The Law

on
Persons
& Family
Ties
Compendium of
Cases in Bar
Question Format

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

2020 - 2021

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Contents

Part 1, Book 1.
Spectrum of Legal Personality

People v. Paycana.......................................................................................... 14

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Montano, et. al., ............. 16

Oposa, et. al., v. Factoran, et. al., .................................................................. 18

The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima v. Alzona, et. al., ................ 20

Carmen Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio S. Eufemio .................................................... 22

People v. Lipata............................................................................................ 24

Alabang Development Corporation v. Alabang Hills Village Association, et.

al., ................................................................................................................. 26

Gloria Santos Duenas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners’ Association .... 28

Pepito S. Pua, et. al., v. Court of Appeals, et. al., ......................................... 30

Verceles v. Posada, GR No. 159785, 27 April 2007 ..................................... 32

Geluz, v. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-16439, July 20, 1961 ........................ 34

Quimuiging v. Icao,....................................................................................... 37

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections..39

Francisco, et. al., v. Montes, et. al., .............................................................. 40

Samahan ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan, et. al., ........................................ 41

People v. ZZZ ............................................................................................... 43

CICL XXX v. People & Redoquerio.............................................................. 46

Malto v. People ............................................................................................ 48

1
People v. Tulagan, ........................................................................................ 50

Feliciano Catalan, vs. Jesus Basa,.................................................................52

People v. Jesse Haloc y Codon, .....................................................................55

People v. Dionesio Roy y Peralta ................................................................. 58

Ortega v. Valmonte ....................................................................................... 61

Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines ......................................................... 63

Republic of the Philippines v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan .............................. 65

Republic v. Dela Vega, ..................................................................................67

Falcis v. Civil Registrar General .................................................................. 68

Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael........................................................................... 70

In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pete Roxas de
Jesus v. De Jesus........................................................................................... 73

Ching v. Goyanko .......................................................................................... 75

Hapitan v. Spouses Lagradilla ......................................................................79

Paghubasan v. Apostol, ................................................................................. 81

Muller v. Muller, .......................................................................................... 83

Beumer v. Amores........................................................................................ 85

Matthews v. Taylor ...................................................................................... 87

Taina Maningque-Stone v. Cattleya Land, Inc. ........................................... 89

Heirs of Satramdas V. Sadhwani, et. al., v. Gop S. Sadhwani, et. al., .......... 91

Borromeo v. Descallar ................................................................................. 93

2
Part 2, Book 1.
Permutations of Valid Marriages

Sanchez v. Darroca,...................................................................................... 96

Perez v. Catindig .......................................................................................... 99

Union School International v. Dagdag ...................................................... 100

Tilar v. Tilar ................................................................................................ 102

Republic v. Pangasinan ...............................................................................104

Perfecto v. Esidera ......................................................................................106

Avenido v. Avenido .................................................................................... 108

Cercado-Siga v. Cercado, Jr., ...................................................................... 110

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat ............................................................................... 113

Abanag v. Mabute ....................................................................................... 116

Wassmer v. Velez, ....................................................................................... 118

Baksh v. Court of Appeals, .......................................................................... 119

Espinosa v. Omana, .................................................................................... 121

Republic v. Albios ....................................................................................... 123

Morigo v. People ......................................................................................... 125

Bandies v. Baylon-Bandies ......................................................................... 127

Ninal v. Bayadog ......................................................................................... 128

Manzano v. Sanchez.................................................................................... 131

Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario ........................................ 132

De Castro v. De Castro ................................................................................ 134

3
Republic v. Dayot, ....................................................................................... 136

Santiago v. People ....................................................................................... 137

Sevilla v. Cardenas ...................................................................................... 139

Republic v. Olaybar, .................................................................................... 141

Ronulo v. People ......................................................................................... 144

Keuppers, v. Murcia, ................................................................................... 146

Mayor Corpuz, Jr. v. People........................................................................ 148

Beso v. Daguman ........................................................................................ 149

Aranes v. Occiano ....................................................................................... 151

Republic v. Quiñonez .................................................................................. 154

Bobis v. Bobis .............................................................................................. 157

Armas v. Calisterio, ..................................................................................... 159

Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon .................................................... 161

Celerina J. Santos vs. Ricardo T. Santos ................................................... 163

Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva ................................................................. 165

Republic v. Cantor ...................................................................................... 167

Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr. .......................................................................... 170

Republic v. Catubag .................................................................................... 172

Castillo v. Castillo ....................................................................................... 174

Villarica v. Villarica ..................................................................................... 176

People vs. Odtuhan ..................................................................................... 178

Capili v. People .......................................................................................... 180

4
Montanez v. Cipriano,................................................................................. 181

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, ...................................................................... 184

Part 3, Book 1.
Book on Void, Defective, & Voidable Marriages

Fujiki v. Marinay .........................................................................................188

Juliano-Llave v. Republic ........................................................................... 191

Mallion v. Alcantara, ................................................................................... 193

Bumatay v. Bumatay ................................................................................... 195

Ablaza v. Republic....................................................................................... 198

Carlos v. Sandoval ...................................................................................... 200

Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli .................................................................... 203

Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, ............................................................ 205

De Castro v. De Castro, .............................................................................. 207

Garcia-Quiason v. Belen, ........................................................................... 209

Morigo v. People, ........................................................................................ 211

Republic of the Philippines, vs. Merlinda L. Olaybar................................. 212

Social Security Commission v. Edna A. Azote, ........................................... 215

Vitangcol v. People,..................................................................................... 218

De Guzman y Jumaquio v. People, ............................................................. 219

Sarto y Misalucha v. People, ....................................................................... 221

Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose A. Dayot ........................................... 223

Nicdao-Carino v. Carino ............................................................................ 226

5
Abbas v. Abbas ........................................................................................... 228

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan .......................................................................... 231

Arrieta v. Arrieta ........................................................................................ 233

Republic v. Mola Cruz, ............................................................................... 235

Republic v. Javier........................................................................................237

Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr. .................................................... 239

Kalaw v. Fernandez, .................................................................................... 241

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes ................................................................ 244

Halili v. Santos-Halili, ............................................................................... 246

Azcueta v. Republic, ................................................................................... 248

Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,......................................................................................... 250

Antonio v. Reyes, ....................................................................................... 253

Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals ..............................................................255

Republic v. Romero ................................................................................... 258

Request to Nullify the Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage

in Civil Case No. 04-2578, RTC Br. 15, Cotabato City ............................... 260

Yuk Ling Ong, v. Co .................................................................................... 261

Simundac-Keppel v. Keppel,...................................................................... 263

Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez .......................................................................... 265

Bautista, Jr., v. Republic, ............................................................................267

Castillo v. Republic .................................................................................... 270

Malilin v. Jamesolamin, .............................................................................273

Baccay v. Baccay, ........................................................................................276

6
So v. Valera, ................................................................................................ 281

Bier v. Bier ................................................................................................. 284

Republic v. Cuizon-Melgar ........................................................................ 287

Marcos v. Marcos ....................................................................................... 289

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina .................................................. 292

Santos v. Court of Appeals ......................................................................... 294

Oropesa v. Oropesa .................................................................................... 296

Crewlink v. Teringtering, ........................................................................... 298

Almelor v. RTC, Br. 254, Las Pinas City .................................................... 299

Alcazar v. Alcazar ........................................................................................ 301

Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,.................................................................. 304

Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna ............................................................................ 306

Republic v. Obrecido III ............................................................................ 308

Galapon v. Republic, ................................................................................... 310

Catalan v. Lee .............................................................................................. 312

Republic v. Manalo ..................................................................................... 314

Rondo v. Civil Registrar General ................................................................ 315

Siochi v. Giozon .......................................................................................... 316

Fajardo v. San Miguel-Fajardo ................................................................... 318

Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong ................................................................................ 320

De Ocampo v. Florenciano ........................................................................ 322

People v. Schneckenburger ........................................................................ 324

7
Part 4, Book 1.
Marital Properties, Rules of Use, Management, &
Disposition

Valencia v. Loquiao .....................................................................................327

Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals ................................................................. 329

Sumbad v. Court of Appeals ...................................................................... 332

In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pete Roxas de
Jesus v. De Jesus........................................................................................ 334

Quiao v. Quiao ........................................................................................... 336

Abrenica v. Abrenica ................................................................................... 341

Francisco v. Gonzales ................................................................................ 343

Buado v. Court of Appeals ......................................................................... 346

Ugaldi v. Yassi ............................................................................................ 348

Munoz, Jr., v. Ramirez ............................................................................... 349

Dewara v. Lamela ....................................................................................... 351

Imani v. Metropolitan Bank Trust & Co., Inc. ........................................... 354

Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank ........................................................................ 356

Ayala Investment and Development Corp., v. Court of Appeals ............... 358

Ching v. Court of Appeals .......................................................................... 360

Paquito V. Ando v. Andresito Y. Campo, et al. .......................................... 362

Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corp Wilfrido Martinez ................................ 364

Go v. Yamane ..............................................................................................367

Pelayo v. Perez ........................................................................................... 369

8
Amada Cotoner-Zacarias v. Sps. Alfredo and the Heirs of Paz Revilla ..... 371

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., v. Pascual ............................................. 373

Fuentes v. Roca ........................................................................................... 375

Flores v. Lindo ............................................................................................ 377

Heirs of Go v. Servacio................................................................................379

Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana ........................................................................... 381

Heirs of Jarque v. Jarque........................................................................... 383

Villaranda v. Villaranda ............................................................................. 386

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. ...................................................................... 388

Grande v. Antonio ...................................................................................... 392

Noveras v. Noveras .................................................................................... 394

Siochi vs. Giozon ........................................................................................ 396

Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City.......................................................... 398

Elna Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr .............................................................401

Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals ............................................................. 404

Alain Diño v. Ma. Caridad L. Diño ............................................................ 406

Yu v. Reyes-Caprio ..................................................................................... 408

Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr., v. Eden Villena Aguila............................................410

Marietta N. Barido v. Leonardo V. Nonato ................................................ 412

Domingo v. Court of Appeals ...................................................................... 414

Ocampo v. Ocampo ..................................................................................... 416

Paterno v. Paterno ...................................................................................... 418

9
Paterno v. Arcaya-Chua ............................................................................. 420

Bangayan v. Bangayan ............................................................................... 422

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat .............................................................................. 424

Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. de Batocael ...................................................... 426

Republic v. Dayot ....................................................................................... 428

Ninal et.al.v. Bayadog ................................................................................ 430

Part 5, Book 1.
Family Ties and the Paternity & Filiation of Children

Edwin N. Tribiana v. Lourdes M. Tribiana ................................................ 433

Esquivias v. Court of Appeals .................................................................... 435

Martinez v. Martinez...................................................................................437

Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., v. Acuña ........................................... 439

Heirs of Favis, Sr., v. Gonzales .................................................................. 442

Spouses De Mesa v. Spouses Acero ........................................................... 445

Eulogio v. Bell .............................................................................................447

Cabang v. Basay ......................................................................................... 449

Patricio v. Dario ......................................................................................... 450

Arriola v. Arriola ........................................................................................ 453

In re: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan .......................................................455

Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz ..................................................................... 458

Arbolario v. Court of Appeals ..................................................................... 461

10
Basbas v. Basbas ........................................................................................ 464

Aguilar v. Siasat ..........................................................................................467

Joanie Surposa Uy vs. Jose Ngo Chua ....................................................... 468

Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao.......................................................................... 471

Concepcion v. Court of Appeals ..................................................................474

Reyes v. Mauricio ........................................................................................ 477

Eugenio San Juan Geronimo v. Karen Santos ............................................479

