Assignment 2 (January 21, 2023)

A.   Judicial Notice

A.1. When Mandatory (Rule 129, Sec. 1)

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the National Government of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (1a)

1.     BSP v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 205966, March 2, 2016

BSP v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 205966, March 2, 2016 

 
DOCTRINE:
The attachment of a public record to the complaint, is considered as on file with the court, thus, the court
can now take judicial notice of such.
 
FACTS:
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and damages (with
application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction) against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., respondent
Feliciano P. Legaspi, et al.
The RTC issued an Order mandating the issuance of preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants Engr.
Ramon C. Angelo, Jr. and Legaspi, and persons acting for and in their behalf, from pursuing the
construction, development and/or operation of a dumpsite or landfill in the property subject of the
complaint.
Legaspi filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging, among other grounds, that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner BSP because the counsel representing petitioner BSP is not
authorized; and that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because the
complaint is prima facie void.
The RTC ruled in favor of BSP.
Legaspi filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
Legaspi argued that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action because the complaint, a real
action, failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property. 
Petitioner BSP claimed that since the subject property contains an area of 4,838,736 square meters, it is
unthinkable that said property would have an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 which is within the
jurisdiction of the MTCs. Petitioner BSP further stated that a tax declaration showing the assessed value
of P28,538,900.00 and latest zonal value of P145,162,080.00 was attached to the complaint.
Legaspi elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
CA, in its assailed Decision, granted respondent Legaspi’s petition.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to, or possession of real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). 
Incidentally, the complaint, on its face, is devoid of any amount that would confer jurisdiction over
the RTC.
The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property, however, is not fatal
because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration of the property in question showing that it has
an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of,
and should be considered together with the complaint. 
In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa and Partners Co., Ltd., this Court ruled that in
determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also consider the attachments to the
complaint, thus:
We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it
appears clearly from the complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The
converse is also true. The complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the
complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 
Hence, being an annex to BSP’s complaint, the tax declaration showing the assessed value of the property
is deemed a part of the complaint and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC
has exclusive original jurisdiction.
In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in taking judicial notice of the assessed
value of the subject property. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same
case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records
on file in the same court. Since a copy of the tax declaration, which is a public record, was attached to the
complaint, the same document is already considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can now take
judicial notice of such.
 
Di ko matanggal ang highlight., kindly edit. thanks

2.     CLT Realty Development Corp. v. Hi-grade Feeds Corp., G.R. No. 160684, Sept. 2, 2015

DOCTRINE:
Sec. 1 of Rule 129 
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative (in
this case a Senate Committee Report), executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be
taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties.
The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to
accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial
scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them
FACTS:
This is a case of a land dispute (overlapping of properties) between CLT and Hi-Grade, the dispute
prompted CLT (plaintiff) to file a case for Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of
Possession, and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City against Hi-Grade
(defendant).
Version of Hi-Grade: That it is the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 237450 and T-
146941, the said lots were previously registered to the following:
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio     TCT No. 4211         09 September 1918
Francisco Gonzales                            TCT No. 5261
Rufina Narciso vda de Gonzales            TCT No. 35486
Children of Rufina & Francisco            TCT Nos. 1368-1374
Philippine Government                       TCT Nos. 12836-
12842  
(Subdivided to lots to 77 parcels of lots)
Benito Villanueva                              TCT Nos. 23027 to 23028
                                                      (further subdivided into Lot-A and Lot 17-B)
Jose Madulid Sr. (Lot 17-B)                 TCT No. C-32979 and TCT No. 7364
VERSION OF CLT
CLT is the registered owner of TCT No. T-177013, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage dated 10 December 1988, executed by the former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito.

CLT argued that Hi-Grade's title is null and void for being fake and spurious based on the following:

1. As shown in the face of TCT No. 4211, it purports to have been derived from OCT No.
994;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. The original copy of OCT No. 994, which is existing and in due form, on file with the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City, contains dilapidated pages and no longer contains the pages where Lot
No. 26 and some other lots are supposedly inscribed.
3. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT No. 994, it can be seen that the technical
descriptions of the lots and the certificate itself are entirely written in the English language. On
the other hand, the technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No.
35486 are still inscribed in the Spanish language.
4. The dates of the original survey of OCT No. 994, the mother title of TCT No. 4211, i.e., 8-27
September, 4-21 October and 17-18 November 1911, are not indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No.
5261, and No. 35486. Rather, an entirely different date, 22 December 1917, is indicated at the end
of the Spanish technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486.
 5. The parcel of land covered successively by TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 is not
identified by a lot number and there is no reference or mention of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo
Estate in the technical description of said titles.
6. There is no subdivision survey plan number indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No.
35486 covering the subdivision of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.
7. The plan Psd-21154 which subdivided the lot covered by TCT No. 35486 (formerly covered by
TCT No. 4211, then TCT No. 5261), could not be traced at the official depository of plans, which
is the Lands Management Bureau (LMB). According to the EDPS Listings of the Records
Management Division of the LMB, there is no record of Plan Psd-21154. Said EDPS listings
indicate those records which were surveyed after the Second World War. It appears, from TCTs
No. 1368 to No. 1374, plan PSD-21154 was done after the war on 15, 21, 29 September and 5-6
October 1946.
8. The technical descriptions inscribed on TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 show that the tie points
deviated from the mother lot's tie point, which is the Bureau of Lands Location Monument
("BLLM") No. 1, Caloocan. Instead, different location monuments of the adjoining Piedad Estate
were used. The tie point used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M. 10, Piedad Estate; while TCTs No. 1369
and No. 1470 used B.M. No. 8, Piedad Estate; and TCTs No. 1371, No. 1372, No. 1373, and No.
1374 used B.M. No. 7, Piedad Estate. The changing tie points resulted in the shifting of the
position of the seven lots in relation to the mother lot, using their technical descriptions inscribed
on the face of the titles. Thus, when plotted, the seven lots do not fall exactly inside the boundary
of the mother lot. The same is true when the lots described on the titles of Hi-Grade are plotted on
the basis of their technical descriptions inscribed on the titles.
9. TCT No. 4211 contains patent infirmities, inconsistencies, and irregularities indicating that it is a
falsified document representing a fictitious title and is, therefore, null and void. The fact was
confirmed by an examination by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation, which concluded that TCT No. 4211 was prepared only sometime in the 1940s and
not in 1918, as it is made to appear on the face of the document. Thus, the series of titles from
where Hi-Grade's titles were derived, starting from TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486,
and up to and including the titles of Hi-Grade, are also necessarily null and void.
RTC RULING:
Ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-Grade's title, the older title, cannot prevail over CLT's
title because it suffers from patent defects and infirmities. Although Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the
subject properties, it is not considered as a conclusive proof of ownership.
Impelled by the adverse ruling of the RTC, Hi-Grade elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. During
the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit and Take Judicial Notice of Committee
Report on Senate Inquiry into Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice and Human Rights
and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement (Senate Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in a Resolution dated 31 August 1998. Included in the Resolution, however, is a
9

statement that although the Court of Appeals takes judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court of
Appeals is not bound by the findings and conclusions therein. 10

Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled as baseless the trial court's
reliance on the testimonies of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalmo, on the alleged patent infirmities
and defects in TCT No. 4211. According to the Court of Appeals, Vasquez and Bustalino never testified
that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to conform to the registration procedures in 1917, the year it was
issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are incompetent to testify on the customary practices in land
registration at that time.

ISSUE: (related to the topic)

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial notice of the
Senate Report

HELD:
Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the law. 

Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions, (1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without
proof because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something
13

as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary support. Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial
14

notice, the court dispenses with the traditional form of presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of
evidence and court proceedings such as cross-examination. The Senate Report, an official act of the
15

legislative department, may be taken judicial notice of.

The Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and evaluated
based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly why the taking of judicial
notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican principle. Thus:
 
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this Court is altogether a different matter.
Certainly, a determination by any branch of government on a justiciable matter which is properly before
this Court for adjudication does not bind the latter. The finding of the Senate committees may be the
appropriate basis for remedial legislation but when the issue of the validity of a Torrens title is submitted
to a court for resolution, only the latter has the competence to make such a determination and once final,
the same binds not only the parties but all agencies of government. 18

That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the Court of Appeals. It
did not allow the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.

AS TO THE INTERVENTION OF THE OSG:

Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps. Oliva v. CA, CLT argues that the Petition
20

for Intervention was time-barred for having been filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 2, Rule 19
of the Rules of Court, i.e., before rendition of judgment. In Oliva, the Court clarified that intervention is
unallowable when the case has already been submitted for decision, when judgment has been rendered, or
when judgment has already became final and executory. And, intervention is only allowed when the
intervenors are indispensable parties.

Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court may wield its power to suspend its own rules
and procedure in lieu of substantial justice and for compelling reasons, the attendant circumstances are
21

not availing in the present case.

The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant litigation. An indispensable party is a party-in-
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. Here, even without the Republic as participant, a final determination of the
22

issues can be attained.

AS TO WHICH OCT IS AUTHENTIC.
A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the same property.
The date of registration is reckoned from the time of the title's transcription in the record book of the
Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the date appearing on the face of a title refers to the date of issuance of the
25

decree of registration, as provided in Sections 41 and 42 of the Land Registration Act or Section 40 of the
P.D. 1529:
Section 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified
copy thereof, under the seal of the court to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces or
city in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called
the "Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted
exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be
the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. x x x

Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any
parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book, "original certificate of title, entered pursuant to
decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at" (stating the time and place of entry of decree and the
number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.
Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled "Transfer from
number" (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also the words
"Originally registered" (date, volume, and page of registration). (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429, the decree registering OCT No. 994, the
date of the issuance is 19 April 1917 while on the other hand, OCT No. 994 was received for transcription
by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. In this case, the date which should be reckoned as the date of
registration of the title is the date when the mother title was received for transcription, 3 May 1917. As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals:
For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by Appellee CLT no less and marked as its Exhibit
"D", shows on its face that the date April 19, 1917 refers to the issuance of the decree of registration by
the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, while May 3, 1917 pertains to the date when the same decree was
Received for transcription in the Office of the Register of Deeds. 26

Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds is 3 May 1917, we
rule that the genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade.

