The Votewatch Public Service Intermediary Model of Election Oversight

Overview
Date: February 22, 2004
- Confidential -
Not for Distribution
Votewatch – Overview Confidential
Document and Contact Information
Primary Contact
Steven Hertzberg
steven@votewatch.us
(650) 814-7840
Mailing Address
Votewatch Corporation
2269 Chestnut Street, 611
San Francisco, CA 94123
Legal Information
Copyright © Votewatch Corporation 2003. All rights reserved. This document and the
information contained herein are proprietary and confidential. It may not be duplicated,
redistributed, reused, or displayed to any other party without the express written consent of
Votewatch Corporation. Votewatch and the Votewatch logo are trademarks of Votewatch
Corporation. All other names are trademarks of their respective companies, and are only used
for identifying product and company information.
Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit i

Table of Contents
I Executive Summary .............................................................................. 4
(a) Votewatch Vision & Mission ................................................................................. 4
(b) Votewatch Background ....................................................................................... 4
(c) Key goals for the 2004 elections .......................................................................... 4
(d) Election Televison Broadcasts in 2004 .................................................................. 4
II Problem Statement ............................................................................... 6
III Our Democracy’s Challenge ................................................................ 16
IV The Votewatch Model.......................................................................... 18

(a) Goals for the 2004 Election ............................................................................... 18
(b) PSI Model Overview ......................................................................................... 19
(c) 2004 Federal Elections Program Outline.............................................................. 19
(d) Contributors to the Votewatch Model.................................................................. 19
(e) Survey Research & Analysis .............................................................................. 20
(f) Votewatch Process ........................................................................................... 20
(g) Communications Outline ................................................................................... 21
(h) Summation of Services..................................................................................... 22
(i) Summation of Content ..................................................................................... 23
(j) Summation of Research Products....................................................................... 23
(k) Mobilizing Volunteers on Election Day................................................................. 24
(l) Milestones & Timeline....................................................................................... 25
(m) First Year Use of Funds ..................................................................................... 26
(n) Current Team .................................................................................................. 28
V Appendix – Electoral Malfeasance....................................................... 31
Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit iii

I Executive Summary
(a) Votewatch Vision & Mission
Votewatch is a non-profit non-partisan organization that works to ensure that the

voices of ordinary people are heard in America’s democratic process. Our democratic
process requires constant vigilance on the part of our citizens in order to ensure free,
fair and unfettered elections nationwide.
Votewatch will ensure that America’s elections are free of malfeasance and that any
electoral malfeasance that occurs can be uncovered, documented, analyzed and
reported upon. This process will create the transparency necessary to guarantee that
our democratic process and principles are being upheld in elections. Votewatch will
provide ordinary citizens, activists and legal experts the means to work in independent
partnership to challenge, prior to the certification of election results, questionable
election outcomes as well as the accuracy of new voting technology.
In order to undertake this mission and facilitate this process, Votewatch will employ
communication networks, including internet, television and radio. These networks will
give ordinary citizens the opportunity to watch their elections and contribute to
America’s democratic legacy.
(b) Votewatch Background
Initially founded in 2002 as a non-partisan election forum, Votewatch provided a way

for voters to monitor (in real time), report on, and discuss irregularities at America’s
polling places. As a result, troubling stories of average Americans at the polls found
their way to citizens and advocacy groups, either through the Internet, word of mouth,
or media outlets. Building on its success in the 2002 election, Votewatch has
expanded its scope in order to ensure that the electoral process is free of malfeasance.
(c) Key goals for the 2004 elections
1) Determine the accuracy of the election process, particularly in precincts and

regions where paperless electronic voting systems have been implemented and
where communities of color have been hindered in the election process;
2) Create transparency by providing real time independent non-partisan election data

directly to the public through a variety of media technologies;
3) Improve the ability to legally contest elections where there is evidence of voting
irregularities. Provide evidence to lawyers and advocacy groups in a timely
manner to allow them to file legal contests of election results prior to certification
of these results.
(d) Election Televison Broadcasts in 2004
Votewatch will leverage citizen observers who will contribute newsworthy stories from
around the country during the election period. Votewatch’s communications networks
will collect, combine, and assemble this information into broadcast quality news stories
by Votewatch associate producers.
Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 4

Rashad Robinson, field director for the Center for Voting and Democracy,1 said,
The idea of giving people an opportunity to express concerns and complaints

about what's happening at the polls is part of our democracy...Giving people
the opportunity to oversee what happens in their community is part of the
process -- especially if it's done in a nonpartisan, nonpolitical way.26
Votewatch will give people this opportunity to express and oversee, protecting the
freedoms guaranteed in our Constitution and building on the rights represented in our
great political tradition.
1
http://www.fairvote.org

II Problem Statement
The need to watch and reform the electoral process in the United States of America is as great
now as it has ever been. The all-too visible and documentable threat or actuality of violence
was a primary means to impact and steer election outcomes in the not so distant past. Now
the hidden, non-documentable and seemingly non-intrusive use of technology is a weapon
that can be relied upon to manipulate voting outcomes.
There have been many solutions proposed to the vast array of electoral troubles experienced
in the 2000 election. However, most of these solutions only serve to compound the problem.
This background will consider some of the problems that exist in the election process, the
shortfalls of the proposed solutions, along with the depth and breadth of the action that must
be taken to ensure a free, fair and unfettered election process.
Disproportionate Disenfranchisement
President Bush’s recent federal ban on racial profiling, which Laura Murphy, director of the
Washington office of the ACLU, calls "…smoke and mirrors…"2 is both ironic and telling,
particularly due to the many voting discrepancies in the 2000 presidential election that were
reported by Greg Palast in Salon Magazine.
Palast reported that 94,000 Floridians who were placed on a voter "purge" list prior to the
2000 election still remain on this same list after the 2002 elections -- half of them African-
American – effectively banning them from voting in Florida in 2000 and 2002, even though the
state knows the list is grossly inaccurate. DBT Online, which generated this flawed list,
reports that if it followed strict criteria to eliminate those errors, roughly 3,000 names would
remain -- and 91,000 people would have their voting rights restored.3
In addition, the article 2 Florida Counties Show Election Day's Inequities by Bob Drogin of the
Los Angeles Times detailed that “Florida's 179,855 uncounted ballots far exceeded Bush's 537-
vote margin of victory over Gore after the U.S. Supreme Court effectively ended the contest
Dec. 12”.4 Additionally, the Florida Ballots Project reported that 175,010 ballots in Florida’s 67
counties are uncertified because they failed to register a “valid” vote for President during the
2000 election.5
Even more frustrating is the stratification of Florida voter disenfranchisement, which

negatively impacted African Americans in a manner that harkens back to the pre-civil rights
era. Dr. Allan Lichtman, a Professor of History at American University, has found that
statewide, based on county-level statistical estimates; African American voters were nearly 10
2
Bush Issues Federal Ban on Racial Profiling, Eric Lichtblau, New York Times, June 18, 2003.
3
Florida's ethnic cleansing of voter rolls, Greg Palast, Salon Magazine, December 4, 2000;
Disappeared Voters, Greg Palast, The Nation Magazine, January 18, 2001
4
http://www.legalright.com/Florida.htm
5
http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/fl/promiss.asp

