People of the Philippines v. Tamani (G.R. Nos.

L-22160 & L-
22161)

FACTS:

On February 14, 1963, the trial court convicted Tamani for the
murder of Siyang. On February 25, 1963, Tamani’s counsel received
a copy of the decision. On March 1, 1963, he filed a motion for
reconsideration. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, accused’s counsel
received the order of denial. On September 10, 1963, the said
counsel appealed the trial court’s decision. People, through Solicitor
General, argue that the appeal must be dismissed on the ground
that it is beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

ISSUE: Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date
of promulgation or from the date of notice of the decision.

HELD: Appeal was dismissed. The 15-day period should commence

from the date of promulgation.

RATIO: Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. When

appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed
from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from
the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or
his attorney.

The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from

February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly
served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken.
The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as
referring to "judgment" while the word "notice" should be construed
as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule
of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each
phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each be put
in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken
distributively". Therefore, when the order denying appellant's
motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July
13th on appellant's counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file
his notice of appeal and not 11 days. Appellant Tamani's notice of
appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58 days late.
Lamb v. Phipps (G.R. No. L-7806)

FACTS:

Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he

resigned due to ill health. Prior to that, he was assigned as
provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He
requested the Auditor General Phipps for his clearance certificate.
This is to show that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds
under his custody. Phipps refuses to issue such clearance since a
certain Fernandez is planning to sue the government despite the
fact that the records show Fernandez acknowledged that he was
paid by the government. Lamb now files a Petition for Mandamus to
compel Phipps to issue his clearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be given due course to

compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of clearance.

HELD: No.

RATIO:

The issuance of a certificate of clearance is purely

discretionary on the part of the Auditor General, where mandamus
cannot lie. Lamb also failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
that is, to appeal the decision of the Auditor General to the
Governor-General and Secretary of War.

By way of obiter dictum, the erroneous provision on

mandamus in the Code of Civil Procedure (Act. 190, Sec. 222) was
corrected by the Court:

The phrase "courts of law" should read "course of law." Many

of the provisions of said Act No. 190 were copied verbatim from the
Code of Civil Procedure of California. Section 222 of Act No. 190
was taken from section 1085 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. The section of the California Code reads "course of law,"
instead of "courts of law." We believe that a mistake or error has
been made in the printing of said section. We believe that it was the
intention of the legislative department of the government to follow
exactly the provision of the California Code and that they intended
to use the phrase "course of law" and not "courts of law." It will be
noted in section 226, the section relating to the writ of prohibition,
the legislature used the phrase "course of law." An examination of
the Spanish translation of said section (222) more clearly indicates
what the legislative department of the government intended. In
Spanish, the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary "courts of
law."

We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the

jurisdiction of this court in mandamus to the cases where there was
no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law.
It is our duty, therefore, to give the statute a sensible construction;
such as will effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible,
avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion. Clerical errors or
misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute
unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended
operation, will not vitiate the act; they will be corrected by the court
and the statute read as amended, provided the true meaning is
obvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent of the
face of the whole enactment.

People of the Philippines v. Duque (G.R. No. 100285)

FACTS:

Duque was convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment, he

allegedly committed in January 1986. His offense was punishable
by a special law (the Labor Code). He now assails the conviction on
the ground of prescription; specifically that Section 2 of Act No.
3226, which provides the reckoning point for prescriptive periods
laid down in special penal laws, is illogical or absurd. According to
Duque, a literal reading of Section 2 appears to suggest that two (2)
elements must coincide for the beginning of the running of the
prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the commission
of the violation of the special law; and second, the “institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.” In
Duque asserts that the relevant prescriptive period would never
begin to run because the co-existence of these two (2) requirements
is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326.

ISSUE: Whether or not “discovery of the commission of the violation

of the special law” must first concur with “institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment” before the
prescriptive period would run.

HELD: No.

RATIO:

Section 2, Act No. 3326 reads: “Prescription shall begin to run

from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.”

The literal reading that appellant suggests does not benefit

appellant for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in
any case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced
only a few months after the discovery of the commission of the
offense. Second, a literal reading of Section 2 is unnecessary. As is
well-known, initiation of preliminary investigation of the offense
normally marks the interruption of the period of prescription. Under
appellant Duque's literal reading, the prescription period would
both begin and be interrupted by the same occurrence; the net
effect would be that the prescription period would not have
effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the
simultaneous interruption of that same period.

Statutes must be construed to effect the intention of the

legislature, and to give a sensible meaning to the language of the
statute. Appellant's literal reading would make nonsense of Section
2 of Act No. 3326. Thus, the phrase "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment" may be either
disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the
word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of

the violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof;

or as:

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of

the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and until institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. v. NLRC
(see Handwritten digest)

Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals and Epifanio

Dela Cruz (G.R. No. 98382)

FACTS:

Dela Cruz mortgaged his property to petitioner as a guarantee

for three promissory notes. He failed to pay his loan from Petitioner.
Petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won
as the highest bidder. The Notices of Sale were published on March
28, April 11, and April 12. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that
the notice of auction sale shall be "published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks". Dela Cruz then instituted an action
for reconveyance against petitioner on the ground that the
foreclosure proceedings and subsequent auction sale were void for
failing to comply with the publication requirement. RTC dismissed
the Dela Cruz’s complaint. CA reversed RTC. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to comply with the

publication requirement regarding foreclosure proceedings.

HELD: Yes

RATIO:
Article 13 of the Civil Code is completely silent as to the
definition of what a "week" is. In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G.
3139 [1938], “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days. The publication on April 11,
1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for the
second week because the period for the first week should be
reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second
week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It
is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was both
theoretically and physically accomplished during the first day of the
third week and cannot thus be equated with compliance in law.
Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of
time and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of
seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on
which it begins.

Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28,

1969 as reckoning point in line with the third paragraph of Article
13 of the New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week
of publication as to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969
because this will have the effect of extending the first week by
another day. This incongruous repercussion could not have been
the unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was
enacted.

ALU-TUCP v. NLRC (G.R. No. 109902)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed separate labor complaints against their

employer, private respondent National Steel Corporation for unfair
labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits. Labor Arbiter
declared petitioners as mere project employees but entitled to
regular employee salary pursuant to their collective bargaining
agreement. On appeal, NLRC modified the decision of the Labor
Arbiter deleting the monetary awards but still declaring petitioners
as project employees. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ more than six year-service to
private respondents qualifies them as regular employees.

HELD: No.

The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project

employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or
legally dissolve, their status as project employees. The second
paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing
that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be
considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to
project employees.

In Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, this

Court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280
relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who
fall within the definition of said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project
employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the
provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof,
unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not only the
phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions
of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is
observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code.