3.     Peralta v. Omelio, A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2259, RTJ-11-2264, & RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013
DOCTRINE:
 
“Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law”
 
FACTS: 
 
These are three consolidated administrative complaints brought against Judge Omelio of RTC Davao
City. 
 
THRID CASE ONLY:
 
(1) Cruzabra is the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Davao City. 
(2) A special proceeding for reconstitution of title was filed by Helen Denila with the RTC wherein Judge
Omelio was the presiding Judge. 
(3) The special proceeding was filed despite the fact that the SC had already ruled against the
reconstitution in a prior case “Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel
Carpio”. 
(4) Despite this ruling, Judge Omelio granted the petition of Helen Denila. 
(5) OSG and Cruzabra attempted various legal procedures to reverse the decision. Cruzabra also
refused to reconstitute the titles as ordered and was eventually charged for indirect contempt by
Judge Omelio. 
(6) An administrative investigation was conducted with the following findings: 
 
a. The first two cases to be dismissed for lack of merit. 
b. Cruzabra v. Omelio – Investigating judge found that Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance of the law;
recommendation that he be dismissed from service and forfeiture of his benefits. 
 
ISSUE: 
 
WON Judge Omelio was guiltly of gross ignorance of the law. 
 
HELD: 
 
YES
 
Guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Should have taken judicial notice of prior decision.
 
(1) Rule 129, Section 1 – prior SC decisions fall under “official acts of judicial departments of the
Phillippines” 
(2) Decisions of courts form part of the legal system and failure of any court to apply them
shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and
shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate (citing
Petran Development Inc v. CA). 
(3) The Supreme Court had already ruled against reconstitution of titles in Heirs of Don
Constancio Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpi
(4) Judge Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failing to take judicial notice of
this prior decision of a superior court (as well as reversing a prior inhibition and taking
cognizance of the motion for indirect contempt).
 

4.     Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 152

DOCTRINE: 
 
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without
proof because these facts are already known to them. It is the assumption by a court of a fact
without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience
and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable
of dispute and are not bona fide disputed. 
 
FACTS:
 
Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG, filed a complaint (CC No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa,
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce
Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before
the Sandiganbayan. 
 
The petitioner alleged that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of
Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings
respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings
beneficially for Sps. Marcos. 
 
CC No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, CC No. 
0130. 
 
CC NO. 0130 
PCGG-conducted ETPI SHs meeting, a PCGG-controlled BOD was elected. The ETPI Share Holdings
convened a special SHs meeting wherein another set of BOD was elected. 
 
Africa filed a petition seeking to nullify the Orders of the PCGG. Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion and
ordered an annual SHs meeting where only the registered owners [or their proxies] may vote their corresponding
shares. 
 
In an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of CC No. 0130, among others, with
CC No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident. 
 
PCGG filed with this Court a Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special SHs Meeting for [the] Sole
Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock (Urgent Petition). 
 
SC referred this Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate resolution. The
Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in CC 0130. 
 
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and
treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on
the respondents by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto
Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, 
England. 
 
PCGG deposed Bane without leave of court (invoking that it is a matter of right after the defendants have filed
their answer, the notice stated that the purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts so as
to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for
sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock. 
 
The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition in evidence in the main case of CC No.
0009. On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross- examined Bane.
 
Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to 
the PCGG:
 
(i)             to cause the holding of a special SHs meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing
ETPIs authorized capital stock and 
 
 
 
(ii)           to vote therein the sequestered Class A shares of stock. 
 
Africa petitioned. 
 
Court referred the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to determine whether
there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill- gotten and there is
an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a SHs meeting. 
 
CC NO. 0009 
 
Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution (1998 resolution) denying the petitioners 1 st motion insofar as
[the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral deposition of Bane as part of its evidence in
CC No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-
examination in this Court by the [respondents]. 
 
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of
Evidence on Dec 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. 
 
Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice (2nd
motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that the case be re-opened for the
introduction of additional evidence. 
 
Sandiganbayan promulgated (2000 resolution) denying the petitioners 2nd motion: On the matter of the
[Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein the
defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not
under Art (sic) 129 on judicial notice. 
 
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners 3rd motion: 
 
1998 Resolution which already denied the introduction in evidence of Banes deposition and which has become final
in view of plaintiffs failure to file any MR or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. 
 
Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to
reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Banes deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for
the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. It has been resolved as early as 1998 that the
deposition is inadmissible. 
 
THE PETITION 
 
Petitioner asserts that CC No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted
in evidence) is but a child of the parent case, CC No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in
any of the children cases should be considered as evidence in the parent case. 
 
Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on flimsy grounds, considering that: 
 
1.    It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would be used
as evidence in CC No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they
must accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they
failed to show up. 
 
2.    The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its allegation that
the respondents interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the government. 
 
3.    The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioners formal offer of evidence was
obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed and the
voluminous records that the present case has generated. 
 
 
THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS AND THE PETITIONERS REPLY 
 
Respondents: 
 
3rd motion - mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner, likewise simply assails the
Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. 
 
3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third MR of the 1998 resolution. 
respondents assert that they have not waived their right to cross-examine the deponent; 
 
The allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129. Bane
deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the 
petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Sec 47, Rule 130. 
 
Petitioner: 
 
It filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of
the Bane deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. It has not yet rested its case
although it has filed a formal offer of evidence. Mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an
ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his
citizenship, and his advanced age. Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Sec 47, Rule 130, should apply to the
present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the 
deposition-taking. 
 
ISSUE:
 
WON THE CONSOLIDATION OF CC NO. 0009 AND CC NO. 0130 DISPENSED WITH THE
USUAL REQUISITES OF ADMISSIBILITY. 
 
NO. 
 
Petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing the provisions of Sec
47, Rule 130. The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of CC No. 0009 and CC No. 0130, among
others, the former case or proceeding that Sec 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists. 
 
Consolidation is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes. 
 
There is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of
action, parties and evidence. 
 
At most , there was a consolidation of trial but not actual consolidation. 
 
Considering the fact that in the present case the party respondents to CC No. 0009 are not parties to CC 0130,
the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidation. 
 
To impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation results in an outright deprivation of the
petitioners right to due process especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken
in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose
admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence without the deponent being actually
called to the witness stand. 
 
Sec 47, Rule 130 lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a
former case or proceeding. 
 
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify ; 
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative; 
3. Involving the same parties; 
4. Relating to the same matter; 
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him. 
 
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony or deposition can be
introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the
basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. 
 
The deposition may not be allowed in this case because petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the
identity of interest or privity between the thenopponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. 
 
WON THE RESPONDENTS NOTICE OF TAKING OF BANE DEPOSITION IS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF WAIVER. NO. 
 
The petitioner asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the deponent for their
failure to appear at thedeposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to them. 
 
Petitioners reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination,
cannot override the non- party status of the respondents in CC No. 0130 the effect of consolidation being
merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they
cannot be bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of
cross-examination. 
 
After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the least
that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed with
the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon.
 
 
Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action . It must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-
parties to CC No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in Africas certiorari petition asserting his right as an
ETPI stockholder. 
 
Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a vital cog in the petitioners case against the respondents,
the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main
case) at a time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so. 
 
RELATED TOPIC: WON THE SANDIGANBAYAN SHOULD HAVE TAKEN 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF BANE’S DEPOSITION. 
 
NO.
 
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and admitted
in CC No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of
its evidence. 
 
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them. It is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further
traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing
evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed. 
 
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or notoria)
non indigent probatione. The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with the
traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious
that it would not be disputed. 
 
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial
notice of the official acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines, or gives the court the discretion to take
judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
 
Generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases
may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge . This rule though admits of exceptions.
 
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of
a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of , and
absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number
or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former
case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. 
 
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in
the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. 
 
 
 
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice;
neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. 
 
Petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever
evidence offered in any of the children cases CC 0130 as evidence in the parent case CC 0009 - or of the
whole family of cases. To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of
judicial notice. 
 
We strongly disagree. 
The supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve only a single
proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases. 
 
The petitioners proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself
admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying
complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners argument, we would be espousing judicial 
confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found
competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the
petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it
seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on 
the court.
 
The Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the
case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial
head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence
the facts upon which they rely.
 
 
 

5.  New Sun Valley Homeowner’s Ass’n., Inc. v. Sangguniang Barangay, Brgy. Sunvalley, Parañaque City, G.R.
No. 156686, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 438
 6.     Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171406, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 111

7.     B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 159230, October 18, 2010

A.2. When Discretionary (Rule 129, Sec. 2)

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. (2)

1.     Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015

2.     Barut v. People, G. R. No. 167454, September 24, 2014

DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered. An exception is
when the following concur: (1) the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded and (2) the evidence
was incorporated in the records of the case.
 
Another exception is where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such
judicial admissions within the context of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the trial court,
in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor
as evidence.
 
FACTS:
Ancheta and Barut pulled over Villas and his passengers Vincent Ucag and his mother because the owner-type jeep
they were driving had no headlights. Vicente Ucag, Vincent’s father, arrived with his companions and confronted
Ancheta and Barut. An altercation occurred and Ancheta fired his revolver at Vicente Ucag, hitting him on both
thighs. Vicente Ucag fired back and hit Ancheta. Vincent rushed to his father’s side, but Barut fired his weapon and
hit Vincent in the chest.
 
The RTC convicted Barut of homicide which the CA affirmed.
 
Barut, upon appeal to the SC, calims that Villas’ extra-judicial sworn statement contradicts Villas’ court
testimony. Thus, Barut insists that Villas was ambiguous and there was doubt whether it was Ancheta or himself
that shot Vincent.
 
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in not taking the extra-judicial sworn statement of Villas into consideration (NO)
 
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered
(Candido v. Court of Appeals). In this case, the CA observed that the RTC could not take the declaration of
Villas into consideration because Villas’ extra-judicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not
been offered and admitted as evidence by either side.
 
The Supreme Court thus laid down the ruled that a document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence
when it is simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an
opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is
necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only— and strictly—upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
 
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed where two
requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence
was incorporated in the records of the case. Furthermore, the rule has no application where the court takes
judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court
relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section
4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their
credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as evidence.
 
