Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crooked Lines
393
394 William H. Sewell, Jr.
turn to cultural history in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Eley’s account of these
transformations is written from the standpoint of his own career and his own en-
gagements as a historian and is, hence, biased toward European history, particularly
German and British, with an emphasis on history written from a left-of-center per-
spective. (His extended discussion of the rise and triumph of social history in Ger-
many, and its eventual challenge by Alltagsgeschichte, is particularly masterful.) The
range of reading and historiographical reference is, however, very wide, and the book
includes shrewd observations on American, French, and South Asian historiography.
Nor do other disciplines escape his gaze: Eley comments on developments in so-
ciology, anthropology, cultural studies, gender studies, postcolonial studies, and lit-
1 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York, 1984).
Derrida, and Lacan and by the vogue for postmodernism. Eley, while never a prime
advocate of these changes, was certainly sympathetic to the new sensibility of cultural
history; at the same time, he never renounced the perspectives of social history.2
Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, when the novelty of cultural history
and the linguistic turn has begun to wear off, Eley ends his book with a plea for
theoretical and methodological pluralism: “between social and cultural history,” he
concludes, “there is no need to choose” (181).3
The book stimulates two lines of rumination. First, as Eley hoped it would, his
story has prompted me to think about how my historiographical and political en-
gagements resembled and differed from his. His account is, at one level, immediately
to the History of Society Two Decades Later,” in Terrence McDonald, ed., The Historic Turn in the
Human Sciences (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 193–243.
3 The point is repeated on p. 201.
the University of Michigan in the later 1980s, Geoff Eley and I were both members
of the steering committee of the Program on the Comparative Study of Social Trans-
formation. CSST, as it was called, was an explicitly interdisciplinary program in-
cluding historians, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and literary
scholars. It was the prime site of the discussions (and hammer-and-tong intellectual
battles) that accompanied the linguistic or cultural turn in Ann Arbor in those
years—and a perfect example of the sort of dialogue between disciplines and the-
oretical perspectives that Eley properly identifies as a potent source of historio-
graphical innovation. During the heady days of our joint involvement in CSST, our
historical lines tracked each other’s very closely.
seemed the dead hand of tradition, not the cutting edge. By contrast, liberal Amer-
ican social science offered valuable tools for getting at the social origins of nine-
teenth-century worker radicalism.5
My lack of political or intellectual commitment to Marxism undoubtedly made
my subsequent move to cultural history easier. Although my common sense was
materialist, my materialism lacked political weight. When my University of Chicago
colleagues Bernard Cohn and Ronald Inden introduced me to the wonders of sym-
bolic anthropology in the early 1970s, I had no political reason to resist. Besides, I
was growing frustrated with the limitations of quantitative social history, which could
indeed reconstruct social structures in exquisite detail, but which remained silent
French labor history, including Robert Bezucha, The Lyon Uprising of 1834: Social and Political Conflict
in the Early July Monarchy (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), and Joan Wallach Scott, The Glassworkers of Car-
maux: French Craftsmen and Political Action in a Nineteenth-Century City (Cambridge, Mass., 1974). My
dissertation on the working class of nineteenth-century Marseille was never published, but for my work
in this vein, see William H. Sewell, Jr., “The Working Class of Marseille under the Second Republic:
Social Structure and Political Behavior,” in Peter N. Stearns and Daniel J. Walkowitz, eds., Workers in
the Industrial Revolution: Recent Studies of Labor in the United States and Europe (New Brunswick, N.J.,
1974), 75–115, and “Social Change and the Rise of Working-Class Politics in Nineteenth Century Mar-
seille,” Past and Present 65 (November 1974): 75–109.
6 Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848 (Cambridge,
1980) was the principal product of this period of my historiographical development. Its arguments cut
strongly against the predominant Marxisant themes of labor history in this era. French socialism, it
argued, was a product not simply of the industrial revolution or even of “proletarianization,” but also
of a political and cultural struggle that created a new working-class political culture between 1830 and
1848 by grafting old regime guild solidarities onto the language and political forms of the French Rev-
olution.
work for social history, on the grounds that it tended so strongly toward reduction-
ism.7 But during the late 1970s and the 1980s, I began slowly to revise this position.
Getting to know the Marxist economists David Gordon, Herb Gintis, and Rick Ed-
wards and the Marxist art historian Tim Clark during my years at the Institute for
Advanced Study in the late 1970s and participating in a Marxist study group at the
University of Arizona in the 1980s made it clear that my grasp of Marxism had been
utterly superficial and that I had a lot to learn. So by the time my crooked line began
to overlap with Eley’s in Ann Arbor in the later 1980s, my appreciation of Marxism
had risen considerably. At the same time, political developments in the 1980s, par-
ticularly Reaganism in the United States and Thatcherism in Britain, made it clear
7 I had always admired the work of E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, but thought of them as
unrepresentative mavericks.
8 For these purposes, I would define our generation as roughly those born between the late 1930s
and the early 1950s. I am too ignorant of the historiography of other areas of the world to know whether
the same pattern applies to historians in, say, Africa, East Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East.
fails to pursue this ambition in his own historical account of recent historiography.
He gives us a fine-grained analysis of intellectual movements in the discipline and
relates these to ongoing political struggles, but fails to relate them to the develop-
ment of global capitalism—which, for him as a Marxist, would seem to have defined,
or at least participated importantly in defining, the social totality within which both
historians and political actors were constrained to act.
