[53] 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains,
G.R. No. 206020 | April 14, 2015 | Reyes, J.
SUMMARY: COMELEC promulgated Res. No. 9615, providing for the rules
implementing the Fair Elections Act. It provided a prohibition on posting, displaying, or
exhibiting election campaigns or propaganda in public places, which includes public
utility vehicles and public transport terminals. Violation of such prohibition shall be a
cause for revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or
operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense. 1-
UTAK alleged that said prohibition violates PUVs’ and transport terminals’ private
owners’ right to free speech. COMELEC argues that, as per the Constitution, it has the
power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises and permits for the
operation of transportation utilities and that privately-owned PUVs and transport
terminals are public spaces, thus, are subject to its regulation. The Court held that the
provisions of the Resolution containing said prohibitions are null and void for being
unconstitutional; the prohibition is not within the COMELEC's constitutionally
delegated power of supervision or regulation for although it may regulate the
franchise or permit to operate PUVs and transport terminals, it may not regulate
ownership per se of such facilities.
DOCTRINE: See highlighted portions
FACTS:
● February 12, 2001: RA 9006 or the "Fair Elections Act" was passed
● Sec. 9 thereof provided for the rules on posting of campaign materials:
“Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private
places with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places
or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially
among the candidates.”
● January 15, 2013: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 which
provided for the rules implementing RA 9006 in connection with the May 13,
2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections
“Sec. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - During the
campaign period, it is unlawful: x x x x
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda
material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public
places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include
any of the following: x x x x
5.
taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether
motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such
as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train
stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a
cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make
the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.”
● Petitioner 1-UTAK, through its president (Vargas), sought clarification from
COMELEC on the application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section
7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-a-vis privately owned
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals
● Petitioner alleges that the prohibition therein impedes the right to free
speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals and thus
requested COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals
● COMELEC en banc then issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, denying
petitioner's request; said that the primary fact in consideration is whether 1-
UTAK or any other PUV owners in the same position possess a franchise
and/or certificate of public convenience and operate as a public utility. If yes,
then its operations, pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, will
be placed directly under the supervision and regulation of the Commission
for the duration of the election period to ensure equality of opportunity, time,
and space for all candidates in the placement of political advertisements
● Having placed their property for use by the general public and having
secured a license or permit to do so, 1-UTAK and other PUV owners, as well
as transport terminal owners, cannot now complain that their property is
subject to regulation by the State
● Securing a franchise or a certificate of public convenience in their favor does
not exempt them from the burdens imposed by the Constitution, RA 9006,
and other related statutes
● Section 6, Article XII of the Consti even commands that the use of property
bears a social function and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good and there is no higher Common good than that as espoused
in RA 9006 – the equalization of opportunities for all candidates for political
office during elections – which Res. No. 9615 merely implements
● Also, the prohibition furthers two important and substantial governmental
interests: (1) equalizing opportunity, time, and space for all candidates, and
 (2) putting to a stop excessive campaign spending. The regulation bears a
clear and reasonable nexus with these Constitutionally- and statutorily-
sanctioned objectives, and the infringement of freedom is merely incidental
and limited as to time
● Exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in transport
terminals: it is public and can be seen by all; although private vehicles ply the
same route as public vehicles, the exposure of a PUV servicing the general,
riding public is much more compared to private vehicles, thus, categorizing
PUVs and transport terminals as 'public places' under Section 7 (f) of Reso.
No. 9615 is logical
● Thus, this case
● Petitioner’s arguments:
○ The provisions violate the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals
○ There is no substantial public interest threatened by the posting of
political advertisements on PUVs and transport terminals to
warrant the prohibition imposed by COMELEC
○ Assuming that substantial public interest exists, curtailment of the
right to free speech is much greater than is necessary to achieve
the desired governmental purpose of ensuring equality of
opportunity to all candidates in elective office
○ The ownership of the PUVs per se, as well as the transport
terminals, remains private thus, the owners could not be prohibited
by COMELEC from expressing their political opinion lest their
property rights be unduly intruded upon
● COMELEC’s arguments:
○ Privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals are public spaces
that are subject to its regulation.
