Alexander of Aphrodisias, on Time

Author(s): R. W. Sharples
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1982), pp. 58-81
Published by: BRILL
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 A lexanderof Aphrodisias,On Time.
R.W. SHARPLES

The treatise On Time by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Aristotelian

commentator (c.200 A.D.), has never been the subject of any detailed
philosophical study, in spite of the interest of its subject matter and the
importance of its author. It enables us to see how Aristotle's theory of time
was handled and modified by one of the most important of his ancient
followers; and it is also of significance as one stage in the series of dis-
cussions of time which begins with Plato and continues to the
Neoplatonists and beyond.
The Greek original is lost. The work survives in an Arabic translation
made by Hunain ibn Ishaq in the ninth century, published by A. Badawi in
Commentaires sur Aristote perdus en grec et autres epitres (Beirut 1971;
19-24), and in a Latin translation from the Arabic made by Gerard of
Cremona in the twelfth century, published by G. Thery in 'Autour du
ddcret de 1210: 1I, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Aperqu sur l'influence de sa
noetique' (Bibliotheque Thomiste 7, 1926, 92-97). Although the Latin is
dependent on the Arabic, the published manuscript of the Arabic text is
relatively late;' moreover, in the penultimate section of the work there is a
major divergence between the Latin and the Arabic text that we have. The
Latin version thus has some claim to be considered as an independent and
even as an authoritative witness. Accordingly, and in the hope of making
the contents of the treatise more widely known to philosophers, I have here
translated Gerard's Latin version into English; this is the first English
rendering of the treatise to have appeared. Dr. F.W. Zimmermann, of the
Oriental Institute in Oxford, has kindly compared my translation with the
Arabic; where there are variations which seem important, the reading of
the Arabic is given in Dr. Zimmermann's translation at the foot of the page.
There are also many other places in which his translation of the Arabic has
helped me to improve my version of the Latin; in particular, material that
appears in angle brackets in the main translation has been supplied from
the Arabic to supplement lacunae in the Latin version, often due to
homoioteleuton. Dr. Zimmermann is not, of course, responsible for any
misuse I may have made of his version of the Arabic.
The authorship of many of the shorter discussions attributed to
Alexander is open to some doubt, though even if they are not by Alexander

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himself in some cases, they still seem to originate in the activity of his
school.2 In the case of the present treatise, however, there seems no reason
to doubt Alexander's authorship; and parallels between it and Simplicius'
reports of Alexander's views in his commentary on the Physics provide
positive arguments in favour of its authenticity.
I have not tried to translate Gerard's crabbed Latin absolutely literally;
this would have resulted in a version which would have been in-
comprehensible and unreadable. Rather, I have allowed myself a certain,
very limited, degree of freedom in trying to bring out what I take to be the
sense of Alexander's arguments in natural English. The marginal numbers
refer to page and line of Th6ry's edition; the division into sections is my
own. Numbers in the translation refer to the list of parallel texts, and letters
to that of variants. In the latter, where no further explanation is given what
is given is the Arabic version, in Dr. Zimmermann's translation; in the
former, 'Ar.' indicates Aristotle's Physics, 'Simpl.' Simplicius' commentary
on this (edited by H. Diels in Commentariain A ristotelem Graeca vols. 9-10,
Berlin 1882), and 'Alex. ap. Simpl.' Alexander (in his commentary on the
Physics) cited by Simplicius.
The substance of this paper was presented at a seminar in the Institute of
Classical Studies of the University of London in June 1980. I am most
grateful to all who were present, and especially to Richard Sorabji and
Fritz Zimmermann, for much useful comment both at the seminar and
subsequently.

TRANSLATION
Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Timea

I. Criticism of Rival Views

92.31 1. Those who disagree with us concerning place raise a difficulty by
saying that it has three dimensions;3 and similarly there is a diffi-
culty to resolve in what is said by those who think concerning time
that it is neither the heavenly sphere, nor its movement, nor the
number of its movement. We have indeed already spoken at length

3 Ar. 4.1 209a4-6?Cf. Alex. ap. Simpl. 529.29ff.

a So in threeof the four Latin MSS cited by Th&ry,and in the Arabic;one Latin MS has
'On Movement and Time'.

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 elsewhere about time; now we will speak briefly, though we may
perhaps, even while abbreviating, mention here things which we
did not mention there.
93.6 2. What is said by those who say that time is the heavenly sphere
itself4 is empty, and the person who says this deserves to be laughed
at. For there are many spheres at a single moment, but not many
times at a single moment. And time includes what is past and what
is future, but the spheres are not like that.5
93.10 3. And what is said by those who think that movements, that is the
movements of the sphere, are time6 is feeble. For the parts of time,
when they are spoken of,' are time, but on the other hand the parts
of a circular movement, when they are spoken of,C are not circular
movement.7
93.13 4. And what is said by those who think that time is movement,
simplySd, need not be accepted; for movement is in the moving
thing and in the place in which it moves,9 <whereas time is neither
in the moving thing nor in the place in which it moves>, but in
every place.10 And again, one movement is swifter than another,
since the movement of the highest sphere, which does not pause or
cease, is swifter than the movement of Saturn, and the movement of
Saturn is slower; but 'swift' and 'slow' are not applicable to time,
but rather to movement. And similarly the movement of the sphere
of the Moon is swifter than the others; but 'swift' and 'slow' are only
determined in relation to time, since a swift movement is one which
takes place in a small time, and a slow movement one which takes
place over a great time.1"
93.22 5. Some however think that time is not any of these things, nor yet
the number of the movement of the heavenly sphere; they think it is
a single thing that other things encounter. For they say that if we

4 Ar. 4.10 218b5; Simpl. 700.19.

5 Simpl. 701.9f.
6 Ar. 4.10 218a33; Alex. ap. Simpl. 700.18ff. (attributingthe view to Plato).
7 Ar. 4.10 218b 1-3.
8 Ar. 4.10 218b9.
9 Ar. 4.10 218b 13; Alex. ap. Simpl. 705.14ff.
10 Ar. 4.10 218b10-13.
11 Cf. Ar. 4.10 218b13ff.

b autumantur: 'thought of' or 'imagined' in the Arabic.

As in note (b).
d Punctuating after sermone plano; so too the Arabic.

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 were to think of the spherestandingstill, its standingstill would be
in time; and since its standingstill would be in time, its movement
would be in time; <and if its movementis in time, the attendant
numberof its movementis in time too>. But what they say is not
true; for if we were to thinkof the spherestandingstill,time would
be done away with.
93.28 6. If time exists and is the numberof the movementeof the sphere,
what harm does it do if it is thoughtof as differentfrom that?For
even if people thinkfthat the globe of the moon touchesthe globeof
the earth, <this> does not affect it in its being and essence,which
is raisedabove the earthand unaffectedby what affectsthe earth."
93.32 7. But they ask about the essenceof that time, and whathas madeit
to be time, indeed,whatproof thereis of its being, and whetherit is
not to be thought that there is some other <time> existing after
time itself.

