Journal of

Experimental
Social Psychology
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

Regulatory focus and temporal distanceq

Ginger L. Penningtona,* and Neal J. Roeseb
a
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA
b
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820, USA
Received 17 June 2002; revised 15 March 2003

Abstract

Four studies identify and examine a temporal component to regulatory focus. Results support the assertion that promotion focus
tends to predominate for temporally distant goals, whereas proximal goals are characterized by more balanced consideration of both
promotion- and prevention-focused concerns. In Study 1, students rated the importance of promotion and prevention goals at two
points in time: 2 weeks before and a few minutes before an examination. Promotion goal importance increased with temporal
distance, whereas prevention goal importance remained constant over time. Study 2 replicated this pattern holding the actual time-
span constant (3.5 weeks) and varying only the psychological sense of proximity/distance. In Study 3, subjects rated the regulatory
focus of goals at varying points in time, both future and past. The temporal effect was replicated for both time periods. Study 4
provided evidence for the reverse effect, that of regulatory focus on the perceived temporal distance of future goals. Taken together,
these findings suggest an integration across research domains that links regulatory focus to temporal perspective for both pro-
spective and retrospective judgments.
Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

Introduction
We are all mental time travelers: Although forever
chained to the present, much of our mental activity
nevertheless aims at events at varying points in the future
and past. But how do perceptions of temporally distant
vs. proximate events differ? And are there any com-
monalties between perceptions of future vs. past? Some
answers to these questions have appeared in independent
research on optimism shifts (e.g., Shepperd, Ouellette, &
Fernandez, 1996), temporal construal theory (Liberman
q
Preparation of this paper was supported by National Institute of
Mental Health Grant MH55578 and by the Canada Research Chair
program, both awarded to the second author. Study 1 was a
component of the first authorÕs MA thesis and was completed under
the direction of the second author. We thank Galen Bodenhausen,
Tory Higgins, and several anonymous reviewers for comments on
earlier drafts; Mike Bailey and Lorne Campbell for their statistical
suggestions; and Kerry Coupland, Colin Defreitas, Vivian Hsing,
Mischa Lumiere, and Colleen Saffrey for their assistance in data
collection.
*
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ginger.pennington@gsb.uchicago.edu (G.L. Pen-
nington), roese@uiuc.edu (N.J. Roese).
& Trope, 1998), the planning fallacy (Buehler, Griffin, &
Ross, 1994), the ‘‘rosy view’’ (Mitchell, Thompson,
Peterson, & Cronk, 1997), durability bias (Gilbert, Pinel,
Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998), and regret
(Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). We argue that these lines of
research have yielded findings compatible with a general
conclusion—changes in temporal perspective alter the
self-regulatory strategies individuals adopt during goal
pursuit. Temporal distance to a goal is proposed to
affect the extent to which goal-related concerns are
framed in terms of promotion and prevention (e.g.,
Higgins, 1998). More specifically, we argue that tem-
porally distant goals are associated with a relatively
greater emphasis on promotion vs. prevention. This
difference narrows as goals draw nearer in time, how-
ever, permitting prevention focus to exert relatively
greater influence on self-regulation in time periods close
to the present.
Regulatory focus
The principle of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998)
distinguishes between two strategies for goal attain-
ment—promotion focus and prevention focus. Although

0022-1031/$ - see front matter Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00058-1
564 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
both strategies embrace the hedonic goal of approaching
pleasure, they are distinct in that a promotion focus
involves sensitivity to the presence or absence of positive
outcomes (e.g., emphasizing advancement, accomplish-
ment, etc.), whereas a prevention focus involves sensi-
tivity to the absence or presence of negative outcomes
(e.g., emphasizing caution, protection, etc.). Regulatory
focus has been operationalized both in terms of situa-
tionally labile cognitive states as well as chronic pro-
cessing tendencies, each having similar classes of
consequences. First, regulatory focus influences social
perception in that it orients attention toward informa-
tion compatible with the regulatory focus (Higgins,
Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Second, failure to
achieve promotion or prevention activates emotion
clusters centering on, respectively, dejection, or agitation
(Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Third, performance
(as mediated by effort and persistence) varies as a
function of the match between regulatory focus and task
characteristics (F€orster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998).
Importantly, promotion focus may be said to involve
maximal goals, whereas prevention focus involves mini-
mal goals (Brendl & Higgins, 1996; Freitas, Liberman,
Salovey, & Higgins, 2002; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins,
2000). A maximal goal reflects the most that one could
wish for, whereas a minimal goal reflects bare necessities
or the least one could comfortably tolerate. A key dis-
tinction between these two types of goals centers on the
boundary of focus, i.e., whether one tends to focus on
potential variation above or below the goal point. For
maximal goals, individuals focus on the upper bound-
ary—the range of higher and better outcomes surpassing
the goal point (e.g., an Olympic athlete might strive
toward getting onto the medal stand, but nevertheless
imagine what it might be like to get the bronze, or the
silver, or the gold, or even to set a new world record). By
contrast, for minimal goals, individuals strive to keep
from falling below a minimally acceptable outcome,
focusing on holding at bay a range of inferior possible
outcomes (e.g., an Olympic athlete might strive to pre-
serve the honor of his nation by not scoring in the
bottom half). In short, maximal goals involve an un-
bounded upper range of ever more desirable possibili-
ties, whereas the scope of action for minimal goals
involves the lower range of unwanted possibilities.
This distinction is of pivotal importance in linking
regulatory focus and temporal distance. Two aspects,
reflecting opposing directions of causal effect, are evi-
dent. First, in the case of the effect of temporal distance
on regulatory focus, time itself is a resource, both
subjectively and objectively. Time affords the luxury of
maximal goals. That is, with a temporally distant per-
spective, individuals have the liberty to envision opti-
mal outcomes, to consider alternative strategies, and to
survey information widely. When this temporal re-
source dwindles, however, promotion focus should
likewise diminish. Individuals instead shift their em-
phasis to self-protection and maintenance of the status
quo. Consistent with this proposal, impending dead-
lines or time restrictions have been shown to result in
behaviors typically associated with prevention focus,
such as less extensive information search, restrictions in
the range of alternatives considered, decreased risk-
taking, greater attention to negative information, and
greater selectivity in information processing (Ariely &
Zakay, 2001; Ben-Zur & Bresnitz, 1981; Maule & Ed-
land, 1997; cf. Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins,
1999, 2001).
But whereas time is a resource, regulatory focus is a
constraint. If we flip the direction of causation around,
to the effect of regulatory focus on temporal distance,
promotion vs. prevention differentially constrain the
bounds of temporal imagination. Maximal goals offer an
unbounded upper limit, meaning that they minimally
constrain ambition. Therefore, promotion relative to
prevention focus invites goals that demand more time to
prepare, more time to implement, more time to com-
plete, and overall that occupy a mental space more
temporally removed from the here-and-now. Thus, we
hypothesized that merely inducing a promotion rather
than prevention focus, because it focuses attention to
betterment rather than preservation, would push the
individual to an imagined time point further removed
from the present.
