US vs Taylor

Gr No.L-9726

FACTS: A libel case was filed against Carson Taylor, who was the acting editor,
proprietor, manager, printer and publisher of a Manila Daily Bulletin. The complaint
alleges that he, on September 25, 1913, intended to impeach the honesty, virtue and
reputation of Ramon Sotelo as well as to expose him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule by composing, printing, editing, publishing, circulating and/ or procuring to
compose an article, which they have alleged to be false and to be a malicious
defamation and libel of Ramon Sotelo. According to the article entitled “Owners fired
building to collect insurance, criminal charges follows civil suit”, there was a conspiracy
to defraud the insurance company. The house in Calle O’Donnell was intentionally
burnt and claims were made from the insurance companies. In this conspiracy, the
name of Ramon Sotello was implicated and was therefore charged with conspiracy and
fraud. Taylor was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.He then appealed
and made assignment of errors.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the defendant was responsible for and guilty of alleged libel
2. Whether or not the defendant is the proprietor and publisher of Manila Daily Bulletin

HELD: The court ruled in favor of the defendant and ordered that the ruling of the
lower court be reversed. According to Act No. 277 Section Six, “every author, editor or
proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the
publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each
newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same.” However, in this case,
the Solicitor-General said that no one is represented to be the author, editor and
proprietor. There was no word of proof in the record showing that he was either the
author, editor or proprietor. It only mentioned that the defendant was the manager.

There was no proof that he as the manager was directly responsible for writing, editing
or publishing the contents in the alleged libelous article. The prosecution only presented
the newspaper to show the relationship of the defendant to it. However, this only
proves the relationship between the defendant and the publication. In the absence of
proof of a single letter showing the direct relationship and role of the defendant on the
publication of the said article, presumptions of his involvement would be unwarranted
and unjust.

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 People vs Cabural
Gr No. L-34105

TOPIC: Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege

FACTS: 1. At about 2am, 3 masked men entered the building of Kim thru an opening of
the roof above the kitchen that was being repaired and forced themselves inside a room
where Pua, Sy and Siao were sleeping. 2. The masked men hogtied the three and began
to ransack the place. One of the men also asked Sy to open the safe and threaten to kill
them if he did not. 3. In the next room, the maids Restituta and Agripina were
awakened by 2 masked men(one holding a knife, the other a gun). The 2 maids were
also hogtied. Later, Agripina was able to free her hands but was discovered by one of
the masked men. The latter raped Agripina in anger, 4. When all the masked men left,
Agripina identified her rapist to be Cabural. Furthermore, upon investigation of the
Constabulary, 2 guns were found in Benjamin’s house. The latter admitted to
committing the crime and pointed to his companions. 5. All the accused were charged
with the crime of Robbery in Band with Rape. The lower court convicted them but only
Cabural and 2 co-accused appealed.

ISSUE: WON all the accused are guilty of Robbery with Rape?

HELD: Yes, with qualifications. 1. Cabural alone was responsible for the rape on
Agripina. There is no evidence that his co-appellant Yangyang and the other
malefactors made advances on her. 2. The extra-judicial confessions of Benjamin and
Leonide point to Cabural as the mastermind and the role each of them would play in
the commission of the crime. Their interlocking confessions indicate how they would go
to the scene of the crime, the manner by which they would enter into the premises of
Kim. 3. Fiscal Magsalin testified that said accused readily and without hesitation signed
their respective extra-judicial confessions. 4. The alibi of the accused has no merit since
there is still no guarantee that he could not be at the scene of the crime. Furthermore,
the crime is aggravated by dwelling and nighttime. 5. In People v. Perello, it was
mentioned that the Chief Justice and the herein ponente (Justice Ramon C. Aquino) are
of the opinion that article 335 cannot be applied to robbery with rape and that that
offense should be penalized under article 294(2) in which case reclusion perpetua
should be imposed. As the accused was charged with a crime against property, he
should not be convicted of a crime against chastity, a private offense. 6. The writer of
this decision is of the opinion that in robbery with rape, the accused should be
penalized under Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal

This Court by a decisive vote 1 sustains the basic postulate in both civil law and
common law jurisdictions, expressed in the maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege. It is undoubted, therefore, that unless there be a radical change in the thinking of
the Court, it is Article 294(2) not Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code that calls for

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 application in the crime of robbery with rape. Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent
to this case) Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death 'when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons.' That increased penalty cannot be retroactively
applied to this case. As such offense of robbery was committed before that date, it is
Article 294(2), before its amendment, that supplies the governing rule. The first and
fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them. The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its
roots in history. It is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common law
tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in
our Constitution. It is of the essence then that while antisocial acts should be penalized,
there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may
be imposed - a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the
legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on jurisdictio
rather than guvernaculum. The judiciary as the dispenser of justice through law must
be aware of the limitation on its own power.