II. The Aristotelian Theory

93.35 8. However, I will speak about time accordingto the opinion of
Aristotle,withoutdisagreeingfromhim at any point.He maintainsh
that it is said dialecticallyto be the numberof the spherethatmoves
from east to west;'2and in anotherway it is defined as the interval
which the motion numbers.13
93.39 9. There are two sorts of number,numberwhich numberssome-
thing else and is in the soul, and numberwhich is numberedby
something else, like individual things among men and the other
animals.'4Time howeveris numberwhich is numberedby some-
thingelse,'5namelyby movement.For it correspondsto movement
and to its smallnessand magnitude,and the movementsimilarly
correspondsto the spatialextent over which it takes place.'6Since
12 Ar. 4.14 213b21.
13 Cf. Ar. 4.12 220b24ff.
14 Ar. 4.11 219b5-9.
15 Ar. 4.11 219b7-9,4.12 220b8.
16 Ar. 4.11 219al5, 4.12 220a24.

' 'of the motion' omitted.

f 'even if one imagined'.
r 'above the earth and separatefrom it'.
h Reading estimat with MS B of the Latin, and the Arabic; estimatur ('It is thought') AC.

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 in a spatial extension there is a first and last, so there is a first and
last in the movement which takes place over it, and a first and last in
the time which is the number of that movement. And time is only
number because of the first and last which are determined in the
movement; for it is by number that one speaks of first and last, since
the unit is what is first in number, and the last is what exists after the
first.17 So when we think of movement, we think of time, and
similarly when we think of time, we think of movement;18 and we
number what is equal in a similar way to what is equal to it, and say
that this number is like that number. So, since movement exists,
time exists through the quantitative aspect of it; so thati time is the
number of movement in this way.
94.16 10. Time is the number of the movement of the heavenly sphere,
apart from other movements, only because there is no movement
swifter than this, and because a thing is only numbered and
measured and reckoned by what is less than itself. For a plurality of
things is numbered by the unit, and long intervals are measured by
the unit, and measures of capacity are reckoned by the twelve-
bushel unityor by what is less than the thing measured itself. And I
say that movementk neither is nor will be done away with.'
94.23 11. Time is a single connected continuum, and is a number only
because it is many in thought. For times only exist in potentiality
and thought, not by being in actuality. And indeed we say that the
length of a thing which is continuous, such as a long piece of wood,
is such-and-such, in cubits, when it is not divided in actuality; and
so there is no indication of that which is numbered by something
else that is not separable (?).m
94.28 12. Part of time is past, and part of it is future, and the instant is in
time as the point is in the line. But there is a difference between
17 Cf. Ar. 4.11 219a22-b2.
18 Ar. 4.11 219a3-1O.

Reading quarewith MS A of the Latin,and the Arabic;quia ('because')B.

caficium,qafiz.
k "the movement of the sphere'.
I MS B adds 'or ceases' after 'is done away with', MS C 'that is, will cease' after 'will be
done away with'. 'Is permanent'Arabic.
m .. divided in actuality. And likewise with things numbered by something else; the
thing numbered may be continuous,for all that it has a number.Now the numberin the
soul, which does not measure anything else, will always be separate' (reading
<lahu>cadadun for Cadadan;Dr. Zimmermann'ssuggestion.)

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 them, in that the point in the line is in actuality; while the instant is
in thought, not in actuality.19 And what is between two instants is
time, but the instant is not time, since the parts of time are times,
but the instant is not divided.20
94.35 13. And the instant, in its travel, creates time, and when time exists
in actuality,n it is only divided into years and months and days in
thought.2' And it is in a similar way that it has, in between, the
instants, which are in a thing that is.0 But if it were divisible in
actuality there would be between its parts an interval which would
not be time; just as a movement is single and it is not possible for us
to pass from one movement to another, without there being some-
thing between the two which is not a movement. And it is not
possible that there should be between two times an interval which
would not be a time; time therefore is one in actuality, although it is
divided potentially. And it is not possible that time should be made
up of instants placed alongside one another. But the instant in its
travel creates time, as we have said.
95.1 14. Time is only known through movement because of the first and
last which accompany movement; for when we speak oPf the
beginning and the end of movement, then we speak ofP the time
which is between the two. And time is not made up of instants, just
as the line is not made up of points.22 And motion numbers time,
according as time numbers motion.23
95.6 15. The movements of the other spheres differ in speed, but the
movement of the sphere that moves from east to west, without
doubt, is the swiftest of them, and is in accordance with order.r
Therefore the number of this, without the number of the other
movements of the rest of the spheres, is time; since a thing is only
measured by what is less than it, as we said previously.
19 Cf. Ar. 4.13 222a 14; Alex. ap. Simpl. 748.21ff.
20
Ar.4.11220a18.
21 Cf. Alex. ap. Simpl. 748.21ff.
22 Ar. 6.1 231b6.
23 Ar. 4.12 220b14ff.

n 'if time is continuous'.

o
'And similarly,it is in the mind that it has instants'.
P As in note (b) above.
P As in note (b) above.
'is the swiftest of them, and they are in a certain order'.

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95.11 16. If the soul, which numbersmovement,were done away with,
time would be done away with.24And if the soul were done away
with the heavenlyspherewould not be moved;and if this werenot
movedall movementswouldbe done awaywith,sinceit is the cause
of all movements,and so of time.25

ll. A nswers to objections, andfurther observations

95.16 17. But if some, consideringthese things, have felt doubt, asking
how time numbersmovement,since it is not in the samegenusas it,
we say that <time numbersmovementeven though movementis
not in the same genus>, just as the cubit measuresthe wood, even
thoughthe wood is not in the samegenus. In thisway timenumbers
every movement,of growthand of ageing and of change;for time
itself numbersall these movements,but not quagrowthand ageing
and change.26
95.21 18.Time is not only itself the numberof movement,but also itself
the numberof rest;for we say that restis 'by day'or 'by night',just
as we say this in the case of movements.Time itselfthereforeis the
number of rest, accordingto what we have said, just as it is the
numberof movement,and that indeed is clearand obvious.27
95.26 19. One time is not swifteror slower than anothertime, and the
reason is that it itself is the number only of a movementthat is
uniform,and which has its beingor element(?)dividedby numbers
according to one thing always,' and this is the movementof the
heavenly sphere.28And movementsdiffer as individualsand in
form; but time is single and undivided.uThis indeed is one of the
points by which it is shownthat time is not movement.29
95.32 20. Movement indeed is only known throughthe mover, and the
mover is what createsit; similarlytime is only known throughthe
24 Ar. 4.14 223a21-9; Alex. ap. Simpl. 759.8ff.
25 Ar. 4.14 223a27-8; Simpl. 760. 1 ff.
26 Cf. Ar. 4.14 223a29ff.
27 Ar. 4.12 221b7; Alex. ap. Simpl. 742.33ff.,750.27.
28 Cf. Ar. 4.14 223bl99;Alex. ap. Simpl. 768.28.
29 Cf. Ar. 4.10 218b33ff., 4.12 220a32, 4.14 223bl-12.

" Reading numero with MS B; non immo ('no, rather') AC.

. . . uniform, and does not differ but is always in a single fashion'.
u 'is single and does not differ'.