This proposed relation between regulatory focus and
temporal perspective may account for a range of previ-
ously observed temporal patterns in judgment, encom-
passing judgments of the past as well as the future. The
summary below is intended to illuminate the common-
alities across these various research areas, with a spot-
light on temporally focused goals, that is, target tasks
with a discrete completion point (e.g., getting married)
as opposed to those that are ongoing and open-ended
(e.g., being happy; see Madey & Gilovich, 1993).
Prospection
People tend to view temporally distant goals more
optimistically than goals that are close at hand. That is,
individuals evince heightened confidence in their ability
to achieve success at discrete tasks when the relevant
events (e.g., exams, athletic contests) are temporally
distant rather than proximate (Gilovich, Kerr, & Med-
vec, 1993; Shepperd et al., 1996; Taylor & Shepperd,
1998). Further, the planning fallacy refers to the pattern
whereby individuals anticipate more rapid task com-
pletion than is actually the case, in part because of their
faith in specific facilitatory behaviors that they intend
to perform combined with disregard for potential im-
pediments (Buehler et al., 1994; Newby-Clark, Ross,
Buehler, Koehler, & Griffin, 2000). Two lines of the-
ory provide explanations for heightened confidence in
 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
success at temporally distant as opposed to proximate
goals, one affective and one cognitive. First, processes of
affect regulation might result in attempts to brace for the
worst by downgrading performance estimates to soften
the blow of potential failure (Sanna, 1999; Shepperd,
Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000). Sec-
ond, level of construal shifts with increasing temporal
distance, such that events in the distant future are con-
strued on an abstract, schematic level, whereas imme-
diate events are construed at a task-specific, contextual
level (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman,
2000, in press). The contextual and concrete nature of
obstacles may thus render them more salient as events
draw near, resulting in reduced confidence relative to
temporally distant events.
These findings may be summarized in terms of rela-
tively greater promotion focus for temporally distant
events and prevention focus for proximate events.
Moreover, both affect and cognition are intimately re-
lated to temporal optimism shifts. Heightened promo-
tion goals for temporally distant events initiate action
and encourage enthusiasm without getting ‘‘bogged
down in details.’’ A relatively greater emphasis on pre-
vention focus for proximate than distant events might
reflect increased levels of anxiety and also heightened
task-specific attention that incorporates assessment of
both facilitating and inhibiting factors. Research on
prospective judgment is thus compatible with the argu-
ment that promotion looms larger than prevention
concerns with increasing temporal distance from the
present. That promotion goals are, on average, con-
strued at a more abstract level than prevention goals
follows from this reasoning, and is tested directly in
Study 3.
Retrospection
Research on retrospective judgment likewise hints at
a relation between regulatory focus and time, though
work in this domain has followed a different path. Re-
flection on failures in oneÕs past typically involves
counterfactual thoughts that specify how the goal might
have been achieved (Roese, 1997). Two lines of research
on counterfactual thinking jointly point to a connection
between regulatory focus and temporal perspective.
First, Gilovich and Medvec (1994) showed that when
people consider events in the distant past, they are likely
to generate additive counterfactuals (i.e., specifying the
addition of some new action that was not in fact per-
formed), whereas when considering the more recent
past, people are more likely to generate subtractive
counterfactuals (i.e., specifying the subtraction of some
action that was in fact performed). Gilovich and Med-
vec (1995) offered several explanations for this temporal
pattern, the most relevant of which was the tendency for
obstacles to become less salient in memory over time.
565
And second, (Pennington & Roese, 2003; Roese, Hur, &
Pennington, 1999) drew a direct connection between
these same counterfactual subtypes and regulatory fo-
cus, showing that additive counterfactuals are evoked by
promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals
are evoked by prevention failure. Collectively, these two
lines of research suggest that individuals perceive dis-
tantly past events with a promotion focus (as evidenced
by predilection for additive counterfactual thoughts),
whereas proximately past events are viewed with a pre-
vention focus (as evidenced by a preference for sub-
tractive counterfactuals).
Additionally, Gilovich et al. (1993) found that ret-
rospective confidence in the completion of promotion-
oriented achievement goals was greater for temporally
distant as opposed to proximate events (Study 3), a
pattern that was equivalent in prospective confidence
judgments (Study 2). More directly relevant, they
found that participantsÕ prospective thought-listings
contained greater emphasis on the causes of success
(i.e., promotion focus) than on the causes of failure
(i.e., prevention focus) when focusing on temporally
distant than proximate events (Study 4). Mitchell et al.
(1997) also examined both prospective and retrospec-
tive judgments, discovering that both were evaluatively
more positive than was the actual present-tense expe-
rience. Again, this pattern was associated with a de-
crease in relevant negative thoughts as temporal
distance from the target event increased. Thus, previ-
ous research on retrospective judgment may also be
summarized with regard to increasing promotion focus
with temporal distance.
The present research
This research examined two directions of effect, that
of temporal distance on regulatory focus (Studies 1, 2,
and 3), and of regulatory focus on temporal distance
(Study 4). Study 1 was a longitudinal examination of
studentsÕ perceptions of an exam when it was either in
the near or distant future, with promotion and preven-
tion focus measured at both time points. Study 2 used a
framing manipulation (cf. Wilson & Ross, 2001) to test
experimentally the effect of perceived future temporal
distance on regulatory focus. Study 3 also assessed the
effect of temporal distance on regulatory focus, but was
additionally intended to widen our scope by examining
not just 2 but 11 time points in both past and future,
permitting an assessment of whether patterns are local-
ized within pockets or generalize linearly over broader
spans of time. Study 4 focused on the reverse causal
relation, that of regulatory focus on temporal distance.
Participants were induced to focus on either promotion
or prevention for either the future or the past, then
asked to estimate the time point of both goal initiation
and completion.
566 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
Study 1
Study 1 tested studentsÕ perceptions of an upcoming
exam at two points in time spanning two weeks. The
contrast between temporally distant vs. proximate
events was thus within-subject.
Method
Eighty undergraduate students (52 women and 28
men) from an introductory cognitive psychology course
at Northwestern University participated.
Participants completed a written survey at two points
in the academic quarter. Two weeks before a midterm
exam, the experimenter distributed consent forms and
surveys at the beginning of the class period. Participants
who chose to participate were asked to record the last
four digits of their student identification numbers and
were allowed approximately 10 min to complete the
survey. On the day of the course exam, the survey was
distributed at the beginning of class. Students were re-
minded that the exam would take much less time than
the allotted class period (which was over 2 h), in order to
assuage any possible concerns that the survey would
interfere with studentsÕ ability to complete the exam in
time.
Participants first estimated how well they expected to
do on the exam by providing an estimated grade per-
centage score and by completing a subjective confidence
rating along a 9-point scale ranging from extremely
poorly to extremely well. For the measure of regulatory
focus, participants were asked to think about their
performance on the exam and to indicate the extent to
which they were concerned with 10 different issues. Five
of these items described positively framed promotion-
focused outcomes (getting a high score, doing well
compared to others taking the test, showing strengths,
being pleased with performance, improving GPA). The
remaining five items pertained to negatively framed
prevention-focused concerns (avoiding an unfavorable
score, scoring in the lower end of the distribution, re-
vealing weaknesses, disappointing oneself, and damag-
ing transcript). Each was rated with regard to current
concern on an 8-point scale ranging from extremely
unconcerned to extremely concerned.
