PFR Case Digests - 2

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS 2
AY 2021-2022 1ST SEMESTER

Under Atty. Marissa Dela Cruz-Galandines
II. Human Relations (19-36, New Civil Code)

1. Uypitching vs. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006
DOCTRINE:
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT: A PERSON SHOULD NOT USE HIS RIGHT
UNJUSTLY OR CONTRARY TO HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH, OTHERWISE
HE OPENS HIMSELF TO LIABILITY
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso approached Ernesto Quiamco, respondent, to

amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco
against them. They surrendered to him a motorcycle with the photocopy of its
certificate of registration. No original copy of the certificate was given. It turned
out later that the said motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero
by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed
by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was
mortgaged to the petitioner corporation and when Gabutero could no longer pay,
Davalan assumed the obligation. However, Davalan stopped paying the
remaining installments and told petitioner corporation’s collector that the
motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men." Nine years later,
petitioner, accompanied by policemen, went to respondent’s business
establishment, where the motorcycle was parked in an open space, to recover it.
The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for
respondent. While the police team leader and the clerk were talking, petitioner
paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a
motorcycle." Unable to find the respondent, the policemen, on petitioner’s
instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent. The complaint was dismissed.
Respondent, then, filed an action for damages against petitioners. The RTC ruled
that petitioner should be liable since he was motivated with malice and ill will when
he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed
a baseless criminal complaint. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this
petition. Petitioners claimed that they should not be held liable for petitioner
corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged
vehicle as its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.
ISSUE:
Should petitioners be held liable for damages despite the claim that their action is
merely exercise of their right as seller-mortgagee to foreclose mortgage in case
of default?
HELD:
Yes, petitioners should be held liable. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the
proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle.
Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's establishment with his
policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or
court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner
Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. No doubt, petitioner
corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the
lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent.
Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the
proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
provides that “every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe
honesty and good faith”. Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use
of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There
is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention
to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
2. Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
DOCTRINE:
MERE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG;
BUT TO FORMALLY SET A WEDDING AND GO THROUGH ALL THE ABOVE-
DESCRIBED PREPARATION AND PUBLICITY, ONLY TO WALK OUT OF IT
WHEN THE MATRIMONY IS ABOUT TO BE SOLEMNIZED, IS QUITE
DIFFERENT
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee Beatriz P. Wassmer (Wassmer) and defendant-appellany
Francisco X. Velez (Velez), following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 1954 as the big day. In August 1954, Wassmer and
Velez applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances.
The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important
occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received. And then, on September 2, 1954, Velez, who was then
28 years old, simply left a note for Wassmer stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao,
and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed
rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from
again. Sued by Wassmer for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared
in default. Judgment was rendered ordering Velez to pay Wassmer damages.
Velez asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. He argues that there is no
provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.
As provided in a number of cases ruled by the Court, the mere breach of a promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong.
ISSUE:
Was the breach of Velez in his promise to marry Wassmer constitute an
actionable wrong provided that the wedding was formally set and elaborate
preparations for the same were made?
HELD:
Yes, Velez is liable to Wassmer for damages. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. It must not be overlooked, however, that the
extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which Vekez must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
3. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et all vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259, February 28,
2005
DOCTRINE:
THE EXERCISE OF A LEGAL RIGHT OR DUTY IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH
NO INTENTION TO PREJUDICE OR INJURE ANOTHER WILL NOT GIVE RISE
TO AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden
(Hotel Nikko) and Ruby Lim assail the Decision CA reversing the Decision of RTC
that dismissed Reyes’ complaint.
Roberto Reyes, also known as Amay Bisaya alleged that while he was having
coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart.
Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a birthday party of the hotel’s manager, Mr.
Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she will vouch for him. However, while lining up at
the buffet table, Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko) saw Reyes. Ms.
Lim then requested a Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not
invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto
who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. When Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo dapat
