MANU/MH/0071/1961

Equivalent Citation: AIR1961Bom292, 1960(62)BOMLR251, ILR1961 Bom 257

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR

A.F.O.D. No. 13 of 1954
Decided On: 30.09.1959
Appellants: All India Reporter Ltd. and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Ramchandra Dhondo Datar
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.P. Kotval and V.B. Raju, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: M.R. Bobde and G.B. Shidhaye, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: B.H. Chati, Adv.
Case Note:
Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), Order VI, Rules 14, 15; Order VII,
Rules 1 & 11; Order IV, Rules 1 & 2 - Plaint not properly signed or verified
whether makes suit ineffective, inoperative, or void--Whether re-signing
and re-verification of plaint relates back to original date of suit--
Amendment of properly instituted plaint whether relates back to original
plaint--Whether words "duly authorized" in Order VI, Rule 14 restricted to
mean authorized by proper written authority or by power of attorney--Plaint
whether can be presented only by plaintiff personally or by person duly
authorized by him--Practice (Civil)--Pleadings--Courts receiving pleadings
to require that requirements of Order VI, Rules 14 & 15 and Order VII, Rule
1 should be complied with.
If a plaint is not, properly signed or verified but is admitted and entered in
the register of suits it does not cease to be a plaint and the suit cannot be
said not to have been instituted merely because of the existence of some
defects or irregularities in the matter of signing and verification of the
plaint. When a defective plaint is rectified and re-signed and re-verified on
a subsequent date, the re-signing or the re-verification of the plaint relates
back to the original date of the suit. Even when the plaint is amended after
it is properly instituted, the amendment relates back to the original plaint
unless the amendment adds new parties or new properties.
The expression "signed by any person duly authorized by him to sign the
same" in Order VI, Rule 14, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is not
restricted to written authorizations. If the authorization is proved, even
oral authorization must be taken as sufficient.
Order IV, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, does not require that a
plaint should be presented by the plaintiff personally or by a person duly
authorized by him. It can be presented by any person. In the case of a suit
where there are two or more plaintiffs, presentation of the plaint by one of
the plaintiffs or by the pleader of one of the plaintiffs will be a proper

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presentation.
Courts receiving pleadings and Officers authorised to receive pleadings
must see that the requirements of Order VI, Rules 14 and 15 and of Order
VII, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, are properly complied with.
Ganpati Nana v. Jivanabai (1922) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 227 : s.c. 24 Bom. L.R.
1302, Bundi Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Hussein [19371 Bom. 85. :
s.c. 38 Bom. L.R. 894, Nanjibhai v. Popatlal (1931) 34 Bom. L.R. 628, Prince
Line Ltd. v. Trustees of Port Trust (1949) 51 Bom. L.R. 1004, Uttamram
Vithaldas v. Thakordas Parshottamdas (1921) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 150 : s.c. 23
Bom. L.R. 911, Ephrayim v. Turner, Morrison & Co. (1930) 32 Bom. L.R.
1178, In the Matter of the petition of Bisheshar Nath (1917) I.L.R. 40 All.
147, Netram v. Bhagwan [1941] A.I.R. Nag. 159, Ali Muhammad Khan v.
Ishaq Ali Khan (1931) I.L.R. 54 All. 57, F.B., Shib Deo Misra v. Ram Prasad
(1924) I.L.R. 46 All. 637, Subbiah Pillai v. Sankarapandiam Pilial [1948]
A.I.R. Mad. 369, 371, Ramgopal Ghose v. Dhirendra Nath Sen (1927) I.L.R.
54 Cal. 380, Sarju Prasad v. Badri Prasad [1929] Nag. 515, Mohini Mohun
Das v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Dos (1889) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 580, P.C., Basdeo v.
John Smidt (1899) I.L.R. 22 All. 55, Great Australian Gold Mining Company
v. Martin (1877) 5 Ch. D. 1. 10, Fowler v. Barstow (1881.) 20 Ch. D. 240,
Govindoss v. Muthiah Chetty [1925] A.I.R. Mad. 660, Rajit Ram v. Katesar
Nath (1896) I.L.R. 18 All. 396, Educational Book Depot v. Rabindra Nath
Tagore (1933) I.L.R. 55 All. 564, Qanayat Husain v. Sajidunnisa Bibi [1949]
A.I.R. All. 499, Bibi Asghari v. Md. Kasim [1951] A.I.R. Patna 323, Calico
Printers Association, Ltd. v. Karim & Bros. (1930) I.L.R. 55 Bom. 151, s.c. 32
Bom. L.R. 1305, Delhi and London Bank v. Oldham (1893) L.R. 20 I.A. 139,
Bengal, Jute Mills v. Jewraj Heeralal [1943] A.I.R. Cal. 13, Rohini Kumar v.
Niaz Mahammad [1944] A.I.R. Cal. 4, Nallakumara v. Pappayi Ammal [l945]
A.I.R. Mad. 219, Weldon v. Weal (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 394, Janardan Kishore
Lal v. Shib Pershad Ram (1915) I.L.R. 43 Cal. 95, Charan Das v. Amir Khan
(1920) 22 Born. L.R. 1370, s.c. 47 I.A. 255, referred to.
JUDGMENT
S.P. Kotval, J.
V.B. Raju, J.
1. I would like to add the following observations on the question of limitation.
2 . In order to appreciate the points of law involved, it is necessary to state a few
relevant facts :
3 . In the plaint two plaintiffs were named, namely, (1) All India Reporter, Limited,
Bombay and (2) Shri V. V. Chitaley. The plaint was signed by Shri V. V. Chitaley
(Plaintiff No. 2) and by one S. 0. Ghushey who signed as agent to plaintiff No. 1. It
was also verified by S- B. Ghushey as agent to plaintiff No. 1. The plaint was filed on
18-2-1949, one day prior to the expiry of the period of limitation. The plaint was
presented by Shri Shidhaye Advocate, whose power was signed by V. V. Chitaley and
S. B. Ghushey who signed as agent of plaintiff No. 1. Along with the plaint, a power
of attorney by AIR Limited, in favour of S. B. Ghushey, dated 1-5-46, was filed. After
the date of this power of attorney and before the date of the suit, AIR Limited was
converted into a public Limited Company in 1948.