Barcelote v. Republic ................................................................................. 482

Dela Cruz v. Gracia, ................................................................................... 485

Montefalcon v. Vasquez ............................................................................. 487

Perla v. Baring............................................................................................ 489

Gotardo v Buling ........................................................................................ 492

People v. Abella .......................................................................................... 494

People v. Gersamio .................................................................................... 496

Grande v. Antonio ...................................................................................... 498

Republic v. Trinidad Capote ...................................................................... 500

Recto v. Trocino ......................................................................................... 502

Tonog v. Court of Appeals ......................................................................... 504

Estate of Rogelio G. Ong v. Minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz ........................... 506

Lucas v. Lucas ............................................................................................ 509

Rosendo Herrera v. Rosendo Alba, et al., ................................................... 511

In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim .............................................. 513

11
Diwata Ramos Landingin v. Republic of the Philippines ........................... 514

Isabelita S. Lahom v. Jose Melvin Sibulo ................................................... 517

Bartolome v. Social Security System ......................................................... 520

Oribello v. Court of Appeals....................................................................... 522

Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic .................................................................. 524

Nepomuceno v. Lopez................................................................................ 526

Lim v. Lim .................................................................................................. 529

Lim-Lua v. Lua ............................................................................................ 531

Lacson v. Lacson .........................................................................................533

Hebron v. Loyola.........................................................................................535

Cherith Bucal v. Manny Bucal .................................................................... 537

Rosales v. People........................................................................................ 539

Caram v. Segui ............................................................................................ 541

Becket v. Sarmiento, Jr. ............................................................................. 544

12
Part 1, Book 1.
Spectrum of Legal Personality

13
Persons
People v. Paycana
GR No. 179035, April 16, 2008
Digested by: Abad, Nikki Noreen A.

Jesus was charged with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion for repeatedly stabbing his wife, Lilybeth, who was 7-month
pregnant. In his defense, Jesus averred that he was acting in self-defense as
it was his wife who attacked him first. And that he cannot be liable for the
death of the fetus since it did not acquire a civil personality or was viable.
The court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and awarded
civil liability and moral damages to the heirs of Lilybeth.

1. Did the court err in charging Jesus with the crime of unintentional
abortion for the loss of life of an unborn fetus?
2. Differentiate the 7-month rule under the Civil Code from the 6-month
rule under the Revised Penal Code.

Suggested answer:
1. No. The law provides that if the fetus is killed inside the maternal
womb, the crime is abortion regardless of whether he is viable or not.
In this case, the unborn fetus was killed when Jesus stabbed Lilybeth
several times. The Court, hence, did not punish the accused for the
loss-of-life of the unborn foetus for infanticide, but for the
unintentional abortion as suffered by the mother.

14
2. Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, births determine personality.
Under Article 41 of the Civil Code, if the intrauterine life of the fetus is
7 months or more, it is considered born if it is alive at the time of its
complete delivery from the mother’s womb. On the other hand, if the
intrauterine life of the fetus is less than 7 months, it is considered
born if it is still alive after 24-hours after its complete delivery from
the mother’s womb. The 7-months rule under the Civil Code
determines if the fetus is considered born for the purpose of
personality. While, the 6-months rule in the RPC determines if the
fetus is viable for purpose of abortion and infanticide. The embryo,
fetus, and infant are persons since abortion and infanticide are crimes
against person under the Revised Penal Code.

15
 Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Montano, et. al.,
GR No. 182836, Oct. 13, 2009
Digested by: Abangan, Stephanie V.

F is an employee of C Corporation. F filed a claim based on the incident that

his wife had a premature delivery during the 38th week of pregnancy where
the fetus died during labor. Petitioner immediately granted F's claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.

C Corp. posited that in the CBA which F signed did not contain an express
provision contemplating the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to
the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none
of which existed in F's case.

C Corp., relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that
only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never
died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the
same line of thought, C Corp. reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the
moment of delivery was not a person at all. Did the fetus acquire civil
personality?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

16
Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it
is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42
plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. Additionally,
Article 164 of the Family Code states that children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

In the case at bar, the reliance of C Company on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of

the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. The issue of the
civil personality of the unborn child is not relevant since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pertain directly to the parents
of the unborn child upon the latter’s death. The Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Furthermore, The Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may
be extinguished by death; it does not explicitly state that only those who
have acquired juridical personality could die. One need not acquire a civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. And lastly, it was not disputed that H and his wife were
validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.

17
 Oposa, et. al., v. Factoran, et. al.,
GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993
Digested by: Abellon, Caryl Mae B.

A,B,C and D, who are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents, filed a complaint in a class suit against the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on the ground
that they have the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
under the twin concepts of inter-generational responsibility and inter-
generational justice. They alleged that their right was breached due to the
disastrous and irreparable damage due to the continuous grant of the
Timber License Agreement issued by DENR.

The defendant, Z, Secretary of DENR, filed a Motion to Dismiss contending

that the petitioners had no cause of action against him for lack of legal
personality being minors.

The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion.

Can minors institute a class suit in claiming their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the minors can validly initiate the filing of a class suit because they
represent their generation as well as the generations yet unborn.

18
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology. As held in the case of Oposa v. Factoran, the petitioners,
who are minors, have the personality to sue on behalf of the succeeding
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

In the case at bar, A,B,C and D have the legal personality to file a complaint
against the Z, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. They acquired the personality under the concept of
intergenerational responsibility.

19
 The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima v. Alzona, et. al.,
G.R. No. 224307, August 6, 2018
Digested by: Acaylar, Franz Lawrence

P is spinster and a registered owner of a parcel of land. Impelled by her

unmaterialized desire to become a nun, she devoted the rest of her life
helping others by becoming a benefactor of the PSL, a religious charitable
group headed by Sister C, their Superior General, who also became P’s close
friend and personal aide. P later learned that she had cancer. Due to this
circumstance, P executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos conveying her
parcel of land in favor of PSL through Sister C as a token of her
appreciation for PSL’s services to her during her illness. At the time of the
donation, PSL was not yet registered with the SEC.

P later died without any issue and was survived by her only brother Y. Y
filed a case before the RTC seeking to annul the Deed executed. He
contends that at the time the donation was made, PSL was not registered
with the SEC and therefore has no juridical personality and cannot legally
accept the donation. Rule on the contention of Y.

Suggested answer:
The donation is valid as PCL although not yet registered with SEC was dealt
with by P as if it were a corporation. PCL is deemed as a corporation by
estoppel.

Under Section 21 of the Corporation Code, “… xxx One who assumes an

obligation to an ostensible corporation as such, cannot resist performance

20
thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation.” The doctrine is
founded on principles of equity and is designed to prevent injustice and
unfairness. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel rests on the idea that if
the Court were to disregard the existence of an entity which entered into a
transaction with a third party, unjust enrichment would result as some
form of benefit had already accrued on the part of one of the parties. Thus,
in that instance, the Court affords upon the unorganized entity corporate
fiction and juridical personality for the sole purpose of upholding the
contract.

In this case, while the contract sought to be enforced is that of a donation,

which is rooted on liberality, it cannot be said the P did not acquire any
benefit so as to prevent the application of the doctrine of corporation by
estoppel. To recall, the property was given as a token of appreciation for
past services. Therefore, past services constitute consideration which in
turn can be regarded as a benefit on the part of the donor.

The existence of the petitioner as a corporate entity is upheld in this case

for the purpose validating the Deed to ensure that the primary objective for
which the donation was intended is achieved, that is, to convey the property
for the purpose of aiding the petitioner in the pursuit of its charitable
objectives.

21
Non Persons
Effect of Death

Carmen Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio S. Eufemio

G.R. No. L-30977, Jan. 31, 1972
Digested by: Alipayo, Queen Anne

XX filed a petition for legal separation against EE after discovering that the
latter abandoned her and is cohabiting a Chinese woman, GG. Before the
trial could be completed, XX died in a vehicular accident. Counsel for XX
moved to substitute the deceased by her father. Does the death of the
plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action?

Suggested answer:
Yes. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce
in this jurisdiction) is purely personal.

The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by
allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by
their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it
follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.

22
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to
such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the
question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of
jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the
subject-matter of the action itself.

23
 People v. Lipata
G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016
Digested by: Alo, Reyniere

X was charged with the crime of murder in killing Y and subsequently

found guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case
and sustained the Regional Trial Court decisions. The case was elevated to
the Supreme Court, however, during the pendency of the case, X died. The
Supreme Court issued a resolution which ordered the PAO to substitute the
legal representatives of the estate of the X and to comment on the civil
liability. The PAO stated that, the death of X pending appeal of his
conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as the civil liability. Is
the contention of PAO correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the contention of PAO is correct.

It is ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Bayotas, that upon
the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal. It is also ruled by the Supreme Court that, if the offended party
upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desired to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1
of Rule 111 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to file a separate civil

24
action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on
other source of obligations.

25
Juridical Persons, Dissolution, Non-Registration

Alabang Development Corporation v. Alabang Hills Village

Association, et. al.,
GR No. 187456, June 2, 2014
Digested by: Amer, Sittie Farhannah H.

X filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages against Y. The complaint

alleged that X, developer of Y, still owns certain parcels of land therein and
yet to be sold. That sometime in 2006, Y started the construction of a
multi-purpose hall and swimming pool on one of the parcels of land still
owned by X without the latter’s consent.

In its counterclaim, Y avers that X no longer has the capacity to sue since it
is no longer the absolute owner of the subject property.

The RTC dismissed X’s complaint invoking that petitioner has no

personality to file the same among others. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC relying on the case of Columbia Pictures Inc v. CA
which ruled that "[l]ack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is
not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary
qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims[;] 'lack of capacity to sue' refers to a plaintiff's
general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party. ..."

26
Is the CA correct in affirming the Petitioner’s lack of capacity?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the CA is correct in ruling that the petitioner’s capacity to sue is
lacking.

As defined in the jurisprudence cited, the term “lack of capacity to sue”

means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not
have the necessary qualification to appear in the case; plaintiff’s general
disability to sue on account of minority, insanity, incompetence or lack of
juridical personality.

In the case at bar, Petitioner lacks capacity to sue because it no longer

possesses juridical personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse of
three years grace period.

27
 Gloria Santos Duenas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners’
Association
G.R. No. 149417, June 4, 2004
Digested by: James M. Andrin

Petitioner X is the daughter of the late B who, during his lifetime, owned a
parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at General T. De
Leon, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, B had the realty subdivided
into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision. The
then Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the
National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required Certificate of
Registration and License to Sell. At the time of B’s death in 1988, there
were already several residents and homeowners in Cecilio J. Santos
Subdivision. In 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to petitioner X a
resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for
recreational and other community activities

Petitioner X, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members

of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA. In a letter dated May 29, 1997,
HLURB, opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not applicable to Santos Subdivision
however SSHA got a favorable decision from the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner X contends that SSHA has no juridical capacity to sue and be
sued under its name.

Is the contention of petitioner X tenable?

28
Suggested answer:
Yes.

Article 44 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical

persons. Under said Article, an association is considered a juridical person
if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its
members.

The records of the present case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is
an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error for
the HLURBNCR Office to give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case
No. REM0702979821, given the SSHA’s lack of capacity to sue in its own
name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by
all the parties who signed and verified the complaint.

The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid
and legal authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association
any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the
Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow
SSHA with the personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of
membership in a federation are insufficient and inconsequential.

29
Not even conceived yet

Pepito S. Pua, et. al., v. Court of Appeals, et. al.,

GR No. 134992, Nov. 20, 2000
Digested by: Ang, Ammiel P.

