JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING VOL. 37, NO. 9, PP.

996±1018 (2000)

What Kinds of Scienti®c Concepts Exist? Concept Construction and

Intellectual Development in College Biology

Anton E. Lawson,1 Souheir Alkhoury,1 Russell Benford,1 Brian R. Clark,1

Kathleen A. Falconer2
1
Department of Biology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287
2
Department of Physics and Astronomy, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287

Received 14 July 1999; accepted 12 June 2000

Abstract: Previous research has found that scienti®c concepts can be meaningfully classi®ed as
descriptive (i.e., concepts such as predator and organism with directly observable exemplars) or theoretical
(i.e., concepts such as atom and gene without directly observable exemplars). Previous research has also
found that developing understanding of descriptive and theoretical concepts is linked to students'
developmental levels, presumably because the procedural knowledge structures (i.e., reasoning patterns)
that de®ne developmental levels are needed for concept construction. The present study extends prior
theory and research by postulating the existence of an intermediate class of concepts called hypothetical
(i.e., concepts such as subduction and evolution with exemplars that cannot in practice be observed due to
limits on the normal observational time frame). The hypothesis that three kinds of scienti®c concepts exist
was tested by constructing and administering a test on concepts introduced in a college biology course. As
predicted, descriptive concept questions were signi®cantly easier than hypothetical concept questions, than
were theoretical concept questions. Further, because concept construction presumably depends in part on
developmental level, students at differing developmental levels (levels 3, 4, and 5, where level 5 is
conceptualized as `post-formal' in which hypotheses involving unseen entities can be tested) were
predicted to vary in the extent to which they succeeded on the concepts test. As predicted, a signi®cant
relationship (p < 0.001) was found between conceptual knowledge and developmental level. This result
replicates previous research, and therefore provides additional support for the hypothesis that procedural
knowledge skills associated with levels of intellectual development play an important role in declarative
knowledge acquisition and in concept construction. The result also supports the hypothesis that intellectual
development continues beyond the `formal' stage during the college years, at least for some students.ß
2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 37: 996±1018, 2000

Following Northrop (1947), Lawson, Abraham, & Renner (1989) described three general
sources of meaning, hence proposed three general categories of concepts (i.e., mental constructs
that have been linked to speci®c terms or phrases). At the most direct level, meaning can be

Contract grant sponsor: National Science Foundation; Contract grant number: DUE 9453610.

ß 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 997

derived from immediately sensed input giving rise to color concepts such as green/red/blue,
external state concepts such as hot/cold, sharp/dull, and internal state concepts such as hunger,
thirst, and tiredness. Here complete meanings are immediately apprehended from the internal or
external environment. Thus, a ®rst category called concepts by apprehension can be identi®ed.
On the other hand, consider the sources of meaning for terms such as table, chair, running,
resting, taller, and heavier. These terms derive meaning from objects, events, and from
comparisons of objects and events. Such meanings are not immediately apprehended. In
Northrop's (1947) words: ``. . .perceptual objects are not immediately apprehended factors; they
are postulates of common sense so thoroughly and frequently and unconsciously veri®ed
through their deductive consequences that only the critical realize them to be postulated rather
than immediately apprehended.'' (p. 93). In other words, objects such as tables, chairs, and
events such as running and resting, and relations such as taller and heavier are mental con-
structions. Yet we lose sight of this fact because we have gathered so much evidence to support
their postulated existence. Hence, a second class called descriptive concepts can be identi®ed. To
understand descriptive concepts, one must mentally construct order from environmental enco-
unters. In short, descriptive concepts allow us to order and describe experience.
The third type of concept described by Lawson et al. is also produced by postulation and
test. However, this type differs from descriptive concepts in that de®ning attributes are only
indirectly testable. The primary use of these concepts is to function as explanations for events
that need causes, but for which no causal agent can be perceived. Angels and ghosts fall into this
category. Common examples from science are photons, electrons, atoms, molecules, and genes.
These are called theoretical concepts. The reason for the existence of theoretical concepts can be
found in a basic assumption that humans make about their worldÐevents do not occur without
causes. Thus, if we perceive an event, but cannot perceive objects or processes that caused the
event, we do not conclude that the event is spontaneous and without cause. Instead, using
analogical reasoning, we invent unseen objects and interactions to explain the event in
perceptible causal terms. Because theoretical concepts are imagined and function to explain the
otherwise unexplainable, they can be given whatever properties are necessary in terms of the
theory of which they are a part. That is, they derive meaning from the analogies upon which they
are based and from the postulates of speci®c theories in which they reside (Northrop, 1947;
Lawson, 1958; Suppes, 1968; Lewis, 1980; 1988).
According to developmental theory, descriptive and theoretical concept construction is
linked to intellectual development because the process depends in part on procedural or
`operational' knowledge structures (i.e., reasoning patterns) as well as prior declarative
knowledge structures (cf., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Karplus, 1977;
Anderson, 1980; Kuhn, 1989; Lawson, 1995; von Glaserfeld, 1995; Fosnot, 1996). Development
of procedural structures occurs gradually with age because it depends not only on maturation
(e.g., Epstein, 1986; Thatcher, Walker, & Guidice, 1987; Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990) but also on
experience (both social and physical) and on the individual's self-regulatory mechanisms (e.g.,
for a review see Kwon, 1997). Thus, during intellectual development, concepts by apprehension
come ®rst. Then descriptive concepts are constructed during childhood followed by the
construction of theoretical concepts during adolescence and adulthood. Similarly, when an adult
begins to construct concepts in a new ®eld of study, the descriptive conceptual foundation must
at least be partially in place before theoretical concepts are constructed. For example, Gregor
Mendel (as well as other biologists of that time) noticed that offspring tend to look like their
parents and wondered why. In Mendel's case, he described observable `phenotypes' of parent
and offspring pea plants prior to constructing his theory of the nature and behavior of
unobservable `genotypes'. Here the descriptive concept of phenotype comes ®rst and the
998 LAWSON ET AL.

