Infinite Times and Spaces in the Later Middle Ages

JOHN E . MURDOCH (Cambridge, Mass.)

In all, or at least most, topics in medieval natural philosophy, it is well to

get one's head as clear as possible about what Aristotle may have had to say
about the topic or problem in question. Thus, we should proceed to that
task first.
In analyzing the opening chapters of Book IV of the Physics, a recent
historian of science and, in agreement with him, Albert Einstein, charac-
terized what Aristode had developed in these chapters as a concept of "space
as positional quality of the world of material objects" 1 . Inasmuch as this
characterization occurs in a general history of the theories of space in physics,
perhaps they had in the back of their mind something of the nature of what
Sir David Ross had to say in the introduction to his well-known edition of
the Greek text of the Physics, to wit: "The doctrine of place in the Physics
is not a doctrine of space. Neither here nor elsewhere does Aristode say
much about space, chôra, and he cannot be said to have a theory about it 2 ."
It is true that Aristode occasionally does use topos or place as a synonym for
chora. Yet when spatial concepts do play an important role in Aristotle's natu-
ral philosophy the terms involved are megethos or (less frequendy) diastema.
And these terms in turn almost always come with a concern about motion
and about its concomitant, time.
This talk about magnitude, motion, and time will, of course, be the major
topic of Book VI of the Physics; but in his analysis of time in Book IV,
Aristotle had already announced where he was going:
But what is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude is
continuous. Therefore, the movement goes with the magnitude. Because the mag-
nitude is continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the movement,
then the time; for the time that has passed is always thought to be in proportion
to the movement ( 2 1 9 a l 0 - 1 4 ) .

That is, when he arrives at Book VI his fundamental concern will be to

establish the essential continuity of all three of these factors: magnitude,

1 M. Jammer, Concepts of Space. The History of Theories of Space in Physics, with a fore-
word by Albert Einstein, Cambridge, Mass. 1954, xiv, 15, 23.
2 W D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford
1936, 54.

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 Infinite Times and Spaces in the Later Middle Ages 195

motion, and time. This is crucial to Aristotelian physics because all processes
occurring within nature are continuous (such as local motion or qualitative
or quantitative change) or occur within the background of a continuous time
(such as, to take Aristotle's own example, something being white after not-
being white). In any case, natural events that take no time at all, such as the
illumination of a medium and the phenomenon of freezing, are clearly the
exception and not the rule 3 .
Now, although Aristotle begins this all-important analysis of continuity in
Book VI of the Physics by defining what things are continuous (things being
continuous if the extremities of their parts are one), showing how any
doctrine of indivisibles fails to meet this requirement, and then moves on to
the fact that anything continuous is infinitely divisible, his reasoning only
really gets going when he brings in what is of primary interest to him, namely,
the introduction of the phenomenon of motion into the argument.
Let us cite at least two of these arguments at some length, while noting
(1) what basic assumptions were made by Aristotle in these arguments and
(2) what the atomiste (of both Antiquity and the Middle Ages) made of them.
After all, Aristotle was an arch-continuist, while atomiste were, for the most
part, adamant discontinuists.
Aristotle begins the first argument about motion in chapter one of
Book VI with the proviso that:
The same reasoning applies equally to magnitude, to time, and to motion: either
all of these are composed of indivisibles and are divisible into indivisibles, or none.
This may be made clear as follows (fig. 1).

A B C
Magnitude | | | |

Motion ιD ιE ι F
ι

Figi

If a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, the motion over that magnitude must be com-
posed of corresponding indivisible motions: e. g., if the magnitude ABC is composed of the
indivisibles A, B, C, each corresponding part of the motion DEF of some mobile over ABC
is indivisible. (...) So the mobile traversed A when its motion was D, Β when its motion was
E, and C similarly when its motion was E Now a thing that is in motion from one place to
another cannot at the moment when it was in motion be both in morion and at the same
time have completed its motion at the place to which it was in morion: e. g., if a man is
walking to Thebes, he cannot be walking to Thebes and at the same time have completed
his walk to Thebes: and, as we saw, a mobile traverses the pardess section A in virtue of the
presence of the morion D. Consequently, if the mobile had actually passed through A after
being in the process of passing through, the motion must be divisible: for at the time when

3 Aristode, Physics, VIII, c. 3, 2 5 3 b l 4 - 2 6 ; De sensu, c. 6, 446b27-447a6.

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196 John E. Murdoch

the mobile was passing through, it neither was at rest nor had completed its passage but was
in an intermediate state: while if it is passing through and has completed its passage at the
same moment, then that which is walking will at the moment when it is walking have com-
pleted its walk and will be in the place to which it is walking; that is to say, it will have
completed its motion at the place to which it is in motion. (...) Then the motion will consist
not of motions but of starts, and will take place by a thing's having completed a motion
without being in motion ( 2 3 1 b l 8 - 2 3 2 a 9 ) .

