1.

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT Facts:

The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which
were originally known as Lot 773 .which was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes
under Original Certificate issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros.

Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora.

Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in
1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.

Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita . Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora
cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots
which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese
time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when
her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that
Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.  2

Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot
773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831
square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938
Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ).  Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella,
Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00.

After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia
R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.   By virtue of a
7

court order granting said motion,   on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
8

P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.

Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia
Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the
ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce
of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court
approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them,
and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees.  11

During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B
and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason

Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel,
filed a manifestation stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim,
monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the
above-entitled case."  Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the defendant Rosendo
15

Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros
Occidental, However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773.in the
return service, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A
and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez,
and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of
execution." 

Private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of
TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez.   Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo
18

Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 8

Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and
823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or
encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding   could not be
19

enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022
could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also
because it had long become final and executory.    20

In The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with
damages.   Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez,
24

Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs
return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the
Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be
made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00.
They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961
until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral
damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00.  25

In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B,
having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res
judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order.   On their part, the Alvarez
26

stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of
limitation and estoppel." 27

In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the
properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was
a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their
failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to
protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they
recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason
was without court approval.  28

The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31,
1983   affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly
30

and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar
as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages
and attorney's fees, respectively

Issues:

4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-
A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed
or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process .  33

Held:

The petition is devoid of merit.

There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence
presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in
question.   In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil
37

Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the
same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who
did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was
also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.

As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.   "It is one thing to protect
39

an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would
be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly
revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality
is precisely sought to be guarded against."  40

The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No.
5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext
that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court.
Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed
their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the
enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.

Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received
from the decedent.

As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady
vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.  41

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate
before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is
thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the
paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.

Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.

The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties
that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from
patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare
cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
its performance by a specific person and by no other.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary
estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate.  42

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of
their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are
other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in
favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

2. BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all

surnamed, GEVERO, vs .INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 

Facts:

The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 acquired by the late Luis Lancero .Deed of
Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel
from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was
duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the
mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and her
children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero,
1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.

The heirs of Teodorica Babangha executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate
of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-
judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, was adjudicated
to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966.

Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI of Misamis Oriental to quiet title
and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices
the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
Trial Coury held that plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No.
2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
80450, containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878)
square meters, more or less.

No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the
said lot is the subject of a civil case between the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand
and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which
case is now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to
costs,

From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now
Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Issues:

1) whether or not the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid;

2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the
litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of sale; and

3) whether or not the private respondents' action is barred by laches.

Held:

As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was
forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact it will be observed that the deed of sale in question
was executed with all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly
acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the
legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized document . In fact it has long been settled that a
public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of
the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to
contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant Forgery
cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise,
petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under Art. 1354
of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.

Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under
OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos'
proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters
listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from
Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed
(Rollo, pp. 67-68).

The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of
the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and
there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until
the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were
transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966,
the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his
mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited
from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to the
different provisions thereof to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, its entirety must
be taken into account .The interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one
paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless
and set at naught the entire provisions thereof.

Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners have
remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at .An instrument
notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument .The execution of a public
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its
execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property Besides, the property sold is a
registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. If the
property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title
and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws.

Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with registered land may
generally rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go
behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property .This notwithstanding, DELCOR did
more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had
first investigated and checked the title in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the
Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo
Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to the premises and
found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR
had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question.Consequently, DELCOR's action
is not barred by laches.

3. RIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE

L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

Facts:

The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed
Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and
Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows:

(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his
daughter, Magdalena Locsin;

(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian,
Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in
Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which
Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the
marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona
Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their
union,  which however was not blessed with children.
1

Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those
that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in
the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.''  2

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and
universal heir of all his properties.  The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal
adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless,
they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their
respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" and those
of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4

Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his
will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both
sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doña Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her
lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's
estate   which she submitted to the probate court for approval,   Catalina declared that "all items
5 6

mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital
at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal."  7

Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and
the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio
was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of
them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who
prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece
Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena
Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.

Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years
after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also
advancing in years, Doña Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don
Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the
following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his
Locsin nephews and nieces:

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the
transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After
the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for
probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them
by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or
estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces
who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins
during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and
intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did
not join the action.After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs
(Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants,

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now
appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.

