THE 18th CENTURY IN INDIAN HISTORY

QUESTIONS

1. In what ways have recent historical writings challenged the

view that the 18th century in India was a ‘Dark Age’? (2005)
2. Do you agree with the view that the various parts of the Indian
subcontinent fell incidentally to the English East India
Company? (2008)
3. Can the 18th century be characterized as a ‘dark age’? Discuss
with reference to some of the recent writings. (2010)
4. Have recent writings on the 18th century radically altered our
understanding of the period? (2011)

INTRODUCTION:

The political, economic and social transitions witnessed in 18th

century India have been subject to great historical debate. Most
historians view this century as marked by two important transitions:

(i) FIRST HALF OF THE 18th CENTURY: The decline of the Mughal
empire and the rise of regional political orders
(ii) SECOND HALF OF THE 18th CENTURY: Post the Battle of
Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) a transition in the society,
economy and polity of India occurred, as the English East
India Company began to assume political control in north
India.

The debate regarding the first half of the 18th century revolved
around the reasons for decline of the Mughal Empire and the nature
socio-economic change that followed. Two broad views can be
outlined:

(i) DARK AGE VIEW: The earliest view held that political collapse
of the Mughal Empire in the early 18 th century initiated a
process of economic and social decline across India, and
thus the 18th century was a “Dark Age”.
(ii) REVISIONIST VIEW: The second view held by Revisionists
historians, viewed the period on its own terms, looked at
 political turmoil in terms of regional assertiveness, due to
economic prosperity noted by them in the 18 th century. Thus
they studied the rise of regional polities and regional
economic prosperity to challenge the “Dark Age” view and
the causal links it draws between political and economic
decline.

The debate regarding the second half of the 18 th century revolved

around whether colonial rule had roots in pre-colonial economy and
society as Revisionists argue or if it marked a politico-economic
break with pre- colonial India as historians who propose the ‘Dark
Age view’ argue.

“A DARK AGE”

Early View (Nationalist Historians): The earliest views on reasons for

Mughal Decline and the “Dark Age” character of the 18 th century were
presented by historians such as Jadunath Sarkar, Ishwari Prasad and
Sri Ram Sharma. They held the individual character of rulers and
their administrative and religious policies as responsible for Mughal
decline. Thus, Jadunath Sarkar held Aurangzeb’s religious policy and
Deccan Campaigns responsible for imperial decline. He said that
peasant rebellions of the 17th century were a “Hindu reaction’’ to
Aurangzeb’s Muslim orthodoxy, destroyed the Mughal polity and
caused the subsequent decline of Mughal economy, institutions and
society. Prasad and Sharma held that the 18th century was an
economically crisis-prone period. This view was echoed by Colonial
historians as well. However, this is considered to be in light of their
efforts to present colonial rule as ‘benevolent’ as compared to that of
the Mughals.

Marxist View: From the 1950s, Marxist historians explained Mughal

decline in materialist terms. Some arguments revolved around the
institutions of jagir(a territory assigned to a noble by the Mughal
emperor for a limited period of time, from which he could extract
revenue as his salary in lieu for his service as a noble)and
mansabh(the administrative rank a noble held, which corresponded
to his jagir). Thus Satish Chandra argued that structural flaws in the
functioning of the Mughal institutions of jagir and mansabh led to a
fiscal crisis in the late 17th century. The efficiency of these institutions
depended on availability, collection and distribution of revenue,
when this began to falter from Aurangzeb’s time it led to and
heralded imperial decline. M. Athar Ali holds that a shortage of jagirs
caused by political expansion of the empire into less fertile tracts of
the Deccan and also an increase in the number of nobles, without a
proportionate increase in their jagirs led to administrative and
economic decline.

John. F. Richards critiqued Ali’s view with his study of Mughal

administration in the Deccan he concluded that there was no
shortage of usable jagirs in the region, and this couldn’t have led to
an imperial crisis. Satish Chandra revised his argument and put an
economic spin on it. He, like Ali, held that jagirs became few and
infertile. Yet he linked this to an economic argument that, few and
infertile jagirs led to an increasing discrepancy in estimated revenue
(jama) and actual revenue (hasil) which led to a decreased ability of
state officials to collect revenue regularly, thus fuelling a fiscal crisis.

