947105 ENS Journal of Eurasian StudiesSakiev

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Journal of Eurasian Studies

Guest warriors: The phenomenon of 2020, Vol. 11(2) 188­–200

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https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520947105
DOI: 10.1177/1879366520947105
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Azamat Sakiev

Abstract
A puzzling aspect of the Syrian war has been the seemingly endless infusion of foreign fighters who have fueled and
sustained the conflict. Unique among these are the militants from former Soviet regions such as Northern Caucasus
in Russia and republics of Central Asia. In the evolving complexity of a layered and multifaceted conflict, it is easy to
overlook the incongruousness of their presence in the conflict. Unlike most other foreign fighters, including those
joining from Western Europe and North America, the post-Soviet militants lack the ethno-linguistic ties to the region.
Rather, they hail from areas steeped in comparatively secular traditions and largely detached from the central tenants of
the Syrian war. This makes their presence among extremist groups, such as the Islamic State, somewhat intriguing and
anomalous. A key question, therefore, is why would these individuals join what to them in many ways is an alien war with
extremely prohibitive costs? This articles proposes, as complementary to the dominant religious-ideological accounts, an
explanation rooted in the enabling effect of marginalization processes in militants’ domestic settings.

Keywords
Extremism, foreign fighters, militancy, post-Soviet, Syrian conflict

Submitted Date: 2 February 2020

Acceptance Date: 13 July 2020

In October 2013, a video emerged from the Syrian war of
some 150 Kazakhstan nationals joining the ranks of the self-
proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The
20-min clip featured groups of families with children declar-
ing their loyalty to the organization (Kozhakanova & Kates,
2013). The video has become a watershed moment in wider
public awareness about the participation in the war of fight-
ers from the post-Soviet area. Since then it has been estab-
lished that militants from northern Caucasus in Russia to
republics in Central Asian form a sizable segment of foreign
fighters in the conflict—nonuniformed private citizen com-
batants not organized by nor affiliated with any state or pri-
vate security entity (Hegghammer, 2010b; Malet, 2010).
Reports suggest that at the height of the conflict in 2017
some 40% of the overall number of outsiders joining the war
were militants from the former Soviet areas (International
Crisis Group, 2015; Neumann, 2015; The Soufan Center,
2017). The region, therefore, has become one of the most
prolific suppliers of fighters to the war.
Despite their numbers, there has not been a steady focus
on these fighters. Partly due to lack of reliable data that
would allow a segmented look at fighters’ make-up, and
partly due to the tendency of uniform labeling where all
militants are lumped together as part of a single mass.
Either scenario prevents a more nuanced analysis of dis-
tinct patterns among the fighters, which may have valu-
able implications for conflict management. For example,
nuanced differentiation of militant composition may help
us better understand their motivations for joining the war.
The dynamics on the ground certainly point to such a need,
as the United States has recently designated an Uzbek mil-
itant group in Syria, Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), as
a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity
(US State Department, 2018). Branching out of ISIS into
regional franchises such as the IS-Khorasan in larger
Department of Political Science, West Chester University, West
Chester, PA, USA
Corresponding author:
Azamat Sakiev, Department of Political Science, West Chester
University, 725 S. Church St, West Chester, PA 19383, USA.
Email: asakiev@wcupa.edu

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Sakiev 189
Central Asia is further evidence of need for closer look at
the militants (Giustozzi, 2018). More granulated analysis
offers advantages for both better understanding the anat-
omy of extremist organizations and the management of the
campaign (military or otherwise) against them.
To be sure, a blanket portrayal of disparate militants has
its own useful benefits. Overarching terms such as ISIS
(ISIL) or “Jihadists” simplify the reality on the ground to
somewhat digestible levels. In Syria, it may even have helped
unite incompatible sides—Syrian Government/Russia, Iran,
Turkey, Kurds, and the United States—to join forces in com-
batting a common enemy. However, this tendency misses
important micro-trends and patterns critical to analysis.
Focusing on aggregate characteristics, such as quantitative
aspect of the militants, their sheer numbers, overlooks the
more refined qualitative aspects pertaining to their individual
backgrounds and diverse motivations. These trends are cru-
cial and need to be discerned for detailed examination. There
are implications not only for the conduct of the war but also
for devising measures to prevent one.
The post-Soviet fighters constitute one such distinct
group who deserve a detailed look. For one, these militants
have had a direct impact on the course of the war. Russia,
for example, used their presence in Syria as a pretexts to
deploy its military; deeply escalating and altering the
dynamics of the conflict (V. Putin, personal communica-
tion, September 27, 2015). On the ground, too, these fight-
ers have established themselves as a potent force. Their
higher literacy rate, training in handling explosives, and
overall military preparedness (all courtesy of Soviet-based
education, compulsory military systems, as well as partici-
pation in post-Soviet conflicts such as in Tajikistan and
Chechnya) have greatly raised their value to extremist
groups (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty [RFERL], 2014).
Exploring the mobilization patterns of these fighters, there-
fore, presents a worthy analytical endeavor.
Beyond the impact on the war, the post-Soviet militants
also present a valuable opportunity to further our under-
standing of militant mobilization. Particularly puzzling, for
example, are the motivations of these individuals to partici-
pate in wars that is alien, remote, or otherwise physically
and conceptually distant from their immediate realities.
Studies of foreign fighters, for example, underscore the pull
power of such factors as religious calling and/or extremist
recruiting networks that lure fighters in from far away
(Giustozzi, 2018; Malet, 2010). Somewhat minimized in
these models is the role of circumstances surrounding
would-be militants that push them to respond to these calls.
That is, factors born out of would-be militants’ immediate
reality play a crucial role in complementing the pulling
forces (of distant calling) to determine the likelihood of
mobilization. The selective self-mobilization of post-Soviet
fighters from among many who have been exposed to the
distant calling illustrates well this prodding effect of locally
shaped influences.
