CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 File No. 3 4.

GOVERNMENT a) Definition, distinguished from administration Government - is the agency of

instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized. Administration – is distinguished from
government, as the aggregate the aggregate of persons in who hands the reigns of government are for the time being (the Chief
ministries or heads of departments. But the terms are often interchanged. Government of the Republic of the Philippines - is the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including the
various arms which political authority is made effective, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government (Sec. 2 (10, E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987). CASES •

We understand, in modern political science... by the term “government”, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are
imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the
aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By “administration” , we understand... the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the
reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments. But the Court adds that the terms
“government” and “administration” are often used interchangeably (US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332).

The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose is akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system
that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall
be administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized
by him and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National
Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the
AFP with the approval of the Secretary of the National Defense. While it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the
contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide
additional benefits to the men in uniform. These above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are
imbued with public interest. As such, the Court held that the same is government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds
(People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 145951, August 12, 2003). •

Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions. The Court held that ACA is a government office or agency
engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as
"constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,
those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of
citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people —
these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in
its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces (ACCFA vs. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649).

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free
exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner
workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated.
The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly,
the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law."As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid
test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256). b)

Classification i) de facto and de jure

De Jure - has a rightful title but no power or control, either because the same has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet
actually entered into the exercise thereof. De Facto actually exercises power or control but without legal title (Lawyers League for a
Better Philippines v. Aquino, GR No 73748, May 22, 1986).

i. De facto proper – government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the vice of the majority, the rightful legal
government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, ii. Government of paramount force – established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; and iii. Independent government – established by
the inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection against the parent state (Ko Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113). ii) unitary
or federal Federal government – is formed when a group of political units, such as states or provinces or together in a federation,
surrendering their individual sovereignty and many powers to the central government. While retaining or reserving other limited
powers. As a result, two or more levels of government exist within an established geographic territory. The body of law of the common
central government is the federal law. Federal law is a body of law created by the federal government of a country.
iii) monarchy, democracy, oligarchy, dtheocracy,

Monarchy – is a form of government in which supreme power is absolutely or nominally lodged with an individual, who is the head of
state, often for life or until abdication, and “is wholly set apart from all other members of the state.” The person who heads a monarchy
is called Monarch. Oligarchy – is a form of government where power effectively rests with a small elite segment of society distinguished
by royal, wealth, family, military or religious hegemony. The word oligarchy is from the Greek words for “few” and “rule. Such states are
often controlled by politically powerful families whose children are heavily conditioned and monitored to be heirs of the power of the
oligarchy. Oligarchies have been tyrannical throughout history, being completely a public servitude to exist. Theocrary – is a form of
government in which a god or deity is recognized as the State’s supreme civil rules, or in a broader sense, a form of government in
which a state is governed by immediate divine. Because of the prominent position, however, which the system gives to the President as
chief executive, it is designated as a presidential form of government. Parliamentary form of Government  The system is founded on
the belief that, by establishing equilibrium among the three power holders, harmony will result, power will not to concentrated, and thus
tyranny will be avoided.  Its principal identifying feature is what is called the “separation of powers.” Legislative power is given to the
Legislature; executive power is given to a separate Executive; and judicial power is held independent Judiciary.  It is first adopted under
the 1935 Constitution and borrowed from American system. guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided. For
believers, theocracy is a form of government in which divine power governs an early human state, either in a personal incarnation or
more often, via religious institutional representatives (i.e. church), replacing or dominating civil government. Theocratic government
enact theonomic laws. Democracy – is a form of government in which state power is held by the majority of citizens within a country or
a state. It is derived from the Greek “popular government”, which was coined from “people” and “rule, strength” in the middle of the
fifth-fourth century BC to denote the political systems then existing in some Greek City – states. iv) Presidential or Parliamentary
Presidential form of Government.

It is the original 1973 Constitution that has adopted a still-born parliamentary system. The difference lies in certain essential features
which are found in all varieties of the parliamentary form, such as the following: 1. The members of the government or cabinet or the
executive arm are simultaneously members of the legislature. 2. The government or cabinet, consisting of the political leaders of the
majority party or of a coalition who are also members of the legislature. 3. The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at the
apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent. 4. The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoy the
support of majority of the legislature. 5. Both government and legislature are possessed of control devices with which each can demand
of the other immediate political responsibility.