The first atomist reaction to this argument of which we know is that of

Epicurus, preserved for us by Themistius and Simplicius in their commentar-
ies on the Physics4. Epicurus appealed to a remedy, Themistius tells us, that
was less palatable than the sickness that he was trying to cure, for he main-
tained that "the mobile moves over the whole segment ABC, but over each
of the indivisible segments constituting the whole, it does not move, but
rather only has moved" {ou kineitai alla kekinêtai). Motion is, then, composed
of indivisibles, of "has-moveds."
Epicurus' conception of motion was surely a discontinuous one. But so
were those of fourteenth-century medieval atomiste' or indivisiblists' who,
while not knowing Epicurus' view of this argument at all, talked about an
equally discontinuous motion being composed of mota esse or mutata esse,
clearly the Latin mates to kekinêsthai.
More important, however, was the basic assumption that was behind this
particular argument of Aristotle's. At the beginning of the argument, as well
as in his announcement already in Book IV of the coming investigation of
continuity, he makes it quite clear that the operative assumption is the corre-
spondence, with respect to divisibility, or indivisibility, of motion, time, and
magnitude or space. Let us call this the Correspondence Assumption of
Spaces and Times. But this implies — and this is the crucial assumption that
Aristotle brings to bear in instance after instance in Book VI of the Physics
— that in any motion spaces are to one another as are the times. Put into
literal variables, we have the following (fig. 2):

Ji _ h
S2 h
Fig. 2

But that this representation of Aristotle's assumption is not so anachronistic

as it might seem, is quite clear from the formulation of this Aristotelian
contention in the fourteenth-century indivisiblist Henry of Harclay:
I take the f o l l o w i n g assertion f r o m [Book] V I o f t h e Physics: w h e n a m o b i l e
m o v e s , it is in a space equal to itself in any designated o r designatable instant, a n d
f r o m o n e instant to a n o t h e r it is in o n e a n d a n o t h e r space, f o r o t h e r w i s e it w o u l d

4 H. Usener, Epicurea, Leipzig 1887, 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 .

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 Infinite Times and Spaces in the Later Middle Ages 197

be at rest and not in continuous motion. Therefore, as many instants as one can
assign in the time during which a mobile moves through some space, so many
spaces equal to the mobile can be assigned in this same magnitude, and so many
points terminating these spaces 5 .

In any event, in what follows we will do well to keep in mind this particular
Aristotelian assumption.
There is, moreover, a second argument about motion in chapter two of
Book VI which is even more crucial when we proceed to the medieval recep-
tion of Aristotle's ideas about spaces and mobiles moving over these spaces.
He begins this second chapter with the declaration that:
Since every magnitude is divisible into magnitudes — for we have shown that it is
impossible for anything continuous to be composed of indivisible parts, and every
magnitude is continuous — it necessarily follows that the quicker o f two things
traverses a greater magnitude in an equal time, an equal magnitude in less time,
and a greater magnitude in less time, in conformity with the definition sometimes
given o f the 'the quicker' (232a23 —27).

Summarizing the argument which follows (for the better part of a page),
we have the nub of Aristotle's intent (fig. 3).

— slow mobiles m% traverses Sl in h

m = fast mobiles m{ traverses Si in h < h
•fi, •f2, ... spaces traverses S2 < Sl in h
A, h, ... time intervals mf traverses S2 in h < h
m% traverses •f3 < S2 in h
and so on.
Fig. 3

Given the fact that a mobile moving at a certain rate passes over a magni-
tude si in time ti, then a faster mobile can move over si in some time t2 less
than ti; hence, ti is divided. But in the time t2 of the faster mobile, the slower
mobile will have passed over magnitude S2 less than si, thus dividing si.
Furthermore, if we ask what time it takes for the faster mobile to traverse
S2, the time will again be divided, giving t3 less than t2. Once more, in t3 the
slower mobile will traverse S3 less than S2, and so on; alternately taking faster
and slower mobiles, the faster will continuously divide the time, the slower
the magnitude. Therefore, time and magnitude must be continuous and infi-
nitely divisible.