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4. Objections having been taken by the defendant on the ground that the plaint was
not properly signed or verified, the trial Court held on 9-4-51 that the plaint was not
properly signed and verified on behalf of plaintiff No. 1 and ordered that the plaint
should be properly signed and verified by someone authorised on behalf of plaintiff
No. 1, either under Order 6, Rule 14, or under Order 29 Rule 1, C. P. C. In
compliance with this order dated 9-4-51, S. B. Ghushey again signed the plaint and
again verified it on 24-4-51 after filing a fresh power of attorney from plaintiff No. 1
dated 18-4-1951.
5. Against the order of the trial Court dated 9-4-51, holding that the plaint was not
properly signed and verified on behalf of plaintiff No. 1, a revision application filed in
the High Court (Civil Revision No. 395 of 1951) was decided on 18-1-1952. The High
Court held that no question of jurisdiction was involved in the revision application as
the trial Court undoubtedly had power to ask the party to rectify a defect in regard to
signing and verification of the plaint. The High Court observed that the trial Court had
not framed an issue on the point of limitation, and therefore the High Court did not
decide the question of limitation in revision, but left it open to the defendant to plead
the bar of Limitation.
6. Accordingly the defendant pleaded the bar of limitation before the trial Court and
this contention was upheld by the trial Court on the following grounds :
1 . The signature o f Ghushey on the plaint and its verification by him in his
capacity as agent of the AIR Limited (Plaintiff No. 1) under a power given by
it when it was a private Limited Company do not enure for the benefit of the
AIR Limited on the date of the institution of the suit when it had become a
public Limited Company.
2. The plaint can be signed and verified by a person Orally authorised by a
plaintiff to do so, but in the instant case plaintiff No. 1 is a company. Under
Articles 153(7) and 156 of the Articles of Association of the Company only
the Managing Director of the Plaintiff Company had power to institute suits
for plaintiff No. 1, and it is nowhere shown that he had power to authorise
somebody else to sign pleadings for plaintiff No. 1. Under Art. 153 (19) of
the Articles of Association of plaintiff No. 1, read with Art. 156, the Directors
could confer a power of attorney under the seal of the Company upon any
person to be attorney of the Company for the purposes of the powers
conferred on the Directors under Art. 152 which include a power to institute
and conduct suits under Art. 153(7). The power of attorney of Ghushey dated
18-4-51 does not bear the seal of the Company. An oral authorization would
also not be valid in view of the Articles of Association.
3. Even if the signature of Ghushey on the plaint for plaintiff No. 1 was valid,
his verification is neither proper nor authorized.
4 . O n 18-249, the date o f the plaint, it cannot be said that Ghushey was
acquainted with the facts of the case as required by Order 6, R. 15, C. P. C.
So verification of the plaint by Ghushey was not proper.
5 . The plaint was also not properly presented On behalf of plaintiff No. 1
who alone had interest in the suit, the other plaintiff, namely, plaintiff No. 2,
being only a formal plaintiff.
6. It was only on 24-2-51 that the plaint was properly signed and verified by

