Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No.
80391) – Digest Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue
with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation
and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly
Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his
presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his
position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be
declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case,
the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue
that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against
some members of the Assembly on a question which should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic" because of its resolution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending
litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words,
what is the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?
Ruling:
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic
simply by reason of the expulsion resolution that was issued. If
the expulsion was done purposely to make the petition moot and
academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of due
process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without force and
effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation. It also does not appear that the
petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft
and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore
that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations.
As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere
accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court
ordered reinstatement of the petitioner.
2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in
Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to
the central government, the Presidential Decree provides that “the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments “more responsive
and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over
them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.” He has not control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local government
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The
Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that “the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang
administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.
Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on
November to be invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The
petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the Sanggunian.
San Juan vs. Civil Service Commisssion
GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left
vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated
Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed
position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and
recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the
ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was
subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the
appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service
Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments
rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to
recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the
appointee should come only from his nominees. In support
thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who
was not expressly nominated by the provincial governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to
recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing
laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the
required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent
DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor
recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free
to appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be
given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy
of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under
Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his
power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere
administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to
itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the
petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements
as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular
No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important
constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is
capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power
in Malacañ ang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over
local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided
by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has
no such power over local governments. He has only supervision
and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in
the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State
shall ensure the autonomy of local governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside.
The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified,
he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining
why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created
through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any project or activity in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is
concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising
the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of
the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The
said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general
law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a
later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to
have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of
police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No.
111097)
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.
It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared
to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners
opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing
business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of
the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground
that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners
contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have
the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for
the general welfare.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.
Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the
Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police
power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now
embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact
permitted by law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to
the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by
P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress
as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For
all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore ultra vires and void.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Philippine Petroleum Corporation vs Municipality
of Pililla, Rizal, GR 90776
FACTS:
Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business
enterprise engaged in the manufacture of a petroleum product,
with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal, conducting
its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax.
Respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, through Municipal
Council Resolution No. 25, S-1974 enacted Municipal Tax
Ordinance No. 1, S-1974 otherwise known as “The Pililla Tax Code
of 1974”. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on
business, except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in
the Local Tax Code
The respondents then filed a complaint for the collection of
business tax, storage permit fees, mayor’s permit and sanitary
inspection fees.
ISSUE 1:
WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the
NIRC, is still liable to pay tax on business unto the respondent
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
HELD 1: YES, a tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article
itself.
RATIO 1: While Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of
local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend
Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426,
wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on
business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature.
The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained
by the present Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of
the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount
to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances.
Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only
guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress
can define and limit such power of local governments.

ISSUE 2: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax
under the NIRC, is still liable to pay the storage fee unto the
respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
HELD 2: NO, Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining all city and
municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called
storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the
local tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC
from the payment of storage permit fee.
RATIO 2: The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla’s tax
ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any
flammable, combustible or explosive substances. Inasmuch as said
storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of
Pililla, but by petitioner PPC, same is obviously not a charge for
any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in
Section 37 of the same Code.
ISSUE 3: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax
under the NIRC, is still liable to pay the permit fees unto the
respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
HELD 3: YES.
RATIO 3: Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla’s Municipal Tax Ordinance
No. 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under
Section 36 of the amended Code.
ISSUE 4: WON the mayor has authority to waive payment of the
mayor’s permit and sanitary inspection fees
HELD 4: NO HE DOES NOT, it is the law-making body, and not an
executive like the mayor, who can make an exemption.
RATIO 4: The trial court did not err in holding that “since the
power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is
essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal
mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw
such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax.”
In the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment
of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. Under Section 36 of
the Code, a permit fee like the mayor’s permit, shall be required
before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any
business or occupation under the provisions of the Code.
Dadole vs CoA
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue
City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC
Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized
by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges
shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to
reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the
last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going
beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject
to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision
by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are
merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are subject to the
power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and
behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The
President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if
he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the
scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION
Facts:
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created and grantedthe Subic SEZ
incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations,
exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to
other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.
And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to
create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence
of the local government units directly affected, other Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the
Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San
Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No.
420 which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay.
In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents
contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic
incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was
established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely
implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US
military bases into hubs of business activity or investment.
Issue:
WON Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for
national and local tax exemption within and granting other
economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
NO!
Nowhere in RA 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet
to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under Section 12
which provides for tax exemption to the established Subic SEZ.
