracking and directing of aircraft within given airspace. RADAR is
the primary means of exercising such control, though other sensors such as IFF can also
be employed. These sensors need to be integrated with control centres through real time
reliable, secure and jam-resistant communications. Data link will further strengthen the
capability. Only such integration can achieve the positive identification of platforms and
avoidance of fratricide.

b. Procedural Control. Procedural airspace control is a system of airspace

control, which relies on a combination of previously, agreed and promulgated orders and

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procedures. Procedural airspace control includes techniques such as segmenting the

airspace by volume and time and/or the use of weapon control orders. This method is
more restrictive than positive air-space control, but is less vulnerable to interference by
electronic means and physical attack. It however does ensure continuity of operations
under adverse environmental conditions, and must always be available as an immediate
fall-back system should the positive control be degraded, or when positive control is not
considered appropriate for the operation at hand.

CONTROL AND REPORTING

24. Success in AD engagements depends, to a large extent, on the ability to detect an attack
at the earliest possible. The defender must be aware of an impending attack in good time so as to
be able to alert his own forces, to neutralise the effects of surprise and to prevent the enemy
from concentrating his attack in time and space. ‘Early Warning’ is the generic phrase that
encompasses the means for doing this and they can be split into two distinct categories; ground-
based systems and airborne early warning (AEW). AEW offers far greater flexibility,
significantly larger early warning and the ability to intercept incoming threats at far greater
distances, compared to ground-based systems, thus enhancing the level of attrition inflicted on
the enemy. In effect, with AWACS aircraft, area defence becomes much more effective and at
the same time provides greater in depth defence and a favourable force-to-space ratio. The
integration of a number of diverse sensor systems is necessary for achieving an effective level of
early warning. Layered surveillance operations provide for the optimum use of sensor systems.
Airborne, ship/ground based RADARs and mobile observation posts (MOPs) should be
interconnected with links capable of rapidly transmitting electronic data, as well as voice
information. Secure digital links are necessary for achieving this. Civilian RADARs can not only
assist in correlating civil traffic but also contribute effectively towards strengthening the AD
network with additional sensors and redundancy. Naval air defence RADARs, whether the ships
are in port or at sea, and army RADARs in the tactical battle area, can also contribute
significantly towards building a comprehensive air picture. Interoperability at the architectural
level would be the key issue. Adequate systemic checks and filtering of information on a need to
know basis, must be built into the architecture to avoid any overload of information at the
respective levels of AD command and control.

25. Communications. The effectiveness of an AD system depends on an integrated and

secure communications network which can meet the imperatives of the network centric warfare
of the future. Without reliable communications, even the most carefully developed system will
be ineffective. All links, from aircraft to ship or shore, from an operations centre to a SAM
battery or from the senior to subordinate commanders, must be completely reliable and secure.
Communication links consist of a combination of satellite, landline, optical, microwave and HF
networks. Such communication networks must be built around a reliable media architecture
which has the capacity and capability to carry data, voice, images, video, etc., in digital mode for
real time transmission and usage.

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26. Electronic Warfare. AD operations are especially vulnerable to EW because of their

reliance on the sensors to provide information in an accurate and complete form and for that
information to be communicated in real-time. Air defence RADARs and associated equipment,
therefore, must be designed for resistance to EW measures. Irrespective of the availability of
ECCM, standard operating procedures (SOPs) should assume that operations will be conducted
in a hostile EW environment and suitable training for the same must be an integral part of
peacetime activity and training exercises.

WEAPON SYSTEMS

27. An air defence weapon system will normally consist of two complementary
components, fighter aircraft and surface-to-air defences.

28. Fighter Aircraft. Fighter aircraft have limited individual endurance (this now can be
increased through AAR) and they cannot be re-armed, re-crewed or serviced in the air (though
most modern ASFs are heavily armed for increased endurance / range and hence number of
engagements). However, they are flexible and reusable and can be switched to tasks other than
air defence, should the operational situation demand it. Fighter aircraft are also mobile and can
be used to protect large areas or be concentrated rapidly to counter enemy saturation raids. They
can be used for the following types of tasks:

a. Interception. An intercept mission may involve the scramble of fighters from a

high state of readiness, or the redirection of aircraft from previously launched combat air
patrols. Interceptions can be carried out autonomously or with the assistance of AD
RADARs.

b. Combat Air Patrol (CAP). Combat air patrols are mounted in an objective area
over a force: that needs protection; over the critical area in a combat zone or over an air
defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they
reach their targets. Air effort for AD cover under such circumstances must be carried out
judiciously; otherwise it can lead to a waste of air effort. The availability of AWACS /
aerostats can offset the limited availability of RADAR cover at low altitudes inside the
enemy territory. Combat air patrols traditionally are defensive in nature and sustaining
them, particularly at long range and over long periods, can absorb a great deal of effort,
hence they should be used with prudence. However, with air to air refuelling and
AWACS cover, they have become significantly more potent and can be strategically
employed well forward to enhance air dominance capability.

29. Surface-to-Air Defences. Surface-to-air defences consist of surface to air missiles

(SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). These defences allow a state of high readiness to be
maintained over long periods, enable quick response (including firing a large number of weapons
in a relatively short period of time) and in certain cases can be used to counter ballistic missiles
as well. They have limited range and low mobility compared to fighter aircraft and therefore,
relatively large numbers of surface to air defence systems would be required to defend anything

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other than point targets. However, the IAF is moving towards area defence with induction of
long range surface to air weapons. The concept of multi-layered point defence will shift to
networked area defence with high priority targets being protected by multiple weapons providing
multi-tier defence.

IFF AND FRATRICIDE

30. Fratricide could become significant in any future war. Though reducing fratricide is
desirable, eliminating it may not be entirely possible. Fratricide occurs for various reasons such
as misidentification, inexperience and lack of command and control. While inexperience
could be countered by training and inadequacy in command and control by better coordination
among the various AD elements/services, reliable and fool proof identification friend or foe
(IFF) is still a necessity. SAMs and AAA have their own problems of IFF. With the multiplicity
of SAM systems being inducted into the three services compatibility of IFF system needs to be
ensured to avoid fratricide as well as to gain maximum operational benefits.

OFFENSIVE AIR DEFENCE

31. An overall defensive posture has been the traditional approach to air defence. The
acquisition of ASF aircraft and technologies such as BVR /AAR / Aerostat / AEW / AWACS /
RPAs / IACCS, necessitates a macro shift in as much that air defence tasks be taken to the
enemy’s air space instead of waiting for his aircraft and weapons to enter own airspace. Thus the
entire philosophy of AD needs to shift from the reactive-defensive approach to offensive. The
aircraft, supporting control and reporting structures of AD can be employed very effectively with
an offensive outlook to the defensive tasks. This would imply placing the AD assets literally in
the enemy air space under AWACS control to tackle the enemy air power at the earliest and
create conditions for achieving air dominance.

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CHAPTER 5

THE ANTI-SURFACE FORCE CAMPAIGN

1. Air power platforms can attack or threaten opposing surface targets. The strategic aim of
the anti-surface force campaign is to destroy or, at least, disrupt targets which fix an opponent in
a position vulnerable to the combat power of surface forces, or may be required to reduce an
opponent’s combat and fighting power. Anti-Surface Force campaign can, therefore, influence
and complement surface manoeuvre. Anti-Surface Force campaign include Land/Air operations
and Maritime Air operations.

Anti-Surface Force Campaign

Land Air Operations Maritime Air Operations

2. The aim is to achieve a position of advantage from which force can be threatened or
applied. Careful selection of targets can do the following:

a. Coerce an opponent into following a course of action which would be more

advantageous to friendly forces.

b. Deny an opponent the freedom to employ air, surface and sub-surface forces
effectively and allow friendly forces to apply a strategy of choice.

c. Dislocate an opponent by causing delay and confusion and creating mental, moral
or physical uncertainty. Dislocation can break the cohesion of ground units and make
them more vulnerable to follow-up attacks by all types of forces.

d. Divert an opponent in order to delay or destroy him. At the strategic and

operational levels of war, diversion can be achieved by concentrating attacks against
time-sensitive target sets, thus achieving the aim of forcing an opponent into diverting
resources from offensive to defensive operations.

e. Delay an opponent as a consequence of dislocation, destruction or diversion. In

defensive situations, imposing delay on an opponent allows friendly forces the time to
manoeuvre. In offensive situations, delay may allow friendly forces to channel or prevent
the escape of enemy forces.

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LAND AIR OPERATIONS

3. The inherent speed and reach of combat air power enables rapid engagement of enemy
ground targets cross the length and breadth of the battlefield. Land Air operations include the
following air power roles:

a. Air Interdiction (AI)

b. Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)
c. Battlefield Air Strike (BAS)
d. Tactical Reconnaissance
e. Search and Strike

4. Air power contributes to the land battle in one of three ways. Firstly, by attacking enemy
ground forces, which are actually engaged in combat with friendly surface forces. This activity is
termed Battlefield Air Strikes (BAS). Secondly, by attacking enemy forces, which are in the
vicinity of the battlefield, and may be closing in to join the ground battle in the immediate future.
These air attacks would take place a short distance behind the battle area and would seek to have
both a direct and speedy impact on shaping the battlefield. These are known as Battlefield Air
Interdiction, or BAI. Air Interdiction or AI involves the targeting of strategic reserves,
reinforcements and re-supply of the entire battle space up to several hundred kilometres behind
the front line. These three operations are designed to influence a limited area of operations, and
though they are usually cited as examples of the tactical use of air power, they have the potential
to create a ‘strategic effect’. A typical example is the impact of air interdiction operations by the
Allied Forces against Rommel’s Africa Corps and its overall impact on the strategic contours of
the North Africa campaign during World War II.

AIR INTERDICTION (AI)

5. AI is conducted to destroy, disrupt, neutralize or delay the military potential of opposing

forces before they can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. AI missions are
conducted beyond the range of most land-based weapons systems, and thus do not require
detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces. They are usually coordinated
with the appropriate surface force commander. AI can strike an opponent’s vital points or
logistic concentrations and can force him to extend his air defences over a far greater depth. The
capacity of AI for disruption, diversion and delay can produce decisive effects in shaping the
battle space for surface manoeuvre. The following factors affect AI:

a. The greater the opposing force’s need for supplies and reinforcement, the more
effective AI may be. On the other hand, AI may have only a limited effect against
regular land forces holding well-stocked static positions or against guerrilla forces with
low logistic support requirements. In contrast, AI can have a major impact on forces in an
intensive, highly mobile battle, particularly if key supply nodes or critical choke points
can be identified by prior surveillance and reconnaissance.

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b. AI attacks may be linked with other air operations in simultaneous or concurrent

operations to exhaust reserves of combat strength and supplies, and retain
advantage in operational tempo. AI should aim to deny an opponent access to more
resources than he is consuming at the front and may affect his operational reserve thereby
affecting his overall scheme of manoeuvre. AI requires joint planning and joint target
selection.

c. There is inevitably a delay between an AI attack and its effects being felt at the
battlefront. Whilst the effects of AI may not be seen immediately, the creation of choke
points by, for example, destroying bridges or forward supply depots can be decisive in
shaping surface manoeuvre. Moreover, the effects of AI may be cumulative and may
need to be pursued for an extended period. Diversion of effort away from AI should not,
therefore, be undertaken lightly.

6. Air interdiction prevents the enemy from moving in or out of the battlefield. Typical
targets would include troop and vehicle concentrations, supply trains and convoys, amphibious
forces, strategic ammunition dumps, communication centers, bridges, railways and waterways.

BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION (BAI)

7. Battlefield Air Interdiction is defined as air action carried out against hostile land targets,
which are in a position to directly affect the friendly forces and which require joint planning and
co-ordination, but do not require intimate synchronization with the fire and movement of own
forces. The basic difference between BAI and BAS lies in the proximity of targets to friendly
forces and the control arrangements that are therefore needed. BAI attacks are conducted to
delay, destroy or neutralize enemy forces, in the battlefield, that are not yet in contact with
friendly land forces. These operations may be used to isolate the enemy forces in the battle zone
from his reinforcements and supplies and to restrict his freedom to manoeuvre.

8. BAI missions are planned against targets usually beyond the limit of friendly artillery
fire. Because they are conducted away from the confusion of the active battle front, they are
potentially the most effective form of air support. The advantages of BAI operations over BAS
are that these operations have a wider area of influence, target identification is relatively easy,
targets are less likely to be defended well, chances of fratricide are lower and the targets are
likely to be more vulnerable. The objectives of BAI operations are to shape the battlefield by;

a. Isolating the battle zone from critical supplies and reinforcements.

b. Denying the enemy freedom of space to manoeuvre by attacking crucial lines of

communication.

c. Degrading the enemy’s offensive potential, and rendering him incapable of taking
meaningful offensive action.

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d. Preventing the enemy from reaching decisive locations and launch pads to further
their offensive.

BATTLEFIELD AIR STRIKES (BAS)

9. Battlefield Air Strikes are the air actions carried out against enemy targets in the close
vicinity of own ground forces and require not only joint planning but close coordination with the
fire and movement of own forces. Aircraft could be employed effectively, where the situation is
becoming critical, response time requirement is less or targets are inaccessible or invulnerable to
the army’s organic fire power. The ground commander must play a key role in determining
where BAS is to be employed.

10. However, the air commander must be the final authority to decide on the employment of
air assets keeping in mind the overall air situation. Limited air assets imply that BAS should be
employed primarily in critical operations and not frittered away in penny packets. BAS are
meant to be employed quickly and decisively, and concentrated in space and time. However,
BAS have their own limitations. These include problems in target acquisition and identification,
difficulty in identifying the bomb line, lethal AD environment, jamming of communication
between strike pilots and the FAC and high probability of fratricide.

RELATIONSHIP OF BAS WITH OTHER AIR OPERATIONS

11. The greater the ‘degree of control of the air’, the greater the range of options available for
undertaking BAS operations. Suppression of enemy air defences in the TBA is vital for
unhindered BAS. Both air and ground commanders must contribute the necessary firepower and
EW assets to achieve this. The effectiveness of interdiction operations in disrupting the enemy
supply routes, limiting reinforcement of enemy ground forces and destroying/neutralizing follow
on echelons will influence the size and intensity of BAS requirements. The importance of tactical
reconnaissance by both air force and army sensors can assist in identifying the right targets.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

12. These are as follows:

a. High Threat Tactics. A heavy concentration of AAA and SAMs may

inhibit effective air operations over the target area, necessitating the use of sensor fused
and loitering weapons that can be dropped from outside the SAM and AAA envelope.

b. Air Space Management. The need for continuous operation of organic

firepower in the battlefield area will require detailed procedures for integration with BAS
missions and incorporation of effective IFF systems.

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c. Communication Jamming. Normal radio communications may be denied,

requiring procedures for control/clearance for BAS strikes with little or no radio
communications. Secure and jam proof communications between the pilot and the
Forward Air Controller (FAC) are therefore essential for executing BAS missions.

d. Night/Adverse Weather BAS. Providing adequate support to ground forces at

night or in adverse weather is a challenging task and necessitates the availability of night
vision devices and night targeting capability.

e. Requirement of Surgical Accuracy. Taking into account the close proximity of

own troops with the BAS target systems and the likely small target dimensions, it may be
necessary to execute strikes with precision weapons. The designation could be carried out
by the RPAs, by the delivery aircraft itself, or from ground by FACs with the help of
portable laser designation systems.

f. Importance of Forward Air Controllers. For successful conduct of BAS, it

is essential to train a large number of personnel as FACs. The manpower would be
provided by both the army and the IAF. Therefore, during peacetime it must be ensured
that selected cadres undergo realistic training. In addition interoperability of equipment
has to be ensured for effective utilization of FACs on ground. It is pertinent to note that a
well-trained and motivated FAC can make the crucial difference in any critical situation
on ground.

ARMED/ATTACK ROLES OF HELICOPTERS IN BAI/BAS MISSIONS

13. Helicopters could be used effectively in BAI / BAS missions. Major tasks of
armed/attack helicopters are:

a. To provide suppressive fire options to the ground troops. This would be

useful in conditions where artillery or the ground attack effort is either not available or is
likely to be less effective. On account of the helicopters’ variable speed and hover
capabilities, engagement of surface targets in various situations would be highly
effective.

b. To provide flank protection to mechanized formations.

c. To provide route cover and suppressive fire to heliborne assaults to create a

favourable ground situation.

d. To provide air defence cover against enemy armed or attack helicopters.

e. To engage enemy helicopters involved in troop carriage, reconnaissance and

communication duties.

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f. To interdict targets in the close vicinity of the TBA.

g. To neutralise RADAR sites located close to the border.

h. To neutralise bridges used by the enemy for breaking out.

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

14. Keeping in mind the changing modern battlefield, the helicopter fleet may be entrusted
with the following roles in the future:

a. Urban warfare, involving precise deployment and extrication of highly specialised

troops from congested and densely populated areas.

b. Covert operations within enemy territory using night vision devices, infrared
systems and stealth techniques.

c. Counter surface force operations in conjunction with Special Forces.

d. High altitude operations including operations in low light conditions.

e. Rapid movement of forces within the theatre.

TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

15. Collection of intelligence through the medium of airborne sensors in the tactical area is
termed as tactical reconnaissance. Tactical recce information pertains to the disposition,
composition, location, activities and movement of the enemy forces over land or sea. Timely
response to such intelligence information is possible only if the evaluation and dissemination of
tactical recce output is in near real time. Such a recce could also provide damage evaluation and
is obtained through a broad spectrum of sensors employed on fighter aircraft, RPAs and satellites
that range from high resolution cameras to synthetic aperture RADARs and infra-red (IR)
detection sensors. A good C3I network will enable real time dissemination of tactical recce
intelligence.

SEARCH AND STRIKE

16. Air power is an option that may be exercised under conditions of air superiority, with or
without FACs. These missions are meant to locate and attack enemy targets such as material,
personnel and facilities. They are also useful in attacking opportunity targets under close control
in dynamic situations.

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17. The following factors should be considered in relation to air reconnaissance:

a. Interpretation. The value of imagery obtained by air reconnaissance and

surveillance operations will depend on the speed and skill with which it is
interpreted.

b. Planning Considerations. Air reconnaissance and surveillance assets will

invariably be limited and tasking must be carefully prioritized. The likely course(s) of
action open to opposing forces should be analysed in advance. Reconnaissance and
surveillance assets should be used to test or confirm which of these courses he appears to
be pursuing, or which he could be in a position to pursue. Thus friendly force
reconnaissance may be an essential element in the locating and tracking of an opponent
as part of the formulation of a rational course of action for friendly forces.

MARITIME AIR OPERATIONS

18. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) can be employed in both Indirect Air Operations and
Direct Air Operations. Maritime Indirect Air Operations are also referred to as Area Operations
(AO). During AO aircraft are tasked independently into a geographically defined operating
area, which may be a considerable distance from friendly surface forces. Within this area, the
aircraft will conduct either Anti-Surface Unit Warfare (ASUW) or Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) operations or, in certain circumstances, a combination of the two, as directed by an
appropriate tasking authority. Tasking for such operations can be passed to the aircraft crew
before flight, or can be passed by secure means during flight. To be effective, such operations
may require rolling 24-hour MPA coverage, which can be expensive in terms of aircraft and
crews.

19. Air power could also be tasked to exert passive and often compelling psychological force
on an adversary merely through the conduct of routine aerial activities like surveillance and
patrolling. Air superiority fighters on CAP, fighter sweep or free escorting duties could have a
profound deterrent effect on the adversary in the maritime domain.

ANTI-SURFACE UNIT WARFARE (ASUW) OPERATIONS

20. ASUW operations, including surface surveillance, include many different mission types.
The MPA is the best airborne ASUW platform because it is capable of conducting all four
elements of ASUW (search, identification, shadow and attack) at the greatest range and with the
greatest coverage. Sea-based helicopters are also capable of conducting all four elements of
ASUW, but with a reduced coverage. An MPA search using RADAR, ESM and other sensors is
a fast and efficient way to search large areas. Such a search requires positive identification of
targets. In order to avoid alerting suspect vessels, this can be achieved at stand-off range using
imaging RADAR, or electro-optical sensors. Shadowing operations may be required, either

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to mark targets prior to attack or to obtain intelligence. Again, this task may be conducted
overtly or covertly. For anti-surface attack MPA can act independently using their own air-to-
surface missiles, or participate in a multi-platform attack during which the MPA would supply
targeting data to other units, including fixed-wing anti-surface force aircraft - either shore or
carrier based rotary - wing aircraft carrying anti-shipping missiles or other maritime assets.

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) OPERATIONS

21. The submarine today is a more formidable weapon system than ever. Nuclear
submarines can cruise at high speeds for long periods, while modern conventional submarines
are extremely difficult to detect and pose an extremely serious threat, particularly in the littoral
environment. A skilfully conducted submarine offensive can be switched rapidly from one
area to another, and submarine forces may be concentrated or dispersed within relatively
short periods of time. Countering the threat posed by submarines to deployed maritime forces
and ships taken up from trade (STUFT) demands an extensive range of capabilities, and ideally a
force mix of air, surface and sub-surface platforms, systems and weapons.

22. The aim of ASW is to deny the enemy effective use of his submarines. This can be done
by deterring the submarine, by making him aware of an aircraft’s presence, and so limiting his
freedom of action. Alternatively, the situation may demand that the submarine be detected
and destroyed. The detection, location and tracking of submarines can be done either covertly
or overtly, using fixed-wing MPA or helicopters. Air assets can work independently or with
friendly submarines and ships, and can subsequently be used to attack the submarine. Offensive
ASW is generally best achieved at natural choke points. Defensive ASW requires a variety of
complementary platforms to give defence in depth. All assets must have good secure data
transmission capabilities and sensor and data fusion systems if they are to exploit fleeting
detection opportunities.

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CHAPTER 6

STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGN

“It is not necessary for an air force, in order to defeat an enemy nation, to defeat its armed
forces first. Air power can dispense with that intermediate step, can pass over the enemy navies
and armies, penetrate the air defences and attack direct the centres of production, transportation
and communication from which the enemy war effort is maintained”.

-Viscount Trenchard

"Airpower will project the spear point of a nation’s military force behind the frontlines of the
battlefield to the enemy’s vital areas to render it powerless to defend itself Aerial bombing would
cause such destruction and paralysis that resistance is no longer possible and capitulation is the
only outcome".

-Brig Gen Billy Mitchell

INTRODUCTION

1. Strategic Air Operations are designed to strike at the enemy’s centres of gravity. The
Strategic Air Campaign would generally show results only in the long term. But in the context of
short duration wars, Strategic targets have to be earmarked and neutralised so as weaken the
adversary’s capability to wage war and to apply pressure on him to make concessions. The
classification of an offensive air operation as ‘Strategic’ is determined not as a function of range,
platform type of weaponry, it is determined by the targets and objectives. Strategic air offensive
action is directed at undermining the enemy’s ability and will to fight by attacking command and
control, industrial, political and economic and military target sets. A critical analysis of enemy
centres of gravity and their vulnerability would enable selection of suitable target systems and
subsequent prosecution of the Strategic Air campaign. Its Strategic aim is to undermine
theenemy’s capability and determination to continue fighting.

2. Distinctions between the strategic and tactical levels of war are no longer clear. Nowhere
is this lack of clarity more pronounced than in designating weapon systems. Long range bombers
can destroy ground forces along the forward line of troops, short-range fighters can attack and
destroy oil remarries and helicopters can hit strategic air defence control centre. Technology now
enables system and elements to become strategic or tactical depending on their intended
objective. The distrinction relates to a target’s impact on the commander’s objective rather than
to the nature of the target itself. Thus, communication nets, fielded forces, oil refinery and
transportation system a strategic or tactical implication depending on the desired outcome.

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3. The concept of ‘Centres of Gravity’, first espoused by Clausewitz as a way of describing

how to compel an opponent in conflict or war to bend to your will, has stood the test of time. In
Clausewitz’s day, he believed the enemy’s army to be the “hub of all power”; now an opponent’s
centre of gravity may take many forms and often different degrees of accessibility. What is clear,
however, is that far from being limited to the physical destruction of targets with high
explosives, we now seek to achieve strategic effect on target sets.

4. The ability of air power to reach, disrupt or, possibly, destroy an opponent’s strategic or
operational centre of gravity suggests that air power is inherently capable of military action with
strategic effect. That effect may be created through independent, distinct action or through joint
or multinational activity operating in cadence with other forces.

5. Throughout the history of air power, air platforms and their associated weapon systems
have been able to carry the fight to the enemy. The aim of this chapter is to offer a brief
overview of the history of the strategic use of air power to place strategic effect into context. The
context of joint force employment will be developed to offer planning considerations for the
employment of air power for strategic effect.

DOCTRINAL PRECEPTS

6. The following doctrinal aspects are relevant from the history strategic air operations:-

a. Targets of strategic air attacks need to be carefully chosen, keeping in mind the
grand-stategic objectives of the war.

b. The strategic Air Campaign can be carried out independent of other air and land
campaigns. However, it tends to be more effective when fully integrated with the overall
campaign plans.

c. Air superiority is desirable for sustaining such operations. However, surprise and
deception may yield decisive results.

d. Strategic air operations, far more than Counter Air or Counter Surface force
operations are shaped by political constraints.

AIR OPERATIONS FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT

7. Air operations for strategic effect are aimed to destroy or disrupt the defined strategic
centre of gravity of an opponent. The effect sought by air power could be destructive, non-
destructive or a combination of both, against target sets which undermine the opponent’s ability,
will and means to continue his aggression. Air operations for strategic effect are not limited to
bombing or solely the domain of attack aircraft. All combat aircraft and associated weapon
systems are capable of action for strategic effect.

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TYPES OF STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS

8. There are essentially two types of Strategic Air Operations Conventional Strategic Air
Operations (CSAO) and Nuclear Attacks. CSAO could be used effectively during crisis or war
situations. During crisis situation, threats of punitive action or actual punitive strikes serve to
enhance deterrence and send the desired political signals. However the enemy should retaliate,
own defences need to be strong enough to counter the enemy reaction. The CSAO consists of Air
Interdiction and political signalling.

NUCLEAR AIR OPERATIONS

9. All nuclear operations must, in essence be considered as strategic operations. NATO

considers nuclear weapons to be weapons of last resort and not war-fighting weapons in the
expected sense of the term. The nuclear weapons are intended to be use to convey political
signals and to act as the ultimate national or multi-national defence sanction and safe guard.
Consequently, the authority to decide when nuclear weapons should be used rests not with the
military commands but at the highest political level.

a. Deterrence. The enormous power of nuclear weapons, the lack of experience

in their use and the inherent dangers of escalation confer a major deterrent capability on
all types of nuclear forces. Land-based cruise and ballistic missiles, sea-lanched cruise or
ballistic missiles or manned aircraft carrying rfee-fall or stand off weapons can carry out
nuclear operations.

10. Following are the thumb rules of conducting Nuclear Air Operations

a. Minimum but credible nuclear deterrence.

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b. No use against non-nuclear states.

c. No first use against nuclear states.

d. Willingness to participate in all non-discriminatory treaties related to nuclear

weapons.

DOCTRINAL PRECEPTS

11. The doctrinal precepts related to nuclear aspects are as follows.

a. There should be a reliable command and control system with adequate

redundancies and an effective nuclear doctrine highlighting the likely target systems.

b. Strong conventional forces to raise the threshold of using a Nuclear Weapon.

c. The system should be operationally prepared and geared to survive first strike so
as to ensure credibility.

d. Political will to use the nuclear weapon.

e. Security, safety and disaster control measures to prevent accidents.

CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS

12. Conventional Strategic Air Operations could be sued effectively during crisis or war
situations. During the former, threat of punitive action or actual punitive strikes serves to
enhance deterrence and send the desired political signal. However, should the enemy have the
capability to retaliate, own defences have to be strong enough to counter the reaction. During
war, conventional strategic air operations serve to provide synergy in air, land and sea
operations, provided targets are chosen appropriately.

a. Strategic Bombing. Air Strikes against selected strategic targets such as

industrial infrastructure ,power grids and communications need to be carried out so
as to degrade the enemy’s capability to wage war.

b. Political Signalling. During crisis situations, the threat or the use of

conventional air strikes provide governments with a flexible and responsive instrument of
crisis management. It enables governments to send the desired political signals
regarding own intent and determination to deter impending aggression, threaten
escalation, or eliminate specific enemy capabilities.

