1147

1.Katherine's vehicle would be secure in the basement garage.

According to the "ouster principle," a right cannot be an easement if it grants the holder
either sole or shared possession or use of the servient tenement. Certain forms of
ownership may be deemed exclusive because of the terms under which they are
held.Since the property owner's capacity to use the land between 8:30 a.m. and 6 p.m.
would be "illusory," the court in Batchelor v. Marlow held that the restriction could not be
an easement. Any easement must safeguard the landowner's lawful use of his property.
In Hair v. Gillman, it was decided that the right to park in a four-space garage was an
easement.
It was determined in Copeland v. Greenhalf that the right did not constitute possession.
The judge's ruling in Marlow that there was no easement of parking if the servient owner
was left "without any legitimate use of his land" was an added insult. Lord Scott and
Neuberger, in an obiter remark in the Scottish case of Moncrieff v Jamieson, appear to
favour a test based on "ownership and control" over the more stringent requirement of
"reasonable usage." The legislation appears to be loosening up as a result of this.
Having "reasonable use of his land" was found to be sufficient for the existence of an
easement in Virdi V. Ghana. The case of Kettel v. Bloomfold appears to demonstrate
that Moncrieff has affected common law. Unless it's an easement, it may be a licence, in
which case Cameron wouldn't have to follow it.
When the lease was renewed, the privilege of parking a car became an
easement.Provision 62 of the LPA 1925 may suggest a right of way and parking for
Katherine depending on the specifics of the situation. Unlike the Burrows rule, real
estate transactions always need a deed. All "liberties, privileges, easements, and rights
appertaining or regarded to appertain to the land" may be included in the transfer of title
under this Act. In Wright v. Macadam, the tenant's licence to store coal in a shed
automatically became an easement after the owner offered the tenant a new lease.
Since Gubby extended Katherine's lease for another seven years, Katherine's two rights
morphed into an easement.
A right need not be shown to be reasonably required for it to be considered "continuous
and obvious" under this Act, in contrast to the standard in Burrows. Schedule 3(2) of the
Land Registration Act 2002, which relates to Katherine's circumstance, states that if a
right was exercised within the year before to the disposition, it may not even need to be
proven to be "continuous and obvious."
2.There was a hidden stairwell in the back of Gubby's house that Katherine could use to
get to her apartment.
An easement can be used in the same way as a right of way, as demonstrated by
previous legal precedent. However, one potential snag in making adjustments for
people with disabilities deserves consideration (with regards to Ellen borough).
Katherine is allowed to utilise the private stairway since she will benefit more from its
use than the dominant tenement. In that situation, Katherine might already have a
licence that doesn't apply to Cameron. In addition, Nickerson v. Barraclough holds that
in order for Katherine to imply create an easement for her right of way (or for parking),
she must show that there is no other way for her to reach the land, which is not the case
here because the driveway was merely a convenient means of access due to her fans
and not the only way. However, Wheeldon v. Burrow principles will protect Katherine
because the easements were open and obvious and necessary to her reasonable use
and enjoyment of the land. While section 62 of the LPA applies to all easements, this
principle only applies to quasi easements. Because of Hansford v. Jago, it's okay to
walk on unpaved roads. Because it's a "private staircase," this route blends in more
subtly. Katherine's parking entitlement appears to be in line with the principles set forth
in Burrows. As a result, Cameron probably won't be able to stop Katherine from parking,
but he may be able to park his own car if there are empty spaces. If Katherine's two
claims are in fact easements, then they can be created in accordance with the principles
articulated in Wheeldon v. Burrow or under section 62 of the Land and Property Act of
1925.
3.Gubby can advertise his company by placing a sign above his penthouse.
Since Gubby operates his company out of Katherine's flat on the ground floor, the lack
of proximity is not a problem for them. In the case of Platt v. Crouch, it was determined
that billboards within sight of a hotel could be construed as an easement. In Moody v.
Steggles, Fry J ruled that the right to attach a sign to a neighbor's wall constituted an
easement, even though doing so would not increase the value of either party's property.
In Hill v Tupper, it was decided that the dominant land did not benefit from the ability to
moor pleasure craft on the canal, but rather that the right was a personal privilege that
appeared to create a commercial monopoly and hence could not be an easement.
An implied reservation may exist in Gubby's right to place a sign. Remember that an
implicit reservation can only develop from a combination of necessity and shared intent.
The courts are hesitant to grant the owner's request since the owner has the legal right
to reserve his rights explicitly. Cordell v. Second Clanfield Properties shows that when a
property owner intends to reserve a right implicitly, the law will be rigidly interpreted
against them. The need for areal necessity, which does not apply to the building of a
sign for advertising purposes, is illustrated by the case of Wong v. Beaumont, in which a
pipe for ventilation was necessary for the underground restaurant to function. Because
of its similarity to easements of necessity, common purpose is also unlikely to apply to
this principle.
If Katherine's two rights are believed to have originated from an implied grant, then they
must be in accordance with paragraphs 1 through 3 of schedule 3 in order to bind
Cameron. Even if Cameron was unaware of Katherine's rights and reasonable scrutiny
of the land did not reveal them, Katherine's exercise of those rights within the previous
year will satisfy as a proprietary right. In the end, Cameron can only force Katherine to
hand over the keys to her automobile if there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
her entitlement does not amount to exclusive ownership. The fact that the private stairs
appears to benefit Catherine rather than the property creates accommodation problems
and may reclassify the easement as a licence, even though normally Cameron would be
bound by the easement. Finally, Cameron needs an easement to be allowed to put up a
sign, but this seems questionable even though it is capable of being one as in Moody v.
Steggles and it conforms with the Elenborough requirements; this is because courts
take a tougher position with implied reservations than grants. An implied reservation
may exist in Gubby's right to place a sign. Remember that an implicit reservation can
only develop from a combination of necessity and shared intent.