times more likely than white voters to have their ballots rejected in the November 2000
election.6
Are Florida’s Proposed Solutions Ineffective?
The US Commission on Civil Rights prepared a report Voting Irregularities in Florida During the
2000 Presidential Election7, which welcomes Florida’s election reforms to decertify punch card
ballots, certify touch voting systems, and require every Florida county to use either optical
scan or direct record electronic voting systems that have “second chance” technology.
However, the commission also acknowledges that replacing the punch card machines has
potential shortcomings:
First, local election officials have a limited choice of voting machines certified by the
Division of Elections. Second, there is the possibility that a malfunction or error will
not be corrected because there is no paper ballot to provide vote verification. Finally,
insufficient funding is an obstacle [to purchasing new voting machines for all of the
precincts].7
The Commission’s report also revealed that eligible and registered voters often unknowingly
arrive at incorrect precincts to vote. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the state
of Florida provide an absolute right to a provisional ballot at any polling place so long as the
voter executes an appropriate affidavit attesting that he or she is eligible to vote. This
recommendation has not been adopted in Florida—a failure that may have devastating
consequences for thousands of Florida voters. Moreover, the US Commission on Civil Rights
estimates that population growth in Florida will result in the creation of approximately 200
new precincts; and congressional redistricting is expected to result in 500 additional precincts
being changed. These changes mean that thousands, if not tens of thousands, of voters will
have their polling sites changed for the general election, compounding a problem that has a
simple and direct solution.8
Florida has also instituted reforms that attempt to correct other problems: a voter will not be
purged unless his or her ineligibility is verified. The process of verifying ineligibility is very
ineffective: local supervisors of elections send a letter to notify a voter that he or she is being
purged from the voter list. Unfortunately, a letter is no safeguard that a registered voter is
not wrongfully removed from this list.
Charles Elsesser, the project co-director of the Florida Equal Voting Rights Project, believes
that the notification-by-letter provision will adversely affect people who move frequently,
people not likely to receive or pick up registered mail, and people who do not arrange for mail
to be forwarded from their last address to their new residence. He noted that minorities are
much more likely to be renters in the state of Florida and, as such, are much more mobile –
therefore, this method of notification only reinforces the stratification of voter ineligibility.
6
Report on the Racial Impact of the Rejection of Ballots Cast in the 2000 Presidential Election in the State
of Florida, Allan J. Lichtman, Professor, Department of History, American University, Washington, DC, June
2001. http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/appendix/lichtman/ltrpt.htm
7
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/sum0802.htm (see Voting Technologies)
8
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/sum0802.htm

Indeed, Mr. Elsesser maintained that mandating removal of voters from the voter rolls
because they failed to receive or respond to a letter will disproportionately affect minorities.9
Are New Voting Machine Standards Deficient?
Current electronic voting systems standards do not adequately address issues such as election
standards, accessibility, software/firmware standards, telecommunications, security, quality
assurance, configuration management, testing and vote recounts. In comments to the Federal
Election Commission on their proposed Voting Systems Standard Update, Dr. Rebecca Mercuri,
a specialist in interactive systems and forensic computing as well as an expert on voting
systems, emphasized that the standards being proposed are “not attainable by any voting
system. All voting systems carry with them some degree of error, and this error must be
accommodated in the regulations pertaining to system performance.10
Moreover, Dr. Mercuri has also addressed the fact that while voting systems must have a
degree of error, the new systems being implemented bring new and more troubling issues of
verification to the table, stating that
The vendors of EVT kiosks and Internet voting systems have proposed randomization
and encryption of ballot images for protection, but the fact is that these schemes
cannot ensure that the ballots cast by the voters are the ones that have been
recorded, transmitted, and/or tallied.10
However, Dr. Mercuri has noted that she and many of her colleagues in the computer science
field have called for developing comprehensive standards to address all of these problems.
These standards would use technology and testing practices common in the commercial world,
standards that are proven to work.
Finally, in a 1988 National Bureau of Standards report Roy Saltman, a Consultant on Election
Policy and Technology, stated that
There is simply no way, in an anonymous election, to use a fully-electronic process

that is independently auditable. Systems using these schemes have failed in actual
elections, votes have disappeared or in some cases even been transferred to other
candidates’ tallies, and the vendors have not been able to recover the actual ballots
cast11
Mr. Saltman, who had conducted two studies on voting technology while working at the
federal government’s National Institute of Standards and Technology, concluded that
9
Charles Elsesser, testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Miami, FL, June 20, 2002,
transcript, p. 25.
10
Mercuri, Rebecca, The FEC Proposed Voting Systems Standard Update, A Detailed Comment by Dr.
Rebecca Mercuri, Submitted to the Federal Election Commission on September 10, 2001 in accordance
with Federal Register FEC Notice 2001-9, Vol. 66, No. 132.,
http://www.notablesoftware.com/Papers/FECRM.html
11
Saltman, Roy, Accuracy, Integrity and Security in Computerized Vote-Tallying, U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Bureau of Standards, NBS Special Publication 500-158, August 1988.

The most pertinent recommendations that respond to these problems are that the
concept of internal control should be extended so as to be applicable to vote-tallying,
and that persons knowledgeable in that professional field should be utilized to assist in
the establishment of sound operational procedures.12
The sound procedures outlined by Mr. Saltman correlate to the very recommendations stated
by Votewatch. If these problems were known in 1988, why have they not yet been address
adequately and fixed?
Is the Help America Vote Act (H.R. 3295) Exacerbating the Issues?
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was signed into law in October 2002 with the
intent to update voting systems, create an Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist
with federal elections, laws and programs; and to “establish minimum election administration
standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for the administration of
Federal elections.”13 On the surface, HAVA sounds beneficial, however, very little coverage
has been granted to detail that the factors fundamental for malfeasance in Florida are being
propagated to other states through HAVA. In short, the federal government is endorsing
election processes that have been proven to be flawed and erroneous.
In addition to the voluntary election standards that will be developed by the EAC, the bill also
establishes a set of mandatory minimum standards for state election systems. Those
standards include:
• Set uniform, minimum standards for federal elections nationwide, including

providing voters with a chance to check for and correct ballot errors;
• Ensure accuracy of state voter registration databases by implementing uniform,

statewide computerized lists;
• Provide provisional ballots, which allow voters who are erroneously left off the
voter registration lists to vote and be counted once eligibility can be verified;
• Help eliminate outmoded punch-card and lever voting systems, and upgrade
voting systems and equipment in every state; and
• Provide funding to ensure that voters with disabilities are able to cast ballots
privately and independently.14
Responding to these changes, the Rev. Martin Luther King III, President of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference and Greg Palast, Author & Investigative Journalist, petitioned
Attorney General John Ashcroft in a letter, detailing how:
[HAVA] requires every state to computerize, centralize and purge voter rolls before
the 2004 election. [Yet t]his is the very system which the state of Florida used to
remove tens of thousands of eligible African-American and Hispanic voters from voter
registries before the Presidential election of 2000.
12
Saltman, Roy, Accuracy, Integrity and Security in Computerized Vote-Tallying, Section 6.18.
13
http://www.fec.gov/hava/law_ext.txt ,
14
http://www.civilrights.org/issues/voting/details.cfm?id=10337