Economic Stand: Amongst the economic decline arguments Irfan

Habib’s view is one of the strongest within the “Dark Century”
conceptualization. Habib says that Mughal Empire was highly
centralized from Akbar’s time onwards. This centralization was seen
in the universal land tax, systematic revenue assessment and
collection, with a share going to zamidars (local claimants) that
operated, as well as highly uniform revenue assignment tenures and
revenue collections from far away territories of the empire. Thus
Habib says the administration was a dominant factor in the economy.

 Role of Zamindars and Jagirdars: Looking at the 18 th century,

Habib argues for economic decline. He says from the late 17 th
century as Francois Bernier observed there was a process of
economic decay in India, due to unrestricted authority of the
jagirdars who were assigned lands for unpredictably short
tenures by the emperor. Accepting this view, Habib argued
there was an increased pressure for revenue by jagirdars,
which led to a flight of peasants from land, peasant uprisings
against the State and a breakdown in collaboration between
 jagirdars and zamidars, as the zamidars became leaders of
peasant uprising. This led to an agrarian crisis and subsequent
weakening of the political edifice. The zamidars emerged
powerful now and shaped local state formation. With regards
to localization of power and administration, Habib argues that
administrative checks collapsed in the early 18 th century, as
seen by a passage from Khafi Khan (1731) which talks of sale of
tax farms becoming a general practice.
 Trade and Urbanization: Regarding trade and urbanization, he
says during the Mughal period there was a growth of
urbanization and trade, with a large transfer of rural surplus to
the towns and its conversion into craft commodities and
services to meet the demands of an essentially town based
ruling elite. There was also large availability of capital and a
developed system of banking and credit. Habib argues that
decline of any of these factors as the empire declined would
have led to commercial and urban decline. He also cites Ashin
Das Gupta’s study of the fall of the Guajarati port of Surat
(significant for inland and overseas trade) which mirrored the
decline of the empire and was caused by disruptions in the
hinterland due to this imperial decline. Das Gupta shows
number of ships calling at Surat declined from 87 in 1693 to 19
by 1741. A similar situation was witnessed in Bengal shipping
too, by him. Regarding inland trade Habib concedes there is
limited material Francis Buchanan’s study from the 17 th /18th
century shows that interest rates seemed stable in Eastern
India early 18th century onwards. Habib says this suggests a
stagnation of capital supply but one can’t confirm this.
 New State Formation: Habib also discussed economic
conditions present under local polities in India which he
divided into two categories- (i) States created out of Mughal
officials turning into local rulers - Jaipur, Bangash, Nizamates of
Deccan, Awadh, Bengal- and (ii) States created by opponents to
Mughal power- Marathas, Jats, Rohillas and Sikhs. For the
Bengal Niazmate, Habib says there is no comprehensive
economic study- based on James Grant’s study one can
conclude that land revenue did not rise in correspondence with
 rise in prices caused by a silver influx, there was only a
moderate inflow of revenue which managed to sustain
considerable urbanization. In Awadh, he says Muzaffar Alam’s
study of 18th century revenue figures, is limited even if it shows
expansion of agriculture in Awadh, as these statistics are
unadjusted to prices. Regarding the Marathas, he says the
establishment of hereditary fiefs and offices (unlike in Mughal
times) led to constant fiscal crisis and urban growth was
limited to Pune. Regarding the Rohillas he says they seem to
have reclaimed land and promoted agriculture. Yet Habib
emphasises that the above studies, are limited in scope and
cause doubts about any significant economic growth in the 18 th
century.

Cultural Decline: M. Athar Ali locates Mughal decline in a cultural

context. He argues that the decline was caused by the cultural failure
of the ruling elite to respond to the superior technology and science
that Europe developed between 1500-1700. He says those regional
polities in India, such as Mysore and the Marathas which attempted
to bridge this gap,failed. Haidar Ali and Mahadji Sindhia tried to
organize their armies on modern lines with French help. Later Tipu
Sultan also tried to develop commerce and production. Yet Ali says
within the intellectual sphere they failed as they didn’t establish
schools or institutions to absorb western learning. Thus these
regimes continued with the Mughal ideological apparatus.