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 instant,and it is the instantthat createsit. And time itself does not
have coming-to-beor being (?),vbut thereis only coming-to-beand
being (?)wof the instant,and its coming-to-beis in the mind and not
in the essence of time,z,since the substanceof time is single in its
essence, and change and alterationdo not apply to it. Rather,it is
time itself that altersthe thingsthat are subjectto it301and, by the
movementwhich is the numberof it, subjectto coming-to-beand
passingawayzin the regionsthatare below the sphereof the Moon.
95.40 21. If the instantdid not exist, time would not be determinate;and
if time did not exist the instantwould not exist.31 And since time is
only known because there is a firstand last in movement,and this
firstand last are instants,time is only known throughtime.aa
96.4 22. All the thingsthatare in timeare so becausethey move and rest,
and time is the numberof movementand of rest,and what neither
moves nor restsis not in time. Moreover,the sempiternalthingsdo
not apply to any thing as a resultof time,bbsince they do not grow
old as a resultof time, as they are not in it or subjectto it, and it is
only the thingswhich fall undertime that growold.32
96.10 23. No-one should think that,when we say that time is the number
of restjust as it is of movement,it is necessaryfor us to grantthatthe
diameterof the universeis at rest and that the centres are at rest,
and that for this reasonit is necessaryfor them to be in time. For we
<do not> think that <whatever does not move is in time, since
according to us> rest is not present in everythingwhich merely
neithermoves nor is moved;ccrather,this only appliesto thatwhich
30 Ar. 4.12 221a30ff., 4.13 222b19ff.
31 Ar. 4.11 219b33ff.
32 Ar. 4.12 221b3ff., cf. 30f.; Alex. ap. Simpl. 739. 14.

'or being' omitted.

W
As in note (v).
2
'not in time itself.
" 'that alters all other things'.
Z 'and it is by the movement which is the number of it that coming-to-be and passing
away arise'.
'I 'though the instant'.
bb 'are not time at all'.
cc Omitting accidit in 96.14, with MSS AC. (or is this the remains of what has been
omitted in the Latinjust before?).The Arabic has 'rest is not only the state of that which
might move but does not', which can be emended, Dr Zimmermanntells me, to give 'rest
is not the state of that which has never moved and never will'.

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 has the propertyof movingand of being at rest.33ddThis is what we
said thereto removethis uncertainty.And whenwe say of the poles
and of the centresthat they do not move,we are not sayingof them
that they are at rest;for it is not in their natureto move. So it is not
necessaryfor them to be in time.
96.20 24. Aristotle did not think that it is time that makes that which
grows old do so; rather,ageing occurs and takes place in time.34
And when he started offee he said that everythingthat growsold
does so as a result of its opposite;35 but time does not have an
opposite, nor is it itself opposite to any thing, since time does not
have any qualities,and what does not have any qualitiesdoes not
have an opposite. And again, time is connectedwith"fall created
things, but nothingamong thingsis connectedwithu9its opposite.
96.27 25. Aristotlethoughtthat time numbersmovementqua movement,
not as having any particularproperty;time does not numberthe
movementof growthqua growth,or changequa change,but rather
qua movement.36So it numbersevery one of the species of move-
ment just as it numbersmovementitself with referenceto its in-
tervals;for it numbersthem with referenceto thatwhich they have
in common, and not with referenceto what is specific to each
movement. Conversely,movement numbers time, since a day is
nothing but the movementof the heavenlyspherefor twenty-four
hours; then, by means of those hours reduplicated,it measures
other longer periodsof time too.
96.39 26. Aristotlesays that the fact that time does not have a coming to
be or a beginninghhis demonstratedby the fact thatwhatcomes to
be only comes to be in time.37Forourexpressions'was'and 'willbe'
33 Ar. 4.12 221bl2f.
34 Ar. 4.13 222b25-7.
35 Ar. 1.9 192a21?
36 Cf Ar. 4.14 223a29ff.
37 Cf. Aristotle,Metaph.A 6 1071b6-10?

dd 'to that which is of a nature to move but is at restper accidens'in the Arabic; 'to that
which is deprivedof movement but is of a natureto move', AristotlePhysics4.12 221bI2f.
ee Or 'And going on' (cum processit);'he had said previously'or 'he had started off by

saying' in the Arabic.

ff The Latin has 'separatedfrom', as a result, Dr. Zimmermannsuggests,of misreading
the Arabic.
w 'connected'in the Arabic; 'equal' (i.e. 'co-ordinate'?)in the Latin.
hh 'or an end' added.

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 and 'existing' and 'will not be'ii owe their being to time; and
similarlyour expressions'before'and 'after'and 'when'and those
like them.
96.43"27. Butif someonesaysthat,becausekkthis time did not existbefore
(since"1it is) and will not exist after (since it is), therefore it is
necessarythat therewas a time beforetime, and that therewill be a
time after the partsof time; we shall say that,if 'before'and 'after'
did not exist,tmm time will not thereforebe swallowed up. And if
time will not be swallowedup,"b
97.5 28. Time indeed in itselfis one, and is only made manyfor us in our
minds,accordingto the mind'smeasuringand thinkingof it.n" In a
similarway 'existing'and 'will be' only have theirbeing according
to our thinkingof them; in itself howevertime is single,continuous
and sempiternal,accordingto a certainordering.

DISCUSSION
I. IS THIS TEXTPARTOF ALEXANDER'SCOMMENTARYON THE
PHYSICS?
Th6ry suggested that this text was an extract from Alexander's lost
commentaryon the Physics;he referredespeciallyto the discussionof what
it is for a thing to be in time in 4.12.38But Dr. Zimmermanhas rightly
argued that this is impossible.39It is true that sections 22 and 23, in
particular,do relateclosely to this passageof the Physics;but our text takes
up points fromthe whole of Physics4.10-14.On the otherhand,it is far too
shortto be the wholeof Alexander'scommentaryon these chapters.It does

ii 'was not'.
" In the Arabicsection 27 runsas follows: To say that this (our) time was not before, since
it is (or: comes to be), or will not be after,since it is (or: comes to be), is to presupposethat
there was a time before time and that there will be a time after the end of time. And if
'before','after','was' and 'was not' did not presupposea time, neitherwould 'hour','day'
or 'month'presupposea time.
kk Or 'says that this time ... because it is necessary'.(The first conjunctionis quod, the
second quia).
1 Or 'although'.(The Arabic has 'since'; but Dr Zimmermannsuggests there may have
been a participialconstructionin the original Greek which could have been taken either
way.)
mmOr 'if (the times) did not exist before and after'.
'in accordancewith our ways of supposing (things about) it and picturingit'.