5 Henry of Harclay, Utrum mundus potent durare in eternum, MSS Tortosa Cated. 88, fol. 87v;
Florence, Bib. Naz. fondo princ. II.11.281, fol. 97v: "Accipio islam propositionem ex VI Phys-
icorum: Mobile dum movetur in quolibet instanti signato vel signabili est in spatio sibi equate, et in alio
et alio instanti est in alio et alio spatio, quia aliter quiesceret et non moveretur continue. Quot igitur
contingit assignare instantia in tempore ilio in quo mobile movetur per aliquod spatium, tot contingit signare
spatia equalia mobili in eadem magnitudine, et tot punda terminativa illorum spatiorum."

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198 John E. Murdoch

Here, in addition to the Correspondence Assumption of Spaces and

Times, Aristotle assumes that a mobile can be faster or slower in any time
interval and over any space. Or, as John Buridan was to express it in the
fourteenth century: "omni motu tardo est motus tardíoΐ' and "omni motu veloci est
motus veloáoS'6. And Aristotle himself explicitly confesses this (let me call it)
Velocity Variation Assumption in the middle of his argument in chapter 2:
Since every motion is in time and a motion may occupy any time, and the motion
o f everything that is in motion may be either quicker or slower, both the quicker
motion and the slower motion may occupy any time (232b20—23).

Of course, this argument and the assumption behind it were especially

troublesome to atomists or indivisiblists. How could they, in face of this
argument, stop the dividing of their indivisibles of space and time (since
space and time in their view were clearly atomistic)? One way to do so was
to disallow the Velocity Variation Assumption. But this could take two forms.
For example, Epicurus had all his atoms move with equal speed. Such was
not the response, as far as I have been able to discover, of any medieval (at
least Latin) atomists, although Thomas Bradwardine in his refutation of all
brands of indivisiblism in his "Tractatus de continuo" felt that this absurd
consequence was entailed by the indivisiblist position.7
There was, however, another form of denial of the Velocity Variation As-
sumption. This one is found among fourteenth-century atomists. Since those
whom I have in mind wish to preserve the fact that at least some mobiles
could move faster or slower than others, their denial of this assumption took
the form of placing limits upon it and assuming that there was a fastest
motion. For the fourteenth-century Dominican Crathorn, for example, this
fastest motion is the only continuous motion. This unique continuous mo-
tion is faster than any discontinuous motion which can be faster or slower
than one another (because these discontinuous motions are made up of indi-
visible periods of motion and indivisible periods or rest, they can vary in
velocity depending upon the proportion of the periods of motion vis à vis
the periods of rest). Other fourteenth-century indivisiblists, such as Nicolas
of Autrecourt and John Wyclif, also assume a fastest motion which they
identify as the aequiveloríter motion of the outermost heaven, for after all,
what could be faster that that?8 (Parenthetically, I should remark that I have

6 J. Buridan, Phys, fol. lOlv (for the abbreviation, see note 10 below).
7 J. Murdoch, Thomas Bradwardine: Mathematics and Continuity in the Fourteenth Century,
in Mathematics and Its Applications to Science and Natural Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
Essays in Honor of Marshall Clagett, ed. E. Grant and J. Murdoch, Cambridge, 1987, 1 2 8 -
129 (conci. 105, 130).
8 See the texts cited in notes 18 — 20 in J. Murdoch, Atomism and Motion in the Fourteenth
Century, in Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences. Essays in Honor of I. Bernard
Cohen, ed. E. Mendelsohn, Cambridge 1984, 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 .

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 Infinite Times and Spaces in the Later Middle Ages 199

