From the question, it concerns the acquisition of an easement by A on B property which

owned by B but later being purchased by C. Easement were set out in Re Ellenborough Park as i)
there must be a dominant and servient tenement, ii) must accommodate the dominant tenement,
iii) the dominant and servient tenements must be owned or occupied by different persons and iv)
must be capable of forming the subject matter of a grant.

The first issue is whether the right of access to the wide field via a drive is constituted as
an easement. Crabb v Arun recognised the right of access as an easement, hence the test is
considered to be met. While easements can be obtained through an express grant, express
reservation, implied grant, implied reservation, or prescription. We assumed that there was no
express grant or reservation because the right of access does not specifically declare so whereas real
necessity is required in Re MRA Engineering. According to Walby v Walby, it is insufficient if the
easement is required for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant land under Adealon where
there is no real necessity. A can get to Rose Mews by a different path even though it is narrower
so the easement isn't regarded as necessary because the wide field isn't the only way to get there. If
both Charlie and Dipak have a common purpose that the easement must exist, the easement may be
created by an implicit grant by common intention.  However, it can be argued that there is an
implied grant based on common intention. When Charlie granted Dipak a lease, they may have
agreed that Dipak would enter through the huge field because it is more reasonable for people to
enter by the front entrance of the cottage rather than the back door. Besides, as Dipak will access
the cottage by driving he may face difficulty if he accesses via the narrow path.

If the grant of the lease to Dipak includes the easement-like rights that Charlie had before the
grant, there may be an implied grant under the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows. To operate the rule, the
use of the right must be continuous and apparent while this will not be an issue due to the access
through the wide field will be utilised continuously and apparently where they want to access the
cottage. Next, there must be reasonable enjoyment of the land since people prefer to enter the
cottage by the front door rather than the back entrance therefore the right of access through the
wide field is appropriate. Furthermore, the original landowner must have enjoyed the enjoyment
prior to or at the time of the grant. Whereas it won't be an issue because Charlie had to get to the
cottage's front entrance via the wide-field earlier. The easement may be impliedly granted under the
rule in Wheeldon v Burrow since all of the conditions have been met.

The second issue to consider is whether a right of storage exists. Right of storage is
traditionally recognised as an easement in Wright v Macadam. Since Charlie permits Dipak to keep
the stones in a shed after a few months of the lease, it seems improbable that the easement is
granted expressly or impliedly from the beginning of the lease. Due to the lack of formalities, the
right of storage may be considered as a mere licence rather than an easement because it is granted
orally after a few months of the lease. When the lease is renewed, the licence may be converted into
an easement under s.62 of the Law of Property Act of 1925. (LPA). On conveyance, S.62 LPA 1925 is
regarded as a word-saving device.

A conveyance by deed or registered disposition is required for the land to be sold and convert
permission into a right whereas s.62 LPA 1925 only creates legal easements but it may not regard
as an issue since the lease was renewed in 2013. Following Sovmots Investment v SSE, it is noted
that prior diversity of occupation is not a necessary ingredient in implying easement by s.62 where
the quasi easement was continuous and apparent, the facts have shown that before the renewal of
lease there is a diversity of occupation as Charlie owns the entire land and Dipak leases the Rose.
Thirdly, the right must be related to the land since the shed is located on Harrow Farm's land it is
fulfilled. Finally, there must be no other objective than the person's right to be expressed. It appears
to be a non-issue because the facts never demonstrate that either side has any conflicting
intentions. The easement may be granted implied under s.62 of the LPA 1925.

The final issue to consider is whether an underground drainage easement is possible. It is

traditionally referred to as an easement in Attwood V Bovis Homes. It is likely to be grand impliedly
by necessity although Iqne can still be utilised without drainage, as per the subject guide. While, the
underground drain exists even before the lease, therefore an implied grant by common intention is
also reasonable. As it's reasonable to assume that C and D both intend D to enjoy the right of
damage throughout the lease. Furthermore, the implied grant established by the rule in Wheeldon v
Burrows is (i) use of the right must be continuous and apparent, (ii) there must be reasonable
enjoyment of the land (iii) the seller must have enjoyed and used the enjoyment prior at the time of
grand. It has been confirmed in Chaffe v Kingsley that the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows cannot create
an easement by implied reservation for the retained land. Once the requirements are fulfilling, the
easement of underground drainage is likely to be possible.