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Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa

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 Rent Seeking and Policing in
Colonial Africa

'I
JOHNMUKUM MBAKU*, MWANCl S. KIMENYI I

1
I

Introduction

The literature on the political economy of colonialism usually characterises

the police and other forms of state coercion as agents of law and order
(Bayley, 1969: 97;Clinard and Abbott, 1973:215-30). The colonial police
force is described as the guarantor of peace and protector of property
rights and individual liberties and viewed as necessary for guaranteeing
demqcratic living in the colonies.
Colonisation was regarded by its proponents as a civilising mission.
European countries, it is argued, came to Africa as modernising agents,
helping to transform societies both economically and culturally. The colo-
nial state, thus, was regarded as the apparatus through which competing
pluralistic interests could be held in equilibrium. The law was the mechan-
ism to be used by the state to realise competitive equilibrium, while the
police provided the coercive force needed to ensure that provisions of the
law were adhered to (see, for example, Tamuno, 1970: 10-15).
Some modernisation theorists have argued that because of human im-
perfections, agencies have to be created by the state to guard against
behaviour that is harmful to the lives, property, and well-being of society.
Although human behaviour is significantly shaped by the civilising influ-
ences of the church, the family and schools, these institutions are often
incapable of properly discharging their role. To maintain law and order
and thus provide for economic and social development, a police force is
needed. Fighting crime and maintaining law and order by the police is said
* The authors would like to thank the participants in the Southern Eoonomic Assodation
session on 'Public Choice: Rent Seeking' held in Washington, D.C., November 1W2,for their
 I
to be indiscriminately fair to all people, especially since the activities of the
police are subject to the law of the state (Bent, 1974). Thus, the colonial
police force was seen by its supporters as providing a stable and peaceful

I
environment needed for the development of the colonies and was expected
to fight crime, prevent ethnic violence, protect property rights and guaran-
tee personal liberty, so as to enable the Europeans to efficiently carry out
their civilising mission.
In this article, it is argued that the police force, like other organs of
violence in colonial Africa, was not an instrument of peace, but rather a
rent seeking tool used by the colonial governments to ensure orderly
transfer of wealth from the colonies to the metropolitan economies. The
police was used to help maintain those institutions that fostered the rent
I
seeking activities of European entrepreneurs. Far from maintaining law I
and order, the police, in many cases, became the agent of violence directed
at Africans in order to force them to help Europeans maximise their own
political and economic interests in the colonies.-1n German Kamerun, for
example, the police played a pivotal role in getting Africans to work as
I labourers on European plantations. Since most Africans preferred the
i
traditional occupations of hunting and gathering, it was necessary to use
) 1 force to compel them to provide labour that German plantation owners
i desperately needed (see, for example, Rudin, 1968).
The process of colonisation in itself required the subjugation of the
i African peoples, the seizure of African property rights, especially in land,
t and their subsequent reassignment to European settlers. It could not have i
j t succeeded without state coercion. The police, rather than being agents of
s 1 peace and order, used their comparative advantage in the use of violence
to subdue the indigenous peoples and allow European settlers to maintain t
I
I!I!/ their political and economic privileges.
'I
i
9:1 Modernisation Theory and Policing in Developing Countries
i'
.i ,
According to modernisation theory, the role of the police in each society is I
; determined by the nature and process of social change. Societies are seen
. as 'self-contained systems which consist of interrelated and interdependent

I!;r !' parts which are mutually supportive of and, compatible with each other'
(Ahire, 1990: 151). In general, societies continue to evolve from smaller
i" I[ and simpler forms to larger and more complex ones. The developed
countries of the West have, through this process of continuous evolvement,
IIj
'1 developed r
I

:I
I)
highly differentiated and compatible (i.e. developed) structures which I
the traditional peasant societies in developing countries must emulate if I

I they too are to modernize. Western systems of political organization, 1

law and policing are held to be some of the components of the compatible
I
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonhl Africa] 279

structures needed to stimulate development in backward societies (Ahire,

1990: 151-52).

Modernisation theory views the state as an agent of social and economic

development. The state is expected to transfer certain 'universalistic struc-
tures and roles from the West to replace largely ascriptive and undifferen-
tiated roles in developing societies' (Ahire, 1990: 152) in order to effect
development in the latter. The process of modernisation, however, can
cause social disruptions and lead to institutional instability. A third party is
needed to maintain law and order so as to allow for sustained growth and
development. That guardian of stability has been the police force. The
process of modernisation, thus, requires the establishment of a highly
centralised state, whose job it is to provide a stable political environment
needed for efficient and equitable allocation of resources and subsequently,
development. Such a state is seen as the 'independent and beneficent
guarantor of the evolutionary voyage from pre-modern to modern stages'
(Ahire, 1990: 152). Its principal functions include rule making, rule appli-
cation, rule adjudication and communication (Almond and Powell, 1966:
129-89). From this discourse, one can see the colonial state as an anent of
modernisation, transferring from the developed countries to the colonies,
the necessary ingredients to 'civilize' and modernise the African colonies
(Ahire, 1990: 151-72; 1991). t

This conception of the state gives modernisation theory a basis for its
analysis of law and of policing. Trubek and Galanter (1974: 1071-74)
summarised this theory's conception of law in the following manner. Law is
used by the state to exercise control over individuals in society. The law is
defined as 'bodies of rules that are addressed universally to all individuals
similarly situated' (Trubek and Galanter, 1974: 1074). In addition to con-
trolling the behaviour of individuals in a society, the law also constraints
the state, thus regulating the extent to which the latter can affect the
behaviour of individuals. The making of rules is undertaken 'through a
pluralistic process which enables all individuals to secure rules favorable
to them, while at the same time ensuring that rules respe'ct the vital
interests of all others' (Trubek and Galanter, 1974: 1071). Thus, the
process of rule making is expected to insure that no individual or group
'derives systematic advantageddisadvantages by virtue of their specific
characteristics' (Ahire, 1990: 153). According to Trubek and Galanter
(1974: 1071), the principals in this pluralistic rule making process 'are
intermediate groups which aggregate individual interests . . . . No single
group, either a minority or majority, dominates the process of formulation
of legal rules, and no special characteristics of individuals or groups such as
wealth or race, gives them systematic advantages or disadvantages in rule
making'. The rules derived through this process are designed to maximise
social objectives, and these are believed to be the objectives of society as a
 whole and not only those of a single interest group. In other words, the I

4
I

rules are designed to maximise some definable 'social welfare' function.