In the hands of the legislature is the vote of non-confidence (censure) whereby the government may be ousted. In hands of the
government is the power to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections.
Briefly, therefore, while the presidential system embodies interdependence by separation and coordination. Parliamentarism embodies
interdependence by integration. v) Others CASES
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government (In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA
160).

It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial department of
a de facto government are good and valid. There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a
proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the
rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such government of England under the Commonwealth, first
by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade
and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of
Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with
Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government of the Southern
Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession (Co Kim Chao vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113). c) Historical survey
of Philippine government CASES •

Under the American Regime: The Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization
somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union.
The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the
President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the
President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations
thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after
it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of
the popular sovereign constituency which lies back of American constitutions. The power to legislate upon any subject relating to the
Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercises such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent
of an amendment of a constitution in the United States. Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a
complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to
such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises
executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor is not a
member of the legislative body, but the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the
head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no
veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven
best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges (US vs. Bull, 15 Phil 259).

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision. (16 C. J.S 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to
require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government (Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1).

Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to
have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not
only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also,
of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the
Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue. Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the
People the Constitution proposed by the Convention. Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73,
"submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon
such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to
be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify. Issue [3]: Whether martial law per
se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]:
Said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a
transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances (Planas vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105). •

It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute — Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by one who
will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of
these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said
funds. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the
power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature,
is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended,
raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force
and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement,
or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in
the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in
the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides
how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not. Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper
subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in
whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional
norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission
to and ratification by the people. As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose amendments to the Constitution
in the absence of a grant of such constituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that
Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333). •

Pres. Marcos’ term was supposed to end on June 30, 1987. However, he submitted a letter of conditional resignation claiming that he
would vacate his position effective only when election’s held & after winner’s proclaimed & qualified as Pres by taking his oath of office
10 days after his proclamation. He claims that he is calling for the new elections to seek a new mandate to assess his policies &
programs as demanded by the opposition. He further stressed that his term will be shortened but in the name of public accountability
he believes that the final settlement of these issues can only be done thru a presidential election. B.P. Blg. 883: enacted by the Batasang
Pambansa calling for special national elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for Pres & VP. Different sectors were against the special elections.
Among the contentions are: 1. Such is unconstitutional because there was no vacancy in the presidency thus there’s no need to call for a
special election. This is pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which requires an actual vacancy before an special election can be
called and in such cases, the Speaker of the House will be the Acting Pres until a new one has been elected. 2. Unconstitutional because
it allows the Pres to continue holding office after calling of the special election. Cutting his term short is valid but he should actually
vacate the office. The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions and deny prayer for issuance of injunction restraining respondents
from holding election and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction. Since there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions
since only a resolution was issued. (PBA vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455). •

The lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally rendered this case moot and
academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no
guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. The transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be
“evaded;” they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is
sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected
with public interest. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-
Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that
the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress
and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media, no law has been
enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O.
No. 5 (David vs. Macapagal – Arroyo, GR 171396, May 3, 2006).

d) Democratic government and republican

Republican State – it is one wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by
the people. Democratic State – this merely emphasizes that the Philippines has some aspect of direct democracy such as initiative and
referendum.

i) Nemo est supra leges – “No one is above the Law” CASES •

The primary question is: Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
Philippine Islands? The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements
with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. The women were given no opportunity to collect
their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had
no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and
had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the
question. By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from
Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints
at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these
women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal
law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778).

ii. universal sufferage (right and duty, popular election, rule of majority
iii) Bill of rights

Bill of Rights – is a set prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on
the powers of the government as a leans of securing the enjoyment of those rights. Classification of Rights: 1. Political rights – granted
by law to members of community in relation to their direct or indirect participation in the establishment or administration of the
government. 2. Civil rights – rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of private individuals for the purpose of securing
them the enjoyment of their means of happiness; 3. Social and economic rights; and 4. Human rights.

iv) accountability of public official)