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13. Intelligence. Intelligence inputs are vital for planning of the strategic air campaign. A
coherent intelligence picture dispels the fog of war and reduces friction Peacetime efforts
should be directed towards collection of requisite target data .During war ,BDA when
superimposed on this data provides commanders with an idea of the progress being made in
the Strategic Air Campaign .

14. Compared with the other strategic targets, collection of information on the tactical
damage done to power and oil facilities is a relatively easy matter . These facilities are not
mobile , cannot be hidden and not particularly difficult to target or damage . Also , it is easy
to discern the indicators of when electricity of petroleum is in short supply . As a result,
fairly complete information should be available on the degree of success of attaining tactical -
level or immediate result. Air Attacks and assessment of damage on NBC sites and mobile
weapons system, however, prove to be more difficult than those are on electricity and oil.
15. Target Selection. Before the declaration of war, comprehensive and timely
intelligence would be required to shortlist the potential strategic targets. These would then have
to be prioritised keeping in mind their impact on the overall war waging capability of the
enemy .Post-attack intelligence would also be required to decide on the likely impact of the
strikes .The following target systems merit consideration.
a. Command and Control. The enemy’s command and control nodes are vital
targets for paralysing his leadership and combat effectiveness. Reliable intelligence
would be a pre-requisite for locating key target systems such as communication hub
centres, and other vital structures in the command hierarchy. Successful attacks on vital
command control nodes of the enemy would give the most immediate results in war
as compared to attacks on other strategic target systems. They would also serve to
isolate the military from the commanders in the field ,leaving them without guidance
and breaking their combat effectiveness .
b. Industrial Infrastructure. Industries that have direct military connotation
such as ammunition /ordinance factories and research establishment would be obvious
strategic targets .Besides , other targets such as oil installation and power generation
facilities could also have and impact on the enemy’s capability to sustain war and on
his morale.

c. Transportation System. The transportation system of any nation is

extremely vital in sustaining the war effort .Destruction of disruption of the same
would isolate enemy forces in the battlefield and prevent them from launching and
sustaining offensive operations. Since transportation systems possess redundancy, care
should be taken in target selection.
d. Population. Though direct attacks against enemy population are to be avoided
,targeting civilian facilities such as media centres and power grids can have a great
demoralising impact on the population .

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16. Selection of Weapon System. Manned aircraft and missile systems can undertake
conventional strategic an operations. The relative advantage of these weapons systems need to
be considered before deciding on the target to weapon matching .The cost - effectiveness
,flexibility and greater accuracy of manned aircraft in combination with PGM s are in its
favour. Sustained leveles of readiness ,a high level of pre –launch survivability especially
with mobile launchers ,difficulty in interception during flight and therefore ,a high probability
of arrival at the target are in favour of SSMs(Surface to Surface Missile).Practically ,some
combination of the two would have to be employed.

STRATEGIC EFFECT IN SUB-CONVENTIONAL OPS

17. In recent times there is an increasing focus on the strategic impact of air power even in
sub-conventional warfare. A classic example of air power creating a ‘strategic effect’ has been
Op Geronimo: undertaken by the US to eliminate Osama Bin Laden. It was air power that
facilitated stealthy and speedy execution of the mission. Not only do these operations validate
the ability of air power to create a strategic effect across the spectrum of conflict, they also
reinforce all its classic attributes of speed, flexibility and surprise.

LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGN

18. It The major limitations to the effectiveness of the Strategic Air Campaign include
negative Political Objectives, fear of attacking targets located in cities, limited use of SAC in
LICO scenario, targets are usually located in depth and weather. The negative political objectives
imply political constraints that are imposed on the conduct of warfare. The US experience in
Korea and Vietnam and Indian experience the Kargil war highlights this point. In all cases,
military leaders contend that the close control by civilians, whose decision about the conduct of
war often ran contrary to sound military advice, was responsible for preventing a clear cut
victory or causing failure. Civilian leaders on the other hand indicate that attacking strategic
CsOG is incompatible with limited warfare. Weather also has become a decisive factor in
assessing the success of SAC.

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CHAPTER 7

COMBAT SUPPORT AIR OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Definition. Combat – support air operations are those designed to enhance or support
the effectiveness of air, surface and sub-surface combat force.

2. Types of Combat-Support Air Operations. Combat-support air operations fall into the
following major categories:

a. Air Transport.

b. Air-to-Air refuelling (AAR)

c. Aerospace Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

d. Airborne Early Warning (AEW)/Airborne warning and Control (AWACS)

e. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

f. Electronic Warfare (EW)

Combat Support
Air Operations

Aerospace Combat Search

Air Surveillance and and
Transport Reconnaissance Rescue

Electronic Air –to Air AEW/AWACS

Warfare Refueling

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HISTORY OF COMBAT - SUPPORT AIR OPERATIONS

3. Early Developments. The first use air power in war was to provide combat
support for the surface forces. The Chinese used kites to observe their enemies some 2000 years
ago, but it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that an aircraft was used for military
purposes in Europe. This was in 1794 when the French used an observation balloon at the battle
of Fleurus. During the nineteenth century, balloons came to be used increasingly in land
campaigns, most notably in the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War. Heavier than
air aircraft were first used for observation in the Turkish-Italian war of 1911 and in this role
made a key contribution throughout World War I. In October 1914, it was an aircraft that
detected the swing to the right of the German 1st and 2nd armies in Northern France and thus
made possible the ‘Miracle of the Marne’ the defect of the German Schliefen Plan. Throughout
World War I the relative effectiveness of the opposing artillery – arguably the most decisive
weapon of that war – depended heavily on aerial observation.

4. The Inter–War Period. The inter-War period witnesses a blossoming in the range
of combat - support air activities. Air – to – air refueling first envisaged in 1909 was
experimented with in 1924, and ten years later was used in the attempted non – stop flight from
Britain to India. Air Transport operation came to be of major importance and was used for an
increasing diversity of tasks. These ranged from routine passenger movement, through air
evacuation (for example of British citizens from Kabul in Afghanistan in 1928) to air assault
(notably by Germany and the Soviet Union). In 1938, thee first purpose-built search and rescue
launches were introduced into the RAF.

5. World War 2. During World War 2, combat support air operations developed
rapidly. Air transport was used extensively by the Germans both for air assault ( for example in
Norway, Belgium and Holland in 1940 and for the invasion of Crete in 1941) and for re-supply
(for example to sustain the Demyansk pocket in 1942 and –less successfully-Stalingrad in 1943).
As the War progressed, decreasing resources and increasing allied air superiority steadily
inhibited German air transport operations. In contrast, Allied air transport operations grew in
scale and scope. Increasingly ambitions air assaults were carries out, most notably in support of
the allied D-Day invasion, Operation Market Garden (the Arnhem Operation) and the Rhine
crossing. Moreover, the use of air transport operations for re-supply purposes came to form the
linchpin of a number of operations and campaigns, particularly those in South East Asia.
Although air transport operations were undoubtedly dominant, other types of combat-support air
activity grew to importance in World War II. The Luftwaffe used flying boats for search and
rescue in early 1940, and the loss during the first two months of the Battle of Britain of two
hundred British aircrew over the Channel forced the RAF to follow suit and greatly expend its
search and rescue capabilities. Airborne surveillance and reconnaissance operations provided
increasingly crucial support for all types of combat operations and became a highly specialized
application of air power. The advent of RADAR and electronic navigation aids produced a rapid
growth in air power electronic capabilities, and these proved a major factor in the outcome of
The Allied Strategic Bombing Offensive against Germany, particularly in 1944 and 1945.
Moreover, by 1945 the first AEW aircraft had begun to appear. Thus, by 1945 virtually all
elements of modern combat-support air operations were in place.

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6. The Post World War II Periods. The relative importance of combat support air
operations continued to grow in the post – war years as capabilities were expanded with rapidly
developing technology. Air transport of re – supply broke the blockade of Berlin in 1948 and
may have saved Israel from defeat in 1973. By the late 1960s, it had replaced surface transport as
the preferred means of moving personnel between theatres .Helicopters emerged as an
increasingly important air transport asset, particularly in the Vietnam War and subsequent
conflicts. Helicopters also came to take over search and rescue duties, not only from rescue
launches, but also from seaplanes and flying boats. Electronic warfare, widely neglected in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, retuned to prominence as a result particularly of the Vietnam and
Yom Kippur Wars. By the mid -1980s, most combat aircraft of advanced nations posed organic
electronic warfare capabilities and, in addition, many nations had deployed dedicated electronic
warfare aircraft .The appearance in the 1970s of highly capable airborne warning and control
systems and the rapid growth of air - to - air refueling allowed far better use to be made of
existing combat air assets than had hitherto been possible. In the Falklands Conflict, the British
Task Force’s lack of and AEW/AWACS proved to be a major disadvantage. In contrast air-to-air
refueling allowed the projection of a wide spectrum of air power capabilities in to the operational
area. By mid 1980s, virtually all RAF fixed -Wing operational aircraft had been equipped to take
on fuel in the air. The importance of the ‘force multiplier’ effect of combat –support air
operations is irrefutable

AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

7. Definition. Air transport operations are defined as those, which involve the
movement, by air of personnel and cargo within and between theatres of operation. Air transport
operations can be conducted in support of all types of sea, land and air forces.

8. Applications. Mobility is a key requirement, particularly for small-scale armed forces

with worldwide commitments. Mobility can compensate for large of numbers -by allowing the
available forces to be rapidly deployed, re-deployed, supplied of evacuated. Air transport is an
indispensable element in this. However, air transport provided more than just a means, of
moving troops and cargo. It can act-particularly in peacetime-as a tool for building trust and
confidence around the world. The Ethiopian famine relief operation (‘Bushel’) of 1984/85 was a
clear example of this.

9. Viability. Air transport operations are affected by many factors. Strategic operations
in particular require appropriate diplomatic and over flight clearances, secure staging posts and
appropriate aircraft and acrgo-handling facilities. However, the most important requirement for a
successful air transport operation in a favourable situation.

10. Categories of Air Transported Operations. Air transport operations can be divided
into two broad categories.

a. Strategic Airlift. A strategic airlift is the carriage of passengers or cargo

between theatres (inter-theatre), or to any place within an area of interest.

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b. Tactical Airlift. A tactical airlift is the carriage of passengers and cargo within a
theatre (intra-theatre). Tactical airlift is resorted to for rapid and responsive movement
within an area of operations to meet specific tactical goals.

ROLES

11. Air transported operations comprise of five major roles

a. Airborne Operations.

(1) Airborne Assault.

(2) Air Landed Operations.

(3) Special Heli-Borne Operations (SHBO).

b. Air Maintenance.

c. Scheduled Services.

d. Special Air Operations.

e. Casualty Evacuation.

12. Airborne Operations. These are operations that involve the movement by air of
Airborne operations involve the movement of combat forces and their logistic support in an
objective area from the air. Combat forces and their support may be delivered by air landing or
airdrops from a fixed or rotary wing aircraft. If, on dispatch from the supporting aircraft, the
forces are required to immediately engage in combat, they could carry out a parachute assault or
slither from a helicopter at hover. On the other hand, forces could be air landed by fixed or rotary
wing aircraft, and thereafter join operations in a nearby objective area. Combat forces delivered
into an objective area normally require subsequent air maintenance support until a surface link-
up is effected or withdrawal is accomplished. Some other tasks of airborne operations include:

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gaining and maintaining favourable air situation; reconnaissance and interdiction to isolate the
area of airborne operations; and to provide a high degree of immunity from enemy interference.
Deception would be vital in the planning phase of any airborne operation and must be made part
of the operational plan. In addition, logistic considerations in terms of fuel and loading of aircraft
as well as the handling capacity of air bases must be kept in mind. Other important aspects are
securing of launch bases from air and ground attacks and secrecy regarding the nature of
airborne operations. Airborne forces once brought to the launch air bases, must be kept isolated
and secured. They are capable of performing a variety of tasks, such as: personnel and cargo
through fixed wing or rotary aircraft within and between theatres of operations.

a. Airborne Assault. Airborne assault is a particular phase of an airborne

operation and is carried out by specially trained units and formations dropped by
parachute or landed by assault aircraft with their equipment. Airborne assault transports
troops for immediate operations and has a considerable shock effect on the enemy. As a
result, airborne forces are capable of producing results out of proportion to their
numerical strength and fire power. A favourable air situation is essential for success, as
is joint staff work, contingency planning and rigorous combined training.

b. Air Landed Operations. Air landed operations are those where the troops are
landed near their objective by fixed wing aircraft, or helicopters. They organize
themselves into combat units and then assault the objective either on foot or on vehicles.
A favourable air situation is a must for undertaking air landed operations since the troops
are particularly vulnerable immediately after landing until they get organized.

c. Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO). Helicopters are a very, versatile

component of air power. They can induct troops and equipment direct into action. More
importantly, they can extricate them on completion of the task. SHBO operations could
include strikes on enemy targets where the troops either slither down on the objective, or
are landed close to the objective for an assault. Helicopters can also be utilized to
overcome impediments imposed by terrain.

13. Air Maintenance Operations. Air maintenance includes tasks, other than airborne
operations, conducted to distribute and recover troops, equipment and supplies. They differ from
airborne operations in that air maintenance does not usually involve the carriage of troops ready
for immediate combat. Maintenance by air can be divided into the following main categories.

a. Strategic Air Supply. These are air operations carried out to airlift the
maintenance requirements of a force in bulk from a main location to a theatre or from one
theatre to another.

b. Tactical Air Supply. These ensure the provision of aerial supplies within a
theatre either by dropping or by landing. It is further classified as follows:

c. Routine Air Supply. Air maintenance carried out as per scheduled/routine

replacing surface mode of maintenance.

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d. Emergency Supply. This is resorted to in cases of sudden operational

requirements, e.g. when forces are cut off from other means of maintenance due to
weather or operational reasons. Time is of vital importance in such cases.

14. Scheduled Services. Scheduled air transport services are regular, programmed point-to-
point air services for movement of personnel and supplies.

15. Special Air Operations. Special air operations are conducted, at any level of conflict,
to support clandestine and psychological operations. These operations include inserting agents or
troops into the enemy occupied territory and may require specialist training such as, low level
ingress and landings by using night vision devices. Some of these operations may have to be
carried out regardless of the total air situation and under conditions not normally considered
suitable for air operations.

16. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). Casualty evacuation involves the movement of the
injured to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Casualties are evacuated
from the combat zone to a forward casualty clearing area and from there moved to the rear.
Casualty evacuation requires special preparation, training, equipment and personnel and can be a
demanding task. Helicopters are better suited for tactical CASEVAC though modern transport
aircraft like C-130 can be fitted with equipment to support large-scale medical evacuation from
battle or crisis zones.

17. Composition of Force. The transport fleet maintains a capability for both strategic and
tactical airlifts. Fixed-wing aircraft have higher transit speeds, carry heavier loads, are more
reliable and are far cheaper to operate as compared to rotary wing aircraft. However, helicopters
have the capability to land anywhere, and because of their greater ability to utilize terrain
masking, they have greater survivability in a combat zone. Thus, both are necessary in the
overall air transport force mix.

18. Use of Civil Resources. Civil airlines could also be pressed into service in war or crisis
situations as was the case during the airlifting of the IPKF to Sri Lanka. The problems of
employing civil aircraft are.

a. Cargo. Generally National carriers do not operate any dedicated cargo aircraft
excluding those on lease. Therefore, they may need to be modified to be used for cargo
purposes.

b. Infrastructure. Modern civil aircraft need appropriate ground infrastructure as

well as special ground equipment.

c. Trained Aircrew. Civil air crews lack a military orientation which inhibits full
exploitation of civil aircraft. Air force personnel too may not be able to exploit these
assets as they may not be trained to operate these aircraft.

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PRINCIPLES OF AIR TRANSPORT OPERATION

19. Air Transport is an expensive and valuable resource for which demand invariably
exceeds supply. Accordingly certain principles must be observed if airlift assets are to be
exploited in the most effective and economical manner. These are as follows.

20. Air Situation. Transport aircraft are vulnerable to enemy air action. A favourable air
situation is, therefore, an essential prerequisite for the employment of aircraft assets in most
operational scenarios.

21. Flexibility and Command. The full flexibility of this force can be obtained only if their
control is centralized at the highest possible level. Only then can conflicting demands and
priorities be properly asserted and resolved. This is especially important where strategic and
larger tactical aircraft are concerned, since correct employment of those aircraft could be crucial
to success of any major operations. In the case of smaller tactical aircraft and support helicopters,
command and control may be delegated to lower levels to accomplish specific tasks.

22. Economy in Use. Transport aircraft frequently officers the best means for the rapid
deployment of combat forces. However, they are costly to operate and therefore, must be used as
efficiently as possible. The cardinal rule is that surface transport, (such as sea, rail of road) must
be used in preference to or in combination with airlift whenever this is feasible and operationally
acceptable. Economical use of forces calls for good management and co- ordination at all levels
in the tasking process, which in turn requires effective communications.

23. Joint Planning. All the operations must be planned jointly from the outset to meet
the requirements of both the user and the operator. An army unit would require its troops and
equipment to be delivered to the destination airfield, dropping zone or helicopter landing site in
the designated sequence within a precisely defined time scale. These must be balanced against
the air force requirements of selecting suitable timings, routes and flight profiles.

24. Rate of Flow. Aircraft should be planned to operate at an even rate of flow along
the route. To allow for unserviceabilities, a delay factor should be incorporated in the plan.
Proper staggering will ensure that there is no congestion, and the support facilities are not over
loaded at the departure, en route and destination airfields.

25. Stage Length. Stage lengths must be planned keeping in mind the requirement of
the load to be carried, aircraft capabilities, availability of staging airfields en route and the
operating and climatic conditions along each stage of the route. The security environment at the
staging airfields must also be considered.

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CHARACTERSTICS AND CAPABILITIES OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

26. To meet the tasks listed at the para above, various types of aircraft are required. Two
board categories are:-

a. Strategic Transport Aircraft designed to carry men or cargo or both men and
cargo between theatres.

b. Tactical Transport Aircraft designed to carry men or cargo or both men and cargo
within theatre. They may be sub-categorized as:-

(1) Fixed wing tactical transport.

(2) Support helicopters.

27. The broad characteristics required of each category of transport aircraft are listed below:-

a. Strategic Transport.

(1) A range of at least 3000-3500 nm with a good payload.

(2) A large passenger/cargo compartment.

(3) High cruise speed.

(4) Rear loading capability.

(5) All weather capability.

(6) ‘Hot’ and ‘High’ capability to operate in high ambient temperature

conditions and at high altitude airfields.

b. Tactical Transport.

(1) Rugged construction and capable of STOL operations from any hard, flat
surface.

(2) A radius of action between 600 to 800 nm.

(3) A cargo compartment capable of carrying the largest single item of air
portable service equipment required in the op area.

(4) Large rear loading doors and integral ramps to facilitate rapid loading and
unloading.

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(5) All weather capability.

(6) Good cruising speed along with good slow flying characteristics.

(7) The ability to change role quickly eg. From cargo to passenger to air
supply/ para-trooping.

(8) Good ‘hot’ and ‘high’ performance.

c. Support Helicopters.

(1) A radius of action of 75-100 Nm with full payload.

(2) Capability of carrying under slung loads.

(3) Good night/poor-weather capability.

(4) Minimum servicing requirements.

(5) Capable of being adapted for search and rescue operations.

(6) Capable of carrying armament.

28. Not all aircraft can be readily classified as strategic or tactical transports. For example the
C-130 (Hercules) is generally considered to be tactical transport aircraft but it meets most of the
criteria for a strategic aircraft. Even amongst the tactical (METAC) and heavy tactical (HETAC).
The scarcity of transport aircraft nullifies to a large extent the theoretical classifications.

29. It takes about 10 years for an aircraft to enter service from the initial design stage if the
right design is to be successfully produced, joint planning is essential at all stages of
development. The Army remains the principal user of air transport and its requirements would
considerably influence the size and shape of SLAF’s transport force.

30. Many of the individual design requirements are conflicting. For example, large payloads
conflict with short take offs and a compromise is necessary. If requirements are made too
specific a whole range of aircraft may be needed to meet them all. As the number of types of ac
in service increase, so too do the problems of logistics and maintenance increase. Thus the
number of aircraft types must be kept to a minimum and as wide a capability as possible given to
each type. Although civil aircraft have often been converted for military use, such conversions
have seldom been completely satisfactory.
31. Due to lack of indigenous production the SLAF is equipped with a variety of transport
aircraft manufactured abroad. Therefore, it is ideal that the total air transport requirement be
obtained from the user as, a combination of aircraft may be used which will have deferent
limitations as payload, range, turn-around time etc.

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AIR TO AIR REFUELLING OPERATIONS (AAR)

32. Definition. Air-to-Air refuelling operations involve transfer of fuel from one aircraft to
another in flight.

33. Applications. Air to air refuelling can contribute to extend the range, payload, time on
task and flexibility of aircraft. It can be used to support all three air campaigns as well as all
types of combat support air operations. It enables

a. Increased Range. The reach the strike aircraft has increased considerably with
the help of AAR. Short-range aircraft can now be used for deep penetration strikes.

b. Increased Endurance. Combat or combat support air missions can be extended

in duration up to the limits of crew endurance.

c. Response Time. AD aircraft can be kept airborne for long durations thus
increasing their ability to respond to intercept requirements at short notice. Likewise
strike aircraft would be able to carry out long range strikes without the need to stage
through airfields, thus improving their reaction time.

d. Increased Flexibility. The flexibility of the aircraft has increased significantly

with AAR. Short range combat aircraft can escort combat or combat support aircraft
over longer distances. Aircraft can take off with a greater weapon load while retaining
the flexibility in choice of flight profiles and tactical routing or even target selection.

e. Enemy Considerations. Extending the strike range of the aircraft by AAR

would have a greater impact on the enemy who would need to expend a disproportionate
amount of resources and effort for protecting area in depth

34. There are essentially three types of air-to-air refuelling methods;

a. Probe and Drogue. This refuelling method employs a flexible hose that trails
from the tanker aircraft. The drogue is a fitting resembling a shuttlecock, attached at its
narrow end (like the "cork" nose of a shuttlecock) with a valve to a flexible hose. The
drogue stabilizes the hose in flight and provides a funnel to aid insertion of the receiver
aircraft probe into the hose. The hose connects to a Hose Drum Unit (HDU). When not
in use, the hose/drogue is reeled completely into the HDU. The receiver has a probe,
which is a rigid, protruding or pivoted retractable arm placed on the aircraft's nose or
fuselage to make the connection. Mode modern versions of the probe are usually
designed to be retractable, and are retracted when not in use, particularly on high speed
aircraft. At the end of the probe is a valve that is closed until it mates with the drogue's
forward internal receptacle, after which it opens and allows fuel to pass from tanker to
receiver.

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b. Flying Boom. The flying boom is a rigid, telescoping tube with movable flight
control surfaces that an operator on the tanker aircraft extends and inserts into a
receptacle on the receiving aircraft. All boom-equipped tankers have a single boom, and
can refuel one aircraft at a time with this mechanism.

c. Buddy Refuelling. A "buddy store" or “buddy pod” is an external pod loaded on

an aircraft hard point that contains a hose and drogue system (HDU). Buddy stores allow
fighter/bomber aircraft to be reconfigured for "buddy tanking" other aircraft. This allows
an air combat force without dedicated/specialized tanker support to extend the range of
its strike aircraft.

35. Roles. Air –to-air refueling operations are divided into two roles.

a. Towline. In the Towline role, tanker aircraft fly a set pattern (typically
racetrack) in a predetermined position. Aircraft that require air-to-air refuelling plan their
routes via that pattern to take on fuel as required.

b. Trail. The trail role can be carried out in one of two ways: accompanied transits
and en route rendezvous. In accompanied transits, the tanker aircraft escorts the receiver
aircraft along a route, transferring fuel as required. The an route rendezvous technique
required the tanker and the receiver aircraft to meet at predetermined locations along the
route to conduct air-to-air refueling

Air to Air Refueling

Towline Trail

36. Viability. While air-to-air refueling officers greatly enhanced flexibility and
capability to a force, it nevertheless has important limitations. The process of in-flight refueling
tasks a finite time, during which both tanker and receiver aircraft are very restricted in their
maneuver. Moreover, there is a limit to the number of aircraft that a tanker can refuel at any
instant. Refueling a multi aircraft formation can take a long time, requires a larger volume of
airspace and tenders tankers and receivers venerable to enemy attack Consequently, air-to-air
refueling operations-particularly large-scale operations-should, whenever possible, be planned to
take place outside hostile airspace

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PLANNING FACTORS FOR AAR

37. Time. While AAR offers greatly enhanced flexibility and capability to a force, it
nevertheless has important limitations. AAR takes a predictable but finite time, during which
both tanker and receiver aircraft are restricted in manoeuvre. Moreover, there is a limit to the
number of aircraft that a tanker can refuel at any instant. Planners, therefore, should be aware
that refuelling a multi-aircraft formation can take a long time, requires a large volume of airspace
and can render tankers and receivers vulnerable to enemy attack.

38. Survivability. Tanker ground survivability is another important wartime planning

factor. Large tankers are very vulnerable on the ground. It is impractical to protect them with
hardened aircraft shelters. Hence, dispersing tankers away from their main base will generally
be the best survival option. However, this may complicate planning, especially for multi-tanker
operations. It will, in any case, be limited by the availability of suitable dispersal airfields with
the effective communications and extensive fuel supplies that are essential for sustained AAR.

39. Operating Constraints. AAR operations are subject to a range of operating constraints.
Diversion requirements in the event of a failure to refuel mean that receivers have to be refuelled
frequently and the route must come within range of suitable diversion airfields with acceptable
weather states. This can pose serious problems, particularly for oceanic transits in winter, where
the lack of such airfields and the frequency of poor weather could lead to delays. AAR is ver y
much like a chain; the failure of any one link can break the chain and lead to the failure of the
complete operation.

40. Deployments. AAR offers the ability to deploy combat aircraft quickly to a crisis area
to demonstrate commitment and resolve. The activation of a ‘trail’ of tanker and combat aircraft
requires considerable pre-planning and may also require diplomatic clearance. The planning
factors for AAR are equally applicable to support carrier-based air operations.

AEROSPACE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

41. Surveillance and reconnaissance operations involve the collection of information from
space-based, airborne, and ground sensors regarding the activities, forces and resources of an
enemy or potential enemy. These operations can be further classified as:

a. Surveillance. Surveillance is the systematic, repetitive gathering of information

by photographic, RADAR, infra-red, electronic, acoustic or visual means. Information
gained from surveillance would normally be used for strategic decision making and
building data bases.

b. Reconnaissance. Aerial reconnaissance is the visual/photo observation of

specific targets, interests and areas at a particular time to gain information about the
activities, resources and intentions of an enemy.

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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

42. Reconnaissance is the collection of information via a specific mission, usually conducted
over a limited period of time and directed against a specific target whereas, surveillance is the
systematic observation of areas, or targets over a period of time by any sensor to provide
accurate and timely knowledge of a potential adversary’s capabilities and intentions.
Surveillance and reconnaissance operations encompass the following roles:

a. Strategic Reconnaissance. Strategic reconnaissance operations gather the

information necessary for the formulation of policy, strategy and military plans at the
national level. The objective of strategic reconnaissance is the collection of data which
builds up a basic pattern of activity in an area of interest to track any significant
departures or trends. Satellites provide an extremely important capability in this.

b. Tactical Reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance operations collect

information related to enemy dispositions and target systems. It also encompasses BDA
following air attacks for the planning and conduct of further air operations. The objective
of tactical reconnaissance is to provide information for targeting and damage assessment.

c. Target Acquisition. Data linking strike aircraft with RPAs would provide real-
time imagery of targets in the battlefield to aid target acquisition. This has specific
relevance to BAS and BAI missions.

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT (RPA)

43. New generation RPAs can carry the latest Electro-optical (EO), Infra-Red (IR) or
Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) sensors and even PGMs. They can fly at high altitudes for
extended periods of time and possess threat warning and ECM capabilities. The multiple
capabilities of these RPAs allow them to undertake a host of missions that include
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) as well as targeting and deception
operations. They can also undertake maritime operations, EW and SIGINT, CBRN
reconnaissance, special and psychological operations, meteorology missions, artillery direction,
battle damage assessment, radio and data relay and precision attacks on high value target
systems. The important employment considerations for RPAs are:

a. RPAs generally require an extensive support infrastructure. This factor limits their
options for deployment in operational areas. They also require data links from the control
stations to the decision makers and users.

b. RPAs can cover only limited areas with desired resolution in short time periods
and initially require intelligence inputs and guidance from either satellites or human
sources to reach a localized area of interest. Within this area, they can then search for
targets.