When these rules are applied, 'they are enforced equally for all citizens,
and in a fashion that achieves the purposes for which they were consciously
designed' (Trubek and Galanter, 1974: 1072).
According to modernisation theory, however, human imperfection is an
indicator that law alone cannot ensure that the behaviour of citizens 1
conforms to the rules and regulations designed by the state. A police force
is needed to enforce compliance. In performing its duties, the police force
is expected to be 'indiscriminately fair to all citizens, especially as the
actions of law enforcers are believed to be subject to these rules. Gener-
I
ally, the police are thought to possess the chief attributes associated with
the law-benevolence, neutrality and impartiality' (Ahire, 1990: 153; see
also Bent, 1974: 1-13). Thus, modernisation theory assumes that the police I
force would be representative of the public interest and would not serve as I
an agent of a narrowly defined segment of the population. I

The process of modernisation, it is argued, results in increased levels of

criminal behaviour. As agents of law and order, the police are essential for
controlling crime and minimising threats to personal freedoms and societal
goals. In the process, the police promote economic and social development
and democratic living. The police, through their control of criminal behav-
hour, are linked to the process of development (Bent, 1974; Ahire, 1990).
In recent years, the-united Nations (UN) agencies engaged in crinie
research have been in the forefront of the movement to link crime with the
processes of industrialisation and modernisation. Clinard and Abbott
(1973:5-6) agreed with the proposition that the process of modernisation
increases criminal behaviour. In their study of the 'major forces and
pressures that influence social change' in developing countries, they argued
that '[als the less developed nations attempt, in one or two generations, to I

bring about transformations that have culminated from several centuries of

development for most of the industrialized nations, severe social repercus- I
sions are often evident'. Mushanga (1976: 5) reiterated this when he said
that '[tlhe impact of abrupt social change with emphasis on development
without adequate provision for the acquisition of non-delinquent social
values has, in Africa, led to a disproportionate rise in crime rates'. Accord-
ing to Shelley (1981: xiii), '[mlodernization has affected rates and forms of
criminality in the past two hundred years in both capitalistic and socialistic
societies'. She further added that 'development, rather than unique cultural
and social characteristics, is responsible for observed changes in criminality'.
Given the relationship between crime and development, orthodox .
scholars perceive the police as the primary prerequisite for and the guardian
of orderly social and economic development. According to Bent (1974: 1):

If all men were perfect there would be no need for formal agencies to
guard against human behaviour detrimental to the lives, property, and
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa / 281

well-being of society. But the human race is not made up of angels, it

depends on the civilizing influence of the family, the church, schools,
and other institutions to regulate behavior. And where these institu-
tions prove inadequate or incapable of fulfilling their role, especially
amid the socially dysfunctional stresses of urban society, the maintenance
of order and safety necessitates the creation of police agencies by the
State.

Fighting crime is one way by which the police maintain order. According to
Bayley (1969), although the police may perform duties that include helping
people during natural disasters, sponsoring clubs to help young people
learn about citizenship, directing traffic, etc., fighting crime is the police
force's primary purpose. He added, '[tlhe criminal is the focus of a police-
man's attention' (1969: 97). Clinard and Abbott (1973: 218) viewed law
and order (i.e., crime control) as the original function of the police in
developing countries. Tamuno's study of the police in Nigeria, suggested
that the rise of crime and disorder in colonial Nigeria provided the impetus
for the establishment of a ~ o l i c eforce. He noted that social and political
disputes' and 'interethnic cbnflicts7
es and 'had an important bearing on
dern police there' (Tarnuno, 1970:
olice force as emerging out of a
desire to stem the growth of crime and disorder. As a result of this
characterisation, the colonial police force represented a crime fighting
public agency.
Tamuno's interpretation of the origins of the colonial police in Nigeria
reinforces the erroneous belief, held by many scholars, that Europeans
came to AMca to save the 'natives' from themselves. Colonialism, in this
light, is depicted as a civilising mission, designed to prevent African societies
from degenerating into anarchy. The colonial police force was supposed to
provide the means through which Europeans could bring the perpetually
wamng factions together and prevent them from eventually destroying
themselves, while at the same time, introducing Africans to European
civilisation and its brand of Christianity. Far from being a civilising mission,
colonialism was an attempt to maximise the economic interests of Euro-
peans. It was an economic 'pact' designed to help Europeans secure raw
materials for the factories for the metropolitan economies. In addition,
markets were needed to dispose of excess production from European
factories. According to Frederick Lugard, who for many years represented
British colonial authority in Nigeria, the colonies were essential for the
well-being of Great Britain: He stated that commodities from the tropics
were vital to Britain's industrial life, and that the African markets repre-
sented an important outlet for the sale of British manufactures (Lugard,
1926: 7). Egeiton (1969: 57), a well-known authority on British imperial
policy, stated that the 'motives which prompted the European nations to
 enter upon the field-sf colonization were in the main two, viz. the desire to
win converts for the church, and the desire to win wealth for themselves'.
Existing evidence shows that the primary objective of annexation of African
Nrritory was economic. According to Ake (1981: 19) colonialism was an
economic imperative brought about by the internal contradictions of capital-
ism in Europe. He stated that

[tlhe transplanting of capitalism arises from those contradictions which

reduce the rate of profit and arrest the capitalisation of surplus value.
Confronted with these effects, it was imperative that the capitalist,
forever bent on profit maximization, would look for a new environment
in which the process of accumulation could proceed apace. Capitalists
turned to foreign lands attacked and subjugated them and integrated
their economies to those of Western Europe.

111 Colonialism was alien, it was forced upon the African people and was
full of contradictions. Since it involved-forced subjugation bT the local
people and abrogation of their property rights, it could only be implemented
through force. As a result, the Europeans who brought colonialism to
Africa required 'a well-organized group possessing a comparative advantage
in the efficient use of violence' (Ahire, 1990: 156) to help them subjugate
the Africans. The colonial police force was developed to serve in this role.
In fact, most colonial institutions, like the police, were primarily 'structures of
exploitation, despotism, and degradation' (Fatton, 1 W : 457). For Crowder
(1987: 11-12), 'the colonial state was conceived in violence rather than by
negotiation'. The colonial police force provided the coercive force required
'
to effect the seizure and abrogation of African property rights, especially in
land and their labour services.
The evolution of the colonial police force, thus, must be viewed as a
reaction to the constraints imposed on the European colonial officers and
colonists by the African peoples. Had the Africans yielded willingly to
colonial exploitation, policing in the colonial state would have been radically
different from what it turned out to be. The establishment of the colonial
police force can also be attributed to the failure of the colonists to rely on
markets and freely negotiated and mutually beneficial contracts for the
acquisition1 of resources (for instance, land and labour services). Had the
colonists relied primarily on markets, instead of state coercion, the char-
acter of the colonial police would have been significantly different. Under
conditions'of a capitalist wage labour system (as opposed to the forced
labour system in existence in many colonies), the police force might have
restricted itself to the traditional duties of maintaining law and order
among all population groups. As a consequence of the colonists' need to
use state coercion as a tool for resource allocation, the police force evolved
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa1283

as an instrument of violence, used to help Europeans conquer, control,

subjugate and exploit Africans (Danns, 1982).
Jeffries viewed the colonial police force as a benevolent public agency
whose main duty was 'to act impartially in the interest of the community as
a whole, to preserve and re-establish the rule of law and order' (Jeffries,
1952: 198-99). Ahire (1990: 156) remarked that any scholar who views the
colonial police as a 'legal and constitutional imperative ignores the fact that
the police in these countries were established by force, despite indigenous
resistance to them'.

