at the latter's house in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
4 As he was
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135919            May 9, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ, appellant.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated October 2, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant
Danny delos Santos guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death.
In the Information2 dated February 23, 1998, appellant was charged with murder,
thus:
"That on or about the 6th day of November 1997, in the Municipality of San
Jose, Del Monte, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen
knife, with intent to kill one Rod Flores y Juanitas, with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said kitchen knife said Rod Flores y Juanitas, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which
directly caused his death."
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty." 3 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution presented Marcelino de Leon, Marvin Tablate, Dr. Benito
Caballero and Romeo Flores as its witnesses. Appellant and Sonny Bautista took the
witness stand for the defense.
Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of November 6, 1997, he saw
Rod Flores drinking "gin" with Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier
about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, he approached them and borrowed Flores'
cart.5 While waiting for the cart, he stood across Flores who was then seated and
conversing with the group.6 Suddenly, appellant emerged from the back of Flores and
stabbed him with a knife,7 making an upward and downward thrust.8 Flores ran after
he was stabbed twice.9 Appellant pursued him and stabbed him many times.10 As a
result, Flores' intestines bulged out of his stomach.11 Appellant ceased stabbing
Flores only after he saw him dead. Thereafter, he turned his ire against Jayvee
Rainier and chased him. Fearful for his life, witness De Leon hid himself and later on
reported the incident to the police.12
Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leon's testimony. On cross-examination, Tablate
testified that he tried to help Flores by separating him from the appellant who ran
away.13 He also testified that the latter joined his group at about 11:00 a.m. and kept
on "coming back and forth."
Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores suffered twenty-one (21) stab
wounds in the frontal, posterior and lateral side of his body, eleven (11) of which were
fatal. Dr. Caballero said it was possible that appellant was behind Flores considering
the stab wounds inflicted at his back.14 According to the doctor, Flores died because
of "massive external/internal hemorrhages due to multiple stab wounds in the thorax
and abdomen penetrating both lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen and intestines." 15
Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then working at Vitarich, Marilao,
Bulacan, earning P600.00 every 15th day of the month; 16 that he spent P100,000.00
for his son's burial and wake; that he has receipts in the amount of P19,110.00 spent
for the funeral services and the cost of the cemetery lot 17 and a list of other expenses
in the amount of P35,960.00;18 and that his family has been grieving for the loss of a
loved one.
Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the accusation and
declared that on November 6, 1997 at 8:00 p.m., he was in his auntie's house in
Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,19 forty (40) meters away from the scene of the
crime. He was then fetching water.20 Earlier, at about 5:30 p.m., he and Flores met
but they did not greet each other. There was no altercation between them. Hence, he
could not understand why De Leon and Tablate testified against him.
Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and time, he and appellant were
in their auntie's house in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. 21 They watched television up
to 8:30 p.m. and then went home. At about 10:00 p.m., appellant was arrested.
Bautista did not inform the policemen that they were watching television in their
auntie's house at the time the crime took place. Neither did he accompany appellant
to the police station.22
1
On October 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"All premises considered, this Court resolves and so holds that the
prosecution has been able to establish the criminal culpability of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Danny delos Santos is hereby found
guilty of the crime of Murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
"In the imposition of the penalty, the Court hereby takes into account the
brutality in the manner by which the life of the victim was taken, and if only to
serve as deterrent to others who might be similarly obsessed, it is believed
that the higher of the two penalties provided should be meted to the accused
herein. Absent any circumstance that would mitigate the severity of his
criminal act and pursuant to Articles 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 6, Republic Act no. 7659, the accused Danny delos
Santos y Fernandez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death by
lethal injection.
"Further, the accused is condemned to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
the amount of P50,000.00 for the victim's death. Moreover, accused delos
Santos is ordered to pay the said heirs of the deceased Rod Flores the
following sums of money:
1. P264,000.00 for loss of earning capacity;
2. P55,070.00 for actual and compensatory damages;
3. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
4. P50,000.00 for exemplary damages.
"With costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."
In his Appellant's brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES,
AND IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.
"II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO
INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF VICTIM THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 FOR
VICTIM'S DEATH; P264,000.00 FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY;
P55,070.00 FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES;
P50,000.00 FOR MORAL DAMAGES; AND P50,000.00 FOR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES."23
Appellant contends that there are some inconsistencies between the testimonies of
De Leon and Tablate, the prosecution witnesses. Also, there is no evidence that he
has a motive to kill Flores. In fact, there was no previous heated argument or
altercation between them. That the prosecution witnesses executed their sworn
statements only after two months from the commission of the crime raises doubt as
to their credibility. Finally, the evidence for the prosecution failed to meet the exacting
test of moral certainty, hence, the trial court should not have ordered him to indemnify
the heirs of Flores.
The Solicitor General, in the Appellee's brief, counters that: (a) the inconsistencies
pointed out by appellant are minor and do not vitiate the fact that he was the one who
killed Flores; (b) appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are worthless since he was
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses; (c) he failed to proffer any
explanation why the prosecution witnesses implicated him; (d) the crime was
aggravated by cruelty because he "butchered" Flores until his intestines bulged out of
his stomach; and (e) the heirs of Flores are entitled to indemnification as it has been
shown beyond reasonable doubt that appellant killed him.
The first assigned error involves a determination of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Settled is the rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts generally do not overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best
position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through
their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and
behavior in court.24
We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
Appellant maintains that there are inconsistencies in the testimonies of De Leon and
Tablate. While De Leon testified that appellant did not join Flores' group, however,
Tablate declared that he was drinking "gin" with them at about 11:00 a.m. De Leon
testified that no one assisted Flores when he was being attacked by appellant.
However, Tablate stated that he attempted to separate Flores from appellant after the
former had sustained two stab wounds.
The first alleged inconsistency is understandable. Unlike Tablate who was with the
group in a drinking spree, De Leon approached Flores only when he borrowed the
2
cart from the latter at about 8:00 p.m. He stayed with Flores' group only for about Q         That was the time when Rod Flores ran away after having been
thirty minutes,25 or up to 8:30 p.m. Thus, he could not have observed that appellant stabbed twice.
joined the group earlier, or at about 11: 00 a.m.
A         Yes, Your Honor.
The second alleged inconsistency is a minor one that does not enfeeble the
prosecution's theory that appellant killed Flores. Evident from De Leon's testimony is xxx           xxx           xxx
the fact that he was so shocked in witnessing the gruesome killing of his companion.
With such a state of mind, it would be too much to demand from him a full Court:
recollection of the details surrounding the event. Many times we have ruled that
inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the Q         How did the accused thrust for the second time the weapon at the
weight of their testimony.26 They only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the back of the victim.
credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 27 What
we find important in the case at bar is that the two prosecution witnesses were one in A         Both at the back, sir.
saying that it was appellant who stabbed Flores with a knife. We quote the clear and
straightforward account of the incident by De Leon and Tablate. During cross- xxx           xxx           xxx
examination, De Leon testified as follows:
Atty. De la Cruz:
"Atty. De la Cruz:
Q         Was Rod Flores able to ran away?
Q         You did not see the accused because it was dark in that place, is
it not? A         Yes, sir.

A         No, sir, he suddenly appeared from the back of Rod Flores and Q         Where were you when Rod Flores was running away?
started stabbing Rod that is why we were surprised.
A         We were left behind, sir. I was not able to move anymore.
Court:
Q         And was the accused able to reach Flores?
Q         How did the accused thrust the weapon to the victim?
A         Yes, sir.
A         (Witness demonstrating by making upward, downward thrust at
the back of the victim)
Q         What did the accused do?
Atty. De la Cruz:
A         Again, he started stabbing at the back, sir.
Q         Where was Rod Flores hit, if you know?
Q         So the stabbing was inflicted at the back of the victim?
A         At the back, sir.
A         Not all, sir, because he turned him face up and stabbed him
again, sir."28
Q         How many times?
Tablate's direct testimony reads:
A         At first, twice, sir.
"Fiscal Vicente:
Court:
3
 xxx           xxx           xxx
Q         How did Danny delos Santos stab Rod Flores?
A         "Patalikod," sir.
Q         What do you mean?
A         Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod Flores at the back, sir.
Q         When you said Danny delos Santos stabbed Rod Flores at the
back, are you saying that Danny delos Santos was at the back of Rod
Flores at the time?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         How many times did the accused stab Rod Flores?
A         I saw him stabbed the victim twice, sir. (Witness demonstrated in
downward position as if he was holding something).
Q         What was he holding?
A         A knife, sir.
Appellant argues that since the prosecution witnesses testified that there was no
altercation between him and Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed
to him. This is an inconsequential argument. Proof of motive is not indispensable
for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an
eyewitness and his participation is adequately established.30 In People vs.
Galano,31 we ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the
offense, it becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive
and there is some doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In the case before
us, no such doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate positively identified appellant.
In a last-ditch attempt to cast doubt on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
appellant questions why their statements were taken only on January 29, 1998 when
the incident happened on November 6, 1997. The two-month delay is hardly an
indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in
a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to
show the cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of retaliation
can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses.32 Thus, in People vs. Dacibar,33 we
held that the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal
case is of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to
affect credibility, especially when a valid reason exists for such hesitance.
Anent the second error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in indemnifying
the heirs of Flores since his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it
to state at this point that the evidence for the prosecution produces moral certainty
that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, hence, should be answerable for all its
consequences.

xxx           xxx           xxx As earlier mentioned, appellant's defenses are mere alibi and denial. He testified that
at the time the crime took place, he was in his auntie's house in Muson; San Jose del
Court: Monte, Bulacan. When probed by the trial court, he categorically stated that the
house is only 40 meters away from the scene of the crime and may be traveled in
xxx           xxx           xxx about three or five minutes.34 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the
Q         Are you sure that when Rod Flores fell to the ground, he was not presence of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.35 Certainly,
able to rise nor was he able to run away? the required impossibility does not exist here.

A         He was able to run but then he was drunk and the accused was Weighing the evidence of the prosecution vis-à-vis that of the defense, the scale of
able to catch and stab him again, sir. justice must tilt in favor of the former. Time and again, we ruled that positive
identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive
on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial
xxx           xxx           xxx which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.36 With marked relevance is the fact
Q         Are you positive to the identity of Danny delos Santos that he that appellant did not present any evidence to show that the prosecution witnesses,
was the one who stabbed Rod Flores? in testifying against him, have improper motive.

A         Yes, sir." 29
4
The prosecution was able to establish that appellant's attack on Flores was from net balance of his annual income by his life expectancy, the loss of his earning is
behind without any slightest provocation on his part 37 and that it was sudden and P266,400.00, thus:
unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. Where the victim was totally
unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no weapon to resist it, the "In computing the life expectancy and loss of earning capacity of a person
stabbing could only be described as treacherous.38 There being treachery, appellant's the following formula is used:
conviction for murder is in order.
Life expectancy -
However, in the imposition of penalty, we cannot appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty considered by the trial court. Pursuant to the 2000 Revised 2/3 x (80 - the age of the victim at the time of death)
Rules of Criminal Procedure, every Information must state not only the qualifying but
also the aggravating circumstances.39 This rule may be given retroactive effect in the
light of the well-established rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts 2/3 x (80 - 25)
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.40 The aggravating circumstance of cruelty, not having been alleged in 2/3 x 55
the Information, may not be appreciated to enhance the liability of appellant.
= 36.66 or 37
Under Article 24841 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the consummated
crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, the lesser of the two Loss of earning capacity -
indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances attending the crime.42 net annual income x life expectancy

In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Flores are entitled to the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto.43 As regards the actual
damages, it appears that out of the P55,070.00 awarded by the trial court, only
P19,170.0044 was actually supported by receipts. The other amounts were based
solely on a list prepared by Romeo Flores. To be entitled to actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured
party.45 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present receipts for the other
expenses incurred. Thus, in light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo,46 we
grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages inasmuch as the proven actual
damages is less than P25,000.00. The moral damages awarded in the amount of
P50,000.00 is affirmed, there being proofs that because of Flores' death, his heirs
suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury. 47 However, we
reduce to P25,000.00 only the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.48
P7,200 x 37
= P266,400.00" 49
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 2, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny
delos Santos y Fernandez guilty of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late Rod Flores y Juanitas the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,0000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P266,400.00 for loss of
earning capacity.
Costs de oficio.

The amount of indemnity for loss of earning capacity is based on the income at the SO ORDERED.
time of death and the probable life expectancy of the victim. In the case at bar, the
trial court found that Flores' annual gross income is P14,400.00 computed at the rate Davide, Jr ., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
of P1,200.00 a month for twelve (12) months. From this amount is deducted the Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
necessary and incidental expenses, estimated at 50%, leaving a balance of Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
P7,200.00. His net income would then be multiplied by his life expectancy, using the
following formula: 2/3 x 80 - 25 (age of the victim at time of death). Considering that
he was 25 years old when he died, his life expectancy would be 37. Multiplying the

5
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8936.  October 23, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FEDERICO
GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR, ET AL., Defendants, FEDERICO GERONIMO
alias Cmdr. OSCAR, Defendant-Appellant.
 
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P.
Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio,
alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias
Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan
Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong,
alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas
alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias
Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny,
Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro
Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez,
Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr.
Danny and John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many
others, were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies,
and kidnapping committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x                    x x x                    x x x
“That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
continuously up to the present time in the province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and in other municipalities, cities and
provinces and other parts of the country where they have chosen to carry out their
rebellious activities, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or
members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said Communist Party of the
Philippines (CCP) having come to an agreement and decide to commit the crime of
Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and confederating among themselves
with all of the thirty-one accused in criminal case Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315, 14270,
15344 and with all the accused in criminal case No. 19166 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila with the other members, officers and/or affiliates of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many
others whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, acting in accordance with
their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, and mutually helping one another, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, help, support, promote, maintain,
direct and/or command the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan (HMB), to rise publicly and take arms against the government of the Republic
of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings for the
purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the
government and laws thereof as in fact the said ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan
(HMB) or the Hukbalahaps’ (HUKS) pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen publicly
and taken arms against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to attain
said purpose, by then and there making armed raids, sorties, and ambuscades,
attacks against the Philippine Constabulary, the civilian guards, the Police and the
Army Patrols and other detachments as well as upon innocent civilians, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof, have then and there committed wanton acts of murder, pillage,
looting, plunder, kidnapping and planned destructions of private and public property
and plotted the liquidation of government officials, to create and spread disorder,
terror, confusion, chaos and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the
aforesaid purpose, among which are as follows, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘1.  That on or about April 28, 1949 at Kilometer 62 at Barrio Salubsob, municipality of
Nueva Ecija, an undetermined number of HUKS led by Commanders Viernes,
Marzan, Lupon and Mulong did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ambush, assault, attack and fired upon the party of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon and her
PC escort whom they considered as their enemies resulting in the killing of Mrs.
Aurora A. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, Major P. San
Agustin, Lieutenant Lasam, Philip Buencamino III, and several soldiers and the
wounding of General Jalandoni and Captain Manalang.
‘2.  That on or about August 26, 1950 in Santa Cruz, Laguna, about one hundred
armed HUKS with intent to gain and for the purpose of securing supplies and other
materials for the support and meintenance of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan
(HMBS) did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and forcibly bringing
the Cashier of the Provincial Treasury, Mr. Vicente Reventar from his house to the
Provincial Capitol and at the point of guns forced him to open the Treasury Vault and
took therefrom Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000) consisting of various
denominations and including Fifty, One hundred and Five-Hundred Peso Bills and
also took away with them type- writers and other Office supplies which they found in
the Provincial Capitol Building, burning and looting private buildings in towns.
‘3.  That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of Pasacao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under Commander Rustum
raided the house of one Nemesio Palo, a police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur and as a result, said HUKS were able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once
captured, with evident premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot and cut
the neck of said Nemesio Palo thereby causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio
Palo.
‘4.  That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego,
Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander Oscar
ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol headed by Cpl. Bayrante, resulting in
seriously wounding of Pfc. Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta a civilian.
6
‘5.   That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur,
a group of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar with evident premeditation,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay a barrio lieutenant.’“
(Appellee’s brief, pp. 1-8)
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When
the case was called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permission
of the court to substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to
change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the
penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his voluntary plea of
guilty being considered as a mitigating circumstance. Geronimo’s counsel, on the
other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused was only prision
mayor, for the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as rebellion
with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the crimes of murders robberies,
and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime
charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion. On
October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as listed in
the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the
proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the
sole question of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
After mature consideration, a majority of seven justices 1 of this Court are of the
opinion that the issue posed by Appellant has been already decided in the recent
resolution of this Court in the case of People vs. Hernandez et al., (99 Phil.,
529; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary21 Lawyers Journal, No. 7 [July 31, 1956], p. 316).
As in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is
integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed
in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in
the first paragraph of article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion
legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of any penalty attached to article 134.
2 It follows, therefore that any or all of the acts described in article 135, when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in article
134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be regarded or penalized
as distinct crimes in themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself,
and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate crime that, under article 48 of
the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
The terms employed in the first paragraph of article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
to describe the component of violence in the crime of rebellion are broad and
general. The Spanish text (which is the one controlling, People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil.
665) states that the acts of the rebels may consists of —
“Sosteniendo combate 3 con la fuerza leal, causando estragos en las propiedades,
ejerciendo violencia grave, exigiendo contribuciones, o distroyendo caudales
publicos de su inversion legitima.”
If all the overt acts charged in the information against herein Appellant were
committed for political ends or in furtherance of the rebellion, they come within the
preceding description. Thus, count 4 (ambushing and firing upon army patrol)
constitutes engaging in combat with the loyal troops; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycount
2 (taking funds and equipment from the Provincial Treasury of Laguna) is diverting
public funds from their ligitimate purpose; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarywhile the killings
outlined in the other counts (1, 3 and 5) are instances of committing serious violence.
The majority of the Court found no cogent reason for limiting “commission of serious
violence” in article 135 to hostilities against the Government’s armed forces
exclusively; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryfor in that case, the former expression would
be redundant and mere duplication of “engaging in combat” with loyal troops, also
described in the same article. If the infliction of “serious violence” was separately
expressed in the law, it is because the violence referred to is that inflicted upon
civilians. Again, to restrict “serious violence” to acts short of homicide, is to
unwarrantedly assume that the broad term “violencia grave” is used in the limited
sense of “lesiones graves”, which in our Penal Code has a specialized signification.
In truth, if physical injuries constitute grave violence, so would killing necessarily be, if
not more. Additionally, it may be observed that rebellion is by nature a crime of
masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds. (People vs. Hernandez, supra; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Almazan, C. A., 31 Off. Gaz. 1932). Hence the broad
terms employed by the statute.
The prosecution insists that the “more serious” crime of murder cannot be justifiably
regarded as absorbed by the lesser crime of rebellion. In the first place, it is not
demonstrated that the killing of an individual is intrinsically less serious or less
dangerous to society than the violent subversion of established government, which
emperils the lives of many citizens, at least during the period of the struggle for
superiority between rebels and loyalists. If, on the other hand, murder is punished by
reclusion perpetua to death, and rebellion only by prision mayor, this leniency is due
to the political purpose that impels every rebellious act. As noted by Groizard
(“Codigo Penal de 1870”, Vol. 3, p. 239) —
“El analisis de toda clase de delitos politicos ofrece para el jurisconsulto un resultado
precioso, pues pone de relieve las diferencias cardinales que existen entre esta
clase de hechos y los delitos comunes; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryentre los reos de
aquellos crimenes y los reos de estos otros. Para los delitos comunes, la sociedad
tiene una constante y energica reprobacion que no atenua ni el trascurso de tiempo
ni el cambio de las ideas. Para los delitos politicos, no. Quien se atrevera si de
honrado se precia, a hacer alarde de la amistad de un hombre condenado por robo o
por asesinato? Y quien no ha tendido la mano cariñosa sin perder nada de
respetabilidad, a algun reo de un delito politico en la serie continuada de
revoluciones y contrarevoluciones que constituyen desgraciadamente los ultimos
7
periodos de nuestra historia? La consumacion del delito y el exito de la rebelion, ya
lo hemos dicho, para el reo politico, es mas que la impunidad, es el triunfo, es el
poder, es el Gobierno, es casi la gloria. Pero no sucede lo mismo tratandose de
delitos comunes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary la consumacion del delito ni apaga el
remordimiento, ni aleja del criminal el peligro de la pena, ni mejora en nada su
condicion respecto de la justicia. Hay, pues, entre el delito comun y el delito politico,
entre las personas responsables de unos y otros diferencias sustanciales, y el mayor
error que en el estado actual de los estudios juridicos puede cometer el legislador es
no apreciar eses diferencias, sobre todo en la aplicacion de las penas.”
And our history of three centuries of uninterrupted rebellions against sovereign Spain,
until she was finally driven from our shores, suffices to explain why the penalty
against rebellion, which stood at reclusion temporal maximum to death in the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870, was reduced only prision mayor in our revised Penal Code of
1932.
In addition, the government counsel’s theory that an act punished by more serious
penalty cannot be absorbed by an act for which a lesser penalty is provided, is not
correct. The theory is emphatically refuted by the treatment accorded by the Penal
Code to the crime of  forcible abduction, for which the law imposes only reclusion
temporal (article 342), notwithstanding that such crime necessarily involves illegal
detention of the abducted woman for which article 267 of the same Penal Code fixes
the penalty of reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. The same
situation obtains in the crime of slavery defined in article 272, whereby the
kidnapping of a human being for the purpose of enslaving him is punished with
prision mayor and a fine of not more than P10,000.00, when kidnapping itself is
penalized by article 267 with a much higher penalty.
And we have already pointed out in the Hernandez resolution that to admit the
complexing of the crime of rebellion with the felonies committed in furtherance
thereof, would lead to these undesirable results:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) to
make the punishment for rebellion heavier than that of treason, since it has been
repeatedly held that the latter admits no complexing with the overt acts committed in
furtherance of the treasonous intent, and, in addition, requires two witnesses to every
overt act which is not true in the case of rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) to
nullify the policy expressed in article 135 (R.P.C.) of imposing lesser penalty upon the
rebel followers as compared to their leaders, because under the complexing theory
every rebel, leader or follower, must suffer the heavier penalty in its maximum
degree; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) to violate the fundamental rule of criminal
law that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “in dubiis reus est absolvendus”; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary“nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege.”
Of course, not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of
rebellion solely because it happens to be committed simultaneously with or in the
course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or
profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and
would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed could
not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts
and intent would be unrelated to each other; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the
individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion as it
would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of the latter. This appears with
utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel should commit rape; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarycertainly the latter felony could not be said to have been done in
furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its commission in any way. The ravisher
would then be liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could
not be merged into a juridical whole.
It is argued that the suppression in the present Penal Code of article 244 of the old
one (article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870) indicates the intention of the
Legislature to revive the possibility of the crime of rebellion being complexed with the
individual felonies committed in the course thereof, because the suppressed article
prohibited such complexing. The text of the suppressed provision is as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 244.  Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o con
motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente segun las disposiciones de este
codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados como tales los jefes
principales de la rebelion o sedicion.”
The first paragraph is to the effect that the “delitos particulares” (meaning felonies
committed for private non-political ends, as held by the commentators Cuello Calon
and Viada, since the Penal Code does not classify crimes into “general” and
“particular”) are to be dealt with separately from the rebellion, punishment for each
felony to be visited upon the perpetrators thereof. This paragraph has no bearing on
the question of complex crimes, but is a mere consequence of the fact that the delicts
committed for private ends bear no relation to the political crime of rebellion (other
than a coincidence of time) and therefore must be separately dealt with. This is so
obvious that, as Groizard pointed out (Vol. 3, p. 650), such action (their punishment
as a private misdeed) would be taken by the courts even if this first paragraph of
article 244 had not been written.
Far more significant, in the opinion of the majority, is that our Revised Penal Code of
1932 did not revive the rule contained in the second paragraph of article 244 of the
old Penal Code (Article 259 of the Spanish), whereby the rebel leaders were made
criminally responsible for the individual felonies committed during the rebellion or on
occasion thereof, in case the real perpetrators could not be found. In effect that
paragraph established a command responsibility; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand in
suppressing it, the Legislature plainly revealed a policy of rejecting any such
command responsibility. It was the legislative intent, therefore, that the rebel leaders
(and with greater reason, the mere followers) should be held accountable solely for
the rebellion, and not for the individual crimes (delitos particulares) committed during
the same for private ends, unless their actual participation therein was duly
established. In other words, the suppression of article 244 of the old Penal Code
virtually negates the contention that the rebellion and the individual misdeeds
8
committed during the same should legally constitute one complex whole. Whether or roblesvirtualawlibraryand considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the
not such policy should be maintained is not for the courts, but for the Legislature, to accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years
say. of  prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment
pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; chan
But while a majority of seven justices 4 are agreed that if the overt acts detailed in the
roblesvirtualawlibraryand, as above explained, for the murder, applying the
information against the Appellant had been duly proved to have been committed “as
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of   prision mayor
a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto
furtherance thereof”, then the accused could only be convicted of simple rebellion,
indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; chan
the opinions differ as to whether his plea of guilty renders the accused amenable to
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
punishment not only for rebellion but also for murder or other crimes.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Six justices 5 believe that conceding the absence of a complex crime, still, by his plea
Felix, JJ., concur.
of guilty the accused-Appellant has admitted all the acts described in the five
separate counts of the information; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that if any of such
counts constituted an independent crime committed within the jurisdiction of the lower
court as seems to be the case under the facts alleged in Count No. 5 (the killing of
Policarpio Tibay), then the avertment in the information that it was perpetrated in
furtherance of the rebellion, being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to Appellant’s
conviction and punishment for said offense, he having failed, at the arraignment, to
object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged. Hence, the
acts charged in Counts 1 to 4 cannot be taken into consideration in this case, either
because they were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court below
(Count 1), or because the allegations do not charge the Appellant’s participation
(Count 3), or else the acts charged are essentially acts of rebellion, with out private
motives (Counts 2 and 4).
Five justices, 6 on the other hand, hold that by his plea of guilty, the accused avowed
having committed the overt acts charged in all five counts; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut that he only admitted committing them in fact “as a
necessary means”, “in connection and in furtherance of the rebellion”, as expressly
alleged by the prosecution. This is not only because the information expressly
alleged the necessary connection between the overt acts and the political ends
pursued by the accused, but in addition, it failed to charge that the Appellant was
impelled by private motives. Wherefore, such overt acts must be taken as essential
ingredients of the single crime of rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to this
crime alone. Hence, there being no complex crime, the Appellant can only be
sentenced for the lone crime of rebellion. Even more, the minority contends that
under the very theory of the majority, the circumstances surrounding the plea are
such as to at least cast doubt on whether the accused clearly understood that he was
pleading guilty to two different crimes or to only one; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryso
that in fairness and justice, the case should be sent back for a rehearing by the Court
of origin, to ascertain whether or not the accused fully realized the import of his plea
(U.S. vs. Patala, 2 Phil., 752; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil.,
91; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil., 305).
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused
convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; chan

