REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
_____ City, Branch ________

LILIBETH ALAGOS BARDOS,

Petitioner,
Case No.
-versus- For: Declaratory Relief with
Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
in his capacity as Executive
Secretary of the Philippines,
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION (DoTr),
herein represented by Hon.
Secretary ARTHUR P. TUGADE,
LAND TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE (LTO), Represented by
Executive Director ROMEO VERA
CRUZ.
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

[WITH APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION]

Petitioner, LILIBETH ALAGOS BARDOS, by counsel, respectfully states:

I
PREFATORY STATEMENT

1
 1.1. The Republic has always sought the protection and safety of the
general public pursuant to the Constitution which states that the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy. The intensified efforts to rid
the country of criminals under the present Administration have challenged
the limits of the legal fundamentals of due process and equal protection of
the laws. While it is true that dura lex sed lex (the law is harsh but that is
the law), it is likewise true that justice should be fair and humane. “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” This
is a basic provision of law whence all rights come from. Law enforcement
and Congress should always be aware of the primacy of the Constitution.

1.2. In the instant case, the fundamental issue before the Honorable
Court is whether Republic Act 11235 otherwise known as “Motorcycle
Crime Prevention Act”, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are
invalid as it creates a legal obligation or legal burden inconsistent with, or
clearly disregards, the constitutionally protected rights of motorcycle
owners and riders.

II
NATURE OF THE PETITION

2.1. This is a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
(“Petition”) under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court seeking a determination of
the Honorable Court of questions of construction or validity of the subject
Republic Act and a determination of the rights of the Petitioner and the
professional motorcycle riders she represents.

III
TIMELINESS AND JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

3.1. As provided in the Rules of Court, the requisites for a petition

for declaratory relief are as follows: (a) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other

2
governmental regulation;1 (b) the terms of the said document and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 2 (c) there
must have been no breach of the document/s in question; 3(d) there must
be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;4 (e) the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination;5 and (f) adequate relief is not available through other means
or other forms of actions or proceedings.6

3.2. In this case, all of the foregoing requisites are present.

3.3. The subject matter of the controversy in the instant Petition is

the validity of Republic Act 11235 (“R.A. No. 11235”) and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (“IRR”). For reasons to be discussed in detail below,
the terms and validity of the subject RA 11235 and IRR are doubtful and
require judicial construction by the Honorable Court considering that the
law-making authority, in issuing the subject RA 11235 and IRR, created a
legal obligation or legal burden inconsistent with, or clearly disregards, the
constitutionally protected rights of motorcycle owners and riders.

3.4. There has been no breach of the subject RA 11235 and IRR in
question as of the date of filing the instant Petition.

3.5. There is also a need for judicial intervention declaring the

respective rights and obligations of the parties which shall depend on the
validity of the Subject RA 11235 and IRR.

3.6. The validity of the subject RA 11235 and IRR is ripe for judicial
determination considering that the subject RA 11235 and IRR were
published on 14 March 2019 and 19 May 2020, respectively. Moreover,
since the government is intent on implementing the subject RA 11235 and
its IRR, Petitioner has no other adequate relief available or other forms of
action or proceeding aside from the instant Petition that would enable
Petitioner to effectively assail the Subject RA 11235 and its IRR.
1
Rule 63, Section 1, Rules of Court.
2
Santos v. Aquino et al., G.R. No. L-5101, 28 November 1953.
3
Teodoro v. Mirasol, G.R. No. L-8934, 18 May 1956.
4
Edades v. Edades, G.R. No. L-8964, 31 July 1956.
5
Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy et al., G.R. No. L-3062, 28 September 1951.
6
Ollada V. Central Bank, L-11357, 31 Mau 1962.

3
 3.7. The Office of the Solicitor General is hereby given notice of the
instant Petition and is included as a necessary party herein in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

IV
THE PARTIES

4.1. Petitioner, LILIBETH ALAGOS BARDOS (“Petitioner”), is of

legal age, Filipino and a resident of __________. She may be served with
legal processes, notices and orders of this Honorable Office c/o
ESCALONA FONACIER LAW OFFICES at
____________________________.

4.2. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary of the Philippines. He may be served with legal
processes, notices, and orders of this Honorable Office at the Office of the
Executive Secretary, Bonifacio Hall, Malacañang Palace, Jose Laurel Street,
San Miguel, Manila.

4.3. HON. ARTHUR P. TUGADE, in his capacity of Secretary of

the Department of Transportation (“DOTr”). He may be served with legal
processes, notices, and orders of this Honorable Office at the Office of the
Department of Transportation in Apo Court along Sergio Osmeña Sr. Zone,
Clark Freeport, Mabalacat, Pampanga.

4.4. HON. ROMEO VERA CRUZ, in his capacity as Executive

Director of the Land Transportation Office (“LTO”). He may be served
with legal processes, notices and orders of this Honorable Court at the
Land Transportation Office, LTO Compound, East Avenue, Quezon City.

4.5. HON. EDUARDO M. AÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the

Department of Interior and Local Government (“DILG”). He may be served
with legal processes, notices, and orders of this Honorable Court at DILG
Napolcom Center, EDSA corner Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.

4.6. The Office of the Solicitor General with address at 104

Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, is being impleaded as a

4
necessary party pursuant to Section 3, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. It may
be served with legal processes, notices, and orders of this Honorable Court
at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City, Metro Manila.