Continuities: Looking at the economic context of the 18th century,

Athar Ali argued that the new regional polities preserved essential
features of Mughal land revenue system yet combined possession of
revenue rights with private zamidari rights. Thus the fundamental
nature of the State still remained that of a rent extracting one. This
necessitated the association of rulers with merchants, to collect land
revenue. Other continuities from Mughal times, we seen in
maintenance of courts on a local scale, large armies, large proportion
of agrarian surplus flowing into towns. Yet he notes a decline in
urban centres such as Delhi and Agra, and the rise of new ones like
Faizabad and Lucknow. Over all Ali concludes that there was
resilience in the economy, but there was no real growth or new
elements as revisionists like C.A. Bayly suggests.

Both M. Athar Ali and Irfan Habib argue that regional polities
specially the Marathas and Sikhs continued the exploitative
tendencies seen under the Mughals. Their analysis explained regional
political realignment within the framework of the Mughal “agrarian
system” and focused on revenue structures. Yet Athar Ali, who is a
proponent of decline like Habib, criticised Habib’s arguments also,
saying that they represent an old simplistic historical view, that the
decline of the Mughal Empire was a major socio-eco-political setback
for India which enabled the British conquest to take place.

CRITIQUE AND REVISIONIST STAND

The view that the 18th century was a “Dark Age” has been criticized
by many historians, specially the Revisionists who present the
second view on this debate. Revisionist works focused on the socio-
economic functioning of regional polities and pioneered in depth
studies on trade and mercantile activity.

Society: Historians Herman Goetz and Bernard Cohn focused on the

society in the 18th century. Goetz analysed 18th century music and
architecture and argued for the resilience of Mughal society, reflected
in evolving music and architectural styles despite imperial decline.
Cohn studies Banaras and analysed efforts of Mughal zamidars and
alimdars, who manipulated imperial and regional power to carve out
independent areas of power for themselves. These works also
critiqued Irfan Habib’s conception of the Mughal state as a
centralized state as it is hard to conceive a centralized bureaucratic
model of state when economic and social markers outlive political
decay as pointed out above.

Muzaffar Alam: Within factors for the decline of the Mughal empire
and state formation of regional polities, (which few revisionists focus
on) Muzaffar Alam’s study critiqued Irfan Habib’s view that zamidars
led uprisings 0f oppressed peasants which were responsible for state
formation. His study of Persian sources, to understand aspects of
agrarian uprisings in north India, focused on three regions-(i)
Moradabad-Bareilly,(ii) Awadh and (iii)Banaras region. He quotes
the Ain-i-Akbari to show that various castes and communities held
zamidari rights in these regions, e.g.- Rajputs (who were dominant),
Jats, Brahmans, Muslims, Afghans, Kayasthas and Kurmis. Yet he says
that not all these groups rose against the Mughals. He points out that
due to caste, clan and territorial distinctions, zamidars were not
unified in their rebellion against the Mughals, but were infact at war
with one another. He says clan often faught against one e.g. in Chakla
Etwah, Akhbarat report two out of four cases were inter clan
rivalries, in which in fact the Mughal state came to the aid of some
zamidars, and played clans off and overcome the danger they posed
to the Mughal State. Alam also mentions that there were intra clan
clashes- eg: in Moradabad Madar Singh a Rajput fought against Debi
Chand a fellow Rajput. Finally critiquing Habib, Alam points out that
zamidars who led raids expressed the anger of local ruling classes,
who had their military contingents and were rising in a context of
local economic prosperity. He also says at times, peasants resisted
zamidars, since rural populations was a victim of zamidar revolts.

Alam also argues for a context of local economic prosperity which led
to zamidar ascendency. In his study of Awadh-He says villages and
zamidars had great availability of money. Agrarian prosperity can be
seen due to brisk trade carried out by Banjaras between Awadh and
Bihar, as they carried goods worth 4,00,000 at times. New towns
came up, indicating expansion of trade networks. He says Banaras in
early 18th century witnessed the rise of 3new market centres-
Azamgarh, Bhadohi and Mirzapur and new ganjs or grains markets
aorse, pointing to rise in commercialized agriculture. Banaras was
the most prosperous city by the 1740s in the region, as it was the
main entrepot for long distance trade which led to a rise of local
industries. The Ain-i-Akbari showed an 85% percent rise in
agricultural revenue collected from Awadh in early 18 th century,
indicating agrarian prosperity. Thus Alam contests the economic
decline model.