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 Ghushey under the power of attorney from plaintiff No. 1 after its conversion
into a public Limited Company. As the plaint must be deemed to have been
properly presented on 24-4-1951 and as the cause of action accrued on 19-
2-46, the suit was clearly barred by limitation as the period of limitation is
admittedly three years.
7. The question of limitation, therefore, involves the following points :
(1) Who has to sign the plaint, who has to verify it, and who has to present
it?
(2) If there are any de facts or irregularities in regard to signing of the plaint
or its verification, can these de facts be removed on a subsequent date after
the hearing of the suit has commenced? Can they be removed in appeal? If
so, does the removal of the defect or irregularity relate back to the original
date of presentation of the plaint? In other words, is the suit deemed to be
instituted on the original date or on the date on which the de facts or
irregularities in regard to the signing etc. of the plaint are removed?
(3) In regard to a private Limited Company which is converted into a public
Limited Company before the date of the suit, can a person holding power of
attorney of the former sign a plaint and verify it on behalf of the latter?
(4) Would the decision of these questions depend on whether the plaintiff is
a sole plaintiff or is one of several plaintiffs? Should the rules regarding
signature, verification and presentation of the plaint be complied with by all
plaintiffs?
8. I shall discuss the questions of law at issue first with reference to the provisions
of the C. P. C. and then with reference to decided cases. Our attention has not been
drawn to any case of the Supreme Court on these points.
9. The relevant provisions of the C. P. C, must be borne in mind. They are : Order 4,
R. 1; Order 6, R. 14; Order 6, R. 15; Order 3, R. 1; Order 3, R. 2 and Order 7, R. 11.
O- 4 R. 1 : "(1) Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the
Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf.''
"(2) Every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII,
so far as they are applicable."
O. 6 R. 14 : "Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if
any); Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for
other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any
person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his
behalf."
O. 6 R. 15: "(1) Save as otherwise Provided by any law for the time being in
force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of
the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the
Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case."
(2) .....(3) .....
Order 3, R. 1:-- "Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court,

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 required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court,
may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time
being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized
agent or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on
his behalf :
Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by
the party in person."
Order 3 R. 2 :-- "The recognized agents of parties by whom such
appearances, applications and acts may be made Or done are-
(a) persons holding powers-of-attorney, authorizing them to make
and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such
parties;
(b) persons carrying on trade Or business for and in the names of
parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the
Court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made
or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only,
where no other agent is expressly authorised to make and do such
appearances, applications and acts."
Order 7 Rule 11 :-- "The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:--
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued,..;
(c) where the ••••plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped.....;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be
barred by any law."
10. Order 6, rule 14, requires that every pleading i.e. a plaint or a written statement,
shall be signed by the party and his pleader, if any, provided that where a party
pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the
pleading may be signed by any person duly authorised by him Order 6 also contains
provisions as to what a pleading should contain and should not contain; for instance,
Order 6, rule 2 provides that pleadings should contain in a concise form a statement
of all the material facts but should not state the evidence by which material facts are
to be proved. Order 7, rule 1 enumerates some essential particulars to be stated in a
plaint.
1 1 . Order 6, Rule 14, provides that in certain circumstances a pleading may be
signed by any person duly authorised by the plaintiff to sign the plaint Or to sue on
his behalf. The expression "signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the
same" in rule 14 need not be restricted to written authorizations. If the authorization
is proved, even an oral authorization should be taken as sufficient and there is no
reason to read Order 6, rule 14 as requiring written authorization or a power of
attorney. At this stage, the provisions of Order 3, rule 1 must also be considered.
Order 3, rule 1, reads as follow:--
(After quoting the rule as given in para 9 the judgment proceeds).