The Act also lays a minefield of other impediments to voters: an effective rollback of
the easy voter registration methods of the Motor Voter Act; new identification
requirements at polling stations; and perilous incentives for fault-prone and fraud-
susceptible touch-screen voting machines.15
The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), founded in 1950 by A. Philip Randolph, Roy
Wilkins, and Arnold Aronson, is the nation’s oldest, largest and most diverse civil rights
coalition. They have spearheaded a broad coalition for electoral reform, stating in a letter to
Congress16 that H.R. 3295 was "an important step forward in improving election procedures
and administration throughout the nation" in a number of respects. Nonetheless, LCCR
ultimately declared that they would neither formally endorse nor oppose the final version of
H.R. 3295 due to a litany of concerns expressed by other organizations. A letter signed by Dr.
Dorothy I. Height, Chairperson and Wade Henderson, Executive Director of the LCCR, points to
the following troubling provisions in the report language of the final document:16
• First, the report contains a requirement that all persons seeking to register must
provide the state with a drivers license number or, in the event they do not have
one, the last four digits of their social security number. Any person who has either
number but does not provide it – even for privacy reasons – will not be registered.
Once a voter provides either number, the state must verify the accuracy of the
data provided by checking it against state motor vehicle or Social Security
Administration (SSA) databases. This system set out by the conference report is
both cumbersome and prone to error. There are many legitimate reasons why the
data provided by an eligible voter may not match the data in a motor vehicle or
SSA database. For example, a woman may marry or divorce without updating her
last name in the database; many Latinos use two last names, which the SSA may
list incorrectly; some Asians list their last name first; and in entering their date of
birth, some people enter the date followed by the month, the opposite of U.S.
custom. Even a simple juxtaposition of a number could result in a “no-match.”
• Second, amendments that have been made to the ID requirement fail to reduce its
disenfranchising impact upon first-time voters. While the conference report
includes minor improvements, these provisions fall far short of reducing the
disproportionate negative impact of the ID provision.
In order to reduce its harmful impact on first-time voters, the ID requirement

should have been linked to the requirement that a state have a computerized
voter list in place. Instead, while the compromise bill requires mail-in registrants
to meet the ID requirements in the 2004 election-cycle, it gives states a waiver
until 2006 to create the statewide computerized lists. As a result, voters in states
without state-wide lists will have to comply with the ID provision anytime they
15
Petition Letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft, Martin Luther King III, President, Southern Christian
Leadership Conference; Greg Palast, Author & Investigative Journalist
http://www.workingforchange.com/activism/petition.cfm?itemid=14993
16
Dr. Dorothy I. Height, Chairperson and Wade Henderson Executive Director, Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights. Advocacy Letter: LCCR letter to Senate on Election Reform. October 9, 2002
http://www.civilrights.org/library/detail.cfm?id=10337

move within the state. Thus, the burden of the ID requirement will fall more
heavily on renters, who change residences more often than homeowners, and who
generally have lower incomes.
• Third, the conference report would invalidate the registration of any voter who
does not check off a new box on the registration form declaring that he or she is a
U.S. citizen. Many elderly voters and voters with low levels of literacy, who find
filling out forms difficult, will be likely to inadvertently fail to check the boxes and
will, as a result, disproportionately be kept off the registration rolls.
Provisional ballots will not solve the above problems. Even if a voter is allowed to
file a provisional ballot, it will not be counted because he or she was never
“properly” registered, due to these onerous registration and verification
requirements.
HAVA requires each state to implement sweeping changes in the election process for the 2004
Presidential election.17 Currently, fifteen states are now either in full or substantial compliance
with the centralized voter registration database requirements of HAVA.18 Statewide
centralization of voter data facilitated Florida’s purge of 94,000 voters from its rolls in 2000
and may precipitate similar gross discrepancies by other states in future elections.19
While the paper ballot data was available to the public in order to study the irregularities of
the 2000 federal election, the adoption of paperless electronic voting machines eliminates the
public’s ability to inspect, audit and analyze election results post-election.20 Currently, 27
states have plans approved to replace existing voting equipment with electronic voting
machines using HAVA funds.21 However, there are neither plans in place nor tools being
implemented that will allow these same states to test the accuracy of vote tabulation during
the 2004 Presidential election.
The National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the largest national Latino civil rights organization,
opposes HAVA because it will not fix the problems faced by voters in the 2000 presidential
election, and in some instances will roll back civil rights laws. In a statement to the House
Judiciary Committee, the NCLR detailed that:
17
Help America Vote Act of 2002, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/hava.pdf
18
http://www.electionline.org/site/dav/html/brief1.html (see illustrations at end of report)
19
For a further discussion on how felons are being disenfranchised see State disfranchises those who have
paid their debt, MARC MAUER, Miami Herald, Jul. 28, 2002 (Marc Mauer is assistant director of The
Sentencing Project in Washington, D.C., and the author of Race to Incarcerate)
20
For example, in Fulton County, Georgia election officials said that memory cards from 67 electronic
voting machines had been misplaced, so ballots cast on those machines were left out of previously
announced vote totals. No hand count can shine any light on this error; the entire state of Georgia went to
touch-screen machines with no physical record of the vote. Fifty-six cards, containing 2,180 ballots, were
located, but 11 memory cards still were missing.
21
http://www.electionline.org/site/dav/html/brief1.html (see illustrations at end of report)

Language minority voters, who requested the assistance of a bilingual volunteer or

materials at the polls, as is their right in many jurisdictions, were denied such
assistance. Reports indicate that in some counties minority voters were asked for
photo identification while White voters were not required to show any form of ID.
Many polls in disproportionately minority precincts were closed even though voters
were still in line; other polls had lines so long that some voters left the polling places
without casting their vote.
Unfortunately, the "Help America Vote Act" (H.R. 3295) will not correct the problems
stated above with enough veracity to ensure that all Americans, including those for
whom English is their second language, are able to exercise the right to vote.22
The underlying pattern behind these changes and the problems they are addressing is rooted
in the underlying issue of political expedience and self-serving interest. Professor Alex
Keyssar, a Duke University political scientist, sums up the foundational problem which will
limit any true reform, stating that “The history of political parties in this country is that each
party believes fervently in the right to vote of its own supporters, and is not too sure about
everybody else.”23 Ultimately, true reform will occur when our major political parties look
beyond their own skewed and vested interests to accept the notion that voter participation
improves and enhances our whole political process.
The Critique from the Technology Schools
The flaws of our voting systems become glaringly evident due to a study conducted by two of
the preeminent science schools in the United States. According to the Voting Technology
Project, conducted by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), as much as six percent of the votes cast in the 2000 federal
election were uncounted, or as they termed them “lost votes”. The outcome of their
nationwide study provided several recommendations. In the short term they noted that the
following should be implemented:
• replace punch cards, lever machines, and some underperforming electronic

machines with optical scanning systems;
• make countywide or even statewide voter registration data available at polling

places;
• make provisional ballots available.
• In the long-term, the noted that:
• First, institute a program of federal matching grants for equipment and

registration system upgrades, and for polling-place improvement.
22
The National Council of La Raza (NCLR). Statement: Opposition to the "Help America Vote Act" (H.R.
3295), House Judiciary Committee, Hearing on Election Reform. December 5, 2001
http://nclr.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=19600
23
Drinkard, Jim. “Election reform at mercy of elected officials.” USA Today. May 14, 2001
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2001-05-14-reform.htm

• Second, create an information clearinghouse and data-bank for election equipment

and system performance, precinct-level election reporting, recounts, and election
finance and administration.
• Third, develop a research grant program to field-test new equipment, develop

better ballot designs, and analyze data on election system performance.
• Fourth, set more stringent and more uniform standards on performance and
testing.
• Fifth, create an election administration agency, independent of the Federal Election