not been able to discover any Latin scholar who explicitly maintains a slowest
motion.)
Yet, once again it is worth emphasizing that non-atomists, that is to say,
continuists of an Aristotelian stripe, highlight the necessity of the Velocity
Variation Assumption. The case of John Buridan relative to this assertion
has already been referred to, but no less emphatic is Thomas Bradwardine
in his "Tractatus de continuo": "Any finite space can be uniformly and con-
tinuously traversed in any finite time" Ç'Quodcumque spatìum fìnitum quocumque
tempore finito posse uniformiter et contìnue pertransirì')9. Today however I do not
wish to direct your attention to the fast/slow mobile argument of Aristode's
or to that of his "walking to Thebes" example, although these are necessary
preliminaries. Instead, I wish to draw your attention to a different chapter of
Book VI and the arguments it contains and then measure the response these
arguments had in the Middle Ages. I have in mind the seventh chapter of
Book VI, although in chapter two, after reflecting on the claims of Zeno,
Aristode looks forward to what he wants to prove definitively in this seventh
chapter. Very well, then, what does he intend to accomplish in this chapter?
Basically two things: (1) there can be no finite motion in an infinite time and
there can be no infinite motion in a finite time (where finite and infinite
motions clearly have to do with a mobile moving over, respectively, a finite
space or magnitude and an infinite space or magnitude). (2) Secondly, he
maintains that it makes no difference at all to these denials whether the
motion in question is uniform (isotachôs) or non-uniform (in medieval lan-
guage this becomes regularis versus irregularis or uniformis versus difformis). We
should remark, of course, that in proving these things, Aristode repeatedly
appeals tacidy to the Correspondence of Space and Time Assumption which
can, of course, be held to exclude automatically the relevant infinite values
involved. (3) Aristode thirdly maintains (through ingeniously applying the
relativity of motion) that the mobile itself cannot be of infinite magnitude.
But the first two of his contentions are those to which, basically, the medi-
evals react.
I have taken such care in extensively setting forth the relevant Aristotelian
background, since without it — as in so many other issues — the ensuing
medieval speculation is scarcely understandable. The medieval speculation I
have in mind is not the thirteenth-century reaction to Aristode on these
points, where we find for the most part straightforward exposition of his
arguments, but the fourteenth-century responses, where we have such things
as the measure of the intension and remission of forms at an all time high,
and where logical conceptions and techniques are the order of the day. The
dramatis personae with whom I shall be dealing are: Walter Burley, Albert of
Saxony, John Marsilius of Inghen, Paul of Venice, Blasius of Parma, Gaietano

9 See article referred to in note 7, Conci. 24, Coroll.

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200 John E. Murdoch

de Thienis, and, more than any others, John Buridan. 10 These are all, inciden-
tally, of the Aristotelian persuasion when it comes to continuity and infinity,
which is to say, they are all non-atomists.
All right, what was their reaction to what Aristotle had contended in
Book VI, chapter 7? First of all, there was almost universal agreement with
respect to Aristotle's conclusions when it came to regular or uniform motion.
"Quod radones philosophi ... solum concludit loquendo de mobili motu regularf\ says
Walter Burley 11 , and his opinion is followed by almost everyone else.
On the other hand, there was almost universal discontent about Aristotle's
arguments about non-uniform or difform motion. Here, almost without ex-
ception, we find arguments about infinitely speeding up and about infinitely
slowing down mobiles, since that had direct relevance to Aristotle's claims
about no infinite space in a finite time and no finite space in an infinite time.
The technique that was always applied in these arguments was to divide,
alternately, the finite space or magnitude and the finite time interval into
proportional parts according to a double proportion (if necessary having
God do the dividing). That is to say, divide the magnitude or time in question
into halves, then divide the second resultant half into halves, the second
resultant half of these halves into halves, and so on in infinitum. One therefore
derives the series (fig. 4).

I l l 1 1

2 ' 4 ' 8 ' " ' 2 n ' 2n+1

Fig. 4

This accomplished, one has the required infinite speeding up or slowing

down. Thus, divide a finite time interval into such proportional parts and in
each of these succeeding parts have a mobile move, for example, one foot;
since there are an infinite number of such proportional parts in the time
interval, the mobile increases its speed infinitely and traverses an infinite
space. Conversely, if a space or magnitude is divided into such proportional
parts and it takes a set amount of time — for example, an hour — for a
mobile to move over each of these succeeding parts, the mobile decreases

10 Walter Burley, In physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones, Venice 1501, reprt. Hildes-
heim/New York 1972 (abbreviated WBurl, Phys., in what follows); Albert of Saxony, Quaes-
tiones in octo libros physicorum, Paris 1518 (= ASax, Phys.); John Marsilius of Inghen,
Quaestiones subtillissimae super octo libros physicorum, Lyon 1518, reprt. Frankfurt 1964
(= Inghen, Phys.); Paul of Venice, Expositio super physico auditu Aristotelis, Venice 1499
(= PVen, Phys.); Blasius of Parma, Quaestiones super libros physicorum, MS Vat lat 2159
(= BParm, Phys.); Gaietano de Thienis, Recollectae ... super libros physicorum, Venice
1496 (= GThienis, Phys.); John Buridan, Quaestiones super octo phisicorum libros Aristo-
telis, Paris 1509, reprt. Frankfurt 1964, occasionally corrected from MS Erfurt Amplon.
Folio 300 (= JBur, Phys.).
11 WBurl, Phys, fol. 182r.