theoretical concept of genotype comes second. In other words, one does not invent an
explanation involving unseen theoretical entities (e.g., genes) until one has some puzzling
observations to explain (e.g., why do offspring tend to look like their parents?).
This theory of concept construction and intellectual development leads to the prediction that
students at any one age who vary in the extent to which they have developed procedural
knowledge structures (reasoning patterns) should vary in the extent to which they can pro®t from
science instruction aimed at teaching descriptive and theoretical concepts. This prediction has
been con®rmed by several previous studies (e.g., Lawson & Renner, 1975; Lawson &
Thompson, 1988; Lawson & Weser, 1990; Renner & Marek, 1990; Shayer & Adey, 1993;
Germann, 1994; Cavallo, 1996; Johnson & Lawson, 1998; Kwon & Lawson, 2000).
Note that the present theory implies that in any ®eld of investigation, the descriptive
foundation should precede the introduction and testing of alternative theoretical explanations.
However, it does not imply that all questions of causality should be avoided until students have
developed higher-order reasoning patterns (cf., Metz, 1995). Rather, the view is that it is the
process of generating and testing alternative theoretical possibilities that leads to the
development of higher-order thinking. Unfortunately, the introduction of theoretical concepts
is usually not done in this way. Instead, most textbooks introduce them as ``facts'' and seldom
bother to introduce the alternatives, the arguments, and the evidence used by past scientists to
arrive at such ``facts''. Thus students are not provided opportunities to develop higher-order
reasoning skills, and they also are not provided opportunities to develop understanding of how
science works.

The Present Study

The initial purpose of the present study is to test the hypothesis that in addition to descriptive
and theoretical concepts as de®ned above, an intermediate class of scienti®c concepts exists.
This intermediate class is in part theoretical, but could, in theory, derive meaning from
observation if it were possible for one to extend the time frame over which the necessary
observations are made. These concepts are assumed to be more abstract than descriptive
concepts, but less abstract than theoretical concepts, and consequently should be of intermediate
dif®culty in terms of concept construction. We have tentatively chosen the word `hypothetical' to
refer to this proposed intermediate class of concepts.
More speci®cally, we propose that the following terms, which were recently introduced to
students in an introductory college biology course, represent concepts that should be classi®ed as
descriptive because readily observable exemplars exist: environmental factors, food chains,
populations, nocturnal, carnivore, stimulus, and community. Further, we are proposing that the
following terms, which were also introduced in the course, represent hypothetical concepts
because, even though instruction did not allow students to observe the processes/entities to
which the terms refer, if observations were made for an extended time period, the processes/
entities could in theory be observed: species (where species is de®ned as organisms that share
enough characteristics to mate and produce viable offspring), limiting factors, fossils (where
understanding of the process of fossilization is implied as fossils must be distinguished from
nonfossilized organic remains), arti®cial selection, evolution, convergent evolution, and natural
selection. And lastly, we are proposing that the following introduced terms represent theoretical
concepts because no matter how long one observes, observable exemplars cannot be seen:
osmosis, combustion, air pressure (in terms of colliding molecules), genes (within the context of
classical Mendelian theory), molecules (in terms of kinetic±molecular theory), photosynthesis,
and biogeochemical cycles.
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 999

Note that this classi®cation scheme does not take into account Harre's (1986) distinction
between realm 2 and realm 3 theories in which more powerful microscopes and telescopes can
cause a realm 3 theory to become a realm 2 theory. In Harre's view, a realm 3 theory/concept
becomes a realm 2 theory/concept when instruments become powerful enough to allow us to
``observe'' what previously was not observable. However, in our view, once a concept is
classi®ed as theoretical (Harre's realm 3), we do not think it is appropriate to later reclassify it at
realm 2. Rather, in our view, regardless of instrument resolution, the central cognitive issue
remains one of interpretation and not observation. For example, in spite of the fact that powerful
electron microscopes can now focus on tiny ball-shaped objects, whether or not one interprets
those ball-shaped objects as atoms, or perhaps just very small ball-shaped molecules, depends on
one's theoretical perspective, rather than one's observational skills. Further, meaning of the term
atom does not come from observations no matter how ``close'' those observations become.
Instead, meaning continues to come from analogy and from the postulates of atomic±molecular
theory.
In summary, our proposed concept classi®cation scheme argues that constructing
descriptive concepts should be the easiest because meanings come from experience.
Hypothetical concepts should have intermediate dif®culty because one has to imagine past or
future events to derive meanings. And theoretical concepts should be the most dif®cult to
construct because their meanings cannot be derived from observation regardless of how much
time one has to do the observing. This hypothesis leads to the prediction that when student
knowledge of speci®c descriptive, hypothetical, and theoretical concepts is assessed, they should
demonstrate signi®cantly more knowledge of descriptive concepts than hypothetical concepts.
Similarly, they should demonstrate signi®cantly more knowledge of hypothetical concepts than
theoretical concepts. These predictions are shown graphically in Figure 1, as is the prediction
based on the alternative hypothesis that the introduced terms fall into only two categories (i.e.,
descriptive and theoretical).
Further, because we are hypothesizing that concept construction depends in part on
developmental level, we predict that students at differing developmental levels who receive

Figure 1. The graph at the left shows the predicted results based on the hypothesis that introduced
concepts fall into three categories (i.e., descriptive, hypothetical, and theoretical). The graph at the right
shows the predicted results based on the hypothesis that introduced concepts fall into only two categories
(i.e., descriptive and theoretical).
1000 LAWSON ET AL.