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Section 2. The President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of
at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. Section 5. There is hereby created the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy
each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. Section 6. The
officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to
the Civil Service Law. Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution. Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be naturalborn citizens of the
Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the
Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must
have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. During their tenure, they shall be subject
to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution. Section 9. The
Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies
shall be filled within three months after they occur. Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be decreased during
their term of office. Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They
shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. Section 12. The
Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. Section 13.
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties. (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (4) Direct the officer concerned, in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts
or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to
the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. (5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. (6) Publicize matters covered by its
investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence. (7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency. (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law. Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel. Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or
indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they
have controlling interest, during their tenure. Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law. Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law. v)

Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws

SEPARATION OF POWERS
Purpose of the separation of powers: to prevent the concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to
irreparable error or abuse in the exercise to the detriment of republican institution. CASES •

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a
check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of
certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power
to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for
their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power
of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The Court held: 1. That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into
the legislative, the executive and the judicial. 2. That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. 3. That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among
the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. 4. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority. 5. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government. 6. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly. 7. That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into
effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members. 8. That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. 9. That such transfer of power from the
legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. 10. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. 11. That
section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. 12.
That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is
not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. 13.
That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139). •

Principle of Blending of PowersIssue: Is Pres. Nixon's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege"
confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review? No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor
the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential
privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to
"the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena
and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes (US vs Nixon, 418 US 683).

Principle of Checks and BalancesInstance when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or
shared by several departments.

Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other
departments. CASES •

Issue: Did President Truman have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held
that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that
authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker (Youngstown Co, vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153).”

The Congress cannot control the execution of its laws; since it doesn’t possess this power, it can’t delegate it to its agents. The CG is an
agent of the Legislature because Congress can remove him by a process other than impeachment. The CG exercises executive power.
Thus, the Act is unconstitutional. The CG’s function under the Act is the “very essence” of execution of the laws since (1) it entails
interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the CG commands the President to
carry out, without variation, the CG’s directive regarding the budget resolutions. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress is the “very
essence” of executions of the laws. Once Congress passes legislation, it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through
impeachment. The Constitution only explicitly provides Congress the power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the
Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for “maladministration,” with Madison
arguing that “so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” Thus, Congress can only remove a member
of the executive branch through impeachment (Bowsher vs. Synar, 478 US 714).

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must
be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information
without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For what republican
theory did accomplish? was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and
replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. Resort to any means then by which
officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely
nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much
greater value ? our right as a people to take part in government (Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), GR 169777).

NON-DELAGATION OF POWERS

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D.
NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix
rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the
imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the
ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No.
857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by
the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District (Philippine Interisland Shipping Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22,
1997).”

Permissible Delegation General Rule: Potestas delegate non potest delegare Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power
constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another. 

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are
convicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive;
(2) that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws. As already stated,
the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. But, probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are
they the same. In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated.
He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. The Court held that the Probation Act does not conflict with the
pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the
power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in a bicameral
Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the
Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power
to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata
non delegare potest. The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of
any other appointee or delegate of the legislature (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56). a. Tariff Powers to the President (Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI; (2)
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. b. Emergency Powers to the President (Section 23 (2), Art VI) (2) In times of war or
other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its
nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution
provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in the
Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act
would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period
for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to
meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law,"; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal
might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create
the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-
third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and
ought not to be, the law.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority
is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously,
mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was
in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner,
between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire
good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order
regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an
executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure. What then was the contemplated period?
President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special
session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It is our considered
opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946,
and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief
Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in
contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no
pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. After the
convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired.
In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total
emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the
enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The
state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The
war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a
position to operate (First Emergency Powers Cases, 84 Phil 368). •

As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be
only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the
emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the
President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President
or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? in palpable repugnance
to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not
dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President. Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by
the President and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress
formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce
effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to
act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and
546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation
repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with
the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself
and to withdraw the same from the President. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to
exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the
Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial
objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or
amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from
or inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is imperative in
some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of
powers in any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were
careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency."
They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient
procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution (2nd
Emergency Powers Cases, 92 Phil 603).

c. Delegation to the People (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII; RA 6735); Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.

d. Delegation to Local Government Units (Art. X; RA 7160);

e. Delegation to the Administrative Bodies
1.1.1 Power of Legislation

Subordinate
CASES •
The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only
to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the
accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the
public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are sustained, and
their force and effect upheld (Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR 98332, Jan. 16, 1995).
1.1.2
Principle of Sub-delegation of Powers

1.1.3 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego Principle

f. Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business or unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v. Sec’y of Interior, 67 Phil 45

1). Tests for valid delegation

1.1.1 •
Completeness Test - Law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions so that there is nothing for the delegate to do
except to enforce it.