9

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152133             February 9, 2006
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001, 1 affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case
No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of
homicide, allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay
Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at
PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in
laceration of spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant 4 for the arrest of
petitioner Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally
released5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May 1997,
petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide charged against him. 7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr.
Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3)
Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime took place.
Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano,
together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in
Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre
and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but along the
way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao.
Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the
culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night.
Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao
ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and
witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist,
which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When hit by
the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness Sañano
put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to
pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he
was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go
home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the
way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone.
They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness Sañano left
victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen. 8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving
petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache,
and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and
then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family
would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00
a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of
cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also
later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and
stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination
Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that
10
the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected
food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried
on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the
Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an
exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation
and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog
and blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete
niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food
particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation
and autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal
hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity
due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt
instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the
victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan. 13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony
of the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was
walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay,
Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and punched him several times.
Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter refused to
calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that
he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner
Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened
to move any closer for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he still had a
family to take care of. When he saw that the victim Cantre was about to stab
Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to
hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then
started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after them, but witness Sañano was
able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the incident
to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police authorities and sought their help
in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao,
meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan
and, instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre
after the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they
still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996.
As far as he knew, the victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996,
because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal
grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident. 15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the
prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in
defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to
run. While it appears that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but
the aggression already ceased after Michael was able to run and there was no more
need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a
retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally
liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left
side was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical
injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the
stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The
accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful
act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
11
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal
acts merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs.
Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the
penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as
compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001, 17 sustained the conviction of
homicide rendered by the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained
by the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the
accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury
sustained by the victim was the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It
resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s
spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a
Senior Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal
Health Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was
food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify in court hence she was
not even able to identify and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made
available for cross-examination on the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report
(Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-
examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food
poisoning, as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their
witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest
respect because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said
witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002, 18 denied the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues
raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29
August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November
1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime
of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with
dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable
doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was
the first physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver
of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to
food poisoning while the second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr.
Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death was due to a
traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings
of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at variance with each other
materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on
the culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in
the case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt
and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146,
November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her
guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the
exclusion of all possibility of error.20
12
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to
hold petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before
the RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are
vital pieces of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the
victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his
spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the
spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was hit with a blunt
object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an
expert witness, whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was
admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr.
Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery,
gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine germane to the issues
involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not
necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly
accorded it great weight and probative value. Having testified as to matters
undeniably within his area of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on
the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death of the victim
Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may
sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the
petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which,
subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or irregularity,
whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of
the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be seriously
considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also
support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan
caused the death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding
and disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of
attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of its blood supply and at the
point where blood vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by
the ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming
its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are
found several blood vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its
branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying
veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the
retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle,
located in the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause
detachment, laceration, stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine
1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow
from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the
organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing
visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality and fragility, it is usually
affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to
comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some
points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the
abdominal area is more than just the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided
into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the
rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to
trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from
the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area
of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen
had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible
external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to
an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim
Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as a
nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is
the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the
lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while
falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are
frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim
Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable,
superficial, and fragile – even without causing any other external physical injury.
Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration of the spleen
was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does
not necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of the external
injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
13
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the
proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." 27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen
Cantre, had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to
05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the
whereabouts, actions, and physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said
period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim
Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the
stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously
complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated,
until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no
other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument
which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated
spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health
Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt
as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem
report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food
poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and
probative value for the following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report,
as well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she
suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back from making a
categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x
x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest. Food
poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the
victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-
Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There
was no showing that further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr.
Ulanday’s suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without
such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that – a
suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement 30 in which she had
explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of
PHILIP B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food
Poisoning". What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a
SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case of food
poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that an examination be done
to confirm that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or
abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the
history of the victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal
hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an
incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my
hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the
cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where
was it located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his
body, his SPLEEN could be injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC 31 how he
conducted the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body
of the victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what
other matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the
intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic
injury of the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this
medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make
causes of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body
like this particular case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this
traumatic injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
14
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the
body of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent
inconsistent findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy
conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the
victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and
his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre,
then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite
being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of
evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her testimony would be adverse
to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court already expounded in the case
of People v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did
not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence.
The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be
presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the
instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be
needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be
dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the
non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of
evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no
showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as witnesses were
not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from
a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2)
the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a
privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other
witnesses was because their testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he
should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his
own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the
RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the
conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing,
however, preventing the defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the
appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly
believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the
prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim
Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by
the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at
variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the determination of the
appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by
which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable
felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the
existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the
language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The
offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause
an injury  to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender
is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without  malice."
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner
Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in
the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner
Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide  under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of
reckless imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that
demonstrate petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and
conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre
was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court
of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the
significance of such circumstances.
15
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Sañano,
on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other,
was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different
destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano were on their way home from a
drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper
Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on
record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and
Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between
the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and
the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly
punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they
met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which
spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses
the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does
take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26
years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao,
the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even
with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner
Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim
Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre.
The stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the
incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim
Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it
is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and
impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim
Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim
Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It
was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to
ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this
Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner
Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a
swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked attack by the
victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the
victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under
the pressure of the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the
victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the
victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to
drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his
helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built
than the victim Cantre.35
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw
the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of
precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict
substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps
unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force
as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten
meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim
Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with
reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains
civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore, retains the reward made by the
RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced
to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum
period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is
further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for the latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
16

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 155791. March 16, 2005]
MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners, v. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade
4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about
eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw
respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage
culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the
drainage culvert.1 Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he
opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the
drainage system.2
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson,
entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter
high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. 3 After a while, respondent
Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left 4 without
saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the
boy's lifeless body down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden turn of events,
Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed her that her son had died.
Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her. 7
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been
conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint
against the respondents for Wilson's death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and
petitioner Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the
drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared
that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while
riding on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of
the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy
report containing the following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long
sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo - tracheal lumina - congested and edematous containing muddy particles
with bloody path.
Lungs - hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody
froth.
Brain - autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach - partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory. 9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and
Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac,
charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 o'clock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of
Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy,
conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
17
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert
where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified
on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victim's head and the
abrasion on the latter's left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming
from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated
that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the
lumina of the larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda stated that such
injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by
force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp
was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a
blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the
occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson's
head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of
water, the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilson's face could have also been
caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough
surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no
sign of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted
the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof, 13 the
prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held
that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of
preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson's death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT
NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO. 14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21,
2001. It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a
finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of.
Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex
delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the
criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15
The petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS' CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO. 16
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head
hitting the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he
might have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin,
causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost
consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges
that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on
the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent
Andres even informed her of Wilson's death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal
Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the
victim which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that
the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed their
guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres
to bring out Wilson's cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage
system only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend
Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that
either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly
and severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution
failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide
18
and caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the
latter's death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17 The civil liability of
such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.18 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.19 With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. 21 The
sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.22 While the prosecution must prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove
the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages
and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.24 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary
course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The
felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate
cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor.25
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of
the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The
"cause and effect" relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones
patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion
del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del
herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault
of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions
supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene. 26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the
felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. 27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter
its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim
if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. 28 A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human
life a salutary and essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
'Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon
the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a
wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment. '30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
'The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to
the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of
his act - and in this case, the physical condition and temperament of the offended
party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the
wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that
the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc. 32
19
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People
v. Delim,33 the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the
commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the
objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other
than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and
(c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or
murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill.
Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered
by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If
the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that
presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not
sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants'. 35
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance
of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. 'In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is
not necessarily with the greater number.36
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the
civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of
Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr.
Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp.
But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He
presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt
object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped,
fell hard and his head hit a hard object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is - the hematoma, caused on the back of the
head might be due to the victim's falling on his back and his head hitting a
pavement?cralawlibrary
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong
enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is
possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the
pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?cralawlibrary
A It is also possible.
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible
that he might have taken in some mud or what?cralawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
cralawlibrary
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that
the victim was still alive when he was placed under water. 37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victim's face could
have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by
the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?cralawlibrary
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.
Q Rough surface?cralawlibrary
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that the
victim was strangled?cralawlibrary
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor. 38
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might
have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
20
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the
victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object and
might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?cralawlibrary
A - If the fall - if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible. 39
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there
were stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones could have
caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on
the culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside from the fact
that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will
naturally take in some amount of water and drown.40
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion
based on the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are
given conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the
outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a
reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia
testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he
refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside. 41 Respondent Andres had
no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the
abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether
the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante
mortem  or post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both
the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and,
consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or
both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes
for no reason at all.42 However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is
relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the
person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-
motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter
was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent
Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the latter's death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?cralawlibrary
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from her
mother who is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?cralawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?cralawlibrary
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.) 43
When the petitioner's son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres
who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son's death.
Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres
followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?cralawlibrary
A He went with me, Sir.
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with
you?cralawlibrary
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the
culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres
also came or arrived?cralawlibrary
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir. 44
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause
of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
21

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA
Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT
PILOLA, Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him
of murder, sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify
the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa y Rulloda in the amount of P50,000 for the latters
death.
The Indictment
On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene
Gayot Pilola were charged with murder in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Ronnie
Diamante who is still at-large and no fixed address and mutually helping and aiding
with one another, armed with double-bladed knives and a bolo and with intent to kill,
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault hack and stab one Joselito Capa y Rulloda,
as a result of which the latter sustained hack and stab wounds on the different parts
of his body, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested 3 and tried, and
subsequently convicted of murder.4 The decision of the trial court became final and
executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante
reportedly died a month after the incident. Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot
Pilola was arrested. He was arraigned on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution[6
On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613
Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive.
Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon
Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking
spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of
their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian,
and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the
protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up.
Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when
Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and
punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian
ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached Aling Soteras store at the end of
the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisas store. For his part, Odilon
positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian
swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselitos
intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his
right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselitos
neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street,
saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They
pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell
how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom.
The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after
Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he noticed that Ronnie was
no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back.
He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselitos head. Not
content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie
then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselitos house
and informed his wife and brother of the incident. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and
prepared Autopsy Report No. N-88-375,8 with the following findings:
22
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.
Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0
cm.; back, suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.
Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.
Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect,
1.5 cm.
Stab wounds:
1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial
extremity is sharp, lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior chest wall, level of
3rd intercostal space, right, 5.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward,
upward and medially, non-penetrating, with an approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;
2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity
is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of
3rd intercostal space, left, 3.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward,
downward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity, penetrating the left ventricle of
the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.;
3. Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity
is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of
4th intercostal space, 12.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward,
downward and medially, penetrating upper lobe of left lung with an approximate
depth of 9.0 cm.;
4. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity
is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of
5th intercostal space, left, 15.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward,
downward and medially, penetrating the left thoracic cavity and then lower lobe of left
lung and then penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of
11.0 cm.;
5. Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity
is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall, level of 7 th intercostal
space, left, 16.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and
medially, into the left thoracic cavity and then penetrating the lower lobe of left lung
with an approximately depth of 10.0 cm.;
6. Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity
is sharp and the other is blunt; located at the lumbar region, left, 14.0 cm. from
anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal
cavity and then penetrating ileum;
7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity
is sharp, lower extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level of 9 th intercostal
space, left; 14.0 cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and
medially, non-penetrating with an approximate depth of 4.0 cm.;
8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity
is blunt, lower extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-lateral aspect,
15.0 cm. from posterior median line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the
abdominal cavity and then perforating the spleen and pancreas with an approximate
depth of 13.0 cm.;
9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity
is blunt, lower extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper third, anterior; directed
backward, downward and medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an
approximate depth of 6.0 cm.;
10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity
is sharp, lower extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm, upper third, anterior;
directed backward, upward and medially and communicating with another wound,
arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0 cm.;
11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity
blunt, lower extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower third, posterior aspect,
directed forward, downward and medially, communicating with another wound, arm,
left, lower third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.
Hemothorax, left 900 c.c.
Hemopericardium 300 c.c.
Hemoperitoneum 750 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple stab wounds.
The Evidence of the Appellant
23
The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He
testified that at around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his
cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City. He
suddenly heard a commotion coming from outside. Julian rushed out of the house to
find out what was going on. The appellant remained inside the house because he
was suffering from ulcer and was experiencing excessive pain in his stomach. The
following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that
Joselito had been stabbed to death. The appellant did not bother to ask who was
responsible for the stabbing.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Julian alias Buboy Cadion corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that the
appellant was in their house on the night of February 5, 1988, and was suffering from
ulcer. The appellant stayed home on the night of the incident. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612,
Int. 4, Allison St., Mandaluyong City, testified that on February 5, 1988 at around
11:00 p.m., she heard a commotion outside. Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into
the kitchen of the house of her niece Teresita; he took a knife and run towards Nueve
de Pebrero Street where Edmar and Julian were fighting. She then followed Ronnie
and saw Joselito trying to pacify the protagonists. Ronnie grabbed Joselito and
instantly stabbed the latter, who for a while retreated and fell down the canal. Not
content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran towards the
direction of the mental hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon or the appellant
anywhere within the vicinity of the incident.11cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero
Street, Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punished
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Pilola is
hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of deceased Joselito Capa alias Jessie in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death jointly
and solidarily with Odilon Lagliba who was earlier convicted herein. With cost against
the accused.12cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY
ANENT THE ASSAILED INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND
IN SETTING ASIDE THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT
WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.13cräläwvirtualibräry
The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of
probative weight. This is so because she contradicted herself when she testified on
direct examination that Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block.
However, on cross-examination, she stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim.
The inconsistency in Elisas testimony impaired her credibility.
The contention of the appellant does not hold water.
First. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de
minimis  importance. The victim died because of multiple wounds. The appellant is
charged with murder for the killing of the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the
other accused.
Second. The perceived inconsistency in Elisas account of events is a minor and
collateral detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves
to strengthen rather than destroy her credibility.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Third. Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the
men who stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon. Elisas testimony is
corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz and his testimony that the
victim sustained eleven stab wounds. The doctor testified that there were two or more
assailants:
Q Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator
in inflicting those two incise wounds?
A Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar
instrument.
Q Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds?
A Yes, sir.
24
Q Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven stab
wounds [are] located?
A Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds?
Q All the eleven stab wounds?
A One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side. Another
stab wound was located also on the chest left side, another stab wound was located
at the antero lateral aspect, its the front of the chest almost to the side. And also
another one, also at the chest, another stab wound was at the left side of the chest
and another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen left side or where the left
kidney is located, lumbar area. Another one at the side of the chest, left side of the
chest. Another stab wound in the abdomen, another stab wound at the left arm.
Another one at the left forearm and the last one in the autopsy report is located at the
left arm. These are all the eleven stab wounds sustained by the victim.
A The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like a
knife, kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.
Q Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there were
several assailants?
A In my opinion, there were more than one assailants (sic) here because of the
presence of different types of stab wounds and lacerated wounds. This lacerated
wound could not have been inflicted by the one holding the one which inflicted the
instrument . . (discontinued) which inflicted the stab wounds.
Q So there could have been two or three assailants?
A More than one.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisas
testimony.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Fourth. Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not
think of any reason why Elisa pointed to him as one of the assailants. In a litany of
cases, we have ruled that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the
part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter
in the commission of the crime, as in the case at bar, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Fifth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisas testimony.
Case law has it that the trial courts calibration of the testimonial evidence of the
parties, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight thereof
is given high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the appellate court.
The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with
Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a
conspirator, his participation in the criminal resolution of another must either precede
or be concurrent with the criminal acts. He asserts that even if it were true that he
was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon who
had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not have
conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter between the
victim, the appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the
appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not
categorically and positively assert as to what part of the victims body was hit by
whom, and how many times the victim was stabbed by the appellant. He asserts that
he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation.
We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide
to commit it.18 Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved
separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are
essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they
had acted with a common purpose and design.19 Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.20 There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the
identities of the other offenders,21 and even though he is not aware of all the details
of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning.22 One need
only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it.23 One who joins a criminal
conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If
conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of
one would be the act of all.24 Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the
others.25cräläwvirtualibräry
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
conspiracy.26 The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not
suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party
25
to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 27 Conspiracy to exist does not
require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the
legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.28 As a rule, the
concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the
evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties
cooperated and labored to the same end.29cräläwvirtualibräry
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they
may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt
acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim,
applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It
is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victims death. Both the
offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and
separate overt criminal acts.30 Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders,
they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a
principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice, under Article 18 of
the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the
community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime.31 Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by
direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony
and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices
do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan
of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its
accomplishment.32 However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime
by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal
by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. 33cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant
and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the
victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also
stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously
stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together,
while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie
returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle.
Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant
before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to
kill the victim.
The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons.
There is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs
criminis, the victim was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the
appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing the victim, the crime was already
consummated.
All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to
kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The
appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.
Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the
victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct
participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and
accelerated the death of the victim or contributed materially
thereto.34cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not
the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but
hard to disprove. To serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. For it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was
absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been present then. 35 In this case, the appellant
avers that at the time of the stabbing incident, he was resting in the house of his
cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he was suffering from stomach pain due to
his ulcer.36 But the appellant failed to adduce any medical certificate that he was
suffering from the ailment. Moreover, Elisa positively identified the appellant as one
of the men who repeatedly stabbed the victim. The appellants defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive and straightforward identification of the appellant as one of
the victims assailants. The appellant himself admitted that his cousins house, the
place where he was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed, was merely ten to
fifteen meters away from the scene of the stabbing. Indeed, the appellants defense of
denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive
testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elisa Rolan.37cräläwvirtualibräry
26
The appellants defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from
the situs criminis and later left his house. The records show that despite being
informed that he was sought after by the authorities as a suspect for the killing of the
victim, the appellant suddenly and inscrutably disappeared from his residence at
Nueve de Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988, a subpoena for the appellant was
returned unserved because he was out of town. 38 The appellants own witness, Julian
Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was no longer seen at Nueve de
Pebrero after the incident, thus:
Q So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?
A One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve
de Pebrero?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.
Q And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero. Is that what
you were then saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola
there?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.39cräläwvirtualibräry
The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the
victim. However, instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he adroitly evaded
arrest. The appellants flight is evidence of guilt and, from the factual circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar, no reason can be deduced from it other than that he was
driven by a strong sense of guilt and admission that he had no tenable defense. 40
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
and the Proper Penalty Therefor
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery.
Abuse of superior strength likewise attended the commission of the crime. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. 41 In this
case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. Odilon, without provocation,
suddenly placed his arm around the victims neck and forthwith stabbed the latter.
The victim had no inkling that he would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify
Edmar and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant, both also armed with deadly weapons,
rushed to the scene and stabbed the victim, giving no real opportunity for the latter to
defend himself. And even as the victim was already sprawled on the canal, Ronnie
bashed his head with a hollow block. The peacemaker became the victim of violence.
Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was
executed in a treacherous manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of
the victim. As testified to by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was stabbed, not just
once, but eleven times mostly on the chest and the abdominal area. Six of the stab
wounds were fatal, causing damage to the victims vital internal
organs.42cräläwvirtualibräry
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by
treachery.43 There is no mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the
felony. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since no aggravating and mitigating circumstances
attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua,
conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita
Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in accord with current
jurisprudence.44 The said heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P50,000, also conformably to current jurisprudence.45 In addition, the heirs are
entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.46cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the victim
Joselito Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity; the amount of P50,000 as
moral damages; and the amount of P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,  (Chairman), and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez,  J., on official leave.
27
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172695              June 29, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Information1 dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo was
charged with the crime of parricide, committed as follows:
That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Isaias Castillo y
Completo, while conveniently armed with illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow,
with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right side
of her neck causing the laceration of the jugular vein which caused her instantaneous
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and raffled to Branch 24 of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on April 15, 1994. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently in the
evening of November 5, 1993. The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage due
to "laceration of the jugular vein of her neck". According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina,
Municipal Health Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who conducted the autopsy on the
victim’s body, the fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument like a nail".
There is no dispute likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling, his
wife hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The letters written
by the accused from his detention cell addressed to his mother-in-law, to his father-
in-law, and lastly, the victim’s sister, speak so eloquently of someone who accepts
the fault for the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness from the close relatives
of the victim is a clear admission of authorship of the fatal act.
In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do the fatal
harm to his wife. This is the same issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether or not
the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental.
xxxx
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening of
November 5, 1993, between 9:00 o’clock to 10:00 o’clock, the accused came home
drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked the door and table, and then
threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But
the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his sling and
arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo
transferred to the adjacent house of her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there,
Guillermo heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo
concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening inside the house of
Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying the
bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia
to the hospital but to no avail.
From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia
was preceded by a quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated the
accused’s version that he was practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia was
hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the prosecution’s contention that the shooting
was intentional.
x x x To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the use of said
weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to
rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and
arrow inside his house.
It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the
hospital and while on the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta
further testified that while the victim was being attended to by the medical personnel
of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital premises, then he
disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside
the comfort room of a premises in an adjoining barangay. The accused’s omission to
surrender himself to the authorities is a clear indication of guilt. 3
28
After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5, 1998, a decision, 4 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS CASTILLO Y COMPLETO
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and hereby sentences
him to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.5
Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a
Decision6 dated February 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied appellant’s appeal
and affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 5, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 of Biñan, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.7
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated
June 16, 2005.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence on which his conviction
was based did not sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that the
prosecution failed to prove his motive in killing his wife; or that they had a quarrel
immediately prior to the incident.
Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the one who shot
his wife with a deadly arrow considering that at the time of the incident, he and his
drinking buddies were all engaged in target shooting using the sling and arrow.
Hence, he surmised that any one of them could have shot the victim. At any rate,
even assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and
not intentional.
Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining
barangay, while his wife was being treated in the hospital, likewise does not prove his
complicity since the prosecution did not prove that he deliberately hid inside the toilet.
Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law where
he asked for forgiveness should not be considered as admission of guilt.
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the
basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
guilty person.8 Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind"
is required.9
In the instant case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a
conviction, are present. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the following
pieces of circumstantial evidence indubitably established that appellant was the
perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia about the violent behavior of her
(Consortia) husband, herein accused-appellant. And even if Consortia would not tell
Leticia about the beatings, the latter would see her face with black eyes as evident
proofs of maltreatment.
2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk and
displaying violent behavior, kicking the door and table.
3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and practicing his sling and arrow.
4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard crying and shouting.
5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying Consortia, bloodied and
unconscious, to be brought to the hospital where she later died.
6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia sustained a punctured wound in the
neck which fatally lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the wound was a pointed
object.
29
7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to the parents and sister of
Consortia asking for forgiveness.
Also notable is accused-appellant’s behavior immediately after the incident. He
disappeared and did not enter the clinic where Consortia was rushed for treatment.
And when Consortia’s sister later sought police assistance in searching for accused-
appellant, the latter was found by the police hiding inside a toilet at a nearby
barangay.10
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove motive
in killing his wife. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense
on which his conviction rests.11 Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.
If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
presumed.12
In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established appellant’s
intent to kill his wife:
First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and
his wife. Leticia, the victim’s sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the
violent behavior of the appellant who would often lay hand on the victim during their
marital squabbles.
Guillermo, appellant’s father-in-law, testified that on the night of the incident,
appellant arrived in their conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the
door and table and threw away the electric fan. Guillermo tried to prevail upon
appellant but to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling and arrow which he kept
near the ceiling.
Guillermo left appellant’s house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law,
Yolanda, located about four meters away; but he could still hear the victim and
appellant arguing and shouting at each other. After a while, Guillermo requested
Yolanda to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda met the appellant carrying
Consorcia soaked in blood.
Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human
nature.13 In the instant case, appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was
rushed to the hospital. This is indeed contrary to human nature. A husband is
expected to lend comfort to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this case, however,
appellant took flight. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent
evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this case, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 14
Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a toilet at the adjoining
barangay is not an indication of guilt because the prosecution failed to prove that he
deliberately hid in order to evade being arrested. 15
The contention lacks merit.
As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a husband to leave his dying
wife, more so if his absence is unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation
for his flight. In appellant’s brief, he claimed that in "all probability, it might have
happened that he (appellant) was merely answering the call of nature at the precise
time when he was arrested."16 However, we find it is highly illogical for appellant to go
as far as the adjoining barangay to answer the call of nature especially since he
could do so inside the premises of the hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he was
fearful of reprisal coming from the victim’s relatives17 is contrary to his claim of
innocence.
Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellant’s intent to
kill the victim. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured
wound in the neck, a vital organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing
massive hemorrhage. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased
manifests appellant’s intention to extinguish life.18
Fourth: As regards appellant’s act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and
bringing her to the hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an
indication of an act of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant. 19
In fine, all these circumstances prove appellant’s intent to harm his wife.
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that he was not the one who shot
the deadly arrow because at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies
were all playing and practicing target shooting with the use of the sling and arrow.
Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically testified that appellant was
alone with his wife inside their house when the incident happened. This completely
discounts the possibility that other than appellant, there could be another person or
persons who could have perpetrated the crime. There is no paucity of evidence
because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the victim up to the time
Yolanda saw him carrying his wife, were all accounted for. Moreover, the testimony of
defense witness Galang supports the prosecution’s contention that appellant was
alone with his wife at the time of the incident. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
30
Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking buddies and
headed home at about 9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00
p.m. when he saw that Consortia was being rushed to the hospital. Instead of
weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galang’s testimony even supports the
prosecution’s version that between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night,
accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk, presumably going home from that
drinking session with his friends. x x x20
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that assuming he was the one
who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting
circumstance of accident is not applicable in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence.21 The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden
of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.22
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be
considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s
defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act
during the incident. As correctly found by the trial court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In
penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was
used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it
be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the standards as an instrument for
archery competitions. To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the
use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even
failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the accused was keeping said
sling and arrow inside his house.23
Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden of
proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of
responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can
not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. 24 Other than his claim
that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the
same.
Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellant’s contention that the letters he wrote
to his parents-in-law and sister-in-law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not be
considered as an implied admission of guilt. He claimed that he wrote the letters in
order to explain that what happened was an accident and that he was to be blamed
for it because he allowed his drinking buddies to play with the sling and arrow.
Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some
wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise.25 Under the present circumstances, appellant’s plea for forgiveness
should be received as an implied admission of guilt. Besides, contrary to appellant’s
assertion, the killing of Consorcia was deliberate, and not by accident.
Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of
the lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the trial court’s factual
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our function to analyze and weigh
the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe a
possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an appeal via
certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might
have been committed by the Court of Appeals.26
Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00
and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 were properly awarded by the
courts below.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 2005 which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, finding appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo
guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the heirs of his victim ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
31

