Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Marcos v. Manglapus
Marcos v. Manglapus
*
G.R. No. 88211.September 15, 1989.
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* EN BANC.
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670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the power under
the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to our country.
—That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar
the Marcoses from returning has been recognized by members of
the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in
the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the
Philippines “as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national
reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence
to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws.” [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p.
321.] The Resolution does not question the President’s power to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it
appeals to the President’s sense of compassion to allow a man to
come home to die in his country. What we are saying in effect is
that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to
the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court has the last word when
it comes to Constitutional liberties.—There is also no disrespect
for a Presidential determination if we grant the petition. We
would simply be applying the Constitution, in the preservation
and defense of which all of us in Government, the President and
Congress included, are sworn to participate. Significantly, the
President herself has stated that the Court has the last word
when it comes to constitutional liberties and that she would abide
by our decision.
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critics of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the
political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly
amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to
invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to
the political question doctrine. We are compelled to decide what
would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting
earlier fundamental charters. This is not to state that there can
be no more political questions which we may refuse to resolve.
There are still some political questions which only the President,
Congress, or a plebiscite may decide. Definitely, the issue before
us is not one of them.
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question that emerges is: Has it been proved that Marcos, or his
return, will, in fact, interpose a threat to the “national security,
public safety, or public health?” What appears in the records are
vehement insistences that Marcos does pose a threat to the
national good—and yet, at the same time, we have persistent
claims, made by the military top brass during the lengthy closed-
door hearing on July 25, 1989, that “this Government will not fall”
should the former first family in exile step on Philippine soil.
Which is which? At any rate, it is my opinion that we can not
leave that determination solely to the Chief Executive. The Court
itself must be content that the threat is not only clear, but more
so, present.
CORTÉS, J.:
The Petition
Article 12
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VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989 703
Marcos vs. Manglapus
x x x x x x x x x
“It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. It is not
so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to
determine what matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used
to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial
power. More properly, however, it means those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.”
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of them.
The Constitution requires the Court “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
How do we determine a grave abuse of discretion?
The tested procedure is to require the parties to present
evidence. Unfortunately, considerations of national security
do not readily lend themselves to the presentation of proof
before a court of justice. The vital information essential to
an objective determination is usually highly classified and
it cannot be rebutted by those who seek to overthrow the
government. As early as Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87, 93
[1905]), the Court was faced with a similar situation. It
posed a rhetorical question. If after investigating conditions
in the Archipelago or any part thereof, the President finds
that public safety requires the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, can the judicial department
investigate the same facts and declare that no such
conditions exist?
In the effort to follow the “grave abuse of discretion”
formula in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, the court granted the Solicitor
General’s offer that the military give us a closed door
factual briefing with a lawyer for the petitioners and a
lawyer for the respondents present.
The results of the briefing call to mind the concurrence
of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,
(121 SCRA 538, 592 [1983]):
“How can this Court determine the factual basis in order that it
can ascertain whether or not the president acted arbitrarily in
suspending the writ when, in the truthful words of Montenegro,
with its very limited machinery [it] cannot be in better position
[than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the
conditions prevailing in the Archipelago? (At p. 887). The answer
is obvious. It must rely on the Executive Branch which has the
appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was
the method which had to be used in Lansang. This Court relied
heavily on classified information supplied by the military.
Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained. For this Court,
relied on the very branch of the government whose act was in
question to obtain the facts. And as should be expected the
Executive Branch supplied information to support its position and
this
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I dissent. As I see it, the core issue in this case is, which
right will prevail in the conflict between the right of a
Filipino, Ferdinand E. Marcos, to return to the Philippines,
and the right
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1. Mr. Marcos5
is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to
return to, die and be buried in this country;
2. respondents have not shown any “hard evidence” or
convincing proof why his right as a Filipino to
return should be denied him. All we have are
general conclusions of “national security” and
“public safety” in avoidance of a specific
demandable and enforceable constitutional and
basic human right to return;
3. the issue of Marcos’ return to the Philippines,
perhaps more than any issue today, requires of all
members of the Court, in what appears to be an
extended political contest, the “cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.” It is only thus that we fortify the
independence of this Court, with fidelity, not to any
person, party or group but to the Constitution and
only to the Constitution.
722
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security,
4
public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
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1 Decision, 4.
2 Seesupra,1-4.
3 Supra,2.
4 CONST., art. III, sec. 6.
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And finally:
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I am not persuaded.
I.
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7 Supra,21-22.
* But see Cruz, J., Dissenting.
8 FERNANDO, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 4 (1972 ed.).
9 Republic v. Quasha, No. L-30299, August 17, 1972, 46 SCRA 160, 169.
10 CONST.,supra.
11 Supra.
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II.
The undersigned would be lacking in candor to conceal his
dislike, to say the least, for Marcos.
**
Because of Marcos, the
writer of this dissent lost a son. His son’s only “offense”
was that he openly and unabatedly criticized the dictator,
his associates, and his military machinery. He would pay
dearly for it; he was arrested and detained, without judicial
warrant or decision, for seven months and seven days. He
was held incommunicado a greater part of the time, in the
military stockade of Camp Crame. In his last week in
detention, he was, grudgingly, hospitalized (prison
hospital) and confined for chronic asthma. The deplorable
conditions of his imprisonment exacerbated his
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21 Supra.
22 Supra,22.
23 See CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 18, supra.
** Abraham (“Ditto”) Sarmiento, Jr., then Editor-in-Chief, Philippine
Collegian (1975-1976), official student organ of the University of the
Philippines. He was detained in the military stockade for common
criminals from January to August, 1976.
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25
abode. We would have betrayed our own ideals if we
denied Marcos his rights. It is his constitutional right, a
right that can not be abridged by personal hatred, fear,
founded or unfounded, and by speculations of the man’s
“capacity” “to stir trouble”. Now that the shoe is on the
other foot, let no more of human rights violations be
repeated against any one, friend or foe. In a democratic
framework, there is no such thing as getting even.
The majority started this inquiry on the question of
power. I hold that the President, under the present
Constitution and existing laws, does not have it.
Mandamus, I submit, lies.
Petition dismissed.
——o0o——