Issue:

whether the ½ share of interest of Theodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots , lot 2476 ubder )
CT no 7610 is included in the deed of sale?

The petition has merit and should be granted.

Held:

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and
nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already
disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her
hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of
(the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession."   The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death,
10

and do not vest in his heirs until such time.  Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or
11

conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her
death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in
her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one
and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the
reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since
neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the
properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents
are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no
legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All
that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of
even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it
were breached, the respondents may not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the
support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the
donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)

The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old when she died
on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed
upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the
petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate.
The records do not support that conjecture.

For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina had already begun
transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano.
She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II.   On 13
April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another
Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin.  The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m.
14

portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020   was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente
16

Jaucian and Agapito Lorete.  At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is
17

estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to
himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded
with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.

Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which
she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally incompetent
when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the
fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously
disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian,
on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years
later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19

From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other
persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes
Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio.   None of those transactions was
20

impugned by the private respondents.

In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's
niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II,   but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda.   If she was competent to make that
21 22

conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer
her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a
"consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties
which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her
inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano)
and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items
34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have known better than
anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that
none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the
probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared
with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not
have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his
own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died,
he and his wife (Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should
eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a
full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also
prejudice his own interest.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's nephews and
nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and
companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their
respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and
undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have
been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doña Catalina
acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact,
considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the
petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or
donate her properties to them. Doña Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother,
Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the
custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the
petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The
(1) deed of donation dated November 19,
1974  in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975   in favor of
23 24

Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975   in favor of Salvador Lorayes,
25

were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and
Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria Olbes.  The sales which she made in
26

favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974   were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian.
27
Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary
acts on her part.

4.NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN, Respondents.

The Facts

The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of

Appeals are:

In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo

[herein private respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven
alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed
in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate,
consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment
of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply
with her obligations under the contract. [Private respondents]
therefore prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her
contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorneys fee
and litigation expenses.

petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of

plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she
put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property
subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio
Carpena (petitioners father), in respect of which a petition for
probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian,
Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were
aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract
to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the
nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the
downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter
refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to
provide funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment
of his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to
rescind the contract.

It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed

a Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained that the
contract to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probate
court. She further argued that the contract was subject to a
suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will of
defendants father Demetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by
[private respondents]. It appears further that in an Order dated
December 15, 1992 the court a quo granted the demurrer to
evidence and dismissed the complaint. It justified its action in
dismissing the complaint in the following manner:

As held by the Supreme Court, a decedents representative

(administrator) is not estopped from questioning the validity of his
own void deed purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil,
755). In the case at bar, the [petitioner,] realizing the illegality of
the transaction[,] has interposed the nullity of the contract as her
defense, there being no approval from the probate Court, and, in
good faith offers to return the money she received from the [private
respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not estop[ped] from
doing so and the action to declare the inexistence of contracts do not
prescribe. This is what precipitated the filing of [petitioners]
demurrer to evidence.6cräläwvirtualibräry

CA

Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the

testate proceedings on Demetrio Carpenas estate, the appellate
court set aside the trial courts dismissal of the complaint and
correctly ruled as follows:

The Issue

Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989

executed by the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without
the requisite probate court approval is valid.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Contract to Sell Valid

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of

the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into
the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix
or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented
herself as the lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of
land.12 She also explained the reason for the sale to be difficulties in
her living conditions and consequent need of cash. 13 These
representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of
the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell.
Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application
to the instant case.

We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs

from the moment of the decedents death.14 Petitioner, therefore,
became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father
died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the
Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to
sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late
father.15 Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols,16 the Court resolved an
identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of

hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without
interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case
the inheritance be accepted. And Manresa with reason states that
upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion
which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being
thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains
undivided. And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part
owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and
the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs,
without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their
deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice
Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect
thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the
vendors upon the partition of the estate.

Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to sell is

contingent on the complete clearance of the court on the Last Will
Testament of her father.19 Consequently, although the Contract to
Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents
during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation
of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the
private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase
price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings.
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners apprehension that the
Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution
of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale
made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the
pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.

