MMDA Vs.

Bel-Air Village

Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government
Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner
to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of
Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate
the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the
MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority
to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can
practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public
traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.

Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police
power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be
delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because
it cannot be delegated to them.

It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower
the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that
grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

Limbona v. Mangelin

Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the
Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was
needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987,
the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared
null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending
further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the
Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot
and academic" because its resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or
regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of
Region XII?

Held:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.

(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of
the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the
latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the
same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can
make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we
review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey
the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in

Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions
shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook".
But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a
settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided
a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could
not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this
mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his
back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side.
For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

Province of Batangas vs Romulo 429 SCRA 736

FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The Oversight
Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-
99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on
October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the
LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit
the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the
Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding
funds. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for
the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for
the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on
the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down. According to Art. II,
Sec.25of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local
governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines
the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control.
Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act,
or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has
no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them. The entire
process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes.Sec.6, Art.
X of the Constitution mandates that the just share shall be automatically released to the
LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to
receive the just share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To subject
its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations
as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the
national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the
collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991
not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of
the LGUs. Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a
separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs.
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in a separate legislation. A general appropriations bill is a special type
of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended to amend another
law is considered an inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed
in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress
to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal
autonomy of the LGUs. The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by
the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty
upon which these provisions are based.

Basco v. PAGCOR
FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to
the policy of the government, “ to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution
all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This was
subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in
general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped
Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:
it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;
2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees;
and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local
Autonomy;
3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling
thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices; and
4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic
and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government cannot regulate it in the
exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local
governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.

4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political
branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case,
the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it
is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit G. R. No. 79956

January 29, 1990

Facts:

Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera

People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that
the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent
struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.

A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement
states that they are to:

Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that
could perform policy−making and administrative functions and undertake consultations
and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P.
Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into
law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the
Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet,
Ifugao, Kalinga−Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing
the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually
pre−empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are unfounded.

E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act
and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous
regions.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region
in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit
to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the
meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region
created. At this time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First
Congress had not yet convened.

Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of

government in the autonomous region),the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did
not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220
do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government,
the ethno−linguistic groups or tribes and non−governmental organizations in a concerted
effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region
signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which
completed the autonomous region−creating process outlined in the Constitution.

Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs. Gonong

GR No. 91023, July 13, 1990 Cruz, J.
GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990 Sarmiento, J.
 Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car was removed by
petitioner while his vehicle was parked in Escolta. He filed a complaint in the RTC of
Manila. He questioned the petitioner’s act on the ground that not only was the car not
illegally parked but that there was no law or ordinance authorizing such removal. The
lower court ruled that LOI 43, which the defendant (petitioner) invoked, did not empower
it to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates or motor vehicles illegally parked and
unattended. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to
free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways. Moreover, the said LOI
had been PD 1605.The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from
implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and
petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to
these parate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board
to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the
Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and
without proper notice and hearing.
ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion
W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic violations as such

HELD:
NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from
ordering, ex parte, aprovisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of
whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce orincrease it further; or 3) to deny
the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section
8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to
the final outcome of the proceeding.
HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which
is an altogether different offense. LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets
and highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of
a traffic law or regulation. In the case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private
respondent’s vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic.
The charge against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The
act, if true is a violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD
1605, which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle
among the imposable penalties

TORRALBA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT

Facts:
BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur,
is being challenged as violative of Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. Petitioners
are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being
a member of theSangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal
officers are the local public officials of the new Municipality. According to the petitioners,
the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any
province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as
yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly
complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and
void.

Issue: Whether or not BP 56 is invalid. NO

Held :
The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail
nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations.
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the
modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It
contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a
municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not
preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once
said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units
should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment
of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new
local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called
for the purpose. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said
requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed
and approved the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the
new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their
functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a long-recognized principle that the
power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence
of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems
essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new
Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the
1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec and in this case: in the Tan
case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3
December1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the Tan case confined the
plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining
areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite
should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a
plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area
for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in
the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste"
attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the
Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in
the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in
that law.
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783

FACTS:
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was
held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said
conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the minimum population requirement was attained.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections
5(1), 4 and 26(1)
HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987
Constitution.
Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction
of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede
legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on
the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be
increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation is not unconstitutional.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.
The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress
itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.
The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

LTO v. City of Butuan

Facts:
Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the
provisons of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of
Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing
mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing
Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for,
among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of
tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a
permit for the driving thereof.

Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that,
indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over
tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and
to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration and license for driving
tricycles has been devolved to LGU's.
Issue:
Whether or not, the registration of tricycles was given to LGU's, hence the ordinance
is a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling:
No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising
Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local
Government Code"- the newly delegated powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and
regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to
the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
Corollarily, the exercised of a police power must be through a valid delegation. In this
case the police power of registering tricycles was not delegated to the LGU’s, but
remained in the LTO.

Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A.
No.4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or
upon any public highway" in the country.

The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime
to examine and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are
registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to
be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and other
infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with being the central repository and
custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.
Adds the Court, the reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local
government units, specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is
tangential.

Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of
sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by delegation given
under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public purpose
and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police
power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of
government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry out its legitimate
objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one does not
necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition and
jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts,
character, scopes and limitations.
 To construe the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result
in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been
intended. If it were otherwise, the law could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of
Book III of the Local Government Code in the same manner that the specific devolution
of LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is
not favored.

The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government
Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the
operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133
(1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing
the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance
of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory
in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are
to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the
competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute
must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant body of
laws.

LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and
to grant franchises for the operation thereof, and not to issue registration.

Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to a statute is void and ultra vires.