Results
ParticipantsÕ optimism about their exam performance
decreased over time, replicating past research. Partici-
pants predicted a higher grade (M ¼ 89:9; SE ¼ :74)
when the exam was temporally distant vs. proximal
(M ¼ 86:8; SE ¼ :85), F ð1; 77Þ ¼ 22:77, p < :001. Like-
wise, participantsÕ subjective confidence decreased from
7.73 to 6.68 (SEs ¼ :10 and .15) as the exam drew nearer
in time, F ð1; 77Þ ¼ 69:29; p < :001.
Regulatory focus items were averaged to produce
promotion and prevention subscales of adequate reli-
ability (CronbachÕs a ¼ :78 and .74). Overall, promo-
tion (M ¼ 6:01; SE ¼ :11) was of greater concern than
prevention (M ¼ 5:36; SE ¼ :14), F ð1; 78Þ ¼ 44:8; p <
:0001. As expected, however, the interaction between
temporal perspective and regulatory focus was signif-
icant, F ð1; 78Þ ¼ 4:45; p ¼ :04. Whereas prevention
concerns remained steady over time, promotion con-
cerns decreased as the event drew nearer. Participants
indicated a higher level of concern with promotion-
focused issues 2 weeks prior to the exam (M ¼ 6:12;
SE ¼ :12) than directly before the exam (M ¼ 5:89; SE
¼ :13), tð78Þ ¼ 1:90; p ¼ :03 (one-tailed). In contrast,
prevention-focused concerns remained equally salient
when the exam was distant (M ¼ 5:36; SE ¼ :15) and
proximate (M ¼ 5:37; SE ¼ :15), tð78Þ ¼ :04; p ¼ :97.
Correlations between optimism and regulatory focus
difference scores (at Time 1 and 2) are presented in
Table 1.
Of additional interest was whether the observed
temporal differences in regulatory focus might account
for the pattern of lowered expectations. We used tech-
niques suggested by Judd, Kenny, and McClelland
(2001) for testing mediation in within-subject designs.
To obtain a single measure of optimism, we first stan-
dardized and averaged the (percentage) grade estimate
and the subjective confidence ratings for each time pe-
riod. In addition, a regulatory focus difference score
(promotion focus minus prevention focus) was created
for each time period. The difference in the two optimism
scores (Time 1–Time 2) for each participant was then
regressed on two predictors: the sum of each partici-
pantsÕ regulatory focus scores for Time 1 and Time 2,
and the difference in each participantsÕ regulatory focus
scores (see Judd et al., 2001). A significant regression
coefficient for the regulatory focus difference predictor
indicated mediation of the optimism effect by regulatory
focus (B ¼
:190; p ¼ :04). Furthermore, the estimated
intercept was not found to differ from zero
(B ¼ :053; p ¼ :56), indicating complete mediation of
optimism shifts by changes in regulatory focus.1
These results provide support for the argument that
regulatory focus is a common thread linking a variety of
temporal shifts in judgment. Regulatory focus was
shown to shift in importance over the course of goal
pursuit. We regard the results of the mediation analysis
as intriguing though preliminary. It is important to note
that alternative methods of testing mediation (such as
examining expected grade and subjective confidence
1
Corresponding mediational analyses were conducted to examine
the reverse causal relationship. Although temporal change in regula-
tory focus was partially accounted for by declining expectations
(B ¼
:292; p ¼ :04), the effect of time on focus persisted over and
above any change in optimism (B ¼ :234; p ¼ :03).
 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
Table 1
Zero-order correlations between temporal changes in regulatory focus
and expectancies in Study 1
Expectancy type Regulatory focus
Promotion Prevention
Percentile .145 .046
Likert .391 .098
Index .273 .061
Note. Regulatory focus and expectancy ratings are represented by
difference scores (Time 1 ratings minus Time 2 ratings).
*
p < :05.
**
p < :01.
separately) did not reveal equally strong evidence of
mediation.
Study 2
Whereas Study 1 examined changes in objective time,
Study 2 examined subjective time. An examination of
the actual passage of time offers strong external validity,
but also introduces a number of complicating factors,
such as differences in the amount of actual task prepa-
ration across conditions. To address these issues, in
Study 2 we held the actual time span constant and
manipulated participantsÕ subjective experience of time
using a framing manipulation derived from Wilson and
Ross (2001). Students were asked to focus on upcoming
final examinations, which for all was approximately 3.5
weeks in the future. These exams were framed as very
near or relatively distant; we then assessed participantsÕ
promotion and prevention focus regarding this exam.
Method
Fifty students (26 women and 24 women) from the
University of Chicago volunteered to participate in a
study of goals in exchange for cash payment of $6.00.
Participants were recruited (via campus fliers) to
complete the study soon after midterm exam period
(November 14th). In a questionnaire administered via
computer, participants were asked to identify a specific
task (e.g., exam, paper, and assignment) that they nee-
ded to complete during finals week (December 9–14). In
the near condition, the next instruction portrayed the
final exam period as psychologically close in time:
This study concerns how people view tasks as they approach in
time. This study is being conducted as we approach ‘‘Week 8’’
of the term. So as of today, ‘‘finals week’’ is only a couple of
weeks away.
In the distant condition, finals were described as rel-
atively far away:
This study concerns how people view tasks at a distance. This
study is being conducted near midterm. So as of today, ‘‘finals
week’’ is still a number of weeks in the distance.
567
Following this paragraph, a timeline approximately
5 in. long appeared on the screen, and participants were
asked to locate today on the line (‘‘Please indicate TO-
DAY by selecting a point along the line with your
mouse.’’). Twelve response buttons were evenly spaced
across the line. In the near condition, the timeline was
anchored by the labels ‘‘Beginning of fall term’’ and
‘‘End of term.’’ In the distant condition, the labels
‘‘Midterm’’ and ‘‘End of term’’ were used. This differ-
ence in labeling was intended to alter the psychological
nearness of the target event by influencing the perceived
distance between now and finals (see Wilson & Ross,
2001, Study 6).
Following the temporal distance manipulation, par-
ticipants specified the exact completion date of their fi-
nal exam by choosing one of eight response options
(corresponding to ‘‘before finals,’’ each of the six days of
finals week, and ‘‘after finals’’). This item allowed us to
determine whether the manipulation of psychological
distance also altered the objective temporal distance
upon which participants focused.
As a measure of regulatory focus, participants were
presented with the target goal they identified and asked
to provide a promotion-focused and prevention-focused
rating. The promotion item was, ‘‘The goal you listed
earlier is printed below. How much do you think it fo-
cuses on ACHIEVING SOMETHING YOU WANT?’’,
and the prevention item was, ‘‘How much does your
goal focus on PREVENTING SOMETHING YOU
DONÕT WANT?’’ Participants provided ratings along a
7-point scale ranging from not at all to completely.
Participants also provided a rating of how well they
expected to do on the task using a 7-point scale ranging
from extremely well to extremely poorly.
Results
As a manipulation check of the distance manipula-
tion, participantsÕ timeline markings were analyzed.