Figure 2. Predicted relationship between developmental level (levels 3, 4, and 5) and concept under-
standing where concepts are classi®ed into three categories (descriptive, hypothetical, and theoretical).
The predicted results are based on the hypothesis that the reasoning patterns associated with each
developmental level are needed to construct concept understanding.

instruction on all three kinds of concepts, will vary in their ability to demonstrate knowledge of
those speci®c concepts. In other words, students with less advanced reasoning skills should
demonstrate less knowledge than more-advanced students. More speci®cally, we are
hypothesizing that intellectual development among our students proceeds from a descriptive
level (similar to Piaget's concrete operations stage) to a more advanced level in which causal
hypotheses can be tested, but only when the hypothesized causal agents are observable (similar
to Piaget's formal operations stage), to a still more advanced level in which hypotheses involving
unseen theoretical entities can be tested (cf., Lawson, Clark, Cramer-Meldrum, Falconer,
Sequist, & Kwon, 2000; Lawson, Drake, Johnson, Kwon, & Scarpone, 2000). Thus, we predict
that students at the descriptive level (we will call it level 3 because it was presumably preceded
by the sensory±motor stageÐlevel 1, and a preoperational stageÐlevel 2) should exhibit
knowledge of descriptive concepts, but they should not exhibit knowledge of hypothetical or
theoretical concepts. Further, students at level 4 should exhibit knowledge of descriptive and
hypothetical concepts, but not of theoretical concepts. And lastly, students at level 5 should
exhibit knowledge of all three types of concepts. These predictions are shown graphically in
Figure 2. We should note, however, that students at less advanced developmental levels may be
expected to demonstrate some knowledge of more advanced concepts because, as will be
described below, our concept assessment measure consists of questions written at Bloom's
knowledge level, a level that does not necessarily require ``understanding'' as de®ned by Bloom
(1956).

Methods

Subjects
Subjects were 663 undergraduate students (nonscience majors) enrolled in a course entitled
The Living World taught at a major southwestern university during the fall semester of 1999. The
students were 17.1±54.2 years of age (mean age ˆ 20.3 years, SD ˆ 3.7).
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1001

The Course
The Living World consists of three 50-min lectures each week (delivered by the course
professor) and one weekly two-hour lab (each taught by one of 12 graduate student teaching
assistants) each week for 15 weeks. In the order presented, course topics included the theories of
evolution and natural selection, animal behavior theory, various physiological theories, theories
of classical and molecular genetics, and theories of photosynthesis and cellular respiration. All
21 terms mentioned above were introduced during the semester. In most cases, topics were ®rst
explored in labs. Lectures then discussed the topics in more detail and applied them to additional
biological and nonbiological contexts. Thus, the course employed the learning cycle method of
instruction (Eakin & Karplus, 1976; Karplus, 1977; Lawson et al., 1989; Renner & Marek,
1990).

Design
A test designed to assess students' developmental level (i.e., procedural knowledge skills)
was administered during the ®rst week of the semester within regularly scheduled lab periods.
The same test was readministered during the last week of the semester again within regularly
scheduled lab periods as part of a graded ®nal exam. The exam also included 105 true/false
questions designed to assess knowledge of the seven descriptive, the seven hypothetical, and the
seven theoretical concepts listed in the introduction.
As a check on the usefulness of this researcher-developed classi®cation scheme, a panel
consisting of 10 preservice biology teachers (biology majors, seniors, and graduates) read the
de®nitions of concept types that appear in the Appendix. The panel also read the biological
concept de®nitions that also appear in the Appendix. They were then asked to individually
classify each biological concept based on the presented de®nition into either the descriptive,
intermediate, or theoretical category. Then the entire panel met to discuss the classi®cation of
each concept and attempted to reach consensus. The extent to which the panel was able to reach
consensus, as well as the relationship of their classi®cations to those of the researchers, was then
determined.

Instruments

Developmental Level. Developmental level was assessed by a group-administered test

based on reasoning patterns associated with hypothesis testing (i.e., the identi®cation and control
of variables, correlational reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, proportional reasoning, and
combinatorial reasoning). The test was a modi®ed version of The Classroom Test of Scienti®c
Reasoning (Lawson, 1978). With respect to hypothesis testing, the original test includes
situations in which the tentative causal agents are for the most part observable. For example, two
situations involve testing hypotheses in the context of swinging pendulums, another situation
involves fruit ¯y responses to colors of light and gravity, and one involves a light bulb's response
to pushed buttons. Validity of the original test has been established by several studies (e.g.,
Lawson, 1978; 1979; 1980; 1982; 1983; 1985; 1992; Lawson & Thompson, 1988; Lawson &
Weser, 1990; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992; Lawson, Baker, DiDonato, Verdi, & Johnson, 1993).
An important aspect of the establishment of test validity, as was the case with many of Piaget's
original tasks, was the need to demonstrate that performance differences on the test were caused
by differences in reasoning patterns and not by the presence or absence of domain-speci®c
knowledge. In other words, situations/tasks should require domain-speci®c knowledge that
1002 LAWSON ET AL.

students can reasonably be expected to have. In short, the studies have found this to be the case.
The pendulum task (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) is an excellent example of this point as virtually
all students know what strings and weights are and what is meant by swinging back and forth.
The modi®ed test used in the present study retained all of the original situations and added
two situations that are hypothesized to require level 5 thinking because each requires students to
test hypotheses involving unobservable entities (i.e., dissolving CO2 molecules and pushing or
attracting Na‡ and Clÿ ions). One situation involves water rise in an inverted cylinder after the
cylinder had been placed over a burning candle sitting in water. The other involves changes in the
appearance of red blood cells when bathed in salt water. The two situations appear as follows:

The Burning Candle. The ®gure below at the left shows a drinking glass and a burning
birthday candle stuck in a small piece of clay standing in a pan of water. When the glass is turned
upside down, put over the candle and placed in the water, the candle quickly goes out and the
water rushes up into the glass (as shown at the right).
This observation raises an interesting question: Why does the water rush up into the glass?
Here is a possible explanation: The ¯ame converts oxygen from the air to carbon dioxide.
Because oxygen does not dissolve very rapidly in water, but carbon dioxide does, the newly-
formed carbon dioxide dissolves rapidly in the water lowering the air pressure inside the glass.
Thus, the relatively higher air pressure outside the glass pushes the water up into the glass.
Suppose you have the materials mentioned above plus some matches and some dry ice (dry ice is
frozen carbon dioxide). Using some or all of these materials, how could you best test this
possible explanation?

a. Saturate the water with carbon dioxide and redo the experiment noting the amount of
water rise.
b. The water rises because oxygen is consumed; so redo the experiment in exactly the
same way to show that water rises due to oxygen loss.
c. Conduct a controlled experiment varying only the number of candles to see if that
makes a difference.
d. Suction is responsible for water rise; so put a balloon over the top of an open-ended
cylinder and place the cylinder over the burning candle.
e. Redo the experiment but make sure it is controlled by holding all independent variables
constant; then carefully measure the amount of water rise.