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 US vs Tampurong
G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPARONG, ET AL.,

defendantsappellants No. 9527. August 23, 1915 Ponente: J. Trent

FACTS Defendants were convicted for having played the game of chance called
“Monte,” in violation of Ordinance No. 35 Defendants appealed to the Court of First
Instance, where they were again tried and convicted upon the same charge 
Defendants raised their appeal to the Supreme Court which ONLY allowed to hear the
case on the grounds that the validity of Ordinance No. 35 was in question

ISSUE/s 1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 35 is valid

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court is required under the law to examine the evidence
for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants

HOLDING/s 1. Yes, Ordinance No. 35 is valid. 2. No. Although the SC wrote that Act
No. 1627 does not explicitly limit their powers from examining issues of facts, it
likewise does not expressly authorize them to do so. The SC, nevertheless, interpreted
that the law was NOT framed to confer them the said power.
RATIO/s 1. For the issue at hand, the SC merely wrote, “The first question is answered
in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. 01).
The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is
unnecessary.” Nothing more. 2.1 The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the
intention of the „framers‟ of the amended section of Act No. 1627; the latter being
ambiguous in the sense that it did not explicitly allow nor prohibit SC to examine issues
of facts on appeals. The SC found, in light of former practices and from further
understanding the circumstances in which the framers of the amended law were subject
to, that the amendment was not meant to confer in them the jurisdiction of reviewing
questions of fact.

2.2 The SC further distinguished their holding from Loeb vs. Columbia Township
Trustees, and Boise Artesian Hot and Cold-Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City. These two
latter cases were taken to the US SC directly from the circuit courts as writs of error,
(not as appeals) where the US SC does not only have jurisdiction to review
constitutional questions but also every other question properly arising. 2.3 In at least
fourteen other cases, the SC has showed that the ruling for this issue in the last 10 years
has remained uniform. And that the court, since its organization, never held that it had
the power to review facts touching guilt of an accused person, ONLY as to when the
appeal involved the validity or constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a
municipal or township ordinance.

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 People vs Estrada
G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000

Syllabus: Criminal Law; Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly
based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will; man, therefore, should be
adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
—The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based,
the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with
an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious
or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e.,
with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.

The law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act To ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time of
the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a
reasonable period both before and after that time.

Facts: December 27, 1994 at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan. While
the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards
the center of the altar. He sat on the Bishop’s chair. The man was Estrada. Crisanto
Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites approached Estrada and requested
him to vacate the Bishop’s chair. Estrada replied [in pangasinense] “No matter what
will happen, I will not move out!” The churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the
security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near Estrada and told him to vacate.
Estrada stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap
Estrada’s hand on the armrest. Estrada did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the
latter’s hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly
Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him. Accused-
appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac parried his
thrust. Estrada went to the microphone and shouted: “Anggapuy nayan dia!” (No one
can beat me here!). He returned and sat on the bishop’s chair. SPO1 Conrado Francisco,
who was directing traffic outside, received a report. SPO1 Francisco then rushed inside
and ran to Estrada and advised him to drop the knife. Estrada obeyed and dropped the
knife and raised his hands. Estrada was brought to the police station and was put in jail.
Mararac was brought to the hospital where he was dead on arrival. He died of
“cardiorespiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound.” He had 2
stab wounds: below the left throat and on the left arm. After the prosecution rested its
case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He claimed
that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence

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 of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; thatthere was unlawful aggression by the
victim when he tapped Estrada’s hand with his nightstick and that he did not have
sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.
Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the
Estrada “pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind”; that after he made the first
stab, he “furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off
undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place” and the plea of unsound mind had
already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995 February 21,
1995, a letter was sent by Jail Warden Wilfredo F. Valdez. Valdez requested the court to
allow Estrada to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he
should remain in jail or be transferred to other institution. The other prisoners were not
comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. While the
motion for reconsideration was pending counsel for accused-appellant filed a “Motion
to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.” Appellant’s
counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks. (attached with two letter one from the jail warden and the
interspector Llopis from Bukang Liwayway Association) On September 18, 1996, the
trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the “Demurrer to Evidence.”
The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence but Estrada did not take
the witness stand instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad
Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General
Hospital. She testified Estrada suffered from “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type
schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type” The trial court rendered a decision on
June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty of the crime
charged and thereby sentenced him to death.