Thus, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the conviction for homicide. 

3.     Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013, 711 SCRA 522
 DOCTRINE:
Courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not
public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the
parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
 
FACTS:
Juan dela Llana and Dr. Leila dela Llana were driving in a car and stopped at a signal light. A dump truck, driven by
Joel Primero who was employed by Rebecca Biong, rammed the car’s rear end. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dr.
dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dr. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible
physical injuries.
 
About a month later, Dr. dela Llana’s health deteriorated and she felt pain on her neck and shoulder. She was treated
multiple times and underwent surgery to release an impinged nerve. This incapacitated Dr. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession. She then demanded from Rebecca Biong compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca
refused to pay.
 
Dr. dela Llana anchors her claim on three pieces of evidence:
1. The pictures of her damaged car
2. The medical certificate created by Dr. Milla which chronicled her medical history and examinations
3. Her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and the whiplash injury.
 
The RTC ruled in favor of Dr. dela Llana, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, stating that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dr. dela Llana did not immediately
visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present expert
witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical certificate. The medical certificate did not
explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.
 
RELEVANT ISSUE:
WON the courts can take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. (NO)
 
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret
the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
 
Furthermore, the medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence.  the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is
hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another
person who is not on the witness stand.
 
Dr. Milla, who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate, was not presented to testify in
court and was not even able to identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. In addition, the
medical certificate did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident.
A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering
from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra.
dela Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical
examinations.
 
Thus, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals.

4.     Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, July 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 651

DOCTRINE:
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.  Judicial
notice may be taken of matters that are of "public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration." Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code,
specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly
acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
 
Citing Saludo v. American Express, the Supreme Court stated that the concept of "facts of common knowledge"
in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community
as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among
reasonable men."
 
FACTS:
MAGDALO filed a Petition for Registration with COMELEC seeking to participate as a party-list in the 2010
National and Local Elections. The petition was denied on the grounds that  It is common knowledge that the party’s
organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny
clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the
process defying the laws of organized societies.
 
The COMELEC En Banc denied MAGDALO’s Motion for Reconsideration, thus the petition to the Supreme Court.
 
MAGDALO contends that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess whether parties
applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, the
latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on pure conjectures instead of on
the evidence on record.

ISSUE:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident (NO)
 
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the
Oakwood incident.  Judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of "public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration." Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to
evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
 
Citing Saludo v. American Express, the Supreme Court stated that the concept of "facts of common knowledge" in
the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to
make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable
men."
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already taken judicial notice of the factual circumstances surrounding
the Oakwood standoff in a number of cases. That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively
covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring
the introduction and reception of evidence thereon.
 
Thus, the petition is denied and the resolution of COMELEC is AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing anew of
a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.

8.     Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171406, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 111

DOCTRINE:
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which
the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department.
The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and
controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only
performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such,
judicial notice cannot be applied.

FACTS:
Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense from China to Manila, insured by
Malayan Insurance, Co., Inc. Upon arrival of the vessel, the stevedores of Asian Terminals, Inc. Unloaded the bags
of soda ash dense and brought them to the open storage area. It was found that 2,702 bags were in bad condition.
Malayan Insurance paid the value of the damaged cargo to the consignee in the amount of P643,000.25. Malayan, as
subrogee, filed an action for damages against Asian Terminals before the RTC of Manila.
 
The RTC ruled in favor of  Malayan Insurance, finding that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the
negligence of Asian Terminal’s stevedores who used steel hooks that damaged the bags despite instructions against
the same. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
 
Asian Terminal claims that the amount of damages should not be more than ₱5,000.00, pursuant to its
Management Contract for cargo handling services with the Philippine Ports Authority. Petitioner contends
that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an official act of an executive
department subject to judicial cognizance.
 
RELEVANT ISSUE:
WON the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between Asian Terminals, Inc. and the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining Asian Terminal’s liability. (NO)
 
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Asian Terminal cannot avail of judicial notice. The Court cited Section 1 and 2 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court to explain when judicial notice is mandatory and when it is discretionary.
 
 SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
 
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
 
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the
courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA,
which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled
corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a
proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice
cannot be applied.
 
Thus, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.

5.     Sps. Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009

DOCTRINE:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.

FACTS

On July 6, 2001, Rosalie Chua (Chua), filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioner
Spouses Latip. Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over 2 cubicles in Roferxan Bld., signed by
Chua, as lessor and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof. 

In their Answer, spouse Latip refuted Rosalie’s claim. They averred that the least of 2 cubicles had already been
paid in full as evidenced by 3 receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00.

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles
in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted
Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time.
According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the
building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.

MeTC  ruled in favor of Rosalie

1. the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the
property subject of this case
2. [Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RTC reversed the MeTC

1. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other
substantial aspects, incomplete.
2. The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented;
and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip
in the amount of ₱2,570,000.00.

CA reinstated MeTC decision

1. the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and
valid contract.
2. the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money,

The CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the
Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn
Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to
occupying the stalls thereat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct when it took judicial notice of the common practice of payment of goodwill money
in the area of Baclaran. - NO!

RULE:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.

state Prosecutors v. Muro

The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: 

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; 

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and 

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence
will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that
the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is
taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted
by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person.

APPLICATION
It is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of
notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to
the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie,
found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove
her claim that the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently,
Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by
other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor.

On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved
under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a
certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e.,
the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be
proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What need not be proved.

CONCLUSION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent
Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No
costs.
  

A.3. When Hearing Necessary (Rule 129, Sec. 3)

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the pre-trial and the trial, the court, motu proprio or
upon motion, shall hear the parties on the propriety of taking judicial notice of any matter. Before judgment or
on appeal, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may take judicial notice of any matter and shall hear the
parties thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (3a)

1.     Pilipinas Shell Petroleum, Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 195876, December 5, 2016

DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.

However, this rule is subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to
all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives
as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated. Thus, for said exception to apply, the party concerned must be given an opportunity to object before
the court could take judicial notice of any record pertaining to other cases pending before it.

FACTS:

On April 16, 1996 RA 8180 also known as “Downstreal oil industry deregulation act of 1996” took effect. It
provides for the reduction of tariff duty on imported crude oil from 10 percent to 3 percent.

9 days prior to effectivity of RA  8180, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum imported 1,979,674.85 US barrels of Arab Light
crude oil. Petitioner paid at the rate of 3 percent.

4 years later, petitioner received demand latter from Bureu of Customs demanding to pay the difference between the
amount allegedly due (at the old rate often percent (10%) or before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8180) and the actual
amount of duties paid by petitioner (on the rate of 3%).

BOC filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against petitioner, together with Caltex Philippines as co-
party. 

Petitioner filed with CTA, a petition for review. CTA in Division denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit citing Section 5(b), Rule 6 of the 2005 Revised Rules of the CTA, as sole legal basis in considering the
Memorandum dated 2 February 2001 issued by the Customs Intelligence & Investigation Service, Investigation &
Prosecution Division (CIIS-IPD) of the BOC as evidence to establish fraud, and the case of Chevron Phils., Inc. v.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs

CTA Former En Banc affirmed the CTA in Division's ruling pertaining to the implied abandonment caused by
petitioner's failure to file the Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration within the 30-day period, and transfer
of ownership by operation of law to the government of the subject shipment in accordance with Sections 1801 and
1802, in relation to Section 13.01, of the TCCP, and with the pronouncements made in the Chevron case.

Petitioner's contention that the principles enunciated in the Chevron case were misapplied in the case at bench. It
explained that the reason for such ruling establishing the "ipso facto abandonment" doctrine was because there was a
finding of fraud on the part of Chevron, being the importer. The existence of fraud was a critical and essential fact in
the disposition on the issues in the Chevron case that justified the goods to be deemed impliedly abandoned in favor
of the government. Corollarily, in the absence of fraud, goods cannot be deemed impliedly abandoned and ipso facto
owned by the government arising from a mere delay in the submission of the Import Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CTA can motu proprio justify the existence of fraud committed by petitioner by applying the
rules on judicial notice. - NO!

RULING:

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary.
In relation thereto, it has been held that the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts; however, the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.

As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception that in
the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it
is sufficiently designated.67 Thus, for said exception to apply, the party concerned must be given an opportunity to
object before the court could take judicial notice of any record pertaining to other cases pending before it.

Such being the case, it would also be an error for the CTA in Division to even take judicial notice of the subject
Memorandum being merely a part of the BOC Records submitted before the court a quo, without the same being
identified by a witness, offered in and admitted as evidence, and effectively, depriving petitioner, first and foremost,
an opportunity to object thereto. Hence, the subject Memorandum should not have been considered by the CTA in
Division in its disposition.

It is well-settled that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike
are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural
rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.

2.     Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, G.R. No. 173148, April 6, 2015

DOCTRINE:
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence
is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, this rule
is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. 

In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because of their close
connection with the matter in the controversy

FACTS:

This case involves a property dispute between petitoner Degayo owner of Lot 861 and respondents owner of Lot
7328.

The Jaluad River is in the middle of  Lot 861 a 36,864sqm parcel of land and lot 7328, a 153,028sqm parcel of land.
Eventually, the course of the Jalaud River encroached on Lot No. 7328. As a result, Lot No. 7328 progressively
decreased in size while the banks adjacent to Lot No. 861 gradually increased in land area.

Degayo and the tenants believed that the area was an accretion to Lot No. 861. As a result, her tenants, commenced
cultivating and tilling that disputed area with corn and tobacco.

The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the disputed property was an abandoned riverbed, which should
rightfully belong to them to compensate for the erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328, over which the Jalaud River
presently runs.

The respondents filed a complaint for ownership and damages against the tenants, with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 27, entitled Cecilia Magbanua Dinglasan, et al. v. Nicolas Jarencio, et al., docketed as Civil
Case No. 16047

Degao sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 16047 but her motion was denied.

Degayo initiated the present suit against the respondents for declaration of ownership with damages, also with the
RTC of Iloilo, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No. 18328.

RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 16047, in favor of the respondents.  The decision
in Civil Case No. 16047 became final and executory on August 6, 1999

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 18328, the court, a quo, found in favor of Degayo and declared the property in
question as an accretion to Lot No. 861. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was
denied. Hence, the respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
CA granted the respondents’ appeal and reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC Branch 22 in Civil Case No.
18328. The CA likewise noted that the previous RTC Branch decision in Civil Case No. 16047 is conclusive to the
title of the thing, being an aspect of the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.