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.” She then turned around trusting
that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on
her.
Reyes filed a complaint for damages based on Article 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code. Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the
process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
ISSUE:
Does Ms. Lim’s treatment to Reyes give rise for an action for damages against
the latter and the hotel based on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code?
HELD:
No. Reyes has no cause of action to file a complaint for damages.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at
him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and
is indeed incredible.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which
he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be
held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Elsewhere,
we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The
object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising
from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly
within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus
mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it
is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which
Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right
done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
4. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
DOCTRINE:
FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY ENTITLES
THE PLAINTIFF TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FACTS:
Private respondent was a 22-year old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner was
an Iranian citizen and was an exchange student taking a medical course in
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. The petitioner courted the respondent and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get
married. They agreed to get married after the end of the semester. Petitioner then
visited the respondent’s parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage. Later, petitioner forced the private respondent to live with him in the
Lozano Apartments. Private respondent was a virgin before they started living
together. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards
her started to change. Petitioner maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result
of which, she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement
and asked respondent not to live with him anymore after a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain which happened a day before the filing of
the complaint. Moreover, petitioner was already married to someone living in
Bacolod. Hence, private respondent seeks for a judgment ordering the petitioner
to pay her damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondent based on Article 21 of the
Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner’s breach of promise to marry contrary to morals, good customs,
and public policy so as to entitle private respondent to the award of damages?
HELD:
Yes, the petitioner’s breach of promise to marry private respondent is contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy; thus, the latter is entitled to damages.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. This notwithstanding, Article 21 of the CIvil Code is designed to expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and
so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made
her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
Hence, for petitioner’s fraudulent and deceptive promise to marry the private
respondent, the latter is entitled to the award of damages.
5. Pe vs. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
DOCTRINE:
DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED BY THE FAMILY IF THE INJURY IS CAUSED
IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY
FACTS:
The petitioners are parents, brothers and sister of Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. The respondent is a
married man and worked as an agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
They stayed in the same town. The respondent frequented the house of Lolita on
the pretext that he wanted to teach her how to pray the rosary. They fell in love
with each other and conducted clandestine trysts. The rumors about their love
affairs reached Lolita’s parents and the respondent was forbidden from further
seeing Lolita. Their love affair continued nonetheless. Lolita later disappeared
from their residence. Her family found a handwritten note from the defendant to
Lolita regarding the date of their meeting.
The trial court did not consider the complaint as actionable because of the
petitioners’ failure to prove that the respondent deliberately and in bad faith tried
to win Lolita’s affection.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners entitled to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and
corrective damages based on Article 21 of the Civil Code for the acts of the
respondent?
HELD:
Yes, the petitioners are entitled to recover damages for the acts of respondent.
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: “Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
In this case, there is no doubt that the claim of petitioners for damages is based
on the fact that respondent, being a married man, carried on a love affair with
Lolita Pe thereby causing the petitioners injury in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy. The circumstances under which defendant tried
to win Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he
who, through an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of
making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how
to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who
was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered
as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs. No other conclusion can be drawn from this
chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Hence, petitioners are entitled to the award of damages because the respondent
has committed an injury to the former in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
6. Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778
DOCTRINE:
WHEN A RIGHT IS EXERCISED IN A MANNER NOT CONFORMING WITH THE
NORMS IN ARTICLE 19 AND RESULTS IN DAMAGE, A LEGAL WRONG IS
COMMITTED AND WRONGDOER MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals finding the petitioners liable for damages.
Restituto Tobias, private respondent, was an employee of Globe Mackay Cable