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 Order 3, rule 2, describes who the recognized agents referred to in Order 3,
rule 1, are. Order 3, rule 2, has been amended by the Bombay High Court.
But this amendment did net govern the plaint in the instant case when it was
filed.
12. Order 3, rule 1, applies only to appearances, applications, or acts in or to any
Court, required or authorised by law to be nude or done by any party in such Court.
The signature on a plaint is not an appearance, or application, or act in or to any
Court. The presentation of a plaint may be an act to or in a Court, but the mere act of
signing a plaint would not be an act in or to a Court. A plaint can be signed outside
the Court. It would not therefore come with-in the scope of Order 3, Rule 1 and Order
3, rule 2. The presentation of a plaint in a Court would also not be governed by Order
3, rule 1, as the presentation of a plaint is not required or autheorised by law to be
made or done by a party to such Court. Order 4, rule 1, which refers to presentation
of a plaint, docs not require the presentation to he made or done by a party. Order 4
rule 1, merely provides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the
Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. Order 4, rule 1, does not specify by
whom a plaint is to be presented. A plaint can therefore be presented by any person.
It can perhaps even be sons by registered Post, addressed to the Court or to the
officer appointed by the Court to receive plaints, but this point need not be further
considered as it does not arise in the present case.
13. The question is whether the provisions contained in Order 6 relating to signing,
verification and presentation of the plaint relate merely to procedure or whether a
plaint which does not strictly comply with the requirements of Order VI would cease
to be a valid plaint and would be a nullity because of such de facts or irregularities. It
is true that when a plaint is presented to the Court or to such officer as the Court
appoints, it is open to the Court or to the officer to point out the de facts or
irregularities to the person presenting the suit and to require him to rectify the de
facts or irregularities. But can it be said that the de facts or irregularities would make
the presentation of the suit itself invalid although the plaint is admitted and
particulars of the plaint are entered in a register of suits as provided by Order 4, rule
2? In this connection it is necessary to note that Order 7, rule 11, which refers to the
rejection of a plaint, enumerates only four cases in which a plaint has to be rejected,
hut it does not enumerate any of the d facts or irregularities referred to in Order 6,
Rules 14, Order 6, Rule 15, or Order 6, Rule 2. It is clear from the prevision
contained in Order 6 that these rules relate only to procedure, and the better view
would be to regard them as mere matters of procedure and to hold that if a plaint is
not properly signed or verified but is admitted and entered in the register of suits it
docs not cease to he a plaint and the suit cannot be said not to have been instituted
merely because of the existence of some de facts or irregularities in the matter of
signing and verification of the plaint.
14. I shall next turn to the authority of decided cases .That de facts in regard to
signature on a plaint are technical irregularities relating to matters of procedure
which can be cured at anytime irrespective of the question of limitation was the view
taken by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ganpati Nana v. Jiwanabai
AIR 1923 Bom 44 : ILR 47 Bom 227, by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in
Bundi Pordand Cement Co.. Ltd. v. Abdul Hussein ILR 1937 Bom 85 : AIR 936 Bora
418, and by another Single Judge in Nanibhai v. Popatlal MANU/MH/0207/1931 : AIR
1932 Bom 367 : 34 Bom LR 628 . A contrary view that it cannot be said that a suit
has been instituted if it did not comply with Order 6, rule 14, or Order 6, rule 15,
Civil Procedure Code, was held by a Single Judge in Prince Line, Ltd. v. Trustees of

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the Port of Bombay MANU/MH/0056/1950 : AIR1950Bom130 , relying on the
Division. Bench judgment in Uttamram Vithaldas v. Thakur Das Parshottamdas AIR
1922 Bom 113 : ILR 46 Bom 150. But the observations i n AIR 1922 Bom 113 : ILR
46 Bom 150 were held in MANU/MH/0207/1931 : AIR 1932 Bom 367: 34 Bom LR
628 to be obiter dicta as the question of limitation was not considered in that case.
The real question decided by the High Court in ILR 46 Bom 150 : AIR 1922 Born 113
was whether or not the plaintiff should be allowed subsequently an opportunity to
rectify defects in the matter of signature on the plaint. The High Court set aside the
dismissal of a suit by the trial Court which had dismissed the suit on the ground that
the plaint had not been properly signed. The High Court set aside the dismissal of the
suit and allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to sign the plaint. Without deciding the
question of limitation the High Court made some observations as to the date on
which the suit must be deemed to have been instituted. As the question of limitation
was not decided, it was not necessary to decide on what date the suit had been
instituted.
15. The judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in AIR 1923 Bom
44 : ILR 47 Bom 227 and the judgments of Single Judges in MANU/MH/0152/1935 :
AIR 1936 Bom 418 : ILR 1937 Born 85,. Ephrayim v. Turner, Morrison and Co.
MANU/MH/0094/1930 : AIR 1930 Bom 511 : 32 Bom LR 1178 and34 Bom LR 628 :
AIR 1932 Bom 367 are in favour of the view that de facts in regard to the signature,
or verification or presentation of the plaint are mere irregularities of procedure. In
MANU/MH/0152/1935 : AIR 1936 Bom 418 : ILR 1937 Bom 85 it was held that the
rule in Order 29, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, regarding signature on the plaint is
only a matter of procedure and that "If the signature on the plaint or the verification
of the pleading is defective, the defect can be cured at any subsequent lime." It was
also held that the provisions contained in Order 29, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, are
clearly permissive and not imperative. Order 29, rule 1 is merely a rule of procedure
and does not exclude the operation of Order 6, rule 14 and rule 15. In ILR 47 Bom
227 : AIR 1923 Bom 44, where a power of attorney was defective, it was held that
the decree should not be disturbed in appeal in spite of the defect. If such de facts go
to the root of the plaint and vitiate the plaint, there could be no suit and no decree.
As the High Court refused to disturb the decree in spite of defect's in the plaint it
impliedly held that de facts in the plaint do not vitiate the plaint or the suit. Section
99 of the Civil Procedure Code was applied apparently on the view that there was
merely a defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the suit after it had been properly
instituted. That the signing and verification of pleadings is not a matter of substance
but of procedure only, that notwithstanding irregularities in the plaint in regard to
signing or verification or presentation, the plaint must be deemed to have been
instituted On the date of its admission by the Court, and that such de facts can be
cured in appeal or even after the period of limitation was the view held in Bisheshar
Nath v. Emperor ILR 40 All 147 : AIR 1918 AH 275, Netrarn v. Bhagwan
MANU/NA/0159/1940 : AIR 1941 Nag 159 Wali Muhammad Khan v. Ishak AH Khan
MANU/UP/0379/1931 : AIR 1931 All 507 : ILR 54 AH 57, Shib Deo Misra v.
Rarnprasad MANU/UP/0043/1924 : AIR1925All79 ,Subash Pillai v. Sankarapandiam
Pillai ATR 1948 Mad 369, Ramgopal Chose v. Dhirendra Nath Sen ILR 54 Cal 380 :
AIR 1927 Cal 378, Sarju Prasad v. Badri Prosad MANU/NA/0129/1939 : AIR 1939 Nag
242 : ILR 1939 Nag 515.
16. Referring to the observations of the Privy Council in Mohini Mohan Das v. Bungsi
Buddan Saha Das ILR 17 Cal 580, it was remarked in 34 Bom LR 628 : AIR 1932 Bom
367 that their Lordships of the Privy Council were of the opinion that the signing of
the plaint was not essential part of it. In Basdeo v. John Smidt ILR 22 All 55 it was