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not show the explicitconcernwith the elucidationof Aristotle'smeaningin
obscure passages which we know from Simplicius that Alexander's
commentarydid show;40and, againstthe suggestionthat it mightbe some
sort of epitome of the commentary,it can be pointed out that, while the
orderof topics does show some correspondencewith that in Aristotle,this
correspondenceis not complete, and our text seems to be organisedon
ratherdifferentprinciplesof its own.
Ratherthan being partof the Physicscommentary,then, our text seems
to be an independentshort treatiseon time, in characterratherlike the
short discussions collected in the Quaestiones and De anima libri mantissa
attributedto Alexander. Of the 35 texts attributedto Alexanderso far
identifiedin Arabicmanuscripts,20 seem to be moreor lesscloselyrelated
to extant Greek texts included in these collections;41 so it is clearly not
implausible that our text should have a similar background.One is
remindedof the relationbetween Alexander'scommentaryon Aristotle's
De animaand his own treatiseof the samename,exceptthatthe latteris on
a far moregenerousscale than our presenttext.
This seems to fall into three sections; an introduction,setting out and
criticisingrivalviews;a constructivesection,in which the Aristotelianview
is expounded;and a thirdsectionin whichthe emphasisis moreon answers
to possible objections,explicit or implicit- though the dividingline bet-
ween the last two sections is not entirelyclear-cut.This type of structure
can be parallelled from other, longer treatisesby Alexander;in the De
providentiaand the De mixtionean initial section criticisingthe views of
rivalschoolsis followedby a positivesectionsettingforthwhat is explicitly
describedas Aristotle'sposition,42while in the De fato a relativelyshort
expositionof the Aristotelianview is followed by more lengthyargument
against the rival determinist position.43

II. ALEXANDERAND ARISTOTLE

Alexanderdeclaresthathis accountof timewill not differat all fromthatof
Aristotle44.In fact, however,and in spite of the close similarityof manyof
Alexander'sargumentsto thoseof Aristotle,thereare certaindifferencesof
emphasis between his account of time as the numberedaspect of move-
ment,on the one hand, and thatof Aristotle,on theother.45Thisshouldnot
surpriseus; it seems essentiallysimilarto the way in whichAlexanderin his
De anima,by describingsoul as the productof the mixtureof the bodily
elements,46gives a very differentemphasisto Aristotle'stheory,while very

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probablythinkingthat his interpretationis morefaithful to Aristotlethan
othersthat had preceded.47
The greatestdifferenceis Alexander'sinsistenceon the unity of time in
its own nature,and its being dividedonly in thought(sections 11,28). This
linksup, as Dr. Zimmermannhas observed,48with a reportof Alexander's
views by Simplicius.Aristotledrawsa contrastbetween the instant,or the
'now',49 on the one hand, and the point in a line, on the other; the 'now'
does not divide time in the sameway as the point dividesthe line, being the
end of one segmentand the beginningof another,for this would involveits
being at rest. Rather, it divides time potentially.5 And Alexander ex-
plained this by saying that the 'now' divides time only in our thought.51
Moreover,Aristotlesaysthat if movementis alwaysone and the same,time
will be so too,52and that timeseemsalwaysto be different.53Ross takesthe
point to be that time is numericallydifferentfromone momentto another,
but specifically the same;54perhaps Alexander interpretedAristotle as
meaning'time seems alwaysto be different,but is not so in fact'.
Alexander'sview that time in itself is a unity is bound up with another
differencebetweenhis positionand Aristotle's;and this is the stresshe lays
on the connectionbetweentime and the movementof the outermostof the
heavenlyspheres,theprimummobile.mFor it is since the movementof the
heavenlysphereis single,continuousand eternalthathe is able to maintain
that time itself too is like this. Aristotleis his accountspeaksof time as the
number of movement quite generally; he only refers explicitly to the
movementof the heavenly sphere,in his own constructivetheory,at 4.14
223bl8ff., and he only states that it is the measureof timepar excellence,
not categorically that time is the number of this movement.56 And indeed,
if he had held such a view, it is difficult to see how the worry at 4.14
223bl-12 - if there are several simultaneousmovements,it would seem
that there are several simultaneoustimes - could ever have arisen.57It is
truethathe does referearlierto the possibilitythatmovementis alwaysone
and the same,58and that this is naturallyinterpretedas a referenceto the
movementof the heavens;nevertheless,thereis still less relativeemphasis
on this in Aristotlethan in Alexander.
There are also two facts which might suggest a certain blurring in
Alexanderof the distinctionbetween movementgenerallyand the move-
ment of the heavens in particular,such that he may not have realisedthe
extent to which he was changing the emphasis of Aristotle'saccount.
Firstly, Simplicius reports that Alexander in his commentaryfailed to
distinguish between the theory that time is movement simply and the
theory that time is the movement of the heavens.59And secondly, while

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Alexander does distinguish between these theories in our treatise,60he
recastsAristotle'sobjection to the identificationof time with movement
simply - movementsdiffer in speed, but time does not6l- in termsnot of
movement in general, but of the movements of the heavenly spheres
(section4). This seemsto weakenthe argument;for it too readilyinvitesthe
stipulationthat it is only the movement of the outermostsphere that is
time.62
Alexandermaintains,not only that time is only divided in thought,but
also that the instantor 'now' only comes to be in thought.63Aristotlesays
that the 'now' is always the same in what it is, but differentin its (in-
dividual) being;64Simplicius reports that Alexander explained this by
saying that we considerthe 'now' as travellingthrough time.65Aristotle
does link the change in the 'now' to the numberingof what is earlierand
what is later,66and this may have promptedAlexander'sinterpretation.67
Alexanderfurthermaintainsthat it is the 'now' that creates time (sec-
tions 13, 20). Aristotle claims that it is through the 'now' that time is
known;68again, Alexander'sposition may rest on a misunderstandingof
this.69But if it is the 'now'thatcreatestime,and the 'now'only comes to be
in thought,does it not follow that time is dependentfor its existenceupon
thought?Well, both Aristotle70and Alexander71 hold that time would not
existin the absenceof soul. Alexanderhoweverhas two argumentsfor this
conclusionwhereAristotlehas only one, explicitly.Bothauthorsarguethat
timedependson soul on the groundthatit is soul that numbersmovement;
but Alexander adds, apparentlyas a separate argument,72that in the
absence of soul there would not be any movement. It is his standard
doctrinethat the movementof the heavenlyspheresis causedby the desire
of theirsouls to emulatethe changelessnessof the Unmoved Mover.73
This second argumentof Alexander'sseemsto have been promptedby a
remarkof Aristotle'swhich in its originalcontextis only an aside.Aristotle
says that, in the absence of a numberingsoul, time as the number of
movementwould not exist, even though movementcould still exist (sc. as
far as this argument is concerned), if (per impossibile) movement could exist
in the absence of soul.74 It looks very much as if Alexanderhas taken this
aside and made it the basis of an independent argument.Interestingly
enough Simplicius,after criticisingAlexander'sdefence of the first argu-
ment against Boethus,75goes on to give the second argument,76but cites
Alexanderonly for the causationof the movementof the heavensby soul,
and not for the argument as a whole.77If we did not have the present
treatise, therefore, we would not know that the argument is in fact
Alexander's;Simplicius'mentioninghim by name when disagreeingwith