Along the 12-point timeline, participants in the near
condition placed ‘‘today’’ significantly closer to the
target event (M ¼ 8:63; SE ¼ :12) than did participants
in the distant condition (M ¼ 4:91; SE ¼ :43),
tð48Þ ¼ 8:98; p < :01. Importantly, however, the psy-
chological distance manipulation did not affect the ob-
jective temporal distance of participantsÕ target. The
actual event date provided by participants in the distant
condition (M ¼ 2:91; SE ¼ :34) was no later in time
than in the near condition (M ¼ 3:15; SE ¼ :35),
tð48Þ ¼ :48; p > :60.
Unexpectedly, participantsÕ performance expectations
were not found to differ across conditions. Expectations
were equally favorable for participants in the near
condition (M ¼ 2:82; SE ¼ :17) as compared to those
in the distant condition (M ¼ 2:57; SE ¼ :18), tð48Þ ¼
1:02; p ¼ :31. Thus, we were unable to replicate previous
568 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
findings on temporal shifts in optimism. We are unaware
of any previous research assessing this effect using a
psychological or subjective manipulation of time, how-
ever, which may account for this result.
A 2 (temporal distance: near vs. far)  2 (regulatory
focus: promotion vs. prevention) ANOVA revealed a
main effect for regulatory focus. Promotion ratings
(M ¼ 5:78; SE ¼ :19) were higher than prevention rat-
ings (M ¼ 3:43; SE ¼ :27), F ð1; 48Þ ¼ 39:76; p < :01.
Of primary interest, however, was the significant inter-
action between temporal distance and regulatory focus,
F ð1; 48Þ ¼ 4:49; p ¼ :04. As expected, participants in-
dicated a stronger promotion focus when the goal was
made to feel distant (M ¼ 6:22; SE ¼ :28) vs. near
(M ¼ 5:33; SE ¼ :25), tð48Þ ¼ 2:36; p ¼ :02. In con-
trast, prevention focus did not vary as a function of
distance condition (Ms ¼ 3:08 and 3.78, SEs ¼ :39 and
.36), tð48Þ ¼ 1:29; p > :20.
This pattern precisely replicates that of Study 1 and
provides especially compelling support for the relation-
ship between temporal distance and regulatory focus.
Even when various factors associated with the actual
passage of time (such as amount of preparation) were
controlled, temporal distance influenced regulatory fo-
cus.
Study 3
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 suggested that pro-
motion focus increases with temporal distance to a goal,
whereas prevention focus remains stable. Two questions
are raised by these findings: (1) does the same pattern
hold for retrospective as well as prospective judgments
and (2) does this pattern hold across a greater range of
specific points in time, such as a week, a month, a year,
or even 10 years in the distance? Much previous research
into perceptions of time has relied upon measurements
at only two points in time. Our understanding of tem-
poral perception would be enriched considerably by
examining perceptions over multiple time points. Study
3 took the same general form as the previous studies, in
that the effect of temporal distance on regulatory focus
was examined. However, Study 3 focused on partici-
pantsÕ mental time travels into both the past and future.
That is, this study examined variation in individualsÕ
perceptions as a function of momentary consideration of
different points in the past and future. In a within-sub-
jects design, participants generated goals that they ac-
complished or intended to accomplish at 11 specific
points in time ranging equivalently over the past and
future. For each goal that participants recorded, they
rated the extent to which it could be characterized as a
promotion goal and a prevention goal.
In addition, this study examined variation in tempo-
ral construal over time. Previous research shows that
individuals construe goals at a more abstract level with
increasing temporal distance (e.g., Liberman & Trope,
1998). Accordingly, we tested whether regulatory focus
and construal level were correlated, and more impor-
tant, whether the effects observed in Studies 1 and 2
would remain reliable even if construal level were sta-
tistically controlled. We expected that construal and
focus would indeed be associated. Brendl and Higgins
(1996) argued that, as compared to minimal (preven-
tion-focused) goals, maximal (promotion-focused) goals
tend to support high-identity goals (p. 110). Maximal
goals specify the most positive end state one hopes to
achieve, a cognition that is likely to be somewhat broad
and self-reflective. Conversely, minimal goals have rel-
atively bounded upper limits. As such, we expected a
correspondence between promotion focus and high-level
construal on the one hand, and prevention and low-level
construal on the other. Based upon our speculation that
cognitive construal is but one component of the more
encompassing motivational constellation of regulatory
focus, however; we suspected that temporal changes in
regulatory focus would persist even with construal levels
statistically controlled.
Method
Subjects were 31 students (22 females and 9 males)
enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Simon
Fraser University, participating for course credit. The
design of the experiment was a 2 (regulatory focus:
promotion vs. prevention)  11 (temporal distance).
Points in time were designed to correspond to 1 week, 1
month, 6 months, 1 year, and 10 years. In order to by-
pass any assumptions students may hold about these
‘‘standard’’ points in time (e.g., ‘‘in 1 year I will be a
sophomore,’’ etc.), the time points were shifted by
adding minor numerical variation.2 Thus, subjects made
ratings for 11 points in time corresponding to (1) today,
(2) 9 days from today, (3) 9 days ago, (4) 40 days from
today, (5) 40 days ago, (6) 7 months from today, (7) 7
months ago, (8) 14 months from today, (9) 14 months
ago, (10) 11 years from today, and (11) 11 years ago.
Subjects were asked to record one goal associated
with each point in time and were given a single line on
which to record each goal. Subjects made three 9-point
ratings of each goal with regard to promotion, preven-
tion, and goal importance. The ratings of promotion
and prevention (‘‘How much does this goal focus on
getting something you want?’’; ‘‘How much does this
goal focus on avoiding something you donÕt want?’’)
were both anchored by not at all and completely. The
rating of construal level (‘‘When you think about
this goal, how much do you focus on the Ôbig pictureÕ
2
Thanks to Tory Higgins for suggesting this procedural improve-
ment.
 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576 569

vs. small details?’’) was anchored by small details and big with increasing temporal distance, F ð1; 30Þ ¼ 9:36;
picture. p ¼ :005, whereas promotion ratings did not vary as a
linear function of temporal distance, F ð1; 30Þ ¼ 3:37;
Results p ¼ :08.
Looking at the pattern of construal ratings across
Promotion vs. prevention goal ratings were compared the 11 time points, we see that the predictions of
at each point in time within a 2 (Regulatory Focus)  11 temporal construal theory were confirmed, but only for
(Temporal Distance) ANOVA. The main effect of regu- prospective judgments. That is, looking only at the
latory focus indicated greater promotion 6-time points ranging from present to future
(M ¼ 7:75; SE ¼ :67) than prevention (M ¼ 6:19; SE ¼ (Ms ¼ 6:33; 4:53; 5:73; 5:93; 6:80; 7:40), the upward
1:40) focus overall, F ð1; 30Þ ¼ 27:72; p < :001. Also, linear effect was reliable, F ð1; 30Þ ¼ 14:54; p < :001,
there was a linear main effect of temporal distance, but the same test conducted on the 6-time points from
F ð1; 30Þ ¼ 10:92; p ¼ :002, such that combined promo- present to past was not, F ð1; 30Þ ¼ 2:30; p ¼ :14
tion and prevention importance increased over the time ðMs ¼ 6:33; 5:43; 4:57; 5:73; 5:70; 4:57Þ. In other
span from distant past to present to distant future. The words, with increasing time from the present into the
linear interaction between the two factors was not sig- future, subjects generated goals focusing more on the
nificant, F ¼ :27, but of central interest was the quadratic ‘‘big picture’’ as opposed to small details. But with
interaction between these two factors, F ð1; 30Þ ¼ increasing time from the present into the past, con-
11:86; p ¼ :002, which suggested that the main effect of strual level showed no such stable linear pattern.