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held that omission to sign a plaint in accordance with Order 6, rule 14, Civil
Procedure Code, was a mere irregularity. The rule in Order 6, rule 14, regarding
signature on a plaint is both desirable and salutary. The object of requiring signature
on a plaint is to prevent fictitious suits. As observed in Great Australian Gold Mining
Co. v. Martin (1877) 5 Ch. D 10, which was Overruled on another point in Fowler v.
Barstow (1881) 20 Ch. D. 240, "signature of counsel to the bill was to that extent a
voucher that the case was not a mere fiction." Signature on the plaint is also
essential to fix the responsibility of the plaintiff and to afford guarantee of his good
faith. Vide ILR 22 All 55.
17. It is open to the Court or to the officer of the Court authorised to receive plaints
to refuse to admit a plaint if it is not properly signed of properly verified. It is also
open to the Court at any subsequent stage, on its own initiative or upon objection
being taken by the defendant, to require the plaintiff to sign and verify the plaint, and
if the plaintiff refuses to do so, the Court can refuse to take any further steps. But
that does not mean that if the Court requires the plaintiff to sign the plaint
subsequently, the original plaint ceases to be a plaint. In ILR 22 All 55 it was held
that the mere fact that the plaint is not signed by the plaintiff or by a person duly
authorised by him will not make the plaint void and that a plaint does not cease to be
a plaint if it is unsigned or if the signature is defective, A similar view was taken in
MANU/UP/0125/1919 : AIR1919All275 , Govindas v. Muthiah ChettyAIR1925All79 ,
Ranjit Ram v. Katesar Nath ILR 18 All 396 and Educational Bonk Depot v. Rabindra
Nath Tagore MANU/UP/0282/1933 : AIR1933All474 . The last three cases are cases of
irregularity in regard to verification of the plaint. See also Qanavat Hussain v. Mt.
Sajidunnisa Bibi MANU/UP/0021/1949 : AIR1949All499 , a case where a person
holding a power of attorney signed and verilisd the plaint not in his own name but in
the name of the plaintiff. That the de facts in regard to signature on the plaint can be
cured subsequently and even in appeal was the view taken in AIR 1945 Mad 369, ILR
40 All 147 : AIR 1918 All 275 and MANU/NA/0159/1940 : AIR 1941 Nag 159. In
MANU/TN/0293/1947 : AIR 1948 Mad 369 plaintiff had not signed the plaint. It was
held that the omission could be cured and should be corrected in the interests of
justice, that the omission to sign or verify a plaint is net such a defect as would affect
the merits of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court, that if the defect is not
discovered until the case conies up for hearing before the appellate Court, the
appellate Court may order an amendment to be made in that Court and that the
appellate Court ought not to dismiss the suit or interfere with the decree to the lower
Court merely because plaint had not been signed. Reliance was placed on the Privy
Council decision in ILR 17 Cal 580 and on ILR 22 All 55. The suit must be deemed to
have been duly instituted in spite of de facts in regard to the signature or verification
or presentation of the plaint. MANU/UP/0043/1924 : AIR1925All79 .
18. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed in ILR 17 Cal 580 that there was no
rule that a person named as co-plaintiff in the plaint was not to be treated as a
plaintiff unless he signed and verified the plaint. Order 6, rule 14, which requires that
every plaint should be signed by the plaintiff and his pleader, if any, has, in view of
the Privy Council decision to be interpreted so as to mean that a plaint should be
signed by at least one plaintiff. See a l s o Bibi Asghari v. Muhammad Kasim,
MANU/BH/0191/1950 : AIR1951Pat323 andILR 54 All 57 : MANU/UP/0379/1931 :
AIR 1931 All 507.
1 9 . The plaint in the instant case is signed by plaintiff No. 2. The signature of
plaintiff No. 2 on the plaint is therefore sufficient, plaintiff No. 2 also admittedly
happens to be the Managing Director of the plaintiff NO. 1 Company. The Managing

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Director of the Company admittedly has authority to file suits o n behalf of the
Company.
20. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to deckle the question whether
Ghushey was authorised by proper power of attorney to sign the plaint on behalf of
the Company (plaintiff-No. 1). Under Order 6, rule 14, Civil procedure Code, in
certain circumstances a person duly authorised by the plaintiff can sign the plaint.
Under Order 29, Rule 1, in the case of Corporations the plaint can be signed by the
Secretary or Director or other principal officer of the Corporation. In Calico Printers'
Association, Ltd. v. Karim and Brothers ILR 55 Bom 151 : MANU/MH/0108/1930 : AIR
1930 Bom 566 after considering the Privy Council decision in Delhi and London Bank
v. Oldham, 20 Ind App 139 (PC) it was held that either Order 29, rule 1, or Order 6,
rule 14, can be applied to companies. See also ILR 1937 Bom 85 :
MANU/MH/0152/1935 : AIR 1936 Bom 418. In the case of companies the plaint can
be signed by either a Secretary or a Director or other principal Officer under order
29, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, or any person duly authorised by the Company
under Order 6, rule 14. The words "duly authorized" in Order 6, rule 14, need not be
restricted to mean authorised by proper written authority Or by power of attorney.
There is authority for this view in Bengal Jute Mills v. Jewraj Heeralal
MANU/WB/0014/1942 : AIR1943Cal13 . In these cases it was held that a plaintiff can
orally authorize another person to sign a plaint for him. The Managing Director of the
plaintiff Company in the instant case, who has authority to tile suits on behalf of the
Company (vide Article 156 of the Company's Articles of Association), can orally
authorize another person to sign the plaint for him on behalf of the Company.
Plaintiff No. 2, who is the Managing Director of the Company (Plaintiff No. 1) has in
his deposition deposed that Ghushey signed the plaint under his instructions. "The
evidence of Ghushey is to the same effect.
21. In the matter of signature on the plaint, as already observed. Order 3, rule 1, and
Order 3 rule 2, have no application because signature on the plaint is not an act in or
to a Court. It is therefore not necessary to decide whether the power of attorney
dated 1-5-46 in favour of Ghushey was a valid one, whether it ceased to "he
operative after the AIR Limited became a public Limited Company in 1948, and
whether the power of attorney dated 13-4-51 in favour of Ghushey was invalid as it
did not bear the seal of the Company. In order to decide whether a person is duly
authorised by the plaintiff to sign a plaint for him under Order 6, rule 14, one has
ordinarily to consider the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code alone and the
general law. But in the case of a plaintiff who happens to be a Company, the
company cannot orally authorize another person. A company can act only under its
Articles of Association. If a power of "attorney is to be executed for a company, it
must satisfy the requirements of its Articles of Association. Article 153 (19) of the
Articles of Association Of plaintiff No. 1 in the instant case requires that a power of
attorney must be under the seal of the Company. In the instant case it is conceded by
the learned counsel for the Appellant that there is no evidence on record to show that
either the power of attorney dated 1-5-1948 or the power of attorney dated 13-4-
1951 bore the seal of the company. There was therefore no proper power of attorney
on behalf of the "Company in favour of Ghushey. However, as already observed, it is
not necessary that there should be a written authorization or a written power of
attorney. The Managing Director of the Company has under Articles 153 (16) and 156
of the Articles of Association full powers of general management of the business of
the company and he has also all the powers and authority vested in the Board of
Directors except those specified in Article 157. The Managing Director of the
Company can therefore orally authorize any person to act for him. As already

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observed, it is the evidence of both plaintiff No. 2 and of Ghushey that plaintiff No. 2
as Managing Director of the Company (plaintiff No. 1) had orally authorised Ghushey
to sign the plaint.
22. As regards the contention that when a private Limited Company is converted into
a public Limited Company, the power of attorney executed by the former would not
be valid after the conversion of the Company into a public Limited Company, this
question need not be decided because both the powers of attorney of 1946 and 1951
do not bear the seal of the Company. However, there is no doubt that when under
Section 154 of the Companies Act, a private Limited Company is converted into a
public Limited Company the Company's identity is not changed, but only its nature. A
private Limited Company can be converted into a public Limited Company by merely
changing two or three Articles of its Articles of Association, the original Articles of
Association continuing to be operative. A company can alter some of its Articles of
Association. Such an alteration does not affect the identity of the company.
23. AS regards signature of the plaint, authorization by plaintiff No. 2 as Managing
Director of the plaintiff No. 1 Company is quite sufficient, and it is the evidence of
both plaintiff No. 2 and Ghushey that the former had authorised the latter to sign the
plaint. Moreover, as already observed, this is a case of plaint with, two plaintiffs, and
admittedly, one of the plaintiff, plaintiff No. 2 has signed the plaint.
24. As regards presentation of the plaint, the trial Court held that the plaint had not
been properly presented as it was presented by Mr. Shidhaye, Advocate, under a
Vakalatnama which bore the signature of plaintiff No. 2 and the signature of Ghushey
who described himself as agent of plaintiff No. 1 and who held a power of attorney
from AIR Limited as it was before its conversion into a public Limited Company. I
have already expressed the view that there is nothing in Order 4, Rule 1 as to who
should present a plaint in the Court. There is authority in support of this view in ILR
54 All 57 : MANU/UP/0379/1931 : AIR 1931 All 507, a Full Bench decision, where it
is observed that there is no rule which in express terms requires that the plaintiff
should file the plaint personally, nor was there any rule which expressly said that it
should be filed by a person holding a power of attorney on behalf of the plaintiff or
otherwise duly authorised by the plaintiff. It was also observed that it is doubtful
whether Order 3 Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code would apply to such a case. In
MANU/UP/0021/1949 : AIR1949All499 , it was held that presentation of a plaint by a
person having no power of attorney is a mere irregularity. A plaint need not be
presented by the plaintiff personally or by a person duly authorised by him. In the
case of a suit where there are two or more plaintiffs, presentation of the plaint by one
of the plaintiffs, or, as in the instant case, by the pleader of one of the plaintiffs,
would undoubtedly be a proper presentation.
25. As regards the verification of the plaint, in the instant case it was verified by
Ghushey as agent of the AIR Limited (plaintiff No. 1). It was not verified by plaintiff
No. 2. Order 6, Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Code requires that the plaint should be
verified by the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs or by some other person proved to the
satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Order 6, rule 15,
does not refer to persons authorised by the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs. If the
plaint is not verified by a plaintiff or by any one of the plaintiffs, it can be verified
only by a person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the
facts of the case. It is true that there are several authorities in favour of the view that
Omission to verify a pleading is a mere irregularity and that a pleading which is not
verified as required by Order 6, rule 15, may be verified at any later stage of the suit,

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even after the expiry of the period of limitation. See MANU/UP/0043/1924 :
AIR1925All79 MANU/WB/0184/1927 : AIR1927Cal376 and MANU/UP/0282/1933 :
AIR1933All474 .
26. In the instant case the objections raised by the defendant to the plaint merely
related to the validity of the power of attorney in favour of Ghushey and consequent
irregularities in regard to the signing and verification of the plaint. The objection that
the plaint was not verified by a person acquainted with the facts of the case has not
been urged by the learned counsel for the defendant respondent before us. But this
point was considered by the lower Court which held that it cannot be said that on 18-
2-1949, the date of presentation of the plaint, Ghushey was acquainted with the facts
of the case. The lower Court therefore held that the verification was not proper. But
in the next paragraph of the judgment (paragraph 37) the lower Court took the view
that it was only on 24-1-51 that the plaint was properly signed and verified by
Ghushey under a power of attorney from plaintiff No. 1, as it came to be after the
conversion °f the company into a public Limited Company. But, as already observed,
in order to comply with the rules regarding verification contained in Order 6, rule 15,
it is not sufficient that the plaint is verified by someone authorised by the plaintiff. It
must be verified by the plaintiff, or one of the plaintiffs, or by some other person
proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case,
See also MANU/WB/0014/1942 : AIR1943Cal13 . Ghushey verified the plaint on 18-
2-49 and also on 24-4-51. In his deposition on 8-8-53 he swore that he had no
personal knowledge about the facts stated in the plaint or the nature of the dispute
between the parties. The plaint is therefore not verified by any of the plaintiffs or by
a person acquainted with the facts of the case. I would like to impress upon Courts
receiving pleadings and officers authorised to receive pleadings the necessity and
importance of seeing that the requirements of Order 6, rules 14 and 15 and or Order
7, Rule 1, are properly complied with. The defect or the absence of a proper
verification of the plaint is however one of procedure and is a mere irregularity. The
defendant did not object to it. In ILR 18 All 396, a case decided by three Judges, it
was held that on a mere question of defect of verification it is not necessary for an
appellate Court to pay any attention or take any steps to rectify a defect in the
verification of a plaint.
27. If de facts in regard to the signature, verification or presentation of the plaint are
cured on a day subsequent to the date of filing the suit, the date of institution of the
plaint is not changed to the subsequent date. 34 BLR 628 : MANU/MH/0207/1931 :
AIR 1932 Bom 367; MANU/WB/0184/1927 : AIR1927Cal376 ; MANU/UP/0043/1924 :
AIR1925All79 . When a plaint is re-signed or re-verified, it may or may not amount to
an amendment of the plaint. In MANU/UP/0043/1924 : AIR1925All79 it was held that
such a re-verification or re-signing would not amount to an amendment of the plaint.
Even when a plaint is amended, the amendment relates back to the date of the suit
except in some cases, e.g. where the amendment adds new parties or properties. See
34 Bom LR 628 : MANU/MH/0207/1931 : AIR 1932 Bom 367, Mohini Kumar v. Niaz
Mohammad : AIR1944Cal4 , Nellakumara v. Pappayi Ammal MANU/TN/0090/1944 :
AIR 1945 Mad 219, Weldon v. Neal, (1887) 19 QBD 394 and Janardan Kishore Lal v.
Sib Prasad Ram ILR 43 Cal 95 : AIR 1917 Cal 841.
2 8 . Holding that it was only on 24-4-51 that the plaint was properly signed and
verified, the trial Court held that the date of the filing of the suit must be taken to be
24-4-51. As already pointed out, the general consensus of authority of the Bombay
High Court and other High Courts is in favour of the view that de facts and
irregularities in the matter of signing, verifying or presenting plaints are mere

