1. Tanjanco v.

CA 18 SCRA 994

FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araceli Santos, both

being legal adults. Tanjanco showed his undying love and affection for Santos,
who eventually reciprocated the feelings of Tanjanco. Santos believed with the
ideas of Tanjanco’s promise of marriage, Santos agreed to his pleas for carnal
knowledge sometime in July 1958. For a year, Tanjanco had carnal access to
Santos, which resulted to Santos getting pregnant. Upon being, Santos had to
resign from her job as a secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. Being unemployed,
Santos was unable to support her baby and herself, and Tanjanco did not fulfill his
promise of marriage, Santos suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation.

Santos then prayed to the court that Tanjanco be obliged to recognize the
unborn child she was bearing, and pay for damages and support.

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted for failure to
state cause of action. Santos then appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter
decided the case. The decision stated that no cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of the unborn child nor for its support. Still, there was a cause of action
for damages, in accordance to Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states that “Any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages.” Tanjanco appealed such a decision pleading that actions for breach of a
promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for
breach of his promise to marry.

RULING: No.

The Court ruled that Tanjaco cannot be compelled since the plaintiff Araceli
was a woman of legal age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Tojanco with
repeated acts of intercourse.

Article 21 cannot be invoked because even though Tanjaco was not able to
comply with the promise of marriage to Santos, the latter still allowed Tanjaco to
have carnal knowledge for a significant period of one year. It is clear that there is
voluntariness and mutual passion between both parties because she would have cut
all relationship when she discovered that the defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises.

In this case, the petitioner, Tanjaco, cannot be held liable for a breach of
promise to marry. Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum
submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the
original draft of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced when Article 21 of the Civil
Code was applied. Seduction cannot be applied in the case of Santos since rather
than being deceived, she exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco, which is
incompatible with the idea of seduction.