On January 4, 1979, Spouses H and W executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in

favor of X, a minor represented by Z, which document was registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds and as a consequence of said registration
TCT No. 12345 in the name of ‘X, minor, represented by his auntie and
natural guardian Z’ was issued. However, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
declared both by the trial court and the appellate court to be null and void
for lack of consent on the part of the buyer.

Can a minor person validly give its consent to a contract?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 1318 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

The evidence shows that X who was named in the deed of sale as the buyer,
was actually born on March 1, 1980. The said deed of sale in his favor was

30
executed on January 4, 1979. Thus, the appellate court correctly found that
since said X was not even conceived yet at the time of the alleged sale, he
therefore had no legal personality to be named as a buyer in the said deed
of sale. Neither could he have given his consent thereto.

In the instant case, X could not have validly given his consent to the
contract of sale, as he was not even conceived yet at the time of its alleged
perfection. The appellate court, therefore, correctly ruled that for lack of
consent of one of the contracting parties, the deed of sale is null and void.

31
The Link between Consent & Legal Personality
The fetus

Verceles v. Posada, GR No. 159785, 27 April 2007

Digested by: Bacalso, Hannah M.

Doctrine: It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to
a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the
substance thereof. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the
parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages.

Question:
A, young lass met a close family friend B, the mayor of Cebu. The B then
offered A a job as a casual employee in the mayor’s office. One day, B
started to make amorous advances on A which latter succumbed to the
former’s advances. A kept the incident to herself until she became pregnant.
In a handwritten letter written by B, B told A that he should have no regrets
should she become pregnant even unexpectedly and that they shall both
take care of the child.

A together with her parents filed a complaint for Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite before the RTC in which the CA affirmed the
judgment of the RTC, ordering B to pay a monthly support to Child from
her birth, and to pay moral and exemplary damages to X and her parents.

Is the Trial Court correct?

32
Suggested answer:
Yes, as to the payment of monthly support of a Child. However, A together
with her parents is not entitled to damages.

Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered
in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because A was already an
adult at the time she had an affair with B. Neither can her parents be
entitled to damages. They have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify
awarding damages to them. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence that
entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to
damages.

33
 Geluz, v. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
Digested by: Bariquit, Joymee

Principle: The presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article

40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the said provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive.
Hence, there is no transmission of the right of action to its parents of heirs
from one that lacked juridical personality.

Question:
Nita Villanueva became pregnant in 1950 before she and respondent Oscar
Lazo were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her
parent and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by
petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. After her marriage with Oscar, Nita
again became pregnant but had herself aborted again by the petitioner in
October 1953 as she was then employed in the Comelec and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant and was again aborted by the petitioner, of a two-month old
foetus, in consideration of P50. Her husband claimed he did not know of,
nor gave his consent, to the abortion. Respondent Oscar sued petitioner for
damages based on the third and last abortion.

Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her

abortion, may recover damages from the physician who caused the death of
their unborn child.

34
Suggested answer:
No.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or

death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act).

It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child

(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because
that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it
be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the
present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated
from its mother's womb.

Article 2206 of the Civil Code also does not cover the case of an unborn
foetus that is not endowed with personality.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as

35
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
right to life and physical integrity

36
 Quimuiging v. Icao,
GR No. 26795, July 31, 1970
Digested by: James Marvin C. Basañez

A and B had close and confidential relations. B, although married,

succeeded in having carnal intercourse with A several times by force and
intimidation and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant.
A claimed for support, damages, and attorney’s fees. However, B moved to
dismiss the case for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born. After the arguments, the lower court
sustained B’s arguments and dismissed the complaint. Question: Was the
lower court correct in sustaining the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the complaint failed to allege if the child had been born?

Suggested answer:
No.

The lower court’s decision is incorrect. As a rule, A conceived child,

although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being
ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced
heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator. It is thus clear that the lower
court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an

37
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40.

38
 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 221697, March 8,2016
Digested by: Kimberly May Butao

X filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency. X declared that she is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines. However, petitions were filed before
the COMELEC to deny her candidacy on the ground that she cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino Citizen for being a foundling. Whether
or not X is a natural-born Filipino Citizen?

Suggested answer:
Yes, X is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. The

Family Code, that said, there is more than sufficient evidence that X has
Filipino parents and therefore, a natural-born citizen. There is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundling either. Under
the UN Convention Law, that Foundlings are automatically conferred with
the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being found.

X having been found in the Philippines shall be considered as a Filipino

Citizen. Wherefore, X’s Certificate of Candidacy shall not be denied.

39
Minority
Francisco, et. al., v. Montes, et. al.,
G.R. No. 212801, Sept. 1, 2014
Digested by: Rheyz Pierce A. Campilan

(Note: The case was only the resolution made by the Supreme Court on the petition for
certiorari. I have not found the full text of the case. So, I based the questions on the
explanation of the Supreme Court with regard to the topic of legal personality . )

Question:
A, B, and C, signed a mortgaged deed knowing that B was a minor. A
problem occured and now the three of them are assailing the validity of the
contract on the ground that on the time it was executed, B was a minor,
making the contract void. Is the contract void? What effect does B’s
minority bring to the contract?

Suggested answer:
No.

Persons who have already benefitted from a loan or mortgage transaction,

are estopped from assailing the validity and due execution of such contract.

With regard to B’s minority, it only renders the contract voidable to the
extent of his share in the contract.

40
 Samahan ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan, et. al.,
v. Quezon City, et. al.
G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
Digested by: Capoy, Marie Concepcion

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a

nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila
started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were
respondents: Navotas City, City of Manila and Quezon City. Petitioners,
spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) an
association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth
and minors, filed a petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because it violates constitutional rights namely: : (1) the
right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the
primary right of parents to rear their children.

Do minors have the legal capacity to give their consent before the State can
implement curfew ordinances?

Suggested answer:
No.

Jurisprudence provides that a child cannot give consent to a contract under

our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of

41
fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation
to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.

In the case at bar, our own legal system recognizes the inherent lack of full
rational capacity of minors to give their consent. Furthermore, the State has
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime;
hence the curfew ordinances are not considered unconstitutional.

42
 People v. ZZZ
GR No. 228828, July 24, 2019
Digested by: Capute, Charlene C.

On May 16, 1996 around 7:00pm, B was on his way to buy cigarettes when
he saw Z dragging A by the wrist toward the school. The following day,
news spread that A was missing. A couple of days later, the barangay
officials and SPO3 L found a lifeless A in a bamboo grove near the school.
The medico-legal officer of NBI remarked that A might have been sexually
assaulted and A’s death could have been caused by the traumatic cerebral
contusion. The RTC found Z guilty of the crime charged. The Court of
Appeals held that the trial court was correct in retroactively applying
Republic Act No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of2006. The
Court of Appeals found that Z acted with discernment when he perpetrated
the crime in a dark and isolated place, and when he evaded arrest by fleeing
to Tarlac under an alias. It noted that even the social worker assigned to
him arrived at the same conclusion. As Z was already above 30 years old
when he was convicted, the Court of Appeals held that the automatic
suspension of the penalty as provided under Sections 38 and 40 of Republic
Act No. 9344 was no longer applicable. Is the accused acted with
discernment?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Under Republic Act No. 9344, A
child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which

43
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings m
accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws. This Court has defined
discernment as the "mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act." This is determined by considering all the
facts of each case.

In the case at bar, Z argues that even if he were guilty of raping A, he must
still be exempt from criminal liability since he was only 15 years old when
he committed the offense and the prosecution failed to prove that he acted
with discernment. The trial court and CA found that Z acted with
discernment in carrying out the crime. First, he perpetrated the crime in a
dark and isolated place. Second, after knowing that he had been tagged as
the suspect, he evaded authorities by fleeing to Tarlac and concealing his
identity. Third, as confirmed by the social worker assigned to him, he knew
and understood the consequences of his acts. Lastly, the medico-legal
officer concluded that A was raped by means of force, as evidenced by the
contusions all over her body and by the tear from her vaginal area. As can
be gleaned from these facts, accused-appellant committed the crime with
an understanding of its depravity and consequences. He must suffer the full
brunt of the penalty of the crime. Considering that accused-appellant is
already over 30 years old when he was convicted, the automatic suspension
of the sentence provided under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, in
relation to Section 40, may no longer be applied. While the suspension of
sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already of
the age of majority at the time his conviction was rendered, the suspension

44
applies only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21. In accordance
with People v. Jugueta, the proper amount of damages for the special
complex crime of rape with homicide when the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua should be ₱75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages,
and exemplary damages. This Court also affirms the award of actual
damages of ₱20,000.00. In addition, the damages awarded shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the
judgment until fully paid.

45
 CICL XXX v. People & Redoquerio
G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019
Digested by: Yu Vega, CM

AAA was sent by his mother to buy iced tea powder from a store. While he
was at the store, AAA heard somebody say “Yan si AAA anak ni Purok
Leader na humuli sa atin nuon.” AAA looked back and saw XXX, a minor
(17 years old), YYY, and ZZZ.

XXX suddenly poked a gun at the face of AAA. XXX pulled the trigger
several times, but the gun did not fire so XXX hit the left temple and top of
the head of AAA with the gun. YYY and ZZZ held the arms of AAA while
XXX punched him several times with a stone causing AAA to loss
consciousness. AAA was in coma for 7 days.

XXX denied the allegations against him. Despite the prosecution’s failure to
show that XXX acted with discernment, the RTC convicted XXX of the
crime of frustrated murder. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

In questioning his conviction, XXX argued that because he was only

seventeen (17) years old at the time he supposedly committed the crime,
then he is presumed to have acted without discernment, and that it was the
burden of the prosecution to prove otherwise. XXX then argues that the
prosecution was unable to discharge its burden.

Is the argument of XXX correct?

46
Suggested answer:
Yes, the argument of XXX is correct.

Jurisprudence dictates that when a minor above fifteen (15) but below
eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that
he or she acted with discernment. For a minor at such an age to be
criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment,
meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt
acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto;
the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt
to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.

Here, the prosecution failed to specifically prove as a separate circumstance

that XXX committed the alleged crime with discernment. Both the RTC and
the CA erred in convicting XXX, as they both equated "intent to kill" -
which was admittedly established through the evidence presented by the
prosecution - with acting with discernment, which, on the contrary, was not
proved, by the prosecution. Discernment is different from intent. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The
prosecution never endeavored to prove that XXX acted with discernment.

As the presumption that XXX acted without discernment was not

successfully controverted, he must perforce be acquitted of the charge.

47
 Malto v. People
G.R. No. 164733, Sept. 21, 2007
Digested by: Castro, Aivy Mae R.

Prof X seduced his student AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in

sexual intercourse for several times with him. Prior to the incident, Prof X
and AAA had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts. The first
incident happened when Prof X asked AAA to talk to him in private. He
brought AAA in Queensland Lodge and implored her to have sexual
intercouse with him. Pressured and afraid of Prof X’s threat to end their
relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.

When AAA knew that Prof X’s was intimately involved with or was sexually
harassing his students in colleges where he taught, she immediately ended
the relationship with him. It was then that AAA realized that she was
actually abused by Prof X. She then confided all that happened between her
and Prof X to her mother, BBB.

Upon discovery, BBB lodged a complaint against Prof X. The trial court
found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s
conviction and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5 of RA 7610, as
amended and sentenced him to reclusion temporal.

May the "sweetheart theory" be invoked in cases of child prostitution and

other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610?