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa

The Concept of Rent Seeking

Economies which are characterised by a significant level of government

regulation, usually pursue public policies which are affected by the behav-
iour of interest groups seeking government transfers and those of groups
supplying the transfers. In such economies, the political equilibrium that
results is one in whiuh some groups gain at the expense of others. In the
process, politiciaqs,who {actas,wealth brokers, increase their political base.
Rent seeking is a type of behaviour most often associated with interest
groups in such heavily regulated economies (Tullock, 1967; Tollison; 1982;
Kimenyi, 1989; Mbaku, 1991a, 1991b, 1991~).
Rent seeking has been defined as the expending of resources to capture
government or artifically-contrived transfers. If, for example, regulators
impose a supply restriction on a good or service, then economic agents
who have been granted the right to produce the item at supranormal prices
will earn far more than the normal profits on their investment. The artificially-
contrived scarcity usually creates rent, 'the anticipation of which will
induce entrepreneurs to spend resources either to obtain the monopoly
rights when they are first created or seek ways to oust the initial recipient'
(DeLorme et al., 1986: 414). Government regulators can also impose price
ceilings (or prices that are below their competitive equilibrium levels) on
markets, allowing consumers who have been given the right to enter the
market on the demand side to receive rents. If the state grants access only
to some consumers, rents will continue to accrue to the latter. Those
consumers who have been denied access to this market will expend resources
in an effort to get the state to transfer the government created rights to
them. This is also a case of rent seeking behaviour (see, for example,
Tollison, 1982: 575-602; Delorme et al., 1986: 413-23).
Rent seeking costs include the expenditure involved in getting laws
passed by the government creating the artificial scarcity and those associ-
ated with the political competition to capture the newly created rights. If
 the primary source of the rents to be competed for is government restrictions
on markets, then most entrepreneurs would concentrate their efforts on
finding ways to capture the newly created rights. If, however, the rents are
derived from the government's tax and spending policies, then rent seeking
will involve attempts by economic agents to influence the spending and tax
policies of the state in order to maximise their share of the rents (Tollison,
1982: 575-602; Buchanan, 1980b: 3 1 5 ) .
In rent seeking societies, agents may respond to government regulatory
activities at three levels. The method used to dispose of the scarcity once it
is created will determine the type of response from economio agents. If the
state regulators decide to allocate the rights to the scarcity themselves,
then agents will lobby to influence bureaucrats in order to obtain the
rights. A t this level, lobbying and the payment of bribes represent the most
important rent seeking behaviours. Should the state prevent some groups
from participating in the political competition for the rights to the scarcity,
violence may erupt as the deprived groups attempt to capture the apparatus
of government in order to avail themselves of rents (Mbaku and Paul,
1989: 63-72; Mbaku, 1991c: 19-31).
If the government, instead, decides to sell the rights to the scarcity in a
competitive market, then there will be an economic response from agents
and the state will receive the full market value of the rights. The proceeds
f.
from the sale will become part of the state budget. -
- . moving rent seeking t o a
second level, where economic agents struggle to enter job categories with
I access t o the rents. If the government returns the rents to the people, say,
1 in the form of transfer payments, then rent seeking will move to a third
level, as individuals attempt to influence bureaucrats in order to maximise
their share of the rents. If, on the other hand, the state allocates the
proceeds from the auction through a random process (such as, a lottery),
then there would be no incentive for agents to indulge in rent seeking (see,
for example, Tollison, 1982: 575-602; Tullock, 1967: 224-32; Krueger,
1974: 291-303).
The kinds of rent seeking behaviours that dominate a heavily regulated
economy are determined by the country's political system. In countries
with democratic political systems, lobbying, bribery and the underwriting
of the campaigns of politicians represent the major rent seeking behaviours.
In societies with non-democratic governments, political violence is usually
the predominant mode of competing for rents. In a country with an
authoritarian political system, members of the politically dominant group
control and dominate resource allocation. Members of locked out groups
usually come to view the resource allocation system as one designed to
benefit primarily members of the politically dominant group. In these
economies, those denied access to markets can only hope to gain entry
either by sufficiently threatening the government to force ah attenuation of
the latter's property rights or by capturing the apparatus of government.
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa1 285

Unfortunately, in such societies, constitutional methods of regime change

either do not exist, or if they do, do not function properly. As a result,
those who aspire to capture the government have to resort to violence. It is
little wonder that, in the African colonies, the Europeans who enjoyed a
comparative advantage in violence, came to dominate rent seeking and
subsequently, resource allocation. The colonial police force provided the
colonists the violence potential needed to dominate resource allocation in
the colonial economy. The Africans were unable to develop enough resist-
ance to force the Europeans to reform the system of property rights or the
system of resource allocation (Mbaku, 1991a: 181-94; 1991b: 25-45; 1991c:
19-31).

Rent Seeking and Property Rights Assignments ,

Many researches have recognised the relationship between rent seeking

and property rights. According to Buchanan (1980a: 35947; 1980b: 3-15;
1980c: 183-94; 1983: 71-85) and Benson (1984: 388-400), the process of
assigning property rights can result in rent seeking. Rent seeking usually
results when the government assumes control of property rights or 'can
- - * -
easilv assign and transfer rights that are supposedlv in private hands'
(Benson, 1984: 396). An entrepreneur who aspires to capture a property
right faces three options-purchase the right from its owner through a
mutually beneficial voluntary private exchange, or persuade the govern-
ment to seize the property right from its owner and reassign it to him, or
seize the property right from its owner and then appeal to the state to
protect and enforce his ownership of the right. In the 16505, White settlers
in South Africa confiscated lands belonging to the indigenous peoples and
a then appealed to the colonial state for protection. The state subsequently
established pri~ate'propert~ rights in land and assigned them to the settlers,
effectively abrogating the rights of Africans in their communal lands (see
Fredrickson, 1981; Magubane, 1979). Finally, the entrepreneur can steal
the right from its owner. In an attempt to capture a property right, the
.economic agent w i choose
~ the method that rninimises his costs of capturing
the right.
If the state becomes involved in the process of capturing and reassigning
property rights, the process becomes politicised and opportunities arise for
individuals to influence the government. Accofding to Benson (1984: 398),
rent seeking activities along this line involve attempts by individuals and
groups to 'define, reassign, modify or attenuate property rights'. The state
can pass laws that result in a direct transfer of property rights. The Natives
Land Act passed in South Africa in 1913, for example, and many of the
laws that provided colonial land concessions, transferred African property
rights in land directly to European settlers (see Burns, 1963; Brace, 1964;
Rudin, 1968; Magubane, 1979; Fredrickson, 1981). The state may create
-

286 / JOHN MuKL':~MBAKU,MWANGI

S . KIMENYI I

new property rights and assign them to members of the politically dominant
groups. The government can also place severe restrictions on the exercise
of rights by their legitimate owners. Members of the politically dominant
groups may then assume ownership of those rights since the law does not ,
usually affect the exercise of the rights by these people. Colonisation of
Africa represented a process in which the colonial state seized African
property rights and reassigned them to European colonists. The police
force was used to effect the seizure and subsequently to provide the
protection needed to allow the colonists to effectively exercise these rights.

Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa: A General View

The Europeans brought to Africa two institutions that had an important

impact on their relationship with the indigenous people. First, was plant-
ation agriculture, which required more land than that used by the average
African farmer, and increased the demand for labour. Second, private
property rights in land to replace the cornnlunal ownership systems oommon I

among many African groups. In the early days when Europeans purchased
products from Africans for shipment to Europe, they relied on markets
1
and voluntary private exchanges in their dealings with Africans. Soon after
settlements were established, coercion became increasingly important in
European dealings with the indigenous people. In their attempt to secure
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa / 287