and Radio Corp. (Globe Mackay), petitioner, as its purchasing agent and
administrative assistant. Tobias later allegedly discovered and reported to his
immediate supervisor and to Herbert Hendry, Executive Vice-President and
General Manager of Globe Mackay anomalies in the company regarding fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions. Thereafter, Hendry confronted
Tobias stating that the latter, as the number one suspect, should have one week
forced leave. When Tobias reported for work after the forced leave, Hendry called
him a “crook” and a “swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie-detector test and
the specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the
police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. The police
investigators, however, cleared Tobias from the said anomalies. Later, petitioners
filed criminal complaints for Estafa which were all dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias
was also terminated by petitioners from his employment. In addition, when Tobias
sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO),
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter
stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty.
Eventually, Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC and CA held
petitioners liable for damages.
Petitioners contended that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful
exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent. On the other hand, private
respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing
him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
ISSUE:
Should petitioners be held liable for damages for the imputation of guilt and
harassment during the investigations despite its claim of lawful exercise of its right
to dismiss employee?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners should be held liable for damages.
Article 19 of the Civil Code is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of

rights. It sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights;
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Article 20 of the
Civil Code pertains to damage arising from a violation of law; while Article 21
pertains to damages arising from a violation of morals, good customs or public
policy. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury."
Here, the imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during
the investigations of Tobias transgressed the standards of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of
the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in
which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is
done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under
the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in
a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
7. University of the East vs. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
DOCTRINE:
WANT OF CARE TO THE CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
COUPLED WITH A CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSE NATURALLY
CALCULATED TO PRODUCE THEM WOULD MAKE THE ERRING PARTY
LIABLE
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45.
Romeo Jader, respondent, sued University of the East (UE) for damages for the
moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights he suffered when he was not able to take the 1988
bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. Jader alleged that he got an
incomplete grade in Practice Court 1. He took the removals examination for said
subject but he was belatedly informed that it was a 5, failing mark. The graduation
ceremony invitation included his name as one of the candidates but the invitation
had a footnote that the list is tentative and still subject to the completion of
requirements. Jader attended the ceremony, he marched with his parents, was
given a symbolic diploma, took pictures, tendered a blow-out attended by
neighbors, friends, and relatives, took a leave of absence without pay from work,
and enrolled at a pre-bar review class. Petitioner denied liability arguing mainly
that it never led Jader to believe that he completed the requirements for an LLB
degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.
The RTC held UE liable for actual damages and attorney’s fees. The CA affirmed
the decision but in addition granted moral damages. Hence, this petition.
UE contended that it has no liability to Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages arose out of his (Jader’s) own
negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal
examination.
ISSUES:
1. May a university be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation?
2. Is Jader entitled to moral damages?
HELD:
1. Yes. UE may be held liable. Considering that the institution of learning involved
herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced
what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings
enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Educational institutions are duty-
bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to
inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can
support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil
obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated

to produce them would make the erring party liable.
Here, UE ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance
of its obligation to inform Jader of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that
respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an L.L.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time
because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court
on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose
from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and
in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the
course. Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own
negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to Respondent. When one
of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred
must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases
where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or
negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused
thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that
is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.
2. No, Jader is not entitled to moral damages. At the very least, it behooved on
respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given
these, SC failed to see how respondent could have suffered untold
embarrassment. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar,
he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements
including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination.
Due to his own negligence, Jader cannot be entitled of moral damages.
8. Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355
DOCTRINE:
A PARENT IS LIABLE FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS RESULTING FROM
HIS OWN MALICIOUS CONDUCT, AS WHERE HE WRONGFULLY ENTICES
HIS SON OR DAUGHTER TO LEAVE HIS OR HER SPOUSE, BUT HE IS NOT
LIABLE UNLESS HE ACTS MALICIOUSLY
FACTS:
The case is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Cebu denying the claim of
petitioner Pastor Tenchavez for legal separation with his estranged wife Vicenta
Escano, and P1,000,000 in damages against Vicenta and her parents, Dr.
Mamerto and Mena Escano.
Vicenta scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish

ancestry, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez in 1948 before a
Catholic chaplain. The marriage was held unknown to Vicenta’s parents. Upon
learning of the same, Dr. Mamerta and Mena Escano, were against it being
clandestinely celebrated contrary to tradition and proposed of a re-celebration of
the marriage before the church. One day, however, a letter was sent to Mamerto
informing him that Pastor is having an affair with another woman. Vicenta, upon
learning of the same, refused to live with Pastor and the spouses became
estranged.
Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of
“Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and
absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal. Tenchavez filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections.
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
Are Vicenta’s parents are liable for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta
from joining her husband?
HELD:
No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she
appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge
what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so
doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of
malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.
9. St Louis Realty vs. CA, G.R. No. L-46061, November 14, 1984. 133 SCRA
179
DOCTRINE:
AN ADVERTISMENT MISREPRESENTING A HOUSE BELONGING TO
ANOTHER MISTAKENLY AND UNNECESSARILY EXPOSES THE PRIVATE
LIFE OF A PERSON; THUS, PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 26
FACTS:
This case is an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the CA and the
TC awarding recovery of damages to respondent Conrado J. Aramil whose house
was mistakenly misrepresented by petitioner Saint Louis Realty Corporation in a
wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio,
but without permission of Doctor Aramil, in the issue of the Sunday Times an
advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading
was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family
where it was portrayed that the house of Doctor Aramil belonged to the latter.
Doctor Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake and wrote a letter of protest
on the same day to St. Louis Realty. The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto,
an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of
the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies.
However, no rectification or apology was published. Aramil's counsel demanded
from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. In it
answer, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if
Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times. It
published in the issue of the Manila Times a new advertisement with the Arcadio
family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil
and an explanation of the error. Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis
Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times a “NOTICE OF
RECTIFICATION".
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the decision is contrary to law and
that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court.
It argues that the case is not covered by Article 26.
ISSUE:
Does the wrongful advertisement violate the privacy of private respondent, thus
entitling him to damages?
HELD:
Yes, the private respondent is entitled to damages as the wrongful advertisement
violated his privacy. The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by
Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral
damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by
Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To
suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up.
It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification “.
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or
that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental
anguish.
10. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009
DOCTRINE:
ARTICLE 26 GRANTS CAUSE OF ACTION THOUGH NOT CONSTITUTING
CRIMINAL OFFENSE
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision of the CA in the case entitled "Sansio Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon.
Romulo SG. Villanueva, et al." An Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. 22
was filed by respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the
Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of petitioner Sansio
Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and
one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering
insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought
by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her. she was
indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the
armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC)
in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and their two (2) daughters at
their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she
was detained but released in the afternoon when her husband posted a bond.
Gregorio filed a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation,

alleging that she could not have issued the bounced checks, as certified by the
branch manager of the Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. The B.P. Blg.
22 cases were dismissed. Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio
and Datuin .Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismisson the ground that the
complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to
state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof
were not alleged in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Is the civil suit filed by Gregorio based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution?
HELD:
It is based on quasi-delict. Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for
damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily
constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity;
(2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social
intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy,

and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they
should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus
depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not
given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges against her,
petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office
address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was
conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city
residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She
suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention
and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and
reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad
in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.
There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other
hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its
vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee
Datuin.
11. Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
DOCTRINE:
THE FINALITY OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
PETITIONER’S SECOND MARRIAGE DOES NOT IMPEDE THE FILING OF A
CRIMINAL CHARGE FOR BIGAMY AGAINST HIM
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) to remand the
Bigamy case of the Petitioner to the trial court for further proceedings.
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the
RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness
or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband
during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter, the
petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the
second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared
void by the RTC. RTC granted the Manifestation of the Peitioner. However, the
CA reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceeding.
ISSUE:
Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy?
HELD:
No, the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was
committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with
private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner's second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for
bigamy against him.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of

the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
12. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004
DOCTRINE:
THE SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY DOES NOT
RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE
FACTS:
This is an instant petition for review filed by Petitioner Tenebro assailing the
decisions of the RTC and CA on the case of Bigamy filed against him by Leticia
Ancajas.
Petitioner in this case contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia

Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between
him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to
petitioner.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. When

arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". During the trial, petitioner
admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired
two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get
the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further
testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was
no record of said marriage. The petitioner further argues that the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which
is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
ISSUE:
Does the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroact to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated.
HELD:
No, the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date on which the second
marriage was celebrated.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity.
13. Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012
DOCTRINE:
BIGAMY IS CONSUMNATED AT THE MOMENT OF THE CELEBRATION OF
THE SECOND MARRIAGE NOTWITHSTANDING THE NULLITY OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the order of the
RTC which dismissed the Information for Bigamy filed against respondent
Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano.
On April 8, 1976, respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano married Socrates Flores.