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143838 - May 9, 2002
ADELMO PEREZ Y AGUSTIN, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision, dated December 16, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
19971 affirming the conviction of petitioner Adelmo Perez y Agustin for the crime of
Attempted Rape.
The Information filed against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of
Balanga, Bataan reads:
That on or about April 14, 1988 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation, commence the
commission of the crime of rape upon Julita Tria y Balagao directly by overt acts, to
wit:
That the said accused, without the permission of anyone, entered the room of Julita
Tria and once inside, embraced and kissed her on the neck, held and mashed her
breast and compelled her to lie down, and thereafter kissed her lips and neck and
with the intent of having carnal knowledge with her, touched her sex organ and tried
to remove her panties thereby commencing [t]he commission of the crime of Rape
directly by overt acts but said accused did not accomplish his purpose, that is, to
have a carnal knowledge with her, it was not because of his spontaneous and
voluntary desistance but because the said Julita Tria succeeding in resisting his
criminal attempt and also due to the timely arrival of her mother to the damage and
prejudice of the said Julita Tria y Balagao.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 complainant, testified as to the extent of injuries sustained by her and that the slight
At his arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial
ensued.
To buttress its case against petitioner, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
Eufemia Tria, mother of the complainant, Julita Tria, the complainant, and Dr.
Emmanuel Cortez-Asuncion. As culled from the decision of the CA, these witnesses
testified as follows:
Eufemia Tria, in her testimony, gave an account of the incident that took place in the
morning of April 14, 1988. She was then washing clothes outside their house when
she heard someone cry "Inay". She then peeped into their window which was just a
few meters from where she was and there saw her daughter Julita lying flat on a
bamboo bed with her skirt raised. She sat accused Adelmo on top of Julita with her
hands pinned down. As accused was kissing her daughter in the neck, his buttocks
were moving in an up and down motion while her daughter was fighting back and
struggling to break free. Eufemia then rushed straight to the room where she found
accused hiding under the bamboo bed. She then ordered the accused to come out
which he did. She thought of hacking the accused with the bolo which she found
hanging on the wall but realized that she could not do it and instead dragged the
accused out of the house and brought him to his parents' house to tell them what
happened.
Complainant Julita Tria testified that in the morning of April 14, 1988, after she was
through with washing the dishes, she proceeded to the bedroom to store away their,
beddings. Suddenly, out of nowhere, accused appeared pulled her by the hand,
embraced her from behind and held her breasts. At this juncture, he pulled her to the
bamboo bed, positioned himself on top of her and placed her hands behind her as he
kissed her lips and neck. She tried to avoid his kisses by moving her head from side
to side. As she was pinned by accused's vise-like grip, accused then managed to
insert his right hand inside her t-shirt and bra and squeezed nipples. Thereafter, he
tried to raise her balloon-like skirt with his right hand, inserted it inside her panty and
held her private part while making up and down motions. Accused then retorted "Sige
na, pagbigyan mo na ako." It was at this point when she cried out "Inay". Shortly
thereafter, her mother entered the room and found the accused under the bamboo
bed.
Complainant further testified that it was not the first time that accused assaulted her.
On March 25, 1988, while she was in the kitchen doing the dishes, accused suddenly
appeared at her back with unzipped shorts and bare torso, embraced her and warned
her not to make a sound or else he would kill her. He then jumped out of the window
and fled. She did not tell anybody about this incident for fear that accused will make
good his promise.
Dr. Emmanuel Cortez-Asuncion who conducted the medical examination on the
physical injuries could have been caused by attempted rape (TSN, September 16,
1988).2
32
For its part, the defense presented as its witnesses Junar Perez and petitioner. They
testified as follows:
Junar Perez is a ten (10) year old grade IV honor pupil who at the time of the incident
was on vacation at his grandmother's place. In the morning of April 14, 1988, he was
playing with his cousins near the house of his Auntie Feming (Julita's mother) when
he got thirsty and asked for a drink in the latter's house. There he saw Julita and
accused conversing while seated on a bench near the door. He also saw Eufemia
washing clothes a few meters away from Julita and the accused. He did not hear any
noise in the house.
Accused Adelmo Perez declared that he was in Julita's house that morning of April
14, 1988 upon her prodding for him to come over as he would often do. When Junar
had left the house, he invited Julita to the room where they could not be seen by her
mother, there they embraced and kissed, he then inserted his hand insider her
clothes, held her breast and slowly laid her on the bamboo bed. Shortly thereafter,
her mother called Julita so she stood up but later returned and they again resumed
embracing and kissing after which they laid down on the bamboo bed and he was
able to place himself on top of her. He sensed that someone had entered the house
and so stood up and hid under the bed upon Julita's advice. He denied that the acts
done were against Julita's will. In fact, he claimed that he and Julita were already
becoming intimate.3
After the prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence, the trial
court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of attempted rape. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused, Adelmo Perez y
Agustin, of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the prosecution having proved his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Said accused is hereby sentenced to jail term of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (10) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He shall be credited with
time spent under detention.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The appellate court, finding the appeal to
be unmeritorious, affirmed petitioner's conviction. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner now comes to this Court assailing the decision of the CA. Petitioner raises
the following issues:
I
WAS THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONER ATTEMPTED RAPE OR
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS; and
II
DID THE PROSECUTION PRESENT THE QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY
TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The petition is partly meritorious. The issues shall be discussed jointly as they are
interrelated.
To exculpate himself, petitioner impugns the credibility of the complainant. Petitioner
contradicts the complainant's allegations as he (petitioner) insists that what
transpired between them was a consensual act.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the determination of credibility of witnesses is
properly within the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe their
demeanor and bodily movements.6 The trial court in this case found the witnesses for
the prosecution and their version of the incident more credible as it made these
findings:
No woman would ordinarily complain to the police and concoct a story that an uncle
attempted to rape her, or subject herself to medical examination of her private parts,
unless righteous indignation compelled her. This was particularly reinforced by the
fact that she submitted herself thereto that afternoon of the same day, accompanied
by her father and mother.
Julita's and her mother's accounts were clear, spontaneous, natural and credible as
weighed against the flimsy excuse of the accused.
The physician admitted that the physical injuries suffered by Julita could have been
caused by attempted rape.
Julita would not have shouted, "Inay" if she liked and consented to what her uncle
was doing to her. The intact hymen of Julita also disproves the accused's declaration
that they were "getting intimate." He himself refused to call themselves lovers.
33
The intention to force Julita to submit to sexual intercourse has been proved by these A: - I was lying face up your Honor.
pieces of evidence which have not been refuted or disproved: he suddenly kissed, xxx
embraced and dragged her to the bamboo bed where he continued to kiss her lips Q: - And while you were in that position or "nakatihaya po ako," what else did Adelmo
and neck; then squeezed her nipples and mashed her breast by inserting his hand in Perez do?
her panty and held her vagina, doing the up and down movement as he held her A: - He placed himself on top of me, sir.
hands under her with his left hand; he unzipped his short pants; put out his penis Q: - What was his position?
while on top of her, as Julita struggled, kicked and pushed (after he [sic] hands were A: - He was lying face down on me.
freed) to extricate herself. The medical certificate found physical injuries in the neck Q: - When you said Adelmo Perez succeeded in lying down in the wooden papag,
and navel which could have been caused by blunt force, FORCE WOULD HAVE what was the position of your feet?
BEEN UNNECESSARY IF JULITA CONSENTED TO THESE ACTS.7 A: - They were hanging from the edge of the "papag" your honor.
xxx
These findings of the trial court had been affirmed by the CA. The Court is not Q: - And while your two hands were at your back, the way you demonstrated where
inclined to deviate from these courts' findings that petitioner, against the will of the was Adelmo Perez?
complainant, performed sexual acts on the latter. However, a careful review of the A: - He was on top of me, sir.
records of the case shows that the crime committed by petitioner was acts of Q: - And what was he doing?
lasciviousness not attempted rape. A: - He was kissing me on my lips and my neck, sir.
Q: - And while Adelmo Perez was kissing you, what did you do, if you did anything?
A: - I was trying to avoid his face sir by moving my face.
Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender
xxx
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform
Q: - What exactly did you want to do with that movement?
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
A: - I was trying to avoid his face by moving my face, so that he could not kiss me
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape,
and I was trying to extricate myself.
penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. 8 Thus, for there to
Q: - So what you were trying to avoid is his face?
be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his
A: - Yes, your honor.
sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his
Q: - You mean his right hand was free but it was not doing anything?
own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.
A: - It was moving your Honor.
Q: - But it was not doing anything aside from merely moving?
There is no showing in this case that petitioner's sexual organ had even touched A: - His right hand was doing something.
complainant's vagina nor any part of her body. The complainant testified as follows: Q: - Precisely you were asked.
A: - He inserted his right hand inside my T-shirt and inside my bra.
Q: - After Adelmo Perez embraced you by the way you demonstrated, what else did Q: - And after, when the right hand of Adelmo Perez was inside your bra, what did he
Adelmo Perez do? do or what was his right hand doing inside your bra?
A: - He pulled me towards the bamboo bed (papag). A: - He was mashing my nipple, sir.
Q: - How did he pull you towards the bamboo bed? Q: - Which nipples?
A: - While he was embracing me. A: - Both nipples, Your Honor.
Q: - He pulled you towards the wooden bed while he was holding you or embracing Q: - You mean your brassier was not detached but his hand was inside, between
you in that position you are demonstrating? your brassier and the nipple?
A: - Yes, sir. A: - Yes, Your Honor.
xxx Q: - While the right hand of Adelmo Perez was inside your bra and squeezing your
Q: - While you were sitting on the lap of the accused Adelmo Perez, what else did nipple, what else did he do?
Adelmo Perez do to you? A: - He took his hand off from the inside of my T-shirt and he tried to raise my skirt,
A: - He laid me face up on the "papag" or on the wooden bed, sir. sir.
Q: - Did he manage to lay you down on the wooden papag? xxx
A - Yes, your honor. Q: - And while the accused Adelmo Perez tried to raise your skirt, what else did you
xxx do?
Q: - How were you positioned in (sic) the wooden bed or "papag" after Adelmo Perez A: - He inserted his hand inside my panties and held my vagina, sir.
succeed in lying you down?
34
Q: - What did he use in holding your vagina? found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as
A: - Right hand, sir. defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced
Q: - And when he held your vagina, what did his right hand do with your vagina? to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4
A: - He held it, sir. years and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum.
xxx
Q: - What happened next? SO ORDERED.
A: - After he held my vagina he told me "Sige na, pagbigyan mo na ako" and that was
the time I shouted. Davide, Jr., Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ.,  concur.
xxx
Q: - What did you say when you shouted?
A: - I said "Inay" (The witness shouted).9

Petitioner's acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her,
mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual
organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted
rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into
the complainant's sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness.
The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation or
(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is
another person of either sex.10

All these elements are present and have been sufficiently established in this case.
Petitioner clearly committed lewd acts against the complainant. Moreover, petitioner
employed force when he committed these acts on the complainant. In fact, as found
by the trial court, there were bruises on complainant's neck and navel which belie
petitioner's claim that the complainant consented to these acts.

Although the information filed against petitioner was for attempted rape, he can be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the crime of acts of lasciviousness is
included in rape.11

The penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional.12 There being no

aggravating or mitigating circumstance alleged and proven in this case, the penalty
prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period,13 i.e., from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, said penalty shall constitute the maximum term, while the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense, i.e., arresto mayor or 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. Petitioner
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated December 16, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 19971 is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Adelmo Perez y Agustin is

35
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 173791 : April 7, 2009]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PABLO AMODIA, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Makati City in
Criminal Case No. 97-289. The RTC found the accused-appellant Pablo Amodia
(Pablo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the corresponding civil liabilities to
the heirs of the victim.
Pablo was indicted, together with three other accused, under the following
Information:2
That on or about the 26th day of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
while armed with a piece of wood and bladed weapon, taking advantage of their
superior strength [sic] and employing means to weaken the defense, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon one FELIX OLANDRIA y BERGAÑO, by beating him on the head with
a piece of wood and stabbing him repeatedly on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal/fatal stab wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Information, dated February 21, 1997, was filed with the court on February 28,
1997.
Pablo was arrested on June 5, 1998 and was thereafter prosecuted. The other
accused remained at large.4 Pablo moved to quash the Information on the ground of
mistaken identity and the staleness of the warrant of arrest issued on March 4, 1997.
The RTC denied his motion.5
Pablo entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge when arraigned on August 3, 1998. 6
The Prosecution's Version
The prosecution presented evidence, both documentary 7 and testimonial,8 to
establish that Pablo was one of the four assailants who, by their concerted efforts,
killed Felix Olandria y Bergaño (victim).9 Acting together, they hit him on the head
and stabbed him.
The records show that Romildo Ceno (Romildo) was a resident of Zone 17, Pembo,
Makati City and lived in the house of Freda Elnar (Freda). 10 At around 12:05 a.m. of
November 26, 1996, he, Mario Bitco (Mario), 11 and Freda were talking and watching
television at their house12 when he heard a noise coming somewhere below the C-5
bridge, located some forty (40) to fifty (50) meters away from their house; he also
heard somebody shout "may away doon."13 Curious, he and Mario went to the
bridge14 and saw five persons whom he identified as the victim, Pablo, Arnold
Partosa (Arnold), George Palacio (George),15 and Damaso Amodia (Damaso). He
knew these men; the victim was his neighbor, while Pablo, Arnold, George and
Damaso were residents of Scorpion Street, Zone 17 Pembo, Makati City. 16
When Romildo was about three arms-length away from the place of the commotion,
then illuminated by light coming from a Meralco post located some five (5) to six (6)
meters from the scene, he saw the victim being held on his right hand by Pablo, while
the other hand was held by Arnold.17 George was positioned at the victim's back and
clubbed the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and stabbed him
three times.18
Luther Caberte (Luther), who happened to be passing by the C-5 Bridge at the time,
also saw what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting under the C-5 Bridge
which was illuminated by a light coming from a lamppost located some ten (10)
meters away.19 From his vantage point (about 15 meters away from the fight), he saw
Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up (pinagtulung-tulungan) on the
victim.20 He saw Pablo holding the victim's hand while Damaso was stabbing him. He
also confirmed that George was positioned behind the victim. 21 He personally knew
both Pablo and the victim; they have been neighbors since 1986. 22
Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the stabbing; Romildo was chased away by
George and Damaso, while Luther went home immediately. Both were shaken and
shocked with what they had seen.23
At 3:00 a.m. of the same day, the CID Homicide received a report of an unidentified
body found in a road along Comembo Bridge, Barangay Pembo.24 SPO2 Romeo
Ubana (SPO2 Ubana), a police investigator assigned to the CID Homicide, and a
police photographer went to the place and saw the body of a dead male person with
36
three stab wounds whom they subsequently identified as the victim. 25 He prepared a
Final Investigation Report of the incident.26
After the spot investigation, the victim's body was taken to the Veronica Memorial
Chapel where Dr. Antonio Bertido (Dr. Bertido), a National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Medico Legal Officer, subjected it to a post-mortem examination. 27 The autopsy
yielded the following findings:
Pallor, intergument and nailbeds.
Stab wounds.
1. Elongated 4.5. cms. Edges are clean cut, medial border is sharp, lateral border is
blunt. Located at the chest, anterior, left side, 6.0 cms. From the anterior median line.
Directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and underlying soft
tissues, into the thoracic cavity, perforating the pericardial sac, into the pericardial
cavity, penetrating the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cms.
2. Elongated, 3.5 cms edges are clean cut, medial border is blunt, lateral border is
sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, left side, 6.5 cms. From the anterior
median line. Directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and
underlying soft tissues, perforating the stomach with an approximate depth of 14.0
cms.
3. Elongated, 3.0 cms, edges are clean-cut, medial border is blunt, lateral border is
sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side. 2.0 cms. From the anterior
median line. Directed backwards, upwards and laterally involving the skin and
underlying soft tissues, penetrating the head of the pancreas with an approximate
depth of 12.0 cms.28
Dr. Bertido stated that the victim was stabbed three times on the body by a single-
bladed sharp-pointed instrument.29 Through the use of an anatomic diagram, Dr.
Bertido showed that the victim was stabbed on his left chest and over his right and
left abdominals.30 He also stated that of the three stab wounds, the wound on the
victim's chest was the most fatal because it was near his heart, while the other
wounds involved the victim's stomach and pancreas.31 Dr. Bertido declared that no
other wound, aside from the three stab wounds, was found on the victim's body. 32 He
later on executed a Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination showing the cause of
death as hemorrhage, secondary to stab wounds.33
Dr. Bertido admitted that while he could not specifically determine the position of the
victim at the time he was stabbed, he was certain that the stab wounds were inflicted
when the victim and his assailant were facing each other. 34 He also disclosed that the
sizes of the wounds were different from each other.35
The prosecution also presented Claudio Olandria, 36 the victim's father, who took the
witness stand and testified on the expenses that he and his family incurred by reason
of his son's death.
The Defense's Version
The defense relied on the defense of alibi, submitting testimonial and documentary
evidence37 to support Pablo's claim that he was in another place at the time of the
stabbing.
Pablo averred that his name is Pablito Amodia and stated that at the time of the
incident, he lived in the house of Elma Amodia Romero (Elma), his sister, located at
Zone 13, Ilocos Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City.38 He has lived there since 1994.
He claimed that he was at home in the evening of November 25, 1996, until the early
morning of the next day.39 At around 10:00 of that evening, his brother - Elias Amodia
(Elias) - who lived next door, awakened him40 and told him that his (Elias') wife, then
pregnant, had started having labor pains.41 He went back to sleep only to be
awakened by Elias at past 12:00 midnight. Elias then requested him to take care of
his house.42
Pablo related that it was at this time that Damaso (another brother), George, Arnold,
and another person he did not know, came to Elma's house. 43 He noticed that
Damaso was in a hurry and was packing his clothes; the latter told him that they
(Damaso and his companions) encountered trouble.44 Damaso and his companions
left past midnight; on the other hand, he went to Elias' house to take care of the
latter's children, while Elias and his wife went to a lying-in clinic. 45 While at Elias'
house, Elma visited him to check on him and the children. 46 He stayed there until
9:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996 when he went back to Elma's house; he went to
school later in the day.47
Pablo also alleged that it was only after returning from school that he came to know
of the victim's death; he only knew the victim by name and even went to the victim's
wake the first night.48
He further alleged that he stopped schooling for lack of funds and went to
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1997.49 He went back to Manila on May 22, 1998 to
continue his education, but was arrested on June 5, 1998. 50
Elma and Elias corroborated Pablo's story.51 Elma stated that Pablo lived with her in
their brother's house together with her husband, their children, and Damaso. 52 She
added that Damaso told her that they were in trouble (atraso) because of a fight, and
that he and his companions were on their way to Cebu. 53 Elma declared that Pablo
was with her when Damaso came to the house to pack his clothes. 54 Pablo and
Damaso left at 12:30, but for different destinations. 55 She knew that Pablo went to
Elias' house because she went to check on him and the children around 1 a.m. and
37
then again at 2 a.m.56 Elias' wife gave birth to a baby girl at 2:50 p.m. of November
26, 1996.57
After some prodding, Elma admitted that she knew that cases have been filed against
Pablo and Damaso as early as December 1996.58 The defense thereafter rested its
case.
Prosecution's Rebuttal Evidence
The prosecution presented Amelita Sagarino, a resident of Scorpion Street, Zone 17
since 1989, as a rebuttal witness.59 She testified that she knew the victim and the
accused who were all her neighbors.60 She stated that she served food at the victim's
wake from seven in the evening up to six in the morning and that she never saw
Pablo there.61 She also heard from her neighbors that the people responsible for the
victim's death were George, Arnold, Damaso, Pabling and Pablito Amodia. 62 She
clarified that Pabling and Pablito Amodia are one and the same person. 63
Subsequently, she stated that Pablito Amodia also attended the wake of the victim. 64
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC convicted Pablo of murder after finding sufficient evidence of his identity,
role in the crime as principal by direct participation, and conspiracy between him and
the other accused who used their superior strength to weaken the victim. The RTC
relied on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Romildo and Luther, the autopsy results
conducted on the body of the victim, and the lack of physical impossibility on the part
of Pablo to be at the crime scene. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Pablo guilty of having committed the crime of
murder as principal by conspiracy. Considering that there are no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, pursuant to
Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, accused is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. He is further sentence to pay the heirs of the
deceased Felix Olandria the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to
reimburse said heirs of the amount of P23,568.00 for expenses incurred for the
funeral service, burial and incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED.65
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC's findings and affirmed Pablo's
conviction.66 The CA, however, corrected the RTC's ruling on the applicable provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code), and modified the award of actual
damages, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated July 19, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with
Rule 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, P23,268.00, as actual damages, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00,
as exemplary damages, in addition to the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
In his Brief before this Court,67 Pablo assigns the following errors committed by both
the RTC and CA:
(1) In finding that his guilt for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
(2) In finding the existence of conspiracy.
Pablo argues that the lower courts erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to his
alibi, thus disregarding the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor. 68 He
emphasizes that his alibi was corroborated by defense witness Elma who confirmed
that he was at Elias's house at the time of the stabbing. 69
He alternatively argues that granting that he was a part of Damaso's group and that
this group killed the victim, the prosecution failed to prove the conspiracy among
them; there was no evidence adduced to establish how the incident that led to the
stabbing began. Any doubt that he acted as a principal should have been resolved in
his favor.70
In their Brief,71 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) representing the People,
maintain that no reversible error was committed by the lower courts. The OSG avers
that the prosecution's evidence has satisfactorily proven all the elements of the
crime. Similarly, the conspiracy between Pablo and the three accused was proven by
the autopsy report which corroborated the categorical testimonies of Romildo and
Luther on how the accused and the others acted, clearly showing a unity of purpose
in the accomplishment of their criminal objective.72 The testimonies of these two
eyewitnesses also reveal that the killing was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and the employment of means to weaken
the defense of the victim. These circumstances qualify the killing to murder.
38
 The Court's Ruling
We affirm Pablo's conviction.
The appeal essentially attacks the soundness of the factual findings of the RTC and
CA that, according to Pablo, are not in accord with the totality of the evidence in the
case. He emphasizes that the RTC and CA disregarded his alibi and the lack of
evidence establishing a conspiracy to kill the victim.
A review of the records fails to persuade us to overturn Pablo's judgment of
conviction. We have emphasized often enough that the factual findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their
probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts
and circumstances of substance were ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted,
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. 73 Under the circumstances,
we find no exceptional reason to warrant a deviation from this rule.
The records show that both the RTC and CA convicted Pablo of murder based on the
positive identification by Romildo and Luther and their eyewitness accounts of the
actual killing, showing the existence of a conspiracy among Pablo's group to kill the
victim. The CA decision clearly reflects these findings and reasoning:
The evidence on record gives the picture of the incident at the time when Felix
Olandria was already being held on both hands by accused Pablo Amodia and
Arnold Pantosa. It was while in this position that accused Damaso Amodia delivered
three (3) stab blows which proved to be fatal . . . 74
Both courts gathered, too, from these testimonies that the killing was qualified by the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, demonstrated by the
concerted efforts of Pablo's group to overpower the victim's strength with their own in
carrying out their criminal plan:
'the nature of the evidence presented, there are sufficient reasons to conclude and
consider as having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of
conspiracy and the qualifying aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and employment of means to weaken the defense. These are: first, the
convergence of four (4) accused; x x x second, the time when the four (4) accused
were seen together which is about 12:05 in the early morning of November 26, 1997;
x x x third, the place where they were seen together which is below the bridge of C-5;
fourth, possession by accused Damaso Amodia of a knife his occupation being that
of a painter; fifth, absence of any other injuries in other parts of the body of the victim
Felix Olandria x x x; sixth, the location of the three stab wounds all of which were
directed against delicate parts of the body indicating intent to kill' The foregoing
circumstances clearly proven by the prosecution evidence, when taken together with
the fact that death ensued indicate that there was conspiracy on the part of the
accused that they abused their superior strength and employed means to weaken the
defense. The act of one is to be considered therefore the act of the other. 75
The Eyewitnesses Testimonies.
The RTC and CA found the identification made by Romildo and Luther to be clear,
categorical, and consistent.76 We observed that in accepting the truth of the
identification and the account of how the stabbing took place, the RTC and CA
considered the witnesses' proximity to the victim and his assailants at the time of the
stabbing - they were about three arms length away and 15 meters away,
respectively; the well-lighted condition of the crime scene; and the familiarity of these
eyewitnesses with the victim and his assailants - they were all residents of the same
area. Similarly, we also note that no evidence was presented to establish that these
eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will against Pablo and had no reason to fabricate their
testimonies. The weight of jurisprudence is to accept these kinds of testimonies as
true for being consistent with the natural order of events, human nature and the
presumption of good faith.77
Aside from these, we additionally note that Romildo and Luther never wavered,
despite the contrary efforts of the defense, in their positive identification of Pablo as
one of the assailants of the victim. The records glaringly show the defense counsel's
vain efforts to prove that these eyewitnesses committed a mistake in identifying
Pablo as one of the assailants since his name was allegedly Pablito Amadio, and not
Pablo.
We state in this regard that positive identification pertains essentially to proof of
identity and not necessarily to the name of the assailant. A mistake in the name of
the accused is not equivalent, and does not necessarily amount to, a mistake in the
identity of the accused especially when sufficient evidence is adduced to show that
the accused is pointed to as one of the perpetrators of the crime. In this case, the
defense's line of argument is negated by the undisputed fact that the accused's
identity was known to both the eyewitnesses. On the one hand, we have Romildo's
testimony stating that Pablo lived across Scorpion Street from where he lived. 78 He
also stated that he had known Pablo for more than a year. 79 On the other hand,
Luther testified that he had known Pablo since 1986 because they were neighbors
and that he even played basketball with him.80 We stress that Pablo never denied
these allegations.
In People v. Ducabo, we took notice of the human trait that once a person knows
another through association, identification becomes an easy task even from a
considerable distance; most often, the face and body movements of the person
identified has created a lasting impression on the identifier's mind that cannot easily
be erased.81
39
The association the eyewitnesses cited - specifically, being neighbors and even
basketball game mates - rendered them familiar with Pablo, making it highly unlikely
that they could have committed a mistake in identifying him as one of the assailants.
Their identification came at the first opportunity (i.e., when they revealed) what they
knew of the killing, and culminated with their courtroom identification of Pablo as
among those who assaulted the victim. 82
Two reasons settle the argument about Pablo's name against his favor. It strikes us
that this argument is a line of defense that came only as the defense's turn to present
evidence neared. We have on record that prior to the defense's presentation of
evidence, Pablo referred to himself as Pablo Amodia when the court asked him his
name.83 We likewise find no competent evidence, other than his assertion and those
of his siblings, showing that his true name is really Pablito Amodia. We therefore
conclude that any uncertainty on the name by which the accused is or should be
known is an extraneous matter that in no way renders his identification as a
participant in the stabbing uncertain.
We find nothing irregular, unusual, or inherently unbelievable, in the eyewitnesses'
testimonies that would affect their credibility. Their narratives are remarkably
compatible with the physical evidence on hand; likewise, their accounts are also
consistent with each other. More importantly, the narration of these eyewitnesses are
in full accord with the human experience of individuals who are exposed to a startling
event and their initial reluctance to involve themselves in the criminal matters
especially those involving violent crimes committed by individuals known to them.
The Defense of Alibi
Pablo argues that his alibi should have been given greater evidentiary weight
because it was corroborated by his sister, Elma. As reproduced by Pablo in his Brief,
the substance of Elma's testimony is as follows:
Q: Mrs. Witness while you were sleeping which you said you start sleeping at 10:00
o'clock in the evening of November 25, 1996, while you were sleeping, what
transpired, if any, was there any unusual incident that transpired? [sic]
A: Pumunta po ang isang kapatid ko, si Elias Amodia dahil naglalabor daw and hipag
ko at manganganak at dadalhin niya sa lying-in, eh malayo po at siya ang
pinagbabantay sa mga pamangking kong maliliit, sir.
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court what time did your brother Elias Amodia wake
up Pablo Amodia?cralawred
A: 12:00 midnight, sir.
xxx
Q: When Pablo woke up, what if any did Pablo Amodia do?cralawred
A: Pumunta po siya sa bahay ng kapatid ko, sir?
Q: And where was that house of your brother Elias located?cralawred
A: Malapit lang po sa amin.
Q: How far is your house to his house?cralawred
A: Tatlong (3) dipa po ang layo, sir.84
Alibi is a defense that comes with various jurisprudentially-established limitations. A
first limitation fully applicable to this case is that alibi cannot overcome positive
identification.85 For the defense of alibi to prosper, evidence other than the testimony
of the accused must be adduced. Evidence referred to in this respect does not
merely relate to any piece of evidence that would support the alibi; rather, there must
be sufficient evidence to show the physical impossibility (as to time and place) that
the accused could have committed or participated in the commission of the crime.
For alibi to be given evidentiary value, there must be clear and convincing evidence
showing that at the time of the commission of the crime, it was physically impossible
for the accused to have been at the situs criminis. 86
As we have discussed at length, Pablo was positively identified by Romildo and
Luther as one of the victim's assailants. We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of
the identification made.
Pablo's alibi does not also meet the requirements of physical impossibility of time and
place. A scrutiny of the entire testimony of Elma failed to show that it was physically
impossible for Pablo to be at the crime scene when the stabbing took place. We note
that although Elma testified that Pablo was at Elias' house at the time of the stabbing,
she nonetheless admitted that her house (which was located beside Elias' house)
and the bridge where the crime was committed is a 10-minute walking distance away
from each other.87 She further testified that after Pablo left for Elias' house, she only
saw him again at around 1:00 a.m. and at 2:00 a.m at their brother's house. 88 Hence,
it was possible that Pablo could have gone out of Elias' house to join Damaso,
George, and Arnold in assaulting the victim, and afterwards returned to his brother's
house without Elma knowing that he was ever gone.
We scrutinize Elma's version of the events with utmost care considering that she is
Pablo's sister. This is not the first time that this Court has encountered a case
where alibi is provided by a close kin; we have recognized that in these situations, it
may come naturally to some to give more weight to blood ties and close relationship
than to the objective truth;89 thus, our strict scrutiny.
40
We find that the time frame in Elma's version of events shows a pattern of
inconsistency that renders its truthfulness suspect. The testimony is inconsistent on
the time Pablo slept and was awakened by Elias - details that, to our mind, are
material to show his whereabouts on that fateful night. 90
Elma initially stated that Pablo slept at 9:00 p.m. and was awakened by Elias at 12:00
midnight.91 Thereafter, she claimed that Pablo was also awakened by Elias at 9:00
p.m. (the same time that Pablo slept) that evening, and that Pablo went to Elias's
house around 12:30 p.m.92 Subsequently, she averred that Pablo was awakened at
10:00 p.m. but went back to sleep then awakened again at 12:00 p.m. 93
These conflicting statements are not rendered any more believable by their conflict
with the time frames claimed in Pablo's version of events. 94 Similarly, Elma's version
of what occurred when is likewise inconsistent with Elias' version of events.95
Finally, even granting that a semblance of truth exists in the defense's narration of
events, the inconsistencies and contradictions in its witnesses' testimonies render
their evidence uncertain. In the final analysis, even their version does not preclude
Pablo from being physically present at the crime scene when the killing took place.
Thus, the defense and prosecution's evidence taken together, render Pablo guilty of
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy
As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the failure of the prosecution's
evidence to establish the conspiracy between him and his other co-accused to make
him liable for murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified to by the
eyewitnesses, only relate to events during, and not prior to, the assault and the
stabbing of the victim. He argues that no evidence was adduced to show that the
accused all agreed to kill the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.96 It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it.97 It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.98
Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is often resorted to
in order to prove its existence.99 Absent of any direct proof, as in the present case,
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.100 An accused participates as a conspirator if he or she has performed some
overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to
be committed.101 The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.102 Stated otherwise, it is not essential that
there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime; it is
sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. 103
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a prior agreement
among Pablo, Arnold, George, and Damaso, the following chain of events however
show their commonality of purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded
the victim on all sides: Damaso at the front, George at the victim's rear, while Pablo
and Arnold flanked the victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm
of the victim and restrained his movement, while Arnold did the same to the left arm
of the victim; third, George then hit the victim's head with a piece of wood; and fourth,
Damaso stabbed the victim three times.
In People v. Elijorde,104 we said: Me-sm
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended
to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by
indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation. S
In People v. Manalo,105 we declared that the act of the appellant in holding the
victim's right hand while the latter was being stabbed constituted sufficient proof of
conspiracy:
Indeed, the act of the appellant of holding the victim's right hand while the victim was
being stabbed by Dennis shows that he concurred in the criminal design of the actual
killer. If such act were separate from the stabbing, appellant's natural reaction should
have been to immediately let go of the victim and flee as soon as the first stab was
inflicted. But appellant continued to restrain the deceased until Dennis completed his
attack.
Tested against these, the existence of conspiracy among the four accused is clear;
their acts were aimed at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
their respective parts in the series of acts that, although appearing independent from
one another, indicated a concurrence of sentiment and intent to kill the victim.
Following the reasoning in Manalo, if there was in fact no unity of purpose among
Pablo and the three other accused, Pablo's reaction would have been to let go of the
victim and flee after the first stabbing by Damaso. The evidence reveals, however,
that after the first stabbing, Pablo still continued to hold the right arm of the victim,
rendering him immobile and exposed to further attack.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Where there is conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of
another.106 Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all. 107
41
The Crime
Murder is committed by killing a person under any of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated by Article 248 of the Code not falling within the provisions of Article 246
(on parricide), Article 249 (on homicide), and Article 255 (on infanticide) of the said
Code.
With Pablo's participation in the killing duly established beyond reasonable doubt,
what is left to examine is whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, which qualifies the crime to murder, is present under the
circumstances.
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 108 Taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless.109
In People v. Ventura, we opined that there are no fixed and invariable rules in
considering abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense of
the victim.110 Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of
superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis - à-vis the
victim.111 Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural
strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both, and the employment
of the means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it. 112 The aggressor must
have advantage of his natural strength to ensure the commission of the crime. 113
In the present case, we find that there was abuse of superior strength employed by
Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso in committing the killing. The evidence shows
that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked. In the attack, two assailants held
his arms on either side, while the other two, on the victim's front and back, each
armed with a knife and a piece of wood that they later used on the victim. Against this
onslaught, the victim's reaction was graphically described by the prosecution
eyewitness, Luther, when he testified:
Q: Which came first, by the way, was the victim or what was the victim doing then
when the fight took place?cralawred
A: Wala siyang nagawa kase hinawakan siya, gusto niyang makawala pero wala
siyang magawa hinawakan siya sa leeg, sir.114 [Emphasis supplied]
Under these circumstances, no doubt exists that there was gross inequality of forces
between the victim and the four accused and that the victim was overwhelmed by
forces he could not match. The RTC and CA therefore correctly appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to
the crime of murder.
The Penalty
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 (2)of the same Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty
consisting of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
Since the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength already qualified
the killing to murder, it can no longer be used to increase the imposable penalty. We
note that while another aggravating circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken
the defense of the victim, was alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to
adduce evidence to support the presence of this circumstance. Hence, the RTC and
CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, the CA correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000 as
exemplary to the heirs of the victim consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.115 However, in line with recent jurisprudence, the award of civil
indemnity shall be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.116
Further, the CA erred in awarding actual damages in the amount of P23,268.00. In
People v. Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by receipts during
the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages
for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. 117 We
reiterated this ruling in the recent cases of People v. Casta 118 and People v.
Ballesteros119 where we awarded temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, in
the amount of P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals
decision dated May 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01764 finding accused-
appellant Pablo Amodia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
with the MODIFICATION that:
(1) The award of civil indemnity shall be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
(2) The award of actual damages in the amount of P23,268.00 is hereby DELETED;
andcralawlibrary
(3) In lieu thereof, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
The other portions of the appealed decision are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
42