What result of your test (mentioned above) would show that the explanation is probably wrong?

Figure 3.
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1003

a. The water rises higher than it did before.

b. The water rises the same as it did before.
c. The water rises less than it did before.
d. The balloon expands out.
e. The balloon is sucked in.

The Red Blood Cells. A student put a drop of blood on a microscope slide and then looked
at the blood under a microscope. As you can see in the diagram below, the magni®ed red blood
cells look like little round balls. After adding a few drops of salt water to a drop of blood, the
student noticed that the cells appeared to become smaller.
This observation raises an interesting question: Why do the red blood cells appear smaller?
Here are two possible explanations: I. Salt ions (Na‡ and Clÿ) push on the cell membranes
and make the cells appear smaller. II. Water molecules are attracted to the salt ions so the water
molecules move out and leave the cells smaller. To test these explanations the student used some
salt water, a very accurate weighing device, and some water-®lled plastic bags and assumed that
the plastic behaves just like red-blood-cell membranes. The experiment involved carefully
weighing a water-®lled bag and placing the bag in a salt solution for ten minutes and reweighing
the bag. What result of the experiment would best show that explanation I is probably wrong?

a. the bag loses weight

b. the bag weighs the same
c. the bag appears smaller

What result of the experiment would best show that explanation II is probably wrong?

a. the bag loses weight

b. the bag weighs the same
c. the bag appears smaller

Scoring. Each of the 26 questions (i.e., 13 two-part situations) required the students to
select the best answer from the choices provided. Students ®rst responded to a question or made
a prediction and then selected an explanation for their response. For example, when asked to
select which of the three pendulums should be used to ®nd out if pendulum length in¯uences
swing speed, students ®rst had to select the correct pendulums (i.e., pendulums 2 and 3) and then
justify their selection (i.e., because only their lengths vary).

Figure 4.
1004 LAWSON ET AL.

Correct responses were awarded one point. Based on the nature of the questions and the
number of each question type, scores of 0±8 were classi®ed as level 3 (i.e., students not able to
test hypotheses involving observable causal agents). Scores of 9±14 were classi®ed as low level
4 (i.e., students inconsistently able to test hypotheses involving observable causal agents). Scores
of 15±20 were classi®ed as high level 4 (i.e., students consistently able to test hypotheses
involving observable causal agents). And scores of 21±26 were classi®ed as level 5 (i.e., students
able to test hypotheses involving unobservable entities). A Cronbach's alpha reliability of .81
was obtained for the test when administered at the semester's end.

Knowledge of Concepts. Five statements were constructed to assess knowledge associated

with each of the 21 concepts. The intent was to write statements that only assessed knowledge
associated with each concept and not reasoning patterns required by more advanced levels of
assessment, e.g., higher Bloom levels such as analysis, application, evaluation, and synthesis
(Bloom, 1956). Even though Bloom considers comprehension to be the lowest level of
understanding, we chose not to write questions at this level because we wanted to avoid, as much
as possible, confounding what students knew about each term with general reasoning skills that
may be called into action when attempting to answer questions at the comprehension and higher
levels.
During the exam, students read each statement and decided whether it was true or false. The
statements used to assess knowledge associated with the terms carnivore, population, limiting
factors, natural selection, genes, and osmosis appear in Table 1. Test reliability as estimated by
Cronbach's alpha was .70. This rather low estimate is perhaps due in part to the true/false nature
of the items in which guessing can signi®cantly contribute to success or failure on any one item.

Results

Agreements/Disagreements Using the Concept Classi®cation Scheme

The Appendix reports the extent to which the researcher-developed concept classi®cation
scheme and the 10-member panel agreed on the classi®cation of each biological concept. In
short, the researchers and the panel were in complete agreement on all seven of the concepts
classi®ed by the researchers as descriptive as well as on all seven of the theoretical concepts.
Complete agreement was also found on two of the intermediate/hypothetical concepts (i.e.,
evolution and convergent evolution). However, differences of opinion existed on the remaining
®ve concepts classi®ed by the researchers as intermediate/hypothetical. Only a slight difference
existed for the concept of natural selection (i.e., 9/10 of the panel members classi®ed the concept
as intermediate). Moderate differences existed for the fossils concept (7/10 panel members
classi®ed the concept as intermediate) and for the limiting factors concept (6/10 panel members
classi®ed the concept as intermediate). Only 2/10 of the panel members classi®ed the arti®cial
selection concept as intermediate; 3/10 classi®ed it as descriptive; 1/10 classi®ed it as
theoretical; and 4/10 remained undecided between the descriptive and intermediate categories.
Interestingly, all 10 of the panel members disagreed with the researchers and classi®ed the
species concept as descriptive.

Student Developmental Levels

Scores on the test of developmental level administered at the start of the semester ranged
from 3±24, Mean ˆ 14.25, SD ˆ 4.6. Scores on the test when readministered at semester's end
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1005

Table 1
Examples of descriptive, hypothetical and theoretical concepts questions

Descriptive concept questions

Carnivores
are animals that eat other animals. (T)
are animals that eat both plants and animals. (F)
are classi®ed as ecological producers. (F)
must have fur. (F)
live only on land. (F)
A biological population
represents organisms of a single type living and reproducing in a particular location. (T)
refers to both living and non-living components of biological communities. (F)
can decrease in numbers over time. (T)
can increase in numbers over time. (T)
usually contains individuals with variable characteristics. (T)
Hypothetical concept questions
Limiting factors
can increase in importance as population size increases. (T)
can wipe out entire populations regardless of population size. (T)
keep the reproductive potential of populations in check. (T)
can be both living and non-living environmental in¯uences. (T)
can refer to non-biological aspects of the environment that limit population size. (T)
According to natural selection theory, species change across time only when the following conditions are
met:
individuals with favorable characteristics produce more offspring than those with unfavorable
characteristics. (T)
environmental factors exist that limit population growth. (T)
climatic conditions change across time. (F)
characteristics acquired during individual lifetimes are passed to offspring. (F)
favorable characteristics can be inherited. (T)
Theoretical concept questions
According to gene theory,
gene pairs separate independently during zygote production. (F)
during egg and sperm production genes recombine randomly. (F)
genes are located in chromosomes. (T)
an individual has at least one pair of genes for each observable characteristic. (T)
one gene of a pair can dominate the expression of the other gene. (T)
Osmosis
will not occur when membranes block diffusion. (T)
occurs only through living cell membranes. (F)
occurs when a dialysis bag ®lled with distilled water is placed in a glucose solution. (T)
is not affected by temperature. (F)
involves random ionic and/or molecular collisions. (T)

ranged from 2±25, Mean ˆ 18.24, SD ˆ 4.54. A dependent t-test indicated that the distributions
(shown in Figure 5) differed signi®cantly (t ˆ 14.99, p < 0.001). Given that a major course goal
was to improve student's reasoning skill, this amount of improvement was not unexpected (cf.,
Lawson et al. 2000).