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 Infinite Times and Spaces in the Later Middle Ages 201

its speed, or slows down, infinitely and consumes an infinite time in its
traversal. Note that each of these cases necessitates the affirmation of the
Velocity Variation Assumption. Buridan makes it explicit 12 , others assume it
tacidy.
Naturally, such considerations of the measure of difform motion and dif-
formly distributed qualities (like heat) over a subject were quite common in
the fourteenth century, especially those which involved some brush with the
infinite. Of course, these particular cases of infinitely speeding up and infi-
nitely slowing down did not involve attempts to sum, as it were, the resultant
infinite series, as was the case with the Calculator, Richard Swineshead, Ni-
cole Oresme and others 13 .
Yet we do find these speeding up and slowing down cases in all our
dramatispersonae. And most of them specify in what way this infinite variation
in velocity is allowed and in what way it is disallowed. In Buridan, for exam-
ple, it is not to be allowed "quantum ad potentias naturaler, but it is to be
admitted "simplicité^ because then we have to do with "potentia supernatu-
rali/'i4. He also parenthetically reminds us that this state of affairs is no less
to be admitted than what Aristotle himself does in Book IV of the Physics
when discussing the void where he assumes "in infinitum potest medium per
quod fit motus subtiliarì"^5. Again, Paul of Venice maintains that "isti casus sunt
imaginabiles, sed non possibiles naturalitei', the reason being, that taken in this
latter sense, we are going to arrive at a part of space so small that the natural
agent accounting for the traversal of a mobile over it does not have a suffi-
cient amount of time to act; similarly, we eventually arrive at a part of time so
small as to frustrate naturally its being the measure of the relevant motion 16 .
Gaietano de Thienis also denies the two "casus naturalitei1', making remarks
similar to those made by Paul of Venice as to reaching a part so small as to
disallow the casus ; yet he does say that other considerations are involved if
we assert the "casus sophistice"*1. And John Marsilius of Inghen and Blasius
of Parma make similar distinctions of allowability versus non-allowability18.
Buridan seems to be alone in claiming that there is a difference in the casus
of infinitely slowing down a mobile and that of infinitely speeding it up.
Considering the rotation of a heavenly sphere, he claims that we have an

12 See note 6 above.

13 See, for example, J. Murdoch, Mathematics and Infinity in the Later Middle Ages, in Pro-
ceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 55 (1981), 4 2 - 4 9 .
14 J Bur, Phys, fol. lOlr.
15 Ibid.

16 pVen, Phys, fol. 33v: "Respondetur, quod isti casus sunt imaginabiles sed non possibiles naturaliter,
quoniam aliqua est ita parva pars magnitudinis, quam in pertranseundo nullum agens naturate posset
occupare unam horam, immo nec millesimam partem eius, et aliqua est ita parva pars temporis, que
naturaliter non posset mensurare motum pedalis magnitudinis nec millesime partes eius."
17 GThienis, Phys, fol. 41v: "Huicpotest responden duplidter, scilicet naturaliter et sophistice: naturaliter
quidem negando tilos casus esse possibiles."
18 Inghen, Phys, foil. 69v-71v; BParm, Phys, fol. 179v.

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202 John E. Murdoch

infinite slowing down as we get closer and closer to the pole of the sphere
since the distance from the pole is itself infinitely divisible. Yet it can be
claimed, he goes on to say, that there is no infinite speeding up, since one
can not get infinitely more remote from the pole due to the fact that there
is a maximum circle connected with the heavenly sphere in question. This
notwithstanding, he confesses to believing that God can move a mobile both
with infinite slowness and with infinite velocity 19 . Nevertheless, even relative
to God, there is a difference in speeding up and slowing down. For, assuming
that the heavens move as they now in fact do, the fact that a day will of
necessity be traversed (that is, have all of its infinity of proportional parts
run through), God continuously speeding up a mobile in each of them will
cause an infinite space to be traversed; on the other hand, the infinitely
slowing down of a mobile does not involve any infinite to be made or tra-
versed, but merely involves God's moving through infinite time, which is
indeed quite possible 20 .
Yet can this infinite speeding up and slowing down really transpire? Buri-
dan thinks it can, and we shall have to return to how he thinks it can. Others
are not so sure. Gaietano de Thienis believes that, even considered "sophistice"
and not "naturaliter 1 ', such speeding up and slowing down are not possible
"propter partium ipsarum incompossibilitatem '. That is (to speak to the case of
speeding up), although it is possible that in the first proportional part of an
hour a mobile traverse one foot and similarly it is possible in the second
proportional part that it traverse another foot, and so on, "sine staiti', these
possibilities are not capable of existing simultaneously. Gaietano feels that
this is precisely analogous to the following example (though his logic is some-
what mystifying): just as it is possible for you to be and it is possible for you
not to be, it does not follow that it is possible for you to be and not to be 21 .
Walter Burley is more ingenious. He outright denies the possibility that
"aliquod mobile moveatur tardando motum suum continue in duplo". The reason for