48
Suggested answer:
No.

The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies

committed against or without the consent of the victim. But for purposes of
sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA
7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable.

Under our civil laws, a child cannot give consent to a contract. This is on
the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable
of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. It
goes without saying that a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

Therefore, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable because consent is

immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct
with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense.

49
 People v. Tulagan,
GR No. 227363, March 12, 2019
Digested by: Vhinjealeen Mae Costillas

Tulagan was charged with the crimes of sexual assault and statutory rape of
AAA, a 9-year-old. The trial court held that Tulagan is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It relied on the credible and
positive declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial if Tulagan.
Tulagan alleged that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Was Tulagan guilty of of sexual assault and statutory
rape?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The RPC punishes inserting of the penis into another person's mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person if the victim did not consent either it was done through
force, threat or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. On the other hand,
sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old or is demented is
statutory rape.

Here, all the elements of sexual assault and statutory rape was duly
established. The victim is not able to give her consent and she is under 12
years old. Evidence of force, threat or intimidation is immaterial because
the offended party, who is under 12 years old or is demented, is presumed
incapable of giving rational consent. The law presumes that the victim who

50
is under 12 years old or is demented does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years or dementia; thus, a child's or a
demented person's consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern good from evil. In sum, a child is presumed by law to
be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious conduct or sexual
intercourse.

51
Insanity

Feliciano Catalan, vs. Jesus Basa,

G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007
Digested by: Cuenca, Joben Vernan C.

On October 20, 1948, X was discharged from active military service. He was
found to be unfit to render military service due to schizophrenia. On
September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On 1951, X
allegedly donated to his sister Z one-half of the real property. On December
11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to
declare X incompetent. After the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication
of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing
Allowance of X, BPI was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On
March 26, 1979, Z sold the property donated by X to her in issue in her
children Z1 and Z2. On 1997, BPI, acting as X’s guardian filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents. BPI alleged that
the Deed of Absolute Donation of Z was void ab initio, as X never donated
the property to Z. In addition, BPI averred that even if X had truly intended
to give the property to Z, the donation would still be void, as he was not of
sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August
14, 1997, X passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals
dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented by the
complainants to overcome the presumption that X was sane and competent
at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Z.

52
 - Whether or not X has the capacity to execute the donation
- Whether or not the property donated to Z and later on sold to her
children is legally in possession of the latter
- Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?

Suggested answer:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court
of Appeals and denied the petition.

A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a

thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the
following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of
the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a
vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A person
suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to
intelligently dispose his property.

By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show

substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, X had lost
total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held
that X was of sound mind at that time and this condition continued to exist
until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid. Z has
the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of
evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Z’ sale of property to
her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in

53
question belongs to Z1 and Z2. The Supreme Court notes the issue of
prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the court. It is
sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed
of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained
binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.

54
 People v. Jesse Haloc y Codon,
G.R. No. 227312, Sept. 5, 2018
Digested by: Cuizon, Razel V.

Accused-appellant Jessie Haloc y Codon, then fifty-one (51) years old, was
apprehended by barangay officials after he hacked Allan de la Cruz, nine
years and his brother Arnel, four years old, inside the de la Cruz's yard at
Barangay Union, Gubat, Sorsogon on June 22, 2008 at around 12 noon.
Arnel died as a result of the hacking blow to his neck, while Allan sustained
injuries on his upper arm.

According to the Joint Inquest Memorandum, the accused, who was armed
with a 24-inch bolo, went to the dela Cruzes' and attempted to strike the
victims' father, Ambrosio who was able to escape. Unfortunately,
Ambrosio's five sons were following him. Jessie took his ire on Ambrosio's
children, hacking Allan on the arm and taking Arnel and cutting his neck,
severing the jugular veins and nearly decapitating his head resulting to
Arnel's immediate death.During the arraignment, the PAO assisting the
accused manifested that he could not effectively interview the accused as he
seemed to be mentally unfit.

The PAO asked that the accused be first subjected to psychiatric evaluation
which the trial court granted. On July 7, 2010, the Head of the Department
of Psychiatry of Bicol Medical Center, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur
submitted a report stating that the accused is already fit for trial.

55
Will the defense of insanity by the accused exempt him from criminal and
civil liabilities?

Suggested answer:
No.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant did not establish the exempting
circumstance of insanity. His mental condition at the time of the
commission of the felonies he was charged with and found guilty of was not
shown to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or
intelligence when he committed the felonies charged. Based on the records,
he had been administered medication to cure his mental illness, but there
was no showing that he suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence.
On the contrary, the medical professionals presented during the trial
conceded that he had been treated only to control his mental condition.

There was also no showing that the accused-appellant's actions manifested

his insanity immediately after the hacking incidents.

Insanity is one of the recognized exempting circumstances under Article 12

of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal/liability.
– The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval.

56
Strictly speaking, a person acting under any of the exempting
circumstances commits a crime but cannot be held criminally liable
therefor. The exemption from punishment stems from the complete
absence of intelligence or free will in performing the act. The defense of
insanity is thus in the nature of a confession or avoidance. The accused who
asserts it is, in effect, admitting to the commission of the crime. Hence, the
burden of proof shifts to him, and his side must then prove his insanity
with clear and convincing evidence.

The defense of insanity rests on the test of cognition on the part of the
accused. Insanity, to be exempting, requires the complete deprivation of
intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the criminal act.16 Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The
accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal
intent. He must be deprived of reason, and must be shown to have acted
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.

57
Imbecility
People v. Dionesio Roy y Peralta
G.R. No. 225604, July 23, 2018
Digested by: Dacles, Darlene Marie B.

Peralta was charged with statutory rape against A before the RTC. B, the
alleged eyewitness, C (A’s mother) and Dr. Tan (the attending physician)
testified on the trial.

C accompanied A to the Philippine General Hospital ('PGH') for

examination. Dr. Merle Tan, the examining physician, testified and
concluded that 'congenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or
penetrating trauma.

Subsequently, Dr. Grace Domingo from the National Center for Mental
Health testified on Peralta’s mental status. She stated that he had
undergone a battery of tests and examinations, and concluded that the
results showed Peralta to be suffering from imbecility, or moderate mental
retardation.

She clarified that while this was irreversible, Peralta can be taught, and
recommended continuous treatment. She testified that the finding of
imbecility only covered the mental status at the time he underwent mental
evaluation, and not necessarily at the time of the offense, meaning that, at
the time of the rape, Peralta probably knew what he was doing and the
consequences thereof.

58
Can Peralta’s condition or circumstance of imbecility be appreciated to
exempt him from his liability?

Suggested answer:
No. Peralta’s condition cannot be appreciated to exempt him from his
liability.

Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile

or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a
lucid interval. "[It] requires a complete deprivation of rationality in
committing the act, i.e. that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be
no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern."

The law presumes that every person is sane. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden to prove that he was
completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged. Note
that the proof of an accused's insanity must "relate to the time immediately
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which
he is charged.

In the case at bar, Peralta failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. Dr.
Domingo's report could not positively and certainly conclude that Peralta’s
state of imbecility afflicted him at the time he raped A. Moreover, the
actions of Peralta negated complete destruction of intelligence at the time
the rape was committed.

59
Dr. Domingo's Report is likewise inconclusive as to the state of his mental
faculties at the time of the rape. While the report extensively discussed his
condition in early 2013, it does not conclude that he was afflicted with
imbecility, or that he was unaware of what he was doing, at the time he
raped A.

The report only concluded that 'at present, Peralta is deemed

INCOMPETENT to stand the rigors of court trial! Unfortunately, such
incompetence merely means that Peralta’s mental state is not fit for trial. It
does not mean that he was completely deprived of reason and freedom of
will at the time he committed the crime.

60
 Ortega v. Valmonte
GR No. 157451, Dec. 6, 2005
Digested by: Dacuba, Model Kim A.

X, an 80 year old pensioner from the United States, came home to the
Philippines and married Y, a 28 year old woman. He executed a will on
June 15, 1983, but the attestation clause was dated only on August 9, 1983.
It is to be noted that the provisions of the will specifically described the
properties he owned in the Philippines and in US and his desire to
bequeath them to his young wife. Two (2) years after the execution of the
will, X died.

X’s niece Z opposed to the probate of the will, attacked the mental capacity
of the testator, and declared that at the time of the execution of the notarial
will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
Rule on this contention.

Suggeted answer:
Under Article 799 of the Civil Code, it provides that to be of sound mind, it
is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by
disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at
the time of making the will knew the following:
1) nature of the estate to be disposed of
2) the proper objects of his bounty
3) character of the testamentary act.

61
Applying this to the present case, X had testamentary capacity at the time
of the execution of the will. It must be noted that despite his advanced age
he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the
extent of his shares in them, and their locations. As regards to the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as his sole
beneficiary.

62
Civil interdiction, penalty
State of being deaf-mute
Prodigality
Gender

Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines

GR No. 174689, Oct. 22, 2007
Digested By: de Guzman, Princess Kay D.

Principle/s: Marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a

special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual).

Question:
X filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex from “male” to
“female” in his birth certificate before the Regional Trial Court. X alleged
that he is a male transsexual and in order to transform himself to a woman
he underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and finally sex reassignment surgery. The Trial Court
granted his petition on the ground of justice and equity. The Republic, thru
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA contending that there is no
law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on

63
the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. The CA granted the
Republic’s petition and set aside the decision of the trial court. X moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Is the petition of X meritorious?

Suggested answer:
No. The Clerical Error Law (RA 9048) governing change of first name does
not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name on the
ground of sex reassignment may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.

Regarding any change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the

ground of sex reassignment, there is no special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. Moreover, the Civil Register
Law provides that a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

In sum, the petition lacks merit because petitioner failed to show or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name and there is no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry. Therefore, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

64
 Republic of the Philippines v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676, Sept. 12, 2008
Digested by: Decena, Leona Mae

Jennifer B. Cagandahan was born and registered as a female in her birth

certificate. She was later diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH), a condition wherein a person is genetically female but secretes male
hormones. Because of Jennifer’s very rare condition, she has both male and
female sex organs, did not develop breasts or ovaries, and never had her
monthly period. Feeling that she has become a male person in mind and
body, she filed a Petition to change her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”, and
her sex from “female” to “male”. Can Jennifer change her sex or gender,
from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”?

Suggested answer:
Yes. Jennifer can change her sex or gender from female to male and her
name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”.

The Supreme Court is on the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Since
the gender of intersexed persons is fixed only at maturity, the original

65
entries in the birth certificate are thus correctible under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

As to the change of name from Jennifer to Jeff, it implies a change of

feminine name to a masculine name. This is proper since it merely
recognizes his preferred gender.

66
 Republic v. Dela Vega,
G.R. No. 195873, Feb. 23, 2015
Degamo

Kris Anne Dela Vega filed a petition for the correction of the entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth with the RTC after she discovered that the name
and sex written in the certificate of live birth are “Ronald” and “male”
respectively. Since childhood, she has been using “Kris Anne” as shown in
her baptismal, school and employment record. But the OSG (Office of the
Solicitor General) opposed the petition stressing that the proper rule that
should have been used is Rule 103, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Is
the contention of the OSG correct?

Suggested answer:
No. The OSG is incorrect in stressing the use of Rule 103, instead of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.

The controversy here is not for the change of name as contemplated under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but only for the correction of entries under
Rule 108 under the same Rules.