regulatory focus was minimal in the present but grew We anticipated that construal levels and regulatory
with greater prospective and retrospective distance from focus would be associated, with promotion focus leading
the present. In order to examine this effect more closely, a to more abstract thinking (i.e., a positive correlation),
regulatory focus difference score was conducted for each and prevention focus to concrete thinking (negative
point in time (promotion focus minus prevention focus). correlation). This prediction received only weak sup-
As expected, single sample t tests indicated that difference port. For judgments of the future, promotion was
in promotion and prevention focus was not significantly modestly correlated with construal (r ¼ :32; p ¼ :08).
different from zero for time periods surrounding the Construal was uncorrelated with prevention in the fu-
present (9 days ago, now, 9 days from now). As distance ture, however (r ¼ :15; p ¼ :87). For retrospective
from the present increased, however, this difference judgments, neither promotion (r ¼
:16; p ¼ :39) nor
generally widened (t values are presented in Table 2). prevention (r ¼ :10; p ¼ :59) was associated with con-
Several further contrasts were conducted to better strual.
characterize this pattern. Looking only at prospective Although promotion focus was only weakly associ-
judgments, promotion ratings evidenced a linear upward ated with abstract thinking overall, we conducted ad-
trend with increasing temporal distance, F ð1; 30Þ ¼ ditional analyses to conclusively determine whether the
19:67; p < :001, whereas this same linear test was not temporal pattern of construal might partially account
significant for prevention ratings, F ¼ 1:07; ns. This for the regulatory focus effects described previously. A
pattern precisely replicates that of Study 1. By contrast, separate growth curve analysis (Karney & Frye, 2002;
the reverse was evident for retrospective judgments: Singer, 1998) was used for each of the promotion and
prevention ratings evidenced a linear downward trend prevention ratings over the full time range, each with
construal level ratings entered into the model. The re-
stricted maximum likelihood approach tests degree of fit
Table 2 between the data and a quadratic vs. linear model of
Promotion and prevention scores as a function of temporal distance
(Study 3)
change over time in within-subject data.
We first looked at promotion ratings. In order to
Distance Mean score Statistics
determine whether construal ratings reduced or elimi-
Promotion Prevention t p nated the obtained effects, we compared a model con-
11 years ago 7.81 4.61 4.852 .000 taining intercept, a linear effect of time, and a quadratic
14 months ago 7.68 6.10 2.608 .014 (i.e., parabolic) effect of time to the same model with
7 months ago 7.74 6.16 2.958 .006 construal ratings additionally entered (both models
40 days ago 7.65 6.32 2.135 .041
achieved good fit, v2 ¼ 30:2; 35:8, both ps < :001). A
9 days ago 7.48 7.29 .434 .667
Today 6.84 6.16 .950 .350 confirmatory test of the curvilinear effect of time on
9 days from now 7.35 6.35 1.755 .089 promotion scores indicated that the quadratic effect of
40 days from now 7.94 5.97 3.555 .001 time (tð318Þ ¼ 3:75; p < :001) remained significant with
7 months from now 7.61 6 2.719 .011 construal ratings entered, tð317Þ ¼ 3:59; p < :001. With
14 months from now 8.52 6.1 4.870 .000
regard to prevention ratings, we again compared the
11 years from now 8.65 7.03 3.416 .002
same models with and without construal ratings entered
570 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
(both models achieved good fit, v2 ¼ 36:4; 56:3, both
ps < :001). Because our primary analyses revealed only
an overall linear effect of time on prevention scores, we
considered only the confirmatory test pertaining to that
effect. As expected, the linear effect of time was reliable
without construal ratings entered, tð318Þ ¼ 1:98; p ¼
:05, and remained so with construal ratings entered,
tð317Þ ¼ 2:57; p ¼ :01. In sum, construal level of a goal
was not able to account for the observed effects of time
on regulatory focus.3
In addition to replicating the results of Studies 1 and
2 for judgments of the future, Study 3 revealed both an
interesting similarity and a divergence between judg-
ments of the future vs. past. Consistent with findings for
prospective judgment, the relative difference between
promotion and prevention focus increased with retro-
spective temporal distance. In contrast to previous
prospection findings, however, this widening was a
function of changes in prevention focus rather than
changes in promotion focus. This exact pattern has been
replicated in additional studies in our lab (e.g., see
footnote 4).4
Study 4
Whereas the previous studies examined the effect of
temporal distance on regulatory focus, Study 4 tested
the reverse relation, the effect of regulatory focus on
temporal distance. Like Study 3, this experiment as-
sessed both retrospective as well as prospective judg-
ments. The design was a 2  2 between-subject
manipulation of regulatory focus (promotion vs. pre-
vention) and temporal direction (prospective vs. retro-
spective).
Our interest was in determining whether adoption of
a distinct type of regulatory focus would affect individ-
ualsÕ temporal scope. Whereas previous research has
demonstrated that future prevention goals tend to be
initiated sooner than promotion goals (Freitas et al.,
2002), it remains unclear whether promotion vs. pre-
vention goals (as well as goals of the past vs. future)
differ with regard to how long one must spend working
3
In a replication of Study 3, ratings of goal importance were
obtained for each point in time. Similarly, analyses indicated that
perceived importance of the goal could not account for the overall
pattern of regulatory focus change across time.
4
In an additional study ðn ¼ 30Þ using an identical 2 (Regulatory
Focus)  11 (Temporal Distance) design, we replicated the temporal
pattern to regulatory focus. As in Study 3, results indicated that the
main effect of regulatory focus was minimal in the present but grew
with greater prospective and retrospective distance from the present.
Promotion ratings evidenced a linear upward trend with increasing
temporal distance in the future, but not the past (ps ¼ :001 and .12,
respectively), whereas prevention ratings evidenced a linear downward
trend with increasing distance in the past (p ¼ :02), but not the future.
to complete them. Study 4 assessed both goal initiation
and completion time, to provide a clearer glimpse of the
time span individuals recall or expect to dedicate to
promotion vs. prevention goals. Promotion-focused
goals, as maximal standards, were hypothesized to invite
lofty, resource-hungry agendas, whereas prevention-fo-
cused goals (minimal standards) were expected to ne-
cessitate focused, immediate attention. Thus, we
expected that promotion-focused goals to be temporally
distant from the present time relative to prevention-fo-
cused goals, with regard to both initiation and ultimate
completion. While our theorizing pertained most
markedly to judgments of the future, we expected a
similar pattern to be evident in judgments of the past.
The increased salience of prevention in the Ôhere-and-
nowÕ was expected to result in prevention-focused goals
being most readily identified for time periods in the re-
cent past.