Commission. The agency would be an expanded version of the current Office of
Election Administration, and would oversee the grants program, serve as an
information clearinghouse and databank, set standards for certification and
recertification of equipment, and administer research grants.24
These recommendations go far beyond what is being implemented through HAVA and provide
a roadmap that election reformers can follow to resolve current problems and prevent future
difficulties.
Is the U.S. Media Reporting the Story?
From the late 1960s through the 1980s there were a variety of news stories and studies
concerning the accuracy of then current election systems and their proposed electronic
replacements ---subsequent coverage and studies were minimal.25 Too often, the news media
can only apportion coverage to an issue that is comparable to a thirty second ad: an issue is
mentioned, given surface coverage and then relegated to the archives. Yet as we well-know,
from issues ranging from child-abuse in Newark, New Jersey to the Enron Scandal to attacks
of September 11, 2001, important news stories that impact people throughout the nation
deserve greater coverage –coverage which has breadth, depth and analysis. For an issue as
significant as election malfeasance, the American public deserves in-depth coverage and
competent suggestions for resolving the ongoing problems that plague our electoral system.
The fallout of the 2000 federal election continues and it requires a new way to blend media
and grassroots movements to prevent such problems from occurring again. Indeed, Rashad
Robinson1 points out that “the media is not necessarily a great place to start as a filter,
because they're looking for a story and looking for something sexy in many cases,”26 Mr.
Robinson believes that grassroots efforts like Votewatch are important at a time when citizens
are skeptical of the election process. Mr. Rashad also stated that the media does not always
do the best job of uncovering voting problems and sometimes takes too long, noting that by
24
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Media/2001-Jul-16.html. For more information, the report is available
online at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/
25
See section IX Appendix, below for specific examples. The studies culminated in two published scholarly
reports, made possible through the funding of the Markle Foundation, prepared by ECRI and another
prepared by Prof. Lance Hoffman of George Washington University in collaboration with Roy Saltman, both
are referred to throughout this document.
26
Philipkoski, Kristen. Watch the Vote on VoteWatch. Wired Magazine. Nov. 05, 2002
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,56192,00.html

the time issues bubble to the surface, especially when votes are being counted, it may be too
late to take action.
Citizen protests and community apathy are evidence of the public’s dissatisfaction with the
delivery of policy information. Many citizens are skeptical of the economic interests and
political leanings of news outlets and exhausted by sensationalism and misinformed rhetoric.
These citizens have begun seeking alternative sources for public and social policy information.
A recent Gallup poll revealed that a plurality, (48 percent), of Americans believe that the news
media favors one political party over the other, and 58 percent believe news organizations are
‘often inaccurate,’ these commercial firms do not instill confidence in the electorate.27
Tracking polls confirm nearly half of Americans have 'not very much' or 'little' trust or
confidence in the mass media to report the news fully, accurately and fairly.28
While reporting in 2001 on the troublesome history of a major voting systems manufacturer,
Stephen Simurda, who teaches journalism at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, said
“These stories got local coverage centered on specific incidents. But the press had trouble
connecting the dots and seeing a larger problem.”29
In July 1989, William Trombley wrote a thorough three-part series on the problems with
voting systems30 for the Los Angeles Times. This series was highly critical of punch-card
ballots. Recalling his research, Trombley has stated
I went to a lot of places doing those stories and many of the worst examples I found
came from Florida. The machines were old and in bad shape, and a lot of the voting
officials seemed pretty incompetent.
Despite his highly critical series, Trombley notes that he was unable to get political leaders
worked up about the issue. ‘I couldn't get either political party to take it seriously,’ he says.
Trombley also noticed that no other news organization has devoted much attention to the
issue in the eleven years since his series.”29
“Roy Saltman11 is appalled that the many problems of punch-card balloting haven't drawn
more attention. It is inexcusable, he says, that between 1 and 2 percent of voters in some
Florida counties did not register a vote for president. ‘Normally one-tenth of one percent would
be more like it,’ he says. ‘This is a very low-performance system.’ ”29
27
Gallup News Poll, February 17 - 19, 2003
28
Gallup News Poll, September 5 – 8, 2002
29
Voting Technology: Who Knew?, Columbia Journalism Review, January/February 2001. Stephen J.
Simurda
http://www.cjr.org/year/01/1/simurda.asp
30
Trombley, William. Glitches, Security Gaps; Computers: Bugs in the Ballot Box. Los Angeles Times ,
July 2, 1989, Part 1; Page 1; Column 1.
Trombley, William. Level of Protection Debated; Electronic Elections seen as an invitation to Fraud. Los
Angeles Times , July 4, 1989, Part 1; Page 1; Column 1.

Within three weeks of the 2000 election, Greg Palast was disclosing facts that Florida purged
thousands of voters prior to the Presidential election. However, Palast's series did not begin in
the United States, but was first reported in Britain's Sunday paper, the Observer, BBC
television's Newsnight, and the Guardian. Palast’s story didn’t reach the U.S. until Salon.com
published part one of his story on Monday Dec 4, 2000, but then, according to Palast, Salon
refused to publish part two.31 Not until the Nation published the remainder of Palast’s work,
on January 18, 2001,32 did the full story become publicly available through U.S. media. The
Washington Post ultimately published the story on Sunday June 10, 2001.33
Too often, the problems that exist in the election process are reduced to catch phrases and
sound bytes (“hanging or dimpled chads”) that not only diminish the extent of these problems,
but also brush to the side concerted attempts to create a real and workable solution.
Abridging such coverage goes contrary to the very freedom of the press granted in our
constitution. Indeed, the media should partner with Votewatch in covering this important
issue, not only because it is a good story that merits coverage, but because it is a way to
encourage progressive change and champion the rights of ordinary citizens.
31
Interview by Ken Wohlrob. The Bully Interview: Greg Palast, The Last True Outlaw Journalist. Bully
Magazine.
http://www.bullymag.com/4.27.03/palast-042703.asp
32
Palast, Greg. Florida's 'Disappeared Voters': Disfranchised by the GOP. The Nation, January 18, 2001.
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010205&s=palast&c=1
33
Palast, Gregory, The Wrong Way To Fix the Vote. The Washington Post. June 10, 2001.

III Our Democracy’s Challenge

Throughout the world, the United States of America is regarded as the exemplar of
democracy. Indeed, much of the thrust of our current foreign policy is grounded in the
philosophic belief that we can lead a democratic nation building process throughout the world.
But are we overconfident in our role? Are there issues at home that challenge us in our efforts
to promote democracy, much less practice it effectively?
The heart of this matter lies in our ability to vote in a free, fair and unfettered manner.
Indeed the very integrity of our election process was questioned in a 1988 report by the
Pennsylvania research firm ECRI which detailed that:
The public's perception of the security (as well as the accuracy) of the vote tabulation
process is as important as the actual security measures…[a]nd care must be taken to
avoid even minor nuisances that can give the public and political leaders the
impression that the system's integrity is not sound.34
Currently, the American public has a very low perception of both the accuracy and the security
of our election processes. Overall, the government is trying to reinforce the integrity of our
voting system, however, with all of the questions raised by differing constituencies, we are
embarking on a path of reform that will leave as many problems as it resolves.
Questions for Election Day 2004
Given the above, should election malfeasance occur in the 2004 federal election, will the
American public have the ability to prevent it? Will citizens even know when malfeasance
occurs and have the means and ability to identify it? If the appearance of impropriety exists,
will it be possible to investigate the impropriety prior to the certification of the election? These
critical questions are at the heart of our confidence in our democracy.
34
An Election Administrator's Guide to Computerized Voting Systems, ECRI, 1988,
http://www.ecri.org/documents/Voting.pdf
Also, see excerpt below from ECRI’s Press Release, February 14, 2001.
ECRI's National Center for Voting Technology Confirms Its Earlier Evaluation of Controversial Voting
Systems Used in Florida's Presidential Election,
http://www.ecri.org/documents/021401b.htm
In its first highly detailed comparative evaluation of voting machines in 1988, An Election
Administrator's Guide to Computerized Voting Systems, ECRI emphatically warned against the use of
Votamatic-type machines that use prescored punch cards. Its report, issued 13 years ago, listed the
problems that Florida precincts eventually experienced with their units. The original study, funded by
the Markle Foundation of New York, was sent to every election official in the country. foot
In Commenting on these findings, Jeffrey C. Lerner, Ph.D., director of the National Center for Voting
Technology, has stated,
the world has not yet caught up to our 1988 study, or, for that matter, the conditions needed for
careful studies. Our center operates with ECRI's stringent conflict-of-interest rules, the toughest of
any organization in the U.S. Together with our technical competence, institutional integrity was the
key factor in the Markle Foundation decision to fund us.

Our Current Path
Spurred by the implementation of HAVA, our elected representatives are implementing new
legislation that leverages new technology with known faults and with no means for verifiable
parallel tabulation. States are also moving to create centralized voter registration databases
using a format that is known to have disenfranchised a disproportionate number of African
American voters in the 2000 federal election. Moreover, the primary audit mechanism for the
counting of election results is private firms, engaged by America’s largest media corporations,
which attempt to predict the winning candidate using the smallest investment possible.
To avoid these improprieties and ensure that American citizens have confidence in their
election process, these new election systems and procedures must be independently tested
and corrective action must be implemented. To date, neither government nor private
enterprise nor non-profit organizations have stepped-up to the plate to fill this essential role.
Many of the concerns and votes of ordinary citizens are being ignored at the polls: the very
foundation of our democratic process is placed at risk when the voter cannot be assured that
his or her participation can make a difference.
If we do not closely monitor and report on the voting process, how can we ensure that the
voices of ordinary people are heard?

IV The Votewatch Model

David King, a Harvard political scientist who chairs a task force on national election reform
commission headed by former Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, has stated that “The
reality is that the most significant things are not going to get done by 2002,” the next federal
election year. However, he goes on to note that “people will be watching those elections
expecting fraud and vote suppression, and they will find both. Then the window of opportunity
for policy change will open again.”23
Votewatch will help watch the elections in 2004, looking out for fraud and suppression, in
order to have a long-term, non-partisan impact on federal election policy. Working as a Public
Service Intermediary (PSI), Votewatch will be both a medium and a tool that citizens,
advocacy groups, media, and lawyers may use to practice democracy more effectively.
Ultimately, Votewatch provides a public service –helping individual citizens leverage their
democratic rights by keeping an eye on the voting process and trying to resolve issues of
malfeasance that are manifest. Votewatch simply acts as an intermediary by empowering
citizen participation and giving citizens the ability to ensure that our elections are free, fair and
unfettered.
Votewatch has created a comprehensive plan to meet the challenge of examining and
reforming America’s electoral process to ensure that each vote is counted and that each vote
counts. Guided by the intent of recording, reporting and reforming voting irregularities,
Votewatch has formulated:
• goals for the 2004 election

• an overview of its Public Service Intermediary model
• 2004 election program outline
• Key contributors to and participants in the Votewatch program
• a detailed survey plan and
• a communications plan that couples media distribution with interactive processes.
(a) Goals for the 2004 Election
Votewatch has prepared its goals for the 2004 election as a response to the problems
that were pervasive in the 2000 election and the changes being implemented under
the Help America Vote Act. Focusing on the need for accuracy, transparency and
validity, these goals are the beginning of a process that will effectively reform election
policy in the United States. These goals include:
1) Determining the accuracy of the election process, particularly in precincts and

regions where paperless electronic voting systems have been implemented and
where communities of color have been hindered in the election process;
2) Creating transparency by providing real time independent non-partisan election

data directly to the public through a variety of media technologies;
3) Improving the ability to legally contest elections where there is evidence of voting
irregularities. Provide evidence to lawyers and advocacy groups in a timely
manner to allow them to file legal contests of election results prior to certification
of these results.

(b) PSI Model Overview
Working as the people’s election monitor, Votewatch will be a medium and a tool that
improves the way citizens actively exercise their right to vote. The concept of working
as a public service intermediary is grounded in citizens using communications
networks (internet/phone/radio/TV/word of mouth/Print) in varying degrees and at
various times to document an issue, formulate corroboration, analyze the issue and
report on it in such a way so as to engender an active response to resolve this issue.
The documentation and responses is citizen driven: citizens are carrying out their
democratic rights and responsibilities.
A PSI provides a means for citizens to express their views, channel their information,
and render it actionable. Overall, this utilization of communication networks will
strengthen and magnify the impact that individual citizens can have on this and other
important issues. Indeed, strengthening the independent contributions from each of
these groups can lead to the creation of credible, comprehensive and actionable
outcomes that ultimately result in a more effective practice of democracy.
(c) 2004 Federal Elections Program Outline
Votewatch shall:
1) solicit citizen volunteer groups to conduct exit polling at pre-selected “high risk”
precincts.
2) implement technology that will allow the exit polling results to be assembled,
counted, analyzed and reported via media portals.
3) establish a secure portal for lawyers wishing to donate their services to voters
whose rights are infringed, including an online forum where lawyers can
collaborate.
4) enhance services to journalists by sending out email digests of voter reports every
hour throughout Election Day and as warranted until all elections are certified.
5) offer a dynamically generated Web site that displays, in real-time,

a) stories contributed by ordinary citizens
b) late breaking election news reported by the mainstream media
c) quantitative and qualitative raw exit polling data
d) independent journalists’ stories
e) legal opinions on matters of malfeasance.
6) broadcast hourly updates on headline stories via satellite television channels
7) publish a report on the election within a few days of polls closing
(d) Contributors to the Votewatch Model
1) the General Public including Voters, Concerned Citizens, Media, Advocacy Groups
and Political Candidates, all of who may submit reports on suspected malfeasance
or voter rights infringement.

2) Videographers, who can upload video content taken from polling locations,
including interviews with voters who experienced infringement(s) on their rights.
3) Lawyers, who can share legal briefs or discuss legal strategies with other lawyers
in an open but secure discussion forum.
4) Journalists, who can submit commissioned article concepts for approval, and then
write and upload approved commissioned articles.
5) Other Media Participants who may request hourly headlines of Votewatch collected
reports on Election Day.
6) Citizen Observers (“Votewatchers”), who can provide raw qualitative and

quantitative exit polling data, record affadavits from victims of voter rights
infringement, and log voting machine malfunctions that can later be tracked so as
to ensure their resolution prior to the next election.
(e) Survey Research & Analysis
Votewatch has teamed with The Aguirre Group (which provides high quality research
on social issues, specializing in projects relating to hard-to-reach and -serve
populations) to measure specific issues relating to the election process. Selection of
these issues will be determined by a panel of content experts; however, some of the
questions that Votewatch will be addressing are:
• Does citizen oversight reduce voting irregularities? If so, what are the most
effective roles that citizens can take? And, where are citizens most effective?
• Do electronic voting technologies reduce or increase voting irregularities when

used at actual polling places? Do these technologies differentially affect specific
populations, including those voters who have low technology literacy and may
have low functional literacy? such as the poor and the elderly? Are electronic
technologies easier or more difficult to manipulate for irregularities than traditional
methods?
• Are the new voting registration processes under HAVA creating or reducing
problems at the polls? Are different communities (e.g. communities of color) more
affected?
(f) Votewatch Process
Votewatch has engaged Aguirre International, a well-respected group devoted to social

research and evaluation, to create the monitoring process that will help citizens
document, analyze and report on the 2004 and subsequent elections. This process is
being created through a careful five-step approach outlined below:
1) Identify the most critical avenues for and types of irregularity, and identify
populations and locations that are most at risk of experiencing irregularities.
2) Create a draft plan identifying sampling populations and locations, the tools
needed to isolate sources of irregularities, and the resources needed to collect this
information.

3) Conduct a feasibility test of this draft plan using independent surveying experts.
Review and revise the plan according to recommendations from independent
experts.
4) Test and refine the methodology of the final plan, these tests will include pilot
studies of a small group of volunteers and on targeted precincts during primary
elections.
5) Recruit and train citizen “Votewatchers” to administer the survey and document
the following during the 2004 election:
voting experience and whether there were any difficulties related to voting;
individuals who believe their rights have been abridged or denied
election processes with regard to adherence to voting regulations
All information will be thoroughly documented, corroborated and analyzed in

preparation for an Election Status report that will be released before the elections are
certified. Immediately after Election Day and before election certification deadlines,
Votewatch data will be analyzed to identify any “hotspots” where election results may
need to be challenged. Following election certification, a full report will be produced
on the “State of Elections and Electoral Irregularities” for the targeted samples. This
report will be made available for general distribution on the Votewatch website and in
hardcopy.
(g) Communications Outline
1) Maintaining a Non-partisan Status
Votewatch will also request that all partners and volunteers recognize that Votewatch
must maintain strict non-partisanship in order to be an effective, efficient and
objective election monitor. As such, Votewatch is unable to support any organization,
corporation, political party, lobbyist or lobbying group, or constituency. Votewatch
cannot function as a vehicle for points of view; otherwise Votewatch will degrade its
objectivity and subsequently debase the credibility of its work product, which includes
its collection of data, analyses and reports.
All volunteers and partners will be required to sign a letter acknowledging that their
participation in Votewatch is grounded upon agreeing to and understanding this need
to maintain strict non-partisanship.
2) To attain its goals, Votewatch has formulated a broad communications plan that
operates on three levels:
Direct Citizen Contact
Electronic interface using diverse technologies, including email, telephone and
live video
Content Delivery using a variety of media.
3) To operate on these three levels, Votewatch will:

solicit citizen volunteer groups to conduct exit polling at pre-selected “high
risk” precincts.
implement technology that will allow the exit polling results to be assembled,
counted, analyzed and reported via media portals.

establish a secure portal for lawyers wishing to donate their services to voters
whose rights are infringed, including an online forum where lawyers can
collaborate.
enhance services to journalists by sending out email digests of voter reports
every hour throughout Election Day and as warranted until all elections are
certified.
offer a dynamically generated Web site that displays, in real-time,
- stories contributed by ordinary citizens
- late breaking election news reported by the mainstream media
- quantitative and qualitative raw exit polling data
- independent journalist’s stories
- legal opinions on matters of irregularity.
- broadcast hourly updates on headline stories via satellite television
channels
- publish a report on the election within 10 days of polls closing
(h) Summation of Services
As a nonpartisan, nonprofit election monitor, based upon citizen participation, Votewatch

focuses on the election process within communities. Votewatch monitors elections by
collecting information from voters, concerned citizens and Votewatchers conducting
surveys about individual’s voting experience at precincts. Votewatch then analyzes this
data and reports the results prior to the certification of election results.
Votewatch encourages citizens to report on their voting experience via its web site –
www.votewatch.us. It also encourages poll workers and election officials to report on their
experience with the voting equipment inside their precinct. Lastly, Votewatch asks
citizens to work as volunteer “Votewatchers” who will monitor the election by asking
voters questions as they exit their polling location. More specifically, Votewatch is
collaborating with various community groups who are committed to its role as a non-
partisan election monitor. To fulfill its mission, Votewatch is providing the following set of
core services:
• The Votewatch Web site, where citizens can enter qualitative information about
their voter experience in the Votewatch Voter Satisfaction Log.
• A Voter Experience Survey, that Voters can download from the Votewatch Web
site; this survey can be completed and returned to Votewatch by mail or be
uploaded online.
• A Voting Equipment Log, in which poll workers or election officials can report their
experience with their voting equipment. Votewatch will give voting equipment
manufacturers access to this log so that they can have an opportunity to address
these issues and respond publicly.
• Votewatching Opportunities for citizen volunteers (“Votewatchers”) who would like

to monitor a precinct on Election Day: Votewatchers will be trained and provided
handheld computers in order to collect information for Votewatch. They will be
shown how to properly interview voters about their voter experience and choices.
This data will be analyzed by Votewatch and made available to the public.
• Close to real-time access to Votewatch data will be made available to Lawyers &
legal team. These groups will be able to utilize Votewatch private and secure
online applications where they may collaborate about legal actions they may

choose to pursue. Votewatch itself does not retain legal teams: each legal
participant is expected to formulate his or her own opinion about Votewatch’s
data, and make independent determinations about the prudence and justification
for legal action.
• Real time data feeds will be available for journalists and other media through a
subscription service. This activity will give online media portals the ability to
provide Votewatch data directly to their audience along with other election
information that they deem relevant. Furthermore, on an hourly basis,
information summaries will be emailed to journalists covering Election Day.
• Research reports, including raw data accompanied by data analysis, will be

prepared and published by Votewatch’s statistical and methodological teams. This
information will be made available on the Votewatch Web site.
(i) Summation of Content
Votewatch Content shall be derived from:
• Voters who have experienced irregularities at the polls and have either called-in to
the toll-free Votewatch number or submitted a posting on the Votewatch Web site
forum
• Citizen Obervers (“Voterwatchers”) at polling locations who have directly

witnessed or interviewed a voter who has experienced irregularities at the polls.
Votewatchers can telephone Votewatch staff directly, submit a posting at the
Votewatch Web site forum or submit information via the Votewatch online survey
system.
• Votewatch partner lawyers who have interviewed a voter who has experienced a
violation of their rights at the polls. Lawyers submit postings at the Votewatch
Legal Forum Web site, where lawyers shall discuss case development for those
instances where there is a perponderence of evidence support a potential election
contest.
• Votewatch videographers observing polling locations and upload their digital video
to the Votewatch Web site on Election Day
• Quantitative data entering the Votewatch computer system in real time from
Votewatchers located at polling places in targeted locations.
(j) Summation of Research Products
The following research information will be made available to the general public following
the election. This information will improve the transparency in our election process and
strengthen each American’s ability to document, analyze and report on elections.
Moreover, these research products will help citizens correct irregularities that are
discovered.
• Access to Votewatch raw data (via subscription)
• Summarized Election Day data
• Annual State of the Election report

• Votewatch will develop and publish a series of indices that measure and highlight
relevant aspects of our election system. These indices, which will be made
available via the Votewatch website and mainstream publications, will have their
data organized on a state-by-state basis. These indices will include but not be
limited to:
a) Felony Voter index – displays the ratio of felon non-voters to registered

voters
b) Election Lottery index – shows the ratio of the amount of money each
state spends on the lottery versus voter education
c) Votes Counted index – illustrates the numbers of votes counted in the last
election versus the number of votes not counted
d) Voter Registration index – an indice calculating the ratio of voters purged

from registratrion databases versus the total number of registered voters.
This index will be regularly calculated and published on a state basis and
the states ranked from worst to first.
(k) Mobilizing Volunteers on Election Day
Votewatch will work with election monitors (“Votewatchers”) in order to report on the
election process, with a primary focus on election anomalies (e.g. faulty ballot design,
malfunctioning equipment, and/or failure to follow election procedures) that may lead to
voting rights being abridged or denied for some citizens, or that could lead to inaccurate
election counts. To mobilize this bases of election monitors, Votewatch will partner with
large membership organizations such as AARP, US Jaycees or the National Coalition on
Black Civic Participation. Constituents of these membership organizations will be given the
opportunity to participate in the monitoring on Election Day by:
• Conducting brief voter surveys outside polling places, which will include questions
concerning:
(i) whether or not a voter encountered any difficulties in the election process prior
to election day; (ii) whether or not a voter encountered any difficulties voting at
the polling station and, if so, what difficulties and to what degree?
• Identifying and recording the facts relating to abridgements or denials of citizens

ability to vote (to be recorded anonymously or with identification at the voter’s
preference).
• Observe polling places for systemic anomalies, including opening and closing time,
access for the disabled and those who do not speak English, processes for
handling registration disputes, and adherence to voting regulations.

(l) Milestones & Timeline
Q4 02 Q1 03 Q2 03 Q3 03 Q4 03 Q1 04 Q2 04 Q3 04 Q4 04 Q1 05
ID Task Name Start End Duration
Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Phase I
1 10/17/2002 1/29/2003 75d
Concept Feasibility
2 Election 2000 11/5/2002 11/5/2002 1d
Phase II
3 Summary Planning & Relationship 1/30/2003 9/18/2003 166d
Building
Phase III
4 Limited Testing - 2003 California 8/25/2003 11/14/2003 60d
Special Election
5 Election 2003 10/7/2003 10/7/2003 1d
Phase IV
6 9/19/2003 5/27/2004 180d
Detailed Planning
Phase V
7 2/16/2004 9/30/2004 164d
Implementation & Testing
Phase VI
8 10/1/2004 11/26/2004 41d
2004 Election Execution
9 Election 2004 11/3/2004 11/3/2004 1d
Phase VII
10 11/3/2004 3/8/2005 90d
Post Election Analysis

(m) First Year Use of Funds
Phase Primary Work scopes Amount Funding Date

Required Source Required
Phase I Launch 2002 Web site $15,000 Internal complete

Concept Feasibility Limited Nat’l PR
2002 Election Trial
Lessons learned
Concept re-development
Phase II Extensive Research $35,000 Internal complete

Summary Planning Preliminary Business Planning
& Relationship Secure Key Partners
Building Secure Key Advisors
Launch 2003 Web site
Phase III Technology Deployment $10,000 Internal complete

Limited Testing -
Statewide PR $15,000 Internal complete
2003 California
Special Election Election Day Organizing (Volunteer training, supervision and $25,000 Internal complete
operations)
Survey Research & Report Generation $25,000 External Sep 2003

Funding
Phase IV 2004 Election Survey Design, including key research development $200,000 Ext. Funding Dec 2003
Detailed Planning and methods plan Round 1
Recruitment and initial funding of media spokesperson and $100,000 Ext. Funding Feb 2004
development director Round 1
Development of Detailed Plans for election 2004 $100,000 Ext. Funding Jan 2004
Round 1
Phase V Pilot testing, including field test equipment. $150,000 Ext. Funding Mar 2004
Implementation & Development of Sampling Plan. Round 2
Testing
2004 PR, development of collateral materials, including PSA’s $60,000 Ext. Funding Mar 2004
Round 2
Recruitment of Executive Director, including initial salary $60,000 Ext. Funding Apr 2004
Round 2

Phase Primary Work scopes Amount Funding Date

Required Source Required
Technology Development $150,000 Ext. Funding Jan 2004

Round 2
Phase VI Technology Deployment $25,000 Ext. Funding Sep 2004
2004 Election Round 3
Execution
Volunteer training, supervision and operations $250,000 Ext. Funding May 2004
Round 3
Equipment for field Volunteers $75,000 Ext. Funding Aug 2004
Round 3
National PR Campaign $100,000 Ext. Funding Jun 2004
Round 3
Survey data transmission and software application $20,000 Ext. Funding Sep 2004
Round 3
Votewatch internal Operational election period staff $40,000 Ext. Funding Oct 2004
Round 3
Operations Center, setup and lease $50,000 Ext. Funding Oct 2004
Round 3
Election day Media Production $85,000 Ext. Funding Aug 2004
Round 3
Phase VII Post election analysis and reporting $100,000 Ext. Funding Nov 1, 2004
Post Election Round 4
Analysis
$1,640,000

(n) Current Team
Steven Hertzberg, Project Director

Mr. Hertzberg’s 16 years of experience includes engineering design, technical program
management, information systems development, international new business
development, strategic marketing, new venture engineering and private capital
acquisition.
Mr. Hertzberg now resides in San Francisco where he serves as an independent

technology consultant.
Previously, Mr. Hertzberg was Managing Director (California) for an information

technology and enterprise integration consultancy based in Toronto, Canada. Mr.
Hertzberg’s clients included Handspring and Roxio (an Adaptec company).
During the previous 12 year period, while dividing residences between California and
Australia, Mr. Hertzberg participated in the management teams of numerous new
ventures (contributing to an IPO). In addition, he also founded and successfully
developed his own ventures in the automotive accessories, industrial food equipment,
information technology, television and direct marketing industries.
Mr. Hertzberg spent the first several years of his career as a civilian within all four
branches of the US Department of Defense, serving as a Project Manager and Test
Director for highly visible military development programs. Mr. Hertzberg received the
U.S Army’s Civilian Special Act Award—the second highest award given by the military
to civilians.
Mr. Hertzberg was born in Los Angeles, California and has one daughter. Steven holds
a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering from Purdue University.
Dr. Susan Gabbard, Survey Research Lead

Dr. Susan Gabbard is one of the nation’s leading experts in face-to-face surveys with
low-literate and minority populations. Dr. Gabbard is currently employed as the Vice-
President of Research at Aguirre International/Aguirre Group and is best known as the
Director of the National Agriculture Workers Survey. She has done research and
evaluation with farmworkers since 1983. Dr. Gabbard has also participated in
research on farmworkers’ knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of pesticides and an
Evaluation of Migrant Head Start. In addition to research with farmworkers, Dr.
Gabbard has been an evaluator of the Corporation for National Service’s AmeriCorps
programs and does research with the Census Bureau on improving Census response
among minority and special populations. Dr. Gabbard has graduate training in
anthropology and economics and a PhD in Agricultural Economics from the University
of California Berkeley.

Dr. Nicole Vicinanza, Survey Research Project Manager

Dr. Nicole Vicinanza holds her Ph.D. in Program Evaluation from the University of
Virginia, and a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from the University of Delaware. She
has expertise in evaluation and survey design, with a focus on program evaluation
with community based and educational organizations, including organizations
addressing sensitive issues such as domestic and sexual violence, HIV/AIDS, and
multi-culturalism. Her expertise includes instrument design, multi-method evaluation
approaches, and technical assistance in program evaluation and program information
management and reporting. Dr. Vicinanza has worked with hundreds of community
based programs to help them identify and assess outcomes, strengthen progress
reporting, and use program evaluation data to improve their program's
accomplishments and outcomes.
Rob Purdie, Operations & Project Manager

Rob is a Project Management Professional with eight years of business consulting and
project management experience in the software development industry. Rob has
worked with teams of four to forty people to deliver technically-complex projects
ranging in size from $4,000 - $4,000,000 USD.
Rob has led departments of project managers, established PMOs, and worked with
senior management teams to roll-out organization-wide processes and best practices.
In May 1997, Rob co-founded an Internet software development start-up and
professional services firm and led the development of several industry-firsts, including
a Java-based data visualization engine, a Java application server and extranet
publishing system, and a graphical XML editor. Rob's career began in distance
learning, where he led roundtable discussions on computer-based learning at
education conferences worldwide.
Rob has a BA from Trent University and a BEd from Queen's University.
Kim Thaxton, Communications

Kim is a marketing consultant specializing in customer acquisition and retention, with
a particular emphasis in sales and marketing process improvement. Her experience
includes consumer and business-to-business marketing, online and offline direct
marketing management, customer relationship management (CRM), marketing
database management, website development, sales lead generation, and event
management. Her consulting client list includes Adobe and Tele Atlas.
Prior to starting her consulting practice, Kim worked for Netprospect, where she
helped launch the Internet’s first free auction rewards program. Kim spent six years at
Claritas, a target marketing company, where she managed product marketing for the
PRIZM® consumer segmentation system and COMPASS® desktop marketing analysis
software, financial industry marketing, partner marketing, and corporate direct and
database marketing. Previously, Kim managed database marketing and marketing
research for AmeriBanc, and worked for market research firms The M/A/R/C Group
and Decision Analyst. Kim graduated Cum Laude from West Virginia State College, and
currently resides in San Francisco.

Marianne Gaddy, Development

Marianne has over twenty years of experience serving the private equity investment
community, startup ventures, non-profit organizations and associations in money-
raising, business development, and coalition-building activities.
Marianne’s personalized approach concentrates on collaborative goal development for

the organization while implementing both short-and long-term fundraising plans that
incorporate benchmark goals to measure progress.
Marianne focuses on identifying target constituencies and determining the best

fundraising techniques to approach investors and donors; securing seed and early
stage funding, strengthening the organization’s board, and planning and producing
events that increase the organization’s visibility.
Bart Calendar, Press & Media

Bart has 10 years experience as a journalist for Gannett New Jersey Newspapers
where he covered politics, crime and rock and roll. Since 2000 he has been running his
own boutique Public Relations Firm, Calendar Communications, in Europe.
Bart is a graduate of Bard College in Annandale On Hudson, New York.
Andrew Manson, Technology

Mr. Manson is an accomplished Silicon Valley technology professional, having worked
for several high profile high-tech companies. Andrew’s experience includes: software
development within Adobe System’s FrameMaker product division; advanced software
engineering within Excite’s e-commerce development department; managing Web
development within Handspring’s e-commerce group.
Andrew holds a B.S. in Computer Science from Stanford University, and was a
member of two NCAA Championship Teams in men's gymnastics.

V Appendix – Electoral Malfeasance

Historical Cases of Electoral Malfeasance35
Most of the proceeding examples have been blamed on computer/human error, yet many
seem fantastical enough to suspect that other forces may have been at work.
• 1968 Missoula County, Montana - "Through a programming error in a few

precincts, ballots cast for Nixon were counted for Humphrey or vice
versa."[Dugger, pg. 52]
• 1970 Los Angeles, California - In a primary voters voted for wrong candidates
due to missing ballot pages and "incorrect rotations." Due to a computer
malfunction hundreds of votes weren't recorded. Ballot cards jammed the machine
and clerks had to duplicate the cards. They were seen poking holes in punch cards
with pencils. The central computer ceased six times and it was found out later that
five hundred precincts had been overlooked. [Dugger, pg. 54]
• 1976 Los Angeles - The outcome of a legislative race is reversed twice. The first
recount is down by a machine. The second by holding every punch card ballot to a
light and counting the tab holes.
Blame: "hanging chad", it occurs when the tabs on the punch cards are not
pushed out all the way and are bulging or hanging. This can cause the vote-
counting machines to make mistakes or invalidate a voter due to under or over-
voting. [Dugger, pg. 56]
• 1978 Madison County, Illinois - A comptroller candidate after suspecting he

didn't lose the county by a large margin discovers that the totals had "flipped",
and he had won the county. [Dugger, pg. 56]
• 1978 El Paso, Texas - Marvin Gamza was deprived of his victory of the school-
board race when the computer failed to count three precincts. Those three
precincts had computers that were programmed for a previous ballot layout.
Suspicions arose that the mistake had been deliberately left uncorrected. Judge
John Wood presided over the case and learned that some of the ballots had been
burned. He concluded that "a willful effort" had been involved in the error and
installed Gamza on the school board. On appeal Gamza's appointment was
rescinded on account that he filed his protest too late. [Dugger, pg. 56-57]
• 1980 Orange County, California - Due to programming error the computers

gave 15,000 Democratic-primary votes meant for Jimmy Carter or Edward
Kennedy to delegates for Lyndon La Rouche and Jerry Brown. [Dugger, pg. 57]
• 1980 Fort Pierce, Florida - Democratic ballots were read well by the computer,
but Republican ballots were not accepted. Quote from the supervisor of elections,
James Brooks, "Those damn machines must have been built by the Democrats."
[Dugger, pg. 57]
35
Vulnerability of Computerized Vote-Counting Systems, Computers, Ethics, And Social Responsibility:
Project from Spring Quarter 1995-96, Stanford University, June 9, 1996
http://cse.stanford.edu/class/cs201/current/Projects/electronic-vote-counting/examples.html

• 1980 San Antonio, Texas - In the Presidential election the computer program
could not tally more than 9,000 votes. In the recount election officials took
unmarked ballots home overnight. [Dugger, pg. 58]
• 1984 Carroll County, Maryland - In a school board election T. Edward Lippy

finished third. When the ballots were recounted in another town with a different
machine about 12,500 uncounted votes were found and Lippy was, in fact, elected
to the board. [Dugger, pg. 58]
• 1984 Moline, Illinois - A candidate for alderman served three months of the
term before he was removed from office. It had been discovered that a slipped
timing belt in the vote-counting machine had lead to a failure to count a large
number of votes. [Dugger, pg. 58]
• 1989 St. Petersburg, Florida - In a municipal election it was discovered that the
election supervisor had authorized the use of two different computer programs to
count the votes, while a third program - not certified by the state - had merged
the two sets of results. In this election one precinct with no registered voters
acquired 7,331. Of these new voters 1,429 cast ballots. The incumbent mayor had
won the race by 1,425 votes. [Peterson, pg. 283]
• Though no formal convictions have been brought against any parties in these
instances there is increased speculation with each new election. In using a
computerized system, that relies on people more than hardware, there are many
weak points that are open for manipulation and fraud. In evaluating an election
arena that is being set up with the possibility of great fraud New York City serves
as an example.

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The Votewatch Public Service Intermediary Model of Election Oversight

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Overview

Date: February 22, 2004

Document and Contact Information

2269 Chestnut Street, 611

San Francisco, CA 94123

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit i

II Problem Statement ............................................................................... 6

III Our Democracy’s Challenge ................................................................ 16

IV The Votewatch Model.......................................................................... 18

V Appendix – Electoral Malfeasance....................................................... 31

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit iii

(a) Votewatch Vision & Mission

Votewatch is a non-profit non-partisan organization that works to ensure that the

(b) Votewatch Background

Initially founded in 2002 as a non-partisan election forum, Votewatch provided a way

(c) Key goals for the 2004 elections

1) Determine the accuracy of the election process, particularly in precincts and

2) Create transparency by providing real time independent non-partisan election data

(d) Election Televison Broadcasts in 2004

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 4

The idea of giving people an opportunity to express concerns and complaints

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 5

Even more frustrating is the stratification of Florida voter disenfranchisement, which

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 6

Are Florida’s Proposed Solutions Ineffective?

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 7

Are New Voting Machine Standards Deficient?

There is simply no way, in an anonymous election, to use a fully-electronic process

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 8

• Set uniform, minimum standards for federal elections nationwide, including

• Ensure accuracy of state voter registration databases by implementing uniform,

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 9

In order to reduce its harmful impact on first-time voters, the ID requirement

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 10

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 11

Language minority voters, who requested the assistance of a bilingual volunteer or

The Critique from the Technology Schools

• replace punch cards, lever machines, and some underperforming electronic

• make countywide or even statewide voter registration data available at polling

• make provisional ballots available.

• In the long-term, the noted that:

• First, institute a program of federal matching grants for equipment and

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 12

• Second, create an information clearinghouse and data-bank for election equipment

• Third, develop a research grant program to field-test new equipment, develop

• Fifth, create an election administration agency, independent of the Federal Election

Is the U.S. Media Reporting the Story?

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 13

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 14

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 15

III Our Democracy’s Challenge

Questions for Election Day 2004

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 16

Our Current Path

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 17

IV The Votewatch Model

• goals for the 2004 election

(a) Goals for the 2004 Election

1) Determining the accuracy of the election process, particularly in precincts and

2) Creating transparency by providing real time independent non-partisan election

Votewatch Corporation, a California nonprofit 18

(b) PSI Model Overview

(c) 2004 Federal Elections Program Outline

5) offer a dynamically generated Web site that displays, in real-time,