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141066             February 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, 1 dated May 17, 1999,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated
August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal
Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise
known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the
RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case
No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and
issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE
THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55),
payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the
check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give
and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank
for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the
accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already
been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the
aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070
are similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and
amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the
amount of ₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the
amount of ₱8,496.55.4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the
two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. 5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He
testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his
regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; 7 sometime in
May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July
7, 1990 issued by Adronico;8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the
first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
₱12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26,
1990 issued by Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a third loan in the amount of ₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No.
106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; 10 the three checks bounced
upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga
spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal
complaint against them.12
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the
checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam
should not encash the checks when they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a
signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 14
43
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico
Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court,
and accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for
each of them, and a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to
one (1) year and a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each
of them and a fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check
No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and
reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00
representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases;
₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of ₱30,302.10 which is the
total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted. 16 On the other hand, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of
the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. 18 It held
that the provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in
the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its
provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the
contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or
sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable
that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which
everyone performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of
one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER
OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-
ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE
HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS
CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF
ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or
in the future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS
CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the
three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks
themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the
principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She
posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of
the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such
as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or
issuance of checks.
44
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to
special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding
the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the
future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it
seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that
they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are
controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only
restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions
prevail over general ones.24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be
considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second
clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is
embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws,
unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs.
Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the
suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code to special
laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article 2228 of the Code to
violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of
penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article
1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized
by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with
reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the
Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions
of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 3932 of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to
the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in
the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. 35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any
overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone
prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present
when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No.
7068.36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe
the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a
direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that
she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be
stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs.
Mandao:40
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at
every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances;
45
as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to SO ORDERED.
prove it must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and
simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
fold.

Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a

judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-
appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its
sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of
the crime.

The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.

Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty --
not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even
when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the
prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all
criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral
certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction.
Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioner’s innocence must be
upheld and she must be acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision,
dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal
Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is
ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to
costs.
46

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152358           February 5, 2004
CONRADO CASITAS, petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming on appeal the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 18, convicting petitioner
Conrado Casitas of frustrated homicide.
The Case for the Respondent
As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General from its Brief and reiterated by the CA
in its decision, the case for the respondent stemmed from the following facts:
Sometime in the evening of August 24, 1994, private complainant Romeo C.
Boringot, along with his wife, Aida, and the other members of the family,
were asleep at their house at Bonot, Tabaco, Albay (TSN, March 12, 1996,
pp. 25-26).
Early in the morning the following day (August 25, 1994), about 1:00 o’clock
A.M., Romeo was awakened by his wife, Aida, the latter having heard
somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: "You ought to be killed,
you devil." So Romeo stood up and peeped to see who was outside. He,
however, did not see anyone (TSN, March 12, 1996, p. 26; TSN, April 29,
1996, pp. 14, 16-17).
Thus, Romeo took the flashlight, held it with his left hand, and flashed it in
the direction of the copra pit to check any intruder. When he did not see
anybody, he proceeded towards the road (TSN, March 12, 1996, pp. 27, 29).
Upon reaching the pathway leading to the road and upon passing by a
coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with a bolo which was
more than one (1) foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he
recognized him to be appellant Conrado Casitas whom he knew since the
1970’s and whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the
place. Appellant hacked him on the back a second time. Romeo tried to
scamper but he was blocked by appellant. In fact, appellant hacked him
again, this time hitting him on his left forearm. The blow caused him to drop
the flashlight he was holding. While in the prone position, appellant went on
hacking him, hitting him on different parts of the body, including the ears and
head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him. Appellant
also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead.
All in all, he sustained eleven (11) wounds (TSN, March 12, 1996, pp. 25, 28-
34; TSN, April 29, 1996, pp. 9, 12, 19-20; TSN, July 2, 1996, pp. 6-7).
Romeo’s wife, Aida, rushed to where he was. Upon seeing his bloodied
condition, Aida shouted for help. Some people came to their rescue. When
somebody with a flashlight arrived, appellant fled (TSN, March 12, 1996, p.
32).
One of those who heard Aida’s shout for help was Benhur Bonaobra, a
laborer, who just came from his copra work at San Isidro, Tabaco, Albay.
While going towards where the cry for help was coming from, he saw
appellant by the road, fleeing away and carrying a bolo with him. Appellant
was about fifteen (15) meters away from him. He also saw appellant trying to
pick up his slippers but failing (sic) to take them with him in his haste to flee
away. Benhur recognized appellant, having known the latter since childhood
(TSN, March 12, 1996, pp. 5-7).lawphi1.nêt
When Benhur arrived at the place of the incident, he saw Romeo lying down
on one side, with blood running down his face, and being cradled by his wife,
Aida, who was crying. He tried to lift the victim. When some people arrived,
he asked that somebody procure a hammock in order to bring the victim to
the hospital. When the hammock arrived, they brought him to the Cope
Hospital at Buhian. Thereat, they were informed that the victim cannot be
attended to, thus, he was brought to the Ziga Memorial District Hospital at
Tabaco, Albay, where he was given preliminary medical attention.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital at Legaspi City
where he was given further medical assistance and he was treated by Dr.
47
 Dante Perez (TSN, March 12, 1996, pp. 7-9, 12; TSN, July 2, 1996, p. 4; pp.
3, 5, Record).
Dr. Perez enumerated and described the injuries sustained by private
complainant in the following manner:
a. These are the injuries sustained by this patient, sir. (Witness
indicating in open Court, the scars on the victim. The scars are found
on the left chest above the left nipple and also the injuries on the left
face including the earlobe). The earlobe was transected sir. I made a
repair of it. And just below the earlobe is an injury. And on the
posterior arm of the patient is also a scar. Also, in the proximal left
posterior lateral left and also on the left scapular area, at the back.
And also at the right posterior thorax, and also at the right shoulder
area. (Witness indicating) And in the proximal distal, third, right arm.
(Witness pointing to the injuries to the radial nerve). The patient’s
radial nerve was transected. It was cut. The patient now have a
permanent nerve injury, a wrist drop. There is already a paralysis of
the wrist. And he also sustained a lacerated wound on his forehead.
PROSECUTOR VILLAMIN:
Q : So, there are eleven (11) injuries on the patient?
A : Yes, sir.
(TSN, July 2, 1996, pp. 6-7)3
The Case for the Petitioner
The petitioner invoked self-defense. The CA summarized the evidence of the
petitioner in the RTC, thus:
… In the early morning of August 25, 1995 at around 12:30 o’clock, while
Conrado Casitas was walking strumming his guitar and singing, Benhur
Bonaobra pelted him with stones, hitting his chest twice. Romeo Boringot
suddenly appeared and hacked him with a bolo. Conrado was able to parry
the first bolo attack with his guitar. When Romeo continued to attack him,
accused pulled his bolo from his waist and they engaged in a duel. When
Romeo fell down, Conrado run (sic) away and went on foot to the Ziga
Memorial Hospital where he was treated by Dr. Magayanes. While being
treated in the hospital, the police arrived and he surrendered himself
including his bolo.
Felixberto Bo, a resident of Bonot, Tabaco, Albay, heard a shout for help at
about 12:00 o’clock midnight on August 25, 1994 and being a Barangay
Tanod he got down from his house and started to run towards the direction of
the person shouting for help; that he met Conrado Casitas at the bridge and
he asked Conrado what happened; that accused told him that Romeo
Boringot waylaid him and that he left him (victim) on the ground; that
Felixberto proceeded walking and saw Romeo Boringot by the roadside near
a coconut tree and full of blood; that when he arrived, his compadre
Reynaldo was already there; that Apolonio Bueza was also there; that
Santos Bueza, a Kagawad member of the barrio and Benigno Boqueo also a
member of the Barangay Council were also there including the wife of
Romeo Boringot; that he was the one who took charge in having Romeo
brought to the hospital (TSN, January 17, 1997, pp. 6-7; 11-13). 4
The trial court rejected petitioner’s plea of self-defense and convicted him of
frustrated homicide. On appeal to the CA, the petitioner asserted the following:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE ON THE
BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE’S EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON THE PART OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.5
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. He
now asserts in this case that the RTC and the CA erred in not giving merit to his plea
of self-defense. In the alternative, in case his conviction is affirmed, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.
Ruling of the Court
On the Petitioner’s Plea of Self-Defense
The petitioner insists that he was merely singing and playing his guitar when
Bonaobra threw stones at him and the victim suddenly attacked him with a bolo. He
used his guitar to avoid being boloed by the victim, and in the process, the bolo hit
his guitar. He had to use his own bolo to parry the victim’s repeated thrusts. He
sustained injuries when he defended himself and was treated by Dr. Ray Magayanes
at the Ziga Memorial District Hospital. He gave no provocation to the sudden assault
by Bonaobra and the victim.
The CA rejected petitioner’s assertion, thus:
48
 The appeal has no merit.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the numerous blows
inflicted by appellant resulting to the eleven (11) wounds suffered by the
victim on vital areas of the body were clear manifestations of a deliberate,
determined assault, with intent to kill the victim, ruling out the claim of self-
defense.
If Conrado Casitas stabbed Romeo Boringot merely to defend himself, it
certainly defies reason why he had to inflict eleven (11) wounds on the latter.
It may be that, after the first few blows, one who acts in self-defense might
deal a few blows without changing the character of his defense, if this was
done out of confusion or fear, but, after delivering several blows, to inflict a
stab wound on the victim’s throat as a coup de grace would negate any
semblance of good faith and manifest a deliberate and wanton intention to
kill.
The presence of several gunshot wounds on the body of the deceased is
physical evidence which eloquently refutes a defense of self-defense.
Just as the presence and severity of a large number of wounds on the part of
the victim disprove self-defense, so do they belie the claim of incomplete
defense of a relative and indicate not the desire to defend one’s relative but a
determined effort to kill.
On cross-examination by Prosecutor Nieto N. Villamin on June 11, 1997, Conrado
Casitas answered:
"Q. You were arrested on October 5, 1995, more than a year after the
incident?
A. Yes, sir."
The said admission shows that appellant did not surrender voluntarily as he claims in
his third assignment of error allegedly committed by the court a quo.
As observed by the trial court –
"The accused would want to picture and make believe this Court (sic) that
there was the actual, sudden and unexpected attack on his person by the
victim when he narrated to us that while walking and at the same time
strumming his guitar he was pelted with stones by Benhur Bonaobra and
suddenly hacked by Romeo Boringot; it was during the second hacking blow
by the victim on him that he remembered that he has (sic) a bolo and
engaged the victim to a duel; would this claim by the accused sounds (sic)
not strange, contrary to human perception if not next to impossibility? Why on
the first blow was he not hit when according to him it was so sudden? Why
during the duel was he not hit with a single blow by the bolo of the victim?
His injuries as per testimony of Dr. Ray Magayanes and as reflected in the
medical certificate were all linear abrasion and hematoma and which
according to the doctor were not caused by the bolo; whereas, the victim
suffered 11 injuries and most of which were hacking (sic) wounds."6
The settled rule is that whether or not the accused acted in self-defense, complete or
incomplete, is a factual issue. And the legal aphorism is that factual findings of the
trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions
anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is
established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted
cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the
case.7 We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no
justification to deviate from the trial court’s findings and its conclusion.
The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the
confluence of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person
defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the
petitioner thereby admitted having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries. The
burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing evidence all the
requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because even if the
prosecution’s evidence is weak, the same can no longer be disbelieved after the
petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. 8 In this case, the
petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.
First. The victim sustained 11 hacked wounds and lacerated wounds. 9 The number,
nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that the said
wounds on the victim were inflicted as they dueled with each other. The protagonists
were face to face as they boloed each other. The petitioner failed to explain to the
trial court how the victim sustained injuries on the proximal left posterior lateral left, at
the back.10 The use of a bolo to injure the victim as well as the number and location
of the wounds inflicted on the victim are proof of the petitioner’s intent to kill and not
merely to defend himself.11 In contrast, the petitioner merely sustained continuous
hematoma and six linear abrasions.12 At the time of the incident, the petitioner was
intoxicated and disoriented. If, as he claimed, the victim hacked him with a bolo, it is
incredible that he merely sustained abrasions and contusions, while the victim
sustained nine hacked wounds and lacerated wounds on different parts of the body.
49
Second. Dr. Ray Magayanes, the witness for the petitioner, testified on re-direct
examination that the wounds sustained by him could not have been caused by a
bolo:
q When you answered the question of the prosecutor that all these injuries
could not have been caused by a bolo, you are referring to injuries other than
the incised wound?
a All these injuries could not have been caused by a bolo. 13
Third. The petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police authorities and
admitted that he had injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he
boloed the victim to defend himself.14 The petitioner did not do so.
Upon his discharge from the Ziga Memorial District Hospital a few hours after the
treatment of his wounds, the petitioner left Tabaco, Albay, and hid in Manila. His
address was unknown. It was only on October 5, 1995 that the policemen were able
to arrest him on the basis of a warrant for his arrest used by the trial court. 15 By
fleeing from his house and concealing his whereabouts for more than one year from
the stabbing, the petitioner thereof implicably admitted his guilt. 16 The petitioner’s
claim that he was told by a policeman to flee to avoid aggravating the situation is
flimsy. When asked about the identity of the policeman, the petitioner failed to identify
the latter.17 The Court cannot believe that a policeman would allow the petitioner, a
suspect in a crime, to escape and thereby open himself to criminal and administrative
charges.
Fourth. The petitioner even failed to give a statement to the police authorities and
lodge a complaint against the victim and Bonaobra for physical injuries or attempted
homicide. If, as the petitioner, he was the hapless victim of unlawful aggression, he
should have lodged the appropriate charges against Bonaobra and the victim. It was
only when he testified before the trial court that he claimed for the first time that he
acted in self-defense when he boloed the victim.
On the petitioner’s contention that he surrendered voluntarily to the police authorities,
the Office of the Solicitor General disagreed, with the following ratiocinations:
Appellant imputes error on the court a quo for not appreciating voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance in his favor (pp. 10-11, Appellant’s Brief).
The same does not persuade.
It was incumbent upon appellant to prove his allegation that he indeed voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities. This cannot prosper solely on the basis of his self-
serving statements, uncorroborated by any other unbiased and credible
evidence.
More importantly, this is debunked by the fact that he was arrested on October 5,
1995, which was a year after the incident (TSN, June 11, 1997, p. 18). The fact
that he had to be arrested is clearly inconsistent with the claim that he voluntarily
surrendered.18
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. The petitioner even failed to identify
the policeman to whom he surrendered voluntarily. The fact of the matter is that the
petitioner fled from Tabaco and sought sanctuary in Manila.
Civil Liabilities of the Petitioner
The trial court awarded P30,000 to the victim for the loss of his earning capacity on
the basis solely of the victim’s testimony, thus:
Q Prior to this incident, what was your occupation or work?
A I am a copra maker.
Q What other occupation?
A I attend to a farmlot.
Q For how many days or months were you not able to work because of these
injuries you sustained?
A From the time of the incident up to the present.
Q Because of those injuries you sustained and you cannot work up to this
time, more or less, how much did you not earn for not working?
A Plenty already.
Q Tell us what is that plenty.
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
That would be speculative.
COURT:
Witness will answer.
WITNESS:
A More than P30,000.00.19
The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove the quantity of copra he failed
to make and the price of each. The settled rule is that actual damages, inclusive of
expected earnings lost caused by the crime, must be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. 20 The
Court cannot rely on the victim’s uncorroborated testimony which lacks specific
details or particulars on the claimed actual damages and the amount hereof.
However, the victim is entitled to moral damages for his injuries, including that on his
wrist that caused the paralysis thereof.21 We find that the amount of P30,000 as
moral damages is reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The petitioner is ordered to pay to the victim Romeo
Boringot P30,000 as moral damages. The award for actual damages in the amount
of P30,000 is DELETED. No costs.
50
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 155258 - October 7, 2003
CONRADO CANO y SAMPANG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The primordial issue to be resolved in this petition for certiorari is whether or not
petitioner killed his brother in self-defense.
Petitioner Conrado Cano y Sampang and his deceased brother Orlando Cano were
rivals in the Rush ID Photo business and had booths along the sidewalk of Rizal
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila fronting the Philippine Trust Bank and Uniwide Sales
Department Store. The fateful altercation which culminated in the fatal stabbing of
Orlando Cano stemmed out of this rivalry, particularly the incident where Conrado
took the business permit from the booth of Orlando without his permission thus
incurring the latters ire.
The prosecutions version of what transpired as summarized in the Peoples
brief1 shows that in the morning of May 31, 1993, at about 7:00 oclock, the victim
Orlando Cano arrived at the Rush ID Booth of petitioner located below the LRT line in
Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The victim asked David Olivario, an employee of
petitioner, where the latter was. The victim angrily said that petitioner was
pakialamero. He also said, "Putang ina niya! Why did he Xerox our permit." Since
petitioner had not yet arrived, the victim returned to his own Rush ID booth located
several meters away.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Later, at about 9:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at his Rush ID booth. After giving supplies
to Olivario, petitioner said he was going to the City Hall. He faced the mirror and
started to comb his hair. The victim suddenly arrived and held petitioner on the
shoulders and turned him around. The victim asked him, "Anong gusto mong
mangyari?" Accused did not answer.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The victim tried to stab petitioner with a balisong but the latter was able to run and
lock himself inside the dark room inside his booth. The victim followed him and tried
to open the door of the dark room and shouted, "Lumabas ka diyan! Putang ina mo,
papatayin kita!" Petitioner did not come out. The victim tried to force the door open by
kicking it and stabbed the door with his balisong. The door of the dark room suddenly
opened and petitioner emerged carrying a pair of scissors. The victim and petitioner
struck at each other. During the scuffle, the scissors fell from petitioners hand. He
then grabbed the knife of the victim who, in turn, picked up the scissors. They again
attacked each other.4cräläwvirtualibräry
The victim fell and his wife rushed to his side. Petitioner fled from the scene. The
victims wife asked for assistance from the people in the vicinity. The victim was then
loaded on a jeep and was rushed to a hospital, but he was dead on
arrival.5cräläwvirtualibräry
The autopsy report submitted by the medico-legal officer of the Western Police
District, Dr. Manuel Lagonera, shows that the victim sustained at least thirty (30) stab
wounds, six (6) of which were fatal.6 On the other hand, petitioner suffered only an
incised wound on the right hand measuring six (6) cm., which required less than nine
(9) days of treatment.
Petitioner had a different account of what transpired. He testified that on May 31,
1993 at around 9:30 a.m. he went to his Rush ID booth in front of the Philtrust Bank
to deliver supplies to his photographer, David Olivario. 7 After handing over said
supplies to Olivario, petitioner intended to go to the Manila City Hall to apply for a
business permit.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners earlier application for a permit was denied. 9 He sought a reconsideration
from the city officials and argued that his brother was issued a similar permit. In order
to prove his point, he borrowed the permit of his brother from his nephew, Wilson
Reyes, to have it machine copied.10 After doing so, petitioner returned it.11 The victim
apparently resented this because petitioner was informed by David Olivario that
Gloria Cano later went to petitioners stall angrily inquiring why they got the
permit.12cräläwvirtualibräry
As petitioner was combing his hair and preparing to leave for the Manila City Hall, the
victim, Orlando, suddenly appeared from behind, grabbed him by the left shoulder
and jerked him around so that they were face to face. 13 As they stood face to face,
Orlando menacingly said, "Anong gusto mong mangyari?" 14 Petitioner noticed
Orlando holding a balisong, and he ran to the dark room of his
stall.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The victim pursued him and tried to force open the locked dark room door by kicking
it and stabbing it with the fan knife.16 He kept shouting, "Get out of there! Pakialamero
ka! Get out of there and I will kill you!"17 The door suddenly gave way and, as it
51
opened, the victim charged at petitioner, but he was able to evade the attack.
Snatching a pair of scissors nearby, petitioner retaliated but the scissors fell from his
grasp because it was parried by the victim.18 Petitioner then grabbed the hand of the
victim holding the balisong and they grappled to gain possession thereof. He
eventually wrested control of the knife and as he stood momentarily, the victim picked
up the scissors and again lunged at him. 19cräläwvirtualibräry
With nowhere to go, petitioner was forced to defend himself from the onslaught of the
victim who was armed with the nine-inch long pair of pointed scissors. 20 No
bystanders tried to pacify them as they engaged in their deadly struggle for almost
two (2) minutes. Suddenly, the victim collapsed and fell bloodied to the
floor.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner stooped to lift his brother up, intending to bring him to the hospital.
However, he was hit by the victims wife with a chair. Then, she started shouting,
"Holdupper!"22 Petitioner was forced to flee from the scene for fear of being lynched
by the people who had gathered around armed with clubs. The people pursued him
but when he saw a policeman coming in his direction, he threw the balisong away
and raised his hands in surrender.23 He was then brought to the police precinct and
later to the hospital for treatment of his injuries. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner was charged with Homicide in an Information 25 which alleges
That on or about May 31, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon one ORLANDO CANO y SAMPANG, by then and
there stabbing the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the
said ORLANDO CANO Y SAMPANG mortal and fatal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-121668 and filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 31.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The case
thereupon proceeded to trial. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment 26 finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime and sentencing him to serve
an imprisonment of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 19254.
During the pendency of the appeal,27 Gloria Cano, the widow of the victim, executed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay28 stating, among others, that petitioner merely acted in self-
defense and that she was withdrawing the charge against him. This sworn statement
became the basis of an Urgent Motion for New Trial 29 on the ground of newly
discovered evidence filed by counsel for petitioner.
This motion for new trial was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated March 19, 1998.30cräläwvirtualibräry
The appellate court subsequently rendered judgment affirming petitioners conviction
but modifying the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from
nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Petitioner was likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages of P24,605.75; P50,000.00 as
moral damages and another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto plus
costs.31cräläwvirtualibräry
Preliminarily, the Solicitor General argues that the petition raises merely factual
issues, such as whether or not petitioner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of
self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of provocation or threat and voluntary
surrender. These issues, says the Solicitor, are not proper for a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Concededly, those who seek to avail of the remedies provided by the rules must
adhere to the requirements thereof, failure of which the right to do so is lost. It is,
however, equally settled that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense and are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. 32 They
should be liberally construed so that litigants can have ample opportunity to prove
their claims and thus prevent a denial of justice due to
technicalities.33cräläwvirtualibräry
Therefore, we shall proceed to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner is
entitled to invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense, considering that what is
at stake is not merely his liberty, but also the distinct possibility that he will bear the
stigma of a convicted felon and be consigned to the fate of being a social pariah for
the rest of his life.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the prosecution and the defense have
diametrically opposed factual versions of what transpired immediately preceding the
killing. Our task is to determine which of them is the truth. In resolving such conflict,
dealing as it does with the credibility of witnesses, the usual rule is for us to respect
the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their
52
deportment and manner of testifying during trial.34 Nonetheless, this rule is
circumscribed by well-established exceptions.35cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the record shows circumstances of weight and influence which
have been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if
considered would affect the result of the case.36cräläwvirtualibräry
For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence
the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 37 Although all the
three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no
self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. 38 In
other words in self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element. It
presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life
and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most
importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor.39cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, there are several material circumstances which were ignored by
both the court a quo and the appellate tribunal.
First, contrary to the findings of both the appellate and trial courts, there are facts
extant on record which clearly shows that it was an armed victim who initially
attacked the petitioner with a balisong. Petitioner testified on the assault thus:
Atty. Ferrer:
What happened after that when Orlando Cano grabbed you and came face to face
with him?
A. I answered him none but he was in a menacing position with his hands around
something and I suddenly ran away.
Q. What was that something in the hands of Orlando Cano that made you run away?
A. Balisong  "29," Sir.
Atty. Ferrer:
And where did you run to?
A. I went inside my booth because that is the only place I can run to.
Q. And what happened inside your booth, if any?
A. He also ran after me and then when I was inside we were having a tug of war of
the doorknob which I tried to close and which he tried to open.
Q. What happened after that?
A. But I was able to close the door but he kept on kicking the door that I turned deaf.
Q. What else happened, if any?
A. While he was kicking, he was also stabbing the door with the "29" (balisong) he
was holding.
Q. And you said you heard the thudding of the door making noise, what happened if
any?
A. He kept on shouting, "Get out of there! Pakialamero ka!"  "Get out of there and I
will kill you."
Q. What did you do did you go out?
A. While he was shouting I did not notice that the door was not completely closed
because the lock went on and the door suddenly opened.
Q. What happened after the door got open?
A. When the door opened he again rushed me, stabbed and I was able to evade it.
Atty. Ferrer:
What else happened?
Witness:
A. I was able to grab a scissors and that was the time I retaliated.
Q. Who owned this scissors?
A. That scissors was mine because it is used in cutting paper.
Q. Now, you said you retaliated after grabbing a pair of scissors where did you
retaliate?
A. I was about to retaliate in the door of the room because the room was very small.
Q. Where you able to retaliate?
A. No, sir, I was not able to retaliate because the scissors fell when he was able to
parry it.
Q. What happened after that, after that piece of scissors fell from your hold?
A. I took hold of his hand holding the "balisong"  and we had a scuffle to get hold or
possession of the "balisong."
Q. What happened after the scuffling for the "balisong"?
A. After one (1) minute I was able to grab possession of the "balisong."
Q. What happened after that?
A. When I was able to get hold of the "balisong" I just remained standing and I
just . . .
Q. What else happened?
A. He was able to pick up the scissors that I dropped and he again launched [himself]
at me [with] the scissors.
Q. What did you do, if any?
A. That was the time when my mind was confused and I dont have any place to go
and I tried to defend myself and we fought each other.
Atty. Ferrer :
And at the time when you said you fought each other, Orlando Cano was holding the
scissors and you were holding the "balisong,"  correct?
A. Yes, sir.40
David Olivario, who was five meters away and saw what transpired, corroborated
petitioners account.41 He remained steadfast and unwavering on cross-examination
despite intense grilling by the prosecution42 and further clarificatory questioning from
the trial court itself.43cräläwvirtualibräry
53
Second, the physical evidence is more in accord with petitioners version of what
transpired, specifically his assertion that it was the victim who was armed and
persisted in his attack on the petitioner even though the latter locked himself inside
the dark room of his stall to protect himself. The findings of Police Investigator SPO3
Julian Z. Bustamante contained in his Advance Information Report 44 discloses that
"[H]oles were observed at the door near the door lock of suspects rush ID photo
booth apparently made by a hard pointed instrument" 45 Aside from stating that a fan
knife and a pair of scissors which both yielded positive results for traces of human
blood were recovered, the report went further to note that the "bloodied scissor were
(sic) recovered in front of suspects rush ID photo booth door." 46cräläwvirtualibräry
The foregoing entries of the Advance Information Report, particularly that referring to
the location of the bloodied scissors, supports petitioners claim that when he could no
longer avoid the unlawful aggression of the victim, he was compelled to grab at the
instrument inside the booth to defend himself. However, the scissors fell from his
grasp, thus forcing him to desperately grapple for possession of the fan knife.
Third, circumstances prior to the fatal incident shows that it was the victim who
purposely sought to confront the petitioner because the latter had his business permit
machine copied without his permission. Maria Cano, an aunt of the victim and
petitioner, testified thus:
Q: And Orlando Cano, did he tell you any reason why he was waiting for Conrado
Cano [at] that particular morning?
A: Because he was very angry and said that there will be an encounter between
them.
Atty. Ferrer:
What did you do, if any?
Witness:
A: You brothers you should calm down because you are brothers.
Q: By the way what was the reason why, if you know why, Orlando told you
that "silay magtutuos," quoting your own words?
A: Orlando Cano is mad because Conrado Cano got Orlandos business permit and
had it xeroxed and after xeroxing it and he returned the permit of Orlando Cano.
Q: Could you tell us how Orlando Cano uttered those words "magtutuos"?
A: Orlando Cano told me this is the day when we will have a confrontation and at this
juncture, I even tapped [his] right pocket, I did not see what was there but I saw the
handle.
xxx
Q: As the aunt of the two (2) what was your reaction when Orlando told you that?
A: I told, Orlando, calm down because you are brothers and if something bad that will
happen (sic) your mother will suffer because of the incident.
Atty. Ferrrer:
And what was the reaction of Orlando, if any, after you said those words of advice?
A: Orlando Cano answered me, well, shall I remain silent and will not utter any word
at all?
Q: And was that that (sic) word confined to Orlando?
A: No, Sir, because I also advised Gloria.
Q And what was the advise you gave Gloria?
A: I told Gloria because the only one who can prevent this incident is you because
Orlando is your husband.
Q: And what was the reaction, if any of Gloria Cano?
A: Gloria told me, there is nothing I can do because they are brothers and they are
responsible for their own lives.
Q: What else happened, if any?
A: That was the time I bid goodbye.47
(emphasis and italics supplied)
Fourth, the record reveals that while indeed numerous wounds were sustained by the
victim, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy admitted that of the
thirty-five (35) wounds supposedly inflicted, thirty-three (33) were scratches and
contusions while only six (6) were penetrating or stab wounds. 48 As regards the
finding that petitioner suffered only one hand wound, it should be stressed that the
superficiality of the nature of the wounds inflicted on the accused does not, per se,
negate self-defense. Indeed, to prove self-defense, the actual wounding of the
person defending himself is not necessary. It is sufficient that the aggression be
attempted so as to give rise to the right to prevent it. 49 The act of a person armed with
a bladed weapon pursuing another constitutes unlawful aggression because it
signifies the pursuers intent to commit an assault with this
weapon.50cräläwvirtualibräry
The particular circumstances which confronted the petitioner at the time of the
incident condoned the means he employed to protect his life. It must be remembered
that the measure of rational necessity is to be found in the situation as it appeared to
petitioner at the time when the blow was struck. The law does not require that he
should mete out his blows in such manner that upon a calm and deliberate review of
the incident it will not appear that he exceeded the precise limits of what was
absolutely necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat, or that he struck one blow
more than was absolutely necessary to save his own life; or that he failed to hold his
hand so as to avoid inflicting a fatal wound where a less severe stroke might have
served the purpose. Under such conditions, an accused cannot be expected to reflect
coolly nor wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof. 51cräläwvirtualibräry
. . . the reasonableness of the means employed to repel an actual and positive
aggression should not be gauged by the standards that the mind of a judge, seated in
a swivel chair in a comfortable office, free from care and unperturbed in his security,
may coolly and dispassionately set down. The judge must place himself in the
position of the object of the aggression or his defender and consider his feelings, his
reactions to the events or circumstances. It is easy for one to state that the object of
the aggression or his defender could have taken such action, adopted such remedy,
or resorted to other means. But the defendant has no time for cool deliberation, no
equanimity of mind to find the most reasonable action, remedy or means to. He must
54
act from impulse, without time for deliberation. The reasonableness of the means interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while
employed must be gauged by the defenders hopes and sincere beliefs, not by the the others may be compatible with a finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the
judges.52cräläwvirtualibräry accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.61cräläwvirtualibräry
Fifth, there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner. When the law
speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element All told, evidence shows that petitioner acted in lawful self-defense. Hence, his act of
of self-defense, it requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to the act killing the victim was attended by a justifying circumstance, for which no criminal and
committed and that it be adequate to arouse one to its commission. It is not enough civil liability can attach.62 Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides
that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. 53 This third requisite of self- that anyone who acts in lawful self-defense does not incur any criminal liability.
defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) Likewise, petitioner is not civilly liable for his lawful act. The only instance when a
when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the person who commits a crime with the attendance of a justifying circumstance incurs
provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) civil liability is when he, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes
when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not damage to another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.54cräläwvirtualibräry Code.63 Otherwise stated, if a person charged with homicide successfully pleads self-
defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil
Petitioner borrowed the permit of the victim and had it photocopied without the latters liability.64cräläwvirtualibräry
permission two (2) days before the incident.55 The victim and his wife resented this.
However, this can hardly be considered a provocation sufficient to merit so deadly an WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
assault with a bladed weapon. Moreover, the act was neither immediate nor REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Conrado Cano y Sampang is ACQUITTED
proximate.56 What, in fact, appears on record is the bellicose temperament of the of the crime charged against him and his immediate release from custody is ordered
victim and his spouse who, despite the advice of their Aunt Maria Cano to calm unless there is another cause for his continued detention.
down, still persisted in confronting petitioner. When the question is raised who
between the accused and the offended party gave provocation, the circumstances of Costs de oficio.
subjective, objective and social character may be considered in reaching a definite
conclusion.57 Thus an accused, to prove provocation in connection with his plea of SO ORDERED.
self-defense, may show that the victim, as in this case, had a quarrelsome and
irascible disposition.58cräläwvirtualibräry
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Sixth, two other notable circumstances on record tend to show that petitioner was
impelled by the instinct of self-preservation rather than the murderous urge of one
bent on killing. The first is when petitioner was able to wrest the balisong from the
victim, he never took advantage of the opportunity to attack his already weaponless
brother. Rather, he stood still and was forced to act only when the victim picked up
the scissors and lunged at him again.59 The second instance is when the victim fell.
Had petitioner been actuated by homicidal intentions, he would have persisted in his
attack on his prostrate brother. He did nothing of the sort. He, in fact, intended to lift
the victim up and bring him to the hospital but the sudden appearance of the victims
wife who hit him with a chair forced him to flee. Moreover, armed people were
attracted by the shouts of the victims wife and had gathered and started pursuing
him.60cräläwvirtualibräry