Sufficient Standard Test - Maps out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued.

CASES

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich
with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. This is not to say that
notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. The protection of the
general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is
simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of
its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding
of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain (Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659).

Legislative standard need not be expressed CASES

Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident
aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment which restrains discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to
denial of due process? The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice
Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that
occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that
restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely
on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since
"in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different
ancestry (Hirabayashi vs US, 320 US 81).”

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him
by law. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not
only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have
regional offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but
are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its
legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has
provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the
grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. On the question of standard. A legislative standard
need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied
in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative
regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize
the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the
public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to
suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal
from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute
the original basis for the organization of administrative regions (Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253).

II. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.

CONCEPTS, PURPOSE OF
a. Definition, purpose of

Constitution – the document which serves as the fundamental law of the state; that written instrument enacted by direct action
of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those
powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.
Constitutional Law -designates the law embodied in the Constitution and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation
and application of its provisions by the courts in specific cases.

b. Distinguished from: decree, ordinance organic law, statute,

Organic law – a fundamental law. Organic statute. Statute – is a formal written enactment of a legislative authority that governs
a country, state, city or country. Decree – is an order made by a head of the State or government and having the force of law.
Ordinance – a law made by a colony, or a municipality or other local authority. Local Ordinance – is a law usually found in a
municipal code or an act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of its law making authority.

c. Classified:

i) written and unwritten

written – conventional or enacted unwritten – cumulative or evolved ii) rigid and flexible iii) democratic and monarchical The
Philippine Constitution is written and rigid (Art. XVII).

d. Qualities of a good written Constitution: brevity- constitution should not be lengthy and contains only important things.
Clarity – every clause of constitution should be written in simple language, comprehensive- constitution should be applicable
to whole country, there should be mention of structure and power of state.

d. Essential parts:

1. bills of rights 2. organization and functions of government 3. provision for amendment i)

bills of rights

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. Significance of the Bill of Rights Government is powerful. When unlimited, it becomes
tyrannical. The Bill of Rights is a guarantee that there are certain areas of a person’s life, liberty, and property which
governmental power may not touch.

e. Powers of Government - All the powers of government are limited by the Bill of Rights.

The totality of governmental power is contained in three great powers: police power, power of eminent domain, and power of
 taxation.

These powers are considered inherent powers because they belong to the very essence of government and without them no
government can exist. Distinction between the guarantees of the Bill of Rights (Art. III) and the guarantees on Social Justice
(Art. XIII)

Social Justice (Art. XIII)

bill of rights - Focuses on civil and political rights. Social rights - Focuses on social and economic rights. The guarantees in the
Bills of Rights are generally self- The social and economic rights implementing, i.e., they can be guaranteed generally require
appealed to even in the absence of implementing legislation. implementing legislation.

ii) organization government and functions

Functions constituent – compulsory because constitutive of the society; 2. ministrant – undertaken to advance the general
interest of the society (Bacani v. NACOCO, 100 Phil, 468); merely optional. 1.

iii) amendment
provision

f. Preamble: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law
and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

i) identifies the authority who makes it and the expression of its will ii) enunciates the great principles and ultimate objectives
iii) identifies on whom it is binding Deliberations on the Committee Report The change from “general welfare” to “common
good” was intended to project the idea of a social order that enables every citizen to attain his or her fullest development
economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. The phrase “Almighty God” was chosen as being more personal than “Divine
Providence” and therefore more consonant with Filipino religiosity. The phrase “ a just and humane society,” The phrase added
the notion that a constitution not merely sets up a government but is also an instrument for building the larger society of
which government is merely a part. Function of the Preamble Preamble is not a source of rights or of obligations, it is useful as
an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the body of the Constitutions. Origin of the Preamble Its origin,
or authorship, is the will of the “sovereign Filipino people. The identification of the Filipino people as the author of the
constitution calls attention to an important principle: that the document is not just the work of representatives of the people
but of the people themselves who put their mark of approval by ratifying it in a plebiscite. Scope and Purpose “to build a just
and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.