Evidence adduced that since childhood, the respondent has been using
“Kris Anne” as shown in her baptismal, school and employment record.
Thus, the respondent never had intention to change her name and sex. She
simply seeks to correct the clerical errors in her registered sex and given

67
 Falcis v. Civil Registrar General
G.R. No. 217910, Sept. 3, 2019
Digested by: Jeanilyn M. Dico

X comes before the SC as an “open and self-identified homosexual” who is

“interested in the unconstitutionality of the provisions of the Family Code
disallowing same-sex marriage.” His Petition sought to “declare article 1
and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify
Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.” He argues that like opposite-
sex couples, same-sex couples are equally capable of founding their own
families and fulfilling essential marital obligations. He alleged that there is
no necessity to limit marriage as only between a man and a woman, Articles
1 and 2 of the Family Code are thus unconstitutional. Rule on the Petition.

Suggested answer: The Petition is without merit.

Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework,

and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to
this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry
cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that
exists outside of the law.

Article XV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution pertains to family "as the
foundation of the nation" and articulates the State's overarching
commitment to "strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development." Article XV, Section 2 concerns marriage, in particular, and

68
articulates the States’ broad commitment to protect its inviolability as a
social institution.

More than being the "foundation of the family" the state of marriage grants
numerous specific rights, privileges and duties that affect most, if not all,
aspects of marital and family relationships. There is a myriad of laws, rules,
and regulations that affect, or are affected by marriage.

A significant number of provisions under current marriage arrangements

pertain to benefits to or burdens on a specific sex and are therefore
dependent on what is assigned at birth based on the appearance of external
genitalia. As our current laws are confined to a heteronormative standard,
they do not recognize the existence and specificities of other forms of
intimacy.

Furthermore, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code provide a definition and

spell out basic requisites of marriage. The definition of marriage under
Article 1 serves as the foundation of many other gendered provisions of the
Family Code and other laws. The Court cannot amend all such laws,
through a mere declaration of unconstitutionality of only two (2) articles in
a single statute.

In the case at bar, allowing same-sex marriage cannot be had under present
laws. Not all intimate relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the
rights and duties afforded by our laws to marital relationships.

Thus, the Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

69
Marriage & family relations
Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael
GR No. 146683, Nov. 22, 2001
Digested by: Ecarma, Kim

Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, X asked U, V,

and Y, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside.

From then on, X and Y were alleged as common law spouses. U said X and
Y were lovers since they slept in the same room, while another one claimed
that X had told her that Y was his mistress. Y argued that she was a mere
helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked
her to and that X in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had
sexual intercourse. Nevertheless, X did not pay Y a regular cash wage as a
house helper , though he provided her family with food and lodging.

Before his death, X executed an instrument denominated "Deed of

Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of his real property
together with his house, to Y, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Y eventually became the absolute owner of said property.

When X died, he had no children. X’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession, alleged that Y was the common-law wife of X and the
donation inter vivos made by X in her favor is void under Article 87 of the
Family Code. Hence, they filed a complaint against Y ’for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and
damages.

70
Is the donation made by X in favor of Y void under Article 87 of the Family
Code?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the donation is void, because Y is X’s common-law wife, and the
prohibition under Article 87 of the Family Code also applies to common law
spouses.

Article 87 of the Family Code provides that every donation or grant of

gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give
each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall
also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.

The term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not
only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
However, it means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. Cohabitation
is a public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and
dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such.

Here, Y admitted that she and X resided under one roof for a long time, It is
very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Y gave X
therapeutic massage and U said they slept in the same bedroom. Their

71
public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver
and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Furthermore, another presented documents apparently signed by Y using
X’s surname. These documents show that Y saw herself as X’s common-law
wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. The same was
corroborated by the testimonies of X’s lessees. Finally, the fact that Y did
not demand from X a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not
simply a caregiver-employee, but X’s common law spouse. She was, after
all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.

Therefore, having proven by a preponderance of evidence that X and Y lived

together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation made
by X in favor of Y is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

72
 In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pete
Roxas de Jesus v. De Jesus
GR No. 168733, Mar. 27, 2006
Digested by: Elesterio, Dessa Marie V.

X married Y. Their union produced three children. In 1977, X emigrated to

the United States of America and thereafter in the same year obtained a
divorce decree against Y and married Z, in the state of Nevada. Notably,
however, X only became a citizen of the United States in 1988. X died in
1994.

Z instituted a petition for the probate of the holographic will of X. In his

will, X instituted Z as his sole heir and disinherited Y.

Is the institution of Z as X’s sole heir based on his holographic will, valid?

Suggested answer:
No, the institution of Z as X’s sole heir based on his holographic will is not
valid.

Under Article 739 of the Civil Code, donations made between persons in a
state of adultery or concubinage are void. Article 1028 of the same code
mandates that the same prohibition be similarly applied to testamentary
provisions.

In the case at bar, X was not yet a citizen of the United States at the time he
obtained the divorce decree against Y. Being a Filipino, X could not at the

73
time validly obtain a divorce decree. Since the first marriage still subsisted
at the time the decedent married Z, the second marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void. Since the marriage between X and Z was bigamous,
necessarily, X and Z are considered as having been in a state of concubinage
in the context of Article 739.

74
 Ching v. Goyanko
GR No. 165879, Nov. 10, 2006
Digested by: Esparagoza, Keneth Jorge A.

X and Y were married and out of the union Z was born. After 35 years, his
parents died. Z, Respondent claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a
661 square meter property located at 29 F. Cabahug St., Cebu City but that
as they (the parents) were Chinese citizens at the time, the property was
registered in the name of their aunt, A. X and Y have been estranged for
years.

On 1993, A executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of

respondents’ father X. In turn, X executed on October 12, 1993 a deed of
sale over the property in favor of his common-law-wife-herein petitioner B.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 138405 was thus issued in
petitioner’s name, B. Respondents thereupon had the purported signature
of their father in the deed of sale verified by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory which found the same to be a forgery.

Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
complaint for recovery of property and damages against petitioner, praying
for the nullification of the deed of sale.

In defense, petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the property
as it was she who provided its purchase price. To disprove that X's
signature in the questioned deed of sale is a forgery, she presented as

75
witness the notary public who testified that Z appeared and signed the
document in his presence.

By Decision of October 16, 1998, the trial court dismissed the complaint
against petitioner, the pertinent portions of which decision read:

There is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void,
fictitious and simulated. The signature on the questioned Deed of Sale is
genuine. The testimony of Atty. ESPARAGOZA who declared in court that
X, and B together with their witnesses appeared before him for notarization
of Deed of Sale in question is more reliable than the conflicting testimonies
of the two document examiners. Defendant B asserted that the Deed of Sale
executed by X in her favor is valid and genuine. The signature of X in the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine as it was duly executed and
signed by Z himself.

a. Does the property belong to the conjugal partnership of X and Y?

b. Is the court correct in dismissing the case? Is there a valid transfer of
ownership to B?

Suggested answer:

a. The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid
marriage between X and Y, is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership.

76
In the case at bar, while X and his wife Y have been estranged for years and
that he and defendant-appellant B, have in fact been living together as
common-law husband and wife, there has never been a judicial decree
declaring the dissolution of his marriage to Y nor their conjugal
partnership. It is therefore undeniable that the 661-square meter property
located at No. 29 F. Cabahug Street, Cebu City belongs to the conjugal
partnership.

b. No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies

even to common law relationships. So this Court ruled in Calimlim-
Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al:

The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and
public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after
he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and
children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was
subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects.

Even if we were to assume that the subject property was not conjugal, still
we cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to
defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming evidence on
records that they have been living together as common-law husband and
wife. On this score, Art. 1352 of the Civil Code provides:

77
"Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no
effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy."

Therefore find that the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant

B was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The
purported sale, having been made by Joseph Sr. in favor of his concubine,
undermines the stability of the family, a basic social institution which
public policy vigilantly protects.

78
 Hapitan v. Spouses Lagradilla
GR No. 170004, Jan. 13, 2016
Digested by: Estorba, Ivy Eunice S.

Spouses No and Esme were indebted to Lily. After several demands made
by Lily, the spouses promised to convey their house and lot as payment.
However, Lily later found out that the house and lot were sold by Ina, No’s
sister, through a Special Power of Attorney. Thereafter, Lily filed a civil case
against the spouses and Ina. The RTC ruled that the sale was null and void.
The RTC further ruled that the house and lot sold were part of the conjugal
property of the spouses. However, later on, No, Ina, and Lily executed an
amicable settlement in which No agrees to the validity of the sale of the
house and lot, in effect waiving his and Esme’s rights over the house and
lot. Can No waive his and Esme’s rights over the house and lot?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or

encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the
other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void. Further, under Article 89
of the Family Code, no waiver of rights, interests, shares, and effects of the
conjugal partnership of gains during the marriage can be made except in
case of judicial separation of property.

In this case, Esme did not consent to No disposing or waiving their rights
over the house and lot through the Amicable Settlement as she took no part

79
therein. Thus, No cannot waive his and Esme’s rights over the house and
lot.

80
 Paghubasan v. Apostol,
GR No. 250372, Feb. 3, 2020 (SC Resolution)
Digested by: Eyas, AC

Rafael and Amparo were legally married in May 1996. However, unknown
to Amparo, her husband, Rafael, had an illicit affair with Norie during the
subsistence of their marriage. In January 2012, Rafael died. By then, he and
Norie had four children.

In December 2012, Amparo filed a complaint against Norie. Amparo claims

that Rafael used their conjugal funds to purchase a property, to construct
the house thereon, and to cause the registration of the same in Norie’s
name to prevent her from knowing and/or recovering the same. She
averred that Norie could not have purchased or contributed any monetary
share to purchase the property as the latter has no financial capacity while
Rafael, a hydraulic engineer who obtained his masteral and doctoral
degrees overseas and who had his own consultancy firm, had the financial
means to purchase the same. She thus prayed that Norie be ordered to
reconvey the property to her or, in the alternative, to pay the amount
corresponding to the property's assessed value, market value, or zonal
value, whichever amount is proper.

In her Answer, Norie denied Amaparo’s claim that Rafael purchased the
subject property for her. She insisted that the subject property was
purchased using her own earnings and savings. Thus, she prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.

81
Whether or not the reconveyance of the subject property to Amparo shall
prosper?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The SC ruled that reconveyance of the subject property to Amparo and
to Rafael’s estate is proper.

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, Rafael and Norie’s property regime is
co-ownership, which provides that only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.

In this case, since Norie failed to substantiate her claim that she was
financially capable to buy the subject property, said purchase was
considered as solely financed by Rafael. Hence, Rafael’s registration of the
subject property under Norie’s name was tantamount to a void donation
under Article 739 (1) of the Civil Code.

82
Alienage
Muller v. Muller,
G.R. No. 149615, 29 Aug. 2006
Digested by: Fontanosa, Alan Vincent II S.

A and B were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The

couple resided in Germany at a house owned by B’s parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal; this was registered in the name of A. However, the couple later
separated causing B to file a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the
Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover
his funds because the property was purchased in violation of the
Constitution.

Is B entitled to a reimbursement of funds used in purchasing the Antipolo

property?

83
Suggested answer:
No. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring

lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. B was aware of the constitutional prohibition; this was
demonstrated by his having the property titled under A and not under his
own name. Save for the exception on hereditary succession, B’s
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even
an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in
violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold
otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the

ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought
the property despite the constitutional prohibition. Additionally, the
distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of
funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he
is not allowed to own.

Therefore, B cannot be allowed to obtain reimbursement as he did not have

the legal capacity to own lands in the Philippines in the first place.