Issue: Whether or not the proceeding is null on the ground of violating the requirement
of due process.

Held: By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively

deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court’s negligence was a violation of the basic
requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court
must be nullified. Convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to
death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper
mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand
trial, and for further proceedings.

People vs SANDIGANBAYAN

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 G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

Facts: Respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur.
Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial
Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for
a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey.
His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original
certificate of... title was issued in his favor
CANCELLATION OF TITLE... the Director of Lands filed an action[2] for the
cancellation of respondent Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The
trial court... rendered judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after finding that
respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in
his application.
PERJURY CASE - DISMISSED DUE TO PRESCRIPTION
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint
of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an
information for perjury[5] was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal
Circuit
Trial Court.
the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move
for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the
proceedings were terminated.
VIOLATION OF RA 3019 - DISMISSED FF THE PERJURY CASE
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan[10] charging
respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent court's... resolution of August 1, 1991[11] and the case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
CASE FILED
Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of public documents.[12] He claimed that

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 respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and
certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during... the
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.
These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes' motion for
reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against
him, in order to support his contention that... the same would constitute double
jeopardy.
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently
discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-
called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that
Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on
the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by
the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he... claimed that he did
so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to
pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in
fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
OMBUDSMAN
The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by
the Ombudsman
SB... respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege
adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in
their opposition to the prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the desired... discharge
on this ratiocination:
"From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer
relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and
after the period alleged in the information.
Issues: whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state
witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege
Ruling: No! The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts
thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the
rule.
***... the application of... the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to
the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. In... other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's
advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the

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 protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares
cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's... consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends
to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's
advice.
In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness
are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of
Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about... to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which
were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges
now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were... for purposes of and in
reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by
Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed.
Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are... outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
***
It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client
may be privileged,... it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.[26] In fact,
it has also been pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation
of attorney... and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or
attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney
under certain circumstances may be... bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice."
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that
such unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by
conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege.

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 US vs Ah Chong
Gr No. L-5272
Summary:
When the accused was suddenly awakened by someone who is forcingly opening the
door, believing him to be a robber, and struck a mortal blow causing his death, and
turned out that it was his friend, such accidental killing is not attended with malice.
Thus, the unlawful killing is exempted by virtue of mistake of fact on the part of the
accused.
Facts: Ah Chong, was employed as a cook. The deceased, Pascual, was employed as a
house boy or muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon
a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was
had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of
vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a
small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this
somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had retired for
the night, was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the
room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and
was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of
the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was
employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies
he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day. He was
charged with the crime of assassination. During the trial, the defendant invokes self-

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 defense as he was merely trying to defend himself from someone whom he believes to
be a robber
The trial court convicted the accused for the crime of homicide.
Issues Ratio: 1) Whether or not, the victim should be acquitted for self-defense
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the elements of self-defense were not present
because there was no "unlawful aggression" on the part of the victim. However, the
accused was acquitted for mistake of fact. The crime of homicide requires existence of
criminal intent. The fact that the accused believed that the victim is a robber, and tried
to attack the robber to avoid injury or loss on his part, negates the existence of criminal
intent on the part of the accused.
The Supreme Court explained that: "A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in
the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged
in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his
sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life
and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he
acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the
means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believed
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge."
Doctrine:
1) Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had
intended to commit.
2) Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the
mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no
fault or negligence on his part. That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in
good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by
the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and
the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have
on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or otherwise, upon which he acted.

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 3) proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or
criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act
punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
4) If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be
either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and
the probable grounds of such belief.

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 US vs Penalosa
GRNo. 424, January 27, 1902
Facts: Appearing from the evidence adduced that the accused, Marcosa Peñalosa, was
not 21 years of age on the 3d day of May, 1901, when she married the codefendant, and
that she contracted the marriage without the consent of her father.
A man who is about to marry and is ignorant of his exact age seeks and obtains a
certified copy of the registry of his baptism. From this it appears that he was born
twenty-one years before the 1st day of June, let us say. He marries on the 15th day of
June. It develops later that the person who took the copy of the registry of baptism read
July as June, and as amatter of fact the man in question did not complete his twenty-one
years until the 1st day of July, fifteen days after his marriage.
As for the husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was
celebrated he received a letter from the woman in which she said that she was 21 years
of age. This letter the defendant showed to the clergyman who married them. The
woman when the marriage ceremony was performed took an oath before the
clergyman, in the presence of her husband, that she was 21 years of age. The defendant
testifies that he had no suspicion that the woman was a minor.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant’s acts violated article 475
Held: The judgment of conviction is reversed with reference to both defendants,
acquitting them freely with costs of suit de oficio.
Ratio Decidendi: This statement has not been contradicted and we consider that it
suffices to demonstrate that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact, and in
conformity with the principle laid down in this opinion he has not been guilty of a
violation of article 475 in connection with article 13, No. 3, nor in any other manner.
"In effect it suffices to remember the first article, which states that where there is no
intent there is no crime, . . . in order to assert without fear of mistake that in our Code
the substance of a crime does not exist if there is not a deed, an act which falls within
the sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral wrong."
It suffices for the present to decide, as we do decide, that one cannot be convicted
under article 475 when by reason of a mistake of fact there does not exist the intention
to commit the crime.
Being true, they disclose that she acted under a mistake of fact; that there was no
intention on her part to commit the crime provided for and punished in article 475

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 Mistake of fact- Authorities, who manned a checkpoint because of information that
there are armed rebels on board a vehicle, have the duty to validate the information,
identify them, and to make a bloodless arrest unless they were placed in real mortal
danger. If they shot the suspected vehicle, which did not stop after have been flagged
down and killed the occupants therein, who turned out be unarmed civilians, they are
liable for multiple homicides. The mistake of fact principle is not applicable since there
is negligence or bad faith on their part (Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 120744-46,
June 25, 2012).The accused shot with a firearm and killed by mistake a thief in the toilet,
who turned out to be his girlfriend. Invasion of property is considered as unlawful
aggression under Article 12 of the RPC because of the self-help doctrine under the Civil
Code

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 US vs Apego
GR No. L-7929, November 18, 1912

Since there was no real need of wounding Pio who had merely caught her arm, and
perhaps did so to awake her, as she was asleep and had not replied to Maria’s calls;
Further, Pio performed no other act of aggression as might have indicated a decided
purpose to commit an attempt against her honor than merely to catch her by the arm.
Although she believed that there was an attempt to her honor and she had to defend
herself, once awake and provided with an effective weapon for her defense, there was
no just nor reasonable cause for striking a blow in the center of the body, where the
principal vital organs are seated, of the man who had not performed any act which
might be considered as an actual attempt against her honor. It is undeniable that
Genoveva exceeded her right of defense.

Facts At about 8 o'clock in the evening of December 24, 1911, Spouses Pio and Maria
Bautista returned to their home from Nasugbu. Before entering the house, the spouses
called Genoveva Apego, Maria’s sister, who was inside. As there was no reply, Pio led
the way and opened the door; he was followed by Maria who, once inside, lit a match
and then a kerosene lamp. In the meantime, Pio went to the place where Genoveva was,
who, startled, immediately awoke, seized a pocketknife which was in a box at her side,
and attacked and struck Pio in the breast. Maria, who was not aware of the aggression,
asked Genoveva why empty tin cans and other articles were scattered about the azotea
of the house, realizing that the spouses were already home, she got up in front of the
said spouses; at this moment Maria advised her to reflect, but Genoveva immediately
ran out of the house, asking for help; it was then that the Maria noticed that her
husband was seriously wounded. Few moments after Pio was brought to the hospital,
he died.
Genoveva was charged with Murder before the CFI of Batangas, but it was ruled that
she was only guilty of homicide as there was no qualifying circumstances present. In
her defense, Genoveva argued that someone touched her left arm which awoke her. She
believed that somebody was trying to abuse her, thus seizing the pocketknife and
struck the person holding her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is criminally liable for killing her brother-in-law?
DEFENSE: Genoveva, unmarried woman, 25 years of age, uneducated, lived with Pio
and Maria for two years, and they had always gotten along well with the least
misunderstanding. To wit, she struck a blow with the pocketknife at the person beside
her who turned out to be her brother-in-law, Pio, without knowing who he was and in
the belief that, since he touched her left arm, he was about to commit an attempt against
her honor

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 PROSECUTION: The defendant exceeded her right of defense, since there was no real
need of wounding the man who had merely caught her by arm, and perhaps did so to
awake her.
HELD: Yes. It cannot be denied that, upon the Genoveva's awakening, startled at
feeling somebody grasp her left arm and believing that an attempt was being made
against her honor, she understood that there was a positive unlawful aggression from
which she had to defend herself. It is also undeniable that there was no previous
provocation on her part; but it is unquestionable that, in making use of this deadly
weapon, even in the defense of her person and rights, by decidedly wounding him who
had touched her or caught her by the arm, the Genoveva exceeded her right of defense.
Since there was no real need of wounding Pio who had merely caught her arm, and
perhaps did so to awake her, as she was asleep and had not replied to Maria’s calls;
Further, Pio performed no other act of aggression as might have indicated a decided
purpose to commit an attempt against her honor than merely to catch her by the arm.
Although she believed that there was an attempt to her honor and she had to defend
herself, once awake and provided with an effective weapon for her defense, there was
no just nor reasonable cause for striking a blow in the center of the body, where the
principal vital organs are seated, of the man who had not performed any act which
might be considered as an actual attempt against her honor. Thus, it is concluded that in
the commission of the crime there was present the circumstance of incomplete
exemption from responsibility.