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c. While the initial flight profile, small size and low speeds may conceal their entry,
but once detected, the RPA is vulnerable to enemy air defences.

d. The operator remains a key part of the mission, hence increased endurance of
RPAs require multiple shifts of personnel for them to be successful. The organizational
structure should be versatile and flexible, and the specialist personnel should be cross-
trained to perform multiple tasks.

44. Force Mix. While imaging satellites can cover large swathes of area without violating
another nation’s air space they are expensive, vulnerable to deception techniques, difficult to
“dynamically re-task”, have extended re-visit times and do not provide direct inputs to the
ultimate user. Also, since these satellites normally occupy a low earth orbit, they cannot remain
stationary over a given point or area of interest. Hence their real-time tactical application
becomes severely restricted. Manned aircraft offer better resolution and flexibility, but are
vulnerable and have low endurance. In contrast, RPAs have role flexibility, are relatively cheap
and survivable. SATCOM capabilities have greatly enhanced the area coverage of the RPAs
which is limited only by the time it takes to reach the intended target area, considering the
relatively low ground speeds achieved by RPAs. On the other hand, ground-based systems have
limited coverage, but offer permanence. The overall force mix should, therefore, have an
optimum combination of all such systems and should provide comprehensive picture of the battle
space.

AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS)

45. AWACS, as a force multiplier gives combat forces a definite edge over the adversaries.
Over the course of its history, the AWACS mission has evolved from that of primary
surveillance and early warning to executing offensive air power. Often, as the first airborne asset
to enter a campaign and one that is the last to leave, AWACS would be in the theatre providing
surveillance and combat support at very short notice. In today’s, non-linear and extremely fluid
battles where, more than one battle management task is put to the test, the biggest challenge is to
maintain the flow of accurate and timely information. AWACS is capable of detecting airborne
and maritime targets as well as providing data link communication to tactical elements. Inherent
capabilities of AWACS are:

a. Enhanced Detection. By virtue of taking the sensor to a greater height the low
level detection capability of the RADAR can be greatly increased. This leads to a better
situational awareness deep inside the enemy territory and a reduction in the desired alert
status because of timely early warning.

b. Mission Flexibility/Versatility. History has shown that AWACS can respond

quickly and effectively to a crisis and can support worldwide deployment and operation
at short notice. AWACS has a greater chance of surviving in warfare than fixed RADAR
system because of its mobility. The planned profile can be adapted as per the mission,
emerging situations and survival requirements.

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c. Deployment. With in-flight refueling, the system can be deployed over extended
and inaccessible terrains such as seas, deserts and other inhospitable terrain.

STRATEGIC ROLES OF AWACS

46. Potent Instrument of Diplomacy. Given its capabilities, AWACS has been effectively
utilized as a deterrent in diplomacy and as an effective instrument of force application.

47. Disaster Management. Post natural disasters, AWACS can play a vital role in
surveillance, aircraft control and airspace management to fill the void created by the inability of
ground based systems to move in quickly and operate in difficult terrain and poor infrastructure.

48. Humanitarian Missions. AWACS help establish localized command and control
mechanisms until ground systems are able to build situational awareness.

49. Search and Rescue. AWACS can be effectively utilized to provide valuable search and
rescue support through direct communication with non-traditional joint players such as the coast
guard, local enforcement and rescue crews. Close coordination and the employment of the
AWACS RADAR would allow crews to de-conflict the flow of airborne assets to and from the
disaster area.

AWACS COMBAT ENABLING MISSIONS

50. Deep Penetration Attack. AWACS is capable of providing long range detection and
identification of air threats, sea-surface tracks, and can detect and report the current status of an
enemy’s strategic SAM and EW RADARs through its ESM systems. The ability to quickly relay
the air and real time intelligence picture can provide the beyond the line of sight picture to both
the strike elements and commanders on ground, enabling real time C2 including timely
corrective decisions.

51. Strike Control. One of the biggest advantages of the airborne RADAR platform is the
ability to warn and control own strike missions in the adversary’s territory, which hitherto was
not possible owing to line of sight constraints of ground based RADARs.

52. Air Control Operations. AWACS can be used to acquire air control over an
adversary’s air space as well as over own air space. It can support the battle along with the army
and navy to attain time critical military objectives. Initiative, surprise, concentration of
firepower, shock effect and operational advantage over adversaries would remain the guiding
principles for utilization of AWACS.

53. Air Defence. Through its improved low level and long range RADAR coverage
AWACS is capable of acting as an extension of AD sectors. The AWACS is an excellent option
for control of air defence weapon platforms well inside the enemy territory.

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54. Air Intelligence. As the monitoring and analysing of the enemy’s air activity is an
ongoing process during peace and during operations AWACS with its integral sensors can
augment existing ELINT and COMINT systems.

AEROSTATS

55. Aerostats are aerodynamically shaped, tethered balloons that house airborne RADARs.
They provide electronic coverage at low, medium and high altitude deep inside the enemy
territory. However, they are limited by their static location. They would, therefore, need to be
protected from aerial attacks and ground threats.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

56. Definition. Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as the art and science of preserving the
electromagnetic spectrum for friendly use while denying its use to the enemy. EW involves the
military use of electronics to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the
electromagnetic spectrum as well as to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. EW includes
systems using all forms of electromagnetic energy e.g., radio, RADAR, IR optical systems,
lasers, etc. However, radiation produced by nuclear weapons is usually classified as
nuclearallout.

57. Applications. EW is a force multiplier. Electromagnetic capabilities are associated with

all aspects of air power employment and EW considerations should form an integral part of
planning and execution of all types of operations. EW operates on multiple levels in a conflict
ranging from self-protection to operational attack plans. When EW actions are properly
integrated with other military operations, a synergistic effect is achieved, losses minimised, and
effectiveness enhanced. There is a particularly close inter-relationship between EW and the
SEAD role wherein EW provides the ‘soft kill’ option.

CATEGORIES OF EW OPERATIONS

58. EW operations can be divided into three main roles:

a. Electronic Support Measures (ESM). ESM is known as the process of

collection, collation, and analysis of enemy’s EW capability. Electronic support measures
involve action taken to search for, intercept, identify and locate radiated electromagnetic
energy to provide electronic warning and surveillance data for the commander. ESM are
passive and therefore available for use in peace, crisis and war. It has three different
branches;

(1) Signal intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT has two components, those are

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i. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)

ii. Communication Intelligence (COMINT)
(2) Warning
(3) Homing

b. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). Electronic countermeasures involve the

use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities and equipment
with the intent of preventing or reducing an opponent’s effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. It involves actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s
effective use of electromagnetic spectrum. This ensures friendly effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum despite the use of EW by the enemy. There are three sub-
categories as follows:

(1) Electronic jamming.

(2) Electronic neutralization.
(3) Electronic deception.

c. Electronic Protection Measures (EPM). Electronic protection measures

involve active and passive measures taken to ensure the friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum despite an opponent’s use of electronic warfare techniques.
Electronic warfare is increasingly important to the success of all types of military
operations.

59. Specialist manned aircraft and unmanned air vehicles for EW support may be critical
factors in support of air operations within the joint campaign. Such aircraft and systems
designed to counter sophisticated SAM and AAA systems are invariably in short supply,
requiring priorities to be set as part of the apportionment process. Moreover, there is a close
interconnection between EW and the associated task of the suppression of enemy air defences.

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR)

60. Air search and rescue operations involve the use of aircraft and helicopters to locate and
rescue personnel in distress and, in particular, to recover aircrew who have abandoned their
aircraft. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) is a specific task performed to affect the recovery
of distressed persons including downed aircrew and isolated personnel from a conflict zone or
battle area. Space enabled SAR has also significantly enhanced the effectiveness of SAR
operations.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAR

61. Peace Time. Considering the geographical expanse of the country, air forces have to be
prepared for search and rescue operations in various terrains, which may dictate use of different

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types of aircraft. These aircraft must have the facility to home onto the distress transmission of
the pilot rescue beacon of the downed aircrew and must also possess winching facilities.

62. In War. Search and rescue helicopters are unarmed and therefore, vulnerable to enemy
attack. This is an important consideration when downed aircrews have to be rescued from enemy
territory. This would involve the use of an attack helicopter, or unarmed helicopter along with
attack helicopters to provide covering fire, or even an armed helicopter with fighter escorts.
Such operations may prove to be costly, especially if the enemy is aware of where the aircraft
has crashed and deploys air and surface forces in that area. Hence, combat search and rescue
operations should only be undertaken, if, the prospects of success are good and if surprise can be
maintained. The depth of penetration would depend on enemy defences in that area. Further,
armed helicopter escorts should take into account their own vulnerability as regards the enemy’s
AD systems.

IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF CSAR

63. CSAR is a specialized operation. The main factor for success in CSAR operations is
quick response. Thus as soon as the aircrew ejects, his position must be quickly, and as far as
possible, accurately relayed to the nearest CSAR base; the base must be located close to the
border; the crew must be close to the aircraft; and the rescue beacon available with the pilot must
be able to accurately indicate his location. The other contributory factors include accurate
intelligence, secure communications, appropriate control over air, AD, enemy surface forces in
the area and the weather.

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CHAPTER 8

ROLES AND COMPOSITION OF AN AIR FORCE

INTRODUCTION

1. The post WW II era has been one of the tremendous growth and specialization in the
functions of the Air Force. Today’s aircraft have the ability to deliver many kinds of weapons on
all types of targets with great speed and destructive capability. The aircraft can extend the reach
of ground forces by intercontinental airlift or by placing special forces deep behind the enemy
lines. They can provide reconnaissance or early warning of attack many hundreds of miles
behind the point of encounter, on land or at sea.

ROLES OF AN AIR FORCE

2. The Air Force has independent as well as complementary roles to play in the event of
war.

3. The Second World War saw the RAF follow a doctrine of air warfare, which was not
directly linked to the ground operation, while Luftwaffe’s role was one of the close co-operations
with the army.

4. What precise role an Air Force should play depends on the nature of threat a country
faces, the economics consideration which limits the force availability, the size of the organic Air
Force of the Army and the Navy and the unique nature of the campaign. But in general roles of
Air Force are as follow;

a. Defence of national territory and essential communications outside national

territory, against air attack.

b. Direct pressure on the enemy’s power of resistance by attack on vital targets in his
country or in territories held by him.

c. Support the Army and Navy in their campaigns by providing them with
reconnaissance, fire power, protection and airlift and also destroy, degrade or immobilize
the enemy’s Army, Navy and the Air Force.

5. Apart from the combat roles, the Air Force is becoming an important instrument of the
Government, in dealing with national calamities like floods, lank slides cyclones, airlifting of
para-military forces to deal with internal strife etc.

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ELEMENTS OF AIR POWER

6. The key element of Air Power continues to be the aircraft. Great strides in technology
have made modern aircraft more lethal and highly capable. Apart from aircraft there are other
elements which are equally important. They are;

a. Weapon Systems. Weapon systems include launching platforms, airborne and

ground based RADAR and other types of sensors, guidance systems, missiles rockets,
precision guided munitions and guns, computers and data links. Modern technology has
made airborne and ground based weapons highly sophisticated complex and costly.

b. Communication Network. Communication is the vital link, which brings

various elements of an Air Force together. A secure, reliable communication network
which is jam-proof and which can survive the effects of battle is crucial to success.

c. Technical Organizations. Technical maintenance ensures that the components

of air power are available where and when required. Adequate technical knowledge,
experience in dealing with modern systems and repair facilities is essential to ensure
availability and reliability of aircraft and other elements.

d. Logistics Organization. With the multiplicity and complexity of the systems

we posses, the logistics organization plays and equally important part in ensuring
serviceability of various systems in the Air Force. Though line replaceable modules
make the maintenance task easy, they have made the logistics task very complicated.
Forecasting and stocking of spares call for technical knowledge and understanding of
modern material management techniques. Military thinkers believe that logistics should
be involved not only in the purchase of equipment but even from the time of initial
consideration of personnel or introduction of new systems.

e. Organization and Administration. An efficient organization integrate various

elements of Air Power and enables their effective functioning. Possession of the state of
the art aircraft or RADAR will become to null and void if the organization is not
functioning efficiently. Administration includes management of men and material. Since
a person once inducted stays in the organization for at least 25 to 30 years, great care is to
be taken in managing human resources. Correct staffing procedure, effective general and
operational training, rational policies on lateral and vertical mobility will go a long way
in motivating the personnel to commit themselves fully for the organizations task.

POTENTIAL ELEMENTS

7. The nation’s technical, industrial and economics capability has a direct bearing on the
size and sophistication of the Air Force. The civil aircraft and civil aviation organization from
an important adjunct and a vital reserve. A well-developed and sophisticated civil industry will
be of great support to military aviation and reduce dependence on foreign sources, which are
often affected by political factors.

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8. Another important aspect is the level of educational standards that prevail in country.
The quality of human resources is directly proportional to the standards of general and technical
education.

FUNCTIONS OF AIR FORCE

9. The military instrument by which a nation applies its Air Power is the Air Force. The
functions in which and Air Force is used in support of national defense policy by executing
various types of Air Operations (Combat Air Operations, combat support Air Operations)
collectively as individually to achieve strategic objective of each air campaign in idea to peruse
the air strategy.

10. Air Operations performed by an Air Force can be listed as below.

a. Offensive Counter Air Operations

b. Defensive Counter Air (Air Defence) Operations

c. Land Air Operations

d. Maritime Air Operation

e. Strategic Air Offensive Operations

f. Air Transport Operations

g. Air To Air Refuelling Operations

h. Aerospace Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations

i. Combat Search and Rescue Operations (CASR)

j. Electronic Warfare Operations

k. Nuclear Warfare Operations

BALANCED AIR FORCE

11. A balanced air force is one that has the capability to fulfill all the tasks mentioned earlier.
For this, it needs to have a variety of aircraft and equipment so that all the tasks can be met
effectively and efficiently. It would need the following:-

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a. Long and medium range strikes forces.

b. Air defence aircraft, weapons and ground-based weapons for the task of air
defence.

c. Transport, logistics and communication aircraft and equipment for air transport
operations

d. Specialist aircraft and weapon systems for the tasks of maritime air support

e. Aircraft specially modified or equipped for EW, photographic and air to air
refueling roles.

f. Specialized aircraft and a network to perform CSAR missions

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CHAPTER 9

STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

EARLY HISTORY OF BOMBING OPERATIONS

1. Air Operations Pre World War I Era. The first-ever offensive employment of
aircraft in war took place on 01 November 1911 when Lt Cavotti of the Aeronautical Section of
the Italian Army led a section of six small aircraft and dropped a few bombs (modified Swedish
hand grenades, each weighing 4 ½ lbs) on Turkish troops near a small town called Ain Zara in
Libya.

2. Turkey protested that this aerial bombardment had hit a hospital, but enquiries
subsequently carried out did not reveal the existence of any hospital – although it might have
been possible that some of the tents in the encampment were used by Turks to shelter the sick
and wounded. This was followed by an acrimonious discussion in the Turkish, Italian and
neutral Press about the ethics of air bombardment, which was the first of many example of a long
series of such controversies.

3. Development of Air Arm. In Great Britain the first unit of military aviation was
formed in 1911. The British idea of the purpose of military aviation was limited to pure and
simple reconnaissance for the Army and the Navy. Accordingly, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC-a
separate corps of the Army) and a Royal Naval Aviation Services (RNAS) were established and
separately organized.

4. Thus, at the outbreak of the First World War military air forces were new and largely
untried; the General and Naval Staffs of various countries in Europe and America had only a
vague idea of the role of the aircraft when they entered the war.

5. Operations during World War I. After the outbreak of war in 1914, there was great
demand for aircraft for the purposes of collecting intelligence and carrying out artillery
reconnaissance. These aircraft known as ‘Scouts’ into fighters by equipping these aircraft with a
fixed machine gun capable of firing bullets between the blades of revolving propeller. Air
fighting began on a serious scale, but, in spite of the Italian experiment in North Africa in 1911,
any army air did practically no bombing force until January 1915, when the RFC carried out its
first bombing attack of the war against Lille railway station if France.

6. Squadrons were earmarked for special training in air bombing tasks. Thus, for the first
time, it was realized that concentration of effort, centralized control, target selection and
specialized crew training were pre-requisites for the success of any bomber operation.

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7. Accordingly, before the battle of Arras in March 1917, air attacks were directed against
German airfields and aircraft on ground but because of interference and pressure from local
commanders for more air activity in the vicinity of fronts, bombers were often diverted from
their primary task of gaining the ‘command of the air’ against the German Air Force.

8. The Germans, on the other hand, had not only been opposing the allied bombers with
their fighters, but had also been preparing to deliver air attacks against England. On 13 June
1917, fourteen four-engine Gotha bombers dropped 118 HE bombs over London killing 162
people and injuring 432. British aircraft engaged the attacking force but all German bombers
returned safely. Another heavy raid was carried out on 11 July 1917. These were the first
manifestations of any consequence that could be likened to a strategic air attack; and these
remarkable events added a new dimension to the art of war. The military aircraft had proved
itself as something more than just airborne observation posts for the Army and the Navy.

OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF AIR POWER

9. The offensive potential of the aircraft, and its ability to strike deep into the enemy
country, as its center of population and industrial power, was acclaimed to be of considerable
strategic importance. It was then felt that the organization and control of aircraft in British
needed to be overhauled. The new organization should be in a position to utilize the offensive
capability of air forces to the best strategic advantage. Hence, Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts
of the Union of South Africa, whose views were greatly respected throughout the
commonwealth, was entrusted by Prime Minister Lioyd George with the of examining the
question of air defence and organization and direction of air operations.

10. Smuts’ Report. In his report dated 17 August 1917, Field Marshal Smuts categorically
stated the following:-

“The time is however, rapidly approaching when the subordination of the Air Board
and Air Service (to the Army and the Navy) can no longer be justified. Essentially, the
position of an air service is quite different from that of the artillery arm; to pursue our
comparison, artillery could never be used in war except as a weapon in military or naval or air
operations. It is a weapon, an instrument ancillary to a service, but could not be an independent
service itself. As air service, on the contrary, can be used as an independent means of war
operations. Nobody that witnessed the attack on London on 11 July could have any doubt on
that point. Unlike artillery, an air fleet can conduct extensive operations far from and
independently of, both Army and Navy. As far as can at present be foreseen, there is absolutely
no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when
aerial operations, with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and
populous centers on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older
forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.

11. Churchill’s Idea. In a memorandum dated 21 October 1917, Mr Winston S

Churchill the then Minister of Munitions, expressed the following views on the offensive
employment of Air Power:-

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“It is improbable that any terrorization of the civilian population which could be
achieved by air attack could compel the Government of a great nation to surrender.
Familiarity with bombardments, a good system of dug-out shelters and a strong control
by police and military authorities should be sufficient to preserve the national fighting
power unimpaired. In our own case we have seen combative spirit of the people, aroused,
and not quelled by German air raids. Nothing that we have learned of the capacity of
German population to endure suffering justifies us assuming that they would not be
rendered more desperately resolved by them. Therefore, our air upon whose structure the
fighting power of his armies and his fleets of the sea and of the depends. Any injury
which comes to the Civilian population from the process of attack must be regarded as
incidental and inevitable”.

12. As a consequence to these opinions expressed by men of eminence and vision, the
independent Bombing Force for strategic air operation was created in Great Britain in early
1918, and the autonomous Royal Air Force was later instituted on 01 April 1918.

13. With the establishment of an Independent Air Force, the air bombardment was aimed at
vital German centers of production and communication. Apart from occasional attacks on
airship sheds in Germany by the RNAS, this was indeed the first time that targets within the
enemy country had been attacked; hitherto all targets for Allied bomber attacks had been
confined to occupied France and Belgium. This therefore, can be regarded as the birth of
strategic air offensive, which reached maturity only during the last couple of years of the Second
World War.

LUFTWAFFE’S OFFENSIVE AGAINST BRITAIN

14. By 17 June 1940 the German armies, with their mechanized and mobile warfare tactics,
and supported by the Luftwaffe, had overrun and occupied Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland
and France in a course of only nine months. Preparations were then set afoot to invade England,
but the successful landing of an invasion force form the sea required the gaining and maintaining
of the ‘command of the air’. The Luftwaffe’s air offensive against Britain began on 08 August
1940 and lasted until May 1941. It, however, failed to suppress the RAF or to reduce the British
war potential. This failure resulted in repeated and in definite postponements of the British war
potential. This failure resulted in repeated and in definite postponements of the German invasion
plans (Operation SEALION)

15. At the commencement of war, the Luftwaffe had first line strength of some 1”500
medium bombers. But these aircraft, though fast and generally well designed, were deficient in
defensive armament. The bomber force was mainly intended to be used for tactical bombing in
support of land operations or for bombardment in countries like Poland, where all opposition was
expected to be slight or negligible. It had been trained and equipped essentially as the supporting
arm for the German Army and Navy, The German Air Force as a whole, was a tactically oriented
force with no inherent capability of mounting any independent strategic operation.

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16. The bombing of Britain, on the other hand, was a strategic, task for the successful
accomplishment of which control of the air had to be first established by the Luftwaffe. But the
lightly armed bombers. (JU 88, He 111 and DO 17) could neither put up with the British fighters
operating under RADAR control, nor carry heavy bomb loads required for the task. These
bombers, moreover, had no means of carrying out precision bombing, which could have helped
in dislocating the British fighting machine and war economy. Moreover, Luftwaffe’s air
offensive against Britain had no clear-cut aims or plans, its tasks were frequently changed,
varying from strategically offensive to tactically defensive, owing to miscalculations and often to
the whims of its leaders. All these factors finally led to the failure of the German Air Force in
1940-41 in their attempt at strategic reduction of Britain by air bombardment.

BRITISH AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY

17. The Royal Air Force, as stated earlier, had been organized since 1918 as an independent
force designed to carry out both defensive as well as strategically offensive tasks. Nevertheless,
at the beginning of Second World War, Bomber Command, representing Britain’s air striking
force, was poorly organized and ill-equipped in manpower, aircraft and equipment. Its total
strength in September 1939 was limited to only 33 bomber squadrons (396 aircraft), and of this
half were light bombers. This was due to the late start in the expansion programme for the RAF,
the technological and financial difficulties faced by that country and an excessive importance
attached by the pre-war Government to the defensive aspect of air force operations.

18. Air Staff Views. The British air staff views, however, had been anchored in the idea
of strategic bombing, though this concept was not clearly defined. The principle of strategic air
operation was based on an obscure offensive idea that it should aim to deliver a greater weight of
bombs against the enemy’s heartland than that what the enemy could deliver against one’s own.
This implied that the morale effect of heavy bombing would itself be sufficient to cripple the
enemy. It was soon realized, however, that a bomber offensive should not only be directed
against the enemy’s morale but, to be effective it must also cause decisive material damage to his
economic and industrial potential. It has been generally felt in pre-war years that, in the event of
a war Germany’s oil position would be critical. Air Staff appreciation had, therefore, stressed on
the desirability of attacking oil and transport targets in Germany; their destruction and
dislocation, it was felt, would have grave industrial and economic effects. Moreover, the choice
of these targets would appeal both to those who believed that the aim of bombing should be to
prepare the ground for military victory and also those who believed in air power as an
independent means of offensive.

19. Commencement of Bomber Offensive. The British strategic air offensive against
Germany began on the night of 15 May 1940, when a force of 99 bombers attacked oil and
railway targets in the Ruhr. The raid however, was unsuccessful, as the question of whether such
precision targets could be actually hit by bombers at night had never been closely examined. It
was wrongly assumed that whatever accuracy could be achieved in daylight raids would also be
applicable to operations in moonlit nights. It was learnt from this attack that, unless sufficient
weight of bombs was accurately delivered against properly selected targets in accordance with

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carefully, prepared plans, the strategic air offensive was bound to degenerate into mere
harassment.

20. Division of Bomber Effort. While the air staff grappled with the technological and
tactical aspects of future bomber operations, two incidents occurred which temporarily deflected
Bomber Command from its primary task of dislocating the German war potential? Firstly, in
mid-June 1940 the Battle of France was lost resulting in an all-out surface and air effort to
extricate the British Expeditionary Force, and secondly, in March 1941. The Battle of Atlantic
reached a crucial stage where a similar all-out effort was required to protect the vital shipping
and sea lines of communication between Britain and America. Both these operations, which
were strategically defensive in character, were, nevertheless, vital for the survival of Britain.
But, by themselves, these operations were incapable of achieving victory over Germany. An
early resumption of the strategic offensive was, therefore, essential and inescapable. Under the
circumstances facing Britain at that time, the only possible offensive that could be immediately
undertaken was through a sustained bomber offensive, against Germany. The offensive, thus,
came to be regarded as the ‘soul of air operations, and strategic bombing its very heart’.

21. Operational Difficulties. By April 1941, the night bombing error of Bomber
Command crews was assessed as 1000 yards in good moonlight conditions. Day bombing was,
of course, far more accurate, but daylight operations had already proved to be prohibitive owing
to heavy casualties from German day fighters. Weather conditions too were not always
favorable, and bombing errors at night tended to increase when the moon was obscured by could,
rain or poor visibility. It was, therefore, virtually impossible to attack oil installations, which
were still considered to be the most profitable target system in the enemy’s economy. Since,
however, the destruction of oil targets was tactically unattainable; this objective was considered
not worth pursuing for the time being.

22. Area Bombing. The thousand-yard error, however, was considered to be adequate for
attacks against the key marshalling yards in the German railway system. But the operational
success of these attacks was subject to various factors including weather. Attention was,
therefore, focused on other target systems. The industrial areas of Germany, with their adjoining
colonies of working population, were considered to be profitable targets. The air staff
appreciated that ‘for approximately ¾ of each month it was only possible to obtain satisfactory
results by ‘Blitz’ attacks on large working class and industrial areas in towns’ accordingly, the
UK Bombing Directive of 09 July 1941 stressed the policy of ‘area bombing’. The principle of
area bombing was to attack a point, which lay at the centre of a large industrial area (or town),
whose destruction would contribute to the progressive neutralization of the German war
potential. This bombing policy, however, was not due to any reprisal motive on the part of
Bomber Command, on the contrary, it was a natural expedient for the continuance of bomber
offensive against Germany in the face of operational difficulties of navigation, identification and
blind bombing of precision targets by night, and those of heavy air opposition by the Luftwaffe
against daylight attacks.

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23. Improvements in Bomber Command. The ‘area bombing’ policy was in force for
two years from March 1942 to March 1944. During this period many technical, operational and
organizational changes were made which enabled Bomber Command to operate increasingly
well against German war industries. With the invention of navigational, target identification and
blind-bombing devices (GEE, OBOE and H2S), bigger and better bombers (Lancasters) and
more powerful bombs, the hitting power of Bomber Command was greatly enhanced.
Operational Research provided scientific analysis of bombing results and these, in conjunction
with economic intelligence (which however, was often misleading), provided some workable
data for more accurate appreciation on target systems. Crew training methods too, were vastiy
improved.

24. Effectiveness of Night Attacks. During 1942 Bomber Command achieved a number
of dramatic successes which greatly helped in restoring confidence in the idea and prospects of
strategic bombing. In March, Renault engine works at Billan-court, near Paris, was attacked
with considerable precision; almost all the bombs dropped on the factory and obliterated it. On
the night of 30/31 May a thousand bombers simultaneously attacked Cologne and nearly crippled
the industrial complex around this city for the duration of the war. It was estimated that five or
six more of these thousand-bomber raids, if properly delivered against important industrial
complexes, would bring about a virtual collapse of Germany. This was not, however, possible
owing to many operational difficulties and objections from the other two services.

25. Pathfinder Technique. In August 1942, a Pathfinder force had been created, which
was specialized in target marking at night, providing clear aiming points for the high altitude
bombers. This technique mainly relied on the use of bombing devices and was successful in
directing an ever-increasing weight of attack on selected industrial targets.