ISSUES:

Whether or not CA erred in taking judicial notice of RTC in Civil Case 16047 which was not even presented during
the hearing of the present case. - NO!

RULING:

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is
intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, this rule is not
absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. In the case of Tiburcio v PHHC, this Court, citing Justice Moran, stated:

"In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection
with the matter in the controversy. Thus, in a separate civil action against the administrator of an estate arising from
an appeal against the report of the committee on claims appointed in the administration proceedings of the said
estate, to determine whether or not the appeal was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of the record of the
administration proceedings. Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the
case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."

citing Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

"A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior
proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the
files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will
be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of
the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. " Lastly, there
is another equally compelling consideration. Degayo undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law
then in force could be availed of, which is to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. It would have served the cause
of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on her part and the vexation to which the
respondents were subjected if she did reflect a little more on the matter.

3.     Ando v. DFA, G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014

DOCTRINE:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.

FACTS:

Petitioner Edelina Ando married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, solemnized at

Candaba Pampanga. Kobayashi subsequently sought in Japan and was granted, under
Japanese Laws, a divorce. 

Edelina Ando believing in good faith said divorce capacitated her to remarry, she married
Masatomi Ando. 

Petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her
husband Ando. However, the DFA refused stating that she cannot be issued with the passport
until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with Ando is valid. 

Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief. The RTC dismissed the petition for
want of cause and action, as well as jurisdiction. The case was endorsed to Family court for
appropriate action and disposition, which also dismissed the petition. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts can take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment without
hearing- NO!

RULING:
For the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a
petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.

4.     Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014

DOCTRINE:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.

FACTS:

David and Leticia were married in Quezon City. They resided in California where they eventually acquired
American citizenship. They then begot two children Jerome and Jena. During the marriage, they acquired
properties in the Philippines and in the USA.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita
Martinez in Aurora province.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court
of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and
judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two
6

children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.

Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied
on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She
prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease
and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited
in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the
Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.

ISSUE:

WON Philippine Courts should take judicial notice of the divorce decree obtained in Californian Courts

RULING:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with
our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved
by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such
official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized
Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any,
or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized
and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that
there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the property
regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly
to liquidation.

5.     LBP v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 370

DOCTRINE:

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence
is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts
prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: 

(1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or

 (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. 

In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of a 27.5730-hectare parcel of
agricultural land (property) in Barangay Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-49465. On April 30, 1999, the government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405, the LBP valued the property at ₱1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find
this valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the determination of just compensation.

The PARAD computed the value of the property at ₱16,543,800.00; it used the property’s current market value
(as shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted that
the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside
the LBP’s valuation.

The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the
judicial determination of just compensation.

The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at ₱200.00 per square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived
at this valuation by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case
No. 2326-96-C, which, in turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36 (Branch 36)
arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C.

As the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s
valuation which was founded on factual and legal bases. 
ISSUE:

WON courts may take judicial notice the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

RULING:

The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous

The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence
is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or the facts
prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any
opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must
observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP opposed.
These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that
noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient compliance with the
requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on
Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally erroneous.

We cannot help but highlight the attendant delay as the RTC-SAC obviously erred in a manner that we cannot
now remedy at our level. The RTC-SAC erred and effectively abused its discretion by fixing the just
compensation for the property based solely on the valuation fixed by Branches 35 and 36 – considerations that we
find were completely irrelevant and misplaced. This is an error that now requires fresh determination of just
compensation again at the RTC-SAC level.

6.     LBP v. Honeycomb Farms, Inc., G.R. No. 166259, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 76

DOCTRINE:

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right
within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.

– During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

FACTS:

Respondent Honeycomb Farms Corporation (HFC) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2550, with an area of 29.0966 hectares, situated in "Curvada, Caintagan,
Masbate." Through a letter dated February 5, 1988, HFC voluntarily offered its land to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL), for P581,932.00 or at P20,000.00 per hectare. Pursuant to the rules and regulations governing the
CARL, the government, through the DAR and the LBP, determined an acquirable and compensable area of
27.5871 hectares, while 1.5095 hectares were excluded for being hilly and underdeveloped.

Subsequently, the LBP, as the agency with the authority to determine land valuation and compensation under the
CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, fixed the value of
the land in the amount of P165,739.44 and sent a Notice of Valuation to HFC.

HFC rejected the LBP’s valuation and it filed, on January 15, 1996, a petition with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for a summary administrative determination of just compensation. In its petition, HFC claimed that the
just compensation for the land should be in the amount of P25,000.00 per hectare, considering its location and
productivity, or for an aggregate amount of P725,000.00.

While the DARAB proceedings were still pending, HFC filed a Complaint for Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation with the RTC, praying for a just compensation of P725,000.00, plus attorney’s fees of ten percent
(10%) of the just compensation. HFC justified the direct filing with the SAC by what it saw as unreasonable
delay or official inaction. HFC claimed that the DARAB disregarded Section 16 of RA 6657 which mandates that
the "DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision." The LBP meanwhile
countered that HFC’s petition was "premature and lacks a cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative
 remedies."

Meanwhile, on May 14, 1998, the DARAB issued a Decision affirming the LBP’s valuation. Owing to the
parties’ conflicting valuations, the SAC made its own valuation. Both parties appealed to the CA.

The LBP also argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it took judicial notice of the property’s
roadside location, its proximity to a commercial district, its incomplete development as coconut and corn land,
and its condition as grassland, to determine just compensation; thereby, it effectively eschewed the formula for
fixing just compensation, provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992.

ISSUE:

WON RTC-SAC can take judicial notice of the nature of land in question without the requisite hearing

RULING:

No. The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the nature of land in question without the requisite hearing.

Separately from disregarding the basic formula prescribed by the DAR, it has also not escaped our notice that the
SAC also erred in concluding that the subject land consisting of 29.0966 hectares is commercial in nature, after
taking judicial notice that it is "situated near the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate."

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we categorically ruled that the parties must be
given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before the court a quo can take judicial
notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholding, thus:

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right
within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.

– During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.

The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is the very
issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the
nature of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the
subject landholdings. As we said in Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco 464 Phil. 83, 97-98 (2004):

The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a
vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed.
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action.

B.    Judicial Admissions (Rule 129, Sec. 4)

Section 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, oral or written, made by [the] party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
it was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not, in fact, made. (4a)

1.     Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48 (1914)

DOCTRINE:

Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions were based on the theory that most of the
allegations were merely pleader's matter -- fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the courts. The whole
modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and
hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case. But some of the
authorities still hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some proof that he has
authorized it.

FACTS:

In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the plaintiff, Lucido, were regularly sold at
an execution sale on February 10, 1903, to one Rosales, who the next day transferred a one-half interest in the
property of Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public document was executed and signed by all of the above parties
and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan, wherein it was stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido,
sold all their rights had obligation pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan for the amount of the
purchase price together with 1 per cent per month interest thereon up to the time of redemption, or 1,687 Mexican
dollars, plus 33.74 Mexican dollars, the amount of the interest. It will be observed that the computation of the
transfer price is in accordance with section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same day Lucido and
Calupitan executed the following document:

I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered this statement to Leonardo Lucido y Vidal to
witness that his lands, which appear in the instrument I hold from the deputy sheriff and for which he has
accepted money from me, I have ceded to him all the irrigated lands until such time as he may repurchase all said
lands from me (not only he irrigated ones), as also the Vienna chairs, the five-lamp chandelier, a lamp stand, two
wall tables, and a marble table; no coconut tree on said irrigated land is included. Apart from this, our real
agreement is to permit three (3) whole year to elapse, reckoned from the date of this instrument, which has been
drawn up n duplicate, before he may redeem or repurchase them from me.

The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to conventional redemption

ISSUE:

WON pleadings are admissible as judicial admissions such that the answer of Calupitan admitting that the
transaction is a sale with the right to conventional redemption should be admitted

RULING:

Yes. Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the agreement entered into
between Lucido and Calupitan on the same day. In this document it is distinctly stipulated that the right to redeem
the property is preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The right to repurchase
must necessarily imply a former ownership of the property.

Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with the right to conventional
redemption is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. This original answer was introduced in
evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper, especially in view of the
fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was the time acting as his own attorney.

Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions were based on the theory that most of the
allegations were merely pleader's matter -- fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the courts. The whole
modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and
hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case. But some of the
authorities still hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some proof that he has
authorized it.

On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are
held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in
evidence.

In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the right to repurchase
governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.

2.     Tan v. People, G.R. No. 218902, October 17, 2016

Syllabus Topic: What Need Not Be Proved → Judicial Admissions (page 4 syllabus)

Legal Provisions: Rule 129, Sec. 4

Doctrine:

It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is

the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing
that this was made thru palpable mistake, as in this case, no amount of rationalization
can offset it.

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy.

Facts:

To avoid the overflowing on Tigum river during rainy season, the Sangguniang
Barangay issued a resolution requesting the IBC to rechannel the path of the Tigum
River for no monetary considerations whatsoever, except that it can get the surplus
supply of sand and gravel taken out therefrom.

Soon thereafter, Criminal Complaints for Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were filed against
involved local officers. They falsified the Minutes of the Regular Session of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin. Instead of  re-channeling the river, the resolution
grants authority for the IBC to engage into massive quarrying activities in the area
even without the required permit.

Issue:

WON the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioner Tan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.sA. 3019 in conspiracy with the accused public
officials? (YES)

Ruling: The Petition is meritorious

In the parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts before the Sandiganbayan, one of facts they
agreed on was that on 27 June 1996 a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into
between the two party, the mayor of Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo and (IBC)
represented by Tan, for the Rechanneling of the Tigum River path at Barangay Naslo,
Maasin, Iloilo.

As the aforesaid Joint Stipulation of Facts was reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, thus, they are bound by it and the same becomes judicial
admissions of the facts stipulated. 