About the only general claim that Eley makes about the initial rise of social
history is that “the radical politics of the sixties were inseparable from the histo-
riographical story. The breakthrough to social history was unimaginable without the
sense of political possibility beckoning during the later 1960s” (59). The radical po-
Authority and the Transition to Post-Fordism: The Plausibility of Positivism in American Sociology since
1945,” in Steinmetz, ed., The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological
Others (Durham, N.C., 2005), 275–323.
10 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York,
1973).
fident about the future, were living independently without adult responsibilities, and
were supplied with inexpensive paperbacks and new and effective birth-control tech-
nologies. Although university students were clearly beneficiaries of the Fordist
boom, universities also afforded them the social space and intellectual resources to
develop a critical political culture and to experiment with new lifestyles. The student
milieu combined the optimism that grew out of the apparently permanent prosperity
of the postwar boom with a highly critical attitude toward the form of capitalism that
in fact enabled that prosperity. The student radicals’ rhetoric and their mode of life
was quite specifically anti-Fordist—especially hostile to bureaucracy, corporate con-
formity, and mass culture. It seems fair to conclude that the student movements of
11 The equivalent American events were Ronald Reagan’s victories in 1980 and 1984.
period of sustained structural crisis. It was not just that economic growth slowed, but
that the underlying structures of Fordist capitalism came unraveled over the course
of the 1970s and 1980s. Industrial heartlands became “rust belts.” Keynesianism,
which could not solve the riddle of “stagflation,” gave way to monetarism and mi-
croeconomics. The system of pegged exchange rates collapsed, making way for the
hypertrophic growth of “off-shore” currency speculation, enhanced, of course, by the
new electronic communications technologies. Financial services replaced manufac-
turing as the leading sector in the wealthiest countries. Labor unions declined in
power and numbers. Corporations themselves metamorphosed from hierarchically
structured “national champions” to much more loosely structured “multinationals”
Revel remarked that “the doubts that . . . spread through our societies, confronted as they were by forms
of crises that they could not comprehend, nor even, in many cases, describe, has certainly contributed
to the diffusion of a conviction that the project of an overall intelligibility of the social had to be, at least
provisionally, put in brackets.” Revel, “Microanalyse et construction du social,” in Revel, Jeux d’échelles:
La micro-analyse à l’expérience (Paris, 1996), 18.
ELEY’S SLOGAN FOR THE CURRENT ERA OF “DEFIANCE” is that “between social history
and cultural history, there is really no need to choose” (181). His basic desire, if I
understand him properly, is entirely laudable: to revive social history’s effort to grasp
(capitalist) social totality without giving up the immense intellectual gains made
possible by the cultural turn. But if the goal is laudable, I do not find Eley’s final
chapter very effective at pointing the way—above all, in my opinion, because he has
not found a theoretical perspective adequate to the task.
At one level, Eley’s claim that there is no need to choose turns out to be little
more than an expression of satisfaction with the sort of work being done at present
under the banner of “the new cultural history.” In this formulation, the admonition
to retain social history is weak, since it is far from clear whether anything worthy of
the name of social history is currently on offer. Thus Eley declares at one point that
social history “simply isn’t available any more,” that it has “ceased to exist” as a
coherent project, and that each element of its paradigm “has succumbed to relentless
and compelling critique” (189). Nothing remains, Eley implies, but fragmentary
13 On “flexible accumulation,” see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into
themes or topics drifting free of the old social history paradigm. Near the very end
of the book, he argues that by the late 1990s, “the new cultural history,” now the
“broadly accepted description” for the best work going on in the field, had actually
become an “eclectic repertoire of approaches and themes” whose boundary with
social history was “extraordinarily more blurred.” Here Eley celebrates younger his-
torians’ ability to muddle through, to find, under the banner of the new cultural
history, concrete ways of combining social and cultural themes and topics while
avoiding “the programmatic advocacy of one authorizing form of theory against an-
other.” He praises the “hybridity” of the “new cultural history” for enabling histo-
rians to set theory aside and get on with a wide range of interesting empirical work
theoretical terms some means of combining, on the same epistemological terrain, the
materialism of “social history” and the idealism of “cultural history.” In a recent
book, I have offered my own attempt at such a theoretical reconceptualization. I
begin by denying that all social relations are reducible to language, but argue that
because all social relations have a meaningful content, they can nevertheless be
grasped by a modified or expanded version of the linguistic model. I try to show that
the whole range of human behaviors—for example, such activities as work, sex, cook-
ing, currency speculation, or basketball—can profitably be understood as constituted
by a web of “semiotic practices.” I also argue that if the implications of such an
approach are followed out correctly, we will find that interconnected semiotic prac-
‘Social’ in Social Science: An Interpretivist Manifesto,” in William H. Sewell, Jr., Logics of History: Social
Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago, 2005), 318–372.
16 For three very different historical perspectives on the endless accumulation of capital, see David
Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Oxford, 1982); Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money,
Power, and the Origins of Our Times (London, 1994); and Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social
Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory (Cambridge, 1993) and “Contemporary His-
torical Transformations: Beyond Post-Industrial Theory and Neo-Marxism,” Current Perspectives in So-
cial Theory 19 (1999): 3–53.
my account of the global capitalist transformations following the 1970s) will prove
much less vulnerable.
Geoff Eley’s A Crooked Line is a powerful stimulus to reflection on the political
entailments and theoretical challenges of history—both as written and as lived. It
goes without saying that not everyone will agree with his judgments. As I have in-
dicated, I think that finding a way forward from the current historiographical per-
plexity will require a stronger dose of theory and a different sort of theory than Eley
has offered. But he has masterfully sketched out the terrain on which the debates
must take place.