ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR VS.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G. R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003
SUMMARY: There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear
to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
DISPOSITION: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

DOCTRINE: Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
 Former President Estrada filed an the first
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. (CJ Davide) for culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes.
 The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but
voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in
substance.
 Four months after the dismissal of the first
complaint, the second impeachment complaint was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and
 Felix William B. Fuentebella against CJ Davide, Jr.
founded on the alleged results of the investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
 Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
 The instant petitions arose against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of
one year."

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA VS. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA

R. No. 143855               September 21, 2010
SUMMARY: This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and determine the constitutionality of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
DISPOSITION: The Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit
DOCTRINE: Ut magis valeat quam pereat -  The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE: The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise
of the police power of the State. To the extent that Republic Act No. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it
cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law.
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
 On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada 1. Whether or not One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the
signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also petitioner lawmakers validity of a law must have a standing to do so. 1 Legal
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of have the legal standing to standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to
2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which challenge the come to a court of justice and make such a challenge.
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from constitutionality of R.A. More particularly, standing refers to his personal and
engaging in the retail trade business. 8762; and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer
 On October 11, 2000 petitioners filed the present direct injury as a result of the passage of that law. 2 To
petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 2. Whether or not R.A. put it another way, he must show that he has been or is
 on the following grounds:
8762 is unconstitutional.
1. First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and
20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins
the State to place the national economy under
the control of Filipinos to achieve equal
distribution of opportunities, promote
industrialization and full employment, and
protect Filipino enterprise against unfair
competition and trade policies.
2. Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762
would lead to alien control of the retail trade,
which taken together with alien dominance of
other areas of business, would result in the
loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
3. Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart
would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store
vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring
about more unemployment.
4. Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary
Fund had improperly imposed the passage of
R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for
the release of certain loans.
5. Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that
the law would promote monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents countered that:
1. First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the
petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are
taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the law he
complains of.
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation
of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices
petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as
taxpayers4 or as legislators.5 Still the Court will resolve
the question they raise since the rule on standing can be
relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when as in this case the
public interest so requires or the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.
2. To the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners’
right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful
business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a
denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due
process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to
engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in
question has permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to
inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it
blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has
said, there is no showing that the law has contravened
any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced
that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually
lead to alien control of the retail trade business.
 disbursement of public funds. Nor can they invoke
the fact that they are members of Congress since
they made no claim that the law infringes on their
right as legislators.
2. Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable
controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as
members of Congress, they represent the small
retail vendors in their respective districts but the
petition does not allege that the subject law violates
the rights of those vendors.
3. Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762.
Indeed, they could not specify how the new law
violates the constitutional provisions they cite.
Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing provisions that
are judicially demandable.
4. Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation
but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It
directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens
certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest so dictates. But the Constitution
leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or
not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit
Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved by
the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong
argument to support its thesis. The law itself has
provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
business. Thus –
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business
subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second,
only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or
incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino
retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade
business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not
be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities
outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile
or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales
representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and
sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade
liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local
small and medium enterprises since its implementation
about a decade ago.
 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284               August 15, 2000

SUMMARY: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to
nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the
"Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
DISPOSITION: Premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
 In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in (1) Whether or not 1. Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in
Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and petitioner has legal possession of the requisites of standing to raise the
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, standing; issues in the petition.
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention
and suppression. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as
(2) Whether or not the a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
 The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of President’s factual the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the determination of the result of the governmental act that is being
"AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary necessity of calling the challenged.13 The term "interest" means a material
of the Interior and Local Government were armed forces is subject to interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
tasked to execute and implement the said order. judicial review; and, distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest.14 The gist of the
 In compliance with the presidential mandate, the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction (3) Whether or not the assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
02/20001 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by calling of the armed presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
which the joint visibility patrols, called Task forces to assist the PNP illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
15