Critique: However Alam’s study has been critiqued from within the
revisionist camp by John. F.Richards and V.Narayana Rao who like
Alam himself, point out his exclusive use of Persian sources which
may hamper evidence of resistance against Mughal rule found in
vernacular sources. Athar Ali critiques him for comparing Ain-i-
Akbari’s jamadani figures with that of 18 th century revenue figures,
which show a rise without adjusting them to the rise in prices in 18 th
century. Ali says it’s incorrect to use this as evidence for agrarian
prosperity.

Other revisionists such as Ashin Das Gupta, B.R. Grover and Karen
Leonard focus on regional shift of trade and banking institutions,
which earlier studies of Habib and Ali ignored. Das Gupta argued that
inland trade increased, even in a period of some decline, and
corporate mercantile institutions survived. He says though former
ports like Surat and Masulipatinam declined with low international
trade, new colonial ports-Madras Bombay and Calcutta arose.
B.R.Grover looked at rural commercial production, found new
provincial markets rose to absorb rural commercial production, thus
compensating the loss in foreign trade. Karen argues that merchant
activity shifted from Delhi to regional territories and led to local
economic buoyancy.

FRANK PERLIN

Frank Perlin’s study of the Maratha state argued that the

characteristic feature of Maratha state building was high
commercialization, which was not a function of state demand alone.
He also says that the new political orders arose due to an
interrelationship between two force-(i)centralizing state building
and (ii)Local communal forces. Thus he says the administrative forms
adopted by the “great households” which controlled these States was
of amassing lands under hereditary control through acquisition of
prebendal rights and former resumeable rights. This process was
accompanied by the rise of an accounting/record keeping class that
served these households to enhance their familistic administration.
This also led to tension between this centralizing tendency of the
state and older rights of peasants. Peasants local assemblies (gota) to
protect their interests. Yet paradoxically, there was a linking of
communal and prebendal properties of the peasant and royal court
respectively as the great households controlled economic power in
the state. Thus these households benefitted from development of
regional and international trade. Perlin critiques the view that
political decline led to economic decline. He argues instead that
political decentralization and localization of power went hand in
hand and this was seen in rise of new political orders (Marathas,
Nizam’s in Hyderabad) which went along with socio-eco
reconfigurations. This was seen in transfer of small lordly courts and
urban functions to small towns and villages in the countryside. He
also argues that manufacture and cash cropping for distant markets
at a local level was part of a “rurban” (rural-urban) economy that he
argues for.

Perlin has been critiqued by M.Athar Ali who argues that Perlin
discounts the influence of the Mughal Empire on Indian society and
that Perlin and just looking at grassroots polity and social groups like
Perlin and C.A.Bayly do, it is easy to see no decline in the economy.
He says these revisionists easily dismiss the significance of the
imperial economy.

C.A. BAYLY

One of the most important revisionist views was provided by

C.A.Bayly. Bayly argues against the Dark Age position. He argues that
certain regions like Awadh and Banaras witnessed urbanization and
agricultural expansion. Regional centres like Bengal and Lucknow
grew and so did the textile industry. He also argues that indigenous
capital didn’t shrink but was engaged in internal bulk and luxury
trade along new routes and in financing military and revenue
machineries. He also points out Mysore, southern Malabar,
Hyderabad and Maratha territories also were nodes of agricultural
stability and state formation. Yet he doesn’t postulate a universal
economic growth in the 18th century. Some areas of decline existed.
He also critiques the views of Habib and Ali who ascribe decline only
to political factors and don’t explore ecological and economic forces.
He also questions Habib’s assumption that the Mughal state and
economy was highly centralized. He said that was not a condition for
the economic growth witnessed in the 17th century. Secondly he
critiques Habib’s assumption that universal economic decline was
due to rising zamindar power at the expense of the State. Bayly says
the interesting facet of the 18th century was that the zamidars and
intermediaries established a closer control of the peasantry and
artisans than under Mughal hegemony, and the mechanisms of
control differed in various kingdoms. He also critiques the view that
the British assumption of diwani rights destroyed all socio-economic
forces unleashed in the 18th century-i.e. wiped out a possibility of
British rule building upon a pre colonial past.

BURTON STEIN

Finally Burton Stein another revisionist, focused on formation of

south Indian polity of Mysore, presented a different view for the rise
of this state. He attributed it to “military fiscalism” and the
subsequent thrust towards centralization, which resulted in the state
being freed from control of the local aristocracy and putting together
an extensive tax base and a state organised around war. He asserts
that the 18th century had a dynamic economy and there was a
relocation and restoration of high economic production even in war
torn economy. He agrees with Bayly on the developments of new
economic relations- commercialization of rights, investment of
capital in new areas, coercion of labour by intermediaries.