Estoppel

Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her

representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as
initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on
her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private
respondents who have relied on them.21 Jurisprudence teaches us
that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an
unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the
required formalities and with full awareness of its
consequences.22cräläwvirtualibräry

5. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS

1 

Facts:

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of
511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidntal, contained the following provisions:

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, , against the above-mentioned
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that
the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters
Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the
near descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of
sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
 3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in
case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot
No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the
name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the
Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer,
accordingly.

, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely
filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there
maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they
are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the
filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as
creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to
establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim
under the Codicil.

the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and
ordering thus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs
of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja
Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to
plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No.
1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court
deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge
Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate
proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and
distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by
the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392
until she dies.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with
its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

Issue:

contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the
testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New
Civil Code.

Held:

The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a
legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court
of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
10 

The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of
11 

the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of
further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death
of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by
virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year.
Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over
the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds
to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now
being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent
has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable
because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by
the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the
piculs of sugar to private respondent.

Again, the contention is without merit.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
12 

transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil

13 

sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
14 

Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that,
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in
15 

fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed
by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right
16 

to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863,
the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one
degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first
heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near
17 

descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the
testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that
such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or
his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he
or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most
analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation
18 

upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the
19 

other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
20 

condition.21

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that
the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during
the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and
the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It
is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to
the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon
the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such
was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and
not conditional.22

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a
right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right
to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application
of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking
into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain
23 

and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. 24

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100)
piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event
that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said
obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of
non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said
obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement
between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the
petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which
25 

a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be
strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby
defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED 

6. EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALSYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business
concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. they decided to dissolve their partnership and
executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them,
consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the partnership. 1 

Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in
1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the
partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his
promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the
partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand
for payment thereof.2

Tabanao' s heirs, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of
assets and damages.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper
venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of
Tabanao to sue.5 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid
because, while realties were involved, the action was directed against a particular person on the
basis of his personal liability; hence, the action is not only a personal action but also an action in
personam.

 As regards petitioner's argument of lack of jurisdiction over the action because the prescribed
docket fee was not paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim, the trial court noted that
a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership may be
ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be paid.

Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had aright to sue in their own names, in view of
the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. 6

The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint, 7 incorporating the additional prayer that
petitioner be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's) assets and thereafter
pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs" their corresponding share in the proceeds thereof.

In due time, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to dismiss, 8 arguing that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay the proper docket fees. Further,
in a supplement to his motion to dismiss,9 petitioner also raised prescription as an additional ground
warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.

the trial court issued an Order,10 denying the motion to dismiss inasmuch as the grounds raised
therein were basically the same as the earlier motion to dismiss which has been denied. Anent the
issue of prescription, the trial court ruled that prescription begins to run only upon the dissolution of
the partnership when the final accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set in the absence of
a final accounting. Moreover, an action based on a written contract prescribes in ten years from the
time the right of action accrues.

Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, 12 dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon a
finding that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed
by the trial court in issuing the questioned orders denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.

Issue:

Whether or not that respondents’ can recover the decedents’ 1/3 share in the partnerships’ assets ,
what they are actually asking is for the trial court to compel petitioner to pay and turn over their
share, or the equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets. They
also assert that until and unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the partnership' s
assets, as well as their corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained.

Held:

Applied to the instant case, respondents have a specific claim - 1/3 of the value of all the partnership
assets - but they did not allege a specific amount. They did, however, estimate the partnership's total
assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00), in a letter 21 addressed to petitioner.
Respondents cannot now say that they are unable to make an estimate, for the said letter and the
admissions therein form part of the records of this case. They cannot avoid paying the initial docket
fees by conveniently omitting the said amount in their amended complaint. This estimate can be
made the basis for the initial docket fees that respondents should pay. Even if it were later
established that the amount proved was less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule
141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the court may refund the 'excess or
exact additional fees should the initial payment be insufficient. It is clear that it is only the difference
between the amount finally awarded and the fees paid upon filing of this complaint that is subject to
adjustment and which may be subjected to alien.
In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, 22 this Court held
that when the specific claim "has been left for the determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment and it shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee." Clearly,
the rules and jurisprudence contemplate the initial payment of filing and docket fees based on the
estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is only when there is a deficiency that a lien may be
constituted on the judgment award until such additional fee is collected.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint outright despite their
failure to pay the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other procedural rules, it may be liberally
construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of an action. While the rule
is that the payment of the docket fee in the proper amount should be adhered to, there are certain
exceptions which must be strictly construed.23

the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated
amount that respondents seek to collect from petitioner, and direct them to pay the same within a
reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired,
Failure to comply therewith, and upon motion by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the complaint
shall issue on jurisdictional grounds.