“the rule of law” – this expresses the concept that government officials have only the authority given them by law and defined
by law … The statement is: “Ours is a rule of law and not of men.”

2. RATIFICATION / POLITICAL VS. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION Political Question - has two (2) aspects: 1. Those questions which, under
the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or 2. In regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislature or executive branches of government (Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101).

Justiciable Question – a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal interest which may be resolved by a court of law through
the application of a law (Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001). CASES •
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. 2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, six (6)
members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters." Under the 1935 Constitution, the
three elements of valid ratification of amendments are: (1) it must be held in an election conducted under the election law; (2)
supervised by the independent Commission on Election; and (3) where only franchised voters take part. 3. On the third question of
acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court hold that
there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their
acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of
knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the
usual media vehicles restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted
the Constitution." 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court voted to DISMISS the petition. 5. On the fifth question
of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's
acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that
they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of
the Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. While majority of the Supreme Court held that whether or not the
1973 Constitution had been ratified in accordance with the 1935 Constitution was a justiceable question, a majority also held that
whether or not the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, with or without constitutional ratification, was a political question. The Court
accepted the glaring fact simply that “there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and in effect
(Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33).

3. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION A Constitution is a system of fundamental law for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute, and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative, or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purpose is null and void and without any force or
effect. A doubtful provision shall be examined in the light of the history of the times and the conditions and circumstances under which
the Constitution was framed (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317). CASES •

Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary amount to a dimunition thereof, and thus
violate Art. VIII, Sec. 9 of the 1935 Constitution. The Court held that nets to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of judges than a fixed provision for their support. The independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial
preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, and are not possessed
of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern (Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 552).

The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution
and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land as in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province
and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact
laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within
the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions (Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696). •
The 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges. The ruling that
"the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,
13 as affirmed in Endencia vs. David 14 is declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have
adopted. Their clear intent was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
judiciary, so as to “give substance to equality among the three branches of the government (Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 152 SCRA 284).

Non- self-executing provisions would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective,
subordinated to the will of the law-making body. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of constitutional are self executing.  Thus, a constitutional provision
is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself. 4.

SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS General rule: All provisions of the constitution are self-executing; Exceptions: Some constitutions are
merely declarations of policies. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.

In case of doubt, the provisions should be considered self-executing; mandatory rather than directory; and prospective rather than
retroactive (Nachura, Reviewer in Political Law, 2005 ed., p. 3). CASES •

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. The Court held that a provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it
was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not,
by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to
that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10,
second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, GR 122156, Feb. 03, 1997).

5. PHILIPPINES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY a. Pre-1935 Constitution: Schurman Commission; Taft Commission; Spooner Amendment;
Philippine Bill of 1902, Jones Law of 1916; Tydings -McDuffie Act of 1934
b. 1935 Constitution
By authority of the Tydings – McDuffie Law, A Constitutional Convention was called.
On November 15, 1935, the Commonwealth Government established by the Constitution became operative.

Many felt a certain unease in that an independent republic should continue to operate under a Constitution that had been fashioned
under colonial auspices.

Gradually, the agitation for a thorough overhaul of the 1935 Constitution gathered momentum.

Declaration of Martial Law

Martial law was imposed on the entire Philippines on September 21, 1972.

CASES •

The provision of the 1935 Constitution referred to in the proclamation reads: "the President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law."