V
STATEMENT OF FACTS

5.1. Petitioner, is currently a partner of Angkas and Lalamove since

_________ and ________, respectively. As partner of Angkas and Lalamove,
her trip is usually from _________ to _______ and earns the amount of
________ from the use of her motorcycle.

5.2. Petitioner owns ________ with Certificate of Registration No.

_____ and MV File No. _____, since ____________. Petitioner purchased her
motorcycle in the amount of _________.

5.3. As partner of Angkas , Petitioner uses her motorcycle to

transport another person from one place to another before COVID-19
occurred. Also, as partner of Angkas and Lalamove, Petitioner delivers
documents and other things to another person for a fee.

5.4. Petitioner is likewise a partner of grab.

5.5. Petitioner owns _______ with Certificate of Registration No.

____ and MV File No. ______, since __________. Petitioner purchased her
motor vehicle in the amount of _________.

5.6. On 13 December 2018 and 14 January 2019, Senate Bill No. 1397
and House Bill No. 8419 were passed, respectively. The two bills were
deliberated in a Bi-cameral Conference Committee and were eventually
consolidated which resulted to Republic Act No. 11235, otherwise known
as the “Motorcycle Crime Prevention Act”.

5.7. RA No. 11235 sought to curb the commission of crimes through

the use of motorcycles by requiring bigger, readable and color-coded
number plates in the front and back sides of motorcycles regardless of the
brand, size, unit and other specifications.

5
 5.8. On 8 March 2019, the bill was signed into law President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte. The law was published on 14 March 2019 and
thereafter became effective on 29 March 2019.

5.9. The LTO formulated the IRR and passed the same on 11 May
2020. The IRR became effective on 6 June 2020 following its publication.

5.10. Upon notice of the impending implementation of R.A. 11235

and its IRR, Petitioner sought the position of Angkas in which she was
referred to the Position Paper dated 22 June 2020 submitted by Mr. Jobert
Christian Bolanos (“Mr. Bolanos”).

5.11. Mr. Bolanos filed the Position Paper on behalf of the Motorcycle
Rights Organization which embodies the concerns of motorcycle owners
regarding R.A. 11235 and its IRR.

5.12. Being affected by R.A. 11235 and its IRR, Petitioner sought the
assistance of a legal counsel to protect her Constitutional rights. The
Petitioner seeks to declare R.A. 11235 as invalid and unconstitutional, the
basis of which will be discussed hereunder.

5.13. Hence, the present Petition.

VI
ISSUE AND GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

6.1. Petitioner submits the following issues for the resolution of the
Honorable Court and grounds for allowance of the Petition:

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO.11235 AND ITS

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE INVALID
AND/OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE:

A
Sections 4 and 11 of RA No. 11235 and Section 12 of
the IRR violate the Constitutionally protected right

6
 against the imposition of excessive fines, penalties or
punishment; and the right to due process.

B
Section 5 of RA No. 11235 and Section 5 of the IRR
are invalid for blatant violation of the laws regarding
invalid delegation of legislative power.

C
R.A. No. 11235 and its IRR are violative of both
procedural and substantive due process, and of the
Constitutional guaranty against undue deprivation
of liberty and property.

D
RA No. 11235 and its IRR are invalid as they violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

DISCUSSION

A. Sections 4 and 11 of RA No.

11235 and Section 12 of the
IRR violate the
Constitutionally protected
right against the
imposition of excessive
fines, penalties or
punishment; and the right
to due process.

7.1. Sections 4 and 11 of RA 11235 provide that:

“SEC. 4. Registration by the Owner. – The owner of a

motorcycle shall register his or her motorcycle with the
LTO within five (5) days from such acquisition of
ownership. The owner of a motorcycle shall also
immediately report any sale or disposition of his or her

7
 motorcycle to the LTO. Failure of the owner to register
within five (5) days from acquisition of ownership, or to
immediately report its sale or disposition, shall subject the
owner to a penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor to
prision correctional, as defined under the Revised Penal
Code, or a fine of not less than Twenty Thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) or both.

“If a motorcycle that is not yet registered with the LTO is

used in connection with an offense punishable under the
Revised Penal Code or special penal laws, the maximum
penalty of the relevant offense shall be imposed on the
offenders.

“SEC. 11. Loss of Number Plate or Readable Number

Plate. If the number plate or readable number plate of a
motorcycle is lost, damaged, or stolen, the owner of such
motorcycle shall immediately report the same to the LTO
and the PNP through the Joint PNP and LTO Operations
and Control Center, and request a replacement number
plate. Failure of the owner to report the same shall be
subject the owner to a fine of not less than Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but not more than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00).”

7.2. Section 12 of the IRR provides that:

“SEC. 12. Loss of Number Plate – If the number plate of

motorcycle is lost, damage, or stolen, the owner of such
motorcycle shall report the same within twenty-four (24)
hours to the Joint LTO and PNP operations and Control
Center. The owner shall, within seventy-two (72) hours
from the time the loss or damage was reported, submit a
duly notarized Affidavit to the nearest LTO Office. The
LTO shall issue a certification of application for
replacement plate, and an authority to use improvised

8
 plates which shall be valid until the issuance of the
replacement plate.