was very fertile and suitable for the cultivation of rubber and tea, they
sought assistance from the colonial state to oust the Bakwiri who had
occupied the land long before official German annexation in 1884. War
broke out between the Bakwiri and the colonial state over land use rights.
The colonial state, with its superior military force, won the war and the
Bakwiri were expelled and their land turned over to German planters. The
effective confiscation of the property rights of the Bakwiri in their ancestral
lands could not have been successfully carried out without the help
 of the police. The police, thus, played an important role in the labour
system, forcing Africans to provide cheap labour for the economic activities
of White farmers. 1
In German Cameroon (Kamerun), the colonial state attempted to deal I
with the labour problem by imposing a tax on Africans that could only be
paid in German marks. On 1 July 1903, the state imposed a head tax of 3
marks per year on all men and unmarried women residing in the colony.
According to Rudin (1938: 339), '[tlhe requirement that every grown
person, man, woman or unmarried woman, capable of performing work
must pay the tax shows the connexion of the tax with the labour system'.
Any individual who did not have the money to pay the tax was required to
perform public service work. Quite often, offenders were 'sold' to private
businessmen, mostly planters, who subsequently forced them to work on
their plantations indefinitely. Again, the police were instrumental in protect-
ing the property rights of the European farmers and ensuring continued
labour services of the Africans to Europeans. Without the coercive force of
the police, the forced labour system could not have survived.
The French also established a forced labour system in their colonies. The L
policy, called corvke, consisted of penal labour, prestation labour, and
military labour. Prestation was the most important economically. All males
between the ages of 18 and 60 years were subject to an annual 'tax' under
which everv individual had to ~rovidethe colonial state with a certain
number of ;lays of free labour each year mandatorily. Affected individuals
were allowed to pay the government the equivalent of those services in
currencv. Since the maioritv
- ,of the indieenous
" I
~ e o ~did
.
l e not have the
currency to pay the government, they were forced into wage labour on
European plantations. Again, the police force was instrumental in provid-
ing the coercion needed to administer this forced labour system.
In colonial Africa, the police helped European settlers seize African
property rights and provided the coercive force needed to prevent Africans
from regaining those rights. Although the police did indeed maintain law
and order, the performance of such tasks was not intended to improve
living standards for Africans but to help Europeans maximise their political
and economic objectives in the colonies.

The Origin of the British Colonial Police Force in West Africa

The organisation, development and training of the colonial police in West

Africa was carried out with one important objective in view-the minimi-
sation of opposition t o European political and economic domination of the
African peoples. To maximise the flow of resources to the metropole, and
to ensure that the colonists retained and effectively exercised the property
rights seized from the Africans, the colonial government had to minimise
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa / 289

t h e dissent levels in the colony. Thus, part of the colonial mission was to
bring together, usually through force, several African societies to form 'a
coercively-imposed colonial market and administrative structure' (Momson
et al., 1989: 239). The colonial police force was instrumental in keeping
these African groups together in an artificial and peaceful 'global village' in
which European entrepreneurs could maintain their.commercia1 mono-
polies.
Although all European powers in Africa maintained coercively imposed
administrative structures, this paper deals primarily with the development
of the police in British controlled West Africa, specifically in Nigeria.
The rapid industrialisation of Europe during the first half of the nine-
teenth century significantly increased output and led to a scramble between
countries for markets to sell excess output. There was an anxiety about raw
material supply sources. These factors led to an increase in commercial
contacts between Britain and the West African coast. Rivalry between
British and other European traders on the Bights of Benin and Biafra
forced Britain to think in terms of establishing permanent settlements on
the West African coast. In these colonies, British trade and later plant-
ations could be protected, not only from the 'native', but also from other
European entrepreneurs. Despite the large volume of trade between Britain
and the Nigerian coast dating back to the fifteenth century, British colonial
capitalism was not formally established in the region until the events of
1849. In that year, the British government established a consulate at '
Fernando Po to serve the Bights - of Benin and Biafra, and later equipped
the post with a military squadron, whose duty was to monitor activities in
the hinterland and ensure that British interests were protected. In 1851, as
part of its effort to establish itself as the dominant political and economic
force in the area, the British overthrew the king of Lagos and captured his
territory. It waS subsequently annexed as a British colony on 6 August 1861
(see, Burns, 1963: 115-39; Ahire, 1991: 33; Tamuno, 1970: 10). Until this
point, most British economic activities in the area composed primarily of
sporadic exploits by traders, most of whom remained on the mast and were
served by several African middlemen. Increased British military exploits
and the establishment of a permanent settlement in the area, encouraged
expansion of trade and plantations. This rapid expansion of commercial
activities provided the context within which a colonial police force emerged
in the area. The significantly large number of British merchants located in
the area regularly requested the colonial authorities in Lagos to protect
them against indigenous and foreign competitors (Rudin, 1968: 17-75; Le
Vine, 1964). British missionaries saw the conquest of Lagos and subse-
quently of the rest of Nigeria as an opportunity to introduce the Christian
religion in this part of the world. Like the merchants, the missionaries also
requested protection from the colonial state. Newly freed slaves, mostly
 from Sierra Leone, Brazil and Cuba, were eager to serve t h e colonial
community (the colonial state, merchants and missionaries) as interpreters,
officials and middlemen (see, Smith, 1971; Ahire, 1990).
The colonial police force in Nigeria emerged as a result of the interaction
of the colonial community with the African people, and the attempt by the
colonial government to regulate this intercourse. Most important was the
fact that the bulk of land needed by the colonial state and British entre-
preneurs was usually seized from African groups, a process that effectively
abrogated the latter's property rights. As a result, some form of coercion
was needed: first, to effect this forced transfer of rights, and second, to
allow the new owners to safeguard these rights. Missionaries and merchants
called for the establishment of a police force because they believed it could
be used to eliminate 'obstructive indigenous chiefs and recalcitrant natives',
usually individuals whose behaviour was not deemed to be in the interest of
European concepts of trade and religion. Missionaries wanted the police to
assist them in their task of forced conversion of the local people to Chris-
tianity. Merchants expected the police to eliminate indigenous competition
and enable them to monopolise trade in the colonies. Smith (1971) and
Tamuno (1970) presented evidence to support the contention that both
British traders and missionaries encouraged the establishment of a police
force and actually suggested what they believed were its proper functions.
Actin8 Governor ~ c ~ o s (of k rthe~ Colony of ~ a ~ oestablished
s) the
first coloqial police force in,the territories later to be designated Nigeria in
1861. It consisted of 25 constables, whose primary function was topatrol
British trading posts (Tamuno, 1970: 15). In 1862, McCoskry's successor,
Governor Freeman increased the strength of the force to 100 constablas,
one Superintendent, four Sergeants and eight Corporals, to form an 'Armed t
Police Force' (Tamuno, 1970: 16). He argued that the military-type police
force was needed to crush interior wars, pave the way for further British
expansion into the interior of Lagos, and provide safe routes for the flow of . I
trade from the hinterland. No historical evidence can be traced in support I
pf the argument suggested by orthodox scholars that the colonial police
force was established to control crime and promote democratic living. The
communications of the earlier British colonial officers, which have been
analysed by several authors (Tamuno, 1970; Anene, 1966; Ahire, 1990,
I 1991) reveal that the police force was established in Lagos to pave the way
I for further colonisation of Nigeria, ensure that Africans did not usurp the I
I property rights of British entrepreneurs, and to protect British trade i
'>
monopolies. In order to assign the colonial police the role of a crime
fighter, one would have to reclassify resistance to domination, subjugation
and exploitation as crime. Only in this context can one view the colonial
police force as a crime fighting entity. The formation of police forces in the
interior of Nigeria followed the same pattern as that followed in Lagos. In e
the Oil Rivers Protectorate (later renamed the Nigerian Coast Protectorate)

- - "
--
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa 1291

and in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, police forces were established

to serve the same functions as those assigned to the police in Lagos:
protection of British trade interests, and the subjugation of African tradi-
tional rulers to allow for continued British hegemony in the region. Speci-
fically, the police provided the coercive force needed to seize African
property rights in land and transfer them to Europeans, and enforce these
rights once they were assigned to the latter. In fact, in many areas in
Nigeria, Africans found themselves unable to pursue their traditional
occupations of hunting and gathering because their lands had been seized
and assigned to European mercantile companies which used the police
force to enforce their property rights in land.'
The arrival of Europeans in the area generally known as the Oil Rivers
 The induction of these guards into the NA Police 'deprived them of their
''nativeness", leaving them no less than colonial creations, with a definite
role in the administration' of the colony. The NA Police served an important
function: providing security for the various indigenous rulers who served as
intermediaries between the people and the colonial government in several
pre-capitalist pockets of the country. Since many of these chiefs were
appointed by the colonial government, and thus, lacked the legitimacy to
rule, the NA Police provided the coercive force to enable them to control
the people.