The tax exemption grant to John Hay SEZ contravenes Article VI,
Section 28 (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “No
law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
Furthermore, it is the Legislature, unless limited by a provision of
the state constitution, which has the full power to exempt any
person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its
power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. The grant by
Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the
John Hay SEZ is VOID for being violative of the Constitution.
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, is the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40.
His salary and representation and transportation allowance
(RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court.
Besides that, petitioner also received a monthly allowance of P944
from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.
On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved a
resolution increasing petitioner judge’s monthly allowance from
P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993. This
supplemental budget was approved by the municipal government
(the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan) and was also
likewise approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the
Office of Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay
sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly
allowance or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the
immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter.
She reasoned that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant
RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was
already receiving from the Supreme Court. Petitioner judge
appealed the matter to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong
who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can
validly provide RATA to its Municipal Judge, in addition to that
provided by the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code
of 1991, provides:
“(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the
municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and
its inhabitants . . ., and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an
efficient and effective municipal government, and in this
connection shall:
xxx
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow,
provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges,
prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and
other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the
municipality; (emphasis supplied)”
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section has
been repealed, modified or amended by NCC No. 67, RA 7645 (the
General Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53. A review of
the two laws, however, shows that this was not so. Section 36 of
RA 7645 merely provided for the different rates of RATA payable
to national government officials or employees, depending on their
position, and stated that these amounts were payable from the
programmed appropriations of the parent agencies to which the
concerned national officials or employees belonged. Furthermore,
there was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of
Section 447(a) (l)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied. In the absence,
therefore, of any clear repeal of Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160,
it cannot be presume to be such intention on the part of the
legislature.
The NCC No. 67 on the other hand, seeks to prevent the dual
collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets of more
than one national agency. It is in fact an administrative tool of the
DBM to prevent the much-abused practice of multiple allowances,
thus standardizing the grant of RATA by national agencies. It was
issued primarily to make the grant of RATA to national officials
under the national budget uniform. In other words, it applies only
to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local funds
of LGUs.
Now, though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within the
ambit of the President's power of general supervision over LGUs,
the SC ruled that Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid. RA
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, clearly provides that
provincial, city and municipal governments may grant allowances
to judges as long as their finances allow. Section 3, paragraph (e)
of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting
allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also
granted by the national government or (2) similar to the
allowances granted by the national government, violates Section
447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991. As already
stated, a circular must conform to the law it seeks to implement
and should not modify or amend it. Moreover, by prohibiting
LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted
by the national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically
prohibits LGUs from granting allowances to judges and, in effect,
totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being unduly
restrictive therefore of the statutory power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges and being violative of their autonomy
guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC
No. 53 is hereby declared null and void.
BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct,
install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of
the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its
subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided,
however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the
approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber
rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent
Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit
unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a
petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No.
205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the
sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws
and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV
operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by
LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because
the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public
properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach
subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system –
the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures,
and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree
of regulation over CATV operators.
But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general
welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are
convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized
limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it
violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s
deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV
operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
Garcia et al. vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992
elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the
province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They
issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall
proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the
gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the Resolution of the
COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the
"substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section
70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out
the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in
passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of
the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to
initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of
elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to
equal protection of the law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The
Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single
mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is
for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this
constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to
choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment
dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of
recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be
effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress
deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall
elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct
action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two
(2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the
recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish
the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the
people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and
sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities
are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political
parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its
members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the
provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province
concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is
that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69
of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally
elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The
members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people. By
necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on
mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of
opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of
democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be
faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the
minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the
initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly
will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that
notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine
qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members
to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state,
compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise,
there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due
course by the COMELEC.
Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, Case Digest
Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the
Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to
annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law." His conclusion was that the challenged
section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of
the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of
Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, and of Section 5 on the
taxing powers of local governments, and the policy of local
autonomy in general.
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two
grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom
or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted,
to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set
aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce
the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.
What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing
the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and
the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but
of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do
it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to
conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the
opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no
more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but
of mere supervision.
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed
before the Department of Local Government against petitioner
Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in
1988 on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding probable grounds, the
respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government
Luis T. Santos issued successive suspensions. The petitioner then
instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in the
RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of
preliminary injunction. He also instituted actions for prohibition
before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this
petition for review with the argument that the respondent
Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and
remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows
the President to exercise said power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President, acting thru the Secretary of Local
Government, has the power to suspend, remove, or both, local
officials.
HELD:
Yes. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding
the change in the Constitutional language, the charter did not
intend to divest the legislature of its right-or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanction against local officials. The Constitution
did not…intend