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either
by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the
admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, as in this case, no
amount of rationalization can offset it. Also, in Republic of the Philippines v. D
Guzman citing Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court held that "a party who judicially admits a
fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;
production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, petitioner Tan is ACQUITTED from the charge of Violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

3.     Yujuico v. United Resources Asset Management, Inc., G.R. No. 211113, June 29, 2015

Syllabus Topic: What Need Not Be Proved → Judicial Admissions (page 4 syllabus)

Legal Provisions: Rule 129, Sec. 4

Doctrines:
Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent
provisions of Rule10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rule of Court.  Hence,
allegations (and admissions) in a pleading—even if not shown to be made through
"palpable mistake"—can still be corrected or amended provided that the amendment
is sanctioned under Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
There was an auction sale auction sale of stocks pledged under Pledge Agreements.
URAMI is the highest bidder. Petitioner filed a case to declare the sale void. In its
answer, URAMI agreed with the petitioner that the 23 June 2004 auction sale was
void; URAMI admitted that it never authorized Atty. Nethercott to cause the sale of the
stocks pledged under the Pledge Agreements.
URAMI filed with the RTC an amended answer with compulsory
counterclaim(amended answer) on 23 February 2009. In its amended answer, URAMI
reneged from its previous admissions under the original answer.
This time, URAMI claimed that the 23 June 2004 auction sale was valid and that it
duly authorized Atty. Nethercott to initiate such sale on its behalf.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to strike out URAMI’s amended answer.
Issues:
W/N URAMI had not shown that the admissions it made under the original answer
were made through "palpable mistake." Hence, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule129 of
the Rules of Court, URAMI is barred from contradicting such admissions through the
filing of its amended answer?
Ruling
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter
of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive
pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days
after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of
court.
In this case, URAMI filed its motion for leave seeking the admission of its amended
answer more than two (2) years after it filed its original answer. Despite the
considerable lapse of time between the filing of the original answer and the motion for
leave, the RTC still granted the said motion. Such grant was later affirmed on appeal
by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner, however, opposes the grant of leave arguing that URAMI is precluded from
filing an amended answer by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court and claiming
that URAMI’s amended answer was only interposed for the purpose of delaying the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027.
We rule in favor of allowing URAMI’s amended answer. Hence, we deny the
present appeal.
First. We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court precludes URAMI from filing its amended answer. To begin with, the
said provision does not set the be-all and end-all standard upon which amendments
to pleadings may or may not be allowed. Matters involving the amendment of
pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule10 and not by
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rule of Court.  Hence, allegations (and admissions) in a
pleading—even if not shown to be made through "palpable mistake"—can still be
corrected or amended provided that the amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, even if we are to apply Section 4 of Rule 129 to the present case, we
still find the allowance of URAMI’s amended answer to be in order.
 To our mind, a consideration of the evidence that URAMI plans to present
during trial indubitably reveals that the admissions made by URAMI under its
original answer were a product of clear and patent mistake.
One of the key documents that URAMI plans to present during trial, which it also
attached in its amended answer as "Annex 8" thereof, is URAMI’s Board
Resolutiondated 21 June 2004 that evinces Atty. Nethercott’s authority to cause the
foreclosure on the pledged stocks on behalf of URAMI. With the existence of such
board resolution, the statement in URAMI’s original answer pertaining to the lack of
authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate the 23 June 2004 auction sale thus appears
mistaken, if not entirely baseless and unfounded.
Hence, we find it only right and fair, that URAMI should be given a chance to file its
amended answer in order to rectify such mistakes in its original answer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

4.     Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015

Syllabus Topic: What Need Not Be Proved → Judicial Admissions (page 4 syllabus)

Legal Provisions: Rule 129, Sec. 4

Doctrines:

Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pretrial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

Facts:

Sumitomo Corporation shipped multiple times on board ESLI’s vessel coils of various
Steel Sheet in good order and condition for transportation to and delivery at the port
of Manila as evidenced by a Bill of Lading. The shipment was insured with the
respondents BPI/MS and Mitsui against all risks. 

Upon withdrawal of the shipment it was found out that part of the shipment was
damaged and was in bad order condition.

ESLI admitted the existence and due execution of the Bills of Lading and the Invoice
containing the nature and value of the goods on the second shipment. The effect of
admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was
signed by another for him and with his authority.

RTC Makati City rendered a decision finding both the ESLI and ATI liable for the
damages sustained by the two shipments.

The Court of Appeals absolved ATI from liability thereby modifying the decision of
the trial court. 

ESLI’s Contention:
ESLI contends that what was admitted and written on the pre-trial order was only the
existence of the first shipment’ invoice but not its contents and due execution. It
invokes admission of existence but renounces any knowledge of the contents written
on it.

Issue:

WON admissions made during the pre-trial as to the validity of the bills of lading are
binding? (YES)

Ruling:

Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial
admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions.

In Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court emphasized that:

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties
and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them.
They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if
placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to
rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the
disadvantage.

Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court declared that:

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as
judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from
the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission
and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the
pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by

the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

5.     Extraordinary Development Corp. v. Samson-Bico, G.R. No. 191090, October 13, 2014

Syllabus Topic: What Need Not Be Proved → Judicial Admissions (page 4 syllabus)

Legal Provisions: Rule 129, Sec. 4

DOCTRINE:
Well-settled is the rule that a judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it.
He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his
pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted
unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no
 such admission was made.

FACTS:
Apolonio owned a parcel of land. When Apolonio and Maria died, the property was
inherited by Juan and Irenea. When the latter died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea
became co-owners of the property.
The heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea, executed in
favor of petitioner EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale. This prompted respondents to file
the Complaint. EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value The RTC and
CA ruled in favor of respondents

ISSUE:
W/N respondents were able to convincingly establish their co-ownership over one-half
of the subject property? Yes

RULING
As borne by the records, respondents were able to convincingly establish their co-
ownership over one-half of the subject property.
Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the subject
property through her clear testimony and admitted by the opposing counsel.
A party may make judicial admissions in 
(a) the pleadings, 
(b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or 
(c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.  
The Answer submitted by the heirs of Juan, as well as the testimony of Juan
constitute judicial admissions. Well-settled is the rule that a judicial admission
conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position
contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not
require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
EDC avers that said judicial admission should not bind it because it was an innocent
purchaser in good faith. The Court of Appeals debunked this contention and correctly
ruled:
In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is
selling. Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to
transfer the ownership of the property sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code
provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the
ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.
The execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them
together with the [respondents], was valid only to the extent of the former’s undivided
one-half share thereof.

6.     Josefa v. Meralco, G.R. No. 182705, July 18, 2014

DOCTRINE: Judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. These
admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge this fact for the reason
that judicial admissions remove an admitted fact from the field of controversy.

SUMMARY: There was an accident involving a dump truck (registered under Josefa’s name), a jeepney, and a car.
It is alleged that the truck hit the post thus making Josefa liable. The SC said that the admissions of material facts
made by Josefa in his pleadings constitute judicial admission which do not require further evidence to prove them
and cannot be later challenged.

FACTS: A dump truck, a car, and a jeepney met an accident. A 45-foot electricity post were damaged which is
owned by Meralco. Upon the investigation of Meralco, it was the truck that hit the post.

In its complaint, Meralco alleged that Josefa was primarily liable because of negligence in the selection and
supervision of Manojo Bautista (Driver). Josefa denied that Bautista was his employee. Same allegations in the
amended complaint.

Meralco presented Elmer Abio as a witness. He identified himself as the driver of the jeepney that was involved in
the accident. He testified that a truck suddenly hit the rear of his jeepney while he was driving along Ortigas
Avenue, Pasig City; he thus lost control of the jeepney and hit a Nissan car on the other lane of the road. Thereafter,
the truck hit the electricity post.

RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to establish that the truck hit the post.

CA reversed the ruling stating that it is proved that it was the truck that hit the post and held that Manoco was an
employee of Josefa because Josefa did not specifically deny this material allegation in the amended complaint.

ISSUE: WON the truck hit the electricity post and Josefa is liable.

RULING: YES.

Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the electricity post through Abio’s
testimony. Abio categorically stated during trial that he saw the truck hit the electricity post. We find his first-hand
account of the incident during the directexamination frank and straightforward. More importantly, Josefa failed to
impeach the veracity of Abio’s testimony during the cross-examination. Abio even reiterated that it was Josefa’s
truck that rammed the electricity post. We thus give full faith and credence to his positive, unrebutted, and
40

categorical declaration on the witness stand, made under solemn oath, that it was the truck that caused damage to
Meralco’s property.

Even without Abio’s testimony, it does not escape this Court’s attention that Josefa judicially admitted in his
motions and pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. In a motion to dismiss dated March 17, 1997, Josefa
stated:
"1. This action was commenced by plaintiff to recover from defendant the sum of ₱384,846.00 as actual damages
resulting from the vehicular mishap which occurred on April 21, 1991 along Ortigas Avenue, Rosario, Pasig City,
Metro Manila, whereby defendant’s dump truck with plate No. PAK 874 hit and bumped plaintiff’s 45-foot wooden
pole; " (emphasis and underline ours)
41

Josefa further declared in his motion for reconsideration dated February 22, 2008:
[T]he manner who and why the accident occurred was not explained. In the absence of any description on such
important aspect, fault or negligence cannot be properly imputed to Pablo Manojo Bautista simply because the truck
he was then driving bumped to electric post. The causal connection between the fault or negligence and the damage
must be shown. x x x Analyzing the testimony of Elmer Abio, what was established is the following:

a) Somebody bumped the back of the jeepney he was driving on April 21, 1991;
b) When his back was bumped, he had no control because it was so sudden;
c) He bumped the approaching car, while the truck bumped into the Meralco post those three (3)
transformers;
d) The pole with 3 transformers fell on the truck.

It may be asked: "Who was that somebody that bumped the back of Abio" "What was the reason why the truck
bumped the post?" "What happened to the car that was bumped by Abio because he had no control?" "Which
happened first, the bumping of the back of Abio or the bumping of the post by the truck?" "Was the bumping of the
back of Abio and the bumping of the car the proximate cause why the truck hit the Meralco post?" (Emphases and
underlines ours) Lastly, Josefa pleaded in his petition before this Court:
“Nowhere in the records was it shown how and why the accident occurred on April 21, 1991.

In the absence of any description on such important aspect, fault or negligence cannot be properly imputed to
petitioner, simply because his truck bumped into Meralco’s electricity post. The causal connection between the
petitioner’s supposed negligence and the damage was not shown. Neither was it proved to be the proximate cause of
the damage.”

These statements constitute deliberate, clear and unequivocal admissions of the causation in fact between the truck
and the electricity post. Judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. These admissions
cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge this fact for the reason that judicial
admissions remove an admitted fact from the field of controversy.

7.     Sps. Manzanilla v. Waterfields Industries Corp., G.R. No. 177484, July 18, 2014
 DOCTRINE: It is well settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the
party [itself] and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it.

"[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making
it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own
acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence,
whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing [to be] true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it."

SUMMARY: Sps Manzanilla leased their property to Waterfields represented by Ma. Waterfields failed to pay and
Ma sent a letter amending the contract where the deposit will be used to pay for the unpaid utilities. Waterfields
allege that the contract was not amended but they admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint of Sps Manzanilla
where it states that it is amended. The SC said that the admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the
party itself and it binds the person who makes the same, in this case, Waterfields.

FACTS:

The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a 25,000-square meter parcel of land in Barangay San Miguel, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, covered by Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-35205. On May 24, 1994, they leased a 6,000-
square meter portion of the above-mentioned property to Waterfields, as represented by its President Aliza R. Ma
(Ma).

Pertinent portions of their Contract of Lease provide, viz:

Section 4. DEPOSIT. LESSORS hereby acknowledge receipt from LESSEE a rental deposit in the amount of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND (₱216,000.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, to answer for any unpaid rentals,
damages, penalties and unpaid utility charges. Such deposit or any balance thereof shall be refunded to the LESSEE
immediately upon the termination or expiration of this contract.

Beginning April 1997, however, Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental. Hence, Ma sent the spouses
Manzanilla a letter dated July 7, 1997 which reads as follows:
Spouses Mr. & Mrs. Alejandro Manzanilla
Sto. Tomas, Batangas
I promise to pay the following rentals in arrears:

10 April 97 8,000.00

10 May 97 18,000.00

10 June 97 18,000.00

10 July 97 18,000.00

check 8,000.00
replacement

₱70,000.00

by way of check payment dated July 15, 1997.

In addition to the aforementioned, I will give a check for the amount of ₱18,000, representing advance rental for the
month of August 1997.
From here on, notwithstanding the terms of the lease contract, I shall pay rentals (eve) on or before the 10th day of
each month, (30-day) representing advance rental.
The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and
other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease.
The lease contract dated 5/24/94 shall be amended according to the above provision.

(Signed)

ALIZA MA

President
Waterfields Industries Corporation

7/9/97

Quezon City

On July 30, 1998, the spouses Manzanilla filed before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against Waterfields.
They alleged in paragraph 4 thereof that they entered into a Contract of Lease with Waterfields on May 24, 1994,
and in paragraph 5, that the same was amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997. However, Waterfields had
committed violations of the lease agreement by not paying the rentals on time. And in yet another violation, it failed
to pay the ₱18,000.00 monthly rental for the past six months prior to the filing of the Complaint, that is, from
December 1997 to May 1998 or in the total amount of ₱108,000.00.

In its Answer, Waterfields admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint and alleged that: (1) when the lease
agreement was executed, the property subject thereof was just bare land; (2) it spent substantial amounts of money
in developing the land, i.e., building of water dikes, putting up of a drainage system, land filling and levelling; (3) it
built thereon a processing plant for fruit juices, preserved vegetables and other frozen goods for which it spent
around ₱7,000,000.00; and (4) it caused the installation in the said premises of an electrical system for ₱80,000.00
and water system for ₱150,000.00.

MTC: Found Ma’s letter to have amended the Contract of Lease.

RTC: Affirmed in toto

CA: Reversed. Contract was not amended by the letter. Manzanilla spouses have no cause of action because there
can be compensation.

ISSUE: WON the letter amended the contract.

RULING: YES.

Waterfields cannot now contradict its judicial admission that the Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997;
the doctrine of estoppel likewise bars it from falsifying Ma’s July 9,1997 letter in this litigation.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no suchadmission was made. "A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings,
(b) during trial, either by verbal or written manifestations orstipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding."
Here, paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges:
5. That, subsequently, the said Contract of Lease was amended on 06 June 1994 and on 09 July 1997x x x.
Whereas, paragraph 2 of Waterfields’ Answer reads:
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint are admitted.

Clearly, Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material allegation that the Contract of Lease
was amended on July 9, 1997. "It is wellsettled that judicialadmissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who
is the party [itself] and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it.

Moreover, "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his
own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence,
whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing [to be] true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it."
In view of these, any effort on the part of Waterfields to impugn the July 9, 1997 letter is futile.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 15, 2006 and Resolution dated April 12,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July
14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 00-96228, which affirmed the Decision
dated May 7, 1999 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 160443-CV granting the
Complaint, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

8.     Dimaguila v. Sps. Monteiro, G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

DOCTRINE:

In the defense of palpable mistake in judicial admissions, it must not be self-serving and it should be supported
 by any iota of evidence.

Through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.

SUMMARY: Monteiro spouses demanded partition for a house because they said that they are co-owners of the
house with Dimaguila. Dimaguila said that there is no co-ownership because the house has already been partitioned.
In light of the Answer of Dimaguila, Monteiro amended their complaint to recovery and possession. Dimaguila said
that there was no partition that happened but the courts said that they already admitted that there was partition and
Monteiro even presented the Extrajudicial partition. Dimaguila said that that was only a palpable mistake. The SC
said that it is not a palpable mistake because it is self-serving and that there was no other evidence to support their
argument. Furthermore, there is already a judicial admission in the pleadings of Dimaguila which states that the
subject property has been partitioned. The doctrine of estoppel is applied because Monteiro relied upon the
admission of Dimaguila in their pleadings.

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC against petitioners. They alleged that they
are co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential house located at Laguna.

Petitioners in their Answer said that there was no co-ownership and the subject property was owned by Buenseda
partitioned equally between her two sons though a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion
assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano
and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated, namely:

xxx

f) Notice of Consignation by the petitioners in the exercise of their alleged right of redemption of the share being
claimed by the Spouses Monteiro in light of the deed of sale they produced and claimed to have been executed by
the heirs of Pedro in their favor;

xxx

On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend
and/or Admit Amended Complaint. The amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead
sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguila as and other
defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro.

In amending their complaint, Spouses Monteiro adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the
subject property had already been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition which they presented.

Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had divided the
southern-half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1 /3 shares measuring 81.13 square meters
each; that Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the southern-half immediately adjacent to the northern-half
adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano.
That on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming
Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of the share of Pedro, they discovered that
the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.
In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and
divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had been
actually divided into southern and nmihern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned
only the division of the subject property "into two and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of
a co-owenrship, contrary to their original position.
RTC: Ruled for Sps Monteiro. The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property
into two share and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division of the
property into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and honored by
their heirs. The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by the Dimaguilas themselves in their original
answer. It gave no credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an error of their former counsel and
that she was unaware of the contents of their original answer.

CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the there was already a partition in the property in question.

RULING: YES.
The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding the partition of the subject property into northern and
southern portions was a mistake of their former counsel, and it was not their intention to partition the property
because to do so would damage the house thereon. Even assuming an admission was made, the petitioners aver that
such was made only by some, but not all, of the co-owners; and that partition can only be made by all co-owners,
and allowing the admission is tantamount to effecting partition by only some co-owners.

It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed "to divide between
them into two and share and share alike" the subject property, including the house situated thereon.

It, thus, appears that the subject property had already been partitioned into definite portions more than 20 years prior
to the original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that such division had been observed by the brothers' heirs.
As earlier pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact in their original answer, to wit:

(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by all the parties in this case from the beginning or as soon as
they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO DIMAGUILA became the sole and exclusive owner of the
southern half of the afore described property and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA became the sole owner of the
northern half of the same property; the house that was built thereon and still existing up to this time was likewise
equally divided between the two (2) DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the extrajudicial partition of half
equal shares;
xxx
2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA in the above described property has already been long
segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well known by all the parties in this case.
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former
counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:
Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?
A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same without giving us a copy ...
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Furthermore, the Court notes that this position
was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in response to the
amended complaint of the respondent spouses.
It was precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The petitioners
cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake.
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so amended their original complaint for
partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property.
Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the
property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to
prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

III. Rules of Admissibility (Rule 130)

A.   Object (Real) Evidence (Rule 130, Secs. 1 and 2)

 A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE

Section 1. Object as evidence. – Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object
is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (1)

B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Section 2. Documentary evidence. – Documents as evidence consist of writings, recordings, photographs or any
material containing letters, words, sounds, numbers, figures, symbols, or their equivalent, or other modes of written
expression offered as proof of their contents. Photographs include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray
films, motion pictures or videos. (2a)

 also cf. Rule 135, Sec. 2; Rule 28

RULE 135

Sec 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. — The sitting of every court of justice shall be public, but any court
may, in its discretion, exclude the public when the evidence to be adduced is of such nature as to require their
exclusion in the interest of morality or decency. The records of every court of justice shall be public records and
shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of
the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in
the interest of morality or decency.

RULE 28

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS

Section 1. When examination may be ordered. — In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is
in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may in its discretion order him or her to submit to a physical
or mental examination by a physician.

Section 2. Order for examination. — The order for examination may be made only on motion for good cause shown
and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties, and shall specify the time, place, manner,
conditions and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.

Section 3. Report of findings. — If requested by the party examined, the party causing the examination to be made
shall deliver to him or her a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting out his or her
findings and conclusions. After such request and delivery, the party causing the examination to be made shall be
entitled upon request to receive from the party examined a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter
made, of the same mental or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on
motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses
to make such a report the court may exclude his or her testimony if offered at the trial.

Section 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by taking
the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he or she may have in that action or any
other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may
thereafter examine him or her in respect of the same mental or physical examination.

1.     People v. Bardaje 99 SCRA 388 (1980)

DOCTRINE:
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than any witnesses put together.
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated
by evidence of corpus delicti

SUMMARY:
FACTS:
Marcelina Cuizon filed a criminal complaint of against ADELINO Bardaje and other 5 persons alleging that she was
taken to a place far away and was raped by ADELINO.
ADELINO was arrested on December 17th, and it was on December 20th, when he signed the alleged confession,
Exhibit "C", admitting having kidnapped and molested MARCELINA, which was probably the basis for
1

MARCELINA's complaint, presumably prepared with the help of the Fiscal.