84
 Beumer v. Amores
G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012
Digested by: Gabor, Jlayda Carmel Y.

A, a foreigner married B, a filipina. Several years thereafter, the RTC

declared the nullity of their marriage. A filed a petition for the dissolution
of the conjugal properties which included several parcels of land, two
houses and several personal properties. The RTC awarded the personal
properties to A while all the parcels of land were awarded to B and the
houses were considered as co-owned by the two. A contended that although
he is a foreigner the parcels of land should be awarded to him or he be
reimbursed half of its price for the reason that it was his own personal
money which was used to purchase said lands invoking equity and that it
would unjustly enrich B. Is A's contention correct?

Suggested answer:
No, A's contention is not correct.

A cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that

he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The Court cannot grant reimbursement to A given that he acquired no

right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will

85
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because
of public policy, cannot be done directly

Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the
basis of unjust enrichment. The provision on unjust enrichment does not
apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.

86
 Matthews v. Taylor
GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Digested by: Garciano, Gerald W.

A, a British national, married B, a 17-year old Filipina. While their marriage

was subsisting, B bought a 1,294 square-meter lot within the vicinity of
Boracay Island. The sale was allegedly financed by A. However, A and B
had a falling out, and B ran away with X. Later, B entered into an
Agreement of Lease with P, involving the Boracay property for a period of
25 years. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a
Notary Public. P, thereafter, took possession of the property.

A, then, instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of

Lease with Damages against B and P, claiming that the Agreement was null
and void since it was entered into by B without his consent. He further
claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the
property subject in the agreement. And by the fact that he was B’s husband,
he averred that any transaction involving the said conjugal property
required his consent. Is A correct and has the right to nullify the Agreement
of Lease?

Suggested answer:

No. A is incorrect and has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease.

The provisions of the Civil Code and Family Code state that when a
property falls within the community/conjugal property of the married

87
spouses, consent of the spouses is necessary to validate any contract of
disposition involving the same property. However, it is worthy to note the
applicable constitutional principle, in fact, is more decisive, which provides
that aliens are absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public
lands in the Philippines.

Here, A is a British national, an alien. Even if A claims that he provided the

funds for such acquisition, the fact that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed;
and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, A had and has
no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease. To sustain the
theory of A would circumvent the constitutional proscription. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband
a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a
decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.

Thus, the Agreement of Lease entered into between B and P cannot be

nullified on the grounds advanced by A.

88
 Taina Maningque-Stone v. Cattleya Land, Inc.
GR No. 195975, Sept. 5, 2016
Digested by: Gaviola

Mr. S, a foreign national, told his girlfriend at that time, Ms. M., a Filipina,
that he wishes to purchase a beach lot in Bohol. Ms. M found Mr. T's beach
lot (TCT No. 17655) and both of them contracted a Deed of Absolute Sale.
After several years, Mr. S and Ms. M married. C Corporation also entered
into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mr. T over the same beach lot. C
Corporation instituted against Ms. M a civil action for quieting of title
and/or recovery of ownership and cancellation of title with damages.
According to C Corporation, the sale between Mr. S and Mr. T, through Ms.
M, was an absolutely null and void sale, because under the Philippine
Constitution a foreigner or alien cannot acquire real property in the
Philippines. Is C Corporation's contention tenable?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain."

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring

lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring

89
private lands. The payment for the beach lot was not done by Ms. M but by
Mr. S, the foreigner. Hence, Mr. S was the real purchaser or buyer. It is
irrelevant even if the Deed of Sale was under the name of Ms. M as the
purchaser or buyer. She was a mere dummy. Mr. S’ eventual marriage to
Ms. M does not validate the sale.

90
Heirs of Satramdas V. Sadhwani, et. al., v. Gop S. Sadhwani, et. al.,
GR No. 217365, Aug. 14, 2019
Digested by: Gubalane, Rafael B.

Spouses AA and BB, both Indian nationals purchased a parcel of land

located at 58 Aries St., Bel Air, Makati and a condominium unit at the Ritz
Tower, Ayala Avenue, Makati City, and the titles thereof were allegedly
placed in the name of their son, GG in trust for his parents and siblings.

Other legitimate children of the Spouses AA and BB filed a Complaint for

Reconveyance, Partition, Accounting, Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction & Temporary Restraining Order against their brother GG, his
wife KK, Union Bank of the Philippines, Philippine Savings Bank, and the
Register of Deeds of Makati City, praying that they likewise be declared
lawful owners of the subject properties as heirs and legitimate children of
the Spouses AA and BB, in accordance with a purported express trust
agreement and the provisions of the Civil Code on succession.

Respondents GG and KK filed a motion to dismiss, alleging, among others

that petitioners had no capacity to sue; and that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action.

If you are the judge, decide on the motion to dismiss filed by the
respondents GG and KK.

91
Suggested answer:
I will grant the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners (Other legitimate children of the Spouses AA and BB ) premised

their right over the subject properties as heirs of aliens who may not own
land or transmit rights over the same by succession, and petitioners failed
to allege that they were in fact heirs of the Spouses AA and BB under the
laws of the Republic of India. In other words, the allegations of the
complaint failed to sufficiently state the concurrence of the three elements
for a cause of action, particularly, the legal right to the relief demanded. In
view of the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action

92
 Borromeo v. Descallar
G.R. No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009
Digested by: Ke-e, Aive B.

WJ, an Austrian, and AD, the respondent, fell in love and decided to live
together. Eventually, however, they went their separate ways as AD found a
new boyfriend while WJ began to live with another woman. WJ met
petitioner BO who was engaged in the real estate business and built and
repaired speedboats as a hobby. WJ purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from BO, for which he became indebted to BO. To
pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro
properties to petitioner as evidenced by a “Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment.” When BO sought to register the deed of assignment, he
discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of
the AD respondent and that the subject property has already been
mortgaged.

Is WJ has no title to the properties in question and may not therefore

transfer and assign any rights and interests in favor of petitioner BO?

Suggested answer:
No.

WJ has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation
over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment to the buyer, BO, as it was shown that the funds to purchase

93
the properties came from WJ, who was therefore the true buyer of the
property.

Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the
couple's cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise
capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case,
respondent AD was still legally married to another when she and WJ lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to
lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.

Absence
Insolvency
Trusteeship

94
Part 2, Book 1. Permutations of
Valid Marriages

95
Marriage as a Special Contract

Sanchez v. Darroca,
G.R. No. 242257, Oct. 15, 2019
Digested by: Lascuña, Rose Ann A.

On August 16, 2018, Vivian Sanchez learned that her estranged husband,
Eldie Labinghisa was among the seven alleged members of the New
People’s Army who were gunned downed by PNP in Brgy. Atabay, San Jose,
Antique. Upon discovering, Sanchez went to St. Peter’s Funeral home to
verify of her husband’s death. However, three police officers stationed took
photos of her without her permission. Fearing what the officers had done,
she left without identifying her husband’s body. Her friend, PO2 Nerissa
Dela Cruz, informed her that her photos was being circulated at the police
station and urged her to tell the investigating officers her husband’s name,
otherwise, they would go after her.

The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home but confronted
by three police officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with
obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing
for her safety she hurried home without confirming the identity of her
husband’s body.

Later that day, two police officers went to Sanchez’s house and showed her
a photo of cadaver, which she identified as her husband.

96
In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car
in front of her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they
went to Iloilo. She also noticed someone shadowing her when she was
outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her children’s safety. Her
15-year-old daughter Scarlet, who attested that the constant police presence
caused her anxiety as she worried her mother’s safety, shared this same
fear.

Can a police officer compel Vivian Sanchez to give testimonies against Eldie
Labinghisa?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is a special contract of

permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

In recognition of the significance of marriage to Philippine society,

testimonial privilege and communication privilege have been granted to
spouses. This is to preserve their harmonious relationship and to prevent
any party, including a spouse, to take advantage of the free communication
between the spouses or of in formation learned within the union.

97
The reason for disqualification given by law text-writers and courts why
neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the
other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the
consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it
necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence
because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

Therefore, the overriding consideration in the State’s support of marriage is

the recognition of its status as an inviolable social institution. The family as
well as its members enjoys similar privilege.

There exist an exception to the general rule and among these is when a
spouse commits an offense that “directly attacks, or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation.

In the present case, Vivian Sanchez admits to being separated in fact from
Labinghisa for more than a decade yet this does not suffice as an exception,
as separation is not tantamount to strained marital relations. Further,
neither spouse committed an offense that impaired their conjugal union.

98
 Perez v. Catindig
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
Digested by: Librando, Ronald Anthony A.

Atty. X was married to Y in a marriage ceremony in the Philippines. Their

marriage never last as Atty. X was only forced to marry Y because she was
pregnant at that time. Subsequently, Atty. X had a relationship with Dr. P
and secured a Divorce Degree in Dominican Republic, however, the degree
is not recognized in the Philippines. Atty. X promised to file an annulment
case in the Philippines so that he can legally marry Dr. P. Despite the legal
impediment to marry again, Atty. X got married to Dr. P at the U.S. Years
later, they relationship turned sour and Atty. X abandon Dr. Y and their son
to live with another woman. At an investigation conducted by IBP, Atty. X
claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that
he never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. Is Atty. X
committed gross immorality, which would warrant his disbarment?

Suggested answer:
Yes. Atty. X’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous
one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. By his own admission, Atty. X made a mockery out of the institution
of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited
a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

99
 Union School International v. Dagdag
G.R. No. 234186, Nov. 21, 2018
Digested by: Magloyuan, Chasmere L.

Dagdag was employed as an Elementary School Teacher on a probationary

status by Union School. During her employment, she found out that she
was eight weeks and five days pregnant. Soon thereafter, Dagdag informed
Mandapat of her pregnancy and that the father of the child was marrying
another woman. Mandapat suggested that she should simply tender her
resignation, as the school may impose harsher penalties. This is evident by
the fact that Dagdag was left with two choices—resignation or dismissal and
threatening her with possible revocation of her teaching license.

Is pregnancy out of wedlock a just cause for termination?

Suggested answer:
No.

To reiterate the ruling of this Court in Leus and Capin-Cadiz, pregnancy of

a school teacher out of wedlock is not a just cause for termination of an
employment absent any showing that the pre-marital sexual relations.
There must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital sexual
relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral.

The totality of evidence in this case does not justify the dismissal of Dagdag
from her employment considering that there was no legal impediment to

100
marry between Dagdag and the father of her child at the time of the
conception.

Hence, pregnancy out of wedlock is not a just cause for termination.

101
 Tilar v. Tilar
G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017
Digested by: Malinao, Deborah D.

X and Y were married on June 29, 1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro
Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. V as the solemnizing officer. Their marriage
went well in the first few months but Y later became an extremely jealous,
violent person which resulted to frequent quarrels and X being threatened
and physically harmed. They eventually separated in 2002; and, that Y is
now living with another man in Cebu City. X consulted a clinical
psychologist and Ywas said to be suffering from "aggressive personality
disorder as well as histrionic personality disorder" which made her
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations. X filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of Y's psychological incapacity. RTC dismissed the
petition stating that: Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an
annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an
ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was
invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by the Church's Canon Law
not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil
marriages. Ergo, the principle of separation of Church and State finds
application in this case. Is the RTC correct in dismissing the petition for
lack of jurisdiction?

Suggested answer:
No.

102
The contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the
requirements and formalities prescribed by law. Although marriage is
considered a sacrament in the Catholic Church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code. The proceedings for
church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is
not binding upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each
other in the eyes of the civil law.