The Colonial Police as a Rent Seeking Tool in Nigeria

The government in colonial Nigeria was a dictatorship in which only

Europeans were permitted access to political institutions. There was no
formal constitutional method for regime change that could provide an
opportunity to the Africans to capture the government apparatus. Some
African elites, who served in certain administrative positions, were either
artificial chiefs whose job was to maintain order in pre-capitalist regions of
the territory, or to act as a liaison between the local people and Europeans.
African access to economic markets was also sienificantlv
" restricted. In
most regions of the Nigerian protectorates, especially where British mono-
poly capital was well established, the system of resource allocation was
designed to benefit members of the politically dominant group-the Euro-
peans. African activities were designed to maximise European objectives.
Eventually, the Africans realised that the only way for them to gain access
to markets was to capture the apparatus of government. Since elections
and other constitutional forms of regime change did not exist, the only way
for Africans to capture the government was through force. British entre-
preneurs, who monopolised trade in Nigeria, were aware of this situation,
and they encouraged and supported the development of a strong police
force to prevent African participation in the economy and to ensure that
they did not become strong enough to overthrow the colonial government.
I
European entrepreneurs were also aware of the fact that the bulk of the
property rights they controlled had not been obtained through voluntary
I
I
private transactions between them and the Africans. These rights had been
seized from the Africans and transferred to the Europeans and coercion
i
I
was needed to maintain them. Thus, the colonial police emerged in Nigeria,
not in response to a need to control crime and encourage democratic living
but to ensure the subjugation of the Africans and to help British entre-
preneurs continue to monopolise the colonial economy. Colonial police
officers actually committed atrocities against peaceful Africans as part of I
their duty to protect British interests. 1
Bayley (1969: 12-13) argued that the apparatus of government can b

'd
,', become the instrument of the elite to impose 'its will on a majority of
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa 1293

people by use of force'. The police, which is a branch of the government,

usually provides the coercive force used by one group to impose its will on
the other. Colonialism represented the imposition of the will of a European
elite on the mass of the African peoples with the support of the colonial
police.
During colonialism, the primary function of the police force, according
to Clinard and Abbott (1973: 2161, was to 'protect the property, person,
and future prospects of the Europeans and those local groups who were
dependent on them for power and livelihood'. The ideas of Sir Robert
Peel, which governed the police forces in England under which the police
was supposed to be subordinate to the rule of law and accountable to
society were not applicable in the colonies. As Clinard and Abbott (1973:
216) observed, the 'exigencies of colonial ~ l required
e a much more passive
relationship between the police and the public in India than it did in Great
Britain'. The relationship between the colonial police and the African
peoples of Nigeria was not any different.
According to Bent (1974: 2), the police bureaucracy derives its character
from the cultural values of society in .which it operates and law enforce-
ment is to be based on 'culturally and legally defined norms of "proper"
behavior'. The colonial police force, like other state institutions of the
time, was alien, and consequently did not incorporate the cultural values of
the societies it was supposed to serve. Mofeover, normal behaviour in
colonial Nigeria was defined by an alien culture and a legal system imposed
from above. Thus, behaviour that was normal (when judged by local
traditional African standards) was quite often illegal by European (colonial)
standards and thus subject to censure. Using the police force to control and
subjugate the Africans constituted a misuse and abuse of police powers.
The behaviour of ,the colonial, police in Nigeria actually contributed to a
rise in criminal activities. By resorting to violence to prevent Africans from
voicing legitimate concerns, the police instigated riots and crime. Using the
police to abrogate African property rights forced the indigenous people to
engage in activities that were labelled by the colonial government as
criminal. For example, after h d s belonging to the pepple of Brass in the
interior of Nigeria were seized and ceded to the Royal Niger Company, the
men of Brass were no longer allowed to hunt and gather firewood on
concession. As a result, Africans found 'trespassing' on cothpany lands
were treated as criminals and subject tofievere ,penalties (Bent, 1974: 4;
Burns, 1963).
The main groups of people in the Lagos Colony in 1861 were traders,
missionaries, liberated slaves (from Sierra Leohe, Brazil and Cuba), freed
Hausa-speaking slaves of the Islamic faith, Nigerians and British political
elites who ruled the colony. Interaction between these. groups and the
attempt by the colonial government to regulate that interaction provided
the context within which the police force was formed. The nucleus of that
interaction was trade and the control of land. The Africans produced the
bulk of the commodities which were transported to the coast and traded for
European goods. To guarantee profitability, British entrepreneurs sought
to establish monopolies that allowed them to control trade routes into the
interior and also markets on the coast. A machinery was needed to regulate
trade and protect British monopolies from African encroachment. The
police force established by Acting Governor of Lagos, McCoskry (himself
a prominent merchant), was designed to protect the monopoly rights of the
British merchants. Shortly after it was established, it became the object of
scorn and continuous attacks from the public. The local people did not
support the police. The mass of the people of Lagos had had no input into
the formation of this police force to shape the character of law enforcement
agencies, and reduce concentration of power in the police bureaucracy,
While European merchants and the colonial administrators may have had
significant input into the establishment of the police force in Lagos in 1861,
there is no evidence that the ~ f r i c a npeople of the colony were consulted
and allowed to contribute. The incessant attacks on the new police force
were the result of a lack of confidence in it by the people. This agency of
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa / 295

Gambia to Lagos in January 1862, followidg the official annexation of

Lagos (Ahire, 1991: 35; Tamuno, 1970: 17-18).
That protection of commerce and of European property rights was the
primary duty of the police force is revealed by the activities of the AHPF
shortly after it was organised. For example, in August 1864,60 constables
of the AHPF were sent to arrest Chief Hunkain Abujoko of Ajido, who
had been accused of robbery and violence. H e was shot dead for resisting
arrest and his village burnt. In April 1865, 118 AHPF, along with 18
officers and marines of the HMS Investigator and HMS Handy and 700
Ikorodu, attacked and destroyed an Egba force which had encamped near
Ikorodu, a town that had cordial relations with the colonial government in
Lagos (Tamuno, 1970: 18). The Egba had attacked the Ikorodu because
the latter had given commercial access to the sea, making it possible for
Ibadan traders to avoid paying tariffs to the Egba (Burns, 1963: 134-36).
As Burns (1963: 135-36) stated, the dispute between the Egbas and Ibadan
that led to the involvement of the AHPF was mainly economic. The 1
I
l badans wanted to secure a trade route to .the Lagos lagoon so that their
trade with the European merchants would not have to pass through the
Egba territory, where heavy tolls were levied. The straight route was one
terminating at Ikorodu, and the people of that town were eager to allow
the Ibadan traders to pass, as they would benefit from the traffic. To the I