26. Objections to Area Bombing. Much has been said about the ‘area bombing’ policy
to be wasteful, morally objectionable and strategically self-defeating and so on. However, it
ought to be remembered that this policy was one of the many phases in the development of
strategic bomber offensive against Germany.

27. Owing to the financial and technological limitations from which the bomber aircraft
industry had been suffering since the pre-world war years and the disadvantageous strategic and
tactical environment in which the RAF had been placed soon after the commencement of war,
there was very little scope of putting the earlier oil pan into effect. The often-repeated argument
that the entire Bomber Command could have been more profitably employed in support of
contemporary naval and land operations ignored the basic premise of offensive strategy in a total
war and unsuitability of bombers in purely defensive or tactical roles.

28. Precision Bombing. The steady improvement in the size and efficiency of Bomber
Command reached a climax on 16 May 1943, when No 617 (Lancaster) Squadron attacked
Mohne, Eder, Ennepe and Sorpe dams at night from 60 ft and successfully breached the first two
of these, destruction of these dams resulted in power starvation in the Ruhr area and affected the
industrial output. But the bomber casualties were also very heavy; almost the entire squadron
was lost due to enemy fire and other operational hazards. Thus, although the wisdom of
undertaking this dangerous operation was questionable, yet it demonstrated the tremendous
potentialities of strategic operations.

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THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE IN WORLD WAR II

ARRIVAL OF US EIGHTH AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

29. On 17 August 1942, the USAAF Eighth Bomber Command, comprising 2,000 heavy
bombers and 1,000 medium bombers, began to operate against Germany from its bases in the
UK in conjunction with RAF Bomber Command.

30. Differences in American and British Strategy. The USAAF approach to strategic
bombing was based on a concept of ‘precision day light attacks, against selected vital industrial
targets’. The first vital target that was selected was the German fighter aircraft industry, as
without the neutralization of fighter opposition Americans would have been unable to operate
their bombers in Germany. The RAF approach, on the other hand, was based on attacks on
‘industrial areas’ by night. Underlying both those strategies, however, was the overriding
principle of the ‘command of the air’. While the Americans sought to neutralize the Luffwaffe
opposition by both offensive and defensive means, the RAF sought to avoid any confrontation
with German fighters by operating at night; until then Luftwaffe had no night fighting capability.
The American strategy emphasized the need for eliminating one target at a time; but the British
strategy emphasized the importance of causing a general and mounting dislocation of the
German industrial potential. As it happened, these two opposing strategies guided the Combined
Bomber Offensive from beginning almost to the end of the war, in effect, Germany was
subjected to an incessant ‘round the clock’ bombing which was to finally knock out the most
critical element of its war potential –the oil output.

31. The Casablanca Directive. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the
combined Chiefs of Staff of Britain and America recognized the importance of strategic bombing
and issued a directive for ‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military,
industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a
point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened’

32. The Combined Plan. In June 1943, a ‘Combined Bomber Offensive Plan’ came into
existence. In general, the key target systems for destruction by bombing were factories and
installations manufacturing submarines, aircraft, ball bearings, synthetic oil, rubber and military
vehicles.

33. ‘Point-blank Directive. Earlier (in 1943), both bomber Command and the USAAF
efforts had been partly diverted to attacks on the French ports in an effort to reduce the U-boat
menace. The heavy losses, which attended these raids, led to a critical review of the target
priorities laid down in the Casblanca Directive. On 10 Jun 43, the ‘Point-blank’ Directive was
issued. This did not change the primary objective of the bomber offensive, as laid down at
Casablanca, but included the German fighter forces and the industries sustaining them as high
priority target systems. This was done with a view to reducing the air opposition and ensuring
for allied bombers greater tactical freedom and an acceptable casualty rate. The American forces
attacked specific plants and airfields by day, while Bomber Command carried out ‘area attacks’

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on towns immediately concerned with aircraft production. The Point-blank Directive continued
to be in force until 17 Apr 44.

34. Strategic Bombers in Support of Operation ‘OVERLORD’. By the end of year 1943
Allies were committed to ‘OVERLORD’. The Chiefs of Staff in USA envisaged of the
forthcoming air and land offensives as part of single strategy. It was believed that, as in North
Africa and Italy, the strategic bomber forces. Could be used in a comprehensive interdiction
program to seal off the invasion area prior to D-day and thereafter in direct support of the Army.
The air commanders of both air forces naturally considered this a negation of the principle of
strategic bombing which, moreover, was in direct opposition to the primary objective of the
‘Casablanca Directive.’ The issue was hotly contested, but it was finally agreed at the highest
political level that strategic bomber forces should be temporarily allocated to the Supreme Allied
Commander. From 14 Mar 44 to 16 Sep 44 control of bomber forces was exercised by SHAEF.
The campaign against the Freedom railway system was very successful, but once the invasion
beachhead was securely established the heavy bombers were used more and more in the tactical
role.

EFFECTS OF THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY

35. Ever since ‘area bombing’ started in a big way, Luftwaffe was forced to undertake large-
scale defensive measures in the air and on the ground, which resulted in their progressively
losing the ‘command of the air’. By the end year 1943 over 2,000,000 Germans were engaged
on anti-aircraft defence duties. Even for Germany the immobilization of such a large number of
men was a serious matter almost as grave as the loss of half the total built-up area of some 40
cities and the very severe damage in 30 more with all its effects on war production. While there
is no evidence to show that German morale was in danger of breaking, yet so far as German
civilian population was concerned, from the end of 1943 they regarded the war as lost, and it was
only the tight hand of the SS and Gestapo that kept industry going. Despite the fact that overall
German war production continued to increase until the end of August 1944, it would be incorrect
to conclude that bombing had no effect on it, since whatever loss Germany suffered in
production was a positive gain for the Allies.

36. But the loss of production is only one measure of the effect of the bomber offensive. The
continuation of bomber offensive forced the German High Command to concentrate upon the
production of fighters and thus to renounce all hope of retaliation except by uncertain V-
Weapons. In 1936, of all military aircraft produced in Germany 31% were fighters. By 1944, the
figure has rise to 78%. Allied bombing also profoundly affected the deployment of the
Luftwaffe. In 1941, 65 % of the German Air Force was deployed against the Russians. Three and
half years later only 32% were to be found there and 68% was stationed in the West and in the
interior of Germany. Bombing also postponed the development of the V-weapons and greatly
reduced their numbers and, finally, almost destroyed the German oil industry and paralyzed all
forms of transport. Without the bomber offensive, air supremacy, without which no organized
invasion force could operate, could not have been achieved.

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37. It is to be noted that the really decisive blows, against oil and communications, fell
towards the end of the war. They could never have been dealt had not the bomber forces been
built up by trial and error over the preceding years until they acquired devastating strength.
Some maintain that transport and oil should have been the only targets and point to the fact that
when these were attacked in force, Germany fell within a few months. It must, however, be
remembered that it was not until 1944 that the bomber forces had the means to attack such
targets with the necessary accuracy.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONDUCT OF STRATEGIC STRIKE OPERATIONS

38. Process of Target Selection. Targets, which are likely to have a direct influence
on the eventual achievement of national aim, should be examined. These may include
population centers, communication centers, military and economic targets. Each target system
must be examined critically to see if its destruction/neutralization would achieve the desired aim.
Do we have the wherewithal to destroy/neutralize to the desired extent the selected target
system? What is the time frame in which this can be achieved? The prospective target systems
will vary depending on the cultural background, economic prosperity, national public opinion etc
of the adversary. Once a decision on a target system to be destroyed/neutralized has been arrived
at, the aim must be pursued relentlessly till it is achieved. The operations research will play a
vital role both in helping to select the correct target as well as in post strike analysis.

39. Penetration. At the beginning of World War II everyone greatly underestimated the
weight of attack that would be required to achieve substantial, let alone decisive results. The
strike force, in a conventional environment, must be able to deliver a heavy weight of attack, and
to do so repeatedly. This may involve a high rate of wastage, but attacks in inadequate strength
are not only ineffective but are likely to incur a higher casualty rate than attacks in great force.
During the Second World War casualties were proportionally smaller when the attack by a
bomber force was concentrated in time and space. The defences were’saturated’. They were,
therefore, less discriminatory and, as a consequence, less efficient.

40. Saturation of enemy defences was, however, only one method of achieving a ‘favorable
air situation’, which was so essential for the success of the ‘bomber offensive’. The Americans,
operating by day, sought to neutralize German air power by attacking aircraft factories and
fighting their way through enemy air defences to the objectives. Towards the later stages of the
war, fighter escort was available which helped to reduces RADAR signature tenfold, avionics
which permit flying at 200ft for long periods, and a host of defence systems to degrade the most
updated AD environment is mandatory for any strike force today. In addition, there are other
considerations, which are discussed below.

41. Vulnerability of Target. Target characteristics need to be carefully studied if the

greatest effect is to be achieved and waste of effort avoided. In other words, what is the target
vulnerability? What weight of attack is necessary to ensure success? Which weapons are the
most suitable, bearing in mind the standard of timing of aircrew, the accuracy of their equipment,
and the characteristics of different types weapons? These are some of the questions, which have

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to be answered, and all available intelligence and expert advice should be enlisted to help answer
them.

42. Concentration. It is only too easy to divert strike aircraft from their decisive task
what ever, it may be at the time. It should always be remembered that the principle of
concentration of maximum force at the decisive time and place has special relevance in the
context of the strategic offensive. Every demand for the employment of the strike force, or part
that force, should be judged in the light of this principle.

43. Accuracy. As a general rule the damage caused by the explosion of a bomb,
regardless of its size or the nature of its filling, decreases rapidly with increase of target distance
from the point of the explosion. Therefore, bombing is dependent on accuracy for its
effectiveness. Without a considerable degree of accuracy bombing is useless, no matter how
efficient the particular type of bomb.

44. Accuracy of delivery of the weapon involves a high standard of training and constant
development of improved aiming devices. One method to achieve accuracy is the automatic
electronic release of the bomb at a predetermined point. This does not, however, eliminate all
errors. Another solution is to guide the trajectory of the bomb during, its fall. By guiding the
bomb after release it is possible to achieve accuracy in spite of the speed and height of the
bombing aircraft. The accuracy of the bomb will their depend on the performance of guidance
and control equipment within the bomb. (It is claimed that a stand-off weapon like the cruise
missile can be launched accurately at a target from distances of up to 1500 miles) This provides
a measure of accuracy of attack against heavily defended targets while achieving security for the
strike force.

45. Deception. Accuracy will depend (to a considerable extent) on the degree of
interference, which the strike force meets in the target area. This and the need to keep the
casualty rate within acceptable limits, calls for every possible measure of deception. Spoof raids,
feints, deceptive routing and all forms of radio and electronic counter-measures must be
employed to mystify and mislead the enemy and cause him to divert defensive effort from the
critical time and place. Above all, attention must be paid to variation in the timing and tactical
form of the attacks.

46. Flexibility. A quality inherent in a strike force is tactical flexibility. Within its
tactical radius in action, a strike aircraft can be switched from one type of target to another of a
different type far away. This does not mean that a strike force can suddenly be switched from
say, a planned raid on an industrial target to an attack on an enemy ship. A strike is not a ‘raid’
that can be laid on at a moment’s notice. It is a complex operation requiring careful preparation,
briefing, and flight planning and arming with the right type of weapons/fuse combinations,
‘fleeting’ targets can seldom be engaged successfully, unless the most careful plans have been
laid to meet such contingencies.

47. Analysis of Results. The importance of careful planning has been stressed. It is
equally important to analyze each operation with care, and use every possible source of
information to assess results. Interrogation of crews, interpretation of raid photographs, reports

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of prisoner-of-war interrogations, gun/bomb camera evidences and other intelligence sources all
help to build up the picture towards BDA. The tendency to overestimate the effects of an attack
must be resisted. The recovery factor of the target should not be overlooked in assessing the
effects of damage inflicted upon them.

IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON STRATEGIC STRIKES

48. On 06 Aug 45, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. It had a power of 15
kilotons (equal to 1500 tons of TNT) Sixty percent of the city was obliterated and the casualties
numbered 306,000 of which 78,000 were killed. Three days later, another atomic bomb
obliterated Nagasaki. Japan was forced to capitulate and with that the Second World War came
to an end. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki naturally led people to conclude that the
bomber had become the ultimate weapon. Yet there was another side to this story. A few
perceptive strategists, even in the first euphoric days of peace, cautioned that in shaping the role
of the bomber, scientific and political factors would probably be the final arbiters.

49. Long before the test atomic bomb had been exploded in the New Mexico desert,
scientists had been discussing the principle, of fusion and the hydrogen bomb. The difference
between the hydrogen bomb and the atomic bomb was as great at that between the atomic bomb
and the conventional bomb of the Second World War.
There was even a more portentous development in Von Braun’s V-2 rocket, which became the
forerunner of today’s ballistic and guided missiles. Thus, the rocket with a nuclear war head
replaced the manned nuclear bomber as the ultimate weapon.

50. The United States monopoly in the nuclear field ended when the Russians exploded their
first atomic bomb in 1949. They followed it up with the explosion of a hydrogen bomb in Jun
53, only a few months later than the Americans. The implications of nuclear weapons was
clearly seen by Field Marshal Montgomery who said, “After the first nuclear exchange, nothing
of any size or quantity will move on land in the areas where these weapons have exploded or are
exploding” He added that “It would no longer be possible to win a war in the previously
accepted meaning of the word, and all effort should be concentrated on deterrence”. This policy
has in fact been dominating the super power politico-military scene.

51. Within the overall strategy of deterrence, in the early years, the prime role of the bomber
came to be that of being able to inflict on a potential enemy such devastating damage as to make
his attacks unlikely. To this end the United States formed its Strategic Air Command equipped
with aircraft capable of delivering a nuclear war load to any point on the earth. The Russians
were not far behind and soon developed their own Long Range AF that was equipped with the
Tupolev-4 initially and later with a long series of aircraft, like the Bear, the Bison, the Badger
and the Beagle. In Britain, an attempt to deal with the situation was made by the creation of the
V-Force consisting of the Valiant, the … and the delta wing Vulcan. All these aircraft relied for
their safety on their ability to fly high and fast, and on their sophisticated electronic equipment
designed to confuse enemy defences.

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52. Another scientific development, which increased the fear of total destruction and had a
profound influence on the strategy of deterrence, was the miniaturization of inertial guidance
systems, which enabled an intercontinental ballistic missile to be fired round the world onto a
target with the necessary accuracy.

53. The strategy o nuclear deterrence was further influenced by the development of
submarines armed with nuclear weapons, which could be strategically deployed at sea.

POSSIBILITIES OF NUCLEAR WAR

54. There is a school of thought, led by authors like Herman Kahn, which subscribes to the
idea that even though the general psychological environment is at present favorable to ‘strategic
deterrence’, nuclear wars are, nevertheless within the realm of future possibility. It must be
conceded that, theoretically, ‘deterrence’ may fail under the following circumstances:-

a. If, one side possesses such technological and operational superiority that it can
achieve a total strategic surprise over the enemy. However, by the present standards of
scientific progress, this is hardly possible.

b. By accident-technological or organizational. Measures have been taken by the

nuclear powers to safeguard against this. (Kremlin-White house direct line)

c. By an irrational act at political decision level or executive command level.

d. Escalation of a minor war by miscalculation. This is, perhaps, the biggest hazard
of deterrence. It may be worth examining, however, if any country would escalate a war
in any manner other than in successive stages. Every calculated move in the
‘escalation ladder’ would be positive; this may be accompanied by threats for further
violence or invitation to negotiation.

55. Thus, perhaps, the concept of deterrence would still hold its sway over major political
and military decisions affecting international relations in the foreseeable future. Nuclear wars,
therefore, are an improbability, equally improbable is, as a result, a major world conflagration
even with conventional weapons.

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STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE IN LIMITED WARS

DEFINITION OF LIMITED WAR

56. Os good in his book ‘Limited War’ defines such a war as follows:-

a. “A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which
they fight to concrete, well defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military
effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated
settlement’.

b. ‘Generally speaking, a limited war actively involves only two (or very few) major
belligerents in fighting. The battle is confined to a local geographical area and directed
against selected targets primarily those of direct military importance’.

c. ‘It demands of the belligerents only a fractional commitment of their human and
physical resources. It permits their economic, social and political portents of existence to
continue without serious disruption’

d. Korea, Vietnam and Falkland war are a examples of a limited wars.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

57. In a general (or ‘total’) war, belligerents fight with every means available to achieve ends
without objective limits, In such a war either the objectives are not well-defined, other than the
destruction of the enemy, or the ideological values attached to it are such as to be beyond
compromise resulting in a fight for breaking the enemy’s will and securing an unconditional
surrender.

58. The two World Wars are perhaps the only examples of such wars; those fought before the
first and after the second World Wars are said to be limited in character. While the earlier wars
were limited because of the non-availability of means of total war, those after the Second World
War have been limited due to the opposite reason, namely the existence of weapons of mass
destruction. The present-day concept of ‘deterrence’ has been based on an assumption that no
rational political end can be served by using nuclear weapons, since their use in war could only
result in mutual annihilation and corresponding political self-defeat.

59. Thus, the problem of determining the means of war has been that a balancing means and
ends within a larger framework of national aims or national strategy-embracing ideological,
political, social, economic and military objectives. All countries (nuclear, as well as non-
nuclear) have had to take an overall and objective view of war, and to consider the following
aspects before committing their forces in any war;-

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a. War, as an instrument of policy, must not be allowed to get out of hand and
superimpose itself on the policy. Therefore, the character and scope of a war must be
pre-determined and limited.

b. To achieve this, political goals of war must be defined, the possibility of

negotiation for political settlement of the dispute should be include in the policy.

c. The military objectives of war should be reasonable-capable of achievement and

without undue risk of escalation.The deployment and employment of forces should,
therefore, be such as to, firstly, deter the enemy from the war and, secondly, to achieve
the military objectives swiftly and with the least possible destruction.

60. Limited Wars with Conventional Weapons. It is for these reasons that all the wars
fought after the World War II have been localized to limited areas of conflict and fought that
feels that occasions might well arise when use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war may
be unavoidable or necessary. It is difficult, however, to visualize how such a war could remain
‘limited’ once it was started. The employment of tactical nuclear weapons in the field by one
side need not necessarily restrict the opponent from using them against his enemy’s cities and
industries. In the event, the ‘strategic deterrence’ would perhaps fail and a general war might
ensue. A process of ‘escalation’ would thus be unavoidable. There are, of course, many
theoretical possibilities in case ‘deterrence’ fails, and being beyond the scope of our study need
not be considered at this stage.

61. Strike Aircraft in Limited Wars. The effectiveness of air weapons in war is
directly dependent on the operational freedom of air power. In other words, the maximum
benefit that can be derived from the employment of air forces against the enemy lies in
exploiting its offensive capability, both strategic and tactical. The strategic strike aircraft is an
offensive weapon of war; and unless it is permitted to exercise its destructive power to the fullest
extent in terms of decisive concentration of firepower against the most vital targets, the
employment of strike aircraft in limited wars would be relatively uneconomical. Thus, political
restrictions or target selection would tend to limit the effectiveness of a strike force from the very
start.

62. There would (almost) be restrictions on the employment of total offensive weapons in a
limited war to suit the political aims. Hence, the scope of a strategic offensive against the
enemy’s war waging capacity, such as population centers, industries and power plants, could be
limited. Accordingly, the strategically offensive task of breaking the enemy’s economic and
industrial means to wage war may not be necessary in a limited war.

63. Strike aircraft, however, could operate effectively against those enemy targets the
destruction or neutralization of which would enable he friendly forces engaged in war to operate
with greater ease and freedom. The task of the strike force would thus be to destroy the enemy’s
air and naval forces in being, and ground targets of immediate strategic significance to friendly
land and naval forces; in the latter category could be included the opposing air forces and navies,
communication systems, base-repair facilities, supply bases, and port and dockyard facilities.
These operations would be strategically defensive in character.

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64. The limited role of the strike force, however, pre-supposes the existence of such targets in
enemy territory. Where, however, the enemy does not depend on traditional means or method of
warfare, as in insurgency, it is unlikely that there would be many profitable targets for strike
operations. Terror attacks in rebel-held areas and attacks on means of communication within
‘Sanctuary’ areas may be mounted, but their effectiveness would vary according to the moral and
physical environment of the rebels.

CONCLUSION

65. Strike aircraft are, essentially, offensive weapons. Their employment in war yields best
results in an unrestricted strategic field-in destroying the enemy’s sources of power and will to
wage war. Limited wars, however, do not allow full scope or operational freedom to a strategic
strike force. Political and military considerations usually limit the selection of targets to those,
which have a direct and relatively immediate bearing upon the actual progress of war. Strike
operations In a limited war are thus confined to strategically defensive tasks, that is, those of
achieving a favorable air situation in the war to facilitate the operation of friendly forces against
those of the enemy and destruction/disruption of the enemy land and naval forces.

66. But against an irregular or unconventional enemy the offensive potentialities of a strike
force would be dependent on moral and physical conditions obtaining in the war.

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CHAPTER 10

LAND/AIR OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Such great advances have been made in air warfare during the last fifty years that air
power today dominates all the factors in war. An essential condition for decisive success in land
operations is a favorable air situation in battle areas and over the lines of communication serving
them.

2. A land campaign could be described as a two-fisted affair one fist on the ground and the
other in the air. The Army and supporting Air Forces must work in close co-operation at all
levels of planning and execution. This is the first condition of success.

3. The first manifestation of employment of air in a land battle can be traced to the Battle of
Fleures (1794) when balloons were used as elevated observation posts. The advent of the
aeroplane and more particularly the developments over the last fifty years have clearly
demonstrated the decisive influence of air operations in land battles. There have been
tremendous changes in aircraft and their application to war. In order to appreciate this evolution
it is necessary to review the development of aircraft in relation to the requirements of the land
campaign.

WORLD WAR I

4. At the start of the World War I, manned aircraft were used primarily for visual
reconnaissance. The design of aircraft and organization of the air force at that time were
influenced considerably by the need to meet the following requirements:-

a. Army co-operation. This included:-

(1) Visual reconnaissance

(2) Photographic reconnaissance

(3) Artillery observation

(4) Tactical co-operation

(5) Tactical air supplies

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b. Aerial Combat. The threat, ie, the exposure of own forces to enemy
observation and attack, led to the arming of aircraft and the establishment of separate
fighter squadrons not associated with the Army or Corps.

5. During the latter part of the World War I the importance or air superiority came to be
recognized. Whereas efforts to establish general air superiority by attacks on airfields and air
craft parks were largely ineffective due to the inadequate punch carried by the aircraft of those
days, local air superiority over limited areas was attempted and achieved. Thus, by the end of
1918, dual tasks of air superiority and direct army support were firmly established. However,
most aircraft were suited for the army co-operation role only.

POST WORLD WAR I

6. The period 1918-38 saw the aero plane being used in tactical operations in various parts
of the world; they were employed with considerable success in Ethiopia, Spain, Finland, Iraq,
Manchuria and NWFP in India. The consensus of opinion was that land operations depended for
success upon direct assistance from the air. Thus, army co-operation squadrons were established
to provide air support to land forces in the field. They assisted in ‘Policing’ action, as army/air
support squadrons, the most well known among them being the ‘Condor Legion’ which took
park in the Spanish War.

WORLD WAR II

7. It was during World War II that air power really became the determining factor in war.
The early German success demonstrated the valuable results of close army/air co-operation. The
Western Desert Campaigns during 1941-43 provided further evidence. The techniques of
land/air warfare, which were being continuously refined, were employed very successfully
during the closing campaigns of World War II.

8. Principles of Land/Air Warfare. Field Marshal Montgomery summed up the

principles involved in the employment of land/air force in the tactical battle after completion of
the North African and Sicilian Campaigns as follows:-

‘The first great principle of war is that you must win your air battle before you
fight your land and sea battles. If you examine the conduct of the campaign from
Alamein through Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, you will find I have never fought a land battle
until the air battle had been won. We never had to bother about the enemy air, because
we won the air battle first. The second great principle is that the Army and the Air Force
have to be so knitted that the two together form one entity. If you do that, the resultant
military effort will be so great that nothing will be able to stand up against it. The third
great principle is that the Air Force side of this fighting machine must be centralized and
kept under Air Force command. I hold that it is quite wrong for the soldier to want to
exercise command over the air forces. The handling of an air force is a lifetime study and,
therefore, the air force must be kept under Air Force command. The next principle is that

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the Army commander directs the military effort of the army plus air, and the Air Force
commander who is with him applies the air effort in accordance with the combined
Army/Air plan. Next, the army/air must sit together at the same headquarters. There
must be between them complete mutual confidence and trust. Each has to understand the
problems and difficulties of the other. The confidence, trust and integration of two staffs
have to be quite remarkable the SASO and the Chief of the Staff have to be great friends.
If there is any friction there, you will be done for. You have to be great friends, not
merely work together. And so it must go downwards. Each side has to realize the other’s
difficulties. A soldier has to realize that the air has certain problems. The air cannot
operate without good landing grounds, and the getting of landing grounds always forms
part of the army plan. Across Africa and through Sicily we fought for airfields. The air
aspect dominates the plan. The soldier has to realize it is not sufficient just to hand
over the airfield. Proper communications must be established. It is our job to protect
the airfields and the soldier has to realize that the airman is very sensitive about them. If
we let up, at once there will be repercussions. The airman must realize that the soldier is
sensitive about this too. We take a tremendous interest in our Recce Wing, which is
almost out life-blood, We are always very anxious that it is properly equipped. You
cannot operate successfully unless you have the full support of the air. If you do not win
the air battle first, you will probably lose the land battle. The desert Air Force and the
English Eighth Army are one. When you can knit together the power of army on the
land and power of the air in the sky then nothing will stand against you and you will
never lose a battle’

9. The general principles of land/air operations could briefly be stated as:-

a. Air superiority must be established before any land campaign begins.

b. Army and tactical air forces must co-ordinate all operations towards a common
aim.

c. All air force units must be kept centralized and under their own commander.

d. The land and air commanders and their staffs must work join, plan together and
should be able to understand each other’s problems.

10. The first principle, that air superiority must be established before any land campaign
begins, has to be viewed in the context of the situation prevailing at that time. These days wars
tend to be of short duration. Therefore, the requirement of air superiority has been modified to
ensuring favorable situation for the critical phases of operations.

POST WORLD WAR II

11. Jet aircraft featured in combat for the first time during he Korean War (1950-53). Being
faster than their predecessors they presented new problems and challenges. The forward air
controller (FAC) system was tried out successfully and proved a valuable air for target

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identification. Interdiction behind the battlefield proved to be most effective as it caught the
enemy when he was both concentrating his forces and engaged at the front. New tactical
formations were tried out to increase the effectiveness of strike aircraft, besides guaranteeing
their own safety by providing mutual cover. Above all, the Korean War confirmed that the
principles of land/air warfare as evolved in World War II were sound and valid.

12. The Vietnam War provided a testing ground for a whole host of new weapons systems
including surface-to-air missiles. This resulted in an unprecedented spurt in the development of
ECM and ECCM to counter this threat. Yet another important development of the Vietnam war
was the employment of armed helicopters in the land battle. The air cavalry units thus equipped
provided great mobility and flexibility to the ground forces, besides providing suppressive fire-
support when such troops were most vulnerable. However, the attrition rate suffered by the
helicopters was very high. This highlighted the fact that although they offered some significant
advantages over fixed wing aircraft, their employment in a tactical theatre would have to be
considered most carefully. The later stages of the war saw the introduction of laser devices
making possible almost unbelievable results being achieved in aiming accuracies. Other notable
developments were the extensive use of drones and RPVs for tactical recce; improvements in
aerial photographic capability in all weather conditions with the use of infra-red, low light TV
and the like; and the use of satellites for recce.

13. The Yom Kippur War (1973) saw the tactical theatre being saturated with surface to air
missiles, posing a great threat to aircraft operating within their kill envelope. The introduction of
weapon systems like the Soviet SA-6 and SA-7 and the four barreled 23-mm Schilka anti-
aircraft. guns into this scenario aided in rapid development of counter-measures and the
evolution of new tactics. Precision guided munitions (PGMs) with stand-off capability helped
retain the attack capability of strike aircraft in such a hostile environment. Nevertheless, the
Yom Kippur War emphasized that the time had come to re-examine the whole issue of providing
close air support to ground forces in the battlefield scenario and thereby to better define what
ground forces may expect from air support in the future. Lending further credence to this
argument is the astronomical cost of aircraft and aircraft systems of the present day, making it
imperative that their use would have to be cost effective.