It will be noted that the complaint filed directly by MARCELINA with the Court was amended by the Fiscal in the
Information. While MARCELINA charged ADELINO only with Rape, the Fiscal charged him with "Rape with
Illegal Detention". MARCELINA merely alleged that she was dragged from the house of Norma Fernandez by
means of force and intimidation and at nighttime. On the other hand, the Information added that the accused were
"armed with bolos".
RTC: Found ADELINO Guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced him to death.

Dr. Vitus Hobayan, Jr., Resident Physician at the Samar Provincial Hospital, declared that he examined
MARCELINA on December 20, 1965 and issued a Medical Certificate with the following findings:

1. No evidence of external injuries around the vulva or any part of the body.

2. Hymen no intact, presence of old healed laceration at 4, 7, 12 o'clock.

3. Vagina easily admits two fingers.

4. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa 7

Explaining the "old healed laceration", the doctor stated that laceration may have been caused by possible sexual
intercourse or other factors, and if it were intercourse, he estimated that it could have occured " say, two weeks or
one month" or possibly more
For his part, ADELINO, aged 18, admitted having had carnal knowledge of MARCELINA but denied having raped
her. He claims that they eloped on December 14 to 17, 1965 as previously planned, they having been sweethearts
since November 12, 1964
ISSUE: WON ADELINO’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: NO.
In the instant case, we find MARCELINA's charge that she was forcibly abducted and afterwards raped by
ADELINO in conspiracy with FIVE OTHERS highly dubious and inherently improbable.
To start with, according to the medical findings, "no evidence of external injuries was found around the vulva or
any part of the body" of Complainant, a fact which is strange, indeed, considering that Complainant was allegedly
"dragged" slapped" into unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally abused.
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than any witnesses put together . We are also
faced with the medical finding of "old healed lacerations" in the hymen which, according to the testimony of the
examining physician would have occurred two weeks or even one month before if said lacerations had been caused
by sexual intercourse. This expert opinion bolsters the defense that MARCELINA and ADELINO had previous
amorous relations at the same time that it casts serious doubts on the charge of intercourse by force and intimidation.

Secondly, by Complainant's own admission, the first hut she was taken to was a small one-room affair occupied by a
woman and two small children. Her charge, therefore, that she was ravished in that same room is highly improbable
and contrary to human experience.

Thirdly, from her own lips, Complainant testified that the second hut where she was taken, that of Ceferino Armada,
consisted of a small room separated from the sala by a wall of split bamboos. Further, that Ceferino with his wife
and seven children all lived therein. It challenges human credulity that she could have been sexually abused
with so many within hearing and distance. It is unbelievable, too, that under those circumstances the FIVE
OTHERS could have stood guard outside, armed with bolos and drinking, while ADELINO allegedly took
advantage of her. If rape were, indeed, their malevolent intent, they would, in all probability, have taken turns in
abusing her. That they did not, indicates that there was, indeed, some special relationship between MARCELINA
and ADELINO. Furthermore, with people around, and the hut constructed as it was, it would have been an easy
matter for MARCELINA to have shouted and cried for help.

In respect of the alleged confession of ADELINO, suffice it to re-state that "an extrajudicial confession made by
an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. 9

Corpus delicti is proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime prosecuted had been committed. That
proof has not been met in the case at bar, the evidence establishing more of an elopement rather than kidnapping or
illegal detention or forcible abduction, and much less rape. Moreover, ADELINO, aged 18, was by himself when
being investigated by soldiers, without benefit of counsel nor of anyone to advise him of his rights. Aside from his
10

declaration that Ws confession was obtained through maltreatment and violence, it was also vitiated by a
11

procedural irregularity testified to by no less than prosecution witness Sgt. Pedro Gacelos to the effect that he and
room after he presented the statement to the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rojas. There is reason to believe, therefore that
12

the so called confession was attested without ADELINO's presence so that the latter cannot be said to have duly
subscribed and sworn to it.

The totality of the foregoing circumstances count with such great weight and significance that they lend an aura of
improbability and reasonable doubt to the allegation that MARCELINA had been "kidnapped" or "illegally
detained" and that when she and ADELINO engaged in sexual intercourse, it was because of force or intimidation
exercised upon her.

WHEREFORE, upon reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from imposing the death penalty, is reversed and the
appellant, Adelino Bardaje, acquitted of the crime with which he is charged. His immediate release is ordered unless
lie is held on other charges.

2.     People v. Rullepa, G.R. No. 131516, March 5, 2003, 398 SCRA 567

DOCTRINE: STATUTORY RAPE CASE  

A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses
of the court.

There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's appearance in determining his or her age

SUMMARY:

FACTS:

On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape.
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in Quezon City, Cyra May, then
only three and a half years old, told her, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig
ko."

When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May had told them was
true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days
earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant several times.
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe
ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga," thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did
these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Cyra May, came up with her report dated November 21, 1995, 7

containing the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is
flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with congested and abraded
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette
and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the examining
index finger.
xxx           xxx           xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of examination. (Emphasis
supplied.)
By Dr. Preyra's explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by friction with an object,
perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.
The defense's sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he took the witness stand on
June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra May's genitalia, and claimed that
prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. He
further alleged that after he refused to answer Gloria's queries if her husband Buenafe, whom he usually
accompanied whenever he went out of the house, was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He
suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the complaint.

ISSUES: WON the accused appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape. YES

WON The physical appearance is admissible as object evidence. YES

RULING:

In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged incident Cyra May was
already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have scratched herself which caused the
abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out this possibility. She stated categorically that that part of the
female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful. The abrasions could not, therefore, have been
22

self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found "no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of
the examination" does not preclude accused-appellant's conviction since the infliction of force is immaterial in
statutory rape.23

More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony that accused-appellant
inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is possible that accused-appellant's penis failed
to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina, the former being more resistant to extreme forces than the latter.

Dr. Preyra, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly beneath the labia majora," proving 27

that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or "scrubbing" of the penis against its
surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
29

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
xxx           xxx           xxx.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age . . .
xxx           xxx           xxx.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death
sentence. The same Article states:

xxx           xxx           xxx.

4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx           xxx           xxx.

Several cases suggest that courts may take "judicial notice" of the appearance of the victim in determining her age.
31

On the other hand, a handful of cases holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule
34

129 of the Rules of Court, cannot take judicial notice of the victim's age.
35

The process by which the trier of facts judges a person's age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as
judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous,
inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are
already known to courts. As Tundag puts it, it "is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take
38

and act on without proof because they already know them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions
governing judicial notice are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved." When the trier of facts observes the
appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is
conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process
militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the presentation of
evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person's
appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court.
Section 1, Rule 130 provides:

SECTION 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court.
When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an alien's age from his appearance. In Braca v. Collector of
Customs, this Court ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the immigrant what his age is. The
person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the board
of special inquiry to determine his right to enter; and such body may take into consideration his appearance to
determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the applicant is not a minor based upon such appearance
is not without evidence to support it.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's appearance in determining his or her age.
As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is
again reproduced hereunder:

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and
the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the
testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative's testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's appearance, as object evidence of her age,
loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused.

This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victim's mere physical appearance is not
enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority
of the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim's age in the present case spells the difference between
life and death.
47

 
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below
twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim's age from her appearance. No
reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature
three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the
victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is,
by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of
reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and
punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

3.     Ocampo v. People, G.R. No. 194129, June 15, 2015

Doctrine: Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the
physical evidence must be upheld.

Facts: On May 7, 2000 petitioner Ocampo, a policeman, with the use of a personal firearm fired at the victim Mario
De Luna, hitting the latter’s chest and several body parts which resulted in the victim’s death. The wounds were
determined to be the direct and immediate cause of the victim’s death by the Medico-legal officer. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and put up the defense of self-defense stating that he was compelled to use
the firearm due to the unprovoked knife attack by the victim upon the person of the petitioner. One witness named
Marita was brought upon the court and testified to the fact that indeed, there was an unprovoked knife attack by the
victim to the petitioner when the latter interjected in a situation which might have resulted in a fight between the
group of the victim and another group that were drinking in close proximity. 

Issue: WON the prosecution was able prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling: YES

Rationale:

Settled is the rule that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be met:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and 

(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person engaged in self-defense.

In this case, petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first element of self-defense. There
was no showing of attack or assault that had placed petitioner’s life in imminent or actual danger. Petitioner’s tale
of self-defense is negated by the physical evidence, specifically the trajectory of the bullets that penetrated the
victim’s body. 

Indeed, physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks higher in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder/homicide or rape, in which the accused stand to lose their
liberty if found guilty, this Court has, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining
the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of
the physical evidence must be upheld.

Ineluctably, the victim in this case cannot be considered as the aggressor. For one, an eyewitness attested that
accused-appellant shot the victim without any provocation. Also, as correctly noted by the trial court, there was
failure to impute ill motive on the part of the eyewitness who had implicated accused-appellant in the fatal shooting
of the victim. Jurisprudence holds that when there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
witness to testify falsely against the accused or to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such motive
exists, and that the former's testimony is worthy of full faith and credit

With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court finds that the means employed by petitioner was
grossly disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful aggression. The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds
in his chest and different parts of his body. Indeed, the Advance Information prepared by the investigator of the case
reveals that there was no mention of either a stabbing incident that happened or a knife that was recovered from the
crime scene. Here, the wounds sustained by the victim clearly show the intent of petitioner to kill and not merely to
prevent or repel an attack.
 4.     Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Reyes, 544 SCRA 206 (2008)

Doctrine: Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witness, we
consistently rule that physical evidence should prevail.

Facts: On December 7, 1990 Respondent Reyes, together with her daughter went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an
ATM account. Respondent informed one of the petitioner’s employees, Mr. Capati, to open an ATM account of
200,000 Pesos, 100,000 pesos to be taken from one of her existing accounts and the other 100,000 pesos to be given
in cash.