Egbas such a new trade route meant a loss of revenue. As soon as Ibadan
concluded a treaty with Ikorodu, the Egbas attacked Ikorodu. The latter
petitibned the Lagos government for help and since '[tlhe trade of Lagos
had already suffered considerably' (Bums, 1963: 136), the colonial govern- .
ment sent forces that killed the Egba king and ravaged the town. Once
again, the AHPF had demonstrated that its primary duty was to protect
British trade and perpetuate British rule over the people of Lagos. Despite
this overwhelming evidence, some orthodox scholars still propagate the
view that the AHPF was established to 'protect the lives and property of
the people' against sporadic attacks by gangs which roamed the trade
routes in search of opportunities to enrich themselves (Tamuno, 1970:
19-20).
The participation of the AHPF in the Ijebu wars provides additional
evidence in support of the fact that the colonial police served primarily to
help the British monopolise both political and economic institutions in the
colonies. Located north of Lagos, the Ijebu kingdom enjoyed a strategic
position on the trade route to the Lagos lagoon. Its chiefs took advantage
of its strategic location and 'closed all trade routes to the coast and
required all produce from the interior to be sold in their frontier towns of
Ejinrin and Oru at their prices' (Ahire, 1991: 36). Subsequently, British
merchants in Lagos found themselves paying significantly higher prices for
commodities from the interior. When profits decreased, many of them
appealed to the &lonial government for help. In 1892, the Governor of Lagos.
 MBAKU,
2961 JOHN MUKUM MWANGT
S.. KIMENYI

Colony, Denton, ordered Ijebu to give up monopolistic practices and

permit 'free and unmolested passage for all traders'. AS this was ignored,
Denton sent a force of 500 constables of the AHPF, a detachment of the
Gold Coast Hausas, the Second West Indian Regiment and seven special
service officers from England, to attack Ijebu on 18 March 1892. The force
defeated the kingdom and subsequently inducted the Hausa-speaking
soldiers of the Ijebu army into the Armed Hausa Police Force. Ijebu
properties were seized by the conquerors (Smith, 1971; Ahire, 1991).
The humiliating defeat of the Ijebu kingdom forced other kingdoms to
make peace with the British. In 1893, Governor Carter (who had succeeded
Denton) signed friendship treaties with several kingdoms to ensure that no
further threats would be made against British com~nercialinterests (Ukpabi,
1964; Crowder, 1981). While the colonial government encouraged and
facilitated monopolistic trade practices by British merchants, it was willing
to go to war to stop such practices by African groups.
Although scholars such as Tamuno (1970: 38-39), appear to realise the
main reason for the creation of the colonial police, their failure to accurately
conceptualise colonialism and its primary purpose has led to a mistaken belief
that the colonial police was created to fight crime. It should be noted,
however, that the colonial police did deal with conveptional crime control.
However, this was peripheral to its other roles.
The functions performed by the police force in other parts of colonial
Nigeria were 'quite similar to those in Lagos. The British began their
colonisation of the Bights of Biafra and Benin by establishing a Consulate
at Fernado Po. In 1872, that Consulate was transferred from Fernado Po to
Old Calabar in the Niger Delta. As was the case in Lagos, struggles
between British merchants and indigenous states over property rights and
control of commerce provided the context within which the police emerged
in this region. The Niger Delta was occupied by a number of independent
indigenous kingdoms which included Itsekiri, Ijaw,. Bonny, Kalabari and
Efik. No centralised administrative structure was in existence to coordinate
relations between these kingdoms. Each kingdom was located at the estuary
of a major river, effectively monopolising important trade routes to the
coast. Access to the interior was carefully guarded, giving each city-state,
considerable monopoly power over a section of Delta trade (Dike, 1956;
Anene, 1966; Nair, 1972).
When British merchants arrived at the Niger Delta, there existed intense
competition between these city-states for control of the trade of the'region.
The British traders and the colonial authorities took advantage of the
rivalry between the states to secure a foothold in the region. In the 1850s,
British merchants sided with rival chiefs and encouraged wars between the
city-states. Eventually the Delta states were weakened considerably and
indigenous political authority was virtually eroded. The British then asserted
their authority, abolished the authority of the indigenous Delta kings,
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa / 297

seized the property rights of indigenous entrepreneurs, and established

'Courts of Equity' to oversee commercial activities (Anene, 1966). Courts
of Equity were trade associations comprising the most important indigenous
and British traders in each city-state. The chairman of each association was
invariably a British merchant (Anene, 1966: 32-33).
Indigenous political authority in the Delta states continued to weaken,
reaching a new low in 1854, as evidenced by the fact that British Consul
Beecroft deported William Dappa Pepple (Pepple V), king of Bonny,
without resorting to force. Beecroft, however, reported to his superiors
that the king had requested for assistance against the powerful chiefs in his
kingdom (Anene, 1966: 32). Following the deportation, a puppet ruler was
appointed by the colonial government and instructed to serve under the
authority of the Court of Equity in Bonny (Anene, 1966: 32-33).
Commercial rivalry in the Delta states ousted several traditional rulers
and created other powerful ones. Two of the most influential rulers were
Jaja of Opobo and Nana of Itsekiri. Jaja was an ex-slave who had risen to
prominence in 1861 as the leader of the House of Opooboo 'the Great' in
Bonny (Anene, 1966: 42). Although William Dappa Pepple was the king of
Bonny, lqcal European merchants believed that the city-state was actually
ruled by Jaja and Oko Jumbo (another ex-slave). Jaja and Jumbo, however,
did not cooperate, but continued to quarrel over trade issues and in 1869,
this conflict led to a civil war in Bonny (Anene, 1966: 42). When the war
ended, Jaja founded his own state at Opobo and was subsequently recognised
as its king by the British in 1873.
Nana of Itsekiri established a very successful and powerful trading
empire west of the Niger River. The ground for Nana's success had been
prepared by his father, Alluma. By 1865, Alluma had overthrown his rival,
;he-son of the queen of Warri aid founded the flourishing stronghold of
Ebrohemie. Nana's mother was an Urhobo. Using extraordinary business
acumen and administrative skill, Nana etablished control over Itsekiri
chiefs and the Urhobo oil producing villages. Because of his wealth and
prestige, he rose to be a prominent figure in the commercial and political
life of Itsekiri and Urhobo districts (Anene, 1966: 150-51). Both Jaja and
Nana imposed,trade regulations that severely restricted the activities of
British merchants in their respective kingdoms (Dike, 1956; Anene, 1966;
Ikime, 1968; Ahire, 1991).
Frustrated with Jaja's monopolistic trade practices, British merchants
appealed to the British Consul for help. They believed that the only way to
undermine Jaja's authority and gain access to the highly profitable trade of
the region was through the use of force. Consul Johnston, in response to
, took the following measures. First, he
ng a fine of 2500 on any British subject
contravening his order. second, h e informed the ~ r i t i s hForeign Office
that Jaja was involved in treasonable activities which included raising a
 large army, endangering the lives of British subjects in the Oil Rivers, and
making arrangements to cede the territory to France. Finally, in 1887,
Johnston extended an invitation to Jaja to come aboard the gun-boat HMS
Goshawk for 'an exchange of views' (Anene, 1966: 90). Upon arrival on
the gun-boat, Jaja and his chiefs were deported to the Gold Coast (now
Ghana) where he faced an illegal trial. We was subsequently deported t o
the West Indies where he died on 7 July 1891 (Anene, 1966: 87-95;
14041).
Following Jaja's departure, Consul Johnston created Governing Councils
in Opobo, New and Old Calabar, Bonny, Brass and Benin. These councils,
expected to fill the Iesdership vacuum created by Jaja's deportation, were
constituted with six British merchants, three 'friendly' or puppet chiefs,
and the British naval officer in the region, with the resident British Consul
acting as the Chairman. These councils were effective in regulating both
political and economic activities in the Oil Rivers. They offered little
protection to the African peoples. Like the police force that had been used
to eliminate Jajp and seize his property rights, the councils were another
rent seeking tool used by the British to monopolise commerce in the Oil
Rivers.
Johnston's successful removal of Jaja through deceit and force did not
end indigenous opposition to British colonial expansion. Nana and several
other indigenous rulers along the Cross River had still not been conquered.
Since these chiefs were domiciled primarily in the interior, Johnston could
not use the military strength of the Preventive Naval Squadron to intimidate
them into submission. In 1890, George Annesley, who assumed charge of
the protectorate of the Oil Rivers, established a small police force compris-
ing immigrants from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Lagos informing the Foreign
1, Office that the force was needed 'to prevent any possible atrocities by the
natives' (Ahire, 1991: 38). Since the police force was alien, it showed
contempt for the local people, their rulers, and their traditions. According
to Anene (1966: 106), 'the members of [this] force in fact constituted
I themselves into a new authority which openly showed utter contempt for
the local rulers and indigenous standards of social behavior'. This force did
not enjoy the support and cooperation of the public as its power was not
derived from the people, or its character shaped by significant inputs from
the people.lThe police force created by Annesley could not be expected t o
perform orthodox police activities and in fact, it was not created to func-
tion as an orthodox law enforcement agency. The circumstances leading t o
its creation and its composition show that it was never intended t o be a
crime fighter in the traditional sense. Its main duty was to conquer and
subjugate the people of the Cross River and provide British merchants the
wherewithal to monopolise the region's commercial activities. Thus, in
I