“Failure of the owner to report the same and apply for a

replacement plate from the LTO within the periods
prescribed herein shall subject the owner to a fine of not
less than Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but not
more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)

“However, if the lost, damaged, or stolen number plate

or readable number plate is used in connection with an
offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or special
penal laws, the failure of the owner to report within three
(3) days that the motorcycle is lost, damaged, or stolen,
shall subject the owner to a penalty of imprisonment of
arresto mayor to prision correccional.”

7.3. A perusal of the above-quoted provisions evidently show that the

mere failure of an owner of a motorcycle to immediately register his
acquisition of ownership or to report a lost, damaged or stolen plate would
already subject the motorcycle owner to a fine ranging from Twenty
Thousand Pesos (PhP 20,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00), or
imprisonment of arresto mayor (one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months) to prision correctional (six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years).

7.4. These fines, penalties and punishments are obviously in direct

contravention of the constitutional guaranty against the imposition of
excessive fines, penalties and punishments.

7.5. Section 19, Article III of the Constitution provides:

“Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor curel,

degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons,
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.”

9
 7.6. In People v. Dionisio,7 the Supreme Court held:

“The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute,

is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in
other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,
the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.”

7.7. Section 56 paragraphs (a) and (d) of RA No. 4136 provide for
penalties in case of failure to register a motor vehicle or in case the motor
vehicle is without a proper license plate, thus:

“ (a) For registering later than seven days after acquiring

title to an unregistered motor vehicle or after conversion of
a registered motor vehicle requiring larger registration fee
than for which it was originally registered, or for a renewal
of a delinquent registration, the penalty shall be a fine of
fifty percent of the registration fees corresponding to the
portion of the year for which the vehicle is registered for
use.

“(d) Driving a motor vehicle with delinquent, suspended

or invalid registration, or without registration or without
the proper license plate for the current year, three hundred
pesos fine or imprisonment not exceeding fifteen days, at
the discretion of the court.”

7.8. In comparison, such fines, penalties and punishments are much

higher than those imposed on motor vehicle owners who fail to register
their motor vehicle in accordance with Republic Act No. 4136 (RA No.
4136), otherwise known as the “Land Transportation and Traffic Code”.

7.9. RA No. 11235 was enacted precisely to curb the evil of using
motorcycles as means of perpetrating various crimes. It is also of common
knowledge that motor vehicles are used to commit crimes such as
7
G.R. No. L-25513, 27 March 1968.

10
kidnapping and murder, to mention a few. Hence, it can be concluded that
the fines, penalties and punishments prescribed in RA No. 11235 is
unreasonable and disproportionate to the offense it seeks to punish.

7.9. It is also worth mentioning that the fines, penalties and

punishment in RA No. 11235 are much higher than the market value of
motorcycles. If a motorcycle owner is caught violating the said law, it
would be logical to just surrender the motorcycle than to pay the
corresponding fine which is higher than the market value of the
motorcycle.

7.10. Petitioner, as minimum wage earner, seeks to invalidate these

excessive and unconscionable penalties of RA No. 11235 and its IRR since it
will unduly create a legal burden to her in using her motorcycle. It should
be emphasized that Petitioner uses her motorcycle at least eight (8) hours a
day for her livelihood. As such, the number plate of her motorcycle is
vulnerable to damages due to ordinary wear and tear or worse, to
tampering.

7.11. To reiterate, a lost, damaged or stolen number plate of a

motorcycle’s number plate even without the owner’s fault, or due to wear
and tear, shall result to the imposition of the excessive penalty.

7.12. Hence, Sections 4 and 5 of RA No. 11235 and Section 12 of the

IRR are patently violative of the Constitution as the penalties provided
therein are inhuman and barbarous, fragrantly and plainly oppressive to
the Petitioner and other motorcycle owners.

B. Section 5 of RA No.
11235 and Section 5 of
the IRR are invalid for
blatant violation of the
laws regarding invalid
delegation of legislative
power.

7.13. Section 5 of RA No. 11235 provides:

11
 “Sec. 5. Bigger, Readable and Color-Coded Number
Plates. – The LTO shall issue a readable number plate for
every motorcycle. The LTO shall, in the implementing rule
and regulations (IRR) of this Act, determine the font style
and size of the bigger, readable and color-coded number
plates: Provided, That the contents of the number plates
shall be readable from the front, the back, and the side of
the motorcycle from a distance of at least fifteen (15) meters
from the motorcycle.

“The LTO shall also devise a color scheme for the

readable number plates for every region in the Philippines
where a motorcycle is registered for quick and easy
identification.

“The readable number plates must be displayed in both

the front and back sides of a motorcycle and shall be made
of suitable and durable material as determined by the LTO.

“The utilization of voluntary and paid labor from

prisoners shall be among the requirements to bid for the
procurement of the number plates under this Act.”

7.14. Section 5 of the IRR provides:

“SECTION 5. Bigger, Readable and Color-Coded

Number Plates. – The LTO shall issue a set of bigger,
readable, and color-coded number plate for every
motorcycle, which shall consist of a. a metal number plate
to be installed at the rear of motorcycle, and b. a decal
number plate to be displayed in its front. It shall bear a
unique combination of alpha numeric characters using the
following format. xxx

“The metal plate shall be 235mm in width and 135mm in

height, and made of suitable and durable aluminum
substrate material with reflectorized background and

12
 security features. The font size for all alpha numeric
characters is 60mm tall.