14. The 6-week war that ended Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in Jan-Feb 91 demonstrated
effectively the latest generation of Western Military techniques. The Iraqi forces were
overwhelmed by a sustained campaign of aerial bombardment. The Aerial missile defences were
neutralized in the opening days by a combination of electronic warfare and precision bombing
raids. Simultaneous and continuing strikes on command and control centres, other military
targets and civil infrastructure as well as blanket bombardment of Iraq’s forward defences, paved
the way for a land offensive that met little opposition. Stealth technology saw action in this war
when F-117A stealth fighters spearheaded Allied attacks on Iraq’s air defence network. The
recently developed E-8 A Joint Surveillance and Target Attack RADAR System (J-STARS) was
used to pick up vehicles at a range of a hundred nautical miles. The sea launched Tomahawk
Cruise missiles fitted with the Terrain Contour Matching Guidance System (TERACOM) were
used to pick off specific ground targets after which spy satellites carried out battle damage
assessment. Two Defence Support Program early warning satellites equipped with heat sensitive
infra-red telescopes had their orbits altered to provide warning of Scud launches while another

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two photo reconnaissance satellites each capable of identifying objects as small as a few inches
square were deployed to cover the Gulf area. The smart weapons employed included the GBU-
15 with a 2000 lb warhead linked to either a TV or IR targeting system that relayed an image of
the target to the launch aircraft which could turn away. The unguided bombs included the BLU-
28 Daisy Cutter seven ton bomb. Launched from the tail ramp of a C-130 transport aircraft the
bomb could devastate an area of one-km radius. To heighten the psychological impact on
ground troops, dropping of leaflets preceded its use over the intended target zone, three days
before the attack. Once it had been used the dropping of leaflets was enough to effect morale.
Interdiction to isolate the Iraqi army was fairly successful using J-STARS which was also used
for conduct of air raids on amour. The final phase of the air war saw an unprecedented support
to ground troops advancing into Kuwait. Due to the sheer size of the air element available (about
2800 aircraft) the amount of support was disproportionate to the threat posed. As in other
conflicts, CAS even in this war lead to stray instances of fractricide due to problems of
identification when aircraft engage in battle in close proximity of own troops. In the worst case
an A-10 strafed two British ICVs killing nine soldiers. Finally it can be said that the Gulf War of
Jan-Feb 91 demonstrated that the armament of the 1960s and 1970s was no match for the
technological superiority of 1990s. Once air superiority had been achieved, the outcome of the
war was virtually guaranteed.

THE PRESENT SCENARIO

15. The present AD environment in tactical theatre includes low looking RADAR for
detection, RADAR controlled, multi-barrelled guns having a very high rate of fire, SAGWs like
the Crotale, the Crotale, SA-6 and Roland; and shoulder-fired missiles like SA-7, SA-14 and
even SA-18 Blow-Pipe and Red Eye. Simultaneously, the capability of interceptors and air
weapon system has improved vastly. Modern air superiority fighters carry versatile airborne
interception RADAR. These RADAR can search vast volumes of airspace at a time identify
targets in ground clutter and engage multiple targets simultaneously, the air-to-air weapons
include both beyond the visual range and all aspect close combat missiles. All the undoubtedly
makes the job of the ground attack pilot rather difficult necessitating development of new tactics
to increase his survivability and yet ensuring that he is able to complete the task/mission
assigned. The most important of them is the high speed, single pass attack from virtually treetop
level. This naturally would further aggravate the already existing problems of navigation and
target acquisition. Developments like terrain-following RADAR, computerized attack systems,
head-up displays and so on have helped considerably to overcome these problems. Stand-off
weapons due to which the attacking aircraft would avoid coming within the lethal envelope of
the terminal defences and yet hit the targets accurately and with the required punch would help to
retain the credibility of the strike aircraft in such an environment. PGMs using the laser for
guidance of weapons and illumination of targets and almost the entire electromagnetic spectrum
for terminal guidance have achieved spectacular results in aiming and aircraft accuracies.
Another feature of the modern battlefield is the extensive employment of both ECM and ECCM
No other single factor may influence he outcome of a battle more than technological superiority
in this field. The Israelis in Bekaa valley operation in 1982 amply demonstrated this.

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16. The compulsions of this complex scenario have dictated changes in aircraft design
philosophy, weapons technology, tactics adopted and thresholds of skill and competence of the
personnel involved. With the increasing influence of outer space on military affairs, further
spectacular and revolutionary changes in the tactical scenario are a certainty.

17. The inherent speed and reach of combat air power enables rapid engagement of enemy
ground targets across the length and breadth of the battlefield. Land Air operations include the
following air power roles:-

a. Air Interdiction

b. Offensive Air Support

(1) Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)

(2) Close Air Support (CAS)

c. Tactical Reconnaissance

d. Armed Reconnaissance (Search and Strike)

18. Terminology varies between countries, but generally speaking aircraft will contribute to
the land battle in one of three ways. First, by attacking enemy ground forces which is actually
engaged in combat with friendly ground forces. This activity is known as Close Air Support
(CAS). Second, by attacking enemy forces which may be closing to joining the ground battle in
the immediate future? Theses air attacks would take place relatively a short distance behind the
battle area, perhaps up to 50 to 100 Kilometers and would seek to have and indirect but speedy
impact on the battle itself. These operations are known as battlefield air interdiction or BAI.
Third a traditional use of offensive air operations is the role of deeper interdiction, where by
reinforcement and in supply of the battle area is denied by deep ranging attacks on resupply area
and reinforcement routes of to several hundred Kilometers behind the front line. All three
activities are designed to influence one particular battle area or theatre of operations, and usually
cited as examples of the tactical use of air power. Although target arrays may be similar,
whether engaged in combat, preparing to enter it or still assembling and moving from the rear,
the operational environment of each provides very different challenges and, not surprisingly
modern technology has contributed several different options for their resolution.

19. Land Air Operations are examined in detail in Chapter 5 under the Anti-Surface Force
Campaign.

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PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF LAND/AIR OPERATIONS WITH

SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

PLANNING OF AIR SUPPORT

20 The following points should be considered while planning tactical air support
operations:-

a. Planning should be carried out at army/air command or corps/tactical air centre

according to the scope of the battle, with advice from accredited representatives of other
forces participating.

b. The army commander should deal with one air force commander only.

c. Weather conditions may preclude air support; and in such an eventuality a

decision has to be made as to whether the ground operation should be postponed.

d. Both services of postponement or cancellation of an operation requires adequate

warning.

e. Target identification is imperative.

FORCE ALLOCATION

21. Air resources for offensive air support are firmly allocated by operational air commands
well before commencement of hostilities to the advance headquarters. Where these formations
do not exist, air resources are handed over directly to tactical air centers (TACs) in consultation
with affiliated army command (see Appendix C) Thus, the TAC commanders exercise direct
functional and operational control over allocated resources through the respective base
commanders.

22. Force allocation of aircraft is done in terms of specific squadrons of flights or number of
aircraft and not in terms of sorties, so that there is no ambiguity in exercising functional control
over these. However, TACs are assured a certain number of sorties, to facilitate planning. The
TAC in consultation with the associated army formation (corps or division) will carry out
employment of allotted resources. The resources are centrally controlled at the JOC level and
are not sub-allotted to lower formations in the field.

23. When an air command deems it necessary to allocate resources on a day-to-day basis due
to changing battle situation, the revised allotments for the next day’s operations, are generally
intimated to advance HQ by 1000 hours and tactical air centers by 1400 hours each day. Re-
allocation ensures that forces are actually located at affiliated operational bases.

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JOINT CONFERENCES

24. At the joint Army Air Operations Conference, a joint conference is held in the early
afternoon of each of operations to decide on the allotment of air resources to corps/divisional
zone/sector, depending on the battle plan.

25. At the JOC, a similar daily conference is held between the Army and Air tactical level
commanders after the force allocation has been received to further sub-allot the effort into
immediate and pre-planned missions for the next day. After all pre-planned demands from the
lower formations have been received at the JOC, an earlier preliminary conference may be held
to consider the acceptance of the pre-planned demands. Execution orders for missions are then
issued to the appropriate supporting wings.

CONSIDERATION OF DEMANDS

26. The points for consideration of air support demand at the JOC are given below:-

a. Army Staff.

(1) Is it tactically sound?

(2) Is it necessary, inescapable and economical?

(3) Does an ACT exist to direct the air effort?

(4) Are there any operations in progress in that area which might endanger the
employment of air arm or would the employment of air arm endanger the safety
of own troops?

(5) In accepting this demand, is the surprise factor being kept in view?

(6) Is there enough time for the air strike?

b. Air Staff.

(1) Is the mission practicable?

(2) Are the desired number and type of aircraft with suitable weapons
available?

(3) If air effort is not available, does the demand justify a request to higher
authority for extra air effort?

(4) Is the target within the radius of action of the aircraft from the operating
airfields?

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(5) Can the demand be met within the available time?

(6) Is the weather suitable?

(7) Is the air situation favourable? If not, is any fighter escort necessary?

RECONNAISSANCE

27. The daily reconnaissance plan is finalized after sifting all recce requests from lower
formations received by the corps HQ. This allotment naturally varies according to particular
phases of the campaign.

28. Framing of requests. Since a request may be originated at any level, all officers should
know the basic information required. This includes:-

a. Type of photograph required.

b. Exact purpose for which the photograph is required.

c. The approximate scale required.

d. The Final delivery time after which the photograph is no longer required.

29. The most important point to consider when making the request is whether copies of
photographs are needed or only information from them is required. All photographic
reconnaissance demands have to be pre-planned.

30. Channel of Request. Requests are submitted through normal intelligence channels or,
in an emergency, over the air support net to corps HQ. Requests are co-ordinated by G(Int) at
corps HQ. The G (Int.) at corps HQ will liaise with G Ops (Trg/Air) all the TAC cmdr who will
arrange to have the mission flown. Any requests beyond the capacity of the TAC recce force
will be forwarded to G (Int) at the army command HQ where a similar procedure is followed.
Refer appendices D,E,F and G.

31. Processing. The processing of films and reproduction of prints is entirely and Air
Force responsibility. For this purpose, there are mobile field photographic sections (MFPS)
these will normally be located with reconnaissance squadrons. Each squadron will have one
MFPS.

32. Interpretation. The photographs, having been processed and printed at the airfields,
are interpreted by officers of the army photographic interpretation sections (APIS) for the land
forces and by Air Force interpreters for the Air Force, in three phases as follows:-

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a. First Phase. The immediate interpretation of the photographs is carried out at

the airfield. This is done as soon as possible and the information is sent forward
immediately to the interested formation by the most convenient means in the form of
‘Hot Reports’ Providing a team for the first stage interpretation at the operating base is
the responsibility of the Army.

b. Second Phase. A detailed report is forwarded to the formations concerned,

usually within 24 hours of the request being made, with annotated photographs or any
other material, which may assist the formation receiving the report.

c. Third phase. This is the final phase when photographs are subjected to detailed
study, and comparison made with earlier cover of the same locality.

33. The organization of interpretation sections, and the various levels at which they work are
shown at Appendix H. the number of interpreters at the various levels is flexible and liable to
alteration according to circumstances in different theatres of operations. A general guides to
scales for interpretation is given at Appendix J.

34. Division of Responsibility.

a. Air Force.

(1) Flying the sorties required.

(2) Processing and printing

(3) Air Force interpretation

(4) Air Force distribution and emergency distribution for the land
forces if so decided by the JAAOC.

(5) Maintaining the base negative and print libraries.

b. Ground Forces.

(1) Clearly stating requirement to the Air Force

(2) Dissemination of information to ground formations

(3) Ground force interpretation

(4) Distribution of prints within the ground forces

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BATTLEFIELD AIR STRIKE AND BATTLE FIELD AIR INTERDICTION

35. Pre-planned Support. Requests for pre-planned support from formations in the field
are submitted to the JOC through normal ‘G’ staff communication channels. However,
communication channels provided by air support signal units (ASSU) may also be used in an
emergency. There is no standard form of requests for pre-planned. Support. An example of a
typical request from an infantry brigade for pre-planned support is placed at Appendix ‘K’. Such
requests from lower formations are collected and vetted at the div HQ and passed to the JOC for
consideration. An expected sequence of events for planning pre-planned air support is attached
as Appendix ‘L’. This is to be used only as a guide. There may be a few variations practiced by
operational commands, particularly in respect of timings, just to suit the requirements of their
organization.

36. Immediate Support. Although it is preferable to have pre-planned air support, there
are many occasions when the delay consequent of careful planning cannot be acceptable to the
Army. Immediate support covers all requests not planned in detail at the daily joint conference
on the previous day but for which air effort has been allotted. For immediate support, speed is
essential and good inter-communication is necessary.

EXECUTION ORDERS

37 After having decided jointly on pre-planned and immediate missions to be flown, clear
and brief execution orders are issued to the appropriate supporting wing, by the air staff at the
JOC.

CO-ORDINATION WITH AIR DEFENCE

38 The air defence commander through the air defence control centre/air defence direction
centres controls all interceptor fighter aircraft. There is, therefore, need for close liaison
between. TAC (and/or intermediary formations, if any) and the air defence organization for
meeting the following tactical air defence requirements:-

a. Air defence operations in the tactical theatre

b. Fighter cover for tactical air support missions

c. Fighter escort

39. At very critical times and places on the battlefield, say during a river crossing or during
the establishment of a bridgehead, it is vital that enemy aircraft do not interfere in the battle area.
For this, pre-planned fighter covers, commonly known as combat air patrol is provided. Combat
air patrol is prodigious consumers of resources and, therefore can be provided for short duration
only. The broad procedures for such support to the Army are given in the subsequent
paragraphs.

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40. For the briefing of the aircrew of combat air patrols, the following points are to be borne
in mind:-

a. The latest ground situation and position of forward troops

b. The locations call signs and RT frequencies of aircraft close to the area.

c. Details about the enemy low-level air defence and artillery fire

d. Intensity, pattern and trajectory of own artillery fire

e. Details of own and enemy aircraft expected in the area

UTILISATION OF AIR EFFORT

41. At all levels of planning and execution of air support, efforts should be made to utilize
the air resources available to the best advantage. For this purpose, it is essential for the users to
know the capability and limitations of aircraft and weapons.

42. The overriding principle in the employment of tactical air forces is to have integrated
planning from the very inception of the ground plan. The normal practice is to prepare the
ground plan and patch on the available air effort. This invariably leads to poor employment of
the air arm. It is worthwhile remembering that if air effort is considered a bonus to a given plan,
that commander will seldom get any effort. Someone else will need it more urgently or would
have planned out its use as a vital part of his plan.

AIR SUPPORT REACTION TIME

43 Reaction Time. When a demand for an immediate air support strike is made using
wireless communications, the normal reaction time is likely to be between 65-100 minutes, On
the face of it, this appears to be much too long. The obvious solution would be to have aircraft
on airborne alert all along the front. Our resources do not permit this. But there is much that can
be done to reduce the reaction time to acceptable limits. Reaction time is composed of the
following:-

a. Communications and decision time – Approx 40-55 min

b. Organization time at Squadrons – ‘ 10-20 min

c. Flying time to target – ’15-25 min-total (65-100 min)

44. Communications and Decision Time. Wireless communications time cannot be

reduced radically. However, if secure landline facilities exist, they will significantly reduce the
communication time, even if they exist only between the TAC and the wings. If hot-line

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facilities exist between the JOC and div HQ ops room, it would save almost another five
minutes. Therefore, with secure voice communications from div HQ to corps HQ and the wings,
it would be practical to reduce the communication and decision time by 15-20 minutes.

45. Wing Organization Time. No air briefing facilities are available. Squadrons may be
called upon to support two corps, and hence a central air support cell is normally set up. The
organization time can be reduced somewhat if each squadron forms its own ASC. However, due
to a considerable dispersal of aircraft, no major inroads can be made into the wing organization
time.

46. Flying Time. This cannot be altered, and must remain more or less constant from a
wing to a general corps area/battle area.

47. Planning and Anticipation. From the above, it should be clear that acceptable
reaction cannot be achieved by the methods discussed. It is generally accepted that very few
situations arise which cannot be anticipated even one to two hours in advance. As soon as the
need for close air support becomes apparent, a demand should be raised. All details can be given
except the TOT who must be indicated as a block time. Remember, target location even if
differs by a few thousand meters is of no consequences provided that a FAC is available to
control the strike. The demand is processed, accepted, the pilots are briefed, and put on ground
alert. In its next message, the demanding formation may just indicate the mission number and
take-off time or TOT. If take-off time is given, the mission leader will hold at the contact point
and go in when called. Thus with intelligent anticipation and judicious planning it is possible to
reduce the reaction time considerably.

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CHAPTER 11

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

INTRODUCTION

1. All operations planned by armed forces, before or during hostilities, are based or the
intelligence collected continuously during peacetime, and that collected during the operations.
Intelligence is absolutely central to weapons, to policies, to strategic and tactical decisions and to
overall military posture. Intelligence gathering, in fact, is a pre-requisite of any military operation.
There are various methods of obtaining intelligence, ranging from some as sample as glancing at the
enemy’s newspapers to some very intriguing, such as espionage involving men in shabby raincoats
and alluring women but increasingly the most important method is to look down from above because
it is impartial and accurate. The ability of an aircraft to travel deep inside enemy territory, to observe
visually or record photographically, the activities of the enemy and to return with this information
quickly to the desired command centre gives this method an added advantage over other forms of
intelligence. Aerial recce thus provides the primary means of collecting up-to-date information of the
enemy.

2. Aerial recce can be defined as that form of intelligence gathering which uses manned aircraft,
dirigibles (airships) or drones and utilizes all available sensors such as vision, photography, RADAR
and infra-red radiation for this propose.

3. Aerial recce may also be defined as an aerial activity undertaken to obtain by visual
observation, or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy
or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydro graphic or geographic
characteristic of a particular area.

4. Aerial recce is classified as tactical when the intelligence gathered relates directly to the
situation and activity an a given theatre of operation and has direct bearing on the conduct of any
given tactical operation. Aerial recce gathering intelligence regarding an enemy or a potential enemy
when not related to any specific theatre of operation or any tactical battle situation is called strategic
air recce. It would be appreciated that areal recce in peacetime falls mainly under the strategic
category and has to be carried out mostly in a covert manner. This publication deals mostly with
tactical air recce over land. Maritime recce has been excluded from this chapter as it would be studied
separately under Maritime Air Operations.

THE BALLOON DAYS

5. A balloon was the first platform used for “looking down from above” Aerial recce indeed
became the chief purpose of this invention of the Montgolfier brothers of Farance. The first pilot less
demonstration of a hydrogen balloon was on 27 Aug 1783, in USA, by Prof Charles. In the early
1790’s, a distinguished chemist named Guytonde Morveau put forward such a strong case for using

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captive balloons for reconnaissance that Captain JMJ Coutelle of the French Army was instructed to
Carry out an experiment at Maudon in 1794. On 26 Jun 1794, in the Battle of Fleures, Coutelle
clambered into the basket of a ballon and stayed aloft for several hours. The information which he
signaled to Gen Jourdon proved to be a material factor in the French victory over the numerically
much stronger Allied forces.

6. The first airborne camera was carried to 262 ft in a balloon over Bie’vre (France) in 1858, by
Gaspard Felix Tourchon, in what was to be a monumental leap in the history of aerial spying, The
observation balloon was used by General McLellon to great effect in America in 1860 during the
Civil War, and became a standard item of equipment with British expeditionary forces in Africa later
in the century. Sausage-shaped Drachen (kite-balloon) were used by both sides down the Western
Front in France during WW I.

WORLD WAR I: INTRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT

7. The first recorded use of an aircraft in war was a recce sortie on 23 Oct 1911 (Italy & Turkey).
Captain Piazza (Italy) remained airborne for hour and was able to report valuable details of what he
had seen on the ground between Tripoli and Azizia. He again made history on 24 and 25 Feb 1912,
when photographed Turkish position from the air. On 19 Apr 1912, Commandant Sulsi carried the
idea an important stage further by taking a cinefilm of an enemy encampment from a military airship.
In WW I the primary duty of the German Naval Airship Division was recce over the North Sea, and
they performed it superbly. Whatever successes the German Navy achieved were due in large
measure to the ceaseless watch that Zeppelins kept on allied shipping movement, and each airship
was reckoned to be worth five to six cruisers for this reason alone.

8. One of the BE-2s flown by Captain (Later Air Chief Marshal, Sir) Philips Joubert de la Ferte,
made the first recce fight recce fight over enemy territory in WW I on 18 Aug 1914, In the final
stages of WW I, more than 35% of all the aircraft in service with the newly formed RAF were classed
as corps reconnaissance or two-seat reconnaissance-fighter aircraft. Mainstay of the force was the
RE-8. By 1918, aerial rec ce was the full time task than 90,000 people on all fronts who produced
roughly 12,000 large photographic a day. Very good cameras were assigned for the job. Some were
hand-held, but the larger ones were fixed to the airframe as ‘vertical’ or as ‘oblique’.

WORLD WAR II

9. Sydney Cotton (Australia) could be considered the father of modern photo-recce. In the
uneasy days preceding WW II he flew many photo-recce sorties in the Locked 12A over Germany in
the guise of a businessman. He used a fan of large F24 cameras and two 35mm cameras hidden in his
aircraft, which brought high-quality pictures of German airfields, factories and fortifications. Later,
he was inducted into RAF for photo recce and photo intelligence duties.

10. In 1940, cameras and flash bombs were fitted in bombers to take photographs of targets
during their attacks. The ‘Dambusters’ achieved their gallant and spectacular success because
every details of their difficult targets had been revealed by repeated photo recce (PR) sorties.

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11. Early in WW II, pilots who were sent on bombing runs using 20 year old maps found that the
targets did not exist there. A need for intelligence that would concern whole of the enemy activity and
his long-term plans were thus felt. Consequently, WW II saw a tremendous increase in strategic
recce. In 1941, a Central Interpretation Unit was formed in UK to carry out interpretations of an
extremely large number of photographic prints that had started flowing in by then. Interpretation
techniques were developed and largely improved during this period.

KOREA

12. A not-so-well-known fact is that the Korean War signalled a rebirth of aerial recce. For the
first time jet aircraft flew recce sorties in Korea. The Korean War brought the American night recce
capability into sharper focus because the communists moved mostly by night. New visual recce
techniques were evolved. Another novel idea was a two-man crew in a Harvard trainer aircraft over
the battle area giving a running commentary of the battle back to the base bringing in near instant air
strikes on the enemy. This was the forerunner of airborne FAC, later developed in the Vietnam War.
The Korean War also saw the induction of ‘Aerial Kodacolor Film’ with an infra-red coating which
could which could photograph a tank hidden under the green vegetation or camouflage.

VIETNAM

13. The art and science of tactical aerial reconnaissance took a big leap during the Vietnam War.
Infrared sensors were widely used in Vietnam. The Integrated Operational intelligence System (IOIS)
fitted on RA-5C Vigilance carried recce sensors, passive ESM, vertical, oblique and horizon-to-
horizon (panoramic) scanning cameras and side-looking RADARs. For “instant” photo recce
information to be made available to the tactical commander, the QF-4C Phantom carrying optical,
infar-red and electronic sensors, side-looking RADAR and a battery of cameras, was believed to have
an automatic in-fight film processing unit, and a special jettisonable cassette that could be ejected in
fight. The use of High Resolution Rader (HRR), IR and other electro-optical devices added a new
dimension to aerial recce during this war.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

14. Great strides have been made in the development of tactical recce systems. While some
countries have gone in for dedicated aircraft (RF 4 C, Mirage III R/RD, SF.37 Viggen, TR-1 ect),
others have developed pods (British Aerospace 401, Swedish Red Baron ect). Advanced IR sensors
(IRLS, FLIR) and RADAR sensors (SLAR with SAR and MTI) have been developed and effectively
used. Advanced tactical recce system (ATARS) being developed in the USA will use digital
computers for imaging and data link. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack RADAR (JUTAR) will use
advanced synthetic aperture RADAR with MTI for packing up battlefield targets, both moving and
stationary, in an area 480 km x 320km in a signal sortie.

15. Unmanned vehicles (RPVs and drones) have lately joined the ranks of the information
gathers. By the end of 60s, there were many RPVs flying recce missions using many kinds of reasons.

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While companies in USA, France and Italy and other counties have all claimed credits for their
inventions, it was Israel that had battle-tested her Scout and Tadiran Mastiff RPVs with honours in
the Bekaa Valley campaign in 1982. Their roles included battlefield control, target identification,
ELINT and decoy missions. Other popular examples are Canadian CL-89/289, Teledyne Ryan 147,
MQM-105 Aquila and Mirach RPVs.

DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC RECCE

16. As discussed earlier, it was during WW II that strategic recce (SR) emerged in a big way.
Ever since, this type of recce has been used in forming a picture about the enemy or potential
enemy’s capabilities and limitations, his national and international policies and, in fact, about all
activities in that country. During actual hostilities, unfavorable conditions hardly permitted aircraft to
get sufficient information. It thus became inescapable requirement to exploit all the sources to the
fullest extent and collect maximum possible information during peace.

17. In the late 40s and early 50s, the USA launched huge unmanned, camera-carrying balloons
with the hops that the prevailing winds would carry them over the USSR and to the Sea of Japan,
where they could be shot down some of these. Propaganda risk and very little intelligence value led to
the shedding of this programme, in favour of aircraft.

18. RB-47, was perhaps the first aircraft used by the US in 50s for photo and electronic int of
strategic value. It employed seven precision cameras to continuous and automatically photograph the
ground below. Lockheed’s U-2 is perhaps the most famous (or infamous) SR aircraft. Designed by
Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, the fragile and delicate U-2 could fly for 12 hours. Flying at 70,000 ft its
60 lpmm “B-Cemmera” could photograph of entire USA in 12 sorties. It made its first flight over
USSR on 04 Jul 56 and the last (that took off from Peshawar with Gary Powers as the pilot) on 01
May 60. TR-1 is a larger and modern version of U-2. It has been used to watch Central American and
Caribbean islands (especially Cuba and Grenada) and it was extensively used in the Gulf War, 91.

19. SR-71, Black Bird, first flown in 1965, is yet another design by Kelly. It can fly close to
100,000 ft at March 3 covering 60,000 sq miles in one hour. Black has made no over fights over
USSR but has been flying over other hot spots-Gulf, Lebanon, Indochina, Chad, Libya, Namibia,
Central America and Caribbean. The USSR is by no means lagging behind Its SR aircraft include Tu-
16 (Bager), Tu-95 (Bear) and MIG 25 R (Foxbat B). The last mentioned has to its credit the world
height recoded (1,23,523 ft). It reconnoitered the entire Israeli coast and Sinai Peninsula with
impunity in 1971-72.

20. The Possibility of artificial earth satellites and their potential for military recce was
recognized immediately after WW II. A series of RAND Studies in the late 40s and early 50s
examined this possibility. The US’s close-look Discoverers and area. SAMOS (Satellite and Missile
Observation System) and the USSR’s Cosmos satellites, are continuously reconnoitering the earth
since early 60s. The Big Bird (KH-9) series combined the role of the area and the close-look
satellites. The Big Bird had an Eastman Kodak-CBS lab film-scan/ radio transmission package, and a
giant Perkin Elmer Camera that fed into one of four capsules, which were ‘air-snatched’ by special C-
130s near Hawaii. It also used TV, IR and SLAR (SAR) sensors. The fifth generation satellites, eg

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KH-11, however, do not use films in their cameras. Instead, they use silicon chips as detector
elements, each light sensitive element corresponds to one picture element (pixel), which is assigned a
numerical value depending the picture again transmits these digits.

21. The USA’ s Landsat, French SPOT and a Soviet recce agency have started commercial
satellite recce services offering up to 15 m resolution pictures. The military satellites, however, can
give a much as 10-cm resolution.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AERICAL RECONNAISSANCE

22. Though the lessons learnt in two World Wars and the subsequent limited wars in Korea,
Vietnam and elsewhere, two major principles of air recce have emerged. These may termed the
principle of priority and the principle of continuity.