This article renews the focus on the complementary role
of locally conditioned (push) factors. It does so in the fol-
lowing sequence. First, it surveys what makes the fighters
from the former Soviet Union a distinct group both in the
Syrian war and in general as foreign fighters. Then, it
reviews the existing literature on why/how individuals
become foreign fighters. The survey highlights the impor-
tance of locally sourced (push) factors that work in conjunc-
tion with overarching pull forces to engender militant
mobilization. The case of post-Soviet fighters is well posi-
tioned to demonstrate this complementary dynamic
(between pull and push factors). These include factors stem-
ming from marginalization processes rooted in economic,
ethno-cultural, and political circumstances surrounding
would-be militants in their home countries. Locally
grounded and centered on domestic concerns of potential
recruits, these factors provide a complementing and refined
account for militant mobilization in post-Soviet space.
Distinct militants
An intriguing aspect of post-Soviet fighters is that they
constitute an intriguing case with regard to both the general
phenomenon of foreign fighters and the militancy specific
to the Syrian war. Studies outline roughly three conditions
that determine the likelihood of foreign militancy in gen-
eral. These are ethno-national affiliations, proximity of the
conflict zone (physical distance), and cause alignment or
salience. Specific to conflicts in the Middle East, there is
often one more determinant—the religious factor. Post-
Soviet fighters seem to constitute a unique group with
regard to all four and thereby present an interesting case for
analysis.
In Syria, the fighters from former Soviet space lack the
ethno-linguistic or national ties to the region in general and
the Syrian conflict in particular. Unlike most other fighters,
including those joining from Western countries, they are
non-Arabic speakers hailing from largely non-religious
political traditions with relatively secular populations.
Although resurgence of Islam following the Soviet demise
has been a recurring theme, the areas remain relatively and
comparatively areligious. These stretch from Northern
Caucasus in Russia to southern Caucasus (Azerbaijan,
Georgia) and on to republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan).
Sometimes dubbed as “Russians,” fighters from these areas
do not have a direct ethno-linguistic connection to the war.
Although southern Russia is a mix of Indo-Iranian and Turkic
ethnic groups, Central Asia comprises mostly Turkic nations
with the exception of Tajikistan, which is predominantly
Farsi. None of these places are home to diaspora populations
with ties to Syria and the Middle East in general.
This distinction is more conspicuous when overlaid
against the background of other outside fighters joining the
war in significant numbers. The majority tend to be of Arab
190 Journal of Eurasian Studies 11(2)
ethno-linguistic descent from either adjacent countries or
diaspora populations elsewhere. Indeed, a trove of detailed
personnel documentation belonging to the Islamic State in
Iraq, one of many groups recruiting foreigners and seized
during a raid in the Iraqi town of Sinjar in 2007, reveals that
overwhelming majority of fighters for the organization at
that time were ethnic Arabs (Felter & Fishman, 2007).
Even among those joining from far away, such as Western
Europe or North America, Arabs or groups affiliated with
ethnicities involved in the conflict, such as Kurds or
Turkomans, constituted the predominant majority. For
example, most Europeans fighting for various radical
groups tend to hail from immigrant populations of Middle
Eastern origin such as Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan, and
other diasporas (The Soufan Group, 2015).
Under these circumstances, the involvement of a dis-
tinct group that lacks ethnic ties to the conflict is particu-
larly striking. It is even more confounding given the
gradual morphing of the Syrian war into a sectarian strife
along the region’s ethnic divisions (Byman, 2014;
Hokayem, 2017). Despite attempts to portray it otherwise,
the war has increasingly become a conflict among Arabs,
Turkomans, Kurds, Allawites, Assyrians, Shias, and other
groups found in the area. Each is in it to defend their
ethno-national turf. Given this increasingly territorial
nature of the conflict, the agenda and purpose of the post-
Soviet fighters is anomalous. Such detachment makes this
a noticeably distinct group and raises a puzzling question
about their motivation. The lack of ethno-cultural link in
no way suggests the lack of purpose for these fighters. But
it does underscore the unique and somewhat bewildering
nature of their presence.
In addition to the ethno-linguistic/national conundrum,
the “Russians” are also geographically removed from the
war. The literature on the subject suggests that physical
remoteness serves as a single most prohibitive deterrent to
foreign fighter mobilization (Mendelsohn, 2011; Saideman,
2002). Wars, in other words, tend to draw participants from
geographically proximate areas. This is why if a conflict
draws foreign fighters, these tend to come from adjacent
countries and territories. According to the Sinjar files, for
example, Saudi Arabia and other proximate countries have
sent nearly all outside combatants to ISIS in Iraq. In Syria,
while fighters from remote destinations as North America
are often highlighted, the majority of rank and file foot sol-
diers for the extremist groups are recruited locally. Studies
of conflicts outside the Middle East, too, show that most
foreign combatants in such wars tend to come from ethno-
culturally related nations nearby (Hewitt & Kelley-Moore,
2009; Krueger, 2006). The “Russians” or Central Asians in
Syria, therefore, are an aberration rather than an expected
notion.
Another predicament added to the geographic proxim-
ity and national-cultural barriers is the uphill battle foreign
militants face in conforming to conflict causes. The agenda
(in)compatibility with the core purposes of a conflict often
prevents outside combatants from joining local militants.
Even when successfully joined, diverging attituded toward
the main cause and purpose of the struggle often antago-
nizes foreign fighters. They are accused by local fighters
of hindering, distracting, or otherwise diluting the legiti-
macy of indigenous causes. In conflicts as varied as
Bosnia, Chechnya, and the recent insurgency in Iraq, local
rebels have often unwelcomed help from outside for fear
of such distraction (Mitchell, 2008; Phillips, 2009; Rich &
Conduit, 2015; Tumelty, 2006). Recruited as military strat-
egists, weapons experts, or foot soldiers, foreign fighters
tend to delay, distort, or completely derail the indigenous
agenda once arrived (Rich & Conduit, 2015). They have
often been found to shift the focus from internal, largely
secular-nationalistic struggle to an externally inspired reli-
gious-extremist one. For this reason, rebels in conflicts
with localized agendas tend to avoid recruiting fighters
with no tangential connections (Bakke, 2014).
It could be argued that the Syrian war, as a globally gal-
vanizing event, is unique and that it does not follow the
general patterns of militant mobilization identified in other
conflicts. Instead of its causes being alien to far-flung for-
eign fighters, such militants can be seen as constituting an
integral fabric of the war. In this line, what was initially
(perceived) a civil war between the government and the
opposition has since turned into a conflict driven by outsid-
ers (Walter, 2017). Foreign militants, therefore, are no
longer an external assistance to a local cause. At this point,
they are the cause. In fact, they are the single most enduring
propellant of the war (Klausen, 2015; Zelin, 2013). For
those reasons, presence of foreign militants in Syria can be
proposed as a predicted outcome, not an unlikely sight.