Student Performance on Descriptive, Hypothetical, and Theoretical Concept Questions

Table 2 shows mean scores for each of the 21 sets of concept questions grouped into the
three concept categories. As shown, mean scores among the descriptive concepts ranged from
1006 LAWSON ET AL.

Figure 5. Distribution of student scores on the test of developmental level administered at the start
(shown at the left) and at the end of the semester (shown at the right).

4.85 (environmental factors) to 3.78 (food chain), among the hypothetical concepts from 4.58
(fossils) to 3.40 (natural selection), and among the theoretical concepts from 4.16
(biogeochemical cycles) to 2.79 (combustion).
Figure 6 shows overall student performance on the three concept categories. To obtain these
data we applied Guilford's equation for determination of item dif®culty when chance success is a
factorÐas it was here with use of true/false questions in which chance alone may lead to a
correct response 50% of the time (Guilford, 1936). Results revealed that overall student
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1007

Table 2
Mean scores and standard deviations (SD) for each set of descriptive,
hypothetical, and theoretical concept questions

Concept Mean SD

Descriptive concepts
Environmental factors 4.85 0.44
Food chain 4.12 0.92
Population 3.78 0.91
Nocturnal 3.88 1.02
Carnivore 4.41 0.70
Stimulus 4.01 1.01
Community 4.39 0.74

Hypothetical concepts
Species 3.96 0.87
Limiting factors 4.07 0.93
Fossils 4.58 0.62
Arti®cial selection 3.46 0.94
Evolution 3.10 0.82
Convergent evolution 3.87 0.92
Natural selection 3.40 1.03

Theoretical concepts
Osmosis 3.22 1.21
Combustion 2.79 0.96
Air pressure 2.83 1.19
Genes 3.70 0.93
Molecules 3.86 0.96
Photosynthesis 2.88 1.00
Biogeochemical cycles 4.16 0.92

Figure 6. Student performance on the descriptive, hypothetical, and theoretical concept questions after
eliminating chance success. Compare with the predicted results shown in Figure 1.
1008 LAWSON ET AL.

performance on the descriptive, hypothetical, and theoretical concept categories after

eliminating chance success was 81.1, 61.4, and 46.5%, respectively. A multivariate analysis of
variance with repeated measures found these overall performance differences to be statistically
signi®cant (F2,642 ˆ 921.0, p< 0.001). All pairwise comparisons were also statistically signi-
®cant (p < 0.001).

Relationship Between Developmental Level and Concept Questions

Figure 7 shows the relationship between developmental level (as measured at the semester's
end) and performance on the three categories of concept questions with chance success
eliminated. The ®gure reveals a clear relationship between developmental level and concept
performance. Multivariate analysis of variance with repeated measures found these overall
performance differences to be statistically signi®cant (F3,633 ˆ 63.01, p< 0.001). All pairwise
comparisons were also statistically signi®cant (p < 0.001).
Figure 7 also reveals that performance for students at each of the four developmental levels
(i.e., level 3, low level 4, high level 4, and level 5) was higher on the descriptive concept
questions than on the hypothetical concept questions, which in turn was higher than performance
on the theoretical concept questions. Again, multivariate analysis of variance with repeated
measures found these performance differences to be statistically signi®cant: F2,16 ˆ 12.77,
p < 0.001 for the level 3 students; F2,106 ˆ 139.06, p < 0.001 for the low level 4 students; F2,
278 ˆ 364.92, p< 0.001 for the high level 4 students; and F2,229 ˆ 423.36, p < 0.001 for the level 5
students. All pairwise comparisons were statistically signi®cant (p< 0.001) with the exception of
the nonsigni®cant difference between the hypothetical and theoretical concept questions for the
level 3 students (p ˆ 0.168).

Discussion
The ®nding that the 10-member panel and the researchers were in complete agreement on
the classi®cation of 16 of the 21 concepts suggests that the concept classi®cation scheme can be

Figure 7. Student performance on the descriptive, hypothetical, and theoretical concept questions at each
level of intellectual development after eliminating chance success. Compare with the predicted results
shown in Figure 2.
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1009