On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal
capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
Petitioner's objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be
appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her
children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner
were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a
mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value
of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their
respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors
who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action
originally pertaining to the decedent. 35 From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to
demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were
transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's
intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City.

7. BELINDA TAÑEDO, vs THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAÑEDO AND

TERESITA BARERA TAÑEDO, respondents.

The Facts

Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo
Tañedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, he conveyed to the latter
in consideration of P1,500.00, "one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the
cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac", the said property being his "future inheritance" from his parents

Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" dated February 28,
1980 (Exh. 3) to "re-affirm, respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962." Lazaro
executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his "undivided ONE
TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191. He acknowledged his receipt of P10,000.00
as consideration therefor.

Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein, through a
deed of sale dated On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in their
favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 166451 (Exh. 5).

Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale
executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from
his father.Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated
December 29, 1980 (Exit. E). Conveying to his ten children his allotted portion tinder the extrajudicial
partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the land in litigation (Lot 191).

Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale"

dated March 12, 1981 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the reason
that it was "simulated or fictitious without any consideration whatsoever".

The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to adduce a
preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and
that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.

The Issues

From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:

1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?

2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the Registry of
Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same buyers valid?

3. May this Court review the findings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the buyers
acted in good faith in registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b) in "failing to
consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the conclusions of the respondent Court "illogical and
off-tangent"?

The Court's Ruling

The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the assailed
Decision conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance
is null and void." But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347
of the Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law."

Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation between the parties.Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28,
1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the
respondent Court, "suffers from the same infirmity." Even private respondents in their
memorandum concede this.
4 

However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are:

(a) the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided
inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered on June 7,
1982; and

(b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property.
These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of
extra-judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over
said property.

In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with the infirmities of
the 1962 sale.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales,
as follows:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who
in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall
belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the
deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership
would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand,
petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.

Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never
took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor
has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual
possession of the immovable property. 5

As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless contended
that it was done in bad faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled;

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No Costs.

8. SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS vs SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA

LUMBAO, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and
surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The other
petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.

Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the
107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.

During her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of
her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19
September 1978.

On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate
through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 4 Respondents
Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an
additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a document also
denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981. 5

After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof
and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the
present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made
several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for
them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of
respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses
Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not
deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs
from Maria had not yet been partitioned.

On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy
with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, 6 adjudicating and partitioning among
themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already
sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No. 81729 7 of the Registry of Deeds
of Pasig City.

On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter 8 to
petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey
the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint
for Reconveyance with Damages9 before the RTC of Pasig City.

During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales
as their witnesses, while the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner Virgilio.

The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the appellate court rendered a Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED

ISSUES:

II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus, they
can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance with damages.

III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein
respondents spouses Lumbao.

HELD

As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981 are null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the said documents and that the
identities of the properties in those documents in relation to the subject property has not been
established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the
enforceability of those documents is barred by prescription of action and laches.

It is the petitioners’ incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981 were falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo
were present in the executions thereof, and their allegation that even respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales proved that said petitioners were not present during the
execution of the aforementioned documents. This is specious.

Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated
17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in
petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the
execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 19 However, in order to avoid their
obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having
knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his
appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner
Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in
support thereof, his testimony in the cross-examination propounded by the counsel of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao is quoted hereunder:

As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are
binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of
fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. 21 And in spite of the presence of
judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other
evidence presented.22 However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its
Decision, "[herein petitioners] had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made
in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17
August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x x." 23 Virgilio’s
answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in
a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.