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve

at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds for the termination
of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for
annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x x (15) In all actions involving
the contract of marriage and marital relations.

103
 Republic v. Pangasinan
G.R. No. 214077, Aug. 10, 2016
Digested by: Joey Ross Maputi

Following a three-month courtship, Mr. A and Mrs. B immediately

contracted marriage civilly, followed by church wedding after 25 days.
Married life generally ran harmoniously, although marred from time to
time by arguments about money matters and they begot three children.
Their marriage started to sour when Mr. A’s business began to slow down
prompted the couple to fight incessantly.

Following, Mrs. B filed three cases, one for violation of R.A No. 9262, a
petition for annulment, but later on she withdrawn and the standing action
for legal separation. On the other hand Mr. A filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of Mrs. B’s psychological incapacity. A
ruling declaring their marriage null and void ab initio on the ground that
both are psychological incapacitated to fulfill their essential marital
obligations was hereby rendered by RTC and concurred by CA, giving
credence to the testimony of Dr. D that Mrs. B is suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder and Mr. A is suffering from symptoms of Passive-
Aggressive and Avoidant Personality Disorder.

Is the RTC correct in deciding the case?

Suggested answer:
No. The Court already settled that in order to void a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, such must be more than just a

104
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

Mrs. B’s insensitivity to Mr. A’s plight translates to a mere refusal on her
part to perform her duties and not an outright incapability to do so. Also,
the root cause of Mrs. B’s personality disorder based on Dr. D’s finding
covered circumstances that transpired after the marriage. Given the fact
that Mr. B was also psychologically incapacitated, that must not be the
basis of RTC decision as well because the petition was anchored on the
psychological incapacity of his wife, Mrs. B. Sec. 2(d) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages specifically states that..”a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.” Records show that the petition is hinged primarily that
Mrs. B is psychologically incapacitated and Mr. A’s failure to allege the
complete facts showing his incapacity, he likewise failed to prove his wife’s
incapacity by preponderance of evidence.

105
 Perfecto v. Esidera
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015
Digested by: D.E.M.P. Maruhom

Mr. P filed a case for falsification of public document and dishonesty

against Judge E. He alleged that Judge E, while her first marriage in 1987
was still subsisting, gave birth to a daughter with another man in 1992 and
reflected in said daughter’s birth certificate that she and the other man
were married in 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child.

Judge E, in her Comment, argued that she did not participate in the
accomplishment of the birth certificate. She, however, conceded that she
married her second husband in 1990 but only under recognized Catholic
rites and the officiating priest did not have authority to solemnize
marriages under civil law. And when the first marriage was annulled, they
married again in Catholic rites and in conformity with law.

Judge E cites that what she did was legal and in accordance with her
religious beliefs. She added that she planned to correct her daughter’s birth
certificate but since it was a conjugal decision, not to correct the birth
certificate prevailed in order to protect their daughter’s welfare and save
her from embarrassment.

Judge E claims that the marriage with the second husband is merely a
sacramental marriage entered only to comply with requirements of their
religious beliefs, and valid only under the Roman Catholic Church but has

106
no legal effect. Furthermore, the solemnizing officer was not licensed to
solemnize marriage from the civil government.

Can Judge E be held liable for bigamy?

Suggested answer:
No.

The elements of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead under the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(d) the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites of validity.

Religious marriages are recognized in and may be governed by our laws

only if they conform with the legal requirements. Religious marriages that
lack some or all the requirements under the law are invalid. The lack of
authority of the solemnizing officer that solemnized Judge E’s subsequent
marriage in 1990 renders such marriage invalid.

Hence, no second marriage can be imputed against Judge E while her first
marriage subsisted.

107
 Avenido v. Avenido
G.R. No. 173540, Jan. 22, 2014
By: Montecillo

W instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against A

on the ground that W is the lawful wife of the deceased H. While the
marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil registrar, the records
of the Local Civil Registrar were destroyed during World War II, however,
they begot four children, but H left his family.

W learned that H got married to A which marriage she claims must be

declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, W
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their
children and certificates to the fact that the marriage certificate/records
were destroyed. RTC ruled against W. It relied on W’s failure to present her
certificate of marriage to H. Without such certificate, RTC considered as
useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar over the lack of
records.

Is the Court correct?

Suggested answer:
No. The court is not correct.

As provided by law, while a marriage certificate is considered the primary

evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant

108
evidence other than the marriage certificate. The execution of a document
may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.

In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies

and of W herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due execution and the loss
of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage.

Hence, it is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the
marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted because even a person’s
birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.

109
 Cercado-Siga v. Cercado, Jr.,
G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015
Digested by: Neri, Jillandro

Petitioners Simplicia and Ligaya assail that they are the legitimate children
of deceased Vicente and Benita after learning that Vicente’s estate has been
extra-judicially settled by their heirs – Vicente Jr. et al. The petitioners
claimed themselves as the rightful heirs to the parcel of land acquired by
their father while he was living which seeks to nullify the Deed. Along with
their claim, petitioners insisted that the marriage between Vicente and
Ditablan were null and void due to the existing marriage of their parents
(Vicente & Benita) by submitting and presenting numerous the following
documents as proof of marriage to the court:
- Marriage contract
- Certificate of acceptance of original marriage
- Certificates of non-production of birth records of Ligaya
- Baptismal Certificate of Simplicia
- Joint Affidavit
-
The RTC initially rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. The
respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals for review. The
appellate court overturned the previous judgment of the RTC as it was
found that the documents presented by Simplicia and Ligaya were
inconclusive and insufficient due to lack of credence and authenticity

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the

ground that it is a duplicate original, and the CA is incorrect to rule that

110
Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was
not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Are
petitioners correct?

Suggested answer:
No.

The marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is not sufficient to prove

the fact of the marriage between Vicente and Benita. They are private
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other
private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. An unsigned and
uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent
evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy
of the copy.

Under ARTICLE 23 OF THE FAMILY CODE “PROOF OF

MARRIAGE”.
Marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind, but the primary or best
evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract or the marriage certificate.
A mere Photostat copy of a marriage certificate is a worthless piece of
paper, but if such Photostat copy emanated from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar and duly certified by the local civil registrar as an authentic
copy of the records in his office, such certified Photostat copy is admissible
as evidence. If the Photostat copies, though not certified by the office of the
local civil registrar, are presented in court without objection from the
opposing parties and consequently admitted by the Court, the said
Photostat copies are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein

111
and therefore can be proof of marriage. Also, baptismal certificates, birth
certificates, judicial decisions, and family bible in which the names of the
spouses have been entered as married are good evidences of marriage.
Certificate of marriage made many years after the marriage is inadmissible,
especially where there was no register of the marriage in the official
records.

Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage

between Vicente and Benita, it follows that they do not have a cause of
action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Vicente and Leonora.

112
 Tambuyat v. Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Digested by: Oñas, Arlene Marie

A and W were married on September 16, 1965. During their marriage, A

acquired several real properties, including a 700-square meter parcel of
land located at San Jose del Monte, Bulacan which was bought on
November 17, 1991. The deed of sale over the said property was signed by A
alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the deed of sale was B.
When Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject property was issued,
however, it was made under the name of "A married to B”.

B remained married to N. They were married on October 15, 1975. N was

alive, and his marriage to B subsisted and was never annulled.

On June 7, 1998, A died intestate. W filed a Petition for Cancellation of title

over the subject property. W alleged that she was the surviving spouse of A;
that the TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name of "A
married to B"; that based on the Marriage Contract, B was still married to
N; and that B could not have been married to A. Thus, W prayed that the
title be cancelled and that a new certificate of title be made out in A’s name,
with her as the spouse indicated.

On the other hand, B denied specifically that the subject property was
acquired by A and W during their marriage. B claimed that she alone
bought the subject property using her personal funds; that she and A were

113
married on September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a married
couple; and that their union produced a son, who was born on April 1, 1990.

Can B be included or named in the TCT as A’s spouse?

Suggested answer:
No, B cannot be included or named in the TCT as A’s spouse.

The parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage

certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union and it
indicates that A was married to W, while B was married to N and both
marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject
property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be
said that A and B were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be
said that they have a common-law relationship at all.

Our law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community
of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case
law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and

114
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage.

Thus, B cannot be included or named in the TCT as A’s spouse; the right
and privilege belonged to W alone.

115
 Abanag v. Mabute
A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011
Digested by: Arcelli Onod

X, an unmarried woman, met Y, a Court stenographer at Singles for Christ.

They started dating and subsequently became sweethearts. Y frequently
visited X at her boarding house and also at her parents’ residence. Y
proposed marriage to X and they eventually lived together in a rented room
near Y’s office. X became pregnant but suffered a miscarriage. When they
separated, X filed an administrative complaint against Y.

Does the administrative complaint have a legal basis?

Suggested answer:
No. Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and
has maintained an amorous relation with a woman equally unmarried has
nothing to do with his public employment. The sexual liaison is between
two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a natural effect
of the physical intimacy. There appears no law which penalizes or
prescribes the sexual activity of two unmarried persons.

The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or

shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to

116
constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.

The sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent were
consensual. Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting
adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit
behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a
man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any
impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor
an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.

117
 Wassmer v. Velez,
G.R. No. L-20089, Dec. 26, 1964
By Oropel, Oliver John R.

X promised to marry Y and they proceeded with all the preparation and
publicity. When the wedding day came, X did not appear nor was ever
heard from again. Y sued X for damages and the trial court ruled in favor of
Y. X appealed, arguing that the said judgment was contrary to law because
there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of
promise to marry. Is the contention of X tenable?

Suggested answer:
No, his contention is not tenable.

Under Art. 21 of the New Civil Code, any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

While a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, this

case is not just a mere breach of a promise to marry. To formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out
of it when it is about to be solemnized, is contrary to good customs.
Therefore, X must be liable for damages under Art. 21 of the New Civil
Code.

118
 Baksh v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 97336, Feb. 19, 1993
Digested by: Pañares

Doctrine: Heart Balm suit

MARILOU T. GONZALES was 22 years old, single, Filipino, on the other

hand, GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, is an Iranian national exchange
student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.

The latter courted and proposed to marry GONZALES which she accepted
on the condition that they would get married. The petitioner forced her to
live with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude
started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her then, she filed a
complaint. Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement as he was
already married to someone.

Private respondent (Gonzales) then prayed for judgment ordering the

petitioner to pay her damages, reimbursement for actual
expenses,attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable.

Is the petitioner liable to pay damages for the alleged Breach of Promise to
marry?

119
Suggested answer:
Marriage is a special contract. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable. The reason therefore is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: "That breach
of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case
of De Jesus v. Syquia (58 Phil. 866 [1933]). The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
states . . ." This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article
21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books (Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978]).

120
 Espinosa v. Omana,
A.C. No. 9081, Oct. 12, 2011
Digested by: Papas

Spouses X and Y sought Atty. O’s legal advice on whether they could legally
live separately and dissolve their marriage. Atty. O then prepared and
notarized a document entitled “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay” which sets
terms and conditions relating to the dissolution of their marriage.

Is the “Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay” valid and binding?

Suggested answer:
No.

This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that
a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Atty. O did in this
case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, the Court cited a number of cases where the
lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in
this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which
permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with
another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying a document
entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from

121
each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and
obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action
that they might have against each other; preparing a document authorizing
a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again,
renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other; and
preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.

122
Formal & Essential Requisites
Consent
Republic v. Albios
G.R. No. 198780, Oct. 16, 2013
Digested by: Parcon, Junfe S.