“The decal plate shall be 135mm in width and 85mm in

height, and made of suitable and durable sticker material
with reflectorized alphanumeric character and security
features. The font size for all alphanumeric characters is
40mm tall.

“The contents of the number plates shall be readable

from the front and the back of the motorcycle from a
distance of at least fifteen (15) meters from the motorcycle.
For this purpose, all motorcycles shall have a rear plate
light. Xxx”

7.15. It can be easily discerned from above-quoted provisions that

every motorcycle is required to display a number plate in its front and back
sides which is readable from a distance of at least fifteen (15) meters from
the motorcycle. Nevertheless, the RA No. 11235 is not complete and
specific in terms and conditions of the required number plate such that
when the law left the legislature and reached the LTO, the latter stepped
into the shoes of the legislature and determined for itself the size and
dimension of the number plates.

7.16. In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima,8 the Supreme Court

explained the tests of a valid delegation of legislative power, thus:

“Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.”

8
G.R. No. 166715, 14 August 2008.

13
 7.17. Here, the first test is wanting.

7.18. RA No. 11235 did not expressly specify the limits of LTO’s
authority in the implementation of the law and apparently failed to
identify and set the parameters under which the LTO may fill in the lack of
details when it comes to readable number plates.

7.19. There are no specific guidelines or limitations in the law that

mapped out the boundaries of LTO’s authority in drafting the IRR and its
implementation.

7.21. The only standard provided in RA No. 11235 is that the front
and back number plates must be “readable from a distance of fifteen (15)
meters from the motorcycle”. The interpretation of such standard should
not be left to the discretion of the LTO.

7.21.1. The danger of leaving to the LTO the determination of

the standard, “readable from a distance of fifteen (15) meters from the
motorcycle” is real than imaginary.

7.21.2. For one, the sizes of the front and back number plates as
stated in the IRR vary in sizes which manifest that the standard of
“readable” is very subjective. It bears stressing that the LTO
prescribes that the number plates shall be 235mm in width and
135mm in height with a font size of 60mm, while the decal plates
shall have a dimension of 135mm in width and 85mm in height with
font size of 40mm tall.

7.21.3. The difference in sizes and dimensions was not even

justified by the LTO when it came it out with the IRR which bolsters
the proposition that the LTO was given too much leeway in its
determination of the concept “readable”.

7.21.4. Furthermore, given the different circumstances, the

standard “readable from a distance of fifteen (15) meters from the
motorcycle” is subject to abuse. This is evident in cases where
professional motorcycle owners or riders such as the Petitioner
makes her trip at night and law enforcers, even with good eyesight,

14
 might not be able to “read” the number plate thus, can apprehend
her in accordance with RA 11235.

7.22. It is also worth mentioning that the LTO acted beyond the scope
of its authority and palpably violated the rule on non-delegation of
legislative power when it included decal stickers in the IRR when the RA
No. 11235 only refers to regular motor vehicle license plate as stated in the
definition of the number plate. Nowhere in the definition of number plate
does it include the words decal sticker or decal or sticker.

7.23. Verily, Section 5 of RA No. 11235 and Section 5 of the IRR are
invalid for blatantly violating the laws and established jurisprudence on
delegation of legislative power.

C. R.A. No. 11235,

particularly Sections 7,
12, 13 and 14, and its
IRR, are violative of both
procedural and
substantive due process
as well as the
Constitutional right to
liberty and property.

1. Section 7 of R.A.
11235 and
Section 8 of the
IRR are violative
of both
procedural and
substantive due
process.

7.24. Section 7of R.A. No 11235 provides:

“Sec. 7. Driving Without a Number Plate or Readable

Number Plate. – Driving without a number plate or
readable number plate is prohibited. The driver of the

15
 motorcycle without a number plate, as provided in this
Act, shall be punished by prision correccional as provided
in the Revised Penal Code, or a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not more than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).

“A motorcycle driven without a number plate or a

readable number plate shall be stopped, and such
motorcycle shall be seized by law enforcers immediately
surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP). Any
apprehension must be reported immediately to the LTO,
PNP and the Department of Information and
Communications Technology (DICT) through the Joint
LTO and PNP Operations and Control Center. The owner
of such motorcycle may redeem his or her seized
motorcycle to the LTO upon proof of ownership, payment
of the costs of seizure and compliance with a number plate
or readable number plate.”

7.25 Section 8 of the IRR provides:

“Sec. Driving without a Number Plate or Readable

Number Plate. – Driving without a number plate or a
readable number plate, as provided in this IRR, is
prohibited. The driver of a motorcycle without a number
plate or a readable number plate shall be punished by
prision correccional as provided in the Revised Penal
Code, or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.)
but not more than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00)

A motorcycle driven without a number plate or a

readable number plate shall be stopped, and such
motorcycle shall be seized by law enforcers and
surrendered within twenty-four (24) hours to the
Philippine National Police (PNP). Any apprehension must
be reported immediately to the LTO, PNP and the
Department of Information and Communications

16
 Technology (DICT) through the Joint LTO and PNP
Operations and Control Center. The form and procedure
for reporting shall be issued jointly by the LTO, PNP and
DICT upon effectivity of this IRR.