The various views on the 18th century help us to conclude, that even
though the “Dark Age” view has been critiqued extensively and
doesn’t seem to hold in light of Revisionist studies which pioneered
work on regional polities, local economies and social
reconfigurations it is also important to note value earlier works
which explored the impact of Mughal decline on the 18th century and
their economic data, which some revisionists tend to negate.

The various views on the 18th century help us to conclude, that even
though the “Dark Age” view has been critiqued extensively and
doesn’t seem to hold in light of Revisionist studies which pioneered
work on regional polities, local economies and social
reconfigurations it is also important to note value earlier works
which explored the impact of Mughal decline on the 18th century and
their economic data, which some revisionists tend to negate.
The debate regarding the second half of the 18 th century mainly
revolved around the question of whether colonial rule constituted a
critical break from the past or whether it marked continuity with the
economy and society of indigenous societies. To put it simply-
whether colonial economy, society and polity had indigenous origins.
This debate unfolded along some basic parameters which are
explored for continuity and change, these are- the agrarian economy,
trade and non-agrarian production, revenue settlements , agrarian
capitalism and governance. In this debate, most historians who argue
for a “Dark Age” previously hold that the Colonial State marked a
distinct break from the past, while Revisionists who see prosperity in
the early 18th century argue for continuities, with the Mughal past.

Regarding the agrarian economy amongst the views on change or

break with the past, one of the earliest views was by R.C. Dutt and
Dadabhai Naoroji who viewed the colonial economy and polity as
break from the past. Irfan Habib focused on Bengal arguing for a
break in the economy, he held that English Company’s trading
operations dislocated indigenous economies as the Company State
was located external to society and exploitative in nature. The
company acquired Diwani rights (revenue rights) of Bengal in 1765,
which reduced the flow of bullion into India, causing inflation and
intensified the drain of wealth from Bengal post 1813. He says there
was a clear decline in the Indian economy and unfavourable balance
of payments, as India was forced to export much more than British
exports of treasure into India. Thus there was a rise in revenue
demand from Bengal from 2.2million pounds (1766) to 3.38 million
pounds by (1779) and estimated annual tribute to Britain was Rs.4
cores (1780-90) and above this Bengal also funded the Company’s
China trade by using Bengal silver. These economic changes caused
large deindustrialization reflected in widespread artisanal and
service sector unemployment and put pressure on the peasantry. The
pressure on the peasantry, who bore the brunt of increased revenue
extraction extended to Mysore and Awadh which were soon annexed
and began to pay annual tribute too. Economic effects of tribute
affected non-annexed regions too, as a deflation was caused due to
decline of silver replenishments. Trade and towns decayed in Punjab
and Delhi after 1770s. Thus Habib says that there was no evidence
for indigenous origins of the colonial economy, as the Company rule
changed the prevailing economic and revenue arrangements in
Bengal which impacted other regions too.

Regarding new revenue settlements and introduction of agrarian

capitalism by the EEIC, historians have made various arguments for
change. Ranajit Guha, held that the introduction of the Permanent
Settlement in Bengal, changed the earlier revenue structure and the
ill practice of revenue farming, as it introduced private property,
created a land market, a landed estates and new zamindars who
invested capital to purchase land and helped develop a system of
rural credit. He also points out that the settlement drew on various
foreign intellectual influences but was largely shaped by French
Physiocratic notions. Eric Stokes argues in a similar vein and says the
Settlement was shaped by Whig notions of recognizing private
property as a basic principle of governance thus marking a break, as
absolute private property and a large land market didn’t really exist
previously.

Historians B.B. Chaudhury and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya argue along

similar lines. For them the Permanent Settlement in 1793 began a
process of institutional innovation. In the agrarian sector, there was
an increase in rural credit, a land market developed as lands of
defaulting zamindars were sold off and the composition/functioning
of agrarian labour changed, as labour earlier composed of low caste
and victims of debt, but now it included impoverished sections of
small peasantry and people who suffered loss of land. Similarly
Neeladari Bhattacharya looks at social impact of British revenue
settlements and says that they changed the social fabric of India.
According to him this agrarian transition was shaped by active ‘social
intervention’ by indigenous classes since the nature of indigenous
response defined the limits within with the Colonial state could
implement policies , thus Colonial revenue settlements introduced
changes shaped by an Indian response.