23. Principle of Priority. The principle of priority states that adequate air recce must precede
every important operation. Accurate and up-to-date intelligence is a per-requisite for the success of
any operation. Since air recce is the prime source of up to the minute intelligence, air recce must
precede every important operation. One classic example of the principle of priority is the defect of the
Italian Navy in the Battle of Mediterranean and specifically the destruction of the cream of the Italian
Feet in Taranto harbour. The Italian Navy had hardly any air recce capability whereas the Allies were
able to maintain extensive aerial vigil over their adversary. As a result, the Italian Navy could not put
up a fight at all. As a result, the Italian Navy could not put up a fight at all. As far as the famous
attack against ships within Taranto harbour is concerned, the extensive and exact location of a balloon
barrage around the harbour was discovered only through air recce. The attack pattern by the aircraft
of the Royal Navy (RN) was chosen accordingly, Had the knowledge of the existence of the balloon
barrage not been there, the pilot of the RN might have suffered heavy casualties. Another classic
example of the triumph of the principle was the success of Operation CROSSBOW, the battle against
the V-1 and the success against V-2 sites at Peenemunde. Many more examples can be quoted.

24. Every successful air recce sortie brings with it a wealth of information. Some temping tactical
targets may be discovered in any of the photographs merely by change. It must however be
remembered that the target discovered though probably ‘juicy’ by it, may not be the target with the
highest logical priority in the sector. One corollary to the principle of priority must therefore be
remembered; tactical plans must never be decided on the basis of incomplete or inadequate air recce.

25. Principle of Continuity. It has been found by experience that the intelligence provided by a
series of air recce sorties over the same target complex or the same battle area over a continuous
period is far greater than the intelligence gleaned from these sorties individually. From this follows
the principle of continuity: for effective extraction of intelligence, each target complex individually
and the whole tactical area generally, must be kept under continuous air recce for the duration of any
hostility. A number of incidents during the Second Would war serve to illustrate this principle. The
battleship Bismarck was spotted and sunk only because the Norwegian coast had been kept under
continuous air recce. The famous home run through the English Channel by the battle ship Prinz
Eugen and battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was detected only because the port of Brest had
been kept under continuous air recce even though the result of it were not favorable to the British due

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to delays in appropriate response. One of the reasons why the German counter offensive at Ardennes
went undetected till it was too late, was that continuous air recce of the area had been denied to the
Allies for over two weeks by low clouds and winter fog.

26. Effective reconnaissance has always been the prime requirement of military commanders.
Since the beginning of organized military operations, the scout was prized individual whose ability,
experience, and advice could make an essential difference in the solution of a tactical problem. It was
no mere accident that the early military aircraft were commonly referred to as scouts. What lies
beyond the next hill will always be a question that would be heard whenever and whenever military
operations are planned. Over the last century air recce has become none of the prime means of
answering that question with a variety of aircraft, equipment and seasons at its disposal, and is
unlikely to lose its importance in the successful prosecution of war. Apart from military need, air
recce also makes a significant contribution to the civil need, be it resource location, disaster warning
and analysis, ecological surveys, urban planning or traffic control.

MODES OF RECONNAISSANCE

27. Aerial reconnaissance makes use of a fairly large portion of the Electro magnetic spectrum.
Areal recce is carried out in the following four main modes:-

a. Visual recce

b. Photographic recce

c. Infrared recce

d. Recce by electronic means.

28. Visual Recce. Visual recce is that from a recce where the pilot or the observer uses
eyesight and power of observation to gain information from the air. In this type of recce, generally a
stranded ground attack fighter aircraft is used for low level visual recce of a given point, a given area,
or a given route. The pilot either report his observations directly over the RT to a FAC or any other
designated ground station in the from of a flash reports, or records his observations on a tape recorder
/note pad carried in the aircraft which is passed to the supported commander after the aircraft lands.
The biggest advantage of a visual tactical recce is the promptitude with which a field commander can
gather information. It also does not require any specialized equipment. This form of recce, however,
suffers from a number of serious limitation and disadvantages. First, the speed of the modern ground
attack fighter make it very difficult for the pilot to discern objects on the ground from a low level,
particularly if the objects happen to be camouflaged/concealed. Second, correct interpretation or even
recognition of an object seen momentarily depends largely on the training state of the pilot: the
commander cannot therefore expect uniformly dependable result from all individuals. It would be
very difficult for a commander to take logical decisions on the basis of non-stranded reports. Third,
this from of recce cannot be effectively used at night. Fourth, losses to aircraft from small arms fire
and other AD wpns can become significantly high in the modern AD environment if the if the recce
requirements increased the loiter time of the aircraft in a particular area. This kind of recce is

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therefore becoming progressively less useful where alternative means are available. For visual recce,
an aircraft with a better cockpit view should be chosen, as far as possible. For example, a MIG 23
would be better than a MIG 21, in this Respect.

29. Photo Recce (PR). The visible spectrum-the wavelength region of the electro-magnetic
spectrum to which the human eye is sensitive-extends from about 400 to 700 nanometer (nm). The
photographic spectrum is far broader. It extends from about 350 to 1,500 nm, performing objects
and/or conditions that cannot be seen to be photographed. Photo recce is one of the most important
forms of aerial recce. A photograph is documentary evidence of enemy activity at the moment of
recce. It does not suffer form illusions, mental distortions and omissions that visual recce is inability
subjected to through the human element. The lens of the recce camera could also have a power of
magnification. Therefore, a good lens and an appropriate film brings about much better resolution
than the naked eye could ever perceive, especially at military planners all over the world. The
following paragraph describes some of the important technical terms. The understanding of which is
essential.

30. Basic Photographic Terminology.

a. Cover. The total area on the ground successfully photography in a sortie is called
cover. Forward cover is the length of ground photographed in a sortie and depends on the
magazine capacity. Lateral cover is the width of ground covered by a print. When a fan
configuration is carried in the aircraft, lateral cover is considered for the full set of lateral
prints in the and is decided by the cone angle. Trigonometrically a manipulation factor to
height is found for every cone angle to determine lateral cover.

b. Covering Angle. The angle subtended at the optical centre of the lens by the area
covered by a single frame is called the covering angle. This also referred to the look angle of
the camera.

c. Cycling Speed. The speed at which the film is made to move through the camera, in
terms of frames per second, is called the cycling speed. The cycling speed changes with
aircraft speed and height in order to maintain a fixed forward overlap between prints.

d. Focal Length. Areal cameras are box cameras, ie, the optical system are pre-
focussed at infinity. In box cameras, focal length is the distance between the optical centre of
the lens and the focal plane, at which the film is kept, measured along the optical axis. Longer
the focal length, smaller would be the covering angle.

e. Covered Area. The ground covered by the covering angle is called covered
area. For any given lens, higher the aircraft flies, greater would be the covered areas.

f. Scale. Scale is the ratio of distance between two points on a photograph to

corresponding distance on the ground. It follows that for any given height above ground
longer the focal length of the lens used, greater would be the scale. Similarly, for any given
focal length of the lens, higher the aircraft files, smaller would be the scale. Number of prints

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and hence, sorties largely depend on scale, Therefore, it is imperative that correct scale is
demanded.

g. Shutter Speed. The period of time for which the film is exposed to light, expressed
in fractions of a second, is called the shutter speed. Foamy grade of film, brighter the object
being photographed faster would be the shutter speed required for correct exposure. In most
modern aerial cameras, the shutter speed is controlled automatically through accurate
metering of light.

h. Film Sensitivity. Film can be made to react differently to any quantity of light
falling on it or to the frequency range of the light it is exposed to. A fast film would be
suitable for a dull or hazy day whereas a slow film would be more appropriate for a brightly
sunlit object. Similarly, a film sensitive to infrared rays would be able to record IR radiation
from objects on the ground. A development in the film sensitivity is the IR false colour film,
which reacts to both the visible and IR range of spectrum.

i. IMC. Even when the shutter speed are very fast, the image on the film moves
slightly if the speed of the aircraft happens to be very high or the aircraft happens to fly very
low. To compensate for this movement of image along the frame due to the forward
movement of the aircraft, most modern cameras have an arrangement to advance the film at
the same speed and in the same direction as the movement of the image. This arrangement is
known as Image Movement Compensation or IMC.

j. Overlap. Overlap between adjacent photographs is necessary to ensure complete

coverage and to provide an area of common ground for stereoscopic viewing.

(1) Forward Overlap. For stereoscopic viewing 50% overlap between

consecutive photographs is necessary. An additional 10% is allowed for possible
errors. Thereby a standard 60% forward overlap is maintained between consecutive
prints.

(2) Lateral Overlap. Lateral Overlap is necessary to ensure full lateral coverage
and helps in the preparation of a mosaic. In a multi-camera fan installation, normally
10% lateral overlap is provided between adjacent prints within the fanspread.
Between adjacent parallel runs of a photographic sortie he standard lateral overlap is
normally planned to be 30% of lateral cover. Therefore, with a single camera
installation there is 30% lateral overlap between adjacent prints of parallel runs. In a
multi-cameral fan installation there would be 30% lateral overlap between two
adjacent fan spreads of parallel runs. In order to economize, lateral overlap between
parallel runs could be reduced up to 10%, if accurate navigation is possible and the
terrain is non-mountainous.

k. Ground Gained. During a photo run the ground gained in a single print is the area
covered ahead of, or beside the overlap.

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(1) Ground Gained Forward (GGF). For a 60% forward overlap, GGF is
40% in every consecutive print. In the last print of a run the 40% GGF does not have
an overlap and therefore cannot provide stereoscopic interpretation. Normally two
extra prints are exposed before and after the target length.

(2) Ground Gained Sideways (GGS). It is also known as Side lap Gained
(SLG). For a 30% lateral overlap between parallel runs, the GGS is 70% in every
consecutive parallel run. The first run would provide 100% GGS but this fact is often
ignored too simplify calculation. Parallel runs are panned so as to spill over the width
of the target on either side to avoid missing out the edges.

l. Stereoscopic Cover. With a stereoscopic, the pictures of the same feature taken
from two different points (eg, two successive pictures in a photo run) are viewed to get a 3-D
effect. Actually the brain is tricked into thinking that each eye is seeing a slightly different
angle of the feature. Thus it is important for a stereoscopic cover to have the same feature on
two successive pictures is a min of 50% overlap between them. Another 10% overlap is added
for safety. Thus a stereoscopic cover is with a forward overlap 60%.

m. Resolution. The sharpness with which the image is captured by the print is called
resolution. Ground resolution is a factor of the focal length, shutter speed, film sensitively,
and effectiveness of IMC. It is, therefore, a measure of good photography. Some details on
photographic resolution are given at Appendix B.

n. Graining. The size of the individual chemical particle on the film that gets fixed
after the development is called grain. It is a factor of the quality of the film and the quality of
development. A coarse grain reduces the resolution of the print and hampers interpretation,
particularly from enlargements. (p) Mosaic. When the complete surface of any given area is
covered by a number of runs by a single aircraft or a number of aircraft at the same time, and
a composite photograph is made out of portions of a large number of prints to cover the whole
area, the result is known as mosaic or montage.

o. Mosaic. When the complete surface of any given area is covered by a number of
runs by a single aircraft or a number of aircraft at the same time, and a composite photograph
is made out of portions of a large number of prints to cover the whole area, the result is known
as mosaic or montage.

31. Main Types of Aerial Photography. Air Photographs are classified according to the
position of the camera in relation to the earth’s surface. These are explained.

a. Vertical photography. When the optical axis of the camera is held perpendicular to
the ground, the Photographic called vertical.

b. Oblique photography. When the optical axis of the camera is turned away from
the vertical towards the horizon, the Photographs are known as oblique. When the frame cover
the horizon, the photograph is called a low oblique. Photographs are further nominated as

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port, starboard, or forward oblique depending upon whether the camera is facing to the left,
right, or front of the aircraft.

c. Pinpoint Photography. A single frame showing a given object is known as

pinpoint Photograph.

d. Split Vertical. When two cameras are fitted with the lenses very close to the
vertical position but with small (about 10 to 15 degrees) angle of divergence between them
and the cameras are made to take synchronized photographs, the pairs of photos are
known as split verticals. This from of photography provides greater coverage.

e. Trim trogon. When three cameras are made to take synchronized photographs high
port oblique, vertical and high starboard oblique positions with a lateral overlap between all
three, the resultant is known as trimetrogon. This form of photography is used mainly for
survey work.

f. Multi Camera Fan. Multi camera installations consist of three or more cameras
mounted, so that the photographs produce overlap on adjacent prints, thus ensuring
uninterrupted lateral coverage of the ground photographed. Installations with odd of number
of cameras include a central vertical camera and those with an even number of cameras, fan
out from a central split pair of cameras. All multi camera insulation has the advantages of
increased lateral cover.

g. Panoramic. When a camera with a high cycling speed is made to scan from
horizon to horizon at 900 to the direction of run the resultant photo is know as panoramic. A
rotating prism mounted in front of the lens may be used in this type of photography to enable
a camera to look and take photographs from horizon to horizon. Panoramic photographs have
the advantage of increased cover in a single print/film and in terms of reduced processing
time. However, they also suffer from certain disadvantages in term of varying scale of
menstruation.

h. LOROP. A special type oblique photography with high power cameras is known
as Long Range Oblique photography (LOROP) or Long Range Areal photography (LOROP).
An aircraft fitted with a LOROP camera can fly on own side the international border and
photograph targets of strategic/technical interest up to the visual horizon. The usable range of
photography, however, depends on atmospheric clarity, the size of the object, camouflage etc.
Apart from certain disadvantages in term of varying scale of menstruation.

i. Sonne Strip Photography. The Sonne Strip camera is specially designed to take
well-defined photographs at large scale and high speeds. The camera has no shutter, the
exposure being made as the film moves continuously, in synchronization with the
ground speed of the aircraft past a stationary slit. The camera has operated effectively at a
scale of 1: 250 and a ground speed of 1,000.00 mph.

j. Colour Photography. In aerial photography, colour film may also be used in place of
the more widely used black and white film. In colour photographs objects appear in their

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natural colour and are, therefore, easy to identify. However, colour photography has
limitations in terms of expenses, processing facilities and time. Due to these reasons, its use in
currently somewhat limited.

k. IR Photography. The IR rays do not effect normal black and white or colour films.
However, by addition of certain dyes to the emulsion the sensitivity could be extended from
0.7 microns to 1.1 microns thus marking use of part of reflective portion of IR radiation.
These IR sensitive films are generally used with a filter that prevents short wavelengths from
reaching the film. For all practical purposes IR photography is similar to conventional
photography. Its value lies in its ability to penetrate haze, to show good contrast between land
and water, and differentiate between various types of vegetation. Its ability to detect dead
vegetation makes it suitable for camouflage detection. The B&W IR photography records IR
radiation reflected by ground objects as varying shades of grey. Water appears as black, dead
vegetation appears as black as light grey and so on. The colour IR photography also known as
False Colour IR photography uses a filter in the camera to cut off the blue portion of the
visible spectrum. The blue sensitive layer in the film is actually made sensitive to reflective
IR radiation appears in cyan and healthy vegetation in magenta colour.

32. It must be remembered that photoreconnaissance of a various kinds can be done by drones as
well as spacecraft in addition to manned aircraft.

ELECTRO OPTICAL CAMERAS

33. These cameras have similar optical systems to that of a conventional camera but solid state
sensors are used instead of a film.

34. The solid state sensors generally used for imaging are called Change Coupled Devices
(CCDs) which essentially consist of liner or two-dimensional (area) array of detectors.

35. Light energy incident on to the photo sites of 10-micron dimensions of the CCD detector is
converted into electrons. These electrons generated by light photos are converted to a voltage. The
voltage depends on the intensity of the incident photos.

36. These voltages are recorded on high-density tape recorders sequentially. The CCD detector is
reset to receive the next set of photos. These are converted to video signals on the ground and
arranged in the sequence to give a video output. The information (voltages) can be tele-metered to a
ground station where the picture below the aircraft can be assembled in near real time for
instantaneous viewing. Each element can sense a difference of 0.1% or there can be a thousand
shades of grey.

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INFRA-RED RECCE

37. Law of Radiation. The related incident upon a body can be absorbed by, reflected from or
transmitted through the body. If radiant energy is the only source of energy to a body, an absorption
process can only take up that energy. If none of the incident radiation is reflected or transmitted
through the body. If radiant energy is the only source of energy to a body, an absorption process can
only take up that energy. If none of the incident radiation is reflected or transmitted, the body is a
perfect absorber of radiant energy and this is the definition of a black body. Kirchoff’s Law of
Radiation states that an absorbing body is entitled to less than perfect absorber or emitter is termed a
grey body. If the emissivity of a black body is defined as unit, the emissivity of a grey body must be
less than unity. Emissivity is a function of the type of material and its surface finish and it can vary
with wavelength and temperature. When the emissivity varies with wavelength, the body is a
selective radiator. For metals, emissivity is low: typically 0.1: but it increases with temperature and
may increase many times if a surface laver of oxide is present. For non-metals, emissivity is high,
typically 0.9: and it decreases with increasing temperature. The concept of blackbody allows
important qualitative statements concerning the efficiency of a body as an emitter. However, we need
to know how the radiated power is distributed over the spectrum and what part temperature has to
play in the process. The total radiant emittance increases rapidly with temperature. The maximum
emittance also shift towards shorter wavelength as the temperature is increased. The total radiant
emittance depends on the fourth power of temperature.

38. Reflectivity. A body send out radiations either as emission or reflections. If a surface is
specular, je a mirror, radiant power reflected from the surface obeys the established laws of reflection.
If, however, the surface is a diffuse reflector, the reflected energy gets diffused.

39. Atmospheric Effects. Usually, IR system must view their targets through the Earth’s
atmosphere. Before the radiant flux from the target reaches the sensor, it is selectively absorbed by
atmospheric gases, scattered by small particles of haze and fog, and occasionally modulated by
atmosphere are rarely bigger than 0.5 to 80 microns, and the peak of their distribution curve is
between 5 and 15 microns. Thus fog particles are comparable to IR wavelengths, and the
transmittance becomes very poor. The same reasoning applies to clouds and the movement to another
part of the spectrum dose not usually help because of the limited extent of the windows in the
absorption bands. As raindrops are must bigger than the wavelengths, there is less scattering from
rain in the infrared band. Rain does, however, have an unfortunate effect in that it tend to even out the
temperature differences between the targets and the surroundings.

40. Use of IR in Recce. The infrared spectrum is used in recce in two distinct forms. The
reflective portion of the IR is made use of in IR photography because there are many similarities
between normal photography and IR photography. The emissive portion of IR is used in recce with
the aid of appropriate sensors by a process called thermal imaging. This is further explained in the
following paragraphs.

41. IR Thermal Imaging. This mode of recce uses emissive IR radiations (89 to 14 millions)
and employs altogether a different technique while IR photography is basically photograph using IR
films, IR thermal imaging employs thermal detectors that transform IR radiation into detectable
electrical signals. The output electrical voltage is recorded either on a magnetic tape for digital

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analysis by computer or on a film. Even if the final output is a photograph, it must be remembered
that this mode is quite different from photograph.

42. Infra-red Line Scan (IRLS). IRLS is a good example of this mode of reconnaissance.
A fast rotating prism: records across tract line to constitute a continuous strip of ground scene. Apart
from the British Aerospace Recce pod on Jaguar: a number of Red Baron pods of Swedish origin
have been introduced. These are composite pods with IRLS as the main component. IRLS is highly
effective against ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ objects like aircraft, tanks or vehicles with engines shut. It is even
possible to see whether a metallic fuel tank if full o empty. Unlike IR photography, IRLS has night
capabilities. IRLS, however, has the following limitations:-

a. Not effective in rain, fog and clouds.

b. Its sensors are unable to detect meaningful info about 500-m agl. At this height, its
coverage is limited to about 1500m only.

c. From its small coverage, it naturally follows that the aircraft has to be navigated
through green foliage because of attenuation of IR energy It dose not have the capability of
detecting minefields.

d. Lacks clarity as compared to ordinary prints.

e. Special interpretation techniques and training is required.

43. Forward looking Infra-red (FLIR). This is another example of this mode. It works
on the same thermal detector principal as the IRLS. Only, It looks in front, FLIR is a useful
penetration and briefing aid.

44. FLIR Staring Array. An infra-red system equipped with a starting focal plane array
based on indium antimonide detectors, operating in the 3-5 micron band have been developed. It is
corporate a telescope with three fields of view to maximize the range. The STAR (Staring array)
SAFIRE system can be fettle on helicopters and fixed wing aircraft operating up to 400kts.

45. Recce by Electronic Means. At the outset, recce by electronic means should be
differentiated from electronic recce/surveillance, ie ELINT & SIGINT. Recce by electronic means
can be divided into the use of RADAR and TV.

46. RADAR Recce. The advantage of RADAR recce is that it can be employed during day or
night. It can penetrate clouds except CB clouds, but its resolution is poor as compared to photo recce.
While a forward looking ground mapping RADAR is a good navigation/penetration aid, it is the
sideways looking airborne RADAR (SLAR) while is really useful for reconnaissance. For any useful
resolution, a recce RADAR ought to have an antenna of immense size (say 15m),While it is
impractical to have such an antenna in forward-looking RADAR, it is possible, with the innovation of
synthetic aperture RADAR (SAR), to produce an artificial aperture (say up to 300 times the physical
size) in a SLAR. The basic principle of SAR (sometimes called synthetic array RADAR) is that the
motion of the platform relative to a fixed tgt creates a predictable history of changing RADAR echoes

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from the tgt. A suitable signal processor can sum the returns from each RADAR pulse, and build up
an image as though each pulse was received by a separate element in an extremely long array. In
simple words, if a RADAR system was looking sideways from a moving aircraft, the returning pulses
could be processed as if the antenna were as long as the distance between the [point at which the
RADAR pulse was transmitted & the point where it was received.

47. The output of recce RADAR may be recorded on a film or used in digital processing for real
time data link. A typical SLAR can look up to 70 km from 2500-m ht and have a data link up to 185
km. Its resolution is of the order of 30 ft.

48. Video Recce. Video is another very useful recce mode because of its ability to transmit
pictures in real time. Its resolution is poorer than PR. It is also limited by weather & light conditions.
However with the advent of LLTV, the latter problem has been overcome.

49. Low Light Television. There was a time when, during the Korean War, a trained
observer after having spent five to six hours in a darkened room was led blindfolded to an aircraft.
Once, in the air, he removed his blindfold and observed movement of troops, vehicles and trains with
his dark adjusted eyes. With LLTV, this cumbersome and not entirely reliable procedure is
unnecessary. Apart from recce, this mode is useful as a navigation and target acquisition aid in poor
visibility. It consists of an ordinary closed circuit television camera fitted with an image
intensification tube which intensifies the light a million times or so and enables the camera to see in
near dark conditions. Complete darkness cannot be penetrated but on a starlit, or a partially starlit
night it is possible to obtain surprisingly good pictures on the ground. The output of the camera is
brought to a monitor in the pilot can see the ground over which he is fling far better than he can with
the naked eye. However, there are the blurring of the picture due to aircraft movement cause some
problems in this method and the flaring caused by a bright light.

REMOTE CONTROLLED RECCE (REMOTE TAC RECCE)

50. Remote Controlled Recce. Remote Tac R employs unmanned vehicles, ie, drones or
RPVs, to carry out recce. These may be fitted with any of the recce sensors depending on design and
requirement. Such vehicles are generally fitted with a Video camera for use in daytime or with an
infrared-scanning device for use at night. The observer gathers intelligence by intercepting Video
presentations on remote read-outs. The drone is light, easily maintained, and is far cheaper than a
modern ground attack. These drones can operate from the RPVs/drones are also less vulnerable to
enemy AD due to their small size and RADAR/IR signatures. Remote Tac R thus retains the main
advantages of Fighter Tac R and at the same time removes some of its main modern armed forces of
the world.

51. Weather Reconnaissance. Weather recce, with suitable RADAR and other equipment6,
may be employed to provide additional or actual met information, particularly over enemy territory
prior to undertaking air ops or while planning such ops. Satellite photographs of the area of interest
can of great importance in aiding accurate met forecasts.

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52. Reconnaissance by Night. One of the important requirements of a field commander is

reliable information about enemy movements at night. It must, therefore, be clearly understood how
far in what way aerial recce can help in supplying such information.

53. Limitations of Night Visual Recce. It has been mentioned earlier that visual recce by
night is likely to be of little value. The following sub-paras amplify the limitations of such recce:-

a. Unlit objects cannot be seen from the air except for the period of full moon +/- four
nights. This will be further limited to the hours when moon is more than about 20 0 above the
horizon.

b. Even during moon periods, movements of vehicles without lights may not be seen
from heights above 1,000ft.

c. Movements along tree-shaded roads cannot be seen at night at all.

d. It is hazardous to fly an aircraft and especially a modern jet fighter at low levels
without referring to radio altimeter or terrain avoidance RADAR. If a pilot is obliged to look
at his radio/RADAR altimeter, he cannot look out to spot enemy movement on the ground.

54. Employment of Visual Recce. In view of the limitations, the temptation to request for
fighter Tac R against unsuitable targets must resisted, as such even if provided, would most probably
be infructuous. The employment of visual recce by night should be restricted to the following when
consideration make it an absolute necessity:-

a. Visual Tac R by light aircraft or helicopters during moonlight period.

e. Fighter Tac R in appropriate moon periods in non-mountainous terrain against:

(1) Rail routs

(2) Roads unshaded by trees.

(3) Vehicles and armour in open desert or on vast stretches or ploughed land
without many trees.

(4) Movement of barges along canals.

55. Night photo Recce. Night photography may often provide information unobtainable at
any other time. Night photography may be carried out either with the use of synchronized photoflash
bombs or with an electronic strobe. IR film may also be employed. The cameras and equipment of
night photography are usually specialized. Due to this reason, such recce would normally be confined
to specific targets or routes. Information obtained from night photography may include the
following:-

a. Movement by shipping, ground troops, supply trains, and convoys.

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b. Camouflage guns or other installations, which may be covered in daytime, are

frequently visible on night photographs.

c. Strike Assessment, the location of bomb impact points and the damage
inflicted by night bombing.

56. The disadvantages of night photography are:-

a. The number of exposures is limited by the capacity of the aircraft to carry illuminates.

b. Difficulty of providing the required amount of illumination at the correct position and
time. This is because the intensity of light decreases by a square of the distance during
artificial illumination.

c. Quality of photography may be inferior.

57. Night Recce by RADAR and IR. RADAR and infrared recce are eminently suitable forms
of recce for use by night. SLAR with MTI is specifically designed for detecting movements on the
ground. As and when the IR technology improves a little more, and IR scan is able to provide state of
art, IR scan can provide reasonably accurate information by night.

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES OF AIR RECONNAISSANCE

58. The main aim of air-recce is to get information and return to the base safely. The enemy
would obviously try to frustrate this aim every available means. With the modern developments in the
fields of RADAR, surface to air missiles and high performance interceptor aircraft, medium-level
photography (between 3 and 10 km AGL) as was practiced during the Second World War has now
become untenable. In the following paragraphs a few of the current tactics and techniques are
described.

59. High level Intrusion. In the present state of the art, a high level (between 25 to 30 km
AMSL) intrusion still presents a reasonably difficult problem for the air defence and therefore can be
exploited by the photo recce pilot. The high-level intrusion can still be vulnerable to high
performance interceptors and if possible should be done under RADAR cover.

60. Low Level Intrusion. At very low levels, (below 100 m AGL) RADAR cover is very
restricted. It is therefore possible for the photo recce aircraft to carry out an extreme low level high-
speed intrusion and get away safety. In such a sortie profile, the usual type of photographs taken are
oblique line overlaps, because the coverage of vertical cameras (except with a very short focal length)
become very small at low heights.

61. Low Medium-supersonic Zoom. When a vertical coverage of an area becomes essential
and a high level intrusion is impracticable owing to the presence of SAM or due to any other reason,
the low medium supersonic zoom technique is used. The recce aircraft intrudes at low level and
thereafter zooms up to the required medium altitude, carries out a supersonic photo run, and descends

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steeply to ground level and run out at high speed. The resultant exposure time of the intruder is so
little that the air defence may have very little chance of a successful interception.

62. Over –the shoulder Technology. In these days of limited wars and the end of cold war,
quite often it is possible to use international air space or friendly air space with impunity for
reconnaissance of enemy territory. The main tools for this type of work are LOROP or SLAR.