The local impounding center shall be open 24 hours a

day, seven days a week and manned by at last two
impounding officers of the local government unit.

xxx xxx”

7.26. A reading of the above-quoted provisions of the R.A. 11235 and

IRR would instantly show that the apprehending officers are given the
authority to immediately cause the imprisonment of motorcycle riders and
the seizure of their motorcycles if caught violating the quoted provisions.

7.27. Obviously, such unbridled authority contravenes the

constitutional right of the Petitioner to both procedural and substantive
due process as well as her Constitutional right against undue deprivation
of liberty and property.

7.28. In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,9 the Supreme Court expounded

on the aspects of the guaranty of due process of law as a limitation on the
acts of government, thus:

“This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate

limits on government, usually called "procedural due
process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the

procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic
procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind
of notice and what form of hearing the government must
provide when it takes a particular action.

9
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308.

17
 Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks
whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient
justification for the government’s action. Case law in the
United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a
justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny
used. For example, if a law is in an area where only
rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is
met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. But if it is an area where strict
scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights,
then the government will meet substantive due process
only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose.

The police power granted to local government units must

always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights
of the people to due process and equal protection of the
law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill
of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his
life, liberty and property.”

7.29. In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was
expressed by Daniel Webster as a "law which hears before it condemns". In
another case[s], "procedural due process is that which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." It contemplate(s)notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered affecting ones (sic) person or property." In both procedural and
substantive due process, a hearing is always a pre-requisite, hence, the

18
taking or deprivation of one’s life, liberty or property must be done upon
and with observance of the "due process" clause of the Constitution and the
non-observance or violation thereof is, perforce, unconstitutional.10

7.30. Here, when a motorcycle owner’s plate is not merely readable

due to tampering or ordinary wear and tear, the owner can be subjected to
imprisonment (prision correctional), or imposition of a hefty fine of at least
Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00). Not to mention that the motorcycle
can also be seized by the apprehending officer.

7.31. It should be noted that R.A. 11235 and its IRR do not provide for
an escape clause or a remedy where the motorcycle rider can contest his
apprehension, imprisonment, and seizure of his/her motorcycle.

7.33. In the case of Petitioner in which she uses her motorcycle

everyday as a source of livelihood, the number plate of her motorcycle can
be easily damaged which can make it unreadable. Parenthetically, a
number plate with light scratches which is readable to the Petitioner can be
unreadable to the apprehending officer. In either case, the imposition of
penalty and seizure of her motorcycle is inevitable.

7.34. In the case of Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,11 which is

similar to Petitioner’s case, the Supreme Court strike down Executive
Order No. 626-A when it ruled that:

“Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the

end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of
the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by
the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by
the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under
the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is
10
Legaspi v. City of Cebu et al., G.R. No. 159110, 10 December 2013.
11
G.R. No. 74457, 20 March 1987.

19
 immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily

confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure
to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.
The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty
of elementary fair play.”

7.35. Applying the case of Ynot, Petitioner is currently in danger of

being apprehended because her motorcycle does not have the required
readable number plate. Worse, her only source of livelihood which is her
motorcycle, shall be immediately seized and impounded without the
benefit of trial, thus denying her of the constitutional guaranty of
elementary fair play.

7.36. It is also worth mentioning that the authority to apprehend

given to law enforcers under the said provisions of R.A. 11235 and IRR
contravene Section 11 of the same law.

7.37. Section 11 of R.A. 11235 provides for the opportunity of

motorcycle owners to immediately report their lost, damaged, or stolen
number plate. Corollary thereto, Section 12 of the IRR gives twenty-four
(24) hours to the motorcycle owners to report their lost, damaged, or stolen
number plate and to submit a duly notarized Affidavit to the nearest LTO
office form the time the loss or damage was reported.

7.38. This creates confusion and undue burden to motorcycle

owners. A motorcycle owner is susceptible to apprehension for lost or
damaged plate even though they have the opportunity or are still in the
process of reporting the same.

20
 7.39. Theoretically, Section 7 renders nugatory Section 11 of the same
law.

7.39. Worse, the apprehending officer can impose simultaneously

both penalties of prision correccional and seizure under Section 7 of R.A.
11235, and the penalty imposed under Section 11 for not reporting the lost,
damaged, or stolen number plate when in fact, the Motorcycle owner still
afforded under the same law the opportunity to report the fact of lost,
damage or stolen number plate. The law already condemns and punishes
the motorcycle owner before it hears him/her. Such scenario is obviously
unconstitutional.

2. Sections 12 and
13 of R.A. No.
11235 and their
corresponding
IRR are violative
of substantive
due process.

7.40. Section 12 of R.A. No. 11235 provides:

“SEC. 12. Erasing, Tampering, Forging, Imitating,

Covering or Concealing a Number Plate or Readable
Number Plate and Intentional Use Thereof. – Erasing,
tampering, altering, forging, imitating, covering,
concealing a number plate or readable number plate, or the
intentional use of such erased, tampered, altered, forged,
imitated, covered or concealed number plate or readable
number plate, under this Act shall be punished by prision
mayor as provided under the Revised Penal Code, or a fine
of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not
more than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or
both.