As discussed by Madey and Gilovich (1993), goal
completion may be more or less temporally focused (i.e.,
specifiable in terms of a discrete point in time). For
example, the goal of completing taxes on time is tem-
porally focused, whereas the goal of being financially
cautious is unfocused—one can be financially judicious
in an ongoing and continuous manner. Promotion suc-
cess (presence of positive) and prevention failure (pres-
ence of negative) tend to be focused, in that they both
involve the presence of a particular outcome, whereas
promotion failure (absence of positive) and prevention
success (absence of negative) tend to be less focused, in
that they involve a non-occurrence. Of course, even non-
occurrences may be temporally focused (e.g., Janice
failed to pay her taxes before April 15), but given that a
natural correspondence is evident between temporal
focus and commission/omission, we attempted to hold
both temporal focus and outcome valence constant. All
participants thus completed a questionnaire formatted
to elicit temporally focused (rather than unfocused) re-
sponses, and all conditions focused on successful (rather
than unsuccessful) completion of goals.
Method
Participants were 56 students at Simon Fraser Uni-
versity (30 women and 26 men) who participated in
exchange for bottled water or candy bars; 1 outlier was
removed leaving a final sample of 55. The design of the
experiment was a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs.
prevention)  2 (temporal direction: prospective vs. ret-
rospective) factorial.
Participants were asked to generate and record three
goals. Instructions in the promotion focus condition,
varying by temporal direction, were: ‘‘What are some
positive things that you expect to be successful at
achieving [have been most successful at achieving]?
Please take a moment to think about your future [past],
 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
focusing on desirable things that you expect to attain
[have attained]. In the space below, please record three
of these things, using no more than one sentence for
each. Then try to estimate when you might start [started]
working actively toward achieving each, and when each
might be [was] achieved. BE SURE TO FOCUS ON
GOALS THAT HAVE A CLEAR COMPLETION
DATE (e.g., winning a tournament, getting a job) RA-
THER THAN GOALS THAT ARE ONGOING.’’
Instructions in the prevention focus condition, also
varying by temporal direction, were: ‘‘What are some
negative things that you expect to be successful at
avoiding [have been most successful at avoiding]? Please
take a moment to think about your future, focusing on
undesirable things that you expect to prevent [that you
have avoided or prevented]. In the space below, please
record three of these things, using no more than one
sentence for each. Then try to estimate when you might
start [started] working actively toward preventing each,
and when each might be [was] prevented. BE SURE TO
FOCUS ON GOALS THAT HAVE A CLEAR
COMPLETION DATE (e.g., not missing classes during
fall semester, not creating a huge student loan debt be-
fore graduation) RATHER THAN GOALS THAT
ARE ONGOING.’’ Three labeled lines appeared next,
with blanks underneath for participants to provide time
estimates for both goal initiation (‘‘will start [started]
working toward it’’) and completion (‘‘can be [was]
achieved/prevented’’). Participants filled in initiation
and completion times in ‘‘year(s) and month(s) from
now.’’
Results
Participants recorded goals centering on a variety of
events of personal importance. Examples of promotion
focused goals include ‘‘getting my driverÕs license (past)’’
and ‘‘starting on the varsity team (future).’’ Examples of
prevention goals include ‘‘not spending money so that I
can afford my trip to Australia (past)’’ and ‘‘not getting
any F s during spring semester (future).’’ Because the
distribution of time estimates was skewed, analyses were
performed using natural log transformed data (all
means presented here are untransformed). One outlier
subject was dropped because the goal initiation time
estimate provided (16.0 years) was 4.58 SDs above the
mean for the rest of the sample (M ¼ 2:31; SD ¼ 2:99).
Analyses reported below were performed on the result-
ing sample of 55 subjects.
Completion time estimates for the three goals were
averaged to produce a single index of temporal distance
(CronbachÕs a ¼ :57). In the 2 (Regulatory Focus)  2
(Temporal Direction) ANOVA, the main effect for
regulatory focus was reliable, F ð1; 51Þ ¼ 4:39; p ¼ :04.
Participants focusing on promotion gave more tempo-
rally distant goal completion estimates (M ¼ 2:13 years)
571
than those focusing on prevention goals (M ¼ 1:53
years). Planned contrasts revealed that this difference
held only for judgments of the future, however. Al-
though the regulatory focus effect was reliable for pro-
spective estimates (Ms ¼ 2:34 vs. 1.10 years, SEs ¼ :45,
.29), tð28Þ ¼ 2:86; p ¼ :001, it was not reliable for ret-
rospective estimates (Ms ¼ 1:92 vs. 1.95 years,
SE ¼ :59; :54), tð23Þ ¼ :37; p ¼ :71.
Looking at the goal initiation time estimates (Cron-
bachÕs a ¼ :81), the most obvious (and least interesting)
effect was that goals of the past have initiation points
further removed from the present (M ¼ 4:33 years,
SE ¼ :68) than goals of the future (M ¼ :63 years,
SE ¼ :13), F ð1; 51Þ ¼ 4:39; p ¼ :04. More interesting is
the replication of the findings of Freitas et al. (2002), in
that subjects expected promotion goals to be initiated
further in the future (M ¼ :88 years, SE ¼ :19) than
prevention goals (M ¼ :37 years, SE ¼ :15), tð28Þ ¼
2:45; p ¼ :02. Goals of the past did not differ in initia-
tion times (Ms ¼ 4:27 vs. 4.38, SEs ¼ 1:25, .77), tð23Þ ¼
:27; p ¼ :79.
To put the goal completion time findings Study 4 into
clearer perspective, we may summarize the above effects
by averaging across initiation and completion times to
produce an estimate of the midpoint of the temporal
deviation from present for the entire period spent on a
particular goal. This midpoint between initiation and
completion of goals was further in the future for pro-
motion goals (M ¼ 1:61 years, SE ¼ :31) than prevention
goals (M ¼ :73 years, SE ¼ :21), tð28Þ ¼ 2:82; p ¼ :009.
This midpoint did not vary as a function of regulatory
focus for judgments of the past (Ms ¼ 3:10 vs. 3.17,
SEs ¼ :89, .59), tð23Þ ¼ :22; p ¼ :83.
Yet another way to frame these data centers on the
total amount of time that individuals expect to spend
on a particular goal, which may be defined as the ab-
solute difference between initiation and completion
time estimates. The reliable main effect for temporal
direction suggests the operation of a bias similar to the
planning fallacy: subjects judged their task durations to
be briefer in the future (M ¼ 1:17 years, SE ¼ :20) than
in the past (M ¼ 3:13, SE ¼ :50), F ð1; 51Þ ¼ 6:32;
p ¼ :02. Importantly, however, participants neverthe-
less intended to spend more time implementing pro-
motion goals (M ¼ 1:45 years, SE ¼ :29) than
prevention goals (M ¼ :73 years, SE ¼ :19) in the fu-
ture, tð28Þ ¼ 2:36; p ¼ :03. This variable did not vary
as function of regulatory focus within judgments of the
past (Ms ¼ 2:40 vs. 2.90, SEs ¼ :82, .72), tð23Þ ¼ :28;
p ¼ :78.
These findings offer an intriguing contrast to the
previous studies, which focused on the effect of temporal
distance on regulatory focus. Here, we found that reg-
ulatory focus influences temporal distance, such that
promotion goals prompt greater distance of temporal
gaze. Further, this effect occurred for judgments about
572 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
the future but not the past, a finding we have replicated
in independent investigations.5
General discussion
A range of prior research on temporal distance effects
in both prospective and retrospective judgment is con-
sistent with a relation between temporal distance and
regulatory focus. Looking across these varied litera-
tures, we noticed that greater temporal distance in-
creases the relative impact of promotion over prevention
focus. In conducting a series of studies to test our sus-
picions, we took two approaches, that of measuring the
effect of temporal distance on regulatory focus and the
reverse approach of assessing the effect of regulatory
focus on temporal distance.
