Sps.

Sajonas v CA

FACTS:

- Sps Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the Sps. Sajonas on
installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell.
- On August 1984, Sps. Sajonas caused the annotation of adverse claim based on the Contract to sell on the title of
the subject property.
- Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in
question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984.
- However, a certain Domingo Pilares filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against Ernest Uychocde to
which they entered into a compromised agreement.
- When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking, a writ of execution was issued by the CFI of QC. Pursuant
to the order of execution, the sheriff of QC presented the notice of levy on execution before the RD of Marikina
and the same was annotated.
- When the deed of absolute sale was registered, a new TCT was issued in the name of Sps. Sajonas and the notice
of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title.
- On Oct 1985, Sps Sajonas filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon city, hence the auction sale of the
subject property did not push through as scheduled.
- Then Sps. Sajonas demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon Pilares, through a letter to
their lawyer, Atty. Flores. Despite said demand, Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation.
- Hence, Sajonas filed the complaint and alleged
o That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of
the defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their title, rights and interests to the
plaintiffs and there was no more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant could levy upon
o That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal
and invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by
the plaintiffs on the corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;
- On the other hand, Pilares alleged that
o Assuming without however admitting that they filed an adverse claim against the property covered by
TCT No. 79073 registered under the name of spouses Ernesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same
ceases to have any legal force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529
o The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 in favor of herein defendant against Ernesto
Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and appropriate because the property is registered in the name of the
judgment debtor and is not among those exempted from execution;
- RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Sajonas.
- CA, however, reversed the decision.

ISSUE: W/N the 30-day petiod for Adverse Claim under Sec. 70 of PD 1529 is absolute?

RULING:

- In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety.
Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
“The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration.”
- At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days.
But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the
sentence following, which reads:
“After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
 - If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty
days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For
then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
- The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.
- For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no
longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
- The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to
afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed
interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of any
encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim.
- In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in
effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution
thereto.
- Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon the execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof.
- Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of
the petitioners.

Sps. Rodriguez vs. CA

FACTS:

- Sps. Calingo were the registered owners of a house and lot in Parañaque. The property was mortgaged to the
Development bank of the Philippines, which mortgage was later absorbed by the Home Mutual Development
Fund (HMDF) or Pag-ibig.
- In April 1992, Sps. Calingo and Sps. Barrameda entered into a Contract of Sale with assumption of mortgage.
- In a letter dated April 23, 1992, Sps. Calingo informed Pag-ibig about the sale, however, said letter together with
an affidavit by Sps. Calingo was served upon Pag-ibig on October 2, 1992.
- Sps. Barrameda filed with the Register of Deeds of Parañaque an affidavit of adverse claim which was inscribed
at the back of the OCT.
- On June 1992, Angelica Barrameda informed HDMF that they have purchased the subject property from the
Calingo spouses and that they filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Parañaque.
o They also sought assistance from said office as regards the procedure for the full settlement of the loan
arrearages and the transfer of the property in their names.
- On July 1992, a notice of levy with attachment on real property by virtue of a writ of execution was annotated at
the back of the certificate of title of the property in question.
- Upon completion of the payment of the agreed purchase price, Sps. Calingo waived all their rights to the
property in favor of Sps. Barrameda and guaranteed that the property was clear and free from any liens and
encumbrances, except the real estate mortgage.
- However, the Sheriff of RTC Makati still levied the property despite Sps. Barrameda’s adverse claim.
- RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Rodriguez
- CA reversed the ruling pursuant to the ruling of the SC in Sajonas vs CA

ISSUE: W/N Sps. Barrameda’s adverse claim on the property should prevail over the levy on execution by another court
in satisfaction of a judgment against Sps. Calingo (NO)

RULING:
 - Sps. Barrameda anchored their claim on the deed of sale executed on April 27, 1992. However, PD 1529 requires
that such document should be registered with the RD to be binding on third persons.
- In this case, the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not registered but instead, respondents
Barrameda filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds.
- The reason given for the non-registration of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was that the owner’s
duplicate copy of the certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF.
- It was not shown, however, that either respondents Barrameda or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to
retrieve the owner’s duplicate copy from the HMDF for the purpose of registering the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage.
- In fact, the parties did not even seek to obtain the consent of, much less inform, the HMDF of the sale of the
property. This, despite the provision in the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor (respondents
Calingo) from selling or disposing the property without the written consent of the mortgagee.

Padilla vs Philippine Producers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

FACTS:

- Padilla and his wife are the registered owners of real properties in Bago City.
- Respondent cooperative had a money claim against Padilla.
- On June 1990, the three lots, all of the Bago Cadastre and registered in petitioner's name, were levied by virtue
of that writ.
- The lots were auctioned off to satisfy the judgement with respondent as the only bidder.
- Padilla failed to exercise his right of redemption; thus, a writ of possession was issued.
- Respondent cooperative filed a motion to direct RD to issue new titles over the properties in its name alleging
that the RD of Bago City would not issue new titles unless the owner’s copies were first surrendered to him.
- The trial court issued an order granting the motion. CA affirmed.
- Petitioner contends that respondent failed to follow the correct procedure for the cancellation of a certificate of
title and the issuance of a new one, which is contained in Section 107 of PD 1529.