1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more
concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is
the question political or justiciable in character? Five (5) justices hold that the question is political and therefore its determination is
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. They hold that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on
that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare martial
law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore is not subject to
judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people. Four (4) other justices who is on the side of justiciability hold that the
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court, and would thus apply the principle laid down in
Lansang although that case refers to the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition
of justiciability accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly distinguished from the power of judicial
review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining "merely whether he (the President) has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The Court added
that implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related
to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against
imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence. On this particular point, that is, that the
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically
unanimous (Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183).

d. 1973 Constitution

Meanwhile, the Citizens Assemblies, organized by Presidential Decree No. 86, were being asked to answer certain questions, among
which was” “Do you approve of the New Constitution?” Then, suddenly, on January 17, 1973 , while the Supreme Court was hearing
arguments on petitions to enjoin the holding of a plebiscite, the President, by Proclamation No. 1102, announced that the proposed
Constitution had been ratified by an overwhelming vote of the members of the Citizens Assemblies. On November 30, 1972, the
President issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.’  Before the Constitutional Convention could finish its
work, martial law was imposed on the entire Philippines on September 21, 1972.  On March 16, 1967, the Philippines Congress,
pursuant to the authority given to it by the 1935 Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 calling a Convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution. The 1971 Constitutional Convention began on June 1, 1971. 

CASES •
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. 2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, six (6)
members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters." Under the 1935 Constitution, the
three elements of valid ratification of amendments are: (1) it must be held in an election conducted under the election law; (2)
supervised by the independent Commission on Election; and (3) where only franchised voters take part. 3. On the third question of
acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court hold that
there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their
acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of
knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the
usual media vehicles restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted
the Constitution." 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court voted to DISMISS the petition. 5. On the fifth question
of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's
acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that
they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of
the Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. While majority of the Supreme Court held that whether or not the
1973 Constitution had been ratified in accordance with the 1935 Constitution was a justiceable question, a majority also held that
whether or not the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, with or without constitutional ratification, was a political question. The Court
accepted the glaring fact simply that “there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and in
effect. (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33).

e. 1986 Snap Presidential Election CASES

Pres. Marcos’ term was supposed to end on June 30, 1987. However, he submitted a letter of conditional resignation claiming that he
would vacate his position effective only when election’s held & after winner’s proclaimed & qualified as Pres by taking his oath of office
10 days after his proclamation. He claims that he is calling for the new elections to seek a new mandate to assess his policies &
programs as demanded by the opposition. He further stressed that his term will be shortened but in the name of public accountability
he believes that the final settlement of these issues can only be done thru a presidential election. B.P. Blg. 883: enacted by the Batasang
Pambansa calling for special national elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for Pres & VP. Different sectors were against the special elections.
Among the contentions are: 1.Such is unconstitutional because there was no vacancy in the presidency thus there’s no need to call for a
special election. This is pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which requires an actual vacancy before an special election can be
called and in such cases, the Speaker of the House will be the Acting Pres until a new one has been elected. 2. Unconstitutional because
it allows the Pres to continue holding office after calling of the special election. Cutting his term short is valid but he should actually
vacate the office. The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions and deny prayer for issuance of injunction restraining respondents
from holding election and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction. Since there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions
since only a resolution was issued. (PBA vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455).

f. People Power Revolt

Proclamation No. 1, Feb. 25, 1986

On the morning of February 25, 1986, Corazon C.Aquino, in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution and without the sanction
of the Batasan Pambansa which had chosen to give the presidency to Mr. Marcos, was proclaimed first woman President of the
Philippines.

She turned her back on the 1973 Constitution whose officials had denied her the presidency. She chose instead to govern under a
Provisional Constitution designed to enable her to meet the people’s challenge. The document of revolutionary defiance was
Proclamation No. 3, became popularly known as the “Freedom Constitution.” CASES
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment, they have accepted the government of Pres. Corazon C. Aquino, not
merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government (Lawyers League vs. Aquino, GR 73748, May 22, 1986).

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading, the petitioner quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated)
of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers. He then asks the
Court who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section. The Court held that mutatis
mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines (In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160). g. 1987 Constitution

Article VI of Proclamation No. 3 said:

The 1986 Constitutional Commission convened on June 1, 1986 and finished its work on October 15, 1986. a plebiscite, held on
February 2, 1987, overwhelmingly ratified the new Constitution. CASES •Adopting a New Constitution Section 1. Within sixty (60) days
from the date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission
shall be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty (50) natural-born citizens of the Philippines.