In the first approach, time appears to be a mental
quantity: large vs. small amounts of time alter judg-
mental strategy. With increasing amounts of time, in-
dividuals become more attuned to acquisition,
achievement and the presence of things desired as op-
posed caution, security, and the prevention of things
unwanted. We found this pattern using three distinct
methods. In Study 1, we used a longitudinal design to
examine studentsÕ expectations of exam performance.
We found that individuals place greater weight on pro-
motion than prevention, an effect which is stronger
when goals are temporally distant than proximate. Sta-
ted somewhat differently, promotion concerns shrank as
goals drew near, but prevention goals remained un-
changed over time. In Study 2, we varied subjective as
opposed to objective temporal distance. Participants
who considered an event expected to occur several weeks
hence evidenced greater promotion vs. prevention focus
when that event was framed as distant vs. near. Finally,
in Study 3, participantsÕ perceptions of various points in
time, both in the future and past, were assessed for the
importance placed on promotion vs. prevention con-
cerns. Again, the difference between promotion and
prevention grew with temporal distance, and moreover,
this effect was roughly equivalent for both prospective
and retrospective judgments. When we say ‘‘roughly,’’
we mean that although the mean difference between
promotion and prevention looks the same in judgments
of the future and past, the curves of each reversed their
form. Replicating the findings of the first two studies,
Study 3 revealed that, when looking to the future, as
temporal distance increased promotion goals grew while
prevention goals remained constant. However, when
5
The results of Study 4 have been replicated with regard to goal
completion estimates. In this replication ðn ¼ 59Þ, a significant
interaction emerged between regulatory focus and temporal direction,
such that a regulatory focus effect was reliable only for prospective
judgments (p ¼ :02), not for retrospective judgments (p ¼ :34).
looking to the past, as temporal distance increased
promotion goals remained constant while prevention
goals shrank.
We believe that this difference may speak to the
process underlying the effect of temporal distance on
regulatory focus. The processes that drive self-regula-
tory strategies toward future goals are likely to have a
subsequent effect on oneÕs recollection of goal striving in
the past. In other words, we view the key process as
unfolding during future-oriented goal pursuit, with later
ramifications for retrospective judgments. Regulatory
focus theory (Higgins, 1998) is essentially oriented to-
wards future goal attainment. Promotion and preven-
tion strategies are two distinct ways individuals attempt
to close the gap between the current self and a desired
future self. We believe that differences in the emphasis
placed on these strategies over time are a function of
perceived resource availability.
Actual and/or psychological distance from an event
provides a cushion of resources; distance affords indi-
viduals greater opportunity for taking risks and mak-
ing mistakes because it provides some latitude for
correction. Thus, at a distance individuals are better
equipped to adopt a promotion focus and to pursue
maximal goals. As previous research indeed attests, a
promotion focus fosters greater creativity, risk-taking,
information search, hypothesis generation, and open-
ness to change (Liberman et al., 1999, 2001)—all stra-
tegic practices that one is only free to engage in
provided sufficient time and resources. In contrast,
actual or perceived proximity to an event signals re-
source depletion. One no longer has the cushion of
time to correct mistakes. Thus, a more restrained and
cautious approach to goal attainment is likely to be
more functional, and a decreased emphasis on pro-
motion strategies should ensue. According to this per-
spective, prevention-focused concerns typically occur
relatively late in goal striving.
As such, when individuals reflect upon goal striving
in their past, prevention-focused concerns should be
most salient for goals near to the present time. Only
within the sphere of the present are prevention-focused
concerns highly salient. Both the need and the ability to
recall security-focused information should be greatly
reduced the longer the temporal distance from the
present. The relative prevalence of promotion focus
throughout goal striving should make promotion-fo-
cused information easiest to recall and more resistant to
decay. In sum, our current theorizing suggests that in-
dividuals are prompted to adjust self-regulatory focus
and strategies in response to perceived reductions in
resources as events draw nearer in time. The processing
differences individuals engage in during goal pursuit
then feed back to influence what is remembered about
goal striving in the near and distant past. Certainly, our
account of these processes remains to be rigorously
 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
tested, and we regard this framework as a promising
avenue for future research.
Whereas our primary focus was on the effect of
temporal perspective on regulatory focus, the findings of
Study 4 make an additional, distinct contribution to our
understanding of the relationship between these vari-
ables. This study examined whether the induction of
either promotion or prevention focus would launch
people on mental time travels of a particular duration.
This is a very different question from those of Studies
1–3. Whereas those studies examined the impact of
mental time, which is akin to a resource that can facil-
itate or hinder goal completion, Study 4 focused on the
effect of goal-related cognitions themselves on assump-
tions about time. Referring back to the idea of perceived
resource availability, we assumed that promotion-
focused, maximal goals would be regarded as resource-
demanding, and that as a consequence, individuals
would regard the completion of such goals in the future
as distant in time. In contrast, we expected that
prevention goals, as perceived necessities, would be
regarded as essential and thus resource-independent
(i.e., this needs to be done here-and-now). As such, we
expected participants to identify future prevention goals
as being satisfied more immediately.
Participants in Study 4 made estimates of both goal
completion and goal initiation times. We found that
promotion goals, on average, were seen as more tem-
porally removed from the present than prevention goals.
Unlike the ‘‘rough’’ equivalence of prospection and
retrospection found in the first three studies, however,
Study 4 indicated an effect only for perceptions of the
future, not the past. The lack of an effect for retro-
spective judgments was somewhat unexpected, in that
we anticipated participants would be best able to re-
member prevention goals that were located in the recent
past (as the result of increased salience, consistent with
the logic presented above). One possible reason that
these results do not mirror those found in Study 3 may
be that in Study 4, participants were directly asked to
identify goals with a specific type of regulatory focus.
Even though prevention goals may be most salient for
periods of time in the recent past, these results suggest
that individuals may be perfectly capable of identifying
prevention goals from both the recent and distant past
when they are directly asked to recruit examples of
prevention goals.
Another interpretation of the pattern is that com-
pletion times for future promotion goals are greater
than the three other means because of essentially the
same factor twice implemented. Depth of temporal
gaze is unlocked by open-ending thinking; the future is
more open-ended than the past, and (according to the
linkage between Gilovich & Medvec, 1995 and Roese
et al., 1999 with regard to the time course of regret)
promotion focus tends to be more open-ended than
573
Table 3
Temporal estimates as a function of direction and regulatory focus
(Study 4)
Condition Time measure
Completion Initiation Total spent
Past
Promotion 1.92 4.27 2.40
Prevention 1.95 4.38 2.90
Future
Promotion 2.34 .88 1.45
Prevention 1.10 .37 .73
Note. Values represent time in years.
prevention focus. Together, these factors produce the
additive pattern represented in Table 3. Relatedly,
Newby-Clark and Ross (in press) showed that indi-
viduals, when asked to recall personal memories, ten-
ded to retrieve a mix of successes and failures, but
when asked to generate expectations for personal ex-
periences, they focused almost exclusively on successes
and positive experiences. Our Studies 3 and 4 required
subjects to focus only successes, and it is important to
emphasize that valence and regulatory focus are con-
ceptually orthogonal (one can successfully learn to
drive and successfully avoid gaining weight). Even so,
Newby-Clark and RossÕs studies dovetail with our
studies to indicate that when individuals focus on fu-
ture personal goals, they aim high, emphasize promo-
tion, neglect prevention, and generate optimistically
rosy images.