Their arrival, therefore, is characterized as joining an
already internationalized insurgency, not a locally driven
agenda.
In sum, studies of foreign militancy indicated that
embarking on a foreign war is prohibitively costly affair.
Mobilization success is dependent on such conditions as
geographic proximity, cause alignment or agenda compat-
ibility, and ethno-national affiliation, lack of which should
prevent one from joining otherwise alien conflict. Based
on these we ought to expect few to no post-Soviet militants
in the Syrian war. Their significant presence despite these
seemingly prohibitive barriers is certainly puzzling. Why
do young men (and to lesser extent women; mostly as trail-
ing spouses), with no ethno-cultural ties, cause alignment,
and geographic distance to the conflict, nevertheless join
it? Addressing these questions from aforementioned indi-
vidual (push) perspective—factors local to would-be
militants’ home regions—presents advantageous analyti-
cal exercise. The following section surveys this link along
with the evaluation of the religious factor (fourth condi-
tion) as presenting the most dominant pull force for
mobilization.
Sakiev 191
Faith and foreign fighters
In general, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is underex-
plored. Their motivations to join external wars are even
more so. Of the works that directly address this phenome-
non, many focus on the role of overarching “pull” factors
that attract individuals to foreign wars. A dominant per-
spective in this regard is the religious-ideational approach.
It builds on the idea that religious calling and solidarity
draw individuals to join far-flung conflicts (Dawson &
Amarasingam, 2017). Although there are nonreligiously
motivated militant mobilizations out there, such as perhaps
foreign fighters in Eastern Ukraine or the various fighters
for some Kurdish groups in Syria (some ostensibly Marxist),
religion tends to occupy an outsized analytical attention as
a pulling force for militant mobilization. A recent global
survey by National Research Group on behalf of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies finds that religion
and religious identity, particularly those based in funda-
mentalism, are thought to be the primary root cause of
intra-state and terrorist violence (Penn, 2016). Religion or
religiosity, in other words, is often seen as the singularly
crucial factor in triggering militant motivation.
Works that emphasize this rationale can be broken down
into several themes. One prevalent variant centers on the
rise of Islamic activism in the last few decades as the main
attraction for would-be militants (Hegghammer, 2010a,
2010b). Particularly prominent among these is the brand of
activism originating in the Hejaz area of Saudi Arabia in
1970s. Its advent is thought to be behind the rise of pan-
Islamic identity that arguably has spawned the global net-
work of militant recruitment for various conflicts. Most
prominent among these is the recruitment drive to send vol-
unteers from the Middle East to the war in Afghanistan to
fight the Soviets. In this narrative, the perceived success of
the “Afghan Arabs” has buoyed and proliferated the subse-
quent recruiting campaigns for other conflicts. Through
1990s and 2000s, the religiously inspired (pan-Islamic)
calling is argued to have been instrumental in supplying
foreign militants to conflicts as far away as North Africa
and South-Asia (Hegghammer, 2010b).
Concomitant example of religious-ideational activism is
the Salafi-Jihadi strand. This network gained notoriety by
initiating the sustained flow of foreign fighters to the
Chechen wars in Russia in mid- to late-1990s (Moore &
Tumelty, 2008). The network has supplied thousands of
fighters on a religiously inspired mission to fight the (net-
work perceived) Russian occupation of Muslim lands. The
core of the pulling drive for these militants was participa-
tion in defensive Jihad. As such, the Chechen recruitment
effectively builds on the success of the Afghan campaign of
1980s. While carried out by distinct networks, the two
recruitment cycles are thought to be sequentially and inex-
tricably linked. To the point where the Chechen campaign
of 1990s is seen as a continuation of the Afghan effort of
1980s (Moore & Tumelty, 2008). The overarching narrative
is one of religiously inspired drive by volunteer fighters to
follow the retreating Russian forces from Afghanistan to
Chechnya.
This mechanism appears to be at play outside the region
as well. Studies in areas away from the Middle East have
found that religion is a key factor in attracting fighters to
join conflicts (Hegghammer, 2013). For example, when
presented with a choice of either attacking at home or join-
ing a war abroad, would-be militants tend to choose the
latter. They explain their choice with religiously informed
sense of legitimacy. That is, joining an established war
abroad is viewed as a superior form of struggle than engag-
ing in militancy at home. Prospective recruits tend to refer-
ence the religious notion of duty and fairness as the
prodding factor for their decision (Hegghammer, 2010a,
2010b). Curiously, this logic signals that fighting abroad is
often the default condition for many potential recruits, even
if options exist for other forms of violent struggle. The
issue, it appears, is not that militants join foreign wars. The
puzzle, it seems, is when they do not.
In a slight variation, other approaches move away from
squarely focusing on the enabling power of religion.
Instead, the emphasis is shifted to message framing and the
use of religion as a tool. In this logic, religion is an instru-
ment rather than the prodding force itself (Malet, 2010).
Along with other concepts such as ethnicity, race, or cul-
tural affinity, religion is used to frame foreign wars in more
immediate terms that attract outside participants. For such
framing to work, one does not have to be particularly reli-
gious. To sway would-be recruits, proper framing generates
defensive impulses and makes a distant confrontation seem
threatening one’s immediate surrounding and (often imag-
ined) community away (Anderson, 1999). Here, the reli-
gion by itself is not as important as the framing built around
it. Coupled with incentive for comradery, individual hero-
ism and fame the mix becomes a potent pull factor. Under
this narrative, carefully calibrated messaging, rather than
the underlying tenet, is the defining element driving the
mobilization impetus of would-be militants.