used consistently, particularly to classify descriptive and theoretical concepts. All ®ve of the
classi®cation disagreements occurred over concepts classi®ed by the researchers at the
intermediate/hypothetical level. In retrospect, this is not surprising as this distinction often boils
down to the likelihood of someone having the opportunity and patience to make the necessary
observations. Consequently, when the necessary observational time-frame extended well beyond
the normal human lifetime, agreement was easy to reach (e.g., evolution, natural selection). On
the other hand, when the observations could possibly be made during a single lifetime (e.g.,
arti®cial selection, limiting factors), disagreements were more numerous. The fact that all panel
members classi®ed the species concept as descriptive while the researchers classi®ed it as
intermediate suggests that the researchers may have misclassi®ed this concept.
The concept classi®cation scheme led to the prediction that students would demonstrate
signi®cantly more knowledge of descriptive concepts than hypothetical concepts. Similarly, they
would demonstrate signi®cantly more knowledge of hypothetical concepts than theoretical
concepts (see Figure 1). The actual results shown in Figure 6 are essentially as predicted.
Therefore, the results lend support to the hypothesis that these three kinds of concepts exist.
Importantly, in terms of the proposed distinction between hypothetical and theoretical concepts,
the pairwise comparison between student performance on these two concept categories was also
statistically signi®cant (p< 0.001). This result lends further support to the validity of this
proposed concept classi®cation scheme.
Because concept construction presumably depends in part on the developmental level, we
also predicted that students at differing developmental levels would vary in performance on the
three categories of concept questions. More speci®cally, we predicted that level 3 students would
exhibit knowledge of descriptive concepts, but they would not exhibit knowledge of hypothetical
or theoretical concepts. Further, level 4 students would exhibit knowledge of descriptive and
hypothetical concepts, but not of theoretical concepts. And lastly, level 5 students would exhibit
knowledge of all three types of concepts. These predictions were shown in Figure 2. A
comparison of the actual results (Figure 7) with the predicted results lends support to the
hypothesis in the sense that more advanced reasoners did in fact perform signi®cantly better than
less advanced reasoners.
But the actual relationship was not as clear-cut as predicted. For example, consider
performance of the level 3 students. These students were expected to perform as well as the level
4 and 5 students on the descriptive concepts, but they did not. They were successful on only 41%
of the descriptive concepts compared to the 57, 62, and 71% success rates of their more
developmentally-advanced peers. Further, they were unexpectedly successful on 27% of the
hypothetical questions and 20% of the theoretical questions, both of which were presumably
beyond their intellectual grasp. Similar remarks can be made about the students at the other
developmental levels. In other words, they were not as successful on some of the concept
questions as they should have been. While on others, they were more successful than they should
have been.
How can these departures from the predicted results be explained? A look back at the
concept questions suggests that the problem may stem, at least in part, from dif®culties in
creating questions that assess knowledge of only one type of concept at a time. For example,
consider the set of statements designed to assess students' knowledge of the descriptive concept
of biological population (Table 1). Notice that the ®rst statement is in fact a de®nition of the term
species. Recall that we previously classi®ed the species concept as hypothetical. Thus, our
attempt to assess knowledge of the descriptive population concept has been confounded by
inclusion of a distractor that requires knowledge of the presumably more abstract species
concept. During construction of the concepts test, we tried to avoid this sort of problem. But in
1010 LAWSON ET AL.

hindsight, we can see that we were not always successful. Consequently, some of the concept
questions were probably more dif®cult than they should have been, which may have led to a
performance lower than expected.
A related problem may stem from the psychological fact that concepts do not stand alone
(e.g., Ausubel, 1963; Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian 1978; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994).
Rather concepts exist within complex conceptual systems such that knowledge and
understanding, of any one descriptive concept, is ``deepened'' by the construction of other
descriptive concepts as well as by hypothetical and theoretical concepts. For example, level 3
students presumably can construct meaning of food chains given the appropriate experiences.
Level 4 students can then construct meaning of the hypothetical concept of limiting factors and
in so doing, their knowledge, and understanding, of food chains is ``deepened'' (e.g., biotic
limiting factors express themselves via feeding relationships within food chains). Similarly,
when level 5 students construct knowledge of theoretical concepts such as atoms, molecules, and
photosynthesis, the concepts of food chains and limiting factors are revisited, but this time with
even more precision, thus are ``deepened'' even further (e.g., food chains begin with plants
because they are the only organisms capable of utilizing the energy of photons to synthesize
organic ``food'' molecules from inorganic molecules found in their environments; food chains
are limited in length because approximately 90% of the energy that enters each trophic level is
``lost'' as heat before it can enter the next trophic level).
If the above discussion represents an accurate view of concept construction, then perhaps we
have explained why the more advanced reasoners outperformed their less advanced peers on all
three types of concept questions. But why did the level 3 students demonstrate some success on
the hypothetical and theoretical concept questions? And why did the level 4 students
demonstrate some success on the theoretical concept questions? Perhaps the most reasonable
explanation is that in spite of lack of any ``deep'' understanding of such concepts, these students
nevertheless retained some ``bits'' of knowledge that led to some success. For example, consider
the set of statements designed to assess knowledge of the theoretical concept of gene (Table 1).
As it turned out, student performance was relatively high on the third, fourth, and ®fth statements
(72, 78, and 90% success, respectively). This suggests that these ``facts'' about genes were
retained by many students regardless of their developmental level. Similarly, 82% of the students
responded correctly to the statement that photosynthesis (presumably a theoretical concept)
involves light-capturing pigment molecules. And 76% responded correctly to the statement
that photosynthesis uses solar energy to combine CO2 with H2O to produce carbohydrate and
O2 molecules. The implication is that understanding is by no means an all or none affair.
Rather, understanding may begin with the accumulation of speci®c ``bits'' of knowledge about
abstract entities and processes, only to proceed further with the development of more ad-
vanced intellectual abilities, which are then used to construct understanding. Unfortunately,
the present results suggest that the development of level 5 thinking abilities and the
associated understanding of theoretical conceptual systems may be limited to a very small
percentage of students, that is, unless their future course work provokes continued intellectual
development.

Conclusions and Educational Implications

The present results provide support for the hypothesis that scienti®c concepts can be
meaningfully classi®ed into three, not two, general categories. In addition to previously
identi®ed descriptive and theoretical concepts, a new class of hypothetical concepts has been
identi®ed. Hypothetical concepts are de®ned as those that, in theory, could derive meaning from
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1011