Overall, the findings support for our interpretation
that draws together prior research on optimism shifts
(e.g., Shepperd et al., 1996), temporal construal theory
(Liberman & Trope, 1998), the planning fallacy (Buehler
et al., 1994), the ‘‘rosy view’’ (Mitchell et al., 1997),
durability bias (Gilbert et al., 1998), and counterfactual
thinking and emotions of regret (Gilovich & Medvec,
1995; Roese et al., 1999). We argue that all contain
shards of evidence consistent with the view that regu-
latory focus shifts with temporal distance from goals.
Our findings are compatible, for example, with findings
from research on temporal construal theory, which has
demonstrated that individuals give less weight to desir-
ability (a promotion-focused concern) when making
decisions for immediate events vs. temporally distant
events (Liberman & Trope, 1998). However, Study 3
showed that temporal construal theory could not sub-
sume our findings: temporal distance produced an effect
on regulatory focus that was independent of temporal
construal. An additional, and we think highly interest-
ing, discovery was that we replicated the previously
noted effect that more abstract construals are associated
with more temporally distant goals, but only for pro-
spective but not retrospective judgment. Although
temporal construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 2002)
574 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
seems at first glance applicable to retrospective judg-
ment, this preliminary evidence suggests otherwise.6
Relation to classic research on approach/avoidance con-
flict
Our conception of temporal shifts in regulatory focus
(at least with regard to future goals) shares similarities
with classic work on approach/avoidance conflict (e.g.,
Lewin, 1935; Miller, 1944, 1959). Early research on this
conflict theory (e.g., Brown, 1948) explored differences
in the strength of approach vs. avoidance tendencies as a
function of an organismÕs closeness to a goal. Our re-
sults are consistent with one basic assumption of this
work—namely, that approach (promotion-oriented mo-
tivation) is relatively stronger than avoidance (preven-
tion-oriented motivation) when goals lie in the distance
(spatially or temporally). Our results for prospective
judgments do not converge, however, with two other
fundamental assumptions of conflict theory. First, ap-
proach and avoidance gradients in past research were
generally characterized by a positive slope. Second, in
earlier work, the gradient for avoidance was found to
increase more steeply than the approach gradient over
the course of goal pursuit. In contrast, our findings re-
veal a stable focus on prevention over time. We found
that prevention focus indeed exerted a greater relative
influence when a goal is near vs. distant, but this influ-
ence stemmed from dampened promotion focus rather
than any increase in prevention focus.
In comparing our findings to this older body of work,
it is important to emphasize some key conceptual dif-
ferences that render direct comparison less informative.
First, our research centers on a higher level of analysis.
Conflict theory centered on simple behaviors (moving
toward or away) conditioned by directly presented
stimuli (food or shock) most typically in animals (rats
and mice), and thus spoke to the simplest hedonic
mechanisms of pleasure and pain. Our research, by
contrast, encompasses the more complex inferences
processes involved in information selection, reasoning,
and decision-making. Even when this older research
focused on humans rather than animals, there was a
tendency to assess avoidance with regard to immediate
termination goals, as when Epstein and Fenz (1965)
assessed avoidance in parachutists using such Likert
items as ‘‘wanting to turn back and call the jump off.’’
Our research instead emphasizes the manner in which
individuals frame a goal as they continue to approach it
6
It is also interesting to note the discrepancy between these results
and past findings suggesting that abstract memories tend to persist
longer than specific ones. Although it is beyond the scope of the
current paper to speculate about potential reasons for this disconnect,
it is certainly an interesting avenue for further research. Our thanks to
an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
in time. Finally, conflict theory targeted situations in
which approach and avoidance responses were incom-
patible. Miller (1944), for example, described the ap-
proach and avoidance behaviors in his research as
‘‘obviously mutually exclusive’’ (p. 456)—an organism
could not both approach and avoid the target event. Our
work, on the other hand, illuminates situations in which
the target event (e.g., an exam) may be simultaneously
construed in terms of approach (promotion) and
avoidance (prevention). Overall, our research is aimed
more at higher, multifaceted human cognition embrac-
ing both tactical and strategic goals.
Relation to recent research on regulatory focus
Our findings also share some resemblance to those
from two recent lines of research. First, F€ orster et al.
(1998) explored the ‘‘goal looms larger’’ effect (i.e., the
finding that motivational strength increases with prox-
imity to a goal) and found that effort and persistence on
a task increased as one moves closer to goal completion,
particularly when there is a match between regulatory
focus and the immediate demands and format of the
task. At first glance, the F€ orster research might be
construed to suggest that promotion focus gets stronger
rather than weaker with goal proximity. However, the
F€orster research held regulatory focus constant then
examined effort/persistence over time. By contrast, our
research suggests that regulatory focus qualitatively
shifts as events draw nearer in time. Further, our find-
ings pertain to the overall importance individuals assign
to promotion- and prevention-framed concerns rather
than motivational strength as measured by F€ orster and
colleagues (e.g., arm flexion/extension). Freitas et al.
(2002) also examined the relation between time and
regulatory focus, showing that individuals prefer to
initiate prevention goals earlier than promotion goals.
This finding is certainly compatible but does not overlap
with our findings. The results of Studies 4a and 4b
replicate the Freitas et al. finding for goal initiation time,
and also indicate the overall effect on goal duration and
completion latency. We concur with Freitas et al. (2002)
that prevention focus motivates individuals to begin
goal pursuit immediately, and provide a broader theo-
retical framework to encompass these effects.
Implications
A temporal shift in regulatory goal strength may be a
specific example of a more general proximity effect in
judgment. For example, analogous findings may emerge
for spatial proximity as for temporal proximity. Pro-
motion focus may typically involve activities ranging
further from home (vacationing, exploring strange new
worlds, and seeking out new life and new civilizations)
than does prevention focus (keeping the grass trimmed,
 G.L. Pennington, N.J. Roese / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 563–576
the toilets clean, and the furniture dusted). Even more
generally, psychological distance might embrace both
temporal and spatial proximity as well as conceptual
proximity, defined in terms of hypothetical vs. actual
activity engagement (Van Boven, Loewenstein, Welch,
& Dunning, 2003). We are presently conducting further
investigations of this compelling question.
To conclude, individuals may be said to inhabit
‘‘spheres of the present’’ marked by both promotion and
prevention concerns. Initially, promotion tends to
dominate prevention focus, but this disparity decreases
with temporal distance. As people gaze further into the
future and past, they see through rosier lenses to a place
where action easily makes dreams come true unfettered
by obstacles and hindrances. Merely focusing on ac-
quisition vs. obstacle, moreover, induces a gaze with
further temporal reach, especially to the future.
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