The prominent role of message framing in recruitment is
highlighted across variety of conflicts. This reveals an
interesting pattern with regard to force mobilization. When
it comes to foreign fighters (or even of national armies for
that matter), recruitment mechanisms are remarkably simi-
lar across distinct settings, including traditional interstate
wars. All rely on carefully crafted conditioning designed to
portray a conflict in terms of immediate urgency, no matter
how remote (in mind and physical distance) they may be. In
other words, there is nothing intrinsically religious about
joining a war. Conflicts as ideologically varied as the
Spanish Civil War, the Israeli Independence War, and the
Afghan insurgency against the Soviets have all been found
to rely on similar set of recruitment strategies based on tar-
geted framing (Malet, 2010). In all these cases, the use of
192 Journal of Eurasian Studies 11(2)
various contexts (whether religious, nationalistic, ideologi-
cal, or any other) has successfully portrayed a distant war as
a proximate and relevant urgency. While waged for distinct
causes, wars, it turns out, share the use of effective messag-
ing in recruiting heavily needed foreign fighters. What
draws foreign militancy, in other words, is not the what of a
conflict, but rather the how (framing and conditioning).
Islam and post-Soviet militants
So how do the various strands of religion-based accounts—
whether pinning it on religion itself or the messaging
around it—explain the puzzling mobilization of post-Soviet
fighters to a conflict in the Middle East? On the face of it, it
would not be imprudent to expect the religion to play a
major role. The region possesses key prerequisites manifest
in largely Muslim population and activity of recruiting net-
works. Indeed, most fighters from the region are predomi-
nantly Muslims, albeit ethno-culturally distinct from the
war. Moreover, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, the his-
torically Islamic areas have arguably been experiencing
religious resurgence. These include the northern Caucasus,
central Volga in Russia, countries in the Caucasus proper,
and the republics in Central Asia (McGlinchey, 2005;
Yemelianova, 2007). Together these regions account for
nearly all the militants joining the Syrian War from the for-
mer Soviet Union. Thus, a religious account for their moti-
vation to mobilize ostensibly makes sense—a predominantly
Muslim populations responding to the religious call (pull
factor) of the Syrian war. Furthermore, the process is argu-
ably aided by effectively recruiting networks pitching
related religious inspiration.
The narrative prompts few questions. One, whether the
extent of Islam’s reach and power in the region is over-
stated. Although a predominant religion, in comparative
terms, Islam here is thought to be of less pervasive nature
than, say, in the Middle East, South Asia, or other tradi-
tionally Muslim locales. Suppressed first by Bolsheviks
and later by Stalinism, the religion is argued to have mor-
phed in places such as Central Asia into what Oliver Roy
calls a peculiar and paradoxical state of “secular pan-
Islamism” (Roy, 2007). Seemingly losing the ability to
project devout and strict religious following, Islam has
mainly become an instrument for building localized secu-
lar-national identities. Decades of strict Soviet regulation
has eroded the ecclesiastical powers of (all) religions and
fostered, as a byproduct, their secularized rendition among
the local populations (Khalid, 2014; Ro’i, 2000). Thus,
Islam’s power in the region to move and influence masses
has arguably been significantly diminished, although not
completely vanquished.
These realities call for a careful consideration of the reli-
gion as a motivating force. While not completely negating
it, the power of Islam to sway masses ought to be taken
with caution in post-Soviet context. Particularly with regard
to religious motivations of such prohibitively costly enter-
prises as joining foreign wars. The unique “secularized”
brand of Islam forged by decades of Soviet control did not
disappear overnight following the latter’s demise. Relative
religious apathy persists to this day underpinning the com-
paratively secular outlook of the region. This appears to be
true across religious denominations prevalent in the region,
not only specific to Islam. A survey by Pew Research
Center of followers of all major confessions in the region
shows that the increased interest in religion following the
breakup of the Soviet Union has not translated into higher
rates of religious practices such as church/mosque attend-
ance (Cooperman et al., 2014). In other words, despite reli-
gious revival, religiosity has not swept the region and
secularism remains a potent legacy across post-Soviet soci-
eties (Tazmini, 2001).
The unique standing of religion across post-Soviet space
presents a challenge to the religion-driven explanations of
foreign militancy. Such a model may fall short in explain-
ing why droves of young men from largely secular regions
seek to join extremist organizations thousands of miles
away. Indeed, a recently commissioned study by the United
Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism has found that most
of the foreign terrorist fighters in the Syrian war tend not to
be religious at all (El-Said & Barrett, 2017). According to
the report, most militants have poor understanding of
Islam’s basic principles, do not know how to pray properly,
and cannot recite the main religious tenets. While absence
of religious knowledge does not preclude one’s susceptibil-
ity to religious calling, nor their self-perceived dedication
to it, it certainly hampers the validity of arguments that
stake so much on its driving force.
Further the exclusive focus on Islam as a religion dis-
tracts from opportunities to learn about the phenomenon
from cases not involving the Muslim world (Malet, 2013).
Consider eastern Ukraine, an interesting case in point in this
regard. This is a conflict that has attracted a high number of
foreign fighters on both sides (Jackson, 2014). Although
some are motivated by strands of Orthodox Christianity,
most fighters are there for a host of other reasons ranging
from nationalism sentiment and state backed enterprises to
personal adventure and profiteering (Rekawek, 2017). Thus,
conflicts such as these present an opportunity to learn more
about various aspects of foreign militancy including fighter
motivations, channels of infusion, impact on war dynamics,
and others. Studying these trends is of generalizable value to
other conflicts as well. Overwhelming emphasis on religion,
as observed in analyses of militant mobilization in the
Middle East, precludes and limits these benefits. Given ear-
lier findings that motivation for foreign militancy holds
remarkably similar across distinct conflicts, religious over-
emphasis may deprive us of these valuable lessons.
Similarly, Islam-centric approaches are not particularly
useful in accounting for the cases of non-Muslim combat-
ants joining seemingly “Muslim” wars. That is, if one to
Sakiev 193
expand the analytical base to include the cases of non-
Muslim foreign fighters, the religion-driven approaches
further lose their appeal. For example, interesting devel-
opment within foreign militancy in Syrian are the instances
of non-Muslim, non-convert westerners (Morin, 2016;
Percy, 2015). They are mostly found among Kurdish
groups fighting the Islamic State in the north of the coun-
try (The Carter Center, 2017). These cases are of enor-
mous value to understanding the dynamics of foreign
militancy. It would require approaches broader than nar-
row focus on religion (i.e., Islam) to account for these
cases.