Seventh, while the general policy is for the courts not to attach any persuasive
evidentiary value to the affidavit of retraction of the victims widow, such sworn
statement acquires a weightier and more decisive evidentiary consideration when
taken in conjunction with the other prevailing facts in this case. Thus, it has oft been
said that where inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more
55

EN BANC
G.R. No. 135981             January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a
novel theory -- the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes
self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete
exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and
unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a
form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and
self-control. This "psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power,
thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13
of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her
batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their
child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state,
which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS,
as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for
and be released from custody on parole, because she has already served the
minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this
case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0,
finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds
the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a
generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased
the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as
indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as moral damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA,
her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following
wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the
mouth.
56
 'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of
the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of
the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of
the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial
hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/
shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of
the facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983
in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at
Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived
with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after
receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching his. When they
arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel,
Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store
across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a
bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side
of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to
which Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time
Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas'
rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend
and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her
pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant
likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie
Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for
a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with
her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her
children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50)
meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her
children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph
noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the
foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant.
Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was
locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him,
Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able
to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to
reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom
where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body
of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his
briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of
the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's misfortune.
Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead
body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then
assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the
foul smell at the Genosas' rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1
Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and
went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his
side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only
had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches
long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end
without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in
disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench,
had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem
examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases,
Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body
57
 was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo
yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against
appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was
'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to
a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work
on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home
yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel
Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at
Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their
return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for
her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging
her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their
children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her
reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut
the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television.
According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on
the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed
clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged
appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck,
and told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since
Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his
wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to
drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with
the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter
ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by
shooting him. She supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and
shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom." 7 (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983.
Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City,
obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and
was working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port
Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben,
Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they
were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third
degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben
was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their
closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together
with Ben's brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic
and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not
remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and
Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic
would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw
Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand
was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22,
1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again
and saw blood from Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben
and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's
forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that
Ben and Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima,
Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became 'already
very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's
two sons, there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when
Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second
incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the
forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was
wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to help; and the
third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the
house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone
cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical
intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995
'After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.'
58
They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and
drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He
stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait
'for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time,
the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers
and runners so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in
the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly.
Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting
cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard
by him was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied
'Why kill me when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the
Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the
cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before
when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave
her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him 'so
many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long
time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the
right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to
her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to
her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change
and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she
would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their
reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he
was drunk, at least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic,
testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas,
testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben
and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he
saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke
hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note
this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe
Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night
of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is
located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each
other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the
accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate
he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work
as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning.
(Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they
were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters
from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13
or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in
him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble.
One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so
angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while
Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go
to our house and he will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call
me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia
further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see bruises and one
time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast)
as according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that
once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only
that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic,
testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her
house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market
place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She
accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the
Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they
got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that
'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was
drunk 'because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.'
Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please
note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep
in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come
home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at
10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very noisy
in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said
Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in
he got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window grill
and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came.
59
On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic's house on
November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-
employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times'
and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that
from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of
physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his
Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of
Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2'
and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all
the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical
injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could
not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He
said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological
make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas
resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to
his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront
the Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic
to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed
'that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with
each other.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night
it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the
Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension,
and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband
at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said
that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone
passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for
Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in
Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher
under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was
leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that
she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun
away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash
him once'; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that
two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged
her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence.
This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of
Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as
such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination
of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986.
She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she
got there, she saw 'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben
Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to
the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving
the skeletal area of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that
based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did
not testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic
Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to
kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and
60
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with
the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17,
22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997,
22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last
trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35,
Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond
reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review
and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared
for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and
permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated
20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty.
Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office,
wherein she submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received
by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take
the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel
Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined
that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem
findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a
lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court
partly granted Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the
case 'to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90)
days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified
before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had
interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews
were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20)
years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle
University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of
Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and
was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has
an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts
in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the
U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the
Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She
is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68
countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member
of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic
and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity
cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology'
(together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the
first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first
case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of
ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of
this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric
disorder.'
61
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse
and also sexual abuse.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a
very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that
usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken
homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a
very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex
and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and
very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of
times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they
become violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family
which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also,
they see often how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of
modeling of aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman
does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked
the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change,
the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake
of the children.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some
leave the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to
fight back triggering 'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a
'normal marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not
consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an
'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long
lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death
on the victim.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she
administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered
woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at
times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which
she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time
she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the
past.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even
consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at
the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since
passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow
of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine
Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight
(38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the
Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on
psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for
twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from
the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the
Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was
presented twice in international congresses. He also authored 'The Mental
Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was likewise
published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on
the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate
(siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug
Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of
the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord
enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a
62
doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in
psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr.
Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and
testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent
family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand
cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation.
As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita
Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal
abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such
that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said
that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may
induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic
constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive
trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very
dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the
'anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming
brutality, trauma.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten
at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her
emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to
become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-
world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an
individual's illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of
the parents. As to the batterer, he normally 'internalizes what is around him
within the environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is very
competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his
strong façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without
thinking.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-
experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot
control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or
any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x
x because that abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to
weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there
is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview
he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx   xxx   xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the
time she killed her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-
experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically
that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just
come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when
the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he
interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert
anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is
involved.'
xxx   xxx   xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or
the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9
63
 Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed --
lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this
Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse;
and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case
for the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's
Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the
lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to
submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic
by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo
Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with
their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court
before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. 12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's
consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic
Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating
with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence
adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a
drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in
concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of
Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila
and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt
to save the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus
in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death." 13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted
in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the
killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral
to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that could affect the outcome of the case. 14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible
error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's
64
disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged
errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his
17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both
the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions.
He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of
the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge's
conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty"
manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996.
Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the
trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment.
That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken
against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his
actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation. 15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant
had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract.
In People v. Malabago,16 this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship
between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the
absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of
marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected
to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's
deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic. 17 The
defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct
examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made
through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. 19 Other than
merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered
no proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage
to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's
death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence.
As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the
appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the
death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was
a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for
automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman
syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-
defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly,
the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear
inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his
personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at
the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellant's children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in
whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary
to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus,
she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic
to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt
or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial
court's appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of
the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-
defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the
victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear
and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense
(and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from
the prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
65
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman
syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized
in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-
defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of
mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order
to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle
at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve. 26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
"cycle of violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. 28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying
out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways
that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the
violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not
usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner
senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted
from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the
more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry,
oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out
of control" and leads to an acute battering incident. 29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness
and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable,
yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put
an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion,
and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she
cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain,
although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the
face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much
stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to
fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such
that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt. 30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one
hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered
woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the
real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for
his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of
getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's
psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on
each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that
it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent,
capable of functioning without the other.31
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented
several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
66
 A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was A Yes, sir.
cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker. Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was A I did.
abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the
manifested to you? record.
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes
he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me. A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower
Q How many times did this happen? eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you? 2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me. 3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and 4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 o to trauma. Attending
after that I go to him and he said 'sorry'. physician: Dr. Caing;
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor? 5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending
A Yes, sir. physician: Dr. Canora; and
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. 6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion
xxx   xxx   xxx Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
attending physician, is that correct?
A Of course my husband.
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the
[Court] /to the witness
patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something
A Everytime he got drunk.
rough substance if force is applied.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
the occurrence?
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A Everytime he got drunk.
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is
A Three times a week.
traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel
xxx   xxx   xxx
me." 32
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr.
A Yes, sir.
Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
Q What did she tell you?
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these
the chart of your clinic?
injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.
67
Q You mean, Ben Genosa? A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is
A Yes, sir. the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this
xxx   xxx   xxx disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the
ATTY. TABUCANON: domestic problem.
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused Q You mean problem in her household?
sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident happened? A Probably.
A As per record, yes. Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
Q What was the date? A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
A It was on November 6, 1995. hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
A Yes, sir. pressure of the accused?
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
patient pregnant? Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous
she? level of blood pressure?
A Eight (8) months pregnant. A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir. Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that
about her pregnancy or for some other findings? on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her were inflicted upon her by Ben.35
pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined? Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic
A Yes, sir. to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home
Q For how many days? drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened
A One day. about ten o'clock at night, because the couple "were very noisy … and I heard
Q Where? something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into Ecel's room and
A At PHILPHOS Hospital. locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a
xxx   xxx   xxx knife.
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you
were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8
months pregnant. On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to
What is this all about? find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period from sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she
1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times. heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
Q For what?
A Tension headache. On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following
had hypertension? backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
She does not response when the medication was given to her, because
tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature. "ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in
nature? the evening?

68
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after
office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached
Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second
child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I
was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest
son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with
me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was
worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with
me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen
again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her
because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What
else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I
was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was
disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off
the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children
were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children who were doing
their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so
he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me
from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was
carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the
bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for
packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my
neck.
69
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How
did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
me.'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer
but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his
wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he
was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind
was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the
same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx   xxx   xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert
witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met
with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their
talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you
in layman's term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she
was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to
emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a
very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner
of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with
barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going
home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had
the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the
husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the
child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at
the same time very depressed because she was also aware, almost like
living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly
or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did
you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most
important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced
during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already
knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of
the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can
consider them as substantial.
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband
they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband
that were fond of battering their wives?
70
 A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a
hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several
times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being
battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is
your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it
was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and
I also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer
anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she
became an abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and that
is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering,
all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test,
what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The
purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person
that I can trust. That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth." 41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on
his Psychiatric Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic
Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben,
everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben
started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially
cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family,
particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional
abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the
viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful
ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a
drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than
eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her
husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further
quoting from the Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and
well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her.
But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x." 43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind
that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her
state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely
merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the
events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out
that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common
law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why
would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live
with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring
hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her
self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is
the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife
syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn
from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person
who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with --
nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience.
Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions
about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on
domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United
Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is
charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the
latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found
71
that "the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in
greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-
sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think
that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that]
they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to
them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not
readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the
latter's belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the
family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for
her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
"probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic
violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to
her loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons "may
believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x
x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of
coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an
active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases
to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect." 52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that "even if a person has control over a situation, but believes
that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping
responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the cognitive aspect
-- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to
be less important than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the
situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it
may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their
own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible
circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the
violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and
that there is no escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety,
and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a shelter is available, she stays with
her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also
because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more. 57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the
presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence"
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-
building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the
existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute
battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What
means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next
(more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or
father's house;58 that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to
change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her
spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she
was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how
dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship?
Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
72
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her
partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled
from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to
them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance
must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting
evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as
manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to
the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the
offense60 -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-
defense must face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense: 62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. 63 It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life
or safety of a person.64 In the present case, however, according to the testimony of
Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression
of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom --
and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still
have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat
upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already
suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the
killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable
pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" 65 Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes)
prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or
communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. 66 Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense.67 In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense --
complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. 68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was
not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and
appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a
hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any
issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties. 69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated
battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of
[cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and
natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity
to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly
experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological
paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
73
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
"repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well
as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic
stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or
the prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and
constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social
support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go
to that disorder....
xxx   xxx   xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of
severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic
stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually
the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the
individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful
stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because
the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So
the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the
individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability
remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first
thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment,
any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first
day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is
stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The
[a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal
and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic
personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified
further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x
x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant
resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance
and natural self-control," "psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or
impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power
without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a
resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance
should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust
or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. 77 To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act
is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. 78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor,
preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while
dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also
be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life
was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which
was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to
retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to
her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of
fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open
the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to
shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a
psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim
74
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being COURT:
beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand
vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." flexed forcibly in her front neck)
Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and ATTY. TABUCANON:
prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should Q Where did he bring you?
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well me'
as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
A I was aware that it was a gun.
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
COURT INTERPRETER
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
ATTY. TABUCANON:
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer
months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his
life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he
passion and obfuscation on her part. was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long,
Second Legal Issue: and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind
Treachery was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the
same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself COURT INTERPRETER
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 81 In order to qualify an
act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the (The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which
have no place in the appreciation of evidence.82 Because of the gravity of the xxx   xxx   xxx
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. 83 Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from Q It is a flexible blade?
the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open, A It's a cutter.
depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish A Yes, because he once used it to me.
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events Q How did he do it?
surrounding his death: A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
did he drag you? xxx   xxx   xxx
75
 ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I
smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened
before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I
know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die
because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him,
the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the
nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I
took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood
pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no
showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might
be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the
contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about
the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of
any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves
the doubt in her favor.87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the
offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of
paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken
into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying
circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. 90 Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the
range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall
be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to
impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one
(1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years
8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the
minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole. 91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in
the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day
reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made --
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give
a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies
conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome
and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has
learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty.
Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work
within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent
them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom,
may do so.
76
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the
phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and
an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the
time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances
could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is

hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty
is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible
for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice Santiago
in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.