The government under Cory Aquino and the Freedom Constitution is a de jure government. It was established by authority of the
legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a revolutionary government in defiance of the 1973 Constitution (In re: Letter of Reynato Puno,
June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 589, 598).

h. Effectivity of the 1987 constitution

CASES •

The 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the day the ratification, that is, the day on which the votes of the people were
cast to signify their acceptance of the draft ( De Leon vs Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602).

6. AMENDMENT – Art. XVII

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or (2) A constitutional convention. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such
a convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition.

a) Amendment vs. Revision

Amendment – an alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the Constitution. Its main purpose is to improve specific
provisional of the Constitutions. The changes brought about by amendment will not affect the other provisions of the
Constitutions.
 Revision - Reexamination of the entire Constitution or an important cluster of provisions in the Constitution.

b) Procedure

1. Proposal
a. Congress By

Acting as Constituent Assembly by a vote of ¼ of all its members. b. By a Constitutional Convention Theories on Position
of Constitutional Convention called either by: 1. 2/3 vote of all the members of the Congress, or 2. A majority vote of all
the members of Congress with the question of whether or not to call a constitutional convention to be resolved by the
people in a plebiscite (Sec. 3, Art XVII) •

If Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly omits to provide for the implementing details, Congress acting as a
Legislative Assembly this time can enact the necessary legislation to fill in the gaps (Imbong v. Ferrrer, GR No. L-32432,
Sept. 11, 1970). c. By the People thru Initiative Petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. Note: No amendment in this
manner shall be authorized within 5 years following the ratification of this Constitution (Feb. 2, 1987) nor more often than
once every 5 years. RA 6735 (System of Initiative and Referendum) - does not authorize a system of intiative to amend the
Constitution. The law was deemed sufficient to cover only the systems of initiative on national and local legislation
because: Sec. 5 of the Act does not provide for the contents of the provision for initiative on the Constitutions. That the
Act does not provide a sub-title for initiative on the Constitution simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on National and Local Laws (Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, GR 127325, March 19, 1997). Proposal by
Congress For both amendments and revisions.  Sec. 2 on the Statement of Policies of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on the amendments to the Constitution. 

Con-Con For both amendments and revisions.

Proposal by People For amendments only

CASES •

Issue: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative? The Court held that R.A.
6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on
the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also,
while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle
is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is
far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in
implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution (Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, GR. 127325, March 19, 1997). c)

Ratification

Proposed amendments (s) shall be submitted to the people and shall be deemed ratified by the majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite, held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days. a. after approval of the proposal by Congress or
 Concon, or b. after certification by the COMELEC of sufficiency of petition of the people. Doctrine of Proper Submission
Plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular election (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774) provided the people are
sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a
genuine manner. Submission of piece-meal amendments is unconstitutional. All the amendments must be submitted for
ratification at one plebiscite only. The people have to be given a proper frame or reference in arriving at their decision.
They have no idea yet of what the rest of the amended constitution would be (Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-341150,
October 16, 1971). CASES •

Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the
ConsConvention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds
that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must
be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to
be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being
called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction
are null and void (Tolentino vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333).

c) Judicial Review of Amendments CASES

1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. 2. On the second question of validity of the
ratification, six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for
ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters." Under the 1935 Constitution, the three elements of valid ratification of amendments are: (1) it must be held
in an election conducted under the election law; (2) supervised by the independent Commission on Election; and (3) where
only franchised voters take part. 3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned
proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members hold that "the people have
already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there
has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the
proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence
to rule on the question. "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicles
restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the
Constitution." 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court voted to DISMISS the petition. 5. On the fifth
question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court hold that it is in force by virtue of
the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on
the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. While
majority of the Supreme Court held that whether or not the 1973 Constitution had been ratified in accordance with the 1935
Constitution was a justiceable question, a majority also held that whether or not the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
with or without constitutional ratification, was a political question. The Court accepted the glaring fact simply that “there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and in effect (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50
SCRA 33). •

It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute — Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by
one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State
for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The interest of the petitioners
as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to
litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session,
the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2
of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to
constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport
to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All
cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court
en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a
limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged
within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex
of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether
the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not
is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial
review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence
to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a
priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose amendments to the Constitution in the absence of a grant
of such constituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. If the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly
to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333).