However, Mr. Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for 200,000 pesos which were to be
withdrawn from the respondent’s existing accounts. Mr. Capati returned to the respondent and informed her that her
existing balance could not accommodate the 200,000 pesos transfer to the new ATM account. Respondent clarified
things with Mr. Capati and was handed a duplicate copy of her deposit reflecting the amount of 200,000 pesos.
However, respondent found out that her account only contained 100,000 pesos and as such, filed a case against the
Petitioner BPI.

Issue: WON Respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove her claim

Ruling: NO.

Rationale:

The assertions of respondent claiming that she had told Mr. Capati to transfer 100,000 from her existing account and
paying the remaining 100,000 pesos in cash is not borne out by the other evidence presented. It is not refuted that
Capati prepared a withdrawal slip for 200,000. This is contrary to the claim of respondent that she instructed Capati
to make a fund transfer of only 100,000 pesos from her saving account to the express teller account she was
opening. Yet, respondent signed the withdrawal slip nonetheless. The court finds it strange that she would sign the
withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw only 100,000 from her savings account and deposit
100,000 in cash with her.

While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by Capati and not by respondent herself was
a violation of the bank’s policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction, nevertheless, we find that the
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of
100,000 pesos deposited to the new express teller account.

Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where
the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witness, we
consistently rule that physical evidence should prevail.

5.     People v. Larrañaga, 463 SCRA 652 (2005)

Doctrine: Physical Evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof and speaks more eloquently than all the
witnesses put together.

Facts: On May 5, 1999, the respondent together with six co-respondents, were found guilty of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of Jacqueline Chiong by the Special Heinous Crimes Court in Cebu City and was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. On 3 February 2004, the Supreme Court of the Philippines found the author also guilty of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape of Marijoy Chiong and sentenced him to death. He
was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Jacqueline
Chiong. According to the prosecution, the respondent, along with seven other men, kidnapped Marijoy and
Jacqueline Chiong in Cebu City on 16 July 1997. On the same day, the two women were allegedly raped. Marijoy
Chiong was then pushed down into a ravine, while Jacqueline Chiong was beaten. Jacqueline Chiong's body remains
missing.

Issue: WON the guilt of the appellants were proven beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling: YES
Rationale:
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusia’s testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to
his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that Rusia’s testimony was not viewed in isolation. In
giving credence to Rusia’s testimony, the trial court took into consideration the physical evidence and the
corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial court’s
findings.
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia’s testimony worthy of belief is its striking
compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks more
eloquently than all witnesses put together. The presence of Marijoy’s ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan,
Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia’s testimony on what actually
took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. 
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw
the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other witnesses
who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed Jacqueline’s two failed
attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as
the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo
Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the white van, driven by Caño,
was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the van.
And lastly, Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan,
Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia’s narration. Now, with such
strong anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why should we not
accord credence to Rusia’s testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be
unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the
prosecution.

6.     Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil 570 (1929)

Doctrine: The constitutional right to not be a witness against himself applies also to cases wherein the prosecution
demands the petitioner to write things down to determine whether or not he was the person responsible for falsifying
a document.

Facts:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to
appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given
upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether or not
it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the respondents contend
that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal
and later granted by the court below, and again which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of
section 1687 of the Administrative Code. Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and
the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any
crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons
cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision
contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58. (To not be a witness against himself)
Issue: WON the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence
against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination

Ruling: Yes. Constitutional right prevails

Rationale:

We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels,
because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not
exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier

writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the
petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. 

But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained
herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in
some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute
the raison d’ etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

7.     People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092 (30 Sept 1987) edited by Dizon

DOCTRINE
The lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise
voluntary, technically." Therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self- incrimination.

FACTS

The RTC of Zamboanga Del Norte renders judgement acquitting Olvis (Principal by inducement) and
sentencing the accused Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela (Principal by direct participation) to suffer the
maximum penalty of Death for Murder.

When Sorela was picked up by the patrolmen. It was alleged that Sorela broke down and admitted having
participated in the killing of Bagon along with Villarojo and Cademas. The latter was soon picked up by the
police.

The police made the 3 re-enact the crime to lead them to the grounds where Bagon was supposed to have
been buried. In the re-enactment, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the victim was bolloed to
death. Exhibit "Y," a photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike
another, while Solero and Cademas look on. Exhibit "X", another photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act
of concealing the murder weapon behind a banana tree, apparently after having done the victim in.

Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solero, Villarojo, and Cademas executed
Discredit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco municipal mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00
each.

While in custody the three executed five separate written confessions each:
September 9, 1975 = 1 to local Philippine Constabulary Headquarters and another to Polanco police
September 18, 1975 = National Bureau of Investigation
September 21, 1975 = Philippine Constabulary
September 25, 1975 = Police of Polanco

On September 9, 14, 21 and 25, the accused pointed out the involvement of accused Olvis as principal by
inducement. In contrast, September 18 confessions categorically denied Olvis involvement.

ISSUES

Whether or not the 3 accused appellants’ extrajudicial confessions are admissible in evidence. – NO!

Whether or not the forced re-enacments of the crime are admissible in evidence. – NO!

RATIONALE:

Extrajudicial confession without a counsel

People v. Decierdo

…  Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation of indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned.

Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity.
In their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not
assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. 

As we said in Decierdo, the lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law,
'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically."

Extrajudicial confession with counsel

Atty Navarro of the Citizen Legal Assistance office, DOJ was requested for the extrajudicial confession
dated September 18 and 25, 1975. 
 There is nothing there that would show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice
(specifically, the appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder). On the
contrary, it is clear therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. He cannot therefore be
said to have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the confession
proceedings. What we said in People v. Galit, applies with like force here:

No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.

Forced re-enactments

Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. The constitution state that “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”

Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution
and hence, incompetent evidence.

It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when they took
part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict
application.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the Decision dated November 30, 1984. The
accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found guilty of homicide, and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years,
eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Discredit Bagon in the sum of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

8.     Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748 (23 July 2014)

DOCTRINE: A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

FACTS:

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,
or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Petitioner denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for
extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but
he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the
NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his
urine sample, to no avail.

RTC found the petitioner guilty. Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the
urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he
alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by
counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: WoN the urine sample (drug test results) is admissible as evidence in the present case.

RULING:

We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue
only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest
curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription.
Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the
right against self incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994];
People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) 

Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel
morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to
determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921])
and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC
and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing
was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People, the petitioner therein and
his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-
NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in
that case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was
found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine
sample was inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material." The situation in Gauteng Was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts
but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner
and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same
when they were requested to undergo a drug test.

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the
trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a
lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he
was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

9.     Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995)

DOCTRINE: The value of photographs as evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the
original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 

FACTS: 

The case occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was
the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in
rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it
resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."

The incident took place during a rally held by Marcos loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the
"Coryistas." 

Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on some
cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused
Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming
but the mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and
lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the
Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he
died upon arrival.
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The press
took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national and
international attention. 

The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo,
and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the
prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various
photographs taken during the mauling.

The RTC found the petitioners guilty. This was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: WoN the photographs presented by the prosecution is admissible as evidence.

RULING:

Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta — starting
from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, — as he was being
chased by his assailants and as he sat pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are
photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star,  
Mr. and Ms. Magazine, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Malaya. The admissibility of these photographs is being
questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took the same.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The
value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer,
however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a
faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who
made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its
accuracy.  Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can
testify to its exactness and accuracy. 

This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through
counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the
accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri
used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not
have participated in the mauling of the victim.  The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and
accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other
accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent
hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No
objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and
interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. 

The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person
who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of
the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy
thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons
for their presence thereat.

10. People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 505 (2004)

DOCTRINE: In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the Rape with Homicide of Kathylyn D. Uba. When the police went to the home of the
victim, they found her naked body with multiple stab wounds. 

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of
Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the
scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of
Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death, however, he was
placed under police custody.

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was
accordingly, sentenced to Death. Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

ISSUE: WoN DNA evidence is admissible

RULING:

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides that an
accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime,
or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal
investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist
immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the
guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the
same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as
hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber
from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.
Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If
properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used
as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony
they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such
novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as
the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is
no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the
right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

11. Malilin v. People, 553 SCRA 619 (2008)

DOCTRINE: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be.

FACTS:

On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five
police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team
was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot,
SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The search—conducted in the presence of
barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly
yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.

Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

The trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. This
was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: WoN the two plastic sachets of shabu are admissible as evidence

RULING:

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a
prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by
law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable
mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and
is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the
level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small
and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in
their daily lives.41 Graham vs. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later
analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court
on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was excluded from the
prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could
have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested
in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have
been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which
similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.

A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon
and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom
Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to
whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not
presented in court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind
might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects
laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?

The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who
recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same
items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his
own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which
she received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until
before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.

The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the seized items
because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such
failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out
the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only
with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.

12. People v. Wagas, G.R. No. 157943 (4 Sept 2013)”

DOCTRINE: Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts
in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except
the party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. 

FACTS:

Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:

That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the
latter, did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the
amount of ₱200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation, but which check when presented
for encashment with the bank, was dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite of
notice and several demands made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same with cash,
he had failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.

On cross-examination, Ligaray, the witness presented by the prosecution, admitted that he did not personally meet
Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert
Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.

The RTC convicted Wagas of estafa. Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.

In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to one other; that it was
highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving a huge
amount of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the person with
whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by Cañada, indicated that
the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA," that the goods had been received by Cañada in good order
and condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued
the check to Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the
element of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with certainty that it was him who had
transacted with Ligaray over the telephone.

ISSUE: WoN the declaration of the witness was admissible as evidence and enough to convict beyond reasonable
doubt Wagas of estafa.

RULING:

Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because
he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was
really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and
trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first
authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed
by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means. Without the
authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all
too easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly
recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. The identity of the caller could also be established by
the caller’s self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call,
the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of
knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller.

Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded
probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to
one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:

Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue,
and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the
party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary
that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was
had, provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the
development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof
of such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible.
However, circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller.
The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether
the threshold of admissibility has been met.

Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish that it had
been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray
during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from
him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas

Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he "know[s]" him was still
vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of
Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was
not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had
transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as
decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.