○ Under the Constitution, COMELEC has the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, including the power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all franchises and permits for the operation of transportation
utilities
○ PUVs and private transport terminals hold a captive audience - the
commuters, who have no choice but be subjected to the blare of
political propaganda, thus, it is within its constitutional authority to
prevent privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals from
concurrently serving campaign materials to the captive audience
that they transport
○ Resolution No. 9615 is a valid content-neutral regulation and, thus,
does not impinge on the constitutional right to freedom of speech
○ The assailed regulation is within the constitutional power of the
COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution
○ The regulation simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity,
time, and space for all candidates which is an important and
substantial governmental interest, totally unrelated to the
suppression of free expression
ISSUES w/ HOLDING & RATIO:
[1] W/N the ownership of facilities is different and independent from the franchise or
operation of the public utility, the former being beyond the power of regulation by
the COMELEC – YES
● The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not
the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
● The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 is not within the COMELEC's constitutionally
delegated power of supervision or regulation.
● COMELEC has the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
utilities during an election period, as provided in Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections
● HOWEVER, the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to
the COMELEC over franchises and permits to operate has its limits
● The Court previously set out the limitations on COMELEC’s said power:
○ Adiong: while COMELEC has supervisory power vis-a-vis the
conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, such supervisory power does not extend to the very
freedom of an individual to express his preference of candidates in
an election by placing election campaign stickers on his vehicle
○ National Press Club v. COMELEC: the grant of supervisory and
regulatory powers to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time,
space, and the right to reply among candidates
● COMELEC's constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation
do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but
only to the franchise or permit to operate the same.
● There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate
transportation for the use of the public and the ownership per se of the
vehicles used for public transport
○ Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.: “What private respondent owns are the rail
tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and
the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to
operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by
themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public
utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public x x x.
 The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the
operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a
franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a
public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
xxxx
In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a
public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment
used to serve the public. x x x x
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and
separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can
own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or
conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the
facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve
the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control
thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.”
The franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is a
privilege granted to certain persons to engage in the business of
transporting people or goods; it does not refer to the ownership of
the vehicle per se.
● Ownership is a relation in private law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to
one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by
public law or the concurrence with the rights of another. Thus, the owner of a
thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. One such limitation as regards PUVs is the
franchise or permit to operate. However, a franchise or permit to operate a
PUV is a limitation only on certain aspects of the ownership of the vehicle
pertinent to the franchise or permit granted, but not on the totality of the
rights of the owner over the vehicle.
● A restriction on the franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is
necessarily a limitation on ownership, but a limitation on the rights of
ownership over the PUV is not necessarily a regulation on the franchise or
permit to operate the same
● A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to
considerations affecting the operation of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the
passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of
reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality.
Thus, a government issuance which purports to regulate a franchise or
permit to operate PUVs must pertain to the considerations affecting its
operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not on
the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle
used for public transport.
● Here, the expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the
posting of election campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect
considerations pertinent to the operation of the PUV. Posting a decal
expressing support for a certain candidate in an election will not in any
manner affect the operation of the PUV as such.
● Thus, regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the
posting of an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the
franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the
vehicle
● Example of dichotomy between the regulation of the franchise or permit to
operate of a PUV and that of the very ownership thereof: commercial
advertisements posted on the vehicle.
● A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is
considered a regulation on the ownership of the vehicle per se. The
restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have
any relation to its operation as a PUV.
● On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial
advertisements on windows of buses, because it hinders police authorities
from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the
franchise or permit to operate. It has a direct relation to the operation of the
vehicle as a PUV which is the safety of the passengers
● COMELEC also does not have the constitutional power to regulate public
transport terminals owned by private persons. The ownership of transport
terminals, even if made available for use by the public commuters, likewise
remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals may be
required by local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the
permit only pertains to circumstances affecting the operation of the
transport terminal as such.
● The regulation of such permit to operate should be limited to circumstances
affecting the operation of the transport terminal
[2] W/N Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615, which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material,
inter alia, in PUVs and public transport terminals are valid regulations – NO
● Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities.
● The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public
transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression,
but also an act of ownership which has nothing to do with the franchise or
permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal
[OTHERS]
● The assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on
speech
 ● The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid
content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
● The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is
not necessary to further the stated governmental interest.
● Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine.
● Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election
campaign materials violates the equal protection clause

RULING: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 issued by the Commission on Elections are hereby declared
NULL and VOID for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.