observation if it were possible for one to extend the time frame over which the necessary
observations are made. However, in practice, such observations are either not possible or very
unlikely, and meaning must be derived from one's ability to imagine past or future events and
situations. Thus, hypothetical concepts have intermediate dif®culty in terms of knowledge
acquisition and understanding.
The present results also provide support for the hypothesis that intellectual development
during the college years is not complete when students gain the abilities/skills typically
associated with Piagetian or neo-Piagetian conceptions of formal operational thinking. Rather, as
previously suggested by others, `post-formal' intellectual development occurs, at least for some
students (e.g., Perry, 1970; Arlin, 1975; Commons, Richards, & Armon, 1984; Perry, Donovan,
Kelsey, Peterson, Statkiewicz, & Allen, 1986; Welfel & Davison, 1986; Castro & Fernandez,
1987; Commons & Miller, 1997; Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998; Yan &
Arlin, 1998). Evidence has been obtained consistent with the view that some students, perhaps
fewer than one third (see Figure 5) develop thinking skills associated with hypothesis testing
when the hypothesized entities are unobservable. As has been found in previous studies, these
thinking skills appear to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge about, and the understanding of,
scienti®c concepts.
Interestingly, the conclusion that a new class of hypothetical concepts exists seems to have
been foreshadowed by philosopher C.S. Peirce over one hundred years ago. Although Peirce was
virtually unknown during his lifetime (1839±1914), the publication of his collected papers in the
1930s led to great interest in his work during the 1940s and 1950s. As cited in Goudge (1950),
Peirce believed in the existence of three types of hypotheses. The ®rst type referred to facts
unobserved when the hypothesis was generated, but which could nevertheless have been
observed. For example, you see a broken window and a nearby baseball and generate the
hypothesis that the ``¯ying'' baseball broke the window. Peirce's second type were hypotheses
that referred to facts not only unobserved but physically incapable of being observed. Peirce
gave the following example: ``Fossils are found; say, remains like those of ®shes, but far in the
interior of the country. To explain the phenomenon, we suppose the sea once washed over this
land.'' (cited in Gould, 1950, p. 196) Concepts associated with this type of hypothesis are what
we are calling hypothetical concepts. Lastly, Peirce's third type were hypotheses that referred to
entities both factually and theoretically incapable of being observed. Goudge cites molecules,
electrons, and the luminiferous ether as examples. Clearly, these are examples of what we are
calling theoretical concepts.
Because many, if not most, of the concepts that ®ll the syllabi of college science courses are
of the hypothetical and theoretical nature, the implication seems clear. College science
instructors should not only concern themselves with introducing new terms/concepts. They
should also concern themselves with student thinking abilities, that is, with students' continued
intellectual development. To do this, a careful analysis of the kinds of concepts introduced, as
well as the order and means of their introduction should become matters of concern. In
introductory biology courses this means overturning the widespread and long-standing tradition
of starting courses with the theoretical concepts associated with chemistry (e.g., atomic and
molecular structures) before progressing to the more descriptive and hypothetical concepts
associated with whole organisms (cf., Heppner, Hammon, Kass-Simon, & Kruger, 1990).
Clearly, a recon®gured introductory biology course that starts with descriptive concepts and
progresses to hypothetical concepts, and then to theoretical concepts, seems in order. Such
changes may not only help students better understand concepts and promote their intellectual
development, they might also help solve the widespread problem of college student attrition
from the sciences (e.g., Rigdon & Tobias, 1991; Seymour & Hewitt, 1997; Sorensen, 1999).
1012 LAWSON ET AL.

This material is based upon research partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant
No. DUE 9453610. Any opinions, ®ndings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily re¯ect the views of the National Science
Foundation. The authors wish to thank Sandra Meyer, Charles Kazilek and Bob Sookvong for their help in
data collection and analysis.

Appendix: Types of Concepts

People have ideas about how the world works. These ideas are sometimes called concepts.
We use words or phrases to refer to our ideas/concepts, which can be classi®ed into at least three
types.

Theoretical Concepts
Have you ever used your direct senses (microscopes do not count) to actually observe a
single helium atom? Of course the answer is no. No person has ever observed a single atom
of any kind simply because atoms are much too small to see with the naked eye. So how do
we know that atoms exist? The answer is that we really do not know in any absolute sense.
Instead the idea that atoms exist was proposed long ago and has subsequently been veri®ed with
so much indirect evidence that people no longer doubt their existence. Nevertheless, in spite of
some recent photographs taken with very powerful electron microscopes showing what appear to
be little round balls (atoms?), no person will ever be able to use the naked-eye to directly observe
an individual atom. Thus the concept of atoms (i.e., the idea that all matter consists of tiny
unseen ball-shaped objects) is classi®ed as a theoretical concept. The meaning of theoretical
concepts comes not from direct sensory input but from the theories from which ideas originate.
Other theoretical concepts about objects too small to see include things such as photons,
electrons, quarks and any type of process that presumably involves knowing what takes place in
terms of interacting atoms and molecules (e.g., diffusion, oxidation, glycolysis, anaerobic
respiration). Because the entities and processes upon which theoretical concepts are based
cannot be directly observed, acquiring understanding of theoretical concepts is relatively
dif®cult.

Descriptive Concepts
Have you ever used your direct senses to actually observe a single chair? Of course the
answer is yes. You may be sitting in one now. No two chairs are identical in all respects. And
some may be quite different from others (e.g., a baby's high chair and a recliner). Nevertheless,
all chairs share enough observable characteristics to allow us to recognize them as chairs. And
because chairs can be directly observed, if someone does not yet know what a chair is, we can
show him one. Thus the chair concept derives meaning from direct observation of objects and is
classi®ed as a descriptive concept. We also form descriptive concepts of directly observed events
(e.g., a girl is seen walking down a street; a dog is heard barking in the night.) and directly
observed situations (e.g., a boy is sitting on top of a box; dirt is swept under a rug.). Other
examples of descriptive concepts include eating, sleeping, hitting, crying, cars, boats, tables,
furniture, next to, below, around, shorter, heavier, and so on. Notice that the concept of furniture
is classi®ed as descriptive in spite of the fact that we do not see the class furniture, rather we see
individual objects (tables, chairs, sofas) that we group together in a larger class of objects that we
call furniture. Nevertheless, the class concept of furniture is still considered descriptive because
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1013

we can observe examples of its class members. Because the entities and processes upon which
descriptive concepts are based can be directly observed, acquiring understanding of descriptive
concepts is relatively easy.