If a person knowingly sells or buys an erased, tampered,

altered, forged or imitated number plate or readable

21
 number plate, both such buyer and seller shall be punished
by prision mayor as provided under the Revised Penal code.
However, if the person who sells or buys the number plate
proves that he or she has no knowledge that it was erased,
tampered, altered forged or imitated, he or she shall be
punished by arresto mayor”.

7.41. A plain reading of the afore-quoted provision would show that

it did not identify the person to be punished in case of erasing, tampering,
forging, imitating, covering or concealing a number plate or readable
number plate. This is certainly a violation of substantive due process since
it dwells into the intrinsic validity of the law which interferes with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

7.42. In Ichong v. Hernandez,12 the Supreme Court stated:

“Substantive due process demands not only that the

law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have been real and substantial
in relation to the subject sought to be attained”.

7.43. Here, the law is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious

as it leaves the discretion to the implementing authority who to punish,
which is prone to misinterpretation and abuse.

7.44. This provision makes the Petitioner and other motorcycle

owners liable even for the acts committed by third persons who may have
erased, tampered, altered, forged, imitated, covered, or concealed the
number plates of their motorcycles, without the Petitioner’s or the other
motorcycle owner’s knowledge. Allowing this to happen will set a
dangerous precedent and will set at naught the constitutional guaranty of
due process to the motorcycle owners.

7.45. Concomitantly, Section 13 of R.A. No. 11235 provides:

“SEC. 13. Use of Stolen Number Plate or Readable

Number Plate. – The use of a stolen number plate or
12
G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957.

22
 readable number plate in a motorcycle shall be punished
by prision mayor as provided under the Revised Penal
Code, or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court.

7.46. This provision seems to punish the Petitioner and other

motorcycle owners with imprisonment of prision mayor even though they
are unaware that the plate number or readable number plate of their
motorcycle is stolen. This can be rampant in cases of re-possessed
motorcycles wherein the buyers have no idea that the number plate or
readable number plate attached to the motorcycle is stolen.

7.47. This is obviously unreasonable, unduly oppressive and leads to

undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Innocent sellers,
purchasers and users of motorcycles are at the mercy of this law and the
true perpetrators of the crime could easily escape the punishment that
could have been intended for them.

7.48. Therefore, Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 11235 and their

corresponding provisions in the IRR, must be declared invalid.

3. Section 14 of
R.A. No. 11235
and Section 15
of the IRR
effectively cause
undue
deprivation to
the right to
property of the
Petitioner
without due
process of law.

7.49. Section 14 of R.A. No. 11235 provides:

23
 “SEC. 14. Prohibition on Sale and Importation on Non-
Compliant Motorcycles. – No person, whether natural or
juridical, shall be allowed to sell motorcycles, as defined
under Section 3(c) of this Act, unless such motorcycle has
the capability to bear and showcase a readable number
plate as required under Section 5 of this Act.

Furthermore, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) shall not

allow the importation into the country of motorcycles, as
defined under Section 3(c) of this Act, whose design will
impede the placement of the required number plate on the
front and back sides of the motorcycles firmly and
securely.

Any motorcycle which does not have any capability

to bear and showcase the required readable number plate
shall not be allowed to be registered with the LTO”.

7.50. Section 15 of the IRR provides:

“SECTION 15. Prohibition on Sale and Importation of

Non-Compliant Motorcycles – No person, natural or
juridical, shall be allowed to sell motorcycles, as defined
under Section 3(c) of this IRR, unless the same has the
capability to bear and showcase a readable number plate
required under Section 5 of this IRR.

Owners of existing motorcycle units which do not have

space for front plate are required to provide a bracket or
any other provision where the same shall be installed.

The Bureau of Customs (BOC) shall issue the

appropriate guidelines in the importation of motorcycles in
compliance with RA 11235 and this IRR. Upon the
effectivity of such guidelines, the LTO shall not allow the
registration of any motorcycle unit which does not have
the capability to bear and showcase the required readable
number plate”.

24
 7.51. A reading of the above-quoted provisions of R.A. No. 11235
and its IRR would reveal that motorcycle owners are directed to provide a
bracket for the installation of frontal plates, otherwise the LTO shall not
allow the registration of their motorcycles. Concomitantly, if motorcycle
owners are not allowed to register their motorcycles due to absence of
bracket, they can be held liable under Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 11235.
This obviously constitutes unlawful deprivation to the motorcycle owners’
right to property without due process of law.

7.52. Current models of motorcycles are not made to accommodate

decal plate, thus most of these motorcycles have no choice but to provide a
bracket for the placement of the decal plate.13 This creates a legal burden to
motorcycle riders since installation of brackets means additional financial
cost to them. Also, improper installation of brackets may cause danger to
the lives of motorcycle owners and the pedestrian as these brackets may
easily be detached due to wind resistance.

7.53. Installation of brackets therefore cause undue interference to

the Petitioners right to property and violates her right to due process of law
as she is required make certain changes to her motorcycle and adapt to the
requirements of the bracket, to the detriment of her safety and the
pedestrians.

4. Sec. 15 of R.A.
No. 11235 is
unreasonable
and oppressive,
thus depriving
Petitioner of her
constitutional
right to due
process.

7.54. Likewise, R.A. 11235 and its IRR violated the Constitutional
right of the Petitioner to due process for being unreasonable and
13
Copies of the photographs of different models of motorcycles are hereto attached as Annexes “__” and
series.

25
oppressive when it failed to consider the safety and welfare not only of the
motorcycle owners, but also the general public.

7.55. Considering that decal plates are required to be placed in the

front side of a motorcycle, it creates mounting issues. Most of the current
models of motorcycles are not compatible with the proposed decal plates in
front of their motorcycles. Different models and designs of motorcycles
require different placement of the required decal plate which endangers
the safety of motorcycle owners and compromises the readability of the
decal plates.

7.56. Section 15 paragraph 2 of the IRR provides:

“xxx xxx

Owners of existing motorcycle units which do not have

space for front plate are rquired to provide a bracket or any
other provision where the same shall be installed.”

7.57. This creates another issue if a bracket shall be required for

motorcycles which model and design are not fit for a decal plate.

7.58. If brackets shall be installed for front decal plates, several

factors such as aerodynamics, wind resistance, suspension constraints,
vibration and bracket failure pose risk to the life and safety not only of
motorcycle owners but also of the general public. The installation of the
brackets, if not custom built for the motorcycle, could injure thousands of
motorcycle owners and pedestrians.

D. RA No. 11235 and its IRR

are invalid as they
violate the equal
protection clause of the
Constitution.

7.59. The equal protection clause requires is equality among equals

as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by

26
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; 

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.14

These are not present in the instant case.

7.60. First, there is no substantial distinction. The classification here

discriminates against motorcycles by imposing upon their owners
additional restrictions and obligations and prescribing higer penalties for
non-compliance as compared to those for owners of other motor vehicles.
The following table shows this unequal treatment:

R.A. No. 4136

R.A. No. 11235
Punishable Act/s (On Other
(On Motorcycles)
Vehicles)
Imprisonment of arresto mayor to
Failure to register prision correccional or a fine of Fine only
ownership or title equivalent to 50%
not less than P20,000.00 but not
of registration fees
more than P50,000.00 or both
under Section 56.
under Section 4.
Imprisonment of prision
correccional or a fine of not less Fine of P300.00
Driving without
than P50,000.00 but not more under Section 56.
proper license plate
than P100,000.00 or both under
Section 7.
Erasing, tampering, Imprisonment of prision mayor Not punishable.
forging, imitating, or a fine of not less than

14
Tolentino, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010.

27
covering or P50,000.00 but not more than
concealing of a P100,000.00 or both under
number plate Section 12.
Prohibition on
registration if unable
Prohibited. No prohibition.
to bear required
number plate

7.61. This unfavorable treatment of motorcycle owners is not

justified because there is no substantial distinction between motorcycles
and other motor vehicles in the sense that both of them may be used in
perpetrating a crime. While it is understood that the purpose of the statute
is to curb the number of crimes committed by riding-in-tandem elements,
the heavy burden imposed upon all motorcycle owners vis-à-vis other
motor vehicles owners is not justified as the latter are similarly capable, if
not more, of committing offenses using their vehicles.

7.62. In a U.S. case, Louisville & N.R.  Co.  v. Faulkner,15  the Court of

Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute
which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free
from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars, as no
similar duty was imposed upon operators of automobiles, thus:

“The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained

because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its
object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of
property. . . . Of course, there were no automobiles in those
days. The subsequent inauguration and development of
transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by
common carriers of freight and passengers created even
greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of
danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under
the law the operators of that mode of competitive
transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal
15
307 S.W.2d 196 (1957).

28
 responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as
are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights
of way. 

“The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis

in Nashville, C. & St.  L. Ry. Co. v.  Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55
S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when
enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to
which it is applied. The police power is subject to the
constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted
arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of
that court are cited in support of the statement. The State of
Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. § 356.01 et seq.
imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad
companies, among which was that a railroad company was
liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing
livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act
of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its
train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that
the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle
transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a
common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal,
the owner would have been required to prove negligence in
the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly
is not equal protection of the law.”

“As stated in Markendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133

S.W.2d 516, 127 A.L.R. 416, appeal dismissed Friedman v.
Markendorf, 309 U.S. 627, 60 S. Ct. 610, 84 L. Ed. 987, the
purpose of the provisions of §§ 3 and 59 of the Kentucky
Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution is to place all persons similarly
situated upon a plane of equality and to render it
impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment.
Applying this proscription of inequality and unreasonable
discrimination, we held invalid an amendment to a statute
regulating motor transportation for hire which exempted
from the operation of the statute such vehicles engaged in

29
 transporting farm products. Priest v. State Tax Commission,
258 Ky. 391, 80 S.W.2d 43”. (emphasis supplied)

7.63. If a train and a car are to be treated equally under the law, the
same should also apply to a car and a motorcycle, especially as the latter
pair are, in fact, more similar as both are used to traverse public roads and
highways.

7.64. Second, the classification is not germane to the purpose of the

law. The policy of the law is to secure and safeguard the citizenry from
crimes committed with the use of motorcycles through bigger, readable,
and color-coded number plates and identification marks.16

7.65. As previously discussed, any motor vehicle can be used for

committing crimes. It is not correct for the State to assume that motorcycle
owners are more inclined to commit crimes. The burdens imposed upon
motorcycle owners and the stiff penalties associated therewith are
unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive, as they are not similarly imposed
upon owners of other vehicles who are equally capable of using their
vehicles to commit crimes.