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CHAPTER 12

MARITIME AIR OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Despite the growth of Air transport in recent decades, the bulk of international trade is
still carried by sea. Naval vessels alone however can not longer ensure freedom of the seas. Air
Power is as complementary to sea power as it is to any combat between ground forces.

2. The air component has become one of the main instruments of maritime power, not only
in its offensive capability, but also in its ability to undertake many of the traditional roles
hitherto performed exclusively by surface unit. Naval vessels can in addition also be carriers of
air power hich, contribute directly and indirectly to the maintenance of a favourable maritime
situation. It is because of this that, so far as sea warfare is concerned, naval and air force
strategies have merged and brought about a closer affiliation which is now being reflected in a
joint approach to maritime strategy.

COMPONENTS OF MARITIME AIR OPERATIONS

3. Maritime Air operations may be defined as the activities of land and sea based aircraft
both fixed wing and rotary in pursuit of a nation’s policy, strategy and tactics at sea.

4. Maritime Air operations could be broken down in to component parts as given below:

a. Maritime reconnaissance (surveillance).

b. Anti-submarine warfare. (ASW)

c. Anti-surface unit warfare. (ASUW)

d. Maritime air defence.

e. Search and rescue.

5. Maritime Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance or surveillance and intelligence gathering

are missions essential not only for building up to of a general picture of the operational area but
also for providing accurate targeting information. Satellites, despite their real-time data link
capability or more suitable for strategic reconnaissance. The manned aircraft therefore remains
the primary platform for the tactical reconnaissance. Shore based long range fixed wing aircraft
are ideal for this role as they have the requisite endurance, speed and sensor capability to cover
large areas in one sortie. Apart from wartime activity, surveillance is equally important in
peacetime, as every nation has to patrol its exclusive economic zone. Most nations today have

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opted for two types of maritime patrol aircraft, one for anti-submarine warfare and long range
surveillance and for surface surveillance closer inshore.

6. Anti Submarine Warfare. One of the most distinct elements of maritime air
operations is anti submarine warfare, which is usually fought as alliance with friendly surface
vessels and dependent on foreign trade in peacetime or external reinforcement and supply
during war protection of shipping from submarine would be a high priority item. Further
submarines also a threat to shore target as modern nuclear submarine carry ballistic missiles.
Anti submarine warfare is therefore one of the principle activities of maritime air operations.

7. Anti Surface Unit Warfare. Surface navy possesses long range surface to surface
missiles and poses a major threat to other surface units. Over the years, the aircraft has provided
to be potent weapon platform against ships. Today most aircraft deployed in the anti shipping
role are equipped with anti ship missiles, which can be fired from stand off ranges.

8. Maritime Air Defence. Air defence in the maritime context is as important as it is in

case of land warfare. The limits between the fleet responsibility and shore based air force
responsibility have somewhat blamed in the recent times. Modern land based aircraft specially
if capable of air to air refueling can maintain combat air patrols at considerable distances from
the base.

9. Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue (SAR) in the maritime context may be
defined as a service provided by units to search for and rescue personnel in distress at sea, in
addition to ships and aircraft the operation may involve submarines and special rescue teams
and equipment. The Navy is the co-ordination agency for SAR at sea. The Air Force is however
required providing augmentation of air effort on request. This concept of maritime air
operations would not be discussed in details in this document.

AIR FORCE MARITIME TASKS

10. The Types of joint maritime air operations that may be carried out by the Air Force units
in support of the Navy during peace and war are as follows:-

a. Strikes against enemy naval ships and merchant shipping.

b. Interception of enemy MR aircraft as opportunity targets within the range of shore

based aircraft.

c. Air defence of air space over land and over waters within the radius of action of
air defence interceptor aircraft. Air defence of offshore installations is also the
responsibility of the Air Force.

d. Augmentation of air effort for air sea search and recue, if requested.

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11. Additional Air Force Tasks. The Air Force may also carry out the following
additional tasks on request during peace and war.

a. Strikes against enemy ports, harbours and naval installations.

b. Tactical and strategic photo reconnaissance

c. Transport and logistics support.

MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE

12. The prelude to any maritime operation involves scouting for the enemy to obtain
knowledge of his presence and has position. Without this information it would be impossible to
progress the war at sea. Scouting is a mission involving search, patrol, tracking or
reconnaissance. A surface ship, Submarine or aircraft may be used these missions and is
referred to as a scout. However, the term reconnaissance is also loosely used to cover all the
missions above. The specific terminology and definitions are given in the succeeding
paragraphs.

13. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, through

observation, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or
to secure, through observation, data concerning the meteorological, hydro graphic or geographic
characteristics of a particular area.

14. Search. A search is a systematic investigation of a particular area, for the purpose of
locating or confirming the absence of an objective known or suspected to be somewhere in that
area. The basis of all search schemes is the suitable arrangements of the tracks of scouts so that
they cover the area in which the objective is most likely to be at the time of the search.

15. Patrol. A patrol is the systematic and continuing investigations along a line know as
the ‘barrier line’ to prevent a moving object from crossing it undetected. Instead of searching an
area where the enemy is believed to be the scout traverses over the same geographical tracks or
patrols in such a way that it will be able to give warning if the objective attempts to cross those
line.

16. Difference between Search and Patrol. The essential difference between a search
and a patrol is that in a search scout goes out to find the objective being searched for, whereas in
a patrol the scout waits for the objective to approach. Also, a scout on patrol is ordinarily
capable of attacking the expected enemy, but this capability is not essential when engaged in a
search.

17. Tracking. Tracking is the observation of a mobile observation of a mobile objective

for the purpose of regularly reporting its composition, location, movement and any other
relevant information.

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18. Methods of Search and Patrol.

a. Visual Observation. By ships, aircraft and submarines for surface objects.

b. RADAR for surface objective and aircraft.

c. Sonar, Sonar buoys, MAD, ETI for submarines.

d. ESM. An effective aid for detection and identification whilst carrying out search
or patrol by ships, aircraft and submarine.

19. Selecting a Scout. A scouting mission may be carried out by surface ships,
submarines or aircraft, or any combination thereof. The principle advantage and disadvantages
of each are:-

a. Search. The search rate of aircraft is so much greater than that of a surface ship or
submarine, that it should be used whenever circumstances permit.

e. Patrol. For patrolling a small area over an extended period, a ship is often more
suitable than an aircraft because of its endurance.

f. Reconnaissance. Aircraft can obtain more information that surface ships or

submarines, and can obtain it quickly with fewer hazards. However, for specialized types
of reconnaissance, surface skips or submarines may be more suitable. Satellites may be
used for strategic reconnaissance.

FACTORS AFFECTING VISUAL DETECTION

20. The factors which affect visual detection range must be considered in each case and
detection range adjusted accordingly. These factors are given below:-

a. Condition of Light.

(1) A patch or sunlight through a cloud gap may enable a sighting to be made
at a bnormally long range: however, allowances should not be made for such an
occurrence: A cloud shadow or poor conditions of light may delay sighting or
even cause the objected to be missed ltogether. If the weather forecast indicates
broken cloud or bad light, a slight reduction in the visual detection range should
be allowed for.

(2) At sea, objects down sun or up moon invariably stand out better thanthose
up sun or down moon. However the reverse will apply when the sun or moon is
low on the horizon.

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b. Colour of the Object. The visual detection range of whose colour blends with that
if its background will be less than that of an object whose colour offers a contrast to its
background.

c. Aspect of the Object. The detection range of the ship viewed bows on will reduce
the distance at which it can be sighted.

d. Speed of the Object. If a ship is moving fast its wake will enable it to be seen
from greater distance than a slow moving or stationary ship, which produces little or no
wake.

e. State of the sea. In a rough sea, particularly if white caps are formed, visibility
will be less than that of a ship seen beam-on.

f. Size of the object.

Factors Affecting RADAR Detection.

21. Factors that may affect RADAR detection rang are given below. The pertinence of these
factors may vary with different type of RADAR equipment, but they should be considered in
each case and the detection range adjusted accordingly.

a. Size and Aspects of the Object. An object made of metal gives a stronger
RADAR return, and consequently can be detected at a greater distance than an
object whose surface contains wood or rubber.

b. Material Composition of the Object. An object made of metal gives a stronger

RADAR return, and consequently can be detected at a greater distance than an object
whose surface contains wood or rubber.

c. State of the Sea. With most types of RADAR equipment there is a blind spot, this
is an area beneath an aircraft, or close around a surface vessel, in which RADAR
transmissions are reflected from the sea. The rougher the sea the greater will be intensity
of the sea returns and the larger will be the area in the close vicinity of the scout in which
objects cannot be detected.

d. Height of the Aircraft. The effect of an aircraft’s height on the detection range
varies with the size of the object and the type of the RADAR equipment in use. The
greater the height of aircraft, the larger will be the area beneath the aircraft in which sea
returns will obscure the detection of an object. Also the RADAR horizon will vary with
the height.

e. Electronic Counter Measures. The enemy may use counter measures that will
interfere with RADAR detection. Such counter measures include RADAR camouflage
and RADAR jamming equipment.

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f. Efficiency of RADAR Operations. A skilled and experienced RADAR operator

will normally detect an object at a greater range than one who is less skilled. The
detection range used should be based on the ability of the least skilled operator taking
part in the operation.

FACTORS AFFECTING PLANNING OF RECONNAISSANCE

22. Almost all forms of maritime operations are preceded by reconnaissance, the aim being to
provide information about enemy surface, underwater and air units, including merchant ships.
So that own force may be brought in to action to destroy them.

23. Maritime reconnaissance includes the following distinct phases :-

a. Gathering intelligence with a view to establish an area for reconnaissance, which

is called Enemy Probable Area (EPA).

b. Mounting search patrols in EPA using the most suitable scout.

c. Location of the enemy force and reporting its position, course, speed and
identification.

d. Tracking or shadowing the target till a strike materializes, or as directed.

24. Intelligence. Intelligence on enemy force or shipping is obtained from the following
sources:

a. Joint intelligence organizations.

b. Reports from ships, aircraft and submarines at sea.

c. DF intercepts of enemy signals.

d. Result of air or satellite photo reconnaissance carried out over en ports and
anchorage.

e. Reports from own merchants hips and commercial aircraft.

f. Reports from naval Controller of Shipping Organizations (NCSO).

g. Information from allies.

h. War watching stations.

i. Local port authorities.

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25. Searches and patrols. Some of the standard type of searches and patrols applicable to
maritime reconnaissance are as follows:-

a. Searchers.

(1) Rectangular Search. This is used by ships or aircraft when search to a

maximum radius is not a consideration and intelligence on the object is indefinite.
The types of searches are the parallel Track, Creeping line Ahead (CLA) and
Combined parallel Track, and CLA.

(2) Sector Searches. This usually used by the aircraft to search to a maximum
distance for providing earliest possible warning of an approaching enemy.

(3) Expending Square Search. Aircraft normally uses this when enemy’s
approximate position is known but course and speed are not known. The success
of this search will depend on early arrival of the scout at the last known position,
which is called Datum.

(4) Intercepting Search. Normally used by ships to intercept enemy whose

earlier position is known and limits of course and speed can be assumed to a
reasonable degree of accuracy.

b. Patrols.

(1) Barrier Patrol. This is done by ships or submarines along a Barrier Line
to located enemy’s movement along the Barrier Line. These could be the Fixed
Station Patrol, used when the speed ratio of the scout over the enemy is lessthan
1.5 or the Linear Patrol when the scout speed is less than 1.5 times the assumed
enemy speed.

(2) Crossover Patrol. This is used normally by aircraft, having a speed

advantage of 1.5 or more over the object. The type of crossover patrol is
Symmetric, Advancing and Retarding Crossover Patrol.

c. Stan Search Plans. In addition to the above type of search/patrol, the ships,
aircraft and helicopters to cater for specific tactical situations use standard search plans.
These could be called Area Search Plans or Close Search Plans.

26. Location and Reporting of Enemy. Having located the object, an Enemy Contact
Report is made indicating the position of the object by the most expeditious means available.
This is followed by an Amplifying report after assessment of object course and speed and
includes other appropriate information on the object.

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27. Identification. Identification poses major problems, particularly when aircraft are not
permitted to close targets to visual identification range because of extended weapon ranges of
the target. The means of identification available to a scout could include the following:-

a. Visual Identification.

b. IFF.

c. ESM intercept analysis.

d. Intelligence on enemy.

e. Correlation of enemy plot with movements of own/friendly forces, assessment of

speeds, assessments of formations etc.

f. Declaration of War Zones or Exclusion Zone where in all unidentified targets are
presumed hostile and liable to be attacked. This is normally done by the government
and promulgated to all concerned.

28. Tracking/Shadowing. Having located and reported a target, a scout may be required
to track the target. The aim of tracking is to maintain touch with the enemy to periodically
report positions, movements and other details in order to home strike forces onto the enemy.
This creates problems for the scout, as once the enemy realizes that is has been located it will
endeavour to prevent the scout from further reports by all available means. The scout is then
required to take measures to evade detection and attack. These are called Gambit Tactics
wherein the scout opens out or closes contact, makes approaches from different directions, and
uses his active means of detection with discretion in order to evade the enemy whilst continuing
to perform its primary task of updating enemy reports periodically. This phase continues till the
strike materialist.

ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

29. Role. It is in the anti-submarine has hitherto been most efficiently used. Its traditional
role has been the interdiction of the enemy’s vital ocean supply line and the destruction of the
escort vessels employed to protect merchant shipping, on which, ultimately it preys.

30. Methods of Employment. The operating plans and targets for the submarine force can
be hidden from the victims until they are attacked in the various combat zones chosen. The
deployment of submarines must necessarily depend on the number available, density of
shipping traffic in the combat zone and the counter-measures expected to be encountered.

a. Lone Tactics. A lone submarine is profitable employed in areas where shipping

is not organized in convoys. Attacks and convoys are dangerous, since experience has
shown that the casualty rates of lone submarines would not justify their employment
against well-organized escort forces.

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b. Pack Tactics. When submarine operate in-groups, or packs as they are called,
their control and direction have to be highly organized. The success of packs, however,
can be very great and well-escorted convoys or combatant force must expect, and provide
for, this form of attack at all times.

METHODS OF ATTACK

31. The conventional submarines main weapon is the torpedo. Ranges of torpedoes vary, but
can be taken as between 5,000 to 20,000 meters depending on the type used. Modern torpedoes
are also wired guided.

32. In addition to torpedoes modern generation of submarines can also fire missiles.
Examples of sub-launched conventional anti-ship missiles are sub-Harpoon and Exsoset
(SM 39).

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

THE AIM OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

33. The aim of anti-submarine operations is to locate and destroy enemy submarines before
they can reach a position to threaten our sea communications. The planning of these operations
require an indication or estimate of enemy submarine positions on which to initiate a search
phase. If the search is successful, this followed by action phase. The action phase begins when a
contact is made and includes the subsequent attacks.

OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS

34. Aircraft are employed on anti-submarine offensive operations in the following ways:-

a. Search. They can search a specified area in which enemy submarines are know to
be operating.

b. Patrol. They can over a specified area in order to prohibit its use to submarines,
which may not be fully submerged.

35. Types of Operations. After the area has been chosen, it is necessary to decide which
type of operation is to be used. The choice between search and patrol will depend upon the
following:-

a. The amount of information available about the enemy’s probable locations.

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b. The air effort available.

c. Whether the operation is to be by day or by night.

d. The type of airborne detecting equipment available.

e. Knowledge of concurrent anti-submarine operations being conducted by friendly

forces.

36. Operations Near a Convoy. Aircraft change with the duty of protecting a
convoy from enemy submarine may be employed to provide either close or distant support and
may be required to co-operate with ASW surface or fighter aircraft.

HUNTER KILLER OPERATIONS

37. Many naval and/or shore-basted aircraft will work with surface force as an air-sea
hunting force known as a Hunter Killer Group. In offensive operation, this force will search
areas of submarine probability or hunt known submarine probability or hunt know submarines.
The area and type of operation will be selected in the same manner as for offensive operations
but the surface force available will further influence the selection.

38. Control of Aircraft. In Hunter killer operations aircraft are under the tactical control of
the senior naval officer of the force. One ship, a carrier if one is present, is made the air control
ship. It co-ordinates the activities of all the aircraft whether carder-borne or shore-based, in
accordance with the requirements of the OTC of the force.

39. Carrier-borne Aircraft. Carrier-borne anti-submarine aircraft although of

comparatively short range, are an extremely versatile force; they have advantage over shore-
based aircraft in that they are in more intimate contact with surface forces and the tactical
situation.

PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS

40. The Aim of Protective Operations. The aim of protective operation is to shield a
force or an area against submarine attaches. In these operation aircraft are generally used with
surface forces. Aircraft may be either carrier-bone or shore-based.

41. Convoy Defence. The defence of a convoy must be planned against attack from
aircraft, surface vessels and submarines. An appreciation of the importance of the convoy, the
area through which it must pass, and the type and scale of the attack anticipated, will govern
evasive routing and the composition of the escorting forces.

42. Convoys are protected from the three-types of attack in the following manner:-

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a. Ocean Convoys.

(1) Air Attack. The surface escort provides the normal anti-aircraft
protection. Shore-based fighters can provide air cover up to their effective
operating range. If a carrier is present, it will provide air cover beyond the range
of shore-based fighters.

(2) Surface Attacks. This is mainly a naval commitment, but under certain
circumstances shore-based air strike force may be used within their operational
radius of action.

(3) Submarine Attack. A combination of surface and force provides the best
protection.

b. Coastal Convoys. Coastal convoy may have the advantage of shore RADAR
coverage and shore-based fighter-aircraft. Surface and air antisubmarine escort forces are
provided when necessary.

c. Independently Routed Ships. Whenever possible, air escort is provided for

protection against air, surface or submarine attack. This is one of the few cases in which
aircraft alone may be used.

43. Defence Area. Past experience has shown that the best method of convoy protection
is provided by defence in depth; surface vessel provide the close escort, and aircraft from the
outer defence screen. This disposition is used with the aim of:-

a. Prohibiting the high- speed approach of surfaced submarines.

b. If possible, detecting and attacking before they have sighted the convoy.

c. Hampering a submarine’s movement when she is closing to intercept the

convoy.

d. Hunting and destroying submarines, which succeed in penetrating the

convoy, defence area.

CONVOY ESCORT FORCES

44. The sixe and strength of the convoy escort force depends on the enemy threat. Convoy
escort may include the following:-

a. Anti-Submarine Close Escort. ASW frigates or smaller ships to protect the

convoy from submarine attack.

b. Anti-Aircraft Close Escort. AA frigates to protect the convoy from air attack.

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c. Fighter Aircraft Escort. Aircraft to protect the convoy from air attack.

d. Anti-Submarine Aircraft Escort. Aircraft to protect the convoy from submarine

attack in co-operation with the ASW surface escort.

e. Heavy Surface Support Cruiser and destroyers, or carrier task groups to provide
protection against attacks by surface units.

45. Both carrier-borne and shore-based anti-submarine escort aircraft are employed to locate
report and destroy submarines, if possible before they convoy. Similarly, their carrier-borne or
shore-based aircraft may provide fighter escort.

CONSIDERATION IN THE USE OF AIRCRAFT

46. The use of aircraft alone as anti-submarine escort for shipping is limited to special tasks
and has the following disadvantages.

a. Aircraft have a limited endurance.

b. There may be jack of continuity of escort.

c. Aircraft are limited in their weapon carrying capacity.

d. Aircraft have difficulty in detecting, plotting, and attacking submerged

submarines.

e. Bad weather limits their operation.

47. Air escort whether used alone or in co-operation with surface forces can, by its presence
in an area discourages a submarine form surfacing or using her snort or periscope. This will
curtail the submarine’s efficiency and mobility in the following:-

a. Under certain circumstances, it prevents the submarine form reaching the most
advantageous position of attack.

b. It forces the submarine to use battery power even though it is fitted with snort.

48. ASW Helicopter. The anti-submarine helicopter is also capable of screening

operations. It can perform the following tasks:-

a. Screen a force.

b. Conduct sonar and visual searches.

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c. Make an urgent attack.

d. Fill gaps in the surface screen.

e. Provide advance sonar coverage into which the convoy may be turning.

ANTI-SURFACE UNIT WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

49. Apart from the threat posed by submarines and aircraft, the surface forces themselves
present a major threat to shipping at sea. Modern surface ships are armed with long range surface
to surface missiles. Most of these ships have integral helicopters. These helicopters can be-
utilized for scouting, over the horizon targeting and some of them can also launch anti operate in
groups as ‘Surface Action groups’ or also act as lone surface raiders.

50. To counter this threat, constant and deep air reconnaissance would be essential. Surface
and air forces should prosecute enemy forces once detected. Air attacks are the most effective
form of anti surface warfare as they can launch their attacks at stand off ranges.

51. Classes of Ships Targets. Ship targets can be divided into tow classes, warships and
merchant vessels. At sea, warships present a more difficult and formidable problem for attack
than merchant ships for they are fast, better armed and armoured. In harbours of protected
anchorage, the tactical problem is much the same for both types, although allowance must be
made for the thickness of the warship’s armour and effect of ship-borne AA armament, in
addition to the harbour derences.

52. Ship Vulnerability. However much it may be possible to strengthen the ship but it is
not feasible to discount damage by both missiles and conventional weapons, thus air attacks pose
a major threat to forces at sea.

53. Intelligence. The success of attacks against the enemy’s shipping is largely dependent
on accurate and up-to-date intelligence. Information on the location or movements of ships
cannot always be readily or easily collected. It must be built up from a number of sources of
which air reconnaissance is probably the most important. The search would need to cover wide
areas ranging form large expenses of open sea to the detailed reconnaissance of a particular port
or anchorage. Certain attacks need careful preparation and planning before they can be launched
some targets will be of such fleeting nature that only a minimum of pre parathion / briefing will
be possible and attacks on these will be successful only if suitably armed aircraft or standing by.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR STRIKES

54. Air strikes on naval units at sea have always been a specialist task and would need a
dedicated force for a measure of success. A strike on surface vessels is a complex and difficult
operation and calls for careful planning and meticulous tactical discipline in execution. The air
strike force, which is normally employed against shipping, is known as a strike wing. It
comprises tow or more squadrons in which some of the aircraft are armed and allotted for attacks
on merchant ships (independent or in convoy) while others are allocated for attacks against
surface escorting force in order to swamp their defensive fire.

55 Offensive air support missions involving strikes may be required at close or long ranges.
By day or night, in all weather against a wide variety of targets ranging from small, single units
to groups of larger naval assels capable of mutual air defence. Targets will need to be located,
identified and tracked by other aircraft and engaged promptly. Feasibility of attacks against
targets at longer ranges could be enhanced by:-

a. Deployment of aircraft at bases in proximity of the projected area of operation

keeping in view problems of maintenance and logistics support.

b. Extension of aircraft range through in-flight refueling. However, careful co-

ordination of such missions and need for safe and reliable RVs. would have to be taken
into account.

56. Some of the problems that shore-based aircraft would face in attacking naval unit’s vis-à-
vis land targets are:-

a. Problems of navigation over the sea where features are non-existent unless the
operations are near the coastline.

b. Continuous movement of targets from the last known position prior to strike force
takes off.

c. Manoeuvring by naval units and resultant weapon delivery problems.

d. Exposure to air defences of naval units other than the one being attacked.

e. A dense AD environment comprising AD aircraft, missiles, AD guns and possibly

the main guns of naval units.

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57. Modem strike however has the means to overcome the above problems as explained
below:-

a. Aircraft like F 16, Mirage, jaguar and Super Etendard have navigation systems,
which permit sufficiently accurate navigation up to ranges of 500 kms from the coast. A
friendly picket ship could also provide navigation up dates.

b. Movement of targets from the last known position could be monitored by

‘Shadowing’ MR aircraft and passed to strike aircraft just prior to attack. Use of modern
navigation aids such as GPS. A secure data link is also a feasible proposition.

c. Employment of low level, high speed, and single pass attacks using ECM.

d. Use of standoff and fire-and-forget weapons by aircraft fitted with state-of-art

navigation and weapon aiming systems. This was effectively demonstrated by the use of
except anti-shipping missiles by the Argentinean aircraft during the Falklands war.

58. Air launched missiles are currently a very effective weapon strikes against shipping.
They are generally launched at stand off distances, have sea-skimming capability, have terminal
guidance and are optimized for penetrating and burning for incapacitating a ship. The
characteristics of anti-shipping missiles ensure safety of releasing aircraft and make anti-missile
defences a difficult proposition.

59. Against unescorted merchantmen and in a less intense AD environment it may be feasible
to use aircraft with 1000-lb bombs and heavy caliber RPs. But there is no substitute for a
specialized force of jaguar/Mirage class of aircraft using latest navigation and weapon aiming
systems, data link between MR aircraft and strike aircraft, ECM and standoff weapons. These
would be imperative requirements if maritime offensive support were to be a viable operational
function.

TYPICAL MARITIME STRIKE

60. During operations, enemy ships may be located/detected by the following:-

(a) MR Aircraft.

(b) Own ships and submarines.

(c) Friendly merchant ships.

(d) Electronic intercepts.

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(e) Satellite Imagery (for large groups)

61. Once enemy shipping has been reported and identified, MR aircraft will shadow the
target, if the tactical situation and endurance of the aircraft permits, with a view to home on the
strike aircraft to the target.

62. Action by MR Aircraft. The MR aircraft on identification of the contact would:

a. Initiate enemy contact report and follow it up with amplifying report to MOC
giving the following details:-

(1) Composition.

(2) Position, course and speed.

b. Pass weather information in the area, giving –wind, Sea State, cloud amount with
base and visibility and subsequent changes of these to MOC.

c. Maintain contact/shadow in accordance with the existing policy, keeping outside

the enemy weapon range and update and relay information as necessary to MOR.

63. Shore based strike aircraft will normally be employed against all enemy warships and
merchant vessels up to their radius of action form their operating base. The type of target to be
attacked will depend upon the capability of strike aircraft available at that time. The type of
strike aircraft available will also govern night attack capability at that time. Maritime elements of
Air Force at MOC will indicate the strike force level at their strike capability.

MARITIME AIR DEFENCE

INTRODUCTION

64. The first step in air defence is to define the threat. Knowledge of the capability of the
enemy, his weapon system; the training standards of his aircrews, the disposition of his forces
and the capability of his command and control systems are among the factors which need to be
assessed in order to determine his likely course of action.

65. The major air threats to surface shipping are from land-based/carrier borne aircraft armed
with air-to-surface fired at stand off rangers. The threats may also be from surface or sub
launched missiles fired with over-the horizon targeting.

66. Offensive Defence. One sure way of removing a threat before it surprises a surface
force it to attack the threat at source. Rather than wait for a defence action, it may be preferable
to attack the strike force at their base. Attacks against maritime strike aircraft bases therefore

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make a significant contribution to the battle at sea, even through overland squadrons might
accomplish the attack.

PHASES IN AIR DEFENCE

67. Defence against air strikes at sea can be broken down into four phases:-

a. Detection of aircraft from the greatest possible distance

b. Accurate location by a system of co-ordinates

c. Positive identification

d. Interception and destruction

68. The success of each phase depends on the success of the preceding phase. However, early
detection at the greatest possible range and the institution of counter measures before the attack
is launched remain the most difficult of problems.

69. Detection. This is provided by the use of AEW aircraft patrolling well outside the
RADAR horizon of the force. Surface ships flung out in the role of air-defence pickets back
them up.

70. Location. The Control ship in the force carries out the establishment of the location
of the air strike by a system of co-ordinates, by filtering all reports received from AEW aircraft
and pickets.

71. Identification: IFF. This can be carried out by the AEW aircraft or pickets.
Identification in air defence at sea is relatively easier than in the case of air defence over the
ground, since there are fewer unknown aircraft movement over the sea than over land.

72. Interception. It is longer possible to defend a naval force with fighters patrolling in
close proximity to it. Interceptions must, therefore, be made at considerable distance from the
force. While ship borne weapons systems can cope with a close-in threat fairly adequately, a
strike aircraft carrying stand-off weapons must be dealt with by an interceptor having high speed,
an exceptional rate of climb with air-to-air missiles.