Finally, a religious focus is also at odds with the uneven
recruitment outcomes among otherwise similar religious
demographics. It remains unclear, for example, as to why
among peers and siblings equally exposed to religious
motivation to join a foreign conflict, not all decide to
embark on the effort. The studies of recruitment networks
across western Europe have noted this puzzle of unequal
pull. The decision to become a foreign militant appears to
be an individualistic one, subject to push factors more com-
plicated and perhaps more particularistic than overarching
and somewhat simplistic account of religious calling
(Hegghammer, 2010b; Zelin, 2013).
It follows then, that when it comes to the post-Soviet mili-
tants, religious factor accounts only for part of the mobiliza-
tion process. While often argued to form a strong calling for
would-be militants, Islam’s pull appeal is comparatively
weaker in the post-Soviet space. This comparatively weaker
religious incentive then requires a complementing push force
to prod the mobilization for some individuals. The religion-
based approaches, in other words, constitute a good starting
point. They provide the underlying necessary condition—
religious predisposition—which requires matching sufficient
ones to complete the explanatory model. Promising in this
regard is to explore the immediate environment of would-be
militants in their home settings.
Marginalization as motivation
One potential area for a matching sufficient condition is to
focus on the effect of marginalization of would-be militants
in their home settings. As a complementary “push” force,
the feelings of relegation and overall deprivation in one’s
own community may help further explain (or regress the
explanatory plain) why some individuals may embark on
foreign militancy. The exclusionary sentiments are gener-
ated by various sources ranging in scope from socioeco-
nomic to ethno-cultural and psychological to ideological.
Regardless of the source, they all share in common the
ability to imbue the exclusionary feeling of uselessness,
dispensation, and lack of meaningful place in society. It
creates the mentality of “escapism,” an attempt to leave
the deplorable conditions for more adventurous and per-
ceivably meaningful endeavors such as foreign militancy
(Hafez, 2004; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). It is these mar-
ginalized segments of the society that are most susceptible
to extremist recruiting networks by answering their reli-
gious call to mobilize. This certainly appears to have been
the case in post-Soviet, particularly Central Asian fighters
in Syria.
There is empirical support for this line of contention. A
UN report finds that among the foreign fighters in Syria the
feeling of deprivation and exclusion in home settings pre-
dominates as the main motivating impetus prodding their
decision to join the war (El-Said & Barrett, 2017). Studies
of militants from Western nations also show that the choice
to join extremist groups is conditioned to a large extent by
sense of alienation in the immediate environment, per-
ceived injustice, and inability to escape the degrading con-
ditions (Azzam, 2007; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Slootman
& Tillie, 2006).
For would-be militants, foreign wars present just such
an opportunity. Despite sounding contradictory, the adven-
turous prospect of foreign conflicts is seen among sections
of deprived populations as a chance to better their condi-
tion, including through material profiteering (Mashal &
Faizi, 2017). In this, joining foreign militancy and becom-
ing a “guest warrior” is much the same as joining the for-
eign labor market and becoming a “guest worker.” Both
processes are underlined by similar decision-making logic
borne out of exclusionary processes. For “guest workers”
the prodding impetus tends to be economic exclusion, for
example, the lack of acceptable employment prospects at
home. For “guest warriors,” however, the material socio-
economic sources are further compounded by elusive and
less tangible factors such as ethno-cultural separation or
political oppression. From this perspective, foreign mili-
tancy is a function of calculated decision-making grounded
in surrounding realities.
Studies support this mechanism at play. In Europe, for
example, the sense of exclusion among immigrant commu-
nities was found to be instrumental in pushing individuals
into foreign conflicts, including the war in Syria (Benmelech
& Klor, 2016). Concentrated in large (informally) segre-
gated quarters across urban centers, immigrant communi-
ties in Western Europe tend to have below average economic
conditions, higher unemployment rates, and often are rele-
gated to what essentially amounts to a parallel existence
(Musterd & Ostendorf, 1998; Sainsbury, 2012). The sense
of resentment tends to be exacerbated under these condi-
tions. The reaction then can be as varied as participating in
violent unrest at home (e.g., Paris in 2005) or engaging in
radicalized militancy abroad. Failure of societal integration
and the lack of prospects for improvement are the primary
factors nudging young individuals from such areas to join
militancy abroad (Azzam, 2007).
The story of social exclusion and violence is closely
linked to the general theory of societal polarization and
conflict. It holds that stratification within societies, for
194 Journal of Eurasian Studies 11(2)
example, due to economic inequalities, have a direct effect
on the likelihood of a conflict, violence, or terrorism
(Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Gurr, 2011; Krueger, 2008).
Fluctuating economic fortunes tend to generate highly
polarized societies with segments of population feeling
left behind. The widening gap between the groups/classes
create conditions for societal instability and struggle.
Economically uneven or deprived societies then are found
to be most likely to face unrest and war. While largely
predicated on grievances and internal societal conflicts,
these theories are also useful for the story of external for-
eign militancy. That is, what prods polarized societies to
clash within—push back by marginalized segments of the
population—can also render the same excluded segments
more vulnerable to mobilize externally.
In addition to economic exclusion, sociopolitical factors
have also been found to generate marginalization processes.
These include regime types, ethno-religious diversity, state
repression, and other factors conducive to exclusion and
violence (Piazza, 2006). For example, societies under
severe political repression and/or with diverse ethnic make-
up are more likely to see violent outbreaks. In Iraq, for
example, low levels of civil liberties and political rights
have sowed deep isolationist sentiments between sectarian
communities that have provided a fertile ground for subse-
quent mobilization of militant groups there (Krueger,
2006). It is often noted in this regard that the intensity of the
conflict in Iraq has picked up exponentially as the minority
populations (mainly Sunnis, but also Kurds) have come to
face the new reality of post-occupational Iraq dominated by
the Shia faction. The subsequent militant resistance has led,
among others, to creation of the Islamic State, an entity
with the largest attraction of foreign fighters to date.
Stable democracies are not immune from generating
politically driven exclusionary processes that may trigger
militant motivations. Although in democratic settings, the
experiences are not entirely similar to marginalization pres-
sures felt in authoritarian regimes, particularly with regard
to civil rights and liberties. Nevertheless, avenues for
exclusionary pressures still exist. These come in the form
of state-sponsored surveillance programs, distrust in the
justice system, and otherwise relative deprivation factors
all thought to imbue the sense of isolation. Even in rela-
tively free societies, these feelings were found to prod
young men to eventually seek forms of radicalization and
join foreign wars (Hegghammer, 2013). The feeling of
alienation has been openly exploited by extremist groups,
including ISIS, to increase their recruitment drives in these
societies (Hussain, 2015).