W married F, an American citizen. Two years after their marriage, W filed a

petition before the RTC for declaration of nullity of marriage and alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they had been separated and have
never lived as husband and wife, they never really had any intention of
living as a couple or establish a family, their purpose is for her to acquire
American citizenship and that their marriage was one made for
convenience and was in jest, therefore null and void.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC which found that the
said marriage is void ab initio, on the ground that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. Will the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
of W prosper? Is the act of W in marrying F to obtain American citizenship
constitutes fraud, hence will render the marriage voidable?

Suggested answer:
No. The petition will not prosper.

A marriage may only be declared void or voidable under the grounds

provided by law. No law declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the

123
acquisition of foreign citizenship. So long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void nor voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

It has been settled that only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
NCC may constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous
conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of
pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud
as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.

Thus, while the avowed purpose of marriage under our law is for the couple
to establish a conjugal and family life, the possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with the
law, nor the marriage be voidable on the ground that it was for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship as it is not among the
circumstances listed under the law as a valid ground for fraud.

124
 Morigo v. People
GR No. 145226, Feb. 6, 2004
Digested by: Perez, Shana Alexandra P.

Michael and Chloe were board mates in Bohol. After years without contact,
Chloe send a card from Singapore and it was then they exchange letters and
eventually became sweethearts. They married each other by just signing a
marriage contract on their own. When Chloe went to work to Canada, she
obtained a divorce decree. Michael now married Linda in the Philippines.
The former filed a for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. A case for
bigamy was filed against Michael. He contended that his marriage with
Chloe was void ab initio due to the absence of the solemnizing officer and
that he is not guilty of Bigamy.
Is Michael’s contention correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes, Michael’s contention is correct.

Article 3 of the Family code provides that a marriage ceremony which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. As
enumerated in Article 4, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35.

125
In the case at bench, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. There
was no valid marriage transpired and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity.

Hence, Michael and Chloe’s marriage is void ab initio and he is not liable
for the crime of Bigamy.

126
Marriage License
Bandies v. Baylon-Bandies
G.R. No. 243122, Feb. 4, 2019
Digested by: Ponce, Junalyn S.

(Cannot state the facts as the full-text of this case cannot be found. A notice
of decision/resolution was only found from the website of the Supreme
Court - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/1896/)

Ruling:
For a marriage to be considered void on the ground of absence of
a marriage license, the law requires that such absence be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification to that
effect from the local civil registrar.

In this case, records show that petitioner and respondent's marriage

certificate bears Marriage License No. 0006386. Moreover, the local civil
registrar's certification did not categorically state that no marriage license
was issued to petitioner and respondent; instead, she only certified that
Marriage License No. 00063866 could not be found in the archives.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals is correct in upholding the validity of the

marriage of the petitioner to the respondent.

127
 Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Digested by: Regala, Mary Licel I.

PN was married to TB on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage, were

born AN, BN, CN, DN and EN (petitioner). TB was shot by PN resulting in
her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months after the death, PN and
certain NB (respondent) got married without any marriage license. In lieu
of the marriage license, PN and NB executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, PN died in a car accident. After their father’s death, he
children filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of PN to
NB alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect the petitioners’ successional rights.

a. Are PN and NB exempted from obtaining a marriage license

claiming to have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years under the Family Code?
b. May the children (petitioners) assail the validity of the
marriage of their father (PN) to NB even after PN’s death?

Suggested answers:
a. No, PN and NB are not exempted from obtaining a marriage
license.

128
The five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the
years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is,
unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.

In the case at bar, from the time PN’s first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with responded, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that PN and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both PN and NB had started living with each other has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law.

The marriage between PN and NB is therefore not exempted from

obtaining a marriage license.

b. Yes, the children may assail the validity of the marriage of PN and
NB even after PN’s death

129
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. Therefore, being good for no legal purpose,
its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either
or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts.

130
 Manzano v. Sanchez,
A.M. No. MTJ 00-1329, March 8, 2001
Digested by: Reyes, Sarah Patricia P.

C, complainant, and her husband, H, got married on May 21, 1966 in

Caloocan City. Subsequently on March 22, 1993, H contracted another
marriage before R, the respondent Judge. When R officiated the marriage,
he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated." On the basis of this, C filed an administrative case against R
for ignorance of the law. Is the second marriage valid?

Suggested answer:
No. The second marriage is not valid.

R demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and

bigamous marriage. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who
have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each
other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case, the Supreme Court ruled.

131
 Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013
Digested by: Reyes, Robin R.

An administrative case from the Office of the Court Administrator

propelled the judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cebu City.

Positive testimonies were given regarding the solemnization of marriages of

some couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The
contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the
same day the marriage was solemnized.

The arguments of the judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the
marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer
especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the
contrary.

Was there gross ignorance of the law committed by judges in this case?

Suggested answer::
Yes.

The Supreme Court held in People v. Jansen that the solemnizing officer is
not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been

132
duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties
had fulfilled the requirements of law.

However, the Supreme Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas that "the
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible
superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the
solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.

The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab

initio. The actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding
the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the
proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In
Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, the Court said that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance
of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the
marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage
without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

133
 De Castro v. De Castro
G.R. No. 160172, Feb. 13, 2008
Digested by: Roa, Vanessa

H and W became a couple in 1991 and applied for a marriage license in

1994. When they went back to the Office of the Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
wedding despite absence of the marriage license, they executed an affidavit
dated March 13, 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for 5 years. They got married on the same day. However, they did
not live together as husband and wife. In November 1995, W gave birth to a
daughter, and supported the child on her own. W then filed a complaint for
support against H before the RTC. W alleged that she is married to H and
that the latter has a responsibility or obligation to financially support her as
his wife and their child. H denied that they are married and claimed that
the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a
fake. Is the contention of H correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes, H is correct.

Article 3 of the Family Code provides the formal requisites of marriage:

1. Authority if the solemnizing officer;
2. A valid marriage license;
3. A marriage ceremony

134
In the case at bar, the falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of W and H is void ab initio. However, H is entitled

to support.

135
 Republic v. Dayot,
G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008
Digested by: Rodriguez, Gericah May

Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years. On July
1993, Jose filed a petition for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and
his consent was secured through fraud. The Trial Court dismissed Jose’s
petition. The Court of Appeals indubitably established that Jose and Felisa
have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage on November 1986. Is the marriage between Jose and Felisa
valid?

Suggested answer:
No. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Although the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, it cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage
is void ab initio.

136
 Santiago v. People
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
Digested by: Rufin, Desiree Mae O.

Santiago is being convicted of bigamy when she married Santos during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Galang. She averred that for there to
be a conviction for bigamy, Santos’ second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution ; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

As indicated in their Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was celebrated

without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long
before the celebration of their marriage.” However, Santiago contended
that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated
without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code. She asserted that she
and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior
to their marriage.

Is the marriage of Santiago and Santos valid in accordance with Article 34

of the Family Code?

Suggested answer:
No. The marriage is void due to the lack of a marriage license. The evidence
on record shows that Santiago and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not

137
have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them
lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Thus, they
cannot validly use Article 34 of the Family Code as an exemption from the
marriage license requirement.

138
 Sevilla v. Cardenas
G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006
Digested by: Ruiz, Lorenzo O.

In a Complaint filed by X before the RTC, he claimed that through

machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Y and the
latter's father, he and Y went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Y
caused him and Y to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to X, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Y and never did they obtain any marriage license
from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer. Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the
validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the
marriage void ab initio.

For her part, Y refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and X
were married civilly and in a church ceremony thereafter at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the
local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. Hence, X is
estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.

However, the Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan,
identified the Certificates issued the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that
their office failed to locate the book wherein the marriage license may have
been registered despite diligent search.

139
Is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License as appearing in
the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare
their marriage as null and void ab initio?

Suggested answer:
No.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by

affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of the
marriage license. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for
the said logbook, it cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The
courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

140
Marriage Ceremony
Republic v. Olaybar,
GR No. 189538, Feb. 10, 2014
Digested by: Hannah Sabal

X requested from (NSO) a (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her

marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Z, a Korean National,
on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and
claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as
well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

RTC granted in favour X. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed
to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage
contract.

Y however, moved for the reconsideration of the Decision on the grounds

that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries
in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring
the marriage void ab initio.

141
Is granting the cancellation of “all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract” is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio?

Suggested answer:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in
1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to

show the existence of marriage. X showed by overwhelming evidence that
no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established
that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine

142
the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial
court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to
reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing
the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.

143
 Ronulo v. People
G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014
Digested by: Salubre, Paulyn

A marriage is supposed to happen between Joey Umadac and Claire

Bingayen on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, the officiating priest refused to marry the
couple due to failure to secure the marriage license. As a recourse, the
couple together with their parents and guests proceeded to the Independent
Church of Filipino Christians, also known as Aglipayan Church and
requested the Aglipayan priest to perform the ceremony. The couple
informed the latter as to the absence of the marriage certificate yet the
priest agreed and still proceeded with the ceremony. He conducted the
ceremony in the presence of the groom, bride, their parents and guests.
Apparently, an information was received by Ronulo charging him of
violating the law by performing an illegal marriage ceremony. Ronulo
entered the plea of “not guilty” and argued that the ceremony he conducted
is a mere “blessing” to the couple and not a marriage ceremony since there
is no marriage certificate presented.

Is Ronulo’s argument correct?

Suggested answer:
No, Ronulo’s argument is incorrect.

Article 6 of the Family Code expressly states that there will no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required,

144
however it shall be necessary for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife. The minimum standards on determining whether a marriage
ceremony has been conducted are: (1) the presence of the contracting
parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and; (2) the
declaration must be witnessed by at least two witnesses of legal age.

In the present case, it is obvious that a marriage ceremony was conducted.

All the minimum requirements set forth under the law was present. Firstly,
contracting parties was present during the performance; and secondly,
there were many people of legal age witnessed the exchanged of vows. More
so, the issues of solemnization rites of marriages is as of no moment
because it was clearly stated under the law that no prescribed form of
ceremony is required. Lastly, the absence of marriage certificate is not vital
in determining the legality of the marriage ceremony. Thus, the “blessing”
argued by Ronulo is already considered as a marriage ceremony.

145
Authority of Solemnising Officer

Keuppers, v. Murcia,
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 3, 2018
Digested by: Samad, Azisa

Principle: A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of

his territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family Code, and is guilty
of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. He should be properly sanctioned.

Question:
Rosalinda and Peter went to the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City
to apply for a marriage license because they wanted to get married before
Peter's departure on May 22, 2008 so that he could bring the marriage
certificate with him back to Germany. Julie, an employee of the LCRO,
explained the process for securing the license, and apprised them that it
would be virtually impossible to solemnize their marriage before May 22,
2008. Julie then handed a note with the advice for the couple to proceed to
DLS Travel and Tours in Sandawa, Matina, Davao City to look for Lorna.
Lorna assured that the couple would immediately get the original as well as
the NSO copies of the marriage certificate. Judge Murcia solemnized the
marriage on May 19, 2008 in the premises of the DLS Travel and Tours in
Davao City. The couple was surprised to find erroneous entries in the
marriage certificate particularly stating "Office of the MTCC Judge, Island
Garden City of Samal" as the place of the solemnization of the marriage

146
although the marriage had been solemnized in the office of the DLS Travel
and Tours in Davao City.
Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction.

By agreeing to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction

and at a place that had nothing to do with the performance of his duties as a
Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social
institution of marriage.

147
 Mayor Corpuz, Jr. v. People
G.R. Nos. 212656-57, Nov. 