77
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO
CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores
for plaintiff-appellee.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia
and Dueñas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P.
Aquino.
Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio
S. Canial.
PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ,
BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y
PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias
"ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO
GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as
accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned
complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her,
pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in
Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force
and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to her
damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her
under the provisions of the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and
JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the
execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal
accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an
indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating,
aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in sequestering
the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky
Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng,
Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus
supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following
aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the
crime and to make its discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which
added ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be
deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for
the commission.
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 CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the
above-quoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the
court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded
presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the
complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their
respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision
on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio
Cañal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as
described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be
executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law;
and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten
thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to
establish a prima facie  case against the accomplices Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario,
the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted,
and the case dismissed against the aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime
Jose identified by pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and
pictures of which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and
"M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to
him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires
the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr.,
Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio
Cañal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as
appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25
years old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College
and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by
profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to
perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per
month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from
P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva,
homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her
bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front
seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was
already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men
aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to
bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas
and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her
house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also
accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This
prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith,
Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards
her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her
car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and
grabbed the lady's left arm.lâwphî1.ñèt The girl held on tenaciously to her car's
steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however,
proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car.
Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of
Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter,
however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose
motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac
car, the three men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the
neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De
la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto
the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was
left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the
back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated
beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in
response were jeers, abusive and impolite language that the appellants and threats
that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if
she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De
la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant
and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted
her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors to
release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her
mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already
dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that
the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take revenge
against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her
pleas. She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became
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angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand up and talk in
whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with
Cañal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed
towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa
Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car
reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of
Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would
be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the
rooms on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was
removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal
sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant:
"Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval and
ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of
the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be
ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be
more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her
stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting.
Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task
that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the
acid.lâwphî1.ñèt They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled
down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to
her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress,
together with her brassiere, fell on the floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling
in front of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about
ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or
thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his
other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover
herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva,
who was sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him
to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward
and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each
other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her
and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The
complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open.
Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the
room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued
between him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the
body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in
a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her
face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room,
leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her,
the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant
went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the
room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times.
The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know what
was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant
Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other
three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and
succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four
appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the
room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to
give in because she could not, after all, escape what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la
Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her
face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her.
They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a
hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was
released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she
did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up
and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva
again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to
be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his
lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by
others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss
De la Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far
from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to
them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to
alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known
company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a
UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what
had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was
a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone
with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the
driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the
negative.
80
It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva
reached home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC
officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the
complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four
of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's
instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman
also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong
solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards
summoned, treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was
not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the
police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva
residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching.
When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual
attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation
until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided
on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what
steps, if any, should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was
reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29,
1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her
lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the
Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a
statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the
four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant
submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief
Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967,
Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the
police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended.
That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters
where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of
persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men
he abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein
she made a formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement
(Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Viñas. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose
admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named
the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that
upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to
come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that
it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally
assaulted the complainant.
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture
of appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who
declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of
her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another
sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the
authorities: Pineda and Cañal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5,
1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva
pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four persons who abducted and raped
her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of
Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn
statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants
from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau,
adding that appellant Cañal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the identification,
one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and undressed him, and he
saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day
of their arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information
previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come
down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her.
Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the
crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the
complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda
executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept
to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made
plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car
and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear,
however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with
him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions
and bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries.
On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant
taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and
the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or
bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index
finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining her,
Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal
wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said
injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The
injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows administered by a
closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject
while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been
sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination, the
81
doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have
been produced by sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he
failed to find spermatozoa. He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually
found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from the last intercourse, not to
mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the
witness stand. We quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative
to the theory of the defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the
Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and
there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing
time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At
the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying
some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of
whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to
his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain
Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their
new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The
five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible
Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel
repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered
the car to España Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon
Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the Rotonda a
small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the
driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the
small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming
mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying
"let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she swerved
ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being
hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and
started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the
presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl
struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted
about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl
into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing
to aid Pineda: but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around
the area just to scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she
begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned to
Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the
"boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not
have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not
have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street
where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but
then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip
tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you
kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the
performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the
spectators were limited to the four of them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and
Maggie alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a
handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the
Hotel.lâwphî1.ñèt The three followed, and when they saw the pair
enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused testify
that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the
boys to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them.
They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed
their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal
stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused
declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and
they heard him promise her that he would pay the balance of
P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes
began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to
5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and
the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal)
left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva
who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of the
balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda
joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie
came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea
that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would
appear as if she had just come from her work.
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29
along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda
went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which
to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he
did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted
Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where
he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make
the company complete they invited Cañal to join them. They used
another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the
day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his compassions
and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In
the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had,
according to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the
municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where the
PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino
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 was the last to be apprehended, when having read in the
newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs.
Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies
one's credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the
prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report
and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on this
point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance
the proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a
strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for
fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later."
The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court
cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in
this kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been
proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as
defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the
worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these wolves
in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to
match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far
stronger than her yen for money, and her revenge much more keen.
The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of
these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget
her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral
curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the
men's hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their
pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again
something beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the
woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade
assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom
woman would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is simply
preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent
to do a striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the
balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of
the flesh paid on the installment basis? By the very precautious
nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are
usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could
demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect
later when she did not even know who these man were, where they
lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!)
whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had
struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her
intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most
stupid one that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense
want this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned
this circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the
press, their police interrogator, the person who negotiated their
surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One
cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch,
desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly
underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the
more clearly their guilt.
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why
was there need for this? The Court realizes that in its desperate
need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Cañal
as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense
concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed
their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it
was hot." What kind of men were these who were so devoid of any
sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury
by not only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her
to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to
argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic
blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid
regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule
rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the
version of the defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of
evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense
unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal) examination conducted
on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings
of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that
Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual
assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either
one of the following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva
and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and
the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense
itself says that these two persons rejoined the three after three or
four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy
Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these
injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva
could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out
83
 a case against the accused. The examining physician rules out this
preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the
imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what
purpose? Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that
much self-torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment
and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If
she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of these
tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much
more to lose in the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and
that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82-
480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA
55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also
be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted
on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and
pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however,
discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises
and traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her
thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by those of
a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and
uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any credence at all as
against the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first
place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was
uncorroborated — she has for corroboration nothing less than the
written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even
assuming that Maggie stood alone in her statements, the cases cited
by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the
Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has
confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in
gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of
the declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more
reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG
2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should
be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a
man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is
the only one available to prove directly its commission and that
corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a
serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of
justice are most often placed in a position of having to accept such
uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical
and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the
abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as
the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to him the act was
purged at any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform
a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the
existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to
stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated
in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in
her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car
against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose
and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing
his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that
meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the
four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This
testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the
defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended
complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated
by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below,
likewise been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence
of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is
untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not
usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the
subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination
was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched
herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa
does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not
the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs  Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980).
Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of
a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated
tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who
is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital
organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike
back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her
for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an
instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries he found in the
mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the
commission of successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's
arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her
mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This
utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value,
considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this
nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth.
84
Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the
reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the
press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her
family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and
her career, was not then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her.
This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of
the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with
disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different
parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as
suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when
the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the
hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what
they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly
suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume
her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public
disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay
her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as
a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass
of evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them by force and
intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police
investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or
that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements
were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the
use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could
hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the authorities could
have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all was
presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and
Canal admitted having waited — together with the two other appellants — for Miss
De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to
exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally
abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear that the
complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the
statements been prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have contained
matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too,
that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives
of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the
Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made
his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite
of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned
with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police
officers who took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand
that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was
supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason
to depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion that the statements were
voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose and
Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to
secure the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose
on the other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda
vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights),
Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ...
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is
identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the
term criminal prosecutions  was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23
Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial
court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said
constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that
is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are
during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and
after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be
unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding
effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the
meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered.
And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the
absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme
Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial
resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge
against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint
cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it
was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The
contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it
constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including
the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the
admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances
qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29,
1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-
15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of
guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to
85
require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested
the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the
better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People
vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil.,
91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial because it
found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that
he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the
information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of
the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota
prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple
language of the contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised
him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said accused
time to think. After a while I consulted him — for three times — and
his decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had
always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the
circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the
aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish only after the
fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life
imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the
Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs.
Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that
attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said
publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a
fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted.
For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been
influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of
the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit
the crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of
this decision.lâwphî1.ñèt There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the
complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not
indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive
acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of
rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been
consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can
not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction — in other words, they
should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction
and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua  to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as
follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of
the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the
provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the
extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of
the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of
determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of
86
simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect
that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating
circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance
to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime
having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf.
People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants
in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten
minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to
appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these aggravating circumstances has
been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which
does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the
reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a
result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in
each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the
trial court applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant
shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe
of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years."
The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong,
the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated
just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only
be taken into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in
the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that
only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial
court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs.
Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court,
found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him
two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not
applying the said principle, the court a quo  said that the case of Balaba is different
from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have
committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex.
As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and
proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar
as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of
Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the
accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in
which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three death penalties for three
distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the settled rule that
once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then
each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a
result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate
penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the
decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at
length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a
useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably
enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to
forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of
man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is
impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty,
the execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be
rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple
imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails
to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it
fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of
sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could
be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of
imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty  and the service of a sentence are two
distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper
penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number
of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is
determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the
court does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the
service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject
to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of
executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into
the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the
nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and
the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they
will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article
70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or more
(multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is
that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital
penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but
actually necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless
formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to
several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal
87
 perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition
of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital
felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible
character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a
grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small
measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could
effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or
commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the
proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in
recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his
constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives
which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple
death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical
effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of
multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and
then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve
a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life
sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among
them and of our finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed,
as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should
be imposed in the premises.
————
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance
Corporation asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below
ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the
complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-
222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged
by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City
Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought
the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel
mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was
stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967
up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was
annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received
and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit
against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The
assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and
annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor
filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court
of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The
sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in
Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G.
Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la
Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in
the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the
ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the
intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was
not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment
in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime.
Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a
motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on
October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case
in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a
petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs.
Gomez to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could
be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with
interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's
fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to
execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ
of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present
petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a
brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a
quo  having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation
is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez,
who, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the
lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said
car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the
criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however, intended to
be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but
were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of
establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the
appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and
its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before the
88
date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the
possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final
judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of
the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool
used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for
confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be
ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.

————

Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal
manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one
of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this
development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants

Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of
the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is
likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each
of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four
crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.

Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the
court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof
is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment &
Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

89
 pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.

Contrary to law.3

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and
dates of issue. The data are hereunder itemized as follows:

SECOND DIVISION
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
G.R. No. 149275             September 27, 2004 93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 ₱30,000.00

VICKY C. TY, petitioner, 93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 ₱30,000.00

vs. 93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 ₱30,000.00
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 ₱30,000.00
DECISION 93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 ₱30,000.00

TINGA, J.: 93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 ₱30,000.00

Petitioner Vicky C. Ty ("Ty") filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45,
seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decision affirmed with modification
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April
1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
222 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22
against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw
and issue to Manila Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account or for value to
Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable
to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of ₱30,000.00, said accused well
knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for "Account
Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 ₱30,000.004
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not
guilty.5
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother Chua Lao So Un was
confined at the Manila Doctors’ Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June
1992. Being the patient’s daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility
for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990. 6 As of 4 June
1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total liability of the mother in the amount
of ₱657,182.40. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13
May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of
₱418,410.55.8 The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to ₱1,075,592.95.
On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of
the obligation in installments.9 To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several
postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks,
each covering the amount of ₱30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But
they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due
to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the
complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand
letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the
instant case.10

90
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury." She averred that she was forced to issue the
checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly
treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that
her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator
and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the
telephone line, late delivery of her mother’s food and refusal to change the latter’s
gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital’s suspending medical treatment
of her mother. The "debasing treatment," she pointed out, so affected her mother’s
mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she
would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to
comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory
note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mother’s
immediate discharge.11
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial
court found that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital
bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense. 12 Thus, on 21 April 1997,
the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of
B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of
the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7)
checks in payment of a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their
respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
13
SO ORDERED.
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of
Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury."
She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed
there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the
payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that
the trial court should not have applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the
principles of justice and equity.14
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead
sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000.00) equivalent to
double the amount of the check, in each case." 15
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s defenses of
involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospital’s knowledge of her
checking account’s lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a
worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What
the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. 16
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration
for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of
Ty’s mother.17
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the
case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals18 wherein this Court declared that in determining
the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human
material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order. 19
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before
the Court of Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court
based on the following grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER
WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE
ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF
AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN
AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF
VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS
WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS  IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL
LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,20 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence,
contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be
presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it falls
91
within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment, the drawee
bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in payment
of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum.21
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Ty’s conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the
disposition of the case.22 Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court
of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of
Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings
are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion.23
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual
findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She,
however, claims that the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She
would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the
issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defense’s claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or
avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues
which are best determined by the trial court. And, as previously intimated, the trial
court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment
accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised
before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual
questions already passed upon twice below, rather than questions of law appropriate
for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raised--whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable
to warrant her exemption from criminal liability--has to be resolved in the negative.
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites
must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.24
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. 25 It should be
based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. 26 A mere threat of
a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. 27 A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was
such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against
his will as well.28 It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape.29
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty
claims that she was compelled to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly
demanded of her before her mother could be discharged--for fear that her mother’s
health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or
worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening
such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical
treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is
not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less
petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear
she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to
make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s threats
or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to
commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to
her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral
or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the
form of postdated checks or jewelry.30 And if indeed she was coerced to open an
account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the
scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without
funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised
her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks "because the moment I
will not have funds it will be a big problem." 31 Besides, apart from petitioner’s bare
assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim
that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospital’s
demands.
92
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition  and Memorandum that
the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised
Penal Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the
actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there
be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. 32
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If
the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, this defense is not applicable.33 Ty could have taken advantage of an available
option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give
jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her
obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury
feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more
so, the willful inaction of the actor.34 In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks
was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve
her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that
the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under the
circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor
avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision  of the trial court in the Civil
Case35 for damages filed by Ty’s mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for
purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein may establish a
claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a preponderance
of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from
liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable
consideration.36 Section 2437 of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a
presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a
consideration38 or for value.39 In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the
checks were issued without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to
overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of
proof. "Valuable consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given,
suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration
means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the
contract, such as the maker or indorser."40
In this case, Ty’s mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the
hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the
hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her signature on her
mother’s Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the
promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Ty’s claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal
obligation because she was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration
for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.41 tells us that "it is no defense to an
action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no consideration
which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a
benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the
instance of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege
or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original
obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement. Appellee
accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for
the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the
new notes."
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.42 B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the
obligation.43 The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them into circulation.44 As this Court held in Lim v. People of the
Philippines,45 "what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the
fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a
required element under B.P. Blg. 22."
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee
bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
93
 five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
by the drawee. remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency
of funds.46 If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. 47 Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith
sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
her liability. alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to
say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a
fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-
the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense
2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check,
hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential. 48
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2)
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals49 wherein this Court
the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking
inquired into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the circumstances
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and
justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
mechanical application of the law.
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and
Petitioner’s reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
the bounced checks were issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, imprisonment.54
where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus
operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while privately
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the
of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating
check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C.
lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since
Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored
the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the
check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
receipt of an actual account or credit for value.
insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also
ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors’ Hospital, the amount of Two
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual "account Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (₱210,000.00) representing the total amount of the
or for value." Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
has established that the checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s
mother.
SO ORDERED.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment,
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario*, JJ., concur.
absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad
faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000,50 adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of
Appeals51 and Lim v. People,52 authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of
imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the Court
resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-2001 53 which
clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:

94
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82815-16 October 31, 1990*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO CARPIO, EDWIN BABLIS, AND ARNOLD CARPIO, accused, PEDRO
CARPIO, appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is an appeal from the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan in Criminal Case No. 863-S (79) entitled "People vs. Pedro
Carpio and Arnold Carpio" and Criminal Case No. 1214-S (81) entitled "Pedro vs.
Edwin Bablis", convicting the accused-appellant Pedro Carpio and Edwin Bablis of
the crime of murder, and acquitting the accused Arnold Carpio.
Pedro Carpio and Arnold Carpio were charged of murder in an information which
states:
That on or about February 20, 1979, in the municipality of Claveria,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, Pedro Carpio and Arnold Carpio, together
with one Edwin Bablis, who is still at large and not yet apprehended,
armed with a gun and a dagger, conspiring together and helping one
another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully and feloniously assault, attack,
shoot and stab one Luis Pacis, jr., inflicting several wounds on his
body, which caused his death.
That the crime was aggravated with superior strenght and without
due regard to the rank of the deceased who was a policeman at the
time of the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 26)
Accused Edwin Bablis who was apprehended later was charged of the crime of
murder allegedly as follows:
That on or about February 20, 1979, in the municipality of Claveria,
province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Edwin y Tadena, together with Pedro Carpio
and Arnold Carpio who were already charged in Criminal Case No.
863-S (79) of the same offense before this Honorable Court, armed
with a sharp pointed instrument, conspiring together and helpind one
another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there willlfully, unlawfully anf feloniously
assault, attack and stab one Patrolman Luis Pacis, Jr., inflicting upon
him wounds on his body which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 26)
The case against the Carpios and Bablis were jointly tried upon agreement of the
counsel for the accused and the prosecution. After Bablis was arraigned, he escaped
from detention. He was later recaptured but escaped for the second time and has
remained at-large up to the present. He was tried in absentia by the trial court. After
trial, he and appellant, Pedro Carpio were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua while Arnold Carpio was acquitted. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING established facts, events and
incidents, the court finds the accused Pedro Carpio and Edwin
Bablis, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
attended by the aggravating circumstances of the (sic) treachery,
evident premeditation and superior strength and hereby sentences
Pedro Carpio, accused in Criminal Case No. 863-S (79) to Reclusion
Perpetua and Edwin Bablis accused in Criminal Case No. 1214-S
(81), also to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of the victim the amount of P40,000.00 as actual and moral
damages and to pay the costs.
The accused Arnold Carpio is hereby absolved and acquitted for lack
of sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 49)
Not satisfied with the decision, Carpio appealed and assigned the following errors:
95
 I. THE TRAIL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE
THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT PEDRO CARPIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE.
The facts of the case as gathered from the records are as follows:
Appellant Pedro Carpio and Pat. Luis Pacis, Jr. were neighbors in Narangtayan,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, the former having bought a parcel of land adjacent to the
land of the latter, from the same vendor. When Pat. Pacis decided to erect a fence on
his land, he met with the vendor and the appellant for them to define the extent of
their respective boundaries. It turned out that some trees planted by appellant on the
lot he thought was part of the land sold to him were inside the lot bought by Pat.
Pacis. The latter uprooted the trees and this caused a serious rift between the two.
Thereafter, appellant challenged Pat. Pacis to a fight but he was ignored by the latter.
At one time, Arnold, the son of appellant, was reported by Pat. Pacis to the barangay
captain for being drunk during curfew hours and Arnold was made to clean the
barangay auditorium as penalty. After the incident, appellant while drunk again
challenged Pat. Pacis to a fight but the latter kept his cool (TSN, pp. 288-293,
Hearing of June 15, 1984).
On February 14, 1979, Edwin Bablis, a cousin of appellant and his co-accused,
visited him and his family. He stayed for six (6) days in the house of appellant.
In the morning of February 20, 1979, appellant and Bablis were seen riding in the
former's motorcycle and proceeded westward to the direction of Claveria, Cagayan.
Once in Claveria, appellant left Bablis at one of the stores at the national highway in
Pantoon (p. 4, Records of Criminal Case No. 1214-S(81), People v. Bablis) and
proceeded to the municipal hall where he asked Cesar Domingo, a long
acquaintance, about Pat. Pacis' whereabouts. After having been informed that Pat.
Pacis was about to leave, appellant told Cesar Domingo "kursunada ko siya" and
then went to the direction of the east riding in his motorcycle (pp. 16-20, Deposition of
Cesar Domingo).
While Pat. Pacis was passing by the store where appellant left Bablis the latter
clapped his hands. This attracted the attention of Pat. Pacis and he stopped his
motorcycle. Bablis went near him and requested that he hitch a ride (p. 4, Records of
Criminal Case No. 1214-S(81), Id.). Pat. Pacis acceded and both rode in the
motorcycle. While negotiating a sharp curve at barangay Dibalio, Claveria, Cagayan,
Pat. Pacis slowed down. There, they were seen by Virgilio Ravelo who was driving a
jeepney (TSN, p. 329, Hearing of August 14,1984).
Francisco Palpallatoc, a prosecution's eyewitness testified that at Camalaggaoan
mountain in barangay Culao, of the same province, while he was riding in his
motorcycle on the same road going westward towards Claveria, he saw four persons
quarreling at about a distance of 50 meters ahead of him. He stopped to observe
what was going on. He saw Bablis holding the right hand of Pat. Pacis from behind
as Pedro Carpio, who was fronting Pat. Pacis, stabbed the latter on the breast while
Arnold Carpio kept on delivering fist blows on the different parts of Pat. Pacis' body.
When the latter was able to free himself, he ran towards Palpallatoc and the three
gave chase. Bablis shot Pat. Pacis five (5) times with a short firearm but missed. Pat.
Pacis passed by Palpallatoc and when the three reached the place where he
(Palparatoc) was, they stopped and warned him not to reveal what he saw to
anybody otherwise they will kill him. They ordered him to leave immediately and so
Palpallatoc left hurriedly. At the place where Palpallatoc saw the four grappling, he
noticed a motorcycle, a fatigue cap, and a pair of colored sunglasses. Despite
passing by several police checkpoints/stations in going to, and from, his place of
destination, Palpallatoc did not report what he witnessed (TSN, pp. 1 40-154, Hearing
of May 3, 1984).
When Pfc. Ambrocio Arizabal, then OIC of the Police Station of Claveria, received
information from a jeepney driver from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that the motorcycle of
Pat. Pacis was parked at the road near Camalaggaoan mountain, he sent Pat. Arturo
Somera and Pat. Bonifacio Tabaldo to investigate. They found the motorcycle but did
not find Pat. Pacis (TSN, pp. 126-130, Hearing of April 4,1983). The two thought Pat.
Pacis met an accident and he must have been brought to the hospital at Namuac or
to any clinic in Claveria. At the police station where they brought the motorcycle of
Pat. Pacis, they were surprised that there was no report of any accident. They
returned to the place where they found the motorcycle to look for Pat. Pacis. A few
hundred meters away was a trail leading to a ravine about 10 meters deep. There,
they saw the lifeless body of Pat. Pacis, his fatigue uniform hanging on a branch of a
narra tree, his rubber shoes and a black belt with a buckle marked "boys scout of the
Philippines". Immediately, they called for the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal
Trial Court Judge, and a photographer to view the body of Pat. Pacis (TSN, pp. 144-
145, May 3, 1983). The postmortem examination conducted by the Municipal Health
Officer of Claveria revealed that Pat. Pacis suffered:
1. Stab wound, 2 cms. with cleancut edges at right parasternal
region between 2nd and 3rd rib, 15.5 cms. in depth, running antero-
posteriorly and obliquely to the right traversing upper lobe of right
lung.
2. Stab wound, 1 cm., superficial, left parasternal between 3rd and
4th rib.
3. Incised wound, 4 cms., superficial, running vertically across left
Alae Nassi and upper lip.
96
 4. Bite mark, 4 x 2 cms. at distal radius. Appellant alleged that: (a) the key prosecution witness, Francisco Palpallatoc was
5. Skin avulsion, 2 x 2 cms. at right hypothenar. rehearsed before he testified as shown by the fact that before the latter gave his
6. Extensive abrasions inferior to left elbow, left knee and left anterior statement to the police, he was first brought to the house of Atty. Rafael Pacis,
leg. brother of Pat. Pacis; (b) Palpallatoc's testimony is incredible because he failed to
report the commission of the crime to the police despite passing by several military
CAUSE OF DEATH: Profuse hemorrhage from stab wound at right and police precincts; (c) if it were true that Palpallatoc was at the scene thereof, the
parasternal area. (p. 3, Record of Criminal Case N. 1214-S (81) deceased could have requested his assistance or borrowed his motorcycle to escape
when being pursued by his attackers; (d) since Pat. Pacis was seen with only one
companion by Virgilio Ravelo prior to his death, he could not have been attacked by
Sgt. Francisco Vinagrera, Chief Investigator of the 115th PC Company stationed at
three (3) men as claimed by Palpallatoc (e) he was in his place of work at Taggat
Curva, Pamplona, Cagayan investigated Pedro Carpio on February 20,1979 based
Industries, Inc., when the crime was committed; (f) his presence at the scene of the
on an information he received from one Patricio Lazo to whom Palpallatoc confided
crime was not sufficiently proven and added that no evidence was adduced to prove
what he saw. On April 30, 1979, Sgt. Vinagrera went to the residence of Palpallatoc
conspiracy and evident premeditation.
to confirm the information. In the morning of May 1, 1979, Palpallatoc was brought to
the residence of Atty. Rafael Pacis, brother of Pat. Pacis. On the same day,
Palpallatoc executed an affidavit regarding the incident. He was again brought to the Appellant's contentions are devoid of merit.
headquarters on May 3, 1979, where he gave another statement.
This Court has always adhered to the rule that where the issue is one of credibility of
On the other hand, the theory of the defense is alibi and simple denial. witnesses, the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless
certain facts have been overlooked and if considered might affect the result of the
case (People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27, 1989,169 SCRA 530; People
It appears that the accused Pedro Carpio is the father of Arnold Carpio, his co-
vs. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 497).
accused in Criminal Case No. 863-s (79) while Edwin Bablis is the first degree cousin
of Pedro Carpio, the father of the latter being the brother of the mother of the Bablis
(TSN, pp. 453; September 25, 1986). On cross-examination Palpallatoc admitted that he did not immediately report the
incident to the police authorities because he was afraid. But when asked by Sgt.
Vinagrera and Pat. de la Cruz if he has knowledge of the incident, he answered in the
On February 14, 1979, Edwin Bablis arrived at the house of Pedro Carpio at
affirmative. He was brought to the police headquarters and later to the house of Atty.
Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan. Edwin stayed in the house of Pedro Carpio
Rafael Pacis, one of the private prosecutors (Decision of the trial court; pp. 8-9;
until 5:00 o'clock early morning of February 20, 1979 when he left their place. Pedro
Original Records, pp. 688-689) which is but proper, being a witness for the
Carpio and Edwin Bablis usually conversed after taking their supper about their
prosecution and does not necessarily imply that he was rehearsed before he gave his
relatives in Abulug, Cagayan and never planned anything during the latter's sojourn
statement to the police.
in Nagrangtayan Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (TSN, pp. 482-483; Hearing of September
25, 1986).
In the same manner, mere delay in reporting cannot reduce his credibility. The Court
in many instances has acknowledged the fact that people are naturally reluctant to
Pedro Carpio contends that he left their house at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira,
get involved in criminal prosecutions and has consistently refused to regard such
Cagayan at about 6:30 in the early morning of February 20, 1979 rode his motorcycle
delay as a necessarily negative factor in the evaluation of his testimony (Rodriguez v.
and arrived at the Taggat Industries Incorporated at 7:00 o'clock of the same morning
Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 220-221 [1989]).
then reported for work. He never left the compound of Taggat Industries, Inc. until he
left for home at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon (TSN, pp. 475-482; Hearing of
September 25, 1986). Furthermore, the defense failed to prove that in testifying against appellant, Francisco
Palpallatoc was motivated by ill motive. In the absence of convincing evidence that
the principal prosecution witness acted because of improper motives, the
Arnold Carpio stated that he woke up at about 6:30 early morning of February
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith
20,1979 then went directly to the basketball court nearby and played with Henry
and credit (People v. Paco, G.R. No. 76893, February 27,1989,170 SCRA 681;
Bagaso, Leony Sabuyo, Edgar Cenal, Vicente Labasan and others. After playing, he
People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 32864, March 8,1989,171 SCRA 30).
went home, piled firewood then helped his mother cook their lunch. After helping his
mother cook, he went to take a bath then took his lunch (TSN, pp. 450-452; Hearing
of September 25, 1986).
97
Appellant's insinuation that three (3) men could not have attacked the victim because
he was seen only with Bablis before his death, is untenable. While it was established
that Virgilio Ravelo saw Pat. Pacis with one passenger in his motorcycle before his
death, such circumstance is not incompatible with the fact that Pat. Pacis was
attacked by at least two (2) men, Bablis and appellant as found by the trial court. It
must be noted that the place where Virgilio Ravelo saw Pat. Pacis with his
companion was different from the place where Palpallatoc saw Pat. Pacis being
attacked by appellant, his son and Bablis.
Appellant's defense of alibi is unavailing. He was positively Identified by Francisco
Palpallatoc, whose credibility was not successfully assailed, as the one who stabbed
Pat. Pacis while the right hand of the latter was being held by Bablis from behind. In
case of positive Identification, the defense of alibi must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence (People vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 70446, January 31, 1989, 169
SCRA 730). Appellant utterly failed to prove that he was doing his job at Taggat
Industries Inc. during the commission of the crime. He did not even request his co-
employees to testify and confirm his presence thereat. The defense of alibi merits
outright rejection when it could have been corroborated by other persons and yet no
such corroborating evidence was presented. (People vs. Alvarez, supra).
Appellant's claim that no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove
conspiracy between him and the other accused, Edwin Bablis deserves scant
consideration. For conspiracy to exist, the evidence need not establish the actual
agreement which shows the preconceived plan, motive, interest or purpose in the
commission of the crime (Antonio v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 595 [1988]).
Conspiracy is manifested in the coordinated acts of the assailants (People v. Tala,
141 SCRA 240 [1986]) as shown in the case at bar where Bablis was seen holding
the hand of the victim while Carpio was stabbing the latter and Arnold kept on
delivering fist blows on the victim's different parts of the body. When the victim was
able to escape, the accused gave chase and Bablis shot the deceased five (5) times
although he missed. Undoubtedly the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective; hence, the presence of conspiracy (People v. Maralit, 165 SCRA 427
[1988]).
But the presence of treachery or abuse of superiority was not convincingly
established, For treachery to be appreciated, the culprits must have employed means
directly and specially tending to insure the without risk to themselves and that such
means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted (People v. Rellon, 167
SCRA 75 [1988]; People v. Marciales, 166 SCRA 436 [1988]). The victim in the
instant case was not rendered totally helpless and defenseless because only his right
hand was held by the other accused while the appellant stabbed him. The victim
even succeeded in freeing himself from his assailants and still managed to escape to
a distance of about 100 meters from the scene of the incident. Witness Palpallatoc
testified that there were three (3) assailants. However, the participation of the other
accused, Arnold Carpio, son of appellant, was not given credence by the trial court.
In fact, the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Thus, it appears then that
only two persons took part in the commission of the crime, the appellant, Pedro
Carpio and the other accused Edwin Bablis.
The fact that there were two (2) male persons who attacked the victim does
not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength depends on the age,
size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
the defense available to the person attacked (People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 101). The prosecution failed to prove that there was
indeed a notorious inequality between the ages, sizes and strength of the antagonists
and that these notorious advantages were purposely sought for or used by the
accused to achieve his ends.
The trial court correctly found that commission of the felony was not attended by the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. The fact that the accused-appellant
and Edwin Bablis were seen riding together on the former's motorcycle does not by
itself prove that they were then determined to commit the crime. Not even appellant's
remark, "Kursunada ko siya" (referring to the victim) uttered to Ceasar Domingo in
the municipal hall when he was looking for the victim, constitute a sufficient proof that
it was during that time that he was determined to kill Pacis. Evident premeditation
cannot be considered to qualify murder where it is not shown when the plan to kill
was hatched, or what time elapsed before it was carried out (People v. Corpus, 107
Phil. 44 [1960]; People v. Acaya, No. 72998, July 29,1988,163 SCRA 768).
In the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is only homicide.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. There is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. In line with the
new policy of this court to grant an increased indemnity to the heirs of the deceased,
the award of P40,000.00 is hereby increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Daniel Sison,
G.R. No. 86455, September 14, 1990).
ACCORDINGLY, except for the above modification, the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
98
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135222. March 04, 2005
PETER ANDRADA, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Peter Andrada, petitioner,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 18, 1997 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 15851 and its Resolution2 dated August 13, 1998.
In an Information dated January 7, 1987, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City charged petitioner with frustrated murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of September 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack one ARSENIO UGERIO
on the head twice with a bolo thereby inflicting upon latter: hacking wound, head,
resulting in 1) skull and scalp avulsion vertex; 2) depressed comminuted skull
fracture, right parieto occipital with significant brain laceration; operation done;
craniectomy; vertex debridement; craniectomy; right parieto occipital; dural repair;
debridement, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of Murder as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless, the felony was not
consummated by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by
the timely medical attendance extended to Arsenio Ugerio which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned on February 9, 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The hearing of the case ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 23, 1986, at around 11:30 in
the evening, T/Sgt. Teodolfo Sumabong, of the defunct Philippine Constabulary (PC),
was resting in the PC barracks at Camp Dado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet when
one Rommel Alcate called up requesting police assistance. Alcate claimed that a
group of persons was suspiciously roaming around his boarding house in Ferguson
Street, Baguio City.
Sgt. Sumabong and two of his companions, Sgt. Gaces and Cpl. Arsenio Ugerio,
went to Alcete’s boarding house, arriving there past midnight. However, according to
Alcate, the suspicious persons have left.
On their way back to the camp at around 1:15 in the morning, the group dropped by
Morlow’s Restaurant, Bokawkan Street, Baguio City, for a snack. They ordered
coffee and sandwiches.
While they were waiting to be served, a woman passed by their table. While Cpl.
Ugerio was talking to her, a man, later identified as Peter Andrada, herein petitioner,
approached the former and scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong, identifying himself as a PC
non-commissioned officer, advised petitioner to pay his bill and go home as he was
apparently drunk.
Petitioner heeded Sgt. Sumabong’s advice for he paid his bill and left the restaurant
with his companions. While Sgt. Sumabong was paying his bill, he heard Cpl. Ugerio,
seated about a meter away, moaning in pain. When Sgt. Sumabong turned around,
he saw Cpl. Ugerio sprawled on the floor. Petitioner was hacking him on the head
with a bolo. Sgt. Sumabong approached them but petitioner ran away, followed by a
companion. Sgt. Sumabong chased them but to no avail.
Upon Sgt. Sumabong’s instruction, Sgt. Gaces brought Cpl. Ugerio, the victim, to the
St. Louis University Hospital. Then Sgt. Sumabong reported the incident to the police
station at Camdas Road and thereafter proceeded to the hospital. When he returned
to the police station, he learned that petitioner was arrested in a waiting shed at the
corner of Camdas Road and Magsaysay Avenue.
The arresting officers then brought petitioner back to the restaurant where they
recovered the bolo used in hacking the victim. Witnesses to the incident were
interviewed by the police and they pointed to petitioner as the culprit.
Dr. Francisco Fernandez, a neuro-surgery consultant, found that the victim suffered
two (2) major injuries. The first was a "scalping avulsion," around 5 centimeters wide,
i.e., the chopping off of a part of the victim’s skull. The second was a depressed
fracture, about 6 centimeters wide, found on the right parieto occipital area of the
skull. Either wound, being fatal, would have caused the death of the victim had it not
been for a timely medical treatment. After three (3) days, the victim was transferred to
the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City. Because of the injuries he sustained, he has
remained incapable to remember or recall visual stimuli or information.
Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. His version is that he and one Romy Ramos were drinking beer
99
with a hospitality girl named "Liza" inside Morlow’s Restaurant, when three military
men occupied the table next to them. They had pistols tucked in their waists. Without
any warning or provocation, two of the men, whom he identified as Cpl. Ugerio and
Sgt. Sumabong, approached him, slapped his face several times and pointed their
guns to his head. They cursed him and threatened to summarily execute him
because he was "so boastful." Cpl. Ugerio then "collared" him and dragged him
outside the restaurant, while Sgt. Sumabing followed. Fearful that he might be killed,
petitioner pulled out his bolo, wrapped in a newspaper, from his waist and swung it at
the two military men. He did not see if he hit any of them. Then he ran to his house in
Camdas Subdivision. He checked to see if his mother or grandmother was at home
so either of them could assist him in surrendering to the police. But neither was
present. On his way to surrender to the police, he met his mother accompanied by a
policeman. They then proceeded to the police sub-station at Magsaysay Avenue
where he surrendered.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which is
quoted below, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused PETER ANDRADA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder.
The Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and
20 days as MINIMUM to 14 years, 10 months and 20 days as MAXIMUM; to
indemnify the sum of P3,000.00, representing part of the victim’s expenses for
medical services and medicine, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s Decision,
thus:
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED WITH
THE MODIFICATION THAT THE APPELLANT IS SENTENCED TO AN
INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS
OF PRISION CORRECIONAL, AS MINIMUM, TO EIGHT (8) YEARS AND TWENTY
(20) DAYS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS MAXIMUM.
SO ORDERED.5
The Court of Appeals, in modifying the imposable penalty, found that petitioner is
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority as he was only 17 years,
9 months and 20 days old at the time of the incident.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate
Court in its Resolution dated August 13, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition.
The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether petitioner’s right to due process was
violated; (2) whether his plea of self-defense is in order; (3) whether the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide; and (4) whether he is entitled
to any mitigating circumstance, assuming he is guilty.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that
the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process. He contends that his
counsel:
1. Failed to present all the witnesses who could have testified that he is innocent of
the crime charged;
2. Failed to present the medical certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by
the victim;
3. Did not notify him to attend the hearing when Sgt. Sumabong was cross-examined;
and
4. Failed to submit a memorandum.
In sum, petitioner ascribes gross incompetence or gross negligence to his counsel.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that there was no violation of
petitioner’s right to due process. Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice.
If the latter’s performance and competence fell short of petitioner’s expectations, then
he should not blame either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross
must have prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard. 6
In the following cases, we held that there has been gross negligence or
incompetence on the part of counsel for the accused, thus:
In US v. Gimenez,7 we remanded a criminal case for new trial when counsel for an
accused inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea of not guilty, thus
resulting in the precipitate conviction of his client.
In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals and People,8 we ordered a dismissed appeal from a
conviction for estafa to be reinstated after it was shown that the failure to file the
appellant’s brief on time was due to sheer irresponsibility on the part of appellant’s
counsel.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,9 we remanded the case for reception of evidence
after counsel for the accused filed a demurrer to the evidence notwithstanding that
100
his motion for leave of court was denied, thus precluding the accused to present his
evidence.
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,10 we ordered a new trial after a showing that counsel
for the accused abandoned her without explanation.
In People v. Bascuiguin,11 we held that the arraignment is not valid. The accused was
not properly represented by counsel de officio since he merely conferred with his
client for a few minutes and advised him to plead guilty to the crime of rape with
homicide.
We find that the petitioner has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the
elements of self-defense. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the
time he hacked the victim, the latter was still seated while he (petitioner) was
behind him. Indeed, how could there be an unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim at that instance? Petitioner’s bare assertions that the victim slapped him,
poked a handgun at him, and threatened to "salvage" him were not duly proved by
the evidence for the defense. Rather, the prosecution established that it was
petitioner who unexpectedly attacked the victim from behind. Clearly, the aggressor
was petitioner. Since the first element of self-defense is not present here, such
defense must fail.

On the third issue, petitioner contends that assuming he is guilty, he should only be

None of the foregoing incidents is present in the instant case. Instead, records show
convicted of frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder. He insists that treachery was
that counsel for petitioner actively participated in the cross-examination of the
not present. His hacking the victim was a "spur-of-the-moment" act prompted by self-
witnesses for the prosecution to test their credibility. At any rate, the fact that he did
preservation.
not choose to present other witnesses did not affect any of petitioner’s substantial
rights. Besides, said counsel might have valid reasons why he did not call to the
witness stand those witnesses. We are not persuaded. There is alevosia  when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to
We note that petitioner was present during the hearing. If he believed that his
himself from any defense which the offended party might make. 17 We agree with the
counsel de parte was not competent, he could have secured the services of a new
lower courts that the petitioner planned to kill the victim with treachery in mind. At that
counsel. He did not. Having decided to retain the services of his counsel during the
time, the victim was seated, having just finished a meal at a late hour. His back was
entire proceedings, petitioner must be deemed bound by any mistake committed by
towards petitioner when the latter, without warning, hacked him twice on his head
him. For if an accused feels that his counsel is inept, he should take action by
with a bolo. The attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no
discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse decision is rendered and
opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself.
thereupon blame his counsel for incompetence.12

Considering that petitioner had performed all the acts of execution which would have
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that a client is bound by the mistakes of
resulted in the death of the victim, had it not been for timely medical assistance, a
his lawyer. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency,
cause not of the will of the petitioner, and considering further the presence of
relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of
treachery, then, the crime committed is frustrated murder, not frustrated homicide.
proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue the case,
unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case,
do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence. 13 On the fourth issue, petitioner insists that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should have been appreciated in his favor.
Having found that petitioner’s counsel was not so inept or motivated by bad faith, or
so careless and negligent of his duties as to seriously prejudice the substantial rights Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran
of petitioner or prevent him from putting up a proper defense, we hold that he is away. He was apprehended by responding police officers in the waiting shed at the
bound by the decisions of his counsel regarding the conduct of the case. 14 corner of Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it
shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities,
On the second issue, petitioner invokes self-defense. Hence, it is incumbent upon
either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and
him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of
expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 18 Here, the
himself. For in invoking self-defense, the accused admits killing or seriously
surrender was not spontaneous.
wounding the victim and thus, has the burden to justify his act. 15 The requisites of
self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation of the part of the Anent the modification of the penalty by the Court of Appeals, the same is in order.
person defending himself.16
101
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 18, 1997 and its Resolution dated August 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. CR No.
15851 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 149368. April 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.  FRANCISCO DACILLO aliasDODOY
AND JOSELITO PACOT y IBARRA (case provisionally dismissed), Accused,
FRANCISCO DACILLO aliasDODOY, Appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 convicting appellant Francisco
Dacillo y Timtim aliasDodoy of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death.
Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot y Ibarra were indicted for murder in an
information that read:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Murder, under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. 7659, committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
That on or about February 6, 2000, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and stabbed one Rosemarie B. Tallada with a bladed weapon, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her death.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 cralawred
The case against appellants co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed
for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him with certainty.
Appellant was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Pre-trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued thereafter.
To establish appellants guilt, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Charlita Tallada, the victims mother; Patricia Turlao, the victims aunt; appellant
Dacillos neighbors, Jovelyn Dagmil, Augusto Cesar Arara, Roche Abregon, Resna
Abregon, Allan Castanares, Jupiter Campaner; police officers SPO2 Rodolfo Taburda
and SPO1 Avelino Alcobus, and medico-legal officer Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
The facts, as established by the prosecution witnesses collective testimonies, follow.
The victim, seventeen-year-old Rosemarie B. Tallada, was last seen alive at dusk on
February 6, 2000, on the bridge near appellants house at Purok No. 3, New Society
Village, Ilang, Davao City.
Around 7:45 p. m. that evening, witness Jovelyn Dagmil, who was living with her aunt
in the house adjacent to appellants, was looking for her cousin when she saw the
victim Rosemarie on the bridge. Because it was drizzling, she invited Rosemarie
inside their house but the latter declined and told her she was waiting for
someone.3 cralawred
After a while, Jovelyn heard a man inside appellants house calling Psst, psst. ..
Thinking the call was meant for her, she turned but instead saw Rosemarie walking
towards and entering appellants house.4 cralawred
Not long after Rosemarie went inside the house, a struggle was heard therein.
Witnesses Roche and Resna Abregon, who were in the adjacent house singing with
a karaoke machine, suddenly felt the floor shaking as if a scuffle was going on at the
other side of the wall. The houses were built on stilts above the seashore, adjoining
one another with mere wooden partitions in between. Roche Abregon peeped
through a hole on the wall and saw appellant and another man grappling with a
woman who was gagged with a handkerchief.5 When Roche saw appellant choking
the woman, she informed her aunt about the commotion in appellants house but the
aunt brushed it aside as a simple family quarrel.6 For a while they heard the sound of
a woman being beaten up. Then everything became quiet. Later that evening, they
saw appellant leaving his house.7 cralawred
The following day, February 7, 2000, at around 8:00 a. m., appellant was seen
entering his house carrying lumber and screen.8 He was observed going in and out of
his house several times, each time carefully locking the gate as he left. 9 At around
9:00 a. m., appellant was seen with ready-mixed cement in a plastic pail and, when
asked what he was going to do with the cement, replied that it was for the sink he
was constructing.10 cralawred
102
Later, appellant entrusted a bag of womans personal belongings to barangay
tanodAllan Castaares and told the latter that it belonged to his woman companion.
He allegedly could not bring it home because his wife might see them. 11 cralawred
By February 11, 2000, neighbors started smelling the rotten odor of Rosemaries
already decomposing body.12 cralawred
At 5:00 p. m. the same day, witnesses Roche, Resna, and Rachel were gathering
seashells under appellants house when they saw droplets of blood and pus dripping
from appellants comfort room. They immediately reported it to their aunt who in turn
instructed her husband to get a stick and poke the sacks covering the comfort room.
However, the husband instead climbed up the house and was greeted by the stink
emanating from the corner where he saw a tomb-like structure. They immediately
reported the matter to barangayofficials who called the police.13 cralawred
At about 10:00 p. m., policemen arrived at appellants house, accompanied by his
wife, and forcibly opened the lock. They proceeded to where the tomb was located.
When cracked open, the tomb revealed the decomposing body of a
woman.14 cralawred
The corpse was brought to the Rivera Funeral Parlor where it was identified by the
victims mother Charlita Tallada and aunt Patricia Turlao as that of Rosemarie,
through the keloid scar on her forearm.
Dr. Danilo Ledesma conducted an autopsy on Rosemaries remains. His necropsy
report revealed that Rosemarie died from a stab wound in the abdomen. The report
further disclosed that she suffered contusions in the anterior chest wall and her right
hand; an incised wound on her left middle finger; a stab wound on the left side of the
face and fractures on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6thand 7thribs on her side.15 cralawred
Dr. Ledesma testified that the wounds suffered by Rosemarie indicated that she put
up a struggle and the wounds were inflicted before her death. 16 cralawred
In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his
participation. Appellant alleged that he only held down Rosemaries legs to prevent
her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he identified as
Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.
He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation (DUCC),
was looking for a house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could spend the night.
He offered his brothers house which was under his care. In the evening of February
6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the house at Purok No. 3, New
Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that
evening, he returned to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had ordered. When
he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with each other and Pacot
was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of heeding him, the latter
ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he was going to be implicated
just the same so he closed the door as ordered and helped Pacot (hold) the feet of
the woman as her feet kept hitting the walls.17 cralawred
The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless. Pacot wanted
to dump the body into the sea but appellant told him it was low tide. Appellant then
suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which Pacot gave
appellant P500.
Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a. m.,
appellant brought the concrete mixture and cast the dead body in cement. After
finishing the job in the afternoon of that day, appellant reported for work at DUCC.
When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000, appellant
immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February 12, 2000. He
stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year.
On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder
and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as
defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty of
DEATH,
He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount
of P50,000. 00, plus the sum of P50,000. 00 as moral damages, and the sum
of P50,000. 00 as exemplary damages.
His immediate confinement to the national penitentiary is hereby ordered.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.18 cralawred
Thus, this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
103
 I appellants idea to pour concrete on the body, prevailing over Pacots suggestion to
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE HEIRS OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY THE AMOUNT OF PHP50,000. 00, WHICH APPEARS AS
PAYMENT FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES.19 cralawred
Appellant admitted that he had a hand in the killing of Rosemarie but attempted to
downgrade his participation in the crime by claiming he only held Rosemaries legs as
Pacot was strangulating her. The rule is that any admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable
therefor. Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never
any such disclaimer by appellant.
Moreover, despite appellants self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his
involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. His declaration
faltered in the face of the testimonies of eyewitnesses positively identifying him as
one of the two men who were with Rosemarie when she was killed. Witness Roche
Abregon pointed to appellant as the one who strangled Rosemarie. He was
established to be inside the house at the time the witnesses heard a woman being
battered. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind,
appellants admission that he participated in its commission by holding Rosemaries
legs made him a principal by direct participation.
Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered
principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present:
1. they participatedin the criminal resolution and
2. they carried out their plan and personally took partin its execution by acts which
directly tended to the same end.20 cralawred
Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have
participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the
commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be
proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient
that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. 21 cralawred
The prosecution was able to prove appellants participation in the criminal resolve by
his own admission that, right after he was told by Pacot to close the door, he held
down Rosemaries legs. He was pinpointed as the one who throttled the victim. He
admitted that they only stopped when they were sure that Rosemarie was already
dead. The two men planned how to dispose of the victims body; it was in fact
just dump the body into the sea. It was appellant himself who encased the body in
cement and made sure that there were no leaks from which foul odor could emanate.
He was a conspirator in the killing and, whether or not he himself did the strangling or
the stabbing, he was also liable for the acts of the other accused.
It is well-settled that a person may be convictedfor the criminal act of another where,
between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the
commission of the crime charged.22 Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of
the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common
purpose or design.23 cralawred
We are convinced beyond doubt of the joint and concerted effort between appellant
and the man he identified as Pacot in the killing of Rosemarie.
Appellant likewise contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
He contends that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not
specifically alleged in the information. Nothing can be farther from the truth. A cursory
reading of the information reveals that appellant was sufficiently informed of the
charges against him, including the use of superior strength in killing the hapless and
defenseless female victim.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength necessitates a showing
of the relative disparity in the physical characteristics of the aggressor and the victim
such as age, gender, physical size and strength. We agree with the trial court that the
killing of Rosemarie was committed with abuse of superior strength. As found by the
court a quo, two grown-up men against a young fragile woman whose ability to
defend herself had been effectively restrained revealed a shocking inequality of
physical strength. The victim was much weaker in constitution and could not have
possibly defended herself from her stronger assailants. 24 Such disparity was manifest
in the contusions in the chest and hands, wounds on the fingers, a stab wound on the
left side of the face and multiple fractures in the ribs of the victim. 25 The abuse of
superior strength was obvious in the way Rosemarie was mercilessly beaten to a
pulp.
The killing of Rosemarie was thus correctly qualified to murder by the abuse of
superior strength, a circumstance specifically pleaded in the information and proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on
the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that he had a prior
conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a
104
recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance
which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetuato death.
In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to
allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences
previously meted out to the accused.26 This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and
therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the imposable penalty
should be reduced toreclusion perpetua.
Regarding the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim, appellant
claims that said amount was awarded by the trial court as payment for actual
damages. This claim is misleading. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
amount was granted by the trial court by way of indemnity ex delictoto compensate
for the death of the victim which prevailing jurisprudence fixes at P50,000.27 The
award of such indemnity requires no proof other than the death of the victim and the
accuseds responsibility therefor.28 cralawred
The award of P50,000 as moral damages is proper, supported as it was by the
testimony of Charlita Tallada, the victims mother, that Rosemaries death caused her
immeasurable pain.29 cralawred
In addition, the Court awards P25,000 in temperate damages, said amount being
awarded in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court.30 cralawred
With regard to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example of
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the offended party.
In People v. Catubig ,31 we explained that:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches
the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim.
The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation
of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary
or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only
be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In
fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the Civil
Code in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. Imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Art. 2229 of the
Civil Code in order to set an example for the public good. 32 For this purpose, we
believe that the amount of P25,000 may be appropriately awarded.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 31, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Francisco Dacillo y Timtim aliasDodoy is declared guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetuaand is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rosemarie Tallada the sum ofP50,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages,P25,000 as temperate damages and P25,000
as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and TINGA, JJ., concur.
105
106