On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent
married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa,
a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In 2003, the
RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and
void.
On the following year, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter

from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for
Bigamy against respondent. Cipriano filed a motion to quash the information,
alleging that her first marriage was already declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus,
there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio in 1983.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that both marriages were
contracted during the effectivity of the Civil Code, hence, no judicial declaration of
absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage is
needed under Article 40 of the Family Code.
The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes
the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first
marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the
court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code,
a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage?
HELD:
NO. Respondent is still liable for bigamy. The elements of the crime of bigamy
are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or

subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage. In this case, it appears that when
respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage
with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of
bigamy were alleged in the Information.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration
of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in
this case where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed.
We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
14. San Miguel Properties, Inc., v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, 4 September 2013
DOCTRINE:
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, EVEN IF PENDING IN THE HLURB,
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, RAISES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
FACTS:
Petitioner purchased in 1992 and 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc., then represented
by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation
receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 130
residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total
area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The
transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering
the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to petitioner,
but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565
square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and
for which petitioner paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to
them.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for
parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain
had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after
being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May
17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20
TCTs despite demands.
Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No.
957. At the same time, petitioner sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB, praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
ISSUE:
Is the pending administrative case in the HLURB a ground to suspend a criminal
prosecution on the ground of prejudicial question?
HELD:
YES, it is a ground to suspend criminal prosecution on the ground of prejudicial
question.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule

111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action
and a criminal case.
In this case, contrary to the petitioner’s submission that there could be no

prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial
question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining
the charge for the criminal violation of PD 957. This is true simply because the
action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be
instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB.
III. Persons (Art. 37-51, New Civil Code)
1. Quimiguing vs. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
DOCTRINE:
AN UNBORN CHILD IS GIVEN BY LAW A PROVISIONAL PERSONALITY OF
ITS OWN FOR ALL PURPOSES FAVORABLE TO IT
FACTS:
Carmen Quisumbing filed a complaint for support against defendant Icao. In her
complaint, she alleged that they were neighbors and had close and confidential
relations. Despite Icao being married, he succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent and
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant,
and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support per month,
damages and attorneys fees.
After trial on the merits, the trial judge dismissed the complaint upon motion of
defendant for lack of cause of action, that is, the complaint did not allege that the
child had been born.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE:
Does an unborn child have a right to receive support?
HELD:
Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet
unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code,
and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid,
besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered
born for ail purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso,
however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it
were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
Plaintiff had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and
the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
2. Geluz vs. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
DOCTRINE:
NO ACTION FOR DAMAGES COULD BE INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF THE
UNBORN CHILD
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari bringing up for review the question whether the
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.
Nita Villanueva became pregnant with her present husband, Oscar Lazo before
they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parents,
and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the petitioner
Antonio Geluz. After her marriage with the Lazo, she again became pregnant. As
she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than two years later,
she again became pregnant and again aborted a two-month old foetus, employing
the services of petitioner Geluz. All throughout this time, Lazo was in the province
of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know
of, nor gave his consent to, the abortion.
When Geluz learned of the third and last abortion, he filed a complaint against
Geluz for damages on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received. The trial court granted the complaint and awarded damages.
ISSUE:
Can damages be recovered by the parents on behalf of an unborn child who was
aborted on account of the injuries it suffered?
HELD:
No, no transmission to anyone can take place as the child lacked juridical
personality due to its pre-natal death.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death

pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents
or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under
Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb. The prevailing American
jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally held that recovery cannot be
had for the death of an unborn child.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all.
But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished
from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and
physical integrity. They would normally be limited to moral damages i.e. on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations and exemplary damages. But in the case before us,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages.
3. Limjoco vs. Estate of Pedro Fragante, G.R. No. L-770, 27 April 1948
DOCTRINE:
THE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT IS IN LAW REGARDED AS A PERSON AND
MAY PROSECUTE AN UNFINISHED ACTION OF THE DECEDENT TO ITS
FINAL CONCLUSION
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) from the
Public Service Commission (PCS) to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in
San Juan, Rizal. Unfortunately, while the application was still pending, he died.
Petitioner opposed the application on the ground that the application should be
denied since the applicant Pedro Fragante already died. Nonetheless, a certificate
of public convenience was still issued to Pedro Fragante’s Intestate Estate,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, to
maintain and operate an ice plant in the San Juan and to sell the ice produced
from said plant. The PCS ruled that “the original applicant Pedro 0. Fragante was
a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service."
Petitioner files the present petition assailing the granting of the CPC to the estate
of Fragrante. Petiioner contends that the estate of Fragrante cannot represent him
in the case then pending before the commission since the PCS Law allows only
Filipino citizen to be granted the certificate.
ISSUES:
1. Is the estate of a decedent considered as a ‘person” in law?
2. May the estate of a deceased person substitute and represent the decedent in
an unfinished action for an application of a certificate of public convenience?
3. Is a certificate of public convenience property?
HELD:
1. Yes. The estate of a decedent is a person in legal contemplation of law.
It is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. In this jurisdiction there are ample
precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as
having legal personality independent of the heirs. The underlying reason for the
legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of a deceased person is
considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of
the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro
O. Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment
of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was
the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission
in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final
conclusion. An injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
2. Yes. If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would
have had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final
conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. Fragrante had invested in
the ice plant in question with P35,000 and with his other properties and business,
he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant
had he not died. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said
application to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through
his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right
was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have
denied the application, although under the facts of the case, the commission
granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and
operate the ice plant.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to
make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under
the control and management of the executor or administrator, cannot be exercised
but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees,
or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens
to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for
a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service
Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and
entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
3. Yes. A certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should

descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property,
and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the
law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial
administrator after his death.
4. Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289,

October 4, 1971.
DOCTRINE:
AN ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING A FILIPNO BECOMES IPSO FACTO A
FILIPINA PROVIDED SHE IS NOT DISQUALIFIED TO BE A CITIZEN UNDER
SECTION 4 OF CA 473
FACTS:
This is an appeal on the decision of CFI which dismissed the petition for the
issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration. The
petition seeks to restrain the latter and/or his authorized representative from
ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest
and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so.
On February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a visa to enter the Philippines as
a non-immigrant. She stated she was a Chinese and that she desired to take a
trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle for a month. She was permitted
to stay for a month. Upon her arrival, Cheng filed a bond to undertake that Lau
Yuen Yueng would depart on or before the expiration of her authorized period to
stay in the country. On January 1962, she contracted marriage with Mo Ya Lim
Yao an alleged Filipino citizen. It was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not
speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with
a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-
in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Petitioner, Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully
naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by
naturalization) contends that she became a Filipino citizen by virtue of her
marriage to Mo Ya Lim Yao. Respondent contends that the mere marriage of a
Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine
citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications.
ISSUE:
Can Lau Yuen Yueng claim Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage with a
Filipino?
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is
not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized

here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to
undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
Hence, Lau Yuen Yueng became a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Mo Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen as of January 25, 1962.
5. Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
DOCTRINE:
DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION NOT A BAR

FOR APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA which
affirmed the decision of RTC granting the Petition for Naturalization of Batuigas.
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
Azucena alleged in her petition that she has all the qualifications required under
Sec. 2 and none of the disqualifications in CA 473.
The OSG filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege
that she engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade, which
the RTC later denied. Neither the OSG nor the Provincial Prosecutor appeared
on the day of the hearing, hence Azucena moved that evidence be presented ex-
parte, which the RTC granted. The RTC found that Azucena has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the
Philippines. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA alleging that Azucena
failed to comply with the income requirement and the ex-parte presentation of
evidence violates CA 473 as the law mandated a public hearing. The CA
dismissed the OSG’s appeal. The CA found that Azucena’s financial condition
permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living and consistent with the demands of human dignity.
The CA also held that the RTC complied with the law requiring notice to the OSG
of its scheduled hearing.
ISSUE:
Did Azucena fail to comply with CA 473 as to the income and public hearing
requirement?
HELD:
No. Azucena complied with the income and public hearing requirement.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire citizenship through judicial or