Even some of the religion-centric accounts of foreign
militancy are, at their core, a story of marginalization and
exclusion (Hegghammer, 2010b, p. 57). Take, for example,
the notorious case of the Saudi Hejaz network or the rise of
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Central to the
evolutionary narrative of these organizations is the history
of state repression, imprisonment and persecution of their
key leaders. Founders of the Hejaz network, for example,
were the persecuted members of the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. For AQAP the founding impetus
came from systematic repression of the Sahwa movement
in Saudi Arabia in 1990s. Forced out of their home bases
activists belonging to these groups have then set up camp in
exile forming the pan-Islamic networks. With operations
across much of the Middle East, the entities were initially
motivated by resisting the political regimes that had
oppressed them. Exclusionary origins have put the organi-
zations on path to become successful recruiters and suppli-
ers of foreign fighters to conflicts around the region.
Whether explicit or implied the focus on the story of
marginalization as a motivating factor allows for more
refined assessment of the phenomenon of foreign mili-
tancy. It better informs our understanding of foreign fight-
ers and provides a more fitting theoretical foundation for
analysis. Marginalization takes us beyond the somewhat
simplistic religious accounts to provide a more nuanced
picture. While broader pull of the religion may still make
sense, the closer analysis of militants’ backgrounds and
circumstances points to more refined, additional factors
that ultimately shape their motivation. Often, these addi-
tional or matching conditions are borne out of “a sense of
exclusion and alienation, moral outrage, and search for a
new identity with a sense of meaning, purpose and belong-
ing” (Esposito, 2015, p. 1077). Foreign militancy, in other
words, cannot and should not be reduced to an overarch-
ing cause such as a religion.
Exclusion in ex-Soviet space
How does the marginalization model play out in the post-
Soviet area? Here, exclusionary processes are a complex
process with multifaceted factors at play. Identifying and
incorporating these accounts require relative abstraction
from any overarching or narrowly focused explanations.
Three areas are particularly helpful to focus on difficult
economic conditions, ethno-cultural tensions, and political
participatory pressures. These generate exclusionary senti-
ments that condition escapism mind-set making such indi-
viduals more susceptibility to militant recruitment. Focus
on these factors demonstrates that the sense of marginaliza-
tion born out of socioeconomic conditions plays a signifi-
cant pushing role prodding individuals to mobilization
(International Crisis Group, 2015, 2016; Sanderson, 2018).
As such mobilizing for foreign militancy is not dissimilar
to embarking on other forms of mobilization, for example,
becoming a migrant laborer. Both economic migrants and
foreign militants may ultimately be pushed by similar set of
factors. This hypothesis finds support both at larger/sys-
temic and individual levels of analysis.
At the larger level, alternative factors such as socio-
economic conditions have long been suspected to be the
Sakiev 195
primary drivers of foreign militancy by creating the exclu-
sionary settings. A report commissioned by USAID, for
example, has outlined as early as 2015 that among the
likely factors contributing to the outflow of Central Asian
youth to the conflict zones in the Middle East are the harsh
socioeconomic conditions in their home regions (Tucker,
2015). Specifically, highlighted were processes such as
repressive state security policies infringing on civil liber-
ties, criminalization and persecution of religious activities,
deteriorating economic conditions, and the setting of gen-
eral anti-western political climate. These factors amplify
the exclusionary sentiment most conducive to radical deci-
sion-making, including embracing foreign militancy. To
underscore this effect, the report recommends locally
grounded socioeconomic measures to stem the flow of
those willing to go to foreign wars. These include improv-
ing economic conditions, raising standards of living, build-
ing community support structures, expanding capacity of
moderate religious practices, expanding the US engage-
ment with the public, and others (Tucker, 2015).
At the individual level, the limited available data on
these fighters also seem to align with the marginalization
model. Consider the well-publicized case of the Kazakh
militants who have relocated to Syria with their entire fami-
lies (Kozhakanova & Kates, 2013). Although the group
professes religious faith as the reason for their move, closer
analysis of their journey reveals an alternative narrative at
play. In interviews, for example, the relatives and friends
give remarkably consistent stories of economic hardship
experienced by the group members back in Kazakhstan
(Glushkova & Najibullah, 2013). Prior to embarking on
militancy, the individuals reported to have expressed frus-
trations with their economic situations. Despite earning
university degrees many of them faced extended periods of
unemployment and constant migration within the country
in search of better prospects. In the end, they have given up
hope finding themselves as productive members of the
society. The perceived failure has eventually prompted the
group’s move to Turkey. From there opportunities have
taken them to join the militancy next door in Syria.
As can be pieced together from these sources, the ulti-
mate underlining factor in the decision of the Kazakh
group appears to have been their socioeconomic plight,
not their religious worldview. The latter may have served
as a catalyst or an escape valve, but only after being trig-
gered by preceding nonreligious conditions. This account
makes more sense given the general level of (non)religi-
osity in Kazakhstan. Studies show that despite the cli-
mate of fear and religious radicalization in Central Asia,
Kazakhstan is generally assessed to be the most resistant
in the region to religious radicalization (Baizakova &
McDermott, 2015). This certainly does not mean the
country cannot produce radically minded militants. But it
opens up the explanatory plane field to encompass the
alternative narratives. In case of the above group,
therefore, their militant path is predicated on the sense of
personal societal failure, uselessness and exclusion rather
than the urge to respond to religious calling. This fresh
perspective on their story is more in line with the margin-
alization model, even if the members of the group coat
their action with religious motivation.
Similar tendencies appear critical for mobilization
accounts of fighters from neighboring Kyrgyzstan. There,
too, marginalization and radical behavior are underpinned
by a network of multivariate influences that go beyond reli-
gious factors. Studies show vulnerabilities and resilience to
radicalization among the youth are determined by variables
ranging from sociopolitical grievances and political prefer-
ences to psychological and religious triggers (Nasritdinov
et al., 2019). The latter is found to be only one of the vul-
nerability nods, not the ultimate one. Moreover, when cou-
pled with effective spread of information, religion is found
to be one of the most resilient forces to counter radicaliza-
tion. Rather, dissatisfaction with current conditions, gen-
eral sense of dispensation, alienation, and economic
depravity play more potent role in determining likelihood
for radicalization (Zenn & Kuehnast, 2014).