On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the
findings made by the appellate court. Thus -

[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-examination if the
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must
be pointed out that earlier in the direct examination of said witness, she confirmed that [respondents
spouses Lumbao] actually bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said witness positively
identified and confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents spouse
Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with
them during the transaction does not automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not
at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their mother’s voluntary act of selling
a portion of her share in her deceased mother’s property. The rule is that testimony of a witness
must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated
passages therein.24

Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were
duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a
notary public is a public document25 that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and
due execution.26 To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and
convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. 27 In addition, one who denies
the due execution of a deed where one’s signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary
to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to
be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners’ denials without clear and convincing
evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-
mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in
the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.

The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not established by
respondents Spouses Lumbao’s evidence is likewise not acceptable.

It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-
heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in the
"Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the exact metes and bounds
of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at
that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents
Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even
while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots
or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. 28 The co-owner, however,
has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because
such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In
any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render
the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner.
Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-
ownership.29

In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to
respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in
representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-
square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the
petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during
the lifetime of their mother.

Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents was described
as "a portion of a parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674," while the subject
matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the property described in Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no
moment because in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that
there was only one estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted by the
petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property
mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in
Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.

The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. It is, indeed, true that the
right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive
prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription
cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be
used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another. 30

In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not
prescribe because the latter have been and are still in actual possession and occupation as owners
of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact has not been refuted nor denied by the
petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because
from the very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from the mother of the petitioners, they
have constantly asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their names but Rita, during her
lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy excuse that the lot
had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire estate of Maria, petitioners
still included the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance which they divided among themselves
despite their knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother and the respondents Spouses
Lumbao.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents
Spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance. The failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have
the said documents registered does not affect its validity and enforceability. It must be remembered
that registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect
of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is merely to
notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property had been
entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the
time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the
effect of registration as to him.31 Hence, the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and
9 January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply with their
provisions. In short, such documents are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.

Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest applies in the present case. Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from
the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were
transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. 33 Thus, the heirs
cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest
because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed
to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as
against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a
property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party
has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. 34

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the
provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they
must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they bought
from Rita, petitioners’ mother. And as correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must pay
respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for having been compelled to
litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest. 35 On this matter, we do not find reasons to
reverse the said findings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.

9.ATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR.
31, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) against the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and
private respondent Segunda Almeida.

On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several
portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced
by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. 1 By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757. 2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in
this case.

The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of
private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and
left heirs.

Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. 3

On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a
Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving
daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita
Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960,
allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;

Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang

naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim
ng panunumpa ay malaya at kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga
sumusunod:

1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon
ng San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG
(771) METRONG PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote
17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure Administration;

2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure

Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT
TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario
Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento
No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;

3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at
pinagsisilbihan nang aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na
nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure
Administration;

4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking

buhay, ang lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na
FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya,
kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro
Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;

5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios

ng aking buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng
aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa unahan.

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba

nito at sa kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng
Octubre, 1960.4

The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-
hand side of both pages of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita
Herrera placed her thumbmark5 above her name in the second page and at the left-hand margin of
the first page of the document.

The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-
Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now,
Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263. 6

On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-
Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and void. 7

During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed
an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.

In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca
Herrera, holding that:

From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the
following facts: the lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late
Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land Tenure Administration; protestant is
the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was the sister of the protestee;
protestee and Beatriz are children of the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee
from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to
Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant;
 protestant occupied the lots in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a
resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the lots in question;
protestee left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan
Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in question; he
has been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960,
Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or
transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor of the
protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966 with the
defunct Land Tenure Administration.

This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question. 9

Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. 10 The NHA Resolution was
affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987. 11

On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her
estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. 12 The
NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued
in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to
leave the premises that she was occupying.

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA,
private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of
the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government
Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.

In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed
properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been
adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca
Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of the Office of the
President was already final and executory.14 They also contended that the transfer of purchase of the
subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and that Francisca
Herrera paid for the property with the use of her own money. 15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes thereon. 16

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the
Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to
real property within its jurisdiction." 18 The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the
merits.

A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.

On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the
NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca
Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The
Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but
a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must
first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.

Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration
which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied admission by the appellate court in
a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA and
for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.