ISSUE: W/N the motion in question is the proper remedy for cancelling petitioner’s OCT and new ones issued in its
name

RULING:

- Petitioner is correct in assailing as improper respondent's filing of a mere motion for the cancellation of the old
TCTs and the issuance of new ones as a result of petitioner's refusal to surrender his owner's duplicate TCTs.
- The proper course of action was to file a petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new
titles. This was the procedure followed in Blancaflor by Sarmiento Trading which was in more or less the same
situation as the respondent in this case.
- It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to respondent's quandary.
- The reasons behind the law make a lot of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner (in this case
the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed the
judgment obligation.
- Petitioner contends that only his interest in the subject lots, and not that of his wife who was not a party to the
suit, should have been subjected to execution, and he should have had the opportunity to prove as much.
- SC granted the petition and annulled the new certificates issued.

Toledo-Banaga & Tan vs CA & Damalerio

FACTS:
 - In an action for redemption filed by Banaga, the trial court declared that she had lost her right to redeem her
property earlier foreclosed and which was subsequently sold at public auction to private respondent.
- Certificates of Title covering the said property were issued to private respondent over which petitioner Banaga
annotated on March 3, 1983 a notice of lis pendens.
- On appeal by petitioner Banaga, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and allowed the former to
redeem the property within a certain period.
- Banaga tried to redeem the property by depositing with the trial court the amount of redemption which was
financed by her co-petitioner Tan.
- Private respondent opposed the redemption arguing that it was made beyond the time given to her by the court
in the earlier case.
- However, the lower court issued an order on August 7, 1992 upholding the redemption and ordered the Register
of Deeds to cancel private respondent's Certificates of Title and issue new titles in the name of petitioner Banaga
- On January 11, 1993, private respondent caused the annotation of said petition as another notice of lis pendens
on the Certificates of Title.
- on January 7, 1993, petitioner Banaga sold the subject property to petitioner Tan with the deed of absolute sale
mentioning private respondent's certificate of title which was not yet cancelled.
- Notwithstanding the notice of lis pendens, petitioner Tan subdivided the property in question under a
subdivision plan, which she made not in her name but in the name of private respondent.
- There being no preliminary injunction issue and with the expiration of the TRO, petitioner Tan asked the Register
of Deeds to issue new titles in her name.
- On March 24, 1993, such titles were issued in petitioner Tan's name but it still carried the annotations of the two
notices of lis pendens.
- On October 28, 1993, the CA set aside the August 7, 1992 and January 4, 1993 orders of the trial court and
declared private respondent absolute owner of the subject property.
- Upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering the RD to reinstate the
OCT in the name of Damalerio.
- But the Register of Deeds refused to comply with the writ of execution alleging that the Certificates of Title
issued to petitioner Tan must first be surrendered. Accordingly, private respondent moved to cite the Register of
Deeds in contempt of court which was denied, as the trial court ruled on January 11, 1995 that the former's
remedy is by consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration.

ISSUE:

RULING:

- Petitioners other contention that the execution of the final and executory decision — which is to issue titles in
the name of private respondent — cannot be compelled by mandamus because of the "formality" that the
registered owner first surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title for cancellation per Section 80 of Presidential
Decree 152919 cited by the Register of Deeds,20 bears no merit.
- To file another action just to compel the registered owner, herein petitioner Tan, to surrender her titles
constitute violation of, if not disrespect to, the orders of the highest tribunal.
- Otherwise, if execution cannot be had just because the losing party will not surrender her titles, the entire
proceeding in the courts, not to say the efforts, expenses and time of the parties, would be rendered nugatory.
- It is revolting to conscience to allow petitioners to further avert the satisfaction of their obligation because of
sheer literal adherence to technicality, or formality of surrender of the duplicate titles.
- The surrender of the duplicate is implied from the executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties
thereto.
 - Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the
decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain person, especially when the
decision had attained finality, as in this case.

Petitioners other contention that the execution of the final and executory decision — which is to issue titles in the name
of private respondent — cannot be compelled by mandamus because of the "formality" that the registered owner first
surrenders her duplicate Certificates of Title for cancellation per Section 80 of Presidential Decree 1529 cited by the
Register of Deeds, bears no merit.

In effect, they argue that the winning party must wait execution until the losing party has complied with the formality of
surrender of the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention borders on the absurd and has no place in our legal
system. Precisely, the Supreme Court had already affirmed the CA's judgment that Certificates of Title be issued in
private respondent's name. To file another action just to compel the registered owner, herein petitioner Tan, to
surrender her titles constitute violation of, if not disrespect to, the orders of the highest tribunal.

Otherwise, if execution cannot be had just because the losing party will not surrender her titles, the entire proceeding
in the courts, not to say the efforts, expenses and time of the parties, would be rendered nugatory. It is revolting to
conscience to allow petitioners to further avert the satisfaction of their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to
technicality, or formality of surrender of the duplicate titles. The surrender of the duplicate is implied from the
executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a
ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a
property in the name of a certain person, especially when the decision had attained finality, as in this case.

The basic distinction between the Padilla Doctrine and Toled-Banaga Doctrine is that in Padilla Doctrine the Supreme
Court ruled that it was improper for the respondent to file a mere motion for the cancellation of the old TCTs and the
issuance of new ones as a result of petitioner’s refusal to surrender his duplicate TCT. The respondent should have filed
a petition in court for the issuance of new titles. A separate cadastral action should have been filed to cancel the old TCT

Meanwhile in the Toledo-Banaga case, the Supreme Court ruled that to filed another action to compel the owner to
surrender her titles constitutes violation of the orders of the highest tribunal. Contrary to the Padilla Doctrine, it held
that the surrender of the duplicate is implied from the executory decision since in this case petitioners themselves were
already parties to the redemption case. Furthermore, as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the
Register of Deeds to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain
person, especially when the decision had attained finality.