Fighters from Kyrgyzstan also present another dimen-
sion to the link between marginalization and militancy.
Here, socioeconomic exclusion is compounded by ethno-
cultural frictions. A pertinent fact in this regard is that over-
whelming majority (up to 80%) of fighters from this
country are ethnic Uzbeks, a minority group that lives in
the country’s south (Paraszczuk, 2015; Standish, 2017).
Authorities also acknowledge the numbers, although do not
publicly emphasize the ethnic backgrounds of those thought
to have joined the war. This brings about an intriguing ana-
lytical question about the causes for the majority–minority
breakdown among the fighters. If subject to random pro-
cess, one would expect proportionate representation of eth-
nic groups, where numbers roughly correspond to their
share in the general population. Instead, we observe a
seemingly nonrandom, lopsided distribution with an ethnic
minority outnumbering the majority.
The exact causal mechanisms for this mismatch remain
to be systematically examined. Meanwhile, a broader look
suggests correlational links between the communal fric-
tions, isolation, and subsequent militancy. Communal sepa-
ration has been found to beget sense of exclusion and
injustice—feelings that trigger quest for radical behavior
and militancy (Udoh, 2013). The case of ethnic Uzbeks in
Kyrgyzstan fits this pattern. They have had a fractious co-
existence with the majority Kyrgyz, often leading parallel
communal existence. Tensions at times, as in 1990 and
2010, cross into open violence. For decades the uneasy bal-
ancing has kept the two communities in relative isolation
from one another, contributing to the general sense of sepa-
rateness. This setting, analyses show, has facilitated the
susceptibility of Uzbeks to militant recruitment and radi-
calization (Tucker, 2018).
196 Journal of Eurasian Studies 11(2)
The inter-communal violence in 2010 is particularly
illustrative in this regard. The clashes were the biggest case
of ethnic violence in Central Asia since it emerged from
under the Soviet rule. Its aftermath was followed by a sharp
uptick in the outflow of populations affected areas.
Estimates suggest as many as 40,000 Uzbeks have left the
country as a direct result of the violence; most of them were
young men (RFERL, 2011). Although some have chosen to
seek opportunities as migrant workers in places such as
Russia, others are reported to have joined militant causes
abroad (Tucker, 2018). Most are thought to have followed
active recruitment networks that capitalized on the sense of
dispensation and relative isolation of young individuals in
hardship-stricken areas. This demonstrates that the seclu-
sion sentiment stemming from inter-ethnic friction may
have contributed to pursuit of active militancy abroad.
Fighters from Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
supply another dimension to the multivariate story of exclu-
sionary politics. The latter two countries are also estimated
to have sent the most number of Central Asian fighters to
the Middle East (Neumann, 2015; The Soufan Group,
2015). Here, socioeconomic hardship, prevalent across the
region, is further exacerbated by political pressures from
repressive regimes. The three countries share a dubious dis-
tinction of having the most severe restrictions on civil liber-
ties and political rights in the world. Freedom House
routinely places all three at the bottom of its rankings of
political openness and freedoms (Puddington & Roylance,
2016). Notions of civil society, religious freedoms, and
political participation by active citizenry have essentially
been eradicated there. These conditions of sever authori-
tarianism have been shown (elsewhere) to produce radicali-
zation and resort to violent militancy on the part of the
oppressed (Hafez, 2004; Storm, 2009).
It is worth noting that political repressions coupled with
socioeconomic hardship have in the past engendered
Central Asia’s own brush with domestically grown radical
group that recruited fighters externally. Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU) is perhaps the most potent case of
such indigenous militancy. The organization was born in
late 1990s as a response to severe restrictions on political
participation and deepening economic hardship in the
Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan (Weitz, 2004). While in
later years the group has embraced radical religious agenda
and morphed into a global security concern (Cornell, 2005),
its origins are firmly rooted in the domestic political condi-
tions. History of IMU, therefore, offers a cautionary tale of
how severe limits on political participation can lead to radi-
calized mobilization.
With regard to current developments, a similar case is
that of a colonel from Tajikistan’s elite forces who joined
ISIS in Syria (Roth, 2015). The case is notable not only
because of the high-ranking nature of the defection but also
because of the domestically rooted political rationale the
officer provided for his action. He expressed his ultimate
goal of inciting a political struggle against what he saw as
political oppression of the current regime in Tajikistan. The
move was similar to the actions by the founders of IMU,
who, at least initially, also rationalized their actions as anti-
government struggle. While IMU is considered to have
been largely eradicated, persistence of the same underlying
preconditions for its formation can, fueled by returnees
from Syria, engender a successor entity (Mehl, 2015; Zenn,
2016). The case of the Tajik colonel is certainly a close call
in terms of realization of this potential threat.
Rise of militancy as a response to exclusionary and
repressive politics is a cross-reginal pattern. Evidence from
elsewhere—from Western Europe to North Africa to the
Middle East—indicates that while coated in religious
dogma, the underlying rationale for foreign militancy is
often locally grounded political grievances (Azzam, 2007;
Carter et al., 2014; Storm, 2009). Consider the anti-extrem-
ism policies some of the regimes adopt in the region. Efforts
in Tajikistan, for instance, have pursued a scope much
wider than narrowly focused targeting of religiously affili-
ated individuals. Moreover, moderation efforts have been
not only state-run processes but also involved concerned
citizens (Lemon & Thibault, 2018). The multi-prone effort
aimed at identifying all vulnerable segments of the popula-
tion, not merely religious ones. In other words, this signals
a recognition that militancy can originate from nonreligious
sources as well.
What the experiences of Central Asian fighters indicate
is that nonreligious factors such as socioeconomic or
ethno-cultural forms of exclusion have a greater impact as
a push factor. Economic and political fragility in these
countries have long been identified as forming a fertile
environment for youth radicalization. Sociopolitical issues
such as rampant corruption, institutional inefficacies, and
distrust by citizens of political processes have a direct ena-
bling effect for militant behavior (International Crisis
Group, 2016). Tackling these fundamental issues are thought
to be more instrumental to prevent the rise of foreign mili-
tancy. Religion remains a crucial part of that story. However,
one that is not enough by itself to serve as the defining vari-
able to account for the unusually active stream of militants
from Central Asia. It is the unique sets of exclusionary pro-
cesses discussed above that appear to supply the comple-
menting sufficient conditions to better account for the
phenomenon.
Implications
These explanations have a number of implications, particu-
larly for conflict mitigation and response purposes. For
one, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is increasingly
becoming a global concern. Not only for the impact such
combatants have on conflicts themselves, but also for their
ability to export the violence elsewhere, including their
home countries (Stern, 2016). The war in Syria is perhaps
Sakiev 197
one of the most consequential in this regard. On one end,
the flow of outside combatants has exacerbated and
extended the conflict by turning it from a civil war into an
expansive regional conflict. On the other end, numerous
fighters returning from the war have engaged in terrorism
and violence elsewhere. The attacks at Istanbul airport in
Turkey and the subway systems in St. Petersburg, Russia
carried out by post-Soviet fighters returning or inspired by
the Syrian conflict are stark examples of potential post-
combat behavior. This underscore the need to understand
the motivation to join foreign wars beyond overarching
religious factors. Doing so better positions us to mitigate
or prevent the spread of violence carried out by these
individuals.
The focus on nonreligious factors allows for diversified
look at motivating factors. The current literature has
addressed the issue in a manner tilted toward the pull factor
or the demand side. That is, foreign militancy has mostly
been looked at from the perspective of needs and dynamics
of a conflict. Such emphasis brings to the questions of why
some conflicts attract foreign fighters while others do not,
or what effect do foreign fighters have on conflicts they
participate in? To be sure, addressing these questions are
extremely important. They have allowed us to acquire
nuanced understanding of the nexus between foreign mili-
tancy and conflict dynamics. For example, we know that
infusion of external fighters significantly prolong contem-
porary wars and contribute markedly to their deadliness
(Malet, 2013). In fact, these days more people die and suf-
fer from intra-state civil wars fueled by foreign militancy
than from interstate wars among nation-states. We also
know that despite driving up the casualty rates such fighters
have marginal impacts on the original causes of conflicts
(Mendelsohn, 2011).
However, such an outlook leaves neglected the push or
supply side of the equation. Equally important in this regard
are questions of why outsiders choose to join foreign wars in
the first place? In Syria, their influx has been the key factor
fueling this seemingly endless strife, already the bloodiest in
the 21st century (Fisher, 2016). Analyses of this, motiva-
tional push perspective, therefore, is equally pertinent.
Doing so requires a move beyond overarching structural
arguments such as religious calling. Personal motivations
are more nuanced than that. Focusing on factors beyond
structure, such as socioeconomic conditions, helps us better
understand the mechanics of foreign militancy. This has
valuable implications for ways to solve conflicts, too. In
Syria, for instance, the supply side analysis could provide a
better accounting of why and how this initially limited civil
strife has turned into a major regional war.
Away from war zones, exploring the supply side of for-
eign militancy also contributes to better understanding the
anatomy of mobilization. Analyses of motivations allows
us to tap into the demographic data that have been elusive
in studies of foreign fighters (Hegghammer, 2013). We
need to place focus on studies that seek individualized data
about the backgrounds of the fighters (supply side), not
merely the characteristics of the war (demand side). This,
for example, has implications for understanding the “lone
wolf” phenomenon—a security threat by individuals at the
absence of overarching hierarchical organizational process.
Increasingly, such attacks are considered to be the most
challenging contemporary security threats (Spaaij, 2010).
Studies of militant motivations are better positioned to
help us develop programs aimed at mitigating or preventing
militant mobilization. Knowing what motivates would-be
militants could help us devise intervention programs to pre-
vent their susceptibility to recruitment. Subsequently it also
allows addressing the issue of returning fighters and their
reintegration. Their war experience, training in handling
firearms and explosives, has generated global security con-
cerns far beyond conflict zones. A lasting legacy of the
Syrian war, it is projected, will be the increased potential
for rise in terrorism due to returnees (Jenkins, 2014). Given
these developments, understanding why and how militants
keep joining foreign wars becomes an increasingly impor-
tant concern. Not only to those interested in examining war
dynamics, but also to the authorities in countries of origin.
Indeed, it can be argued that returnees from war zones
present a bigger challenge than their impact in those wars.
This has tragically been exemplified by attacks in Europe
(France, Germany, Belgium), the Middle East (Egypt,
Jordan, Turkey), North Africa (Libya), and other regions
carried out, influenced or otherwise impacted by partici-
pants in foreign wars. Studies emerging in this regard are
mostly concerned with fighters returning to Europe (Bakker
et al., 2013; Ciluffo et al., 2010). Unfortunately, less atten-
tion is paid to militants returning to developing or less
resourceful countries such as the parts of the former Soviet
space. Less developing countries arguably are more vulner-
able and ill-equipped to face the problem of returnees,
which ultimately can pose security concerns far beyond
their borders (Hafez, 2008).
Conclusion
The phenomenon of foreign fighters is becoming a global
security concern, particularly in the wake of the Syrian
war. Attempts to account for it often center on religious
factors. Thus, Islam and its use as a recruiting tool is fre-
quently pointed to as the defining mechanism for militant
mobilization. Such an emphasis, however, may be mis-
placed. Religious accounts are broad and tend to leave
much variation unexplained. The case of post-Soviet fight-
ers in Syria, as presented in this study, is a good illustration
of this challenge. Nevertheless, these accounts serve as
underlying necessary condition that needs to be comple-
mented by matching sufficient factors toward a more
holistic explanation. In case of the post-Soviet militants,
the push factors stem from the societal marginalization
198 Journal of Eurasian Studies 11(2)
rooted in socioeconomic conditions, ethno-cultural fric-
tions, and political participatory pressures. Analysis and
inclusion of these variables provides a better calibrated
account of mobilization. Focus on these and other match-
ing factors is a promising proposition to further refine the
explanatory models for foreign militancy.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Azamat Sakiev https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9480-7643
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Author biography
Azamat Sakiev is an assistant professor in the Department of
Political Science at West Chester University of Pennsylvania,
USA. He studies security, democratic transition and political
leadership in Russia & Central Asia.