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irregularities of procedure which do not make the suit ineffective, inoperative, or
void. The existence of such de facts does not mean that the suit had not been filed.
Even when the plaint is amended after it is properly instituted, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original plaint unless the amendment adds new parties or new
properties. That is why leave to amend a plaint has ordinarily to be refused, except in
very exceptional cases, if the effect of the proposed amendment is to take away from
the defendant the legal right which accrued to him by lapse of time. See Charan Das
v. Amir Khan MANU/PR/0043/1920 : AIR 1921 PC 50 :47 Ind App 255. If the
amendment is allowed, it relates back to the date of the original plaint. If is not a
case of the amendment taking effect from the date of amendment and of condoning
the bar of limitation. If the amendment of the plaint is allowed, the question of
limitation cannot be reserved. It is not a case of allowing the amendment of the
plaint and reserving the question whether or not to condone the delay and the bar of
limitation. If the Court feels that the bar of limitation should not be avoided, it must
refuse the amendment of the plaint. After allowing the amendment the Court cannot
say that the amendment takes effect from the date of the amendment .Similarly,
when a defective plaint is rectified and re-signed and re-verified on a subsequent
date, the re-signing or the reverification of the plaint relates back to the original date.
See ILR 1937 Bom 85 : AIR 1938 Bom 418, MANU/WB/0184/1927 : AIR1927Cal376 ;
MANU/UP/0043/1924 : AIR1925All79 , and ILR 40 All 147 : AIR 1918 All 275.
29. Even in the MANU/MH/0056/1950 : AIR1950Bom130 it was held that if a plaint is
not properly signed or verified or presented the Court has always got the discretion
to allow the plaintiff to remedy the defect at a later stage even though the period of
limitation may have already expired and the defendant has vested in him by that time
a right to plead the bar of limitation, and that if that discretion is exercised by the
Court, the curing of the defect or the amendment of the plaint would he effective as
from the date of the institution of the suit itself, and it would not be open to the
defendant to plead the bar of limitation.
30. The date of institution of the suit or the date from which an amendment takes
effect does not depend on the discretion of the Court. Of course, the Court has a
discretion to allow or not to allow an amendment of the pleading or the re-signing or
re-verification of the plaint. Once the discretion is exercised, the amendment of the
plaint or the fresh signature or verification of the plaint relates back to the original
date of the suit. In other words, the original date of institution of the suit is not
affected by the amendments of the plaint or the fresh signature or verification of the
plaint. It is also open to a Court to say that it provisionally allows an amendment of
the plaint and that the question whether or not to allow the amendment of the plaint
or its resigning or re-verification would be finally decided later. In such a case it is
only the final order of the Court that has to be considered and not the provisional
order. But once the amendment of the plaint is allowed, the question of limitation
cannot be reserved.
31. In the instant case, the plaint is signed by one of the plaintiffs, which is quite
sufficient in view of the decision of their Lordships to the Privy Council in ILR 17 Cal
580. In regard to presentation Of the plaint, as already observed, the plaint need not
be presented by plaintiff or any person authorised by him. Presentation of the plaint
by the pleader of one of the plaintiffs is quite proper. As regards verification to the
plaint, unfortunately ,even today the plaint is not properly verified by one of the
plaintiffs or by any person acquainted with the facts of the case. But this however is a
matter of mere irregularity in regard to procedure and does not make the suit filed on
18-2-49 detective. The lower Court was therefore wrong in holding that the suit must

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be deemed to have been instituted only on 24-4-51 and that it was therefore barred
by limitation. I therefore agree with my learned Brother's view that the suit is within
time notwithstanding the irregularities in the plaint.
32. Appeal dismissed.

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