Force Tulungan, would be conducted.2 Task in joint visibility patrols

Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of violates the constitutional  In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its

the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous
directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to
the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. 3 In the
Memorandum,
 the President expressed his desire to improve the
peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a
more effective crime prevention program including
increased police patrols.
 The President further stated that to heighten police
visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the
AFP is necessary.5 Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence.6 Finally, the President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign
are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved.7
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the
instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
provisions on civilian
supremacy over the standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
military and the civilian the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from
character of the PNP. this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is
not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
 This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the
standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to
present a specific and substantial interest in the
resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose
which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court, is to elevate the standards of the law
profession and to improve the administration of
justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines.
 It should also be noted that the interest of the
National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present action.
To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the
judiciary included, have varying opinions on the
issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly
authorized the National President to file the petition,
has not shown any specific injury which it has
suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
governmental act. Indeed, none of its members,
whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained
deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that:
I. The deployment of the philippine
marines in metro manila is violative of
the constitution, in that:
A) no emergency situation obtains in
metro manila as would justify, even only
remotely, the deployment of soldiers for
law enforcement work; hence, said
deployment is in derogation of article ii,
section 3 of the constitution;
B) said deployment constitutes an
insidious incursion by the military in a
civilian function of government (law
enforcement) in derogation of article xvi,
section 5 (4), of the constitution;
C) said deployment creates a dangerous
tendency to rely on the military to
perform the civilian functions of the
government.
Ii. In militarizing law enforcement in
metro manila, the administration is
unwittingly making the military more
powerful than what it should really be
under the constitution.
any form of injury as a result of the operation of the
joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of
its members has been arrested or that their civil
liberties have been violated by the deployment of
the Marines.
 What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
"militarization" of law enforcement which might
threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run. Not
only is the presumed "injury" not personal in
character, it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not
successfully established a direct and personal injury
as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not
possess the personality to assail the validity of the
deployment of the Marines. This Court, however,
does not categorically rule that the IBP has
absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues
now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of
allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it
has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution
of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that
this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing when paramount interest is involved
Asserting itself as the official organization of
Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the
IBP questions the validity of the deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court
in a Resolution,11 dated 25 January 2000, required
the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the
petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General
submitted his Comment.
 The Solicitor General vigorously defends the
constitutionality of the act of the President in
deploying the Marines, contending, among others;
 that petitioner has no legal standing; that the
question of deployment of the Marines is not
proper for judicial scrutiny since the same
involves a political question; that the
organization and conduct of police visibility
patrols, which feature the team-up of one police
officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does
not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
2. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of
the President’s powers as protector of the peace.
[Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the
President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-
to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want
of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-
chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President’s exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the
armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to
keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
The President has already determined the necessity and
factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent
crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings
and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila..."
We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s
assessment of the situation, especially in the light of
present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of
the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in
the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public
places. These are among the areas of deployment
described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts,
we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to
call for military aid in law enforcement and in the
exercise of this constitutional power.

3. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a

breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The
limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides
the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is
noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila
Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine
Marines joint visibility patrols. 37 Under the LOI, the police
forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police
patrol procedures.38 It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines.39 It is, likewise,
their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers.40 In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
 the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious
incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement
in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

SUMMARY: The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:

FACTS ISSUES RULINGS

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G. R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

SUMMARY: The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

DISPOSITION: respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose
DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract

CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:

FACTS
 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the
government opened to public bidding the sale of
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only two
bidders participated: 1) herein petitioner, Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino Corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of MHC shares at P41.58
per share, and 2) Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
Firm, with a bid of P44.00 for the same number of
shares.
 Pending the declaration of the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
contract, MHC matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad. GSIS, however,
refused to accept MHC’s offer.
 MHC, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS would
disregard the matching bid it tendered and that the
respondent would hasten the sale of the subject
shares, filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus. Petitioner invokes Section 10, par. 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
Manila Hotel is a part of the national patrimony and
its business unquestionably a part of the national
ISSUES
Whether the provisions  YES. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
on National Economy
and Patrimony of the
Constitution is self-
executing and binding to
GSIS in the conduct of its
businesses
 In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
RULINGS
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that —
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubijus ibi remedium . xxx
economy distinct from the government are considered "state
action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when
the government is sosignificantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes
under the second and third categories of "state
action." Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact
a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command.
 It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.
Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not
an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with
the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates
of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
  Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is,
as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules
be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It
is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws
and contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.

SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS
SUMMARY:

DISPOSITION:
DOCTRINE:
CONNECTION OF DOCTRINE TO THE CASE:
FACTS ISSUES RULINGS