Regarding the second view point which presents a case for

continuities with the pre colonial past, Ratnalekh Ray on the basis of
local records from Rajshahi says that there was no major change
brought about by British revenue settlements as changes were
confined to the upper crust of rural society yet at the village level
both landholdings and agricultural base remained unaltered. Even
amongst the elite in rural society, minor changes were affected as
land didn’t usually change hand but perpetual rights in revenue
management changed. Property ownership rights may have been
conferred upon Zamidars, yet this was only a formality as they
already held rights over revenue collection and land, thus arguing for
continuities. N. Mukherji and R.E. Frykenberg emphasised continuity
in the agrarian order in regions under Ryotwari Settlement in South
India. They say direct dealings with ryots may have been interrupted
initially, but soon old social balance was restored as the Company,
restored traditional privileges of mirsardars, kadims and ulkudis, like
under regional polities.

Regarding the introduction of agrarian capitalism and change, Irfan

Habib argues that in pre colonial India there was no evidence of
capitalist accumulation in agriculture. He says the payment of Kharaj
or land tax, led to growth of merchant capital but it remained
confined to the urban sectors and was not invested in the agricultural
industry, as the parasitic relationship between towns and rural areas
prevented this. Furthermore merchant capital dried up by the late
17th century due to an agrarian crisis.

Revisionists C.A. Bayly and Laxmi Subramaniam challenge Habib’s

view and locate the rudimentary beginnings of agrarian capitalism in
the economies of the pre-colonial regional polities (Mysore, Marathas
etc) which emerged in the early 18th century. The revisionists have
argued that in the early 18th century the main problem with the
Mughal state was a gap between jama(estimated revenue) and
hasil(collected revenue).Regional polities rectified this problem by
greater control of peasantry, artisans and inferior trading groups, for
this they indulged in revenue farming, giving collection rights to local
intermediaries (merchants, zamindars, bankers), who amassed
money through this. The local economy was prospering in this period
according to Revisionists, as internal and luxury trade increased and
grew along new routes. In such a situation trading and merchant
classes that emerged as a new intermediary class, had a lot of capital
accumulating and rulers who needed money to finance their trade
and wars borrowed money from this class, giving them prebendal
rights, which these intermediaries slowly converted into hereditary
entitlements. Thus C.A. Bayly says the ‘new gentry’ and portfolio
capitalists that emerged, broke earlier norms by extending the notion
of private inheritable wealth and began the process of capitalism.
Subramaniam and Bayly suggest that agrarian capitalism developed
as a result of interaction between the new indigenous capitalist
relations and more powerful colonial capitalism.

Regarding trade and non agrarian production and the economy,

historians who argue for changes, such as Habib point out that the
economy was in a state of decline in the 18 th century. Similarly
Bhattacharya points out as the Company established monopoly rights
over salt, opium and saltpetre and sidelined middlemen in the textile
industry also. It assumed Diwani rights of Bengal thus marking a
change in Bengals econmu as it’s revenue was used to purchase
export goods by the British. This change confined Indian capital to
internal trade, unorganized banking and petty commodity
production. Thus the British rule changed the nature of Indian trade
and subordinated it, thus marking a break with the past.

Revisionist historians who focus on regional studies and trade argue

contrary to this, they see links between the pre colonial and colonial
economy as historians such as C.A. Bayly, Burton Stein, Marshall and
Ashin Das Gupta argue that Company rule grafter it’s self onto
networks of indigenous economy and infrastructure. Ashin Das Gupta
says that when Colonial rule was established the intermediary
classes(bankers, traders, portofolio-capitalists) that emerged
powerful in the regional polities drifted towards the Company as
traditional trade centres declined and new trade centres emerged
under company rule (Calcutta, Madras, Bombay). In these new
centres these intermediaries collaborated with the English, thus
stressing continuity.