7.66. In fact, the requirement to use bigger, readable, and color-

coded number plates is not an effective deterrent of motorcycle criminal
activity. Most, if not all, of these crimes are committed using stolen
motorcycles. While higher penalties for motorcycle theft may curb these
crimes, imposing burdens and penalties upon innocent owners certainly
does not.

7.67 Lastly, the classification does not apply equally to all of the
same class, assuming that motorcycles are in a class of its own. The
requirement to have a numbered plate in front cannot be applied to all
motorcycles. The IRR requires a decal plate to be displayed in front that is
135mm in width and 85mm in height. Not all motorcycles have the
specifications to accommodate this requirement. As discussed in the
Position Paper:17

16
RA No. 11235, Sec. 2.
17
Annex “__”

30
 “Mounting – There is no uniform holder for any decal on
any motorcycle. Each mode

is unique. Some may be an updated model but, body parts

may still differ. In reality, there are hundreds of motorcycle
models on the streets today. This is the primary cause of
mounting issues. Different design, different placement.
Different placement, different issue. xxx

A good number of motorcycles does not have a flat surface

that faces front for the decals to be readable from 15 meters
away. Most of these surfaces are angled, have edges or are
curved that can affect its readability and integrity on the
surface. This will cause mounting issues, placement issues
and readability issues as well. xxx

As far as the brackets are concerned, there are numerous

factors to consider that requires extensive engineering
research of every single model. Factors such as vibration,
wind resistance, suspension constraints, handling effects,
bracket failure, bolt failure, surface failure, aerodynamics
and so on. Each factor can cause the bracket to dismantle,
fall, fly off or fail on the mounting point. And when this
happens, the risks entailed can cause anything from
damage to property up to death to a rider, a pedestrian or
even other road users.”

7.68. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person

shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the
prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying
the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is
unconstitutional.||18|As RA 11235 and its IRR clearly discriminate against
motorcycle owners in an oppressive, arbitrary, and capricious manner,
they have to be struck down as unconstitutional.

VII

18
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531-793 (2004).

31
 APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

8.1. Petitioner repleads the foregoing allegations in support of its

application for a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction.

8.2. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court specifies the grounds

for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, including the following:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,

and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act
or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance
of an act or acts, either for a limited period of
perpetually;

(b)That the commission, continuance or non-performance

of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the applicant; and

(c) That a party, court, agency, or person is doing,

threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant, respecting the
subject matter of the action or proceeding, and tending
to render the judgment ineffectual.

8.3. Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following

requisites must be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction,
whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be

protected, that is a right in esse;

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

32
 (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury
to the applicant; and

(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to

prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.19

8.4. Based on the facts narrated and applicable laws, there is no

doubt that Petitioner is entitled to the relief demanded, which consists in
wholly restraining and enjoining the implementation of the subject RA
11235 and its IRR.

8.5. In Sps. Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank,20 the High Court discussed
the requisites and the proof required for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, thus:

“The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction

must further establish that he or she has a present and
unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against
which injunction is directed violate such right; and there is
a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right
and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be
nullified. Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or
disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility
of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing
right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.

However, to establish the essential requisites for a

preliminary injunction, the evidence to be submitted by the
plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. The
plaintiffs arc only required to show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their
complaint. A writ of preliminary i11iunction is generally
19
St. James College of Paranaque 11. Equitable PCI Bank, 641 Phil. 452, 466 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., First
Division] citing Bifian Steel Corporation v. Court a/Appeals, 439 Phil. 688, 703-704 (2002) [Per J. Corona,
Third Division] and Hutchison Ports Philippines Ltd v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 393 Phil. 843,
859 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
20
545 Phil. 138 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third Division].

33
 based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such
evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give
the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary
injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case,
and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet
to be a decided.”21

8.6. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by

law or is enforceable as a matter of law. 22 The subject RA 11235 and its IRR
infringe on the existing rights of the Petitioner and all the professional
motorcycle owners and riders, particularly the enjoyment of their property
as their sole means of livelihood. The subject RA 11235 and its IRR unduly
deprive the motorcycle owners and riders of their constitutional right to
due process and equal protection of the law, to the detriment of the riding
community.

8.7. Further, the implementation of the subject RA 11235 and its IRR
would surely cause great and irreparable injury to the Petitioner and the
professional motorcycle owners and riders who will be unduly and
continually subjected to hefty fines and penalties.

VIII
RELIEF

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioner LILIBETH ALAGOS

BARDOS, respectfully prays that the Honorable Court:

a. Upon filing of the instant Petition, grant the prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the Department of Transportation and/or Land
Transportation Franchising Board from executing and/or implementing or
giving effect in any manner to the subject Republic Act 11235 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations; and

b. Give due course to the Petition, and thereafter:

21
Id. at 160-161.
22
Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 162336, 1 February 2010.

34
 (i) Declare the subject Republic Act 11235 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations as invalid for
having been issued in violation of the Constitution and
other existing laws, rules and regulations; and

(ii) Permanently enjoin the Department of Transportation

and/or the Land Transportation Franchising Boar,
and/or any persons acting pursuant to the subject
Republic Act 11235 and/or its Implementing Rules and
Regulations from executing and/or otherwise
implementing or giving effect in any manner to said
subject Republic Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise
prayed for.

35