See Bayley (1969: 11-31) and Bent (1974: 7) on the character of the police.
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa1 299

March 1890, the Annesley police force attacked Andemeno, king of Enyong,
whom Annesley had accused of closing trade routes to British merchants
and harassing people friendly to the colonial government. Annesley, shortly
after constituting the force on the pretext of stopping atrocities committed
by Africans, proceeded to Enyong to commit atrocities against King
Andemeno and his people (Tamuno, 1970: 3-4). Annesley, however, did
not realise the importance of cooperation and respect of the people of the
Oil Rivers Protectorate and believed that through coercion British juris-
diction could be strengthened in the territory (Tamuno, 1970: 5). This
reveals an important connection between the colonial police and the com-
mercial and political interests of the British.
In 1894, the British established the Niger Coast Protectorate comprising the m
territories seized from the Africans. Claude McDonald became Consul-
General of the new protectorate. His assistant, Ralph Moor, formerly an
Inspector of the Royal Irish Constabulary, founded a military police force
called the Oil Rivers Irregulars, consisting of 165 men. The existing police
force was expanded from 20 men in 1891 to 450 in 1894 and took the name
the Niger Coast Protectorate Constabulary (Tamuno, 1970; Ikime, 1971).
These two armed police forces were used to attack King Nana, who at the
time was a dominant figure in the Cross River trade. Prior to attacking
Nana, the colonial authorities asked the king to enter into a treaty permit-
ting British merchants to trade freely in his kingdom and allow English
missionaries to freely proselytise in Itsekiri and the neighbouring regions.
Nana, a sovereign in his own right, refused to sign the treaty. The British
decided to break Nana's trade monopoly. To lay the ground for eventual
attack, Acting Consul Ralph Moor .accused Nana of participating in the
slave trade, encouraging his people to oppose the British government, and
causing breach of the peace. Moor subsequently blamed 'every act of
insubordination on the part of any petty chief' on the diabolical influence
of Nana (Anene, 1966: 156). With a combined force of the Oil Rivers
Irregulars and the Niger Coast Protectorate Constabulary, Moor attacked
and defeated Nana. The king was tried and deported for life and his
property and that of most of his chiefs seized (Anene, 1966: 151-58).
Shortly after Nana was banished, the law and order situation in the
Urhobo country progressively deteriorated, 'demonstrating that Nana's
paramountcy did serve an extremely useful purpose in the hinterland
involved' (Anene, 1966: 157). His forceful removal was intended to pave
the way for British control of commercial activities in the region and not to
check criminal behaviour and improve social conditions for the people of
the Oil Rivers, as claimed.
The colonial government mistakenly believed that the elimination of
Nana would improve trade and permit palm oil to flow freely to the British
merchants on the coast. Trade in the hinterland involved a series of
middlemen who facilitated the flow of commodities to the coast. Trade
'boys' maintained and financed by Nana had served very successfully as
middlemen, purchasing commodities from the hinterland and bringing
them to the coast for sale to the British merchants. Besides, Nana's
Lieutenants provided security in the different markets, allowing trade to
proceed without interruption. The elimination of Nana resulted in the
breakdown of law and order in the hinterland markets, significantly affect-
ing the flow of palm oil and other products to the coast. Without Nana's
middlemen, who 'provided a vital chain which bound together the scattered
hinterland markets to the port of export' (Anene, 1966: 158), the flow of
commodities to the coast was adversely affected. This account reveals that
Moor's police forces (as were the other police units in colonial Nigeria) and
the colonial legal system were designed primarily to advance the political
and economic interests of the Europeans while undermining those of the
indigenous people.
On 1January 1900 the Protectorate, of Northern Nigeria was established
to take over the properties of the Royal Niger Company (RNC), whose
charter had been revoked in December 1899. The formation of a police
force in the new protectorate followed a pattern similar to that in Lagos
and the Niger Delta. Shortly after assuming office as the first High Com-
missioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, Frederick Lugard selected
SO men from the RNC's disbanded constabulary to serve as the nucleus of a
civil police force. Lugard also established a supreme court, as well as
provincial and native courts. He effectively established a modern bureau-
cracy to 'enforce the norms of state law and accelerate the dispersal of state
authority throughout the superstructure' (Ahire, 1991: 40). By 1902, the
strength of the Civil Police was increased to 150 men and a new commander,
Major Bain, was appointed. By 1906, Lugard reorganised the Police Force,
increased its strength to 30 officers and 1,180 men, and renamed it as the
Northern Nigerian Constabulary. The new force was expected to assist the
WAFF in preserving law and order throughout the territory (Grantham,
1936: 223-24). The two forces worked side by side: the WAFF undertook
military missions to conquer and subdue the Northern Nigerian emirates
while the Northern Nigerian Constabulary followed closely behind to
provide security to colonial bureaucrats and British entrepreneurs, and
help implement the colonial administrative system (Ahire, 1991: 40).
During the early period, when Lugard was reorganising the police forces
and establishing a judiciary system, his argument was that the most im-
portant task facing his new administration was the completion of the
conquest of the remaining Northern Nigerian emirates in order to provide
a politically safe environment to British merchants to carry out their
commercial activities. He was emphatic that it was impossible to conduct
trade satisfactorily unless all the Hausa states were conquered and incor-
porated into the protectorate. To properly administer such a vast territory,
Lugard argued, a well-equipped militia, and particularly a strong police
 Rent Seeking and Policing in CoEonial Africa 1301