Bayly argued for continuities as well, he explores the “rise of

intermediary class” of merchants and service communities in the
regional polities and how colonial state used them. He says that as
the new regional polities emerged since as large zamindars built up
primary land holdings, as the Mughals lost control. These new
polities founded by leading regional families, patronized merchants
and service class (Brahmans)e.g. Jagath Seths of Bengal, in their
territories in return for information, credit and legitimacy. Thus
intermediaries groups rose in society. Merchants had access to
political power as they loaned capital to the State, funded its wars
and took on revenue farming functions in regional polities. Thus
there was a commercialization of State power and the State emerged
as a military fiscal State. In the 1760s Bayly says an economic
downturn was witnessed in these new polities due to famine and
war, in which period the Company used these intermediaries to
establish its power. This being continuity as even regional polities
used these intermediaries in their rise to political power. He says that
as the military fiscal states emerged (Indian regional polities and
later British), revenue pressure increased which enhanced the role of
moneylender and trader and scribal expertise. After 1780 when the
company took over he argues that the British used these
intermediary groups and their functions, by delegating business of
local control to them and also involving them in new cash crop trade.
Thus British rule drew upon extant groups to establish its colonial
power.

While looking at the relationship between intermediary groups and

non elites (labour, artisans and workmen) Bayly argues that 18 th
century saw the subordination and oppression of non elites, as
intermediary groups extracted revenue from non-elites. In the
Colonial State when the Company began to collaborate with these
intermediary groups, Rajat Datta, P.J.Marshall and Bayly point out
that these intermediary groups(e.g. Bengali Traders) increased their
control over the peasantry and economy as a result of revenue
squeeze imposed by the company. Thus the rise of the intermediary
classes who prospered in the 18th century was closely connected to
peasantisization and subordination of labour, and the Company’s
collaboration with intermediaries from regional kingdoms shows
continuity between the pre-colonial and colonial period as well.
Burton Stein too emphasises similar continuities, and collaboration
between British and certain pre-colonial groups. Take for instance
the company’s military and political collaboration with surplus
extracting bureaucratic elite and traders.

Athar Ali critiques the views of Burton Stein and C.A.Bayly who
accept, that British rule continued the traditional institutions and
policies of former regional states, or even the view that English
power was dependent on compromise and collaboration with certain
indigenous groups. Ali delineates two types of collaboration-(i)
Where two powers collaborate on an equal footing (which is rare)
and (ii) Where one power is dominant and the other collaborates
because this is his only means of survival or profit. Ali says that the
collaboration with Indian merchants in the Permanent Settlement
was of the second type. This collaboration was only due to the
company’s profit aim, as in the case of merchants and bankers
because they helped in revenue collection. There was no
collaboration with zamidars as Ali points out and Subsidiary Alliance
was one sided as Awadh was compelled to pay 50laikh annual tribute
till 1801, and loose half its territory. Thus Ali concludes that
colonialism marked a break from all previous political regimes of
India, in its nature and objective.

Revisionists also argue for continuities in the area of law,

administration, the military and society. Bernard Cohn and Burton
Stein regarding social structures have both argued for the resilience
of the clan-holding structures in North India, and segmentary
systems of south India respectively, well into the British period. Cohn
also argued that the new administrative and fiscal networks built in
regional polities were the base upon which English rule later
structured itself, thus arguing for continuity. Anand Yang’s study
demonstrates the persistence of local power holders during early
colonial expansion, while Frykenburg’s study of Guntur proposed
that in outlying districts of Madras between 1770 and 1830, British
rule was supported by old district officials, as such officials were in
return patronized by the British. C.A. Bayly also argues that company
drew on an indigenous network of support from the vibrant Indian
information order- the scribes and informers. Regarding military
cultures, and the building of the Company State as a “garrison” or
military state Peers says, this new State monopolized the pre colonial
practice of military fiscalism seen in regional polities, while Seema
Alvi and Dirk Kollf’s study focus on the Company State drawing upon
indigenous military labour market and the military state’s sustenance
due to their relationship with the native ‘sepoys’ respectively. With
regards to the legal sphere and the Company’s rise to political power,
Singha argues that the Company drew upon indigenous normative
codes- of rule, rank, status and gender even though it reshaped these
to its own advantage.

In conclusion the recent revisionist arguments that comprise bulk of

new literature on the debates surrounding the 18 th century, give us a
nuanced understanding of the 18th century. It is important to note
that Revisionists writings may argue for continuities, but they also
recognize the changes that colonial rule brought in within political,
social and economic spheres, rather than a black and white
understanding of the century as one in decline with the pre colonial
order being completely uprooted and suddenly replaced by colonial
rule as older writings seem to suggest.