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him, but not giving him (full) credit when agreeing with him, is not
untypical of ancient practice.
There is, however, a problem. If time, as the numbered aspect of move-
ment, is dependent on thought for its existence, how can a distinction still
be drawn between time in itself as a continuum and time as divided in our
thought? It does not seem likely that the explanation is to be sought in a
contrast between our intellects, on the one hand, and a superhuman intel-
lect which measures movement without introducing divisions into it, on the
other. Rather, as Professor Sorabji has suggested to me, the explanation
may be that the instant as it creates time is thought of as travelling, and
while being so thought of cannot also be thought of as dividing. Or, putting
what is essentially the same contrast another way, the distinction may be
between time as the continuous numerable movement of the heaven and
divided time which is movement which is actually numbered. Aristotle
does, notoriously, say in Physics 4.14 not only that movement cannot be
numbered in the absence of soul, but also that it cannot be numerable.78It
may be noted, however, that Alexander's second argument for the
dependence of time upon soul in section 16 does not involve an appeal to
this somewhat questionable principle.
Section 21 on its own might suggest that we should resolve the problem
in a different way, by arguing that it is only determinate (i.e. divided?) time
that is dependent on the instant for its existence, not time itself. But it is
clearly stated in sections 13 and 20 that it is the instant or the 'now' that
creates time.
One is naturally led to ask how Alexander's distinction between time in
itself and time as divided in thought relates to that between McTaggart's A
and B series. In saying that time in itself is a continuum, and that the 'now'
only comes to be in thought, he might seem to be according priority to the
B-series, that of terms (like 'earlier than' or 'later than') that are not relative
to the present. On the other hand, he does say that time is created by the
travelling 'now', which is diflicult to reconcile with regarding the B-series
as fundamental; and divisions of time into 'the year before so-and-so' or
'the month after so-and-so' are presumably as secondary as those into 'last
year' or 'next month'. So it seems as if Alexander's distinction cuts across
McTaggart's, rather than coinciding with it.
There is an oddity in Alexander's argument in sections 22 and 23.
Aristotle had argued that certain things are outside time,79 and that, while
time measures rest as well as movement,80 it does not follow that everyhing
that does not move is in time.81Alexander takes this up, and uses it to argue
that the poles, diameter and centre of the universe are not in time -

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apparentlyenvisaginga claim thathis positionmightinvolve this and that
it would be objectionable if it did. (Strictly,presumably,the argument
applies only to the poles and axis of the outermostsphere- those of the
other spheres being moved by the spheres outside them - and to the
centresof all the spheres,which may be differentin essence even though
identicalin position).82Butwhy does Alexanderfeel the need to arguethat
the poles and the axis are not in time, while apparentlyallowingthat the
restof the heavensare?Both for Aristotle83and for Alexander84 all change
is in time,whichimpliesthat the movingheavensare in time;and Aristotle
says not only that all change is in time, but also that every moving thing
is,85which rules out any suggestion that the heavens are not in time
although their movement iS.86 Aristotle'sonly examples of things not in
time are mathematical;87though it must be admitted that what is con-
trastedwith these is thingssubjectto coming-to-beand passingaway,88so
that this in itself would leave open the possibilitythat the eternalheavens
arenot in time. But,as has been seen, theirmovementimpliesthattheyare.
That the whole of the universe, including the heavens, is in time for
Alexanderis suggestedby Simplicius,89even thoughhe is in the firstplace
concernedwith Alexander'sdiscussionof the conversethesisthat timeis in
the universe. On the other hand al-Shahrastani90reportsAlexanderas
saying that the heavens are not surroundedby time - i.e. there is no
durationlonger than theirs?- and this might be taken as implyingthat
they are not in time.91
Nevertheless,it remainsproblematicon any view why the poles should
be singledout. Alexanderdid know of a theorythat located the Unmoved
Moverat the heavenlypoles, thoughhe himselfrejectedit.92But the most
plausibleassumptionseems to be thatsection23 is an ad hominemreplyto
some opponent who had raised the specific issue of the poles; and if
Alexanderdoes hold that the heavens are as a matterof fact in time, his
pointmightnot be thatthe poles are not in time,but only thatthe merefact
that they are at rest does not prove that they are. Galen had apparently
singled out the heavenly poles and the centreof the earth as examplesof
things at rest, in his attemptto breakAristotle'slink between thinkingof
time and thinkingof movementby arguingthat thereis change in us even
when we think of what is at rest.93

1II. ALEXANDER AND GALEN?

Ibn al-NadTm, in his Fihrist, refersto a work by AlexanderAgainst Galen
on Time and Space.94 And it is presumably to this that Ibn abi Sacid (10th

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century)is referringin a passagewhich is translatedas follows by Pines:95
Let me know whetheryou considerthat time is necessarilyconsequentupon motion,
so that there cannot be time otherwisethan throughmotion,which is the cause of its
existence - this being the view of Aristotle- or whetheryou consider that time has
an existent nature, that it is a substancewhich subsistsper se, and that motion only
measures it as a surveyormeasures land with a cubit. Galen - accordingto what
Alexander states about him in the treatise in which he opposes Galen's views on
time and place - held this opinion, which is refutedby Alexander.Galen's view was
that time is eternal (a parte ante) and that it does not need motion in order to exist;
and he states that Plato was of a like opinion on this point. That is to say that he
considered that time is a substance, meaning by that duration, and that motion
measures it. Galen states accordinglythat motion does not produce for us time; it
only produces for us days, months and years. Time, on the other hand, exists
accordingto him per se, and is not an accidentconsequent upon motion.

These reports might at first sight not seem to have very much to do with our
text. The difficultyis not so much that Galen is nowheretherementioned
by name; after all, the proponentof the view outlined in section 3 is not
named either, a4thoughwe know from Simplicius that Alexander had
definiteviews as to his identity.96It is disputedwhetheror not Galen was
named in Alexander'srefutationof his criticismof Aristotle'stheory of
motion;97 in the De fato Alexander does not name his determinist
opponents at all, though this is at least in part because it is with
determinismitself as a philosophicaltheory that he is concerned,rather
than, in the first place at least, with specificallyStoic formulationsof it.98
And certainly, in our present treatise,a position like that attributedto
Galen by Ibn abi Sacid is outlinedin section 5.
The difficultyin relatingthe reportsof the workagainstGalen on time to
our presenttext residesratherin the generalcharacterof that text. It does
not seem to be a refutation of a particularrival theory, so much as a
constructivepresentationof Alexander'sown position. And - a further
point - Ibn abi SaCidcould not have obtainedall his informationabout
Galen'salleged position fromit.
Nevertheless, Dr Zimmermannhas suggested that what we have is
indeed the treatise referredto in the Fihrist.99The descriptionof it as a
'Refutation'could well, he tells me, have been based simply on the first,
polemicalsection;the openingdoes indeedlead us to expect a treatisethat
will be mainly concernedwith the discussionof a rival theory. One may
perhapscomparethe carelessnessof some of the titlesgiven - presumably
not by Alexanderhimself- to some of the shorterdiscussionsattributedto
him that survivein Greek.100Nor need thereever have been any evidence,
eitherin the textor outsideit, thatit wasto Galen'spositionthatAlexander

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was referring in section 1; for Alexander was type-cast in the Arabic
tradition as an opponent of Galen, and the fact that the opening of our text
leads us to expect a defence of the Aristotelian position against a rival
theory could have been enough in itself to lead to the conclusion that it was
Galen who was the object of attack.10' Ibn abi Sacid could then have
combined information that he took from our treatise, so interpreted, with
other information that he had about Galen's views from elsewhere; he does
not, after all, explicitly say that all his information about Galen's position
came from Alexander's treatise. As for the reference to a treatise against
Galen on time and space, this might reflect an original lost section preced-
ing what we have.102 One might think, on the other hand, that this too
could simply be an unjustified inference from the reference to place in the
opening section; but Dr Zimmermann reminds me that the Fihrist is much
earlier than either the Latin or the Arabic manuscripts that we have, and
that it would therefore be unsound method to disregard its report through
giving preference to a textual transmission that may well be incomplete.
We are left, then, with the question; how does what we have in the
treatise compare with what we know of Galen's views concerning time
from elsewhere? The evidence suggests that he, unlike Aristotle and
Alexander, allowed that
(1) There can be time even in the absence of the ordered movement of
the heavens.
For he understood Plato as asserting in the Timaeus that the ordering of
the cosmos by the Demiurge literally took place at a certain time; and,
while he for his own part expressed agnosticism as to whether the idea of a
beginning of the ordered universe in time was actually correct,'03 he
attributed to Plato the view that there was disorderly movement before the
ordering of the heavens.104
Now this is less than the view which Ibn abi Sacid attributes to Galen,
(2) There can be time in the absence of any movement at all.
But, as Professor Sorabji has pointed out to me, Alexander's report of his
opponents' view in section 5 does not actually imply more than (I); Ibn abi
SaCid's report could indeed rest on a careless reading of section 5. The
misinterpretation, if such it is, is not an unnatural one; for the opponents
are reported as arguing that there would still be time even if the heavenly
sphere stood still, and it is only too natural to assume that, if the heavens
were not in movement but stationary, a fortiori nothing else would be in
movement either. This, however, is to forget that what the opponents say is
part of their argument against the Aristotelian position, not an exposition
of their own positive view; the fact that they try to embarrass the supporters

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of the Aristotelian position, by postulating a situation in which there is a
heavenly sphere but it is stationary, does not preclude the possibility that in
their own view the only real alternative to the present state of affairs is one
in which there is no heavenly sphere at all, only disorderly movement, and
that the latter is the minimal condition for the existence of time.
Alexander responds to the opponents' attack first of all by simply
asserting that (1) is false (section 5), and then by saying that the assertion of
a false theory cannot alter the facts (section 6). However, he does then
return to the opponents' arguments (section 7); what he says leads one to
expect that he will take these up later, and the reference both in section 7
and in section 27 to time existing after time suggests that it is in section 27
that such further discussion is to be sought.
Any attempt to interpret the argument of section 27 must be fraught with
uncertainty, not only because of the discrepancy between the Latin and the
Arabic texts, but also because of the obscurity of the argument in either
version. The structure of the argument suggested by the Latin version is
more complicated than that of the Arabic version we have; it may seem
unlikely that Gerard would have introduced complexities that he did not
find in his original, and it is this passage which suggests most strongly that
the Latin derives from a version of the Arabic different from that which we
have. It is probably best to consider the two versions separately.
Taking the Arabic first, it seems most plausible to see this simply as a
restatement of the argument that time has no beginning in Aristotle
Metaphysics A 6.105 If one postulates a beginning of time, then one can
speak of what was 'before' it; but to say 'before' implies the existence of
time, so the postulated beginning was not a beginning after all.106 An
opponent who asserted (1) above - let us call him Galen for the sake of
convenience - could of course accept this, while pointing out that the fact
that time has always existed does not mean that the orderly movement of
the heavens has always existed. Unless the opponent is claiming that time
itself has a beginning, in other words, Alexander's argument may seem
simply to miss the point.
That it does this is not inconceivable. It may be that Alexander would
regard (1) as self-evidently absurd, and thus would suppose that there is no
difference between someone who asserts that the orderly movement of the
heavens has not always existed, on the one hand, and someone who asserts
that time has not always existed, on the other. And in this case he might
regard Aristotle's argument as relevant against such a person. On this
interpretation, section 27 follows on closely from 26 - which the Arabic
allows, whereas in the Latin 27 seems to introduce a new argument - and

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26 is introducedby a referenceto Aristotle.(On the otherhand,section28
is much more closely linked with 27 in the Latinthan it is in the Arabic.)
The argument is the Latin is more complex, in that the opponentis
presentedas derivingthe existenceof a time aftertime from the non-exis-
tence of 'thistime' before and after,107 and Alexanderas answeringthis by
the assertion,in section 28, that time in itself is undivided.Does 'thistime'
referto the present moment,or to the time relatedto the presentstate of
affairs,that is, time as measuredby the orderlymovementof the heavens?
'End of time' in the Arabicof section 27 clearlyimpliesthe latter;so does
'partsof time' in the Latinif it is understoodcollectively,thoughnot if it is
understooddistributivelyas 'each partof time'.
If 'this time' is to be understood as 'time measured by the orderly
movementof the heavens',the opponent'sargumentmight be that, if as
Alexanderclaimstime is dependenton the rotationof the heavens,andthat
is not eternal,then the absurdityresultsthat there must be a time before
time began; the conclusion being that time cannot be dependenton the
motionof the heavensafterall. And Alexander'sreplymightthen be taken
as an allusion to the Aristotelianargument;the notions'beforetime' and
'after time' are self-contradictory,and this shows that time is indeed
eternal.But this is obscure;and it showsthe same beggingof the question
against 'Galen' as did the interpretationof the Arabicversionsuggested
above. Unless Alexanderassumesthat, by showingthe eternityof time,he
has shown the eternity of orderedheavenly movement - which was the
very point at issue - his argumentis irrelevantto the positionof 'Galen';
indeed,it would seem that any attemptto interpretsection27 as relatingto
the questionwhetherthe movementof the heavensis eternal,ratherthan
as it seems to do to the questionwhethertime itself is eternal,mustinvolve
the imputationof some such ignoratioelenchito Alexander.
If on the other hand 'this time' does refer specificallyto the present
moment,it may be suspectedthat the argumentis not concernedwith the
question whether time is linked to the movement of the heavens at all.
Rather, it seems to deal with a paradoxwhich is a variant on one put
forward by Aristotle in Physics 4.10.108 He there raises the problem that it
would seem that time does not exist at all, since the pastdoes not exist any
more and the future does not exist yet; our objector,on the other hand,
would be arguing that there is no such thing as past and future, since
presenttime, assumedto be the only real time,109did not exist beforeand
will not exist in the future.And Alexander'sreplywill be thatthisdoes not
affectthe existenceof time, since'before'and 'after'as divisionsof timeare
somethingwe imposeon it and arenot fundamentalto it. Thiswouldgive a

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betterconnectionwith section28, and would also give more force to 'since
it is' in 27; but thereno longerseems to be any connectionwith the issue in
section5.
Anotherpossibilitywouldbe to supposethat'thistime'does indeedrefer
to that measured by the ordered rotation of the heavens, and that the
objector is someone who is trying to circumvent the argument of
MetaphysicsA 6 as follows: 'yes, time, and the orderedrevolutionof the
heavens,did have a beginning;but just because this was the beginningof
time, for this very reasonyou cannot say that it was 'before'that time did
not exist'.This would involvesupposingthatthe textof section27 had been
corrupted,the originalclaim being somethinglike 'it was not beforethat
this time did not exist'; this is not perhapstoo difficult,since such a text
mighteasily be misunderstoodand so corrupted.It is also true thaton this
view too the positionof the objectoris not directlyrelevant,at any rate,to
the claim referredto in section5, that time could exist in the absenceof the
orderedheavenlymovements;our objectorwould ratherbe agreeingwith
Alexanderthat it could not. But the real difliculty with such an interpre-
tationis the responsethatit wouldinvolveattributingto Alexander.Forhis
replywould not be to insist that the movementof the heavenswas eternal,
but ratherto insist that timeis eternal,whetherone can speakof 'before'in
a particularcontext or not; the distinctive feature of the Aristotelian
position,that time is dependenton the rotationof the heavensand that the
lattermust thereforebe eternal if the formeris, would either be ignored
altogetheror else be assumed,once again, in a question-beggingway.110
Whateverone may say about section 27, there is a point of contact
between Alexander'streatiseand Galen's position as reportedby Ibn abi
Sacid,in that both drawa contrastbetweentime in itself and time divided
into unitssuch as days, monthsand years.The differenceis that Alexander
links time in itself to the movementof the heavens, whereasGalen does
not. IndeedIbn abi SaCid'sdescriptionof Galen'spositionis so reminiscent
of sections 10 and 11of our text that one is led to wonderwhetherIbn abi
Sacid misunderstoodAlexander, or whether indeed sections 10 and 11
relateto the position of Alexander'sopponentand not to his own position
at all. This last suggestion, however, does not seem possible; the text
requires that Alexander is there expounding his own view. If Ibn abi
Sacid's attributionto Galen of the distinctionbetween time in itself and
time as measuredby motion - a likely enough distinctionin itself - rests
on anythingmore than a misunderstandingof the Alexandertext we have,
Alexander'sown position might be seen as an attempt to take over the
distinctiondrawnby Galen while still connectingtime in itself, as well as

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time divided into periods,with the movementof the heavens.
We know from Simpliciusthat Galen brought two furtherarguments
againstthe Aristoteliantheoryof time. Firstly,he argued that it involved
circularity,if time is the numberof motionin respectof 'before'and 'after',
but the 'before'and 'after'are before and after in time. Section21 of our
text looksat firstsight as if it mightbe makinga similarpoint,at leastin the
Latin.Time is only knownthroughtime;111and indeed, if we combinethe
claim in section 21 that (i) the instantwould not exist if time did not with
the claim in 20 that (ii) it is the instantthat createstime, it would seem to
follow, not just that time is only known throughtime, but also that time
only existsthroughtime. However,section21 seemsto be presentedas part
of Alexander'sown position,not as an opponent'sobjection;and Aristotle
holds both that the existence of the instant implies that of time and vice
versa.'12It would seem that Alexanderdoes not regardthe circularityas
vicious,and that thereis no directattemptto answerGalen here.
Galen also argued, against Aristotle'sclaim that knowledge of time
involves knowledge of change,'13 that even when we think of thingsthat
are themselves unchangeable, there is none the less a change in our
thought.114 Alexander too links awareness of time with awarenessof
movement(section9); but theredoes not seem to be a referenceto Galen's
argumentin our text.
A final observationhas a certain piquancy. Alexander'semphasison
time as a unity in itself could providean answerto the paradoxraisedby
Aristotle,that it would seem that timehas no realexistencebecauseneither
the pastnor the futureexists.'"5Furthermore,the claimthat the 'now'only
comes to be in our thought (section 20) might provide a solution to the
problemof when it comes to be."6 However,Simpliciusstatesthatno-one,
not even Alexander,has succeededin solvingAristotle'sparadoxes."17 The
question remainswhetherhe says this because he did not know our text,
even though he knew Alexander'sPhysics commentary;or becausethese
solutionsare only implicit;or becausehe did not considerthem valid.

University College, London

1 I am gratefulto Dr. Zimmermannfor this information.The Arabicis known from two

manuscripts,Teheran Meskat425 (cat. 452) and Tashkent2385/87 (cat. 1887);cf. J. van
Ess, 'Ober einige neue Fragmente des Alexander von Aphrodisiasund des Proklosin
arabischerObersetzung',Der Islam 42 (1966) 20. Badawl uses the Tashkent MS in his
edition.

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2See I. Bruns, SupplementumAristotelicum 2.2 (Berlin, 1982) v-xiv; P. Moraux,
Alexandred'Aphrodise:Exegete de la noetiqued'Aristote(Liege and Paris, 1942) 19-28.

38 ThUry,97.
39 F.W. Zimmermann and H.V.B. Brown, 'Neue arabischen Obersetzungen aus dem
Bereichder spatantikengriechischenPhilosophie',Der Islam 50 (1973) 314.
40 Cf. Simplicius 728.2ff.,
748.12ff., etc.
41 I have endeavoured to summarise the details in 'Alexander of
Aphrodisias:Scholas-
ticism and Innovation',a Forschungsberichtforthcomingin Aufstiegund Niedergangder
romischenWelt,eds. H. Temporini and W. Haase, Teil 2 Principat,section 'Philosophie
und Wissenschaften'.
42 Cf. De providentia31.11ff. in the edition by H.-J. Ruland, Die arabischenFassungen
zwei Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias,diss. Saarbrucken, 1976; De mixtione
(Suppl.Aristotelicum2.2) XIII 228.5ff.
43 Cf. R.W. Sharples, 'Alexanderof Aphrodisias'Second Treatmentof Fate?'Bull. Inst.

Class. Stud. 27 (1980), 76-7.

44 Section 8. The Latin as it stands is ambiguous, but the Arabic makes the sense clear.
45 Al-Shahrastani, Religionspartheienund Philosophenschulen,II, tr. T. Haarbrucker,
Halle 1851,208 reportsAlexander as saying that time is either what numbersor what is
numbered. He does suggest that the nows may be numbering number; Simpl. 729.7,
Philoponusin phys. 738.24. Cf. Aspasius ap. Simpl. 714.31.
46 Alexander De anima (Suppi. Aristotelicum 2.1), 24.21-3.
47 P.L. Donini, 'L'anima e gli elementi nel De Anima di Alessandro di Afrodisia',Atti
della Acad. delle Scienze di Torino, classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 105
(1971), 104-6.
48 Zimmerman-Brown(above, n.39) 314.
49 Aristotle'sTb vvvcovers both. The Latin has instans,the Arabical-an, throughout.
50 Ar. 4.13 222a14,cf. 4.11 220a 12 ff. (I owe this referenceto ProfessorSorabji),and Alex.
ap. Simpl. 728.19.
51 Alex. ap. Simpl. 748.21 ff. (but cf. the alternative explanations given by Alex. ap.
Simpl. 749.3ff. and 749.13f.)
52 Ar. 4.13 222a30-33.
53 Ar. 4.13 222b4.
5 W.D. Ross, Aristotle'sPhysics (Oxford 1936) 609, comparing 4.12 220b6-14; cf. also
4.11 219b9 f.
55 Sections 10, 15 and 19. On the other hand, in section 16 the step in the argument'if the
sphere were not moved, all movement would be done away with' seems superfluous if
time is expressly identified with the number of the movement of the sphere.
56 At 4.14 223b2 1 f. he states that time seems to be the movementof the sphere.'Seems' is
presumably to be explained by the absence of any reference to the number of the
movement of the sphere; nevertheless,it is left open whether or not time is categorically
to be identified with the numberof the movement of the sphere.
57 Ar. 4.14 223bl-12. Admittedly, the discussion of the movement of the sphere does
come immediately after this.
58 Ar. 4.13 222a32 (above, n. 52).
59 Simpl. 705.4-7.