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123298               November 27, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO L. CALPITO alias "Francis," appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated July 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City1 in Criminal Case No. 91-01-59 finding appellant Francisco Calpito alias
"Francis" guilty of the crime of Murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.2
Appellant was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide under an information
which reads, as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of November, 1990, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a deadly weapon, with intent [to] gain did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of violence and intimidation on the person of FLORENTINA
VILLAS rob, take and carry away a shoulder bag containing cash in the amount of
₱15,000 and jewelries amounting to P30,000 belonging to Florentina Villas; that on
the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof and for the purpose of enabling
him to take/rob and carry away the above-mentioned bag, taking advantage of
superior strength with treachery and with intent to kill, said accused did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack and stab with the said weapon
Florentina Villas and Israel Montilla inflicting wounds on Florentina Villas which
caused her death and [a] wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated medical
attendance on him for a period of 5-7 days and [which] incapacitated him from
performing his usual work for the same length of time.
Contrary to law.3
Initially, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial. 4 Upon appellant’s
motion, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted. 5 However, the prosecution
resolved to maintain the original information.6 On January 15, 1993, appellant was re-
arraigned, and after being appraised of the consequences of the nature of his
offense, he changed his plea to one of guilty. 7 The court a quo thereafter received the
prosecution’s evidence to prove the nature and extent of appellant’s culpability as to
the crime charged.8
The prosecution presented  its sole witness  in the person of Israel Montilla, the
grandson of the victim Florentina Villas. In his testimony, 9 he narrated that at around
2:00 a.m. of November 21, 1990, he was sleeping in the sala of the victim’s
residence when he was awakened by the victim’s shout for help. He then rushed to
the victim’s bedroom which was just 2 ½ meters away from the sofa on which he
slept. By the doorway, he met appellant who was holding a fan knife in his right hand
and the victim’s shoulder bag in his left. He grappled with appellant, who suddenly
stabbed him on his left upper arm. While Montilla searched for something with which
he could defend himself, appellant rushed out of the house through the kitchen door,
the lock of which the latter had destroyed. Montilla looked inside the bedroom and
saw his grandmother on the bed lying in a pool of blood, with stab wounds all over
her body.
Montilla further declared that no other person was inside the bedroom when the
incident happened. He was able to recognize appellant because of the fluorescent
light. He testified that he could not be mistaken regarding the assailant’s identity,
since he had long known appellant, who resided near the victim’s house. He also
stated that appellant, in his haste, left a flashlight and a cap which had the latter’s
name written on its inside portion. He added that he had known appellant to be a
drug user, and that at the time of the incident, the latter appeared to be under the
influence of drugs.
The Medico-legal Report10 submitted by Dr. Benjamin Ver disclosed that the victim
suffered a total of 4 stab wounds and 7 incise wounds on different parts of her body.
These wounds caused the victim’s death, at the age of 74.
The court a quo, finding the charge of Robbery with Homicide unsubstantiated by
evidence, convicted appellant of the crime of Murder. Appellant was thus sentenced,
as follows:
107
WHEREFORE, in view of the plea of guilty of accused Francisco Calpito alias
"Francis" to the crime charged in the information and considering the evidence
adduced by the prosecution which sufficiently established the absolute culpability and
degree of participation of the herein accused in the killing of the deceased, accused
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, but of Murder, the prosecution having failed to prove with sufficient
amplitude the existence of Robbery, [and] the Court hereby sentences accused to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum
of ₱50,000, and to pay the costs.11
Appellant, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 12 arguing that the trial court
erred in convicting him of Murder instead of Homicide, and in failing to apply the
mitigating circumstance of minority.
Acting on the motion, the court a quo ordered the reception of evidence to prove
appellant’s minority. Appellant presented the testimony 13 of Paquito Ato, Civil
Registrar of Butuan City who allegedly issued the former’s birth certificate, the
original of which was submitted as evidence. On this birth certificate, it was stated
that appellant was born on May 31, 1974, thus indicating that he was only 16 on
November 20, 1990 when the crime happened. Ato confirmed the authenticity of the
aforesaid document, and its late registration, as indicated thereon. He further
declared that it was applied for by appellant’s mother, who supplied to him all the
details on appellant’s birth. He, however, admitted that he was unable to verify the
information given, as the hospital where appellant was born no longer existed, and as
the named attending physician no longer resided in Butuan City.
In its Order dated September 15, 1995, the court a quo denied the motion and
affirmed appellant’s conviction for Murder. It further found the submitted birth
certificate dubious and self-serving.14
Hence, the instant appeal. Appellant questions his conviction on two grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRIVILEGED
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY INTERPOSED BY THE
DEFENSE.15
Appellant disputes the court a quo’s finding of the attendance of qualifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime. The information alleged the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength. Although the assailed
decision did not discuss which of these qualified the killing to murder, a perusal of the
facts of the case readily reveals that abuse of superior strength attended the crime. In
several cases, this Court has ruled that this circumstance depends on the age, size
and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality
of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or took
advantage of in the commission of the crime.16 In a recent case, it was held that an
attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes an abuse of the aggressor’s superior strength. 17 The circumstance
must apply with more reason in the present case, where the abuse of superior
strength is evident from the notorious disparity between the relative strength of the
victim, a 74-year-old unarmed woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with a
knife.
With respect to treachery, this Court holds that it cannot be considered in the present
case. This circumstance cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved
the events after the attack happened, but not the manner the attack commenced or
how the act which resulted in the victim’s death unfolded. 18 It must be noted that in
this case, the prosecution’s lone witness only accounted for what transpired after the
stabbing, as he did not see the actual attack on the victim.
Given the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the court a
quo therefore correctly convicted appellant for Murder.
This Court, however, disagrees with the trial court in its conclusion on the mitigating
circumstance of minority. In its order,19 the court a quo  found appellant’s birth
certificate doubtful because there appeared a slight discrepancy between the name
stated thereon and the name being used by appellant. It also took into consideration
the fact that the document was belatedly registered by appellant’s mother, who
appeared to have supplied the necessary information so that her son may avail of the
aforesaid mitigating circumstance.1âwphi1
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that in assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.20 In fact, in several cases, this Court
has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused
regarding his age.21
This Court emphasizes that while the submitted birth certificate is not entirely
satisfactory, a careful review of the records reveals other evidence of appellant’s
minority. In the December 19, 1994 hearing, upon being asked by the trial court,
appellant declared that he was 20 years old,22 consequently indicating that on
108
November 21, 1990, he must have been only 16 years old. Also, as appearing in MINIMUM, to 12 years of prision mayor maximum as MAXIMUM and that, in addition
appellant’s sworn statement executed on November 21, 1991, 23 he declared that he to the civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000, he is further ordered to pay the heirs
was 18 years old, hence evincing that he must have been only 17 at the time of the of the victim ₱25,000 as exemplary damages and ₱25,000 as temperate damages.
incident. Notwithstanding the discrepancy, both declarations nonetheless show that Costs de oficio.
he was below 18 when he committed the crime. This Court has held that the claim of
minority by an appellant will be upheld even without any proof to corroborate his SO ORDERED.
testimony, especially so when coupled by the fact that the prosecution failed to
present contradictory evidence thereto.24 In this case, the prosecution only Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
questioned the submitted birth certificate, but did not adduce any evidence to
disprove appellant’s claim of minority when he committed the crime. Accordingly, the
mitigating circumstance of minority should, as a matter of fairness, be appreciated in
favor of appellant, especially in light of the compassionate liberality this Court has
granted to minors involved in serious crimes.25

Furthermore, this Court agrees with appellant’s claim that he should be credited with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty to the offense charged. The
requisites of this circumstance are: (1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his
guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the
competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made
prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. 26 In this case, upon re-
arraignment, appellant, in the presence of his counsel, and in open court, voluntarily
pleaded guilty to the crime charged before the prosecution presented its
evidence.27 This mitigating circumstance should therefore be considered in computing
the proper penalty.

On the matter of appellant’s civil liability, this Court finds it appropriate to impose
additional damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence: exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱25,00028 and temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000. 29 The civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000 is sustained.

Lastly, modifications on the imposable penalty are in order. As the crime was
committed prior to the amendment of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by
Republic Act 7659, the appropriate penalty for Murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death.30 In view of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed in its proper period,
pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the Code, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal  medium.31 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being an
ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty and no aggravating circumstance,
the maximum penalty should be taken from the minimum period of the imposable
penalty, which is prision mayor in its maximum period, while the minimum should be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is anywhere within the range
of prision correccional  in its maximum period to prision mayor  in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding appellant Francisco L. Calpito

alias "Francis" guilty of Murder is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATIONS that he
is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years of prision mayor medium as
109
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182793               July 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO CALONGE y VERANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01516 which affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision2 dated August 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27 in Criminal Case Nos. 4077-4080 finding the above-named
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and frustrated
parricide.
The facts as culled from the records:
Rosita A. Calonge was appellant’s legitimate wife, with whom he had three (3)
children, namely: Melody, Dony Rose and Kimberly whose respective ages at the
time of the incident were nine (9), seven (7) and six (6) years. 3 The family lived in a
four (4) by five (5) meters house at a farm land near the house of Rosita’s parents at
Barangay Cabuluan, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, the Villaverde Police
Station received a radio call from the barangay captain of Cabuluan that a massacre
took place in their locality. By 7:30 a.m., the responding team led by PO3 Alfelmer
Balut arrived at the area. Rosita’s bloodied body was found lying on the ground about
fifteen (15) meters away from their house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a
knife. Lying on his back near the stairs was appellant who was also wounded but still
conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained with blood. While
the windows of the house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door was already
opened, its metal lock was found three (3) to five (5) meters from the door and seven
(7) to ten (10) meters from the body of Rosita. Inside the two (2) "bedrooms" of the
house separated only by a curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of the two (2) young
girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, Melody, was also bloodied but alive
and conscious. They brought Melody to the Veterans Regional Hospital where she
was treated and confined for seventeen (17) days.4
Police investigators found no signs of struggle or forcible entry as the things inside
the house were not disarranged. Photographs of the three (3) dead victims (Rosita,
Dony Rose and Kimberly) were also taken at the crime scene. When interviewed by
the policemen, Melody’s grandmother, Ana O. Amlag, said that Melody told her it was
their father (appellant) who attacked her, her mother and her sisters. Melody’s
grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they had heard Rosita
shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when appellant was asked
what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does not know. Appellant
asked to be treated also and they brought him to the hospital. 5
While still in the hospital, Melody, assisted by her first cousin Ana Fe Huang, gave
her statement to the police. She identified her father, who had a quarrel with her
mother the previous night, as the one (1) who hacked her and also fatally stabbed
her mother and two (2) sisters.6
On January 17, 2002, appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide
under the following Informations:
Criminal Case No. 4077
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a bladed/pointed object, stab ROSITA CALONGE y
AMLAG, legal wife of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which
caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 4078
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a bladed/pointed object, hack KIMBERLY CALONGE y
AMLAG, 06 years old, daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her
heirs.
110
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Criminal Case No. 4079
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a bladed/pointed object, stab DONY ROSE CALONGE y
AMLAG, 07 years old, daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her
heirs.
9 2005 convicting appellant of the crimes charged, the fallo of which reads:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 4080
That on December 01, 2001 in the morning, at Barangay Cabuluan, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery and superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a bladed object, hack Melody Calonge y Amlag, 09 years
old, daughter of the accused, thus inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds and
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
Parricide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely medical attendance given
which prevented the victim’s death, but nevertheless resulted to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution
presented as witnesses PO3 Alfelmer Balut, Dr. Telesforo A. Ragpa (Municipal
Health Officer), Lourdes Amlag, Dr. Lirio Marie Ronduen-Adriatico and Melody A.
Calonge.
The sole witness for the defense was appellant who gave a different version of the
incident. According to appellant, he came home on the night of November 30, 2001
at around 6:00 o’clock. After taking coffee, he took supper with his family. At about
8:30 p.m., he put Kimberly to sleep while his wife together with Dony Rose was in the
kitchen preparing for their food the following morning because they will go to church.
He could not remember what time he fell asleep but when he woke up in the morning,
he was no longer in their house but in a hospital. Only then he realized that he was
wounded on the chest and neck. He tried to inquire from people in the hospital what
happened but no voice came out of his mouth. He does not know who caused his
injuries as he could not recall anything that transpired from the time he slept until the
morning of December 1, 2001. Appellant denied that he and his wife quarrelled the
previous night. What he knows is that his wife had a quarrel with spouses Manong
Sante and Manang Paula, as the latter who is the sister of his wife did not want them
to stay in the place.11 On cross-examination, appellant claimed that the doors of the
house were still open at that time because somebody else was still using the kitchen.
He denied that he sharpened his bolo that same night, as in fact all his carpentry
tools were placed in their kitchen. As to his flashlight, appellant insisted it was his
wife who was using it that night but he admitted that it was already placed very near
the door where he had put Kimberly to sleep. He actually placed his bolo, flashlight
and those other items in a shelf just four (4) meters away from where he slept. 12
On August 18, 2005, the trial court promulgated its Joint Decision dated August 10,
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Dionisio Calonge y Verana GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of parricide and one count of frustrated parricide,
he is hereby sentenced as follows: (1) for the killing of Kimberly Calonge and Dony
Rose Calonge, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer death penalty by lethal
injection for each case; to pay the heirs of the said victims, the sums of P75,000.00
for each case as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the
heirs actual damages in the sum of P21,255.00 for the death of Kimberly, Dony Rose
and Rosita A. Calonge; (2) for the killing of Rosita Calonge, the said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to pay the heirs of
Rosita the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) for the crime of frustrated parricide for wounding Melody Calonge, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as the
minimum term to 20 years of [reclusion temporal13] as the maximum term; to pay the
victim moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00; exemplary damages in the sum of
P20,000.00 and P11,015.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.14
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment but modified the death penalty
imposed on appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 4078 and 4079 (parricide committed
against Kimberly and Dony Rose) by reducing it to reclusion perpetua. 15 Appellant
filed a notice of appeal16 and accordingly the records of the case were elevated to
this Court.
On August 11, 2008, the Court resolved to require the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired.17 In a Manifestation dated October 29, 2008,
the Public Attorney’s Office, representing the appellant, informed the Court that it
would no longer file a supplemental brief; it was adopting its main brief on
record.18 The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People, likewise
omitted to submit a supplemental brief.19
111
Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction by the RTC and CA on the following
grounds:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
MELODY CALONGE DESPITE ITS EVIDENT CONTRADICTIONS AND
APPARENT UNREALITY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.20
Appellant contends that the trial court overlooked the following inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimony of Melody: (1) the alleged misunderstanding between
her parents prior to December 1, 2001, which she first denied but changed it during a
subsequent hearing when she claimed her parents had a quarrel before the stabbing
incident occurred, (2) the time of such quarrel for which she gave three (3) different
answers (8:00 to 9:00 p.m. of November 30, 2001; 2:00 early morning of December
1, 2001; and 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of November 30, 2001), and (3) whether it was Melody
or her mother who was first hacked by her father. These inconsistent statements of
the alleged eyewitness engender doubt as to their reliability and veracity.
Appellant further argues that Melody’s identification of appellant as the perpetrator of
the crimes remained uncorroborated. The failure to present such other alleged
witnesses (her grandparents) was not satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. He
assails Melody’s testimony as highly incredible. While Melody claimed that she saw
appellant hacked and stabbed her sisters, the fact is that, during that time, according
to her, she was sleeping together with her mother in another room inside their house.
Moreover, it was impossible for Melody to have seen that the person who killed her
mother and two (2) sisters was appellant when in fact, according to her, there was no
light inside their room when the incident happened. Clearly, the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving the identity of the offender.
We disagree.
It is plain that the errors imputed to the trial court are factual and chiefly assail its
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. The doctrinal rule is that findings of fact
made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses
and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies are entitled to great
weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same,
an opportunity not equally open to the appellate court. 21 We find no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings and conclusions of the RTC and CA in this case.
It was established from prosecution evidence that the lone survivor Melody saw
appellant using his bolo and knife, struck at her mother who was able to evade it and
run outside the house. Appellant then turned to Melody, and hacked her three (3)
times before stabbing Dony Rose and Kimberly who were both still sleeping. After
finishing off his family, appellant inflicted his lone superficial wound before lying down
on the floor, apparently to avoid suspicion that he was himself the culprit and create
an impression that a trespasser had attacked all of them in the night. Melody vividly
recounted to the court what she had witnessed while pretending to be still asleep
even after she was hacked by appellant.
Melody’s account was corroborated by the findings of prosecution witnesses Dr.
Ragpa (who conducted the autopsy on the bodies of the three [3] victims) and Dr.
Ronduen-Adriatico (who examined and treated Melody). Dr. Ragpa testified that
Rosita sustained only a single stab wound on the chest. He explained that the width
of such wound, 2 ½ inches, was caused by a single upward thrust and pulling out of
the bladed instrument. The six (6)-inch deep wound hit the lower tip of the heart and
resected the pulmonary vessels. For Rosita, the cause of death was hypovolemic
shock due to resected pulmonary blood vessels. As for Kimberly, she sustained a
hacking wound on the left axilla (armpit), probably inflicted in a lying position, which
cut the head of the left humerus and resecting the axillary blood vessels. Kimberly
also died from hypovolemic shock due to injured/resected left axillary blood vessels.
Dony Rose had one (1) incised wound and one (1) stab wound on her chest, which
penetrated the left ventricle of the heart. She likewise died of hypovolemic shock due
to penetrating stab wound on the chest.22 On the other hand, Dr. Ronduen-Adriatico
testified that Melody sustained five (5) wounds and had three (3) amputations of the
three (3) digits of her right hand. She found the wounds located at the left side of the
head, lower lip, left side of the neck, left shoulder, chest and the third, fourth and fifth
fingers. Although the only fatal wound is that at the left side of the neck, the
combination of all wounds would have caused the death of Melody had there been no
timely medical assistance rendered on the patient. The neck wound was a fatal injury
(victim could have died in less than six [6] hours) because of its proximity to large
blood vessels such as carotid and tubular vessels.231avvphi1
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding Melody’s testimony clear and
unequivocal, despite her answers not being as complete as would be desired,
considering her age and difficulty of translating the questions to her in the Ifugao
dialect. Her account of the incident was consistent with the physical evidence,
particularly the findings of Dr. Ragpa and Dr. Ronduen-Adriatico on the injuries
sustained and cause of death of the victims as a result of the carnage wrought upon
their family by appellant.
The inconsistencies mentioned by appellant relate only to minor details and not to the
fact of the fatal stabbing of his wife and two (2) children in his own hands. We have
112
consistently ruled that not all inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony affect their Q. Who own these bolo and knife Melody?
credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the A. My father sir.
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimonies. Thus, Q. How are these knife and bolo related to the bolo and knife used by your
although there may be inconsistencies on the testimonies of witnesses on minor father in hacking your sister, yourself and your mother?
details, they do not impair credibility where there is consistency in relating the A. He used that bolo in hacking and stabbing my mother and my sister,
principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. 24 Discrepancies sir.
referring only to minor details and collateral matters – not to the central fact of the Q. Who was hacked first by your father Melody?
crime – do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of a witness A. I, sir.
as long as it is coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. 25 Q. After hacking [you] Melody. . .By the way, what part of your body was
hacked by your father?
It must be further stressed that during her testimony, Melody had to be assisted by an A. This one, sir. (Witness showing to the Court the three fingers that were cut
interpreter as she responded to the questions in the Ifugao dialect. Besides, ample from the middle finger up to the small finger of the left arm and also below
margin of error and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who, the shoulder of the left arm).
much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the Q. Where else, Melody?
experience of testifying before a court.26 Despite the language barrier, Melody A. (Witness showing to the Court the scar located at the left side of her lower
remained categorical and steadfast in declaring that it was her very own father, lip and also at the back of her left ear).
appellant, who hacked her, her mother and her younger sisters using his bolo and Q. After your father Melody hacked you, what happened next?
knife in the early morning of December 1, 2001 at their house. Thus, she testified A. My mother, sir.
during the direct examination: COURT:
Q. What was done to your mother?
A. He stabbed her, sir.
PROS. TURINGAN:
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. Do you recall of any incident at that evening that is relevant to this case
Q. And after he stabbed your mother, what did your father do next Melody?
involving the killing of your sister Dony Rose, Kimberly, your mother and the
A. He returned back and used the bolo in hacking me three times, sir.
fact that you were wounded?
Q. After that, what happened next Melody?
A. Yes, there was sir.
A. Next, sir my father used the bolo in stabbing my sister’s armpit and
Q. What was that incident that you recall Melody?
used in hacking her abdomen.
A. He hacked us, sir.
Q. Which of these bolo and knife did he use in hacking and stabbing your
Q. Who hacked you?
sister?
A. My papa, sir.
ATTY. TABAGO:
COURT:
Who? Sister?
Q. Do you know the full name of your papa or nickname?
A. Both, sir.
A. Yes, sir I know.
COURT:
Q. What is the full name of your papa?
Q. Are you saying that your father was holding two weapons at the same
A. Dionisio Calonge, sir.
time?
xxxx
A. Yes, sir.
PROS. TURINGAN:
Alright, go ahead.
Q. What did your father use in hacking you Melody?
PROS. TURINGAN:
A. The knife and the bolo, sir.
Q. After that what did your father do?
xxxx
A. He pretended to stab his body, his neck and his abdomen, sir.
PROS. TURINGAN:
Q. What did your father use in stabbing and wounding himself?
These bolo and knife, how are they related to the bolo and knife used by your
A. The bolo, sir.
father in hacking you, your sister and your mother?
Q. You are referring to this Exh. "G"?
A. He stabbed and then he hacked, sir.
A. Yes, sir.27 [Emphasis supplied.]
Q. By the way, these bolo and knife, do you know who own these bolo and
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT
knife?
BY PROS. TURINGAN:
A. Yes, sir.

113
Q. When was that again when your mother and your sisters were hacked and
stabbed by your father?
A. December 1, 2001, sir.
Q. In the early morning of December 1, 2001 were there other persons in
your house aside from you, your father, mother and your sisters?
A. None, sir.
Q. The weapons used by your father in hacking and stabbing you, your
mother and your sisters, if you can see them could you be able to identify
them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There are here a bolo and a knife Melody, can you please examine these
bolo and knife and tell the Court if these are the same weapons used by your
father in hacking and stabbing you, your mother and your sisters?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who owns these bolo and knife Melody?
A. My father, sir.28
As to appellant’s assertion that Melody could not have seen her father stab
her two (2) sisters who slept on the other room since it was still dark inside
the house, Melody (during cross-examination29) had described their "rooms"
as not actually separated by walls. She could thus see her two (2) sisters and
appellant from where she was sleeping.30 The policemen who investigated
the crime scene also found that the partition was just a curtain. 31 Melody
slept beside her mother while her sisters were beside their father on the
other "room."32 And while indeed it was still dark when appellant started
hacking his wife and daughters, Melody had sufficient illumination provided
by the flashlight used by appellant. This was mentioned by Melody in the
later part of her direct examination:
Q. Please tell the Court how you were able to see your father hacked and
stabbed you, your mother and sisters?
A. (No answer yet)
COURT:
Q. x x x Why don’t you start with where was she at the time the hacking and
stabbing took place?
PROSECUTOR:
We withdraw that, your Honor. Aside from these bolo and knife Melody, was
your father holding any other things?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that Melody?
A. Flashlight, sir.
Q. Can you identify that flashlight it (sic) [if] you can see it Melody?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There is here a flashlight marked as Exhibit "I". Can you please examine
this flashlight and tell the Honorable Court if it is the same flashlight you
mentioned?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who owns this flashlight Melody?
A. My father, sir.
x x x x33
Q. Could you please tell the Court how this flashlight was being held by your
father?
A. He put in his head the flashlight, sir.
Q. Can you demonstrate how he placed in his head Melody?
A. (Witness demonstrating how he placed the flashlight at the left side of her
head with the use of a rubber tied on the flashlight). 34 [emphasis supplied.]
On cross-examination, Melody fixed the time of the incident at 4:00 in the morning
when she woke up to prepare food. However, she went back to bed because she
knew that appellant was already awake. Her mother and sisters were still asleep.
Appellant then started hacking, first her mother, who evaded the blow and was able
to run outside to seek help from her grandmother and aunt. Returning to Melody,
appellant hit her three (3) times before following her mother outside. 35 At this point,
Melody also recalled that her parents quarrelled on the night of November 30, 2001.
Before they went to sleep, she saw her father sharpening his bolo. When she asked
appellant what he was doing, he replied that he will kill Uncle Santy and his family.
Melody said that she pretended to be still asleep when she woke up the next morning
because she had seen appellant placed that bolo under his pillow. As to the exact
time the quarrel took place, it can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic
notes that Melody initially could not estimate with reference to the night before they
slept, but she eventually declared that her parents quarrelled from 6:00 o’clock until
7:00 o’clock in the evening of November 30, 2001.36
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused.37 The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender
with the victim.38 All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by
the prosecution.
Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual stabbing of her mother
and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no one else but the
appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable
for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his
guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for
conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.39 While no general rule can be laid
down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case,
all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
114
only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the guilty person.40
As correctly found by the CA, the following circumstances taken together established
without doubt that it was appellant who inflicted fatal wounds on Rosita, Melody,
Dony Rose and Kimberly inside their house early morning of December 1, 2001: (1)
after having a quarrel with Rosita the previous night, appellant was seen by Melody
sharpening his bolo which he later hid under his pillow; (2) the bolo, knife and
flashlight used in the hacking of the victims belong to appellant, and which were
found in his possession when policemen arrived at the scene; (3) the medical
findings showed that the victims’ injuries were caused by sharp and bladed
instruments; (4) there were no sign of forcible entry as the things inside the house
were not disarranged; (5) the only persons inside the house were appellant, Rosita
and their three children who slept in adjacent rooms separated only by a curtain; (6)
the only house near appellant’s house was that of his parents-in-law; (7) Rosita was
heard by her relatives shouting for help before their bodies were discovered; (8)
appellant sustained only superficial wounds and was found conscious by the
policemen; (9) appellant could not explain or say anything about how and when he
and the victims were injured; and (10) Melody saw her father initially strike at her
mother before the latter ran outside the house, and then stab her also five (5) times.
Appellant simply raises the defense of denial, which is inherently weak and cannot
prevail over the positive identification41 made by Melody that he was the one (1) who
hacked her, her mother and her sisters. Moreover, an affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a
credible witness,42 as in this case, the child of the assailant who survived his
murderous rampage.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7659, the penalty for parricide is composed of two (2) indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua to death.
In the killing of Dony Rose and Kimberly, the trial court was correct in appreciating
the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so
sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack
or to defend himself.43 Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected than
when a father stabs to death his two (2) young daughters while they were sound
asleep and totally defenseless. Thus, for the parricide committed against both Dony
Rose and Kimberly, appellant was properly meted the death penalty in Criminal Case
Nos. 4079 and 4078. Since the killings were committed in 2001, the trial court was
correct in imposing upon appellant the supreme penalty of death. In view, however,
of the passage and effectivity of R.A. No. 9346 on June 24, 2006, proscribing the
imposition of the capital punishment, the CA correctly modified the imposable penalty
on appellant to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, in line with Sections 2
and 3 of the said law.44
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use
of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended. (Underscoring supplied.)
As to the killing of Rosita, neither treachery nor evident premeditation was present
considering that she was able to parry the first thrust of appellant and ran away
outside the house, and there is no evidence proving that appellant determined to
commit the crime even as Melody recounted that she saw his father sharpening his
bolo before they slept the previous night. Evident premeditation needs proof of the
time when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind of the accused,
the motive which gives rise to it, and the means which are beforehand selected to
carry out that intent. All such facts and antecedents which make notorious the pre-
existing design to accomplish the criminal purpose must be proven to the satisfaction
of the court.45 There is paucity of evidence as to the time, motive and the means
chosen by appellant to carry out the intent to kill his entire family. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court was correct in sentencing
appellant to the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua 46 in Criminal Case No. 4077.
On the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each
and another ₱50,000.00 each as moral damages, for the deaths of Dony Rose and
Kimberly, the Court sustains the same. Likewise, the heirs of Rosita are entitled to
civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
With regard to the frustrated felony, Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that –
ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. – The courts, in view
of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of
parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a
penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under the provisions
of Article 50.
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one degree the
penalty which under Article 51 should be imposed for an attempt to commit any of
such crimes.
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We therefore find the penalty imposed by the trial court proper and correct for this
offense.

The trial court awarded Melody moral damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, and
another ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages which are justified under Articles 2219
(1) and 2229 of the Civil Code. Further, under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages are awarded to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as
vindication of undue suffering and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured person,
and as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. 47

Melody is likewise entitled to the sum of ₱11,025.00 as cost of her treatment and
hospitalization. Anent actual or compensatory damages, it bears stressing that only
substantiated and proven expenses or those which appear to have been genuinely
incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized
by the courts.48 Prosecution witness Lourdes Amlag testified that the family incurred
expenses in connection with the funeral, wake and burial, totalling ₱21,255.00, as
shown in the itemized list submitted to the trial court.49

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 29, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01516 is hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

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