administrative naturalization. A third option called derivative naturalization, which
is available to alien women married to a Filipino is found under Sec. 15 of CA 473

which provides that “any woman who is now married to a citizen of the Philippines
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.”
The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests
with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative
naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from
seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her
application at the CID was denied not because she was found to be disqualified,
but because her husband’s citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was
based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the
courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine
citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any
disqualification under Sec. 4, CA 473. The OSG had the opportunity to contest
the qualifications of Azucena, however the OSG failed to appear prompting the
RTC to order the ex-parte presentation of evidence. The OSG was notified of the
ex-parte proceeding but despite notice, again failed to appear.
Hence, Azucena, for complying with all the requirements should be granted the
Filipino Citizenship.
6. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
DOCTRINE:
IT IS NOT ONLY THE LAW ITSELF (PD 725) WHICH IS TO BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE EFFECT, BUT EVEN THE REPATRIATION GRANTED UNDER
SAID LAW
FACTS:
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 for certiorari and preliminary
injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the Comelec, First Division and
another Resolution of the Comelec en banc denying Lee's motion for
reconsideration.
On March 20, 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, Raul
Lee, filed a petition praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding
any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines,
and that his COC be canceled. The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed
the canvass of the election returns and Frivaldo obtained the highest votes.
However, at 8:30 pm of June 30, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the
annulment of the June 30 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that on June 30 at 2:00 pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of
the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 had been granted.
The proclamation of Lee as Governor is annulled by Comelec Divisionp] because
Lee did not garner the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation. Lee’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Comelec en banc.
Lee contends that the alleged repatriation of Frivaldo was neither valid nor is the
effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the
Office of Governor.
ISSUE:
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal, thus seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor?
HELD:
Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application
on August 17, 1994.
Under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general
rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
CREATES NEW RIGHTS. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain
voids in our laws. Said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in
favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but
now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation
of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could
now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of
repatriation.
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became
an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is
to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in
this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to
past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came
into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right
of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive
or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the
passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application.
7. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995.
DOCTRINE:
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOMICILE
AND RESIDENCE; FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL LAW, RESIDENCE IS
USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH DOMICILE
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the
Comelec alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, he contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives
on the evidence of declarations made by her in her Voter Registration Record and
in her COC. Petitioner then filed an Amended/Corrected COC, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
The Second Division of the COMELEC, came up with a Resolution 1) finding

private respondent's Petition for Disqualification; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended COC of; and 3) canceling her original COC. Comelec en
banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the

congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to the SC for relief.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner is a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "for the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence."
In Ong v. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent."
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing
or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence
of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up
his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business,
or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is
to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. For political
purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon
her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in
Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew
up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence
in different parts of the country for various reasons. It cannot be correctly argued
that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the
use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code
is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS 2

AY 2021-2022 1ST SEMESTER

II. Human Relations (19-36, New Civil Code)

Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso approached Ernesto Quiamco, respondent, to

2. Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

5. Pe vs. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962

6. Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778

Restituto Tobias, private respondent, was an employee of Globe Mackay Cable

Article 19 of the Civil Code is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of

obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated

8. Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355

Vicenta scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish

Gregorio filed a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation,

It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy,

11. Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of

12. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004

Petitioner in this case contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. When

13. Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012

On April 8, 1976, respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano married Socrates Flores.

On the following year, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter

The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or

The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule

In this case, contrary to the petitioner’s submission that there could be no

III. Persons (Art. 37-51, New Civil Code)

1. Quimiguing vs. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970

Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

2. Geluz vs. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death

3. Yes. A certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should

4. Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289,

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized

5. Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013

DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION NOT A BAR

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire citizenship through judicial or

is available to alien women married to a Filipino is found under Sec. 15 of CA 473

6. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996

7. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995.

The Second Division of the COMELEC, came up with a Resolution 1) finding

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the

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