Intermediate Concepts
An intermediate class of concepts exists. Do you know where dinosaurs came from? Do you
know what killed them some 65 million years ago? Do you know what produced the Grand
Canyon in northern Arizona? And do you know how ecological succession occurs on abandoned
farm land in Georgia or why predator±prey populations often show cyclic oscillations? Of
course nobody was alive when the dinosaurs arose, when they died, and when the Grand Canyon
was carved. So direct observation of these events by humans is not possible. And although it may
be possible for any one person to observe ecological succession and predator±prey population
oscillations, these events generally take place on time scales that extend well beyond the normal
person's experience. Thus our ability to make these sorts of observations is limited in a
fundamentally different way than in the case of theoretical concepts. Our limitation here is not
our senses but our relatively short lifespan or our inability to take the time to make the necessary
observations. In other words, although we will never be able to use our senses to directly observe
an atom because it its size, presumably we could have observed where the dinosaurs came from,
what produced the Grand Canyon, and how succession occurs had we been around long enough
and at the right time.
Thus ideas/concepts about events that occur beyond the normal, or even possible, time
frame of observation form an intermediate class of concepts. Additional examples include the
geologist's concepts of plate tectonics, subduction, and orogeny and the paleontologist's
concepts of speciation, adaptive radiation, and extinction. Because the entities and processes
upon which intermediate concepts are based are not directly observed, but could in theory be
directly observed if the observational time period were extended beyond the normal, acquiring
understanding of intermediate concepts is of intermediate dif®culty.

An Exercise in Classifying Concepts

Here are some terms or phrases including their de®nitions. Please classify them into one of
the three concept classes de®ned above. Pay particular attention to the de®nitions as the
classi®cation of any one term/phrase may differ depending upon how it is being de®ned.

1. Environmental factors: The observable factors surrounding an organism that may

effect its growth and development, e.g., amount of soil, number and types of other
organisms. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ descriptive. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ
descriptive).
2. Molecule: A particle that results from the joining of two or more atoms. (Researcher
classi®cation ˆ theoretical. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ theoretical).
3. Food chain: A sequence of feeding relationships starting with plants, moving through
successive levels of animals; for example, grass being eaten by a mouse that is in turn
eaten by a snake, that is in turn eaten by a hawk. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ descrip-
tive. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ descriptive).
4. Arti®cial selection: The selective breeding of organisms over several generations for
the purpose of producing offspring with certain desired characteristics. (Researcher
classi®cation ˆ intermediate. Panel classi®cation 3/10 ˆ descriptive; 2/10 ˆ inter-
mediate; 1/10 ˆ theoretical; 4/10 undecided between descriptive and intermediate).
1014 LAWSON ET AL.

5. Air pressure: The force exerted on a surface due to the collision of unseen gas
molecules with that surface; the amount of force depends on the frequency of colli-
sions, the mass of the colliding molecules and their speed. (Researcher classi®ca-
tion ˆ theoretical. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ theoretical).
6. Combustion: The rapid breaking apart and oxidation (i.e., addition of O2 molecules) of
relatively complex molecules to produce heat energy and usually light energy.
(Researcher classi®cation ˆ theoretical. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ theoretical).
7. Convergent evolution: The independent evolution of similar characteristics within two
or more populations of unrelated organisms as a result of living under similar selective
pressures. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ intermediate. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ
intermediate).
8. Nocturnal: A type of animal that is active at night. (Researcher classi®ca-
tion ˆ descriptive. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ descriptive).
9. Species: Groups of organisms that may live in different locations but that share enough
characteristics such that if they were brought into contact with each other they could
mate and produce fertile offspring (i.e., fertile offspring are those that can in turn mate
and produce their own offspring). (Researcher classi®cation ˆ intermediate. Panel
classi®cation 10/10 ˆ descriptive).
10. Osmosis: The diffusion of water (H2O) molecules through a selectively permeable
membrane; from a region of relative high concentration of water molecules to a region
of relatively lower concentration. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ theoretical. Panel
classi®cation 10/10 ˆ theoretical).
11. Limiting factors: Environmental factors that act over an extended period of time to
keep a population from living in a particular area or restrict its population size.
(Researcher classi®cation ˆ intermediate. Panel classi®cation 2/10 ˆ descriptive; 6/
10 ˆ intermediate; 2/10 ˆ undecided between descriptive and intermediate).
12. Population: A group of organisms that appear to be of the same kind living together in
a particular location. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ descriptive. Panel classi®cation 10/
10 ˆ descriptive).
13. Biogeochemical cycles: Pathways in which atoms and molecules such as carbon (C),
oxygen (O2), nitrogen (N2), phosphorus (usually in the form of a phosphate ion POÿ 4)
and water (H2O) cycle through living and non-living components of ecosystems.
(Researcher classi®cation ˆ theoretical. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ theoretical).
14. Community: All of the organisms living and interacting in a particular area.
(Researcher classi®cation ˆ descriptive. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ descriptive).
15. Evolution: The lengthy process by which some past species have gone extinct while
others have changed to give rise to present-day species. (Researcher classi®ca-
tion ˆ intermediate. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ intermediate).
16. Natural selection: The evolutionary process in which organisms better suited to live in
a particular environment are able to survive and pass on their helpful characteristics to
subsequent generations. Natural selection is one of the most important processes that
causes evolutionary change. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ intermediate. Panel classi-
®cation 9/10 ˆ intermediate; 1/10 undecided between intermediate and theoretical).
17. External stimulus: An occurrence such as a ¯ash of light or a poke external to an
organism that provokes it to respond in some way. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ
descriptive. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ descriptive).
18. Gene: A basic hereditary unit consisting of a sequence of DNA nucleotide molecules
within a chromosome. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ theoretical. Panel classi®cation 10/
10 ˆ theoretical).
19. Photosynthesis: The process by which chlorophyll molecules in green plants capture
light energy and use it to combine CO2 and H2O molecules together to produce
 CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION IN COLLEGE BIOLOGY 1015

glucose (i.e., C6H12O6) molecules. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ theoretical. Panel

classi®cation 10/10 ˆ theoretical).
20. Carnivore: An animal that eats primarily meat. (Researcher classi®cation ˆ descrip-
tive. Panel classi®cation 10/10 ˆ descriptive).
21. Fossils: The remains of once living organisms preserved in rock through a lengthy
process of fossilization (i.e., the replacement of living matter by rock-like matter).
(Researcher classi®cation ˆ intermediate. Panel classi®cation 1/10 ˆ descriptive;
7/10 ˆ intermediate; 2/10 ˆ undecided between descriptive and intermediate).

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