19 JBur, Phys, fol. lOlv.

20 See the text cited in note 29 below.
21 GThienis, Phys, fol. 41v: "Sophistice autem posset responden non admitiendo illos casus ob aliam
causam, videlicet propter partium ipsarum incompossibilitatem. Nam, licet sit possibile, quod unum mobile
pertranseat in una bora primam partem proportionabilem unius pedalis, et similiter licet sit possibile, quod
in una alia hora pertranseat secundam partem proportionalem eiusdem pedalis, et sic in infinitum, non
tarnen hec omnia sunt simul compossibilia. Et pariformiter dicatur in secundo casu, videlicet, quod est
possibile, quod in prima parte proportionabili hore mobile pertranseat unum pedale, et similiter est possibile
in secunda pertranseat unum aliud, et sic sine statu. Sed tarnen hec omnia non stant simul, ita quod
possibile sit in prima parte proportionabili hore pertranseat unum pedale et in secunda aliud et sic in
infinitum; sicut etiam non sequitur, quod, si possibile est te esse et possibile te non esse, quod possibile est
te esse et non esse; nec sequitur, quod, si potes currere et non potes currere, quod possis currere et non
currere; nec sequitur, quod possibile est, quod secundum hoc punctum hoc continuum sit actu divisum, et
possibile est, quod secundum hoc aliud punctum sit idem continuum actu divisum, et sic in infinitum, ergo
possibile est, quod secundum hoc et hoc punctum et sic sine statu ve! secundum quodlibet punctum hoc
continuum sit adu divisum; est etiam antecedens verum et consequens falsum; quare."

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 Infinite Times and Spaces in the Later Middle Ages 203

his denial is quite intriguing. There are an infinite number o f parts of the
same proportion in any traversed magnitude and in any one part, howsoever
small, motion over that part too would consume an infinite dme; thus the
mobile would be at rest in any finite dme (which is Burley's way o f saying
that the mobile would never get started.) Consequendy, it is not possible that
any mobile can slow down in the specified way, and he gives a parallel argu-
ment about a mobile continually speeding up in this fashion 2 2 .
Now, finally, we return to Buridan. To begin with, he agrees with everyone
else that Aristode's arguments are effective when it comes to uniform mo-
tion. This much he posits, "cum Aristotele", as two valid conclusions 2 3 . Then
he points out that Aristode proposes a third conclusion to the effect that,
howsoever much the motion be non-uniform, it is impossible that some
mobile move over a finite space throughout an infinite time 2 4 . This conclu-
sion is not proved, he feels, by the arguments Aristode gives for its proof.
Since, although the conclusion is true for the term 'infinite' taken categore-
matically, if the term be taken syncategorematically, nothing prevents G o d
f r o m being able to move something throughout an infinite time 2 5 . Thus
Buridan substitutes this latter state of affairs for Aristode's third conclusion
while at the same time admitting that Aristotle's original conclusion is true
"secundumpotentias et cursus naturales"26.
Buridan devotes even more care to what he takes to be Aristode's fourth
conclusion: namely, that, howsoever much the motion be non-uniform, it is
impossible that an infinite space be traversed in a finite time. Buridan admits