On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:

There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita
Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
on October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a
waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera.
This Court is disposed to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of
Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after
her death. Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita
 Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over
the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for submission to the defendant
NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did
not. Hence it is apparent that she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and
not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution would want to make it appear.
The intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the
former's demise executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she
is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was questioned in court by the
surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca
Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights. 19

The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of
Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon death.
The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.

Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.

Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR
NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM
FURTHER DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS
FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON

THE SUBJECT LOTS; AND

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS

ARBITRARY.

We rule for the respondents.

Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy
of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule
which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as
well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards
acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . . It has
been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the
property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a
certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence
were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions
rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope
thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of
bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.

In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule
prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express
statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.

In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial
power—that which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication
of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order." 22 This function applies to the
actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. 23 However,
administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of
powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branches—the legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere.
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its
agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of
societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check
whether the other branches of government committed an act that falls under the category of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 25

Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 26 where
it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of
the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution…"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards
made by the NHA.

Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that
the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on
August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989). 28 We find no reason to disturb
this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system of judicial review
should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. 29 The
appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by
reason of policy.30

Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when it
considered the application for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter
Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the subject lot; that it considered the respective
application and inquired whether she had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a
possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private respondent possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not done
arbitrarily.

The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not
bind the NHA.31 That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were
indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then
applying to purchase the same before it."32

We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have
noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the
instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such
period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her
estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides
that:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.33

By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has
already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. 34 The NHA issued its
resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca
Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights
and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same
should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go
to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in
accordance with a will or by operation of law.

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera
had an existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this
Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both
parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. 37 Margarita Herrera's obligation
to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.

If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the
NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property
already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession
and the law on sales and obligations.38

When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the
next "person"39 likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The
opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard
as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the
Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void 40 should have alerted the
NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the
property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in
the award of the lots.

We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We
affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of
testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall
transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-5803            November 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants.
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, defendants-appellants.

Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag, Manuel Concordia, P.M. Stuart Del Rosario,
Tomas R. Umali, Eufemio E. De Mesa and Edmundo T. Zepeda for appellants.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and sentencing each of them to
"life imprisonment, other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial Punsalan
in the amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of
P700; Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of
Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio Untalan in the amount of P6,000;
Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion
Aselo in the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of
P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of the principal penalty that is
imposed upon them."

The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed during
the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November
14, 1951, by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the burning down
and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at
P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death
of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the
wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the burning of the
houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and
that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers
stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in
Tiaong not only shortly before that raid but one year or two years before it. Narciso Umali and
Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general
elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the
elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the
latter's election as Congressman. However, these friendly relations between the two did not endure.
In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the political
head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast
growing popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political
guidance, leadership, and favors. In time the strain in their relations became such that they ceased
to have any dealings with each other and they even filed mutual accusations. According to
Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee
to the mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this is in order to discredit Punzalan's
administration; that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen and tried to
persuade them to return to the town and to the service, but they told him that they and their
companions would not surrender except and with through the intervention of Congressman Umali,
and so Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the surrender of the 26 men with
their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all belonged to
him from his guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned
them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep peace and order; and that the refusal of
Punzalan to grant Umali's request further strained their relations, and thereafter Umali would not
speak to him even when they happened to meet at parties.

On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umali's men, including his
bodyguard Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali
interceded for his men and Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram stating that the
firearms taken away from the men were licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This
incident was naturally resented by Umali and spurred him to have a showdown with Punzalan.

Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose
him, and to clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence
in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.

The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions — Punzalan and Pasumbal, was
intense and bitter, even ruthless. The election was to be a test of political strength and would
determine who was who in Tiaong, — Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political meetings, extolling
the virtues of Pasumbal and the benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if he was
elected, at the same time bitterly attacking Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in
office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those meetings he told the audience not to vote for Punzalan
because he would not be elected and that even if he won the election, he would not sit for blood will
flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan). After denying the
charges, in retort, Punzalan would say that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he did
not even attend the sessions and that his chair in Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.

To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star
witness for the prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had some
experience in political campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model citizen, being
sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political
meetings he delivered speeches for Pasumbal. He was ever at the back and call of Umali and
Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the latter's houses or headquarters. The result of the
elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat
Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly
disappointed, and according to the evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's
victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election speeches about blood flowing
and gold coffin.

Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short narration of
the happenings shortly before it, established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of
the reason or purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those who took part in it. According to
the testimony of Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the
election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard
Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be
killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the mountains which were
quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and
Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his
death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.

The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and
testified to by Nazario Anonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later took an
active part in the raid. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report to Umali
about his conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the
proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack, that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong)
under Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to lead the sector towards the East; but that
Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal may yet win the
election the following day, thereby rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan.

Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali
he went to the house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the day following the election,
with the result of the election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan over
Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with
Pasumbal at the wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once there he
(Mendoza) was left at the school premises with instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng
and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his
troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived and after explaining his
identity and his mission to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the direction
of Punzalan's house and on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he pointed out Punzalan's
house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal.
Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his
yard. While doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just
across the street from their house, belonging to the father of Umali, and among those men they saw
Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20
armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way
of the railroad tracks.

It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure, part of
the attacking force was deployed toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the
suburbs and the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army unit but to keep it
from going to the rescue and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party went
toward Punzalan's house and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with
bottles filled with gasoline (popularly known as Molotov's cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of
the attack on Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately, however, and apparently unknown to the
attackers and those who designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of November 14th Punzalan
and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the
election to the Governor.

The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including
policemen who happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the
house saw Epifanio Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali) and Moises Escueta
enter the gate of Punzalan's house and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was
stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as
one of those firing at the house. Lacorte said that he was guarding the house of Punzalan when he
suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house and going over to the place to investigate,
he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he was hit on
the left check and later Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right
forearm and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman
who was sitting inside a jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized defendant
Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in the yard said ina loud voice as though addressing
somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs. Punzalan who was then inside the house related to
the court that at about eight in the evening while she was resting she heard shots and rapid firing. As
a precaution she took her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed that her house was being fired
at because the glass window panes were being shattered and she heard the explosion of a hand
grenade inside the house, followed by flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito nets in
the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke of gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and
the children ran out of the house and went to hide in the house of a neighbor.

Nazario Añonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk
Commander Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and
mustered in the ranks of the Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951, he saw
Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November
14th by order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they
crossed the Osiw River already near Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when
they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by Commander Tommy to attack
the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to the town proper; that he took part
in firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and that
because of his wound he could not escape with his companions to the mountains when the Army
soldiers dispersed and drove them out of the town and so he was finally captured by said soldiers.

As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly
established not only by the going of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following
instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong and kill
Punzalan, but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November
14th met the Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later
Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons
and hand grenades.

What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the
testimony of Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng
and ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less circumstantial,
but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the
house of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his important position
as Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he
would seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and he could well stay in the
background. However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the
lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk
Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for developments. Then he and his companions
left in the direction of Taguan.
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in
Taguan, about seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There
is ample evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only around midnight.
An Army soldier named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier in
the evening and who was invited to take some refreshments said that he did not see the two men
until they arrived about midnight when the Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way
to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that does not speak in favor of Umali, or
Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is the rather strange and unexplained, at least not
satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th. Assuming for a
moment as they claim, that the two were not in Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between
8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that they were all that time in the
home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they were informed by persons
coming or fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses were
burning. As a matter of fact, considering the promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about
seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the fire and the glow produced by the
burning of three houses and the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the
explosion of the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and heard
from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been
to rush to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give succor to the
stricken residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the fathers
of Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet,
instead of following a natural impulse and urge to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction
towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely avoided the same and
preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and
spattered and very tired. Had they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the
police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or better still, when the army
reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that
evening was returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong
that there was fighting in the town, he immediately returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to
relieve his town, was passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali and Pasumbal could have joined
said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to the capital
(Lucena) where before dawn, they went and contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of
Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two officials accompany them to the Army
camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the sending of aid or reinforcement to
Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials, specially the Army Commander that they
(Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever with the raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid
and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be suspected of having had some connection with the
raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali himself, while still in
Taguan that evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col.
Legaspi of the Army was looking for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was
wanted of him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the
next day he took the train for Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the two men, particularly
Umali, all contrary to impulse and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily have
done under the circumstances, prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The
guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as
well reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court, to wit:

. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as
true, for the sake of argument, that the said accused were really at the party of Pasumbal on
the night in question, that would not prevent them from being in Tiaong between 8 and 9.
Besides, why was it that night the hasag lamp was replaced with candles when the
reinforcements passed through Taguan about midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did
Congressman Umali and company instead of going to Tiaong which was the scene of the
attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the house
of Felix Ona walking through a muddy path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid
to pass through the provincial road and preferred a muddy road instead? Was he trying to
conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal and company also go to the house of Ona? Why did
they go to the house of Felix Ona instead of going to the house of Manalo who could have
given them better protection? And again why did Congressman Umali and the other co-
accused repaired and sought the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early hour to
the Army authorities, did they fear any reprisal? From whom? Why did Umali go to Manila
from Lucena on November 16, 1951? "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the
innocent stands bold as a lion."

At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former
should seek the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It
would seem rather strange and anomalous that a member of Congress should have friendly
relations with this dissidents whom the Government had been fighting all these years. But if we study
the evidence, it will be found that the reason and the explanation are there. As already stated, during
the Japanese occupation, to further the resistance movement, guerillas were organized in different
parts of the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known as President Quezon's Own
Guerillas (PQOG) operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna. Umali,
Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali
attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and Punzalan that of Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then
being known as "Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, and became a Huk
Commander. It was not unnatural that Umali and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and
association with Commander Abeng and seek his aid when convenient and necessary. Umali
admitted that he knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano Ramos, one of the witnesses of the
prosecution told the court that way back in May 1950, in a barrio of San Pablo City he saw Umali
confer with Commander Kasilag, which Commander after the conference told his soldiers including
Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks to raid Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan. Of
course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded as hearsay, but the fact is that Umali
conferred with a Huk commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact that on November 18 of
the same year Punzalan wrote to President Quirino denouncing the congressman Umali for
fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign among them in preparation for the elections
the following year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of Tiaong stands at the foothills
of Mt. Banahaw where the dissidents under Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others
had their hideout, so that it was not difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal to
communicate and even associate with dissidents in that region.

After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are constrained to agree with the trial
court that the three appellants are guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great measure,
hinges on the credibility of witnesses. The learned trial court which had the opportunity of observing
the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their testimony,
decided the Government witnesses, including Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable.
And we find nothing in the record to warrant correction or reversal of the stand and finding of the trial
court on the matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated retraction of Amado Mendoza made
on October 31, 1952, about a year and 9 months after he testified in court. Considering the
circumstances surrounding the making of this affidavit or retraction, the late date at which it was
made, the reasons given by him for making it and the fact that when he testified in court under the
observation and scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was the star witness for the
prosecution and his testimony naturally extremely important, and the trial court after the opportunity
given to it of observing his demeanor while on the witness stand had regarded him as a witness,
sincere, and his testimony truthful, and considering further the case with which affidavits of retraction
of this nature are obtained, we confess that we are not impressed with such retraction of Mendoza.

The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense of offenses committed. Appellants were
charged with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder,
arson and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc? While the
Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of
his stand "asks for leave to incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umali's
petition for bail, counsel for appellants considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-
existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime committed "is of no moment to
herein appellants because they had absolutely no part in it whatsoever". For that present, and with
respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and controversial
question, its consideration and determination to another case or occasion more opportune, when it is
more directly and squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity to discuss and argue the
question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is
no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not
have been legally charged with, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information
should therefore, be regarded as having charged more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106,
section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed
no objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several,
separate crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule that the appellants may properly be
convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel particularly
supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison
sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the
Court below, which is life imprisonment.

We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime committed
here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in
rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of
doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not
even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by
means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the
person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article
139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with
which appellants were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it
was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his
house. The robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents,
as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from
the shooting and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to
replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only those who
actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With respect to the
crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand
grenade causing him injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated
murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere
physical injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson,
frustrated murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation
because the premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing of three others
intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be qualified by
treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless, with the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be punished with
the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the penalty should be life
imprisonment.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the appellants in their brief.

In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision
correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is
sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and
for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the
house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even
and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the
pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall
not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find
it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and
physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia
and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs.