CENITA M.

CARIAGA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.

Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of
malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Branch 20 of
the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22, 2004, convicted petitioner in the three cases.

Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he intended to appeal
the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. By Resolution of May 28, 2007, the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon.

Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the Regional Trial Court considering
that the position of Municipal Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27. Pursuant to
Section 4 of [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249], it is the
Sandiganbayan, to the exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the
offense. Evidently, the appeal to this Court of the conviction for malversation of public funds
was improperly and improvidently made. (emphasis and underscoring implied)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:
YES. That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied).
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty
due to a procedural lapse militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court grants
petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate
substantial justice must always be avoided.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.

29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the
Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.

The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional
Trial Court is WARNED against committing the same procedural error, under pain of
administrative sanction.

G.R. No. 90625 May 23, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @
"Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN,accused.

FACTS:
• The information was filed against accused-appellant and his co-accused. When arraigned with
the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty.

• At the scheduled hearing, new counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that the accused
had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense

•The court issued an order acknowledging the manifestation of the de oficio counsel and noted
there are two mitigating circumstances that maybe applied. The Prosecuting Fiscal made no
objection but also manifested that he has to look into the penalty applicable. The hearing was
reset to another date.

• Upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected settlement of the
civil liability of this case, the hearing was reset again. However, counsel de oficio for the
accused did not appear, hence "a report on the projected settlement of the civil aspect of the
case cannot be made" and the hearing was reset again which schedule was later on cancelled
due to the compulsory retirement
of the presiding judge.

• In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court.
• The initial reception of evidence took place on 4/24/1987 with the accused appellant
represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon. Thereafter, hearings were had until the parties
completed the presentation of their evidence.

TRIAL COURT:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
• The accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. However, Judge Cipriano de Roma
erroneously directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. The CA transmitted to
this Court on the records which were erroneously transmitted to it.

• The accused is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and conclusion of
facts by the trial court. But that, the trial court erred in not applying the indeterminate
sentence law.

• Accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty of reclusion temporal
by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is
tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the Constitution" and
he submits that "the righteous and humane punishment that should have been meted out
should be indeterminate sentence" with "all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal
provisions favorable to the accused . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and
humanitarian reasons."

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was denied?

RULING:
There was no denial of due process.

• REQUISITES:
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a
court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.

• People vs. Castillo: If an accused has been heard in a court of competent

jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then
he has had due process.

• All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The
records further disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and
unhampered opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel the hearing of
2/10/1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him and to present
his own evidence

• If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have

faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
but definitely for more.

• Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To

make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC or
of any other provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for
specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294,
par. 1 of the RPC has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the
1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the
1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases.

• The same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel degrading and inhuman
punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus: Sec. 19(l). Excessive
fines shall not beimposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua

• As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We agree with the Solicitor

General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
RPC is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in
view of theabolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the
first paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC shallapply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua
must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.

PEOPLE VS. SOLA, GR. N0S. 56158-64, MARCH 17,1981

Facts: 
CFI issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7
persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda in Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental. Armed with the above warrant, the Philippine Constabulary proceeded to
the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7
bodies.
 Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and 18
other persons before CFI of Kabankalan. The trial court ordered their arrest. However, without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong, the court granted them the right to post bail. Pablo Sola and two others have since been
released from detention. The witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their
fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan,
their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are official with power and influence
in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained
at large. There had also been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families
of the witnesses. Prosecution petitioned for a) change of venue for trial and b) cancellation of
the bail bonds.

Issue:
Whether or not the change of venue is proper?
Held:

Yes. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above
constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for
their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any
of the days of trial. Because of fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to
save their lives. It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed,
may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it
has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must
ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue.

ANTIPORDA, JR. V. GARCHITORENA G.R NO. 133289, 23 DECEMBER 1999

Facts:
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of
kidnapping,the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court
ordered the prosecution to submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the
new information contained the place where the victim was brought.
 
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a re investigation be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the
Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to
hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same was also denied. Subsequently,
the accused filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the
Court and after their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied
ISSUE: 
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING:
YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The original
Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the
accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly
remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. However, we hold that the
petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the
supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10,
1997 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said
crime is work connected.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for
hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on
the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. In the case of
Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense,
territory and person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is
undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case. And we are in
accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was
tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

Conspiracy with public officer Sandiganbayan jurisdiction where public officer died
People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, 25 March 2014

FACTS:
The late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the DOTC, committing the offense in relation to his
office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman
and President of the PIATCO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a
Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the NAIA IPT III was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under RA 6957, as
amended by RA 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as
the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default
under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement,
which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines. The SB issued and order wherein prosecution is
given 10 days period to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and
the public official Arturo Enrile is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. The
prosecution complied with the order. The respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information
filed against him and it was granted by SB and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

RULING:
Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however,
that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for
his death, he should have been charged.

A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.
This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent
display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must
be held solidarily liable. However, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring
with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature
and involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is
better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence
to prove or disprove its presence.
Voluntary appearance filing motion seeking affirmative relief
People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, 25 March 2014

FACTS:
The late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the DOTC, committing the offense in relation to his
office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman
and President of the PIATCO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a
Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the NAIA IPT III was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under RA 6957, as
amended by RA 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as
the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default
under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement,
which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines. The SB issued and order wherein prosecution is
given 10 days period to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and
the public official Arturo Enrile is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. The
prosecution complied with the order. The respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information
filed against him and it was granted by SB and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of herein respondent in posting bail or in filing motion seeking
affirmative relief gave the court jurisdiction over his person.

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the private respondent’s act of posting bail for his provisional liberty
and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is
well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA, “Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this
defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "where the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court
jurisdiction over the person."
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only
came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

Alva vs. CA
G.R. No. 157331, April 12, 2006

Facts: The present petition stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with having
committed the crime of estafa. Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued a Warrant of Arrest against
petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond. Petitioner and counsel both failed to appear
in court despite due notice. RTC found petitioner guilty of estafa. Personal Bail Bond issued by
Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been filed before and approved by the
RTC. Petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction. Incompatible
to the above inference, judgment was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety
Corporation, bonding company that issued petitioner’s original bail bond, for failure to produce
the person of petitioner. Police Superintendent De Jesus returned of the unexecuted Warrant
of Arrest for the reason that the address of the accused is not within their area of responsibility.
It was revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without informing
the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied because the appellant
has failed to submit himself under the jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law
and there was no valid bail bond in place when appellant took his appeal.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of
petitioner’s alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal
(2) Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the
custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.

Held:
(1) No. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final
and executory. Petitioner’s alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is unimportant because
under the circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal.

(2) The question posed has now become academic. “Custody of the law” is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender; while “jurisdiction over the person of the accused” is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself
under the custody of the CA, we cannot say the same for "being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused.

Cojuangco vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 134307, December 21, 1998

Facts: A complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), against former members of the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA), the petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. However, the Court ruled that all proceedings in
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was
directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for
appropriate action. In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended
the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. On August 19, 1992
then Ombudsman ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial
question posed by respondent Lobregat. However, on January 16, 1995, it was resolved that the
case does not pose a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal
proceeding. On February 16, 1995 the criminal case no. 22018 was issued by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the country except
upon approval of the court. The Petitioner prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan from further
enforcing its order which bans petitioner from leaving the country
except upon prior approval by said court.

ISSUES:
(1)WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should
now be lifted if initially valid?
(2)WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner?

Held:

(1)YES. The Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue
the warrant of arrest against the accused; first, the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel
of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information
and second, the Memorandum dated January 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the
criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution. The
Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above
were the product of somebody else’s determination, insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause by the Sandiganbayan.
(2)YES. With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by
the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. By
posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction
of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of
the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when
he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions
that sought other affirmative reliefs.