22 WBurl, Phys, fol. 182r: "Ad radones in contrariar». Ad primam dico, quod non est possibile, quod
aliquod mobile moveatur tardando motum suum continue in duplo, quia, si ita esset, illud mobile non posset
pertransire aliquam partem magnitudinis quantumcumque parvam nisi in tempore infinito, quia sicut in
magnitudine pertransita, quantumcumque sit parva, sunt infinite partes eiusdem proportionis, quarum
quelibet est totaliter extra aliam, sic oportet in tempore mensurante ilium motum sint infinite partes eiusdem
quantitatis, quarum quelibet est totaliter extra aliam; et sic illud mobile non moveretur nisi in tempore
infinito et sic quiesceret in quolibet tempore finito. Et ideo dico, quod impossibile est, quod aliquod mobile
moveatur per aliquod spatìum ilio modo tardando motum suum continue in duplo per quamlibet partem
spatii."
23 JBur, Phys, fol. lOlv: "(1) Quod existente semper motu eque veloci et eque tardo, impossibile est aliquod
mobile tempore finito infinitum spacium transiré. (2) Quod existente semper motu eque veloci, quod impossib-
ile est aliquod mobile tempore infinito pertransire spacium finitum."
24 JBut, Phys, fol. 102r: fJJ Sed (variant reading: Tunc) Aristoteles ponit tertiam conclusionem, scilicet,
quantumcumque motus sit difformiter velox, tamen impossibile est, quod aliquod mobile in spado finito
moveatur per tempus infinitum. "
25 Ibid.: "Sed non apparet quod bec tertía conclusio sit probata per predictam rationem. Unde, licet sit verum
quod impossibile est tempus esse infinitum capiendo infinitum cathegoreumatice ... capiendo infinitum
sincathegoreumaüce nichil videtur prohibere quin per tempus infinitum deus possit movere Β super spacium
finitum, ut unius leuce, et etiam in sensu composito nichil apparet prohibere quin sit deum movere Β in
infinito tempore super spacium finitum."
26 Ibid.: "Ego credo et pono loco illius tertie conclusionis Aristotelis, quod bee est possibilis: Deus in infinito
tempore movebit Β super spacium finitum motu recto et continuo et nunquam pertransitum erit illud spacium.
Sed conclusio Aristotelis erat vera secundum potentias et cursus naturales, quia non est possibile secundum
naturam, quod semper fiet de una medietate proportionabili ad aliam talis retardatio."

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204 John E. Murdoch

that, "prima faá¿\ this conclusion does not seem to be true because God
can, after each proportional part of the time, speed up a motion "in duplo"21.
On the other hand, in order to get at the truth of the matter, he posits two
other conclusions in place of this fourth conclusion of Aristode. They both
merit citation in the Latin, (1) "Quod per infinitum spatium Deus potest movere Β
in tempore finito". (2) "Quod impossibile est Deum per infinitum spatium movere Β in
tempore finito". The intended contrast is, of course, between the terms " potest
movere' " and " ''movere' ", or, in another parallel text, between " 'Deus potest
velocitare' " and " 'Deus velocitef " 28 . That is to say, between a modal proposition
being taken de re versus its being taken de dicto, or, what amounts to the same
thing, taken in sensu diviso versus in sensu composito.
At this point, for more enlightenment Buridan refers us to what he had
discussed in his last question in Book III of the Physics29. Appropriately so,
because there he provides us with an investigation de infinito quantum adproposi-
tions de possibili30. He goes on at great length about the potential infinite
divisibility of continuous quantity in terms of a modal proposition in the

27 Ibid.: "(4) Deinde Aristoteles ponit quartam conclusionem, videlicet, quod quantumcumque motus sit
difformiter velox, impossibile est infinitum spaàum transiri in tempore finito Sed prima fade videtur,
quod hec conclusio non sit vera propter hoc, quod Deus post quamlibet medietatem proportionabilem temporis
potest velocitare motum in duplo, prout concessum fuit, et si ita faäat, sequitur, quod dicta conclusio sit
falsa, sicut in prindpio questionis arguebatur; et iterum concessum est, quod possibile est Deum in infinito
tempore movere Β super spacium finitum propter hoc, quod in qualibet medietate proportional! <temporis)
potest retardare motum in duplo, ergo, pari ratione, possibile est Deum movere Β in tempore finito per
spaàum infinitum propter hoc, quod in qualibet medietate proportionabili temporis potest velocitare motum
in duplo"
28 Ibid.: "Rationes enim utrobique videnturprobabiles, sed ut de hoc appareat Veritas, ego loco illius quarte
conclusionis Aristotelis dirigendo eam, pono duas conclusiones, scilicet quartam et quintam. (4) Quod per
infinitum spaàum Deus potest movere Β in tempore finito, sdlicet in ista die, etìam uniformi velocitate,
quia non potest per tantum spacium, quin per maius. (5) Quod impossibile est Deum per infinitum spaàum
movere Β in tempore finito. Hec enim est impossibilis: 'Deus per infinitum spaàum movet Β in tempore
finito' et hoc est, quia, licet ista sit vera: 'In qualibet medietate proportionabili Mei potest Deus movere per
leucam et facere magnitudinem pedalem', tamen hec est impossibilis: 'Deus in qualibet medietate proportio-
nabili diei movet per leucam velfacit magnitudinem pedalem'."
29 Ibid.: "Et de hoc apparuit satis veritas in ultima questione tertii libri. Nec est simile illud, quod modo
dicebatur, scilicet de retardatìone in duplo et de velocitate in duplo, quia dies de fado erit tota pertransita
de necessitate, si celum sicponatur moveri sicut nunc movetur; oportet enim consummatam esse solis revolutio-
nem àrea terram; ideo oporteret pertransitum esse spaàum infinitum, etiam capiendo infinitum cathegoreu-
matice, etsi sic fieret velodtatio, quod est impossibile. Unde etiam impossibile est, quod post quamlibet
medietatem proportionabilem diei Deus velocitet in duplo, etc., licet hec sit vera, quod post quamlibet
medietatem Deus potest veloritare in duplo. Sed siponamus, quod post cuiuslibet medietatis proportionabilis
spadum per transitum retardai in duplo, non sequitur, quod unquam sit infinitum fadum vel transitum,
sed quod per tempus infinitum movet, quod est possibile, capiendo infinitum sincathegoreumaúce, nec propter
hoc erit tempus infinitum transitum, capiendo infinitum cathegoreumatíce"
30 The relevant question in Book III to which Buridan refers, has now been edited by J. M.
M. H. Thijssen, John Buridan's Tractatus de infinito (Artistarium, Supplementa VI), Nij-
megen 1991, 66 — 80. Among the propositiones de possibili that Buridan analy2es in this question
are " 'Deus potest separare et separaüm conservare omnes partes linee Β ' and Hec est possibilis: 'Deus
separat et conservât separatim omnes partes linee B.' "