73. Layered Air Defence. Modern naval air defence systems at sea will have a
combination of interceptors using air-to-air guided weapons and ship-to-air guided weapons with
early warning being provided by RADAR surveillance, both by AEW aircraft and surface
pickets. In essence, air defence from the sea is ‘layered’ from the point of origin of the threat to
its intended point of impact.

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74. Air Defence Formations. Force at are of the following two types:-

a. Combatant forces.

b. Convoys.

75. The defence formation of a force at sea depends on its composition as give in the
succeeding paragraphs.

76. Combatant Forces. Combatant forces always move in formation. The choice of
formations is dependent on their composition and the nature of the expected threat. Against an
expected air threat, and provided sufficient escorts are available, a combatant force will be in
circular formation, with the main body, usually a carries, forming the core. In this way, all round
AA defence is possible. Considerable dispersion of ship may be necessary in view on a possible
nuclear threat. Individual ships are free to maneuver as necessary to take avoiding action and the
force can also easily manoeuvre as whole.

77. Where a combination of an air/underwater threat exists a semi-circular formation is

adopted, so as to provide a balance between the provision of all round protection and an
unbroken sonar front. Alteration of course of the provision of all round protection and unbroken
sonar front. Alteration of course of the force has, however, to be preceded by a rotation of the
screen axis to enable ASW protection to be provided to the main body on the new course.

78. Convoys. Since merchant ship formations are neither easily manoeuvrable non fitted
with any but most elementary forms of AA defence armament, the close surface escorts have to
take all measures for the AA defence of the convoy.

79. Convoy escorts are so stationed as to provide an anti-submarine screen in depth. AA

frigates are however stationed where they can move in rapidly to provide AA defence. When air
attack is imminent, all escort move closer to the convoy to take up a specified AA screening
formation.

80. The covering force, if available, would normally augment the AA defence of the convoy.
However, if a carries is present in the covering force, it would be more expedient and convenient
for the force to remain detached so as not to restrict its manoeuvring capability in any way. The
force would provide aircraft for the air defence of both the convoy and itself.

ADVANTAGES OF LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT

81. Land-based aircraft offers significant feature in their contribution to the defensive battle
at sea. Land-based AEW aircraft are larger, capable machines carrying large crew whom man
several control consoles. The aircraft can be deployed rapidly to distend patrol areas and can
loiter on patrol for several hours. The communication systems in the modern AEW aircraft are
also extremely effective.

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82. The land-based interceptor is generally more heavily armed than his carrier-borne
counterpart. It can also transit rap-idly to the combat air patrol (CAP) position and can remain on
it for many hours provided air to air refueling support is made available. But due to the transit
time, land based fighters will always have to be airborne on a CAP position if the surface fleet is
some distance away from a fighter base. The need to rely on a land-based fighter held at ground
alert to scramble in time to meet the rapidly closing threat is not an attractive preposition to any
officer in tactical command at sea. He would rather use his indigenous assets or have land-based
fighters in already airborne well up-threat.

83. The greater contribution made by the land-based aircraft is in long-range, high-speed, log
loiter time and high weapon-load capabilities, as exemplified in the AEW aircraft and in fighters
when supported by tanker aircraft. The Fighters in particular make their contribution by forming
the outer layered defence system around a surface force.

OVERLAPPING AIR DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

84. As dictated by geography, one air-defence CAP ordered to protect on force may, at the
same time, either purposefully or inadvertently, be also protecting another asset. A strike force
when detected by an AEW aircraft may be heading in such a direction as to threaten a particular
surface force. However, because of the geography and the tactical situation, the aircraft may not
be intending to attack that force at all. Their proximity to the force may be purely coincidental as
they transit to the area to reach their assigned target beyond the surface force.

85. A strategically placed AAEW aircraft, with its associated fighters on CAP and their
tanker support, may effectively cover the approach routes to more than one target. The fighters
may from the outer layer of more than one layered defensive system at a time. While this may
appear cost effective, great care has to be exercised in station priorities for the fighters and
organizing contingency plans to ensure that one task is not pursued to the detriment of the other.

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CHAPTER 13

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF HELICOPTERS

INTRODUCTION

1. Although Leonardo Da Vinci had sketched a man carrying ‘air gyroscope’ around 1500AD, it
was not until the Second World War that versatile aircraft came into general use throughout the
world. While many experimental models were developed prior to the 1936, the first practical
helicopter to be developed and proved was Focke-Achegelic FW-61. It was developed by a German
and was successfully demonstrated to the public in Berlin during 1936. The next year, it went on to
establish a speed record of 2.5 km and 1 h 20 Mtr, respectively with a payload of 80kg. In 1942,
Sikorsky introduced his R-4B, which ultimately emerged as the first helicopter to go into production.

2. Since then, the helicopter has improved its performance in many folds. The Mi-26, a Russian
heavy lift helicopter is capable of carrying over 20 000kg to an altitude of 5:6 km. Many helicopter
are now capable of speeds in the region of 350 km/h they are more versatile, reliable and safe.
Revolutionary changes that are taking place in helicopter design and technology today are bound to
produce helicopters with improved capability and performance for versatile employment.

3. The potential of the helicopter as a weapon platform was first realized by the French army and
was put to good use in their campaign in Algeria. During Sept 67, Huey Cobra helicopters (gun
ships) were introduced in Vietnam. They proved to be important fire support weapon systems in the
conflict. Though their performance was remarkable, often the aircraft performed beyond design
envelopes. In the 70s and 80s many leading helicopter manufactures set in motion a series of
programmes aimed at elimination helicopter deficiencies as well as adding lethality, mission
versatility, range, survivability and reliability

CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS

CHARACTERISTICS

4. General. Conventional aircraft derive their lift from fixed aerofoil surfaces or wings. To
develop lift, these surfaces have to be moved at certain minimum forward speeds. This necessitates
the runway or running take-off. On the other hand, the helicopter derives lift from rotating aerofoil
surfaces, collectively called the rotor. The rotary movement of the aerofoil surfaces are
predetermined revolutions per minute, providing them with the required speed to develop lift. This
method of lift development characterizes the helicopter with the ability:-

a. To take-off and land vertically (VTOL).

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b. To hover. Hover is a condition of flight wherein the aircraft maintains a constant

ground position: It is also defined as flight at zero speed.

c. To move sideways and backward.

5. Factors Affecting VTOL Performance. In condition, the helicopter may have to use
either a short Take-Off or Landing run (STOL). Such a situation could normally arise when the
power required for a VTOL operation cannot be met. This is generally on account of one or a
combination of the following factors.

a. All Up Weight (AUW). The total weight of an aircraft at the moment of take-off
or landing is the basic deciding factor for power requirements. Greater the AUW, greater is
the power required.

b. Air Density. High altitude, high ambient temperature and high humidity conditions
contribute individually and in combination to the reduction of air density. Lower the air
density, greater the power required for the same AUW. Therefore, the AUW would have to be
reduced to compensate for any reduction in air density; this can be effect only by as reduction
in payload. For example, at a density altitude of about 2-00m, the Chetak can lift an AUW of
approximately 2100kg; however, at 5700 m the AUW lift capability is reduced to
approximately 1600kg.

c. Winds. Like conventional aircraft, helicopters take off/land most efficiently when
pointed into wind. Stronger the head winds the more efficiently the helicopter will behave
during take-offs and landing thus permitting an increase in the AUW. Power required
increases considerably in nil/tailwind conditions with attendant penalties in the AUW.

Note: It must be noted that STOL operations may not airways be possible due to
the surface condition of the helipad. Also, same helicopters are equipped with
skids and are therefore not capable of carrying out running take-offs and landings.
Also, loads on under carriage impose a restriction

6. Types of Hover. There are two types of hover, namely-in ground Effect (IGE) and out of
Ground Effect (OGE). When hovering, the rotor forces a downward column of air. When hovering
close to ground, a large portion of this air is deflected upwards by the restrictive action of the
ground. This creates an area of increased pressure between the rotor and the ground; when this
condition is mer, the helicopter is said to hover IGE. However, due to the greater distance between
the rotor and the ground during an OGE hover, no increase in pressure takes place, and the hover is
sustained purely by the power of the engine and rotor rpm. Hence, the power required for given
AUW would be less for an IGE hover than for an OGE hover.

7. Ceilings. Helicopter performance is also dependant on three ceilings- Service, Hover

IGE and Hover OGE. Service Ceiling is said to be reached when the rate of climb equals 0.5 m/sec.
The hover ceilings are attained when the helicopter is usable to maintain the hover, i.e. is insufficient
to keep it airborne at zero speed, within the laid down design parameters, all three ceiling can be
raised by reduction of the AUW. To a large extent, the ceiling capabilities decide the limits of high

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altitude operations of helicopters. One of the most important effects altitude has on planning is the
size of helipads.

ADVANTAGES

8. a. Ubiquity. The ability of the helicopter to operate from almost anywhere and
everywhere is its principal advantage. It does not require a runway as in the case of fixed
wing aircraft and in most cases can operate from unprepared surfaces. Where landing is
not possible for any reason, the machine is capable of operating at hover and delivering
or lifting its assigned payload. This ubiquity permits rapid movement and development
of personnel and equipment; in the cases of the attack helicopter, this characteristic
permits rapid and lethal concentration of fire.

b. Role Flexibility. Role Flexibility of most general purpose helicopters is the next
most important advantage the air planner enjoys when utilizing this machine, It can be
rapidly converted to carry out various tasks such as casualty evacuation (casevac), rescue with
hoist, external load carriage of large and bulky equipment, assault, attack etc.

c. Logistics Support. The helicopter can provide logistics support of even such
confines areas where fixed wing cannot reach e.g. very narrow valley. When compared to para
dropping of supplies and equipment, the helicopter guarantees loss-free deliveries. Also
specialized containers if used can be easily recovered after delivery of the stores.

d. Vertical Envelopment. In the case of the helicopter, vertical envelopment may be

feasible without the need for a link up. After the mission is completed, the assault force could
be extracted by helicopter. If required, the same force could be redeployed repeatedly in a
leapfrog manner in support of the main force. The tactical application of this advantage is
limited only by the imagination of the commander.

e. Flight Versatility. Because of its ability to remain airborne at all speeds (i.e. zero
to its maximum speed), the helicopter can fly safely and efficiently at very low heights. This
permits use of terrain for cover and concealment, and is the major source of survivability for
the battlefield helicopter.

f. Weather. Because of its flight versatility, the helicopter can be flown in most
conditions of precipitation and poor visibility. Its low height-low speed capability permits the
pilot to fly the helicopter in weather conditions, which normally ground fixed wing aircraft.
Provision of better avionics today has further enhanced its all weather operation.

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LIMITATIONS

9. Helicopters suffer from a few, but nevertheless serious limitations when compared to fixed
wing aircraft. Through research and development, these limitations will be reduced to a large degree;
but it is extremely doubtful that they will be wholly overcome. Some of the major limitations are
sted below:-

a. Speed. The fastest that an operational helicopter has flown to date is in the region of
400km/h. however, the average top speed for most helicopters is between 200 and 300 km/h.
these speeds are indeed low when compared to the speed attained by fixed wing aircraft.

b. Fuel Consumption. The fuel consumption is considerably higher than

conventional aircraft in the same weight class.

c. Range. The high fuel consumption has greatly restricted the range capability of
helicopters. The average range of today’s helicopters is of the order of 500 km. However
aerial refuelling in helicopters is also possible now.

d. Payload. The payload capacity in helicopters gets severely curtailed with

increase in altitude. In addition, a combination of range requirements and fuel consumption
further aggravates the payload problem. Condition of the helipad, i.e. its take-off and
approach paths also affect the payload capacity.

e. Maintenance. Though rapid strides are being made in easing maintenance problems,
it is still a more difficult machine to maintain than a conventional aircraft because of a large
number of moving parts.

f. Cost. The basic machine is practically four to five times as expensive as a

comparable fixed wing aircraft. Also the cost per tone kilometer is roughly two to three times
that of moving parts.

g. Pilot Fatigue. Due to the large number of rotating components in a helicopter, the
machine is characterized by high vibration levels. These vibrations, which are almost totally
absent in conventional aircraft, are responsible for early onset of pilot fatigue; the instability
necessitates constant tending to the flight controls by the pilot, which in turn demands
concentration and continuous physical effort. Pilot fatigue requires that aircrews be turned
around more often that in the case of fixed wing aircraft. In newer generations, an autopilot
has considerably reduced the workload on pilots.

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CLASSIFICATION OF HELICOPTERS

10. General. The classification of helicopters into well-defined categories has been rendered
difficult on account of the role flexibility of the machine. Therefore, no detailed classification is
proposed here, and for the purpose of study the following broad classifications will suffice:-

a. Utility Helicopter.

b. Transport Helicopter.

c. Armed or Attack Helicopter.

Broad qualitative requirements of the above three classes of helicopters are discussed in the
subsequent paras.

11. Utility Helicopter. The utility helicopter would essentially be a light, unarmed aircraft
with good all round field of vision; permitting its use for reconnaissance. To ensure a degree of
survivability against small arms fire, as also to permit its use under difficult climatic and terrain
conditions, its condition would have to be robust. Along with the capability to carry out hoist
operations and move understand loads, the aircraft should preferably be capable of carrying two
stretcher casualties or four passengers. To permit its use in the radio relay role, it would be desirable
that the aircraft’s avionics fit has the capability to accept radio equipment as used but the ground
forces. In terms of flight capabilities the aircraft should have a top speed capability in the region of
200 km/h, the ability to operate at altitudes up to five km, and radius of action capability (depending
on AUW and altitude)b extending from 150 to 200km.

12. Transport Helicopter. The transport helicopter would be a medium sized aircraft
designed to carry a specified number of troops. The type and quantity of equipment would be
essentially dictated by the proposed utilization of the helicopter in the battlefield. In addition it would
be desirable that the helicopter has the capability of carrying externally slung loads, such as heavy
mortars and light guns, thus allowing for rapid induction and deployment in battle. To confer a degree
of survivability on this otherwise vulnerable vehicle, the transport helicopter would have to be
integrally equipped with button-on armament to provide suppressive fire during induction of troops
equipment. To enable rapid battlefield egress the transport helicopter would have to capable of fairly
high speeds in the region of 250 km/h. In the context of mountain warfare, the helicopter should be
capable of operating up to an altitude of 4.5 Km; without undue reduction in the payload over a radius
of action approximating 150 km.

13. Armed or Attack Helicopter. The term ‘Armed helicopter’ implies general utility
helicopter retrofitted with armament, which may include anti-tank guided missiles, cannons or
machine guns, grenade launchers, rocket projectiles and so on; this button-on capability is without
prejudice to the other roles and tasks the helicopter is capable of. In contrast, the ‘Attack roles and
tasks the helicopter is a machine specially designed and built for the offensive role; the weapons and
sighting system re permanent fits thus making the entire machine a complete and dedicated weapons
system.

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14. In case, whether it be an armed or attack helicopter, the aircraft would have to be capable of
carrying substantial amounts of munitions even in adverse density altitude conditions. It would also
have to be agile and capable of high battlefield ingress/egress speed; these capabilities would permit,
terrain-masking tactics, so essential in a hostile environment. For the ground commander to use this
weapons system effectively, the armed or attack helicopter must possess combat endurance in the
region of 30 minutes at a radius of action at least 50 km.

15. In the context of modern day warfare, the armed or attack helicopter would also have to
possess night fighting capability. To this end, it would have to be fitted with suitable optical and
sensing devices.

ROLES AND TASKS

16. Utility Helicopter. Taking into account the capability of the utility/general purpose
helicopter, the roles and tasks it would be best suited for are as under:-

a. Airborne Forward Air Controller Platform. As a platform for the Forward Air
Controller, (FAC) the helicopter bestows many advantages when compared to the ground
based Forward Air Controller. Some of the advantages are;-greater range of vision; greater
radio range; accurate direction and control of fire; and rapid redeployment to different
localities for direction and control of more than one close air support mission during a single
sortie. In mountainous terrain, the Airborne FAC will most obviously be at an advantage over
the ground based FAC on account of the latter’s restricted mobility. This helicopter is suitable
for the scout role.

b. Air Observation Post (Air OP). In the Air OP role, the helicopter is superior to
its fixed wing counterpart on account of its VTOL and hover capability. This permits the pilot
to vary his tactics thus ensuring surprise and survivability. When compared to the ground
based Observation, the advantages accruing are the same as those applicable to the Airborne
FAC.

c. Search and rescue. Being light and because of good cockpit visibility, suitable for
SAR ops. The height weight will permit landing with minimum clearance. The
manoeuvrability will permit tactical SAR also.

d. Air Reconnaissance Platform. It can provide immediate reconnaissance from own

side of the forward edge of the battle area forward line of own troops (FLOT). However, it
would have to be restricted to close tactical reconnaissance on account of its vulnerability to
enemy ground action. In this rile, it would also be a useful platform to provide the ground
commander with a bird’s eye view of the battle zone.

e. Miscellaneous Roles and Tasks. The general purpose helicopter could also be used
for communications flight, column control, camouflage inspection, topographical survey,
airborne radio relay, laser designation, courier duties, limited casevac and load carriage, and

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as an airborne command post. Also, it is an invaluable vehicle in counter insurgency and psy
war operations as also for clandestine missions.

17. Transport Helicopter. The transport helicopter is capable of undertaking a host of

military tasks by virtue of its size and lift capability. Some of the major battlefield tasks that it may be
used for are enumerated below:

a. Tactical movement of troops, weapons and stores in the assault role, during
redeployment and infiltration operations including SHBO.

b. Resupply and maintenance, including recovery of drop equipment.

c. Electronic Warfare. For this role, the helicopter would have to be fitted with suitable
electronic equipment. Retrofitting such equipment should not pose a problem, as the aircraft
possess adequate space.

d. A host Naval roles e.g. anti sub, anti ship, AEW, Mine sweeping etc.

18. Armed or Attack Helicopter. One of the principle roles of the attack helicopter would be
the engagement of enemy thanks. Other major tasks for attack/armed helicopter is:-

a. To provide close fire support to ground troops. This would be most useful and
valuable in conditions where artillery or fighter ground attack fire support is either not
available, or is likely to be less effective. Such conditions may arise in hilly or mountainous
regions where terrain and attendant development problems could acquisition considerations
may preclude the use of ground attack fighters. On account of its variable speed and hover
capabilities, engagement in various situations, and thus ensure greater safety for own troops as
well.

b. To provide route cover and suppressive fire to heli-borne assaults as a means of

creating a favourable ground situation outside artillery range.

c. To provide air deference covers against enemy armed or attack helicopters.

d. To engage enemy helicopters involved in troop carriage, reconnaissance and

communications.

e. Interdiction of targets in and close to the TBA.

f. Battlefield air strikes.

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ATTACK HELECOPTERS

EVOLUTION

19. Helicopters were not designed from the outset as an aerial weapon system. In the early 1950s,
the French in Vietnam and the US army in Korea windows using side arms and light machine guns
resorted to side ward firing from the helicopters. It was the Algerian War (1956), however, that
provided the first incentive for helicopter armament development. During this war against guerrillas,
the French armed their Alouettes and A-55s with machine guns, rockets, and later guided missiles.

20. The success of the French experiment led the US army Vietnams and the British in Malaya, to
arm their helicopters giving birth to the concept helicopter of armed with machine guns and grenade
launchers as escorts to troop carrying/casevac helicopters in Vietnam. Subsequently their armed UH-
1 Hueys become knows as the ‘Gunships’ on the other side the Russian Mi-1 and Mi-4 (HOUND)
were also being teste3d with various types of arms fitted on them.

21. The success of the armed helicopters in Vietnam led to the birth of a dedicated 9Attac
helicopters’ (AH) in the form of Huey Cobra in 1967. Since, then the place of Development of Ahs
has been rapid and the world has seen a host of versatile dedicated Ahs like the Soviet Hind, US
Apache and the Italian Mangusta to name a few.

CHARACTERISTICS

22. The AH is also basically a helicopter, and hence has all the normal characteristics of any
helicopter. However, being specially designed for the attack role, it would have the following special
characteristics in varying degrees.

23. Fire Power. An AH would normally be able to carry a mix of various type of armament
along with suitable aiming/sight system. The type of arraignment/weapons could include:-

a. Air to Ground Missiles (particularly anti-tank.).

b. Rocket Projectiles of various calibers.

c. Guns-of various bores. These could be fixed or swiveling. The guns could also be
padded or strapped on.

d. Bombs.

e. Grenade launchers.

f. Mine dispensers.

g. Air to Air Missiles.

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24. Survivability. An AH would be required to fight in a lethal and hostile Tactical Battle
Area. To enhance its survivability in the TBA, an AH would normally have some special
survivability features like:-

a. Armour protection for vital components and crew cabin.

b. Redundancy of essential systems.

c. Low thermal, RADAR and acoustic signature.

d. ECM protection.

e. Capability to absorb hit and crash worthiness

25. Performance. Certain features of performance would be more dominant in an AH. For
example:

a. Manoeuvrability. AHs would generally be more maneuverable than other utility/

Bad Weather Capability. This would include capability to engage targets by night. For
this the AH’s may be equipped with special aids to permit flying in bad weather and night,
and also to acquire targets (NVG/FLIR).

b. Night/ Bad Weather Capability. This would include capability to engage target by
night by night. For this the AH’s may be equipped with special aids to permit flying in bad
weather and night, and also to acquire targets (NVG/FLR).

c. Avionics. Appropriate avionics including accurate nave aids would be a feature of

AHs to assist the pilots in accurate flying and navigation, as also precision attacks.

d. Infrastructure. An AH, being a fairly complicated system. Requires a fair

amount of infrastructure for routine servicing and system testing. This tends to limit its easy
operation from field conditions. Armament replenishment also poses some problems in this
respect.

26. Tasks. There is no limit to the tasks which an AH can perform. These are limited only by
the imagination of the commander in the field. Some of the conventional tasks for an AH are listed
below:

a. Anti-armour.

b. Close Air Support (CAS).

c. Interdiction.

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d. Precision/Surgical strikes.

e. Escort to SHBO.

f. Escort to convoys.

g. Anti-helicopter operations.

CONCLUSION

27. Attack helicopters have evolved extremely rapidly from a utility helicopter fitted with a
machinegun to today’s lethal weapon system incorporating the state of the art technologies.
Considering its envisaged key role in future wars, the AH is likely to continue occupying the center
stage as weapon system in time to com, and develop further. It has proved a force multiplier in so far
as surface operations are concerned, and its imaginative use by a commander will always tilt the
balance in his favour. Keeping in mind the likely characteristics of future wars i.e. mobility, fluidity,
speed, intensity, lethality, rapidity and spread over vast areas, it may not too far fetched to imagine
the AH overshadowing the tank as the main fighting vehicle.

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CHAPTER 14

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS

1. Air Forces are not generally structured to deal with LIC situations. This is because
national decisions made in the past dictated that the bulk of the defence budget went to
preparations for the higher intensity conflict threats. The dilemma is how much can an air force
re-programme form deterring those, and from being prepared to meet them, in to preparations for
low intensity conflicts situating to meet the need of LIC.

2. The key to success in LIC operations is excellent intelligence and the ability to react
quickly and effectively when the situation warrants, both of which rely heavily on air support.
Co-ordinated small unit action supported by air can prove to be very effective with air power
contribution in times of mobility and flexibility. Some of the tenets in the employment of air
power in LIC situations are:-

a. LICO are joint operations that require close and continuous liaison with the
surface forces.

b. The most vital function is tactical support, including airlift and reconnaissance.
Air strikes may offer only a small pay-off for the effort expended, but at times, they
would be absolutely essential.

c. The intelligent function is the most difficult to perform well, but it is vital. The
use of RPVs surveillance and reconnaissance roles can greatly reduce the problems
associated in intelligence gathering.

d. Aircraft can perform well in the psychological operations role, although their
success is difficult to measure.

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

3. Today the smallest Anti National Element (ANE) Insurgent group has access to the arms
bazaar, providing them state of the art shoulder-fired SAMs. This makes the employment of air
power in LICO even more complicated. Some essentials which must be considered before
employing air power in a LICO Situation are:-

a. Intelligence. The foremost operational requirement is to know the

strength and deposition of the insurgents, their logistical infrastructure including
bases, infiltration/exfiltration routes from neighbouring countries, strengths and
vulnerabilities.

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b. Communication. In a LIC Situation air operations may have to be

conducted from semi-permanent or dispersed locations. Air Force operating under
such conditions would have to be provided secure communication to link them
not only with the rear areas but also with the surface forces participating in the
operations.

c. Authority. Authority in to LICO should be delegated to the, on-the

scene commander. The insurgents could often interpret procrastination as a
weakness in air action of the government. Timely action during early stages of a
situation greatly increases the likelihood of success of the air operation.

d. Joint Planning. Air Force involvement in LICO has to be embedded

intimately with the role of the Army/Navy. Good understanding and joint
planning between the services would provide synergy in effort as well as prevent
fratricide.

e. Self Defence Capability. In view of the threat post by shoulder-fired

SAMs, all AF aircraft whether combat, transport or helicopters should have n
inherent capability to protect themselves form SAMs. All aircraft involved must
have missile approach warning suites and flare dispensers and other electronic
counter measures. Suitable procedures, tactics and training for the same would
have to be evolved.

AIR POWER ROLE IN LICO

4. Depending on the peculiarity of the situation, LICO would demand prosecution of all or
any of the air campaigns, viz Counter Air, Strategic or Counter Surface Force. All or many of the
combat Support elements could also be employed. The following specific roles could be
envisaged:

a. Air interdiction. Fighters or attack helicopters could be used to interdict

supply lines, over land or by sea/river routes. However, the effect of interdiction in a
LICO situation would depend on the terrain as well as the degree of dependency of the
enemy on conventional supply lines. Offensive air strikes against maritime targets could
also be envisaged.

b. Air Transport. Transport aircraft and helicopters would have a major role
to play in LICO. Transport aircraft could move ground troops rapidly from area to area
and enable concentration of effort. They could also be used for air delivered- supply of
own troops in enemy area. Helicopters would find employment in heliborne assault roles,
surveillance, casualty evacuation, air supply and psyops roles.

c. EW. Electronic support and warfare assets would have to be utilized to

penetrate the enemy’s communication network and to deny penetration of own

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communications network. Army/Navy/Civil intelligence Agencies/EW assets will have to

be suitable integrated COMINT would play a very important role in LICO situations.

d. Punitive Strikes. Direct air attacks on insurgent strongholds would need to

be done either to soften them before ground action or to send the desired political signals.
Punitive strides may either be carried out against insurgent activity both within the own
territory and across the international borders. However these operations require careful
planning and proper execution because of the high risk of co-lateral damage which could
bring unexpected results. Use of air power in Afganistan by the Russians could be taken
as improper use of air power in LICO. Air operations conducted by the SLAF in the
North and East of Sri Lanka provide an example for positive application.

e. Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Constant of insurgent activity enables

timely reaction to their operations. Aircraft, UAVS or even space- based systems may be
employed to carry out the surveillance. Reconnaissance would be necessary to locate and
identify insurgent dispositions, supply routes and dumps. UAVs can be particularly
useful in this role.

f. Psy Ops. Air Power can be employed to carry out psychological operations
through operations such as leaflet dropping and voice communications using loud
speakers and hailers: National level planning and exploit the scope of these operations.

5. Limitations in LICO. The following limitations need to be considered while

employing Air power in LICO.

a. Successful air strikes depend on high-grade intelligence on exact location of

targets.

b. The targets may not always be clearly identifiable or easily acquired.

c. Targets may be located in the vicinity of populated areas. Therefore, precision

munitions are necessary to avoid used collateral damage.

d. SEAD operations, in the classical sense, would not be possible in a LIC situation
against portable/ concealable air defence systems such as shoulder fried SAAMs
Therefore, attacking aircraft would have to rely more on defensive measures.

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Bibliography

1. The Art of War - Sun Tzu

2. On War - Carl Von Clausewitz
3. Arthashastra - Kautilya
4. Strategy and Tactics of War - Marshall Cavendish
5. War - Gwyn Dyer
6. AP 1300 - ACM Sir Peter Harding
7. Air Book - DSSC, Wellington, India
8. Air Ops Book - CAW, Secunderabad, India
9. Strategic Strike Operations - DSSC, Wellington, India
10. Aerial Reconnaissance - DSSC, Wellington, India
11. Maritime Air Operation - DSSC, Wellington, India

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