force was needed. Unlike some of his contemporaries, Lugard truly under-
stood colonialism: a business venture involving costs and benefits. Thus,
the main problem facing his administration in Northern Nigeria was to
minimise costs and maximise the benefits or returns of operating the vast
properties captured from the emirates.
In an attempt t o minimise the costs of administering the huge territory,
Sir Percy Girouard introduced the 1908 Police Reorganisation Scheme.
The new High Commissioner confessed openly that policing in the territory
was cruel, oppressive and was not sensitive to the needs of the indigenous
people. H e decided to introduce drastic changes in policing in general and
in the organisation of the police forces in particular. First, the Northern
Nigeria Police was withdrawn from those areas that were said to b e
'effectively policed by native police' and was subsequently re-assigned t o
the so-called 'purely pagan communities' without any specific duties (Ahire,
1991: 42). Second, the police force was withdrawn from prison duties, and
third, the control of provincial police detachments was withdrawn from the
District Superintendent of Police and vested in the Resident. Many
researchers consider the 1908 Reorganisation as very important in colonial
policing because for the first time the colonial government recognised the
existence, 'within the indigenous society, of an alternative and viable
police force' (Ahire, 1991: 42) and incorporated it in the formal organisation.
T h e 1908 Reorganisation and Girouard's pronouncements marked the
admission of the colonial authorities for the first time that 'they lacked
both the resources and legitimacy effectively to control the activities of the
colonized in the pre-capicalist enclaves, and they needed to rely on certain
indigenous structures and institutions, and the partnership of indigenous
ruling classes' (Ahire, 1991: 42). This realisation provided the impetus for
the establishment of the Native Administration (NA) police to facilitate
'indirect rule'.
The British colonial rulers first established the NA police in the Muslim
states of Northern Nigeria which had highly centralised pre-colonial social
structures. After the holy war (jihad)of 1804, the Sultan of Sokoto appointed
emirs (Muslim chiefs) to rule the emirates (Fika, 1978). Before the emer-
gence of colonialism, the emirs possessed a contingent of bodyguards (the
dogarai) who delivered edicts, collected faxes, arrested offenders and
performed other police duties assigned by the emir. In addition, each emir
also had a large number of slaves and servants. This highly organised pre-
colonial social structure provided an excellent framework for the imposition
of colonial institutions. Perham noted that,

Here, instead of the usual divisive tribalism, there was a high degree of
cultural and religious uniformity, a much more developed system of
administration than in most of the continent, a docile people which was
already under the overlordship of a conquering class with a suzerain at
 Sokoto. Nowhere was it easier administratively to impose a higher
authority (quoted in Kirk-Greene, 1965: x).

The existing social structure in Northern Nigeria had well-defined channels

for the extraction of rents, and thus appealed to the British merchants. In
addition, it was based on a culture of domination that attracted the colonial
officers. When Lugard was appointed the High Commissioner of Northern
Nigeria, he saw the existing system as providing the British with a proper
framework to impose their authority. In a speech at Sokoto in 1903, he
declared that:

the Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They
took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and create
kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule, which has come into
the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by
conquest took the right to do now pass to the British (quoted in Kirk-
Greene, 1965: 43-44).

Thus, Lugard intended to maintain the existing social structure but modified
it to suit British needs. The protectorate, he argued, would be ruled by two
sets of rulers, British and native, both working together to maximise the
objectives of the former. Lugard, however, emphasised that the British
reserved the right to seize effective political power from any emir,levy
taxes of any kind, control assignment of property rights, make new laws
and abolish any laws deemed not to promote British interests in the
territory, and delegate some authority to commissioned agents. The dele-
gation of some authority to commissioned agents represented what came to
be known as the principle of 'indirect rule'. Lugard felt that the British
government was faced with an enormous task of administering the vast
territories of Northern Nigeria. Indirect rule, he believed, would minimise
the cost of controlling the protectorate since part of the burden of admin-
istration would be transferred to the native authorities without causing any
significant loss of overall control by the British. Moreover, he felt that the
reforms needed to place colonial officers at the local levels of administration
would endanger British legitimacy and make the control of the protectorate
more difficult. Indirect rule, according to its founder, thus, was not designed
to protect the rights of the indigenous people or to help them develop
sustainable democratic institutions. Some scholars mistakenly argue that
the principle of indirect rule was designed to assist the indigenous people
develop the capacity to eventually rule themselves (Temple, 1%8). Indirect
rule was a political expediency, designed to convert pre-colonial institu-
tional frameworks into channels, and the indigenous elites into agents, for
the colonial subjugation of the people (Crowder, 1981). Although colonialism
was usually imposed by destroying indigenous structures, a compromise
 Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa 1303

was made in Northern Nigeria. The adjustment in its traditional approach

to domination, however, was not a sign of respect for the people, but an
attempt to minimise the costs of operations. This is evidenced by the fact
that most emirs. In Northern Nigeria were reduced from the position of
autonomous paramount rulers to that of paid employees within the colonial
state apparatus. It was in this context that the NA police was established in
Northern Nigeria. In addition to other duties, the NA police served pri-
marily to help maintain the authority of the indigenous rulers, many of
whom were reduced to appendages of the colonial state. The colonial
government viewed vagrancy among 'primitive pagans' as a serious threat
to trade and order in the protectorate, and so assigned the armed consta-
bulary the task of dealing with it. Conventional crime among the indigenous
groups, regardless of its severity, was regarded as less important and so was
assigned to the NA police.
In the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, the NA police forces were first
established in Abeokuta in 1904, and eventually spread to Ibadan' (1907)
and Egbado (1913). In 1918, the Native Authority Ordinance was passed
giving indigenous chiefs formal authority to hire native police. Since the
indigenous chiefs derived their authority from this ordinance, they were
exercising statutory but not traditional authority (Morris and Read, 1972).
In addition, the NA police directed most of their power at 'objects which
had little relevance to traditional life' (Ahire, 1991: 46). Thus, in carrying
out their duties, the NA police spent most of their time in checking
possession of firearms, arresting and bringing to prosecution tax offenders,
and preventing the cutting of timber. Little attempt was made to perform
the traditional functions of the police that contribute to an improvement in
social conditions for the people. This change in emphasis is explained by
the fact that colonialism had significantly changed the traditionat concept
of policing. Since the Native Administration served as a channel 'through
which colonial authority filtered through to the colonized' (Ahire, 1991:
46), it was inevitable that the NA police would adopt the colonial concept
of policing. Thus, the protection of commercial activities and the pacification
of the people became the main duty of the indigenous institutions. In fact,
since the colonial authorities reserved the right to 'establish, control and
dismiss NA police' (Ahire, 1991: 48), it was a misnomer to call them native
institutions. Tamuno (1970: 93-94) naively argued that the NA police
forces were established to provide 'better police forces to assist in the
maintenance of law and order, the preservation of public safety and the
prevention, detection and punishment of crime'. The evidence presented
here leads to a different conclusion. The NA police forces were part of the
violence potential needed to help the colonial state maintain a monopoly
on power and control property rights assignments, and enable British
entrepreneurs to control commercial activities in the colonies. These forces
were, thus, part of the military might used to help Britain establish political
control of colonial Nigeria. Such control was essential for surplus extraction.
The colonial forces, thus, were rent seeking tools used to extract rents in an
economy in which violence had become the most important method of rent
seeking.

John Mukum Mbaku

Department of Economics
Weber State University
Ogden
Utah 84408-3807

Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Department of Economics
University of Connecticut
Storrs
Connecticut 06269-1063

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