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60 The Latin is ambiguous; Thery's punctuationwould imply that the distinctionis not
recognised,but the Arabicsupportsthe view that it is. See above, note (d). The theorythat
time is movement simply is omitted in section 1; but so it is in Ar. 4.10 218a33-b1.
61 Ar.4.10218b13ff.
62 Cf. Alexander section 15. Alexander'sfirst argumentin section 2 also seems weak; it
could easily be specified that it was the outermostsphere that was meant.
63 Section 20.
64 Ar. 4.11 219b12-33,cf. 219a31f. and 4.13 222a14 ff.
65 Cf. bnvooivrEsin Simpl. 713.14-16(on Ar. 219a31f.),also 749.3ff.(above, n.51).
66 Ar. 4.11 219b27 f.
67 For the connection between numberingand thoughtcf. Alexandersection 16.
68 Ar. 4.11 219b23-5, 28-31.
69 Compare the
references to the instant as making time known at the beginning of
section 20, and in section 21. I am gratefulto ProfessorSorabjifor this suggestion.
70 Ar. 4.14 223a21-9.
71 Section 16.
72 That this is a separateargumentis not indeed clear from the Latintext, but seems to be
requiredby the logic of the arguments.
73 Alexander Quaestiones (Suppl. Aristotelicum2.2) 1.25 40.10ff., 2.18 62.27ff., 2.19

63.18ff. Cf. P. Merlan,'PlotinusEnneads2.2', TAPhA74(1943), 181f.,and the Appendix

to my 'Alexander of Aphrodisias on divine providence:two problems',forthcomingin
Class. Quart.32 (1982).
74 Ar. 4.14 223a27 f.; cf. Simpl. 760.1Iff.
75 Simpl. 759.18-760.11;cf. 764.35ff., 765.9.
76 Simpl. 760.1 1ff.
77 Simpl. 760.17f.
78 Ar. 4.14 223a22-5.
79 Ar. 4.12 221b3 ff.
80 Ar. 4.12 221b7; cf. above section 18, and Alex. ap. Simpl. 742.33ff., 743.36, 750.27,
758.7. Ross (above n. 54) 610.
81 Ar. 4.12 221b12 ff.
82 Cf. Aristotle De caelo 2.14 296b16, on the centre of the earth and the centre of the
universe.
83 Ar. 4.14 222b30, 223a15.
84 Alex. ap. Simpl. 739.21-5 and ap. Themistiusin
phys. 197.4.
85 Ar. 4.14 222b31.
86 Cf. Simplic. 743.32f. and 739.21-5.
87 Ar. 4.12 221b23 f., 222a3-7.
88 Ar. 4.12 221b28-30.
89 Simpl. 758.19ff. At 781.20ff. he suggests that Alexanderand Aristotlemightwell have
been awareof a distinctionbetween the sempiternityof the heavensand the timelessness
of the Unmoved Mover, even though they used the same word, alcwvov,for both.
90 Ed. Haarbrucker(above, n. 45) 207f.
91 Cf. Ar. 4.12 221a20ff., b3Of.
92 Simpl. 1354.14f

93 Themistiusin phys. 144.23ff.(below, n. 114).

94 The Fihristof al-Nadim, tr. B. Dodge, New York 1970,2.609.
95 S. Pines, 'A Tenth Century PhilosophicalCorrespondence',Proc. American Academy

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for JewishResearch24 (1955) 11If., reprintedin A. Hyman,ed., Essaysin MedievalJewish
and Islamic Philosophy,New York 1977; also cited, but wrongly attributedto Yahya b.
Ad!, in Pines, Beitragezur islamischenAtomenlehre,Berlin 1936,74f.
96 Above, n. 6.
97 S. Pines, 'Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri', Isis 52 (1961) 22-4,
argues for the restorationof Galen's name by emendation; against, N. Rescher and M.
Marmura,Alexanderof Aphrodisias:The Refutationof Galen's treatiseon the theoryof
motion, Islamabad 1969, 58-60.
98 Cf. A.A. Long, 'Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias Defato (I-XIV)',
Arch. Gesch.Philos. 52 (1970) 247 n. 3 and 266-8.
99 F.W. Zimmermann, 'Al-Farabi und die philosophische Kritik an Galen von
Alexander zu Averroes', Akten der 7 Kongr. der Arabistik, Gottingen 1976 (= Abh.
Gottingen,phil.-hist. KI. 3. Folge 98) 410 n. 49.
ZO
Cf. 1. Bruns(above n. 2) ix, xi.
101 Again, I am grateful to Dr. Zimmermannfor this information.
102 Zimmermannand Brown(above, n. 39) 314.
1Q3 Cf. M. Baltes,Die
WeltentstehungdesPlatonischenTimaios1, Leiden 1976,63f. and n.
168.
104
CompendiumTimaei4, p. 43.6-10 Kraus-Walzer(Plato Arabus 1, London 1951). Cf.
G. Vlastos,'The DisorderlyMotion in the Timaeus',in R.E. Allen (ed.), Studiesin Plato's
Metaphysics,London 1965,385-8 and 409-14.
105 AristotleMetaphysicsA
6 1071b6-10;cf. Physics8.1 251b10-26.
106 Cf., however, the
criticismsof this argumentat W.L. Craig, TheKalamCosmological
Argument,London 1979, 108f.
107
That is, taking quod in 97.1 as 'because' and quia in 97.2 as 'that' (above, n. (kk)).
Gerard'susage in fact rathersuggests the reverse,so that the non-existence of this time
beforehandwould be inferred from the claim that there was a time before time; but no
reasonhas been given for supposing the latter.
108 Ar. 4.10 217b32-218a3.
109Cf. 'since it is' in 97.1-2; 'although it is' would make equally good sense on this
interpretation(above, n. (11)).
110 I am particularlyindebted to discussion with ProfessorSorabji in the whole of the
precedingfour paragraphs.
" So the Latin; 'through the instant'in the Arabic(above, n. (aa)).
112 Ar.
4.11 219b33 ff.
113 Ar. 4.11 218b21 ff.
114
Simpl. 708.27ff.;Themistius in phys. 14423ff.
115 Ar. 4.10
217b32-218a3;above, n.108.
116 Ar. 4.10 218al6
ff. I am grateful to ProfessorSorabjifor this suggestion.
117 Simpl. 795.33.

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