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 Infinite Times and Spaces in the Later Middle Ages 205

divisive sense and is careful to place the mode ex parte copulae in these proposi-
tions, something that was the hallmark for modal propositions of all types in
sensu diviso, and not just de possibili ones. In the question from Book III as
well as in the present question in Book VI, he concentrates on what cannot
be licitly inferred from the appropriate divisive modal proposition treating
of the infinite: namely, that one cannot descend to universals in which the
relevant mode does not mediate between the subject and the predicate (as is
the case with divisive modals) but precedes the whole dictum of the proposi-
tion.
To bring all of this back to the present concern of mobiles infinitely speed-
ing up, what Buridan has done is to specify how such speeding up allowable,
under, to be sure, divine power or just plain secundum imaginationem. He has,
in a way, put in a precise form what Gaietano tried clumsily to say in terms
of the "incompossibility of parts" 31 . Buridan was surely not alone in treating
problems surrounding the infinite in the context of the de possibili modal
propositions 32 . Paul of Venice in his analysis of our seventh chapter refers
to how the loyci, as he calls them, treat, not only the problem before us,
but many things which are "praeter cursum naturaletri,yi. Though he does not
specifically say so, one can bet that the lion's share of these many things have
something to do with the infinite. And one can readily see why. The essen-
tially unrealizable potency which is involved in the potential infinite divisibil-
ity of the space or in any potential infinity itself, almost automatically lends
itself to an analysis in terms of modal propositions, especially in a period so
attuned to the exercise of logical conceptions and techniques as was that of
the fourteenth century.

31 See above, note 21.

32 Albert of Saxony also refers to Book III of his questions on the Physics, where we find
similar dealings with modal propositions: ASax, Phys, fol. 70v (in a question treating of
Book VI, chapter 7): "Rationes in oppositum vaâunt vijs suis, quia argumt de motu irregulari et non
de motu regulan, de quo intelligit Aristoteles. Quomodo autem in qualibet parte proportionali Deus potest
intendere aliquem motum ad duptum, et tarnen non est possibile quod hoc facial, de hoc aliqualiter visum
fuit in tertio huius de infinito." If we look to Q. 12 of Book III, we find, for example, the
following (fol. 40v): "Quamvis non sit possibile quod in qualibet parte proportionali alicuius bore deus
faciat unum lapidem pedalem, tamen in qualibet parte proportionali alicuius bore deus potest facere unum
lapidem pedalem." For Ockham's treatment of continuity and the infinite in terms of modal
propositions, see J. Murdoch, William of Ockham and the Logic of Infinity and Continuity,
in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought, ed. Ν. Kretzmann, Ithaca/
London 1982, 192-194.
33 PVen, Phys, fol. 33v: "Dicerent tamen loyci, quod infinita magnitudo potest pertransiri tempore finito,
sed non est possibile, quod infinita magnitudo pertranseatur tempore finito ... et sic de multis que sunt
prefer cursum (consimilem edj naturalem"

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