People vs Gervero

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 GR No. 206725, July 11, 2018

Doctrines: Mistake of Fact. —The mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
Facts: Victims Hernando Villegas (Hernando), Jose Villegas (Jose), and Benito Bausug,
Jr. (Bausug) were members of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO). Accused
were members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), and were
carrying firearms. They approached the victims and asked money from Hernando, and
the latter gave them Php 20. One of the accused (Bañes) remarked, “Is that the only
amount you can give when you just received money from your wife?” The other
accused (Castigador), took the money and said “You just watch out.” Later in the
evening, a burst of gunfire from where the victims were walking was heard. A shout
was heard, “This is Hernando, a CVO!” and someone replied, “Birahi na! (Shoot now!)”.
The accused interposed the defense of mistake of fact, claiming that they thought the
victims were members of the New People’s Army (NPA). The accused were given oral
instructions by Senior Inspector Benigno Baldevinos to conduct a tactical patrol and
combat operations against the NPA. They were told to use the password “Simoy”, to
which the response would be “Amoy”.
Issue: Whether the defense of fact applies
Ruling: No, mistake of fact finds on application in this case. As early as in the case of
People v. Oanis and Galanta, the Court has ruled that mistake of fact applies only when
the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness: In support of the theory of non-
liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of US v. Ah
Chong. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after
having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. called out
twice, “who is there,” but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber,
he leaped from his bed and called out again, “If you enter the room I will kill you.” But
at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the
door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck
and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. A common
illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a
footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with
leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the
mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded
and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In
these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or
carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further

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 inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but
to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing.
Here, there was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because they
were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by
a light bulb. In addition, the witnesses testified that the victims were conversing and
laughing loudly. It must be borne in mind that it was not the first time that the accused
had seen the victims as, in fact, accused Bañes and Castigador met Hernando just a few
hours before the shooting. Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly, the
accused who were all members of the CAFGU would know the residents of that town
so as to easily distinguish them from unknown intruders who might be alleged
members of the NPA. Also, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and
shouted, “This is Hernando!” However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims,
the accused continued to fire at them. One of them even shouted, “Birahi na!” (“Shoot
now!”). In addition, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies.
At that point, they could no longer claim that they didn’t recognize the victims; and still
not contented, they sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot
wounds, Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds.

People vs Bayambao

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

 GR No. L-29481, Oct. 31, 1928

Bayamabao’s ignorance or error of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith, and this
rebuts the presumption of malicious intent accompanying the act of killing. This case is
analogous to the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong where the Court acquitted the accused, thus,
the Court deem that the doctrine laid in Ah Chong to be applicable in this case.
FACTS: On the night of the incident, Bayambao was informed by his wife that someone
threw stones at their house. He then took his revolver and went down. Since he saw no
one, he was about to ascend the staircase, when he saw a black figure rushing towards
him with its hands lifted up as if it was going to strike him. Bayambao was frightened
and thought that the black figure was an outlaw, thus, he fired his revolver at the black
figure, but it turned out that the black figure was his brother-in-law. After realizing that
it was his brother-in-law, he went straight to the latter and embraced him asking for
forgiveness as he thought that his brother-in-law was an outlaw. His brother replied
stating that he also thought that Bayambao was an outlaw. The lower court found him
guilty of murder. The reason why Bayambao thought that his brother in law was an
outlaw was because days before the incident, a soldier killed two outlaws. Being a tax
collector for the government, he feared that they are being targeted by them.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayambao is criminally liable for murder. (NO)

RULING: Bayambao acted from the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an ill at least
equal in gravity, in the belief that the deceased was a malefactor who attacked him with
a kampilan or dagger in hand, and for this reason, he was guilty of no crime and is
exempt from criminal liability.
Furthermore, his ignorance or error of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith, and
this rebuts the presumption of malicious intent accompanying the act of killing. This
case is analogous to the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong where the Court acquitted the
accused, thus, the Court deem that the doctrine laid in Ah Chong to be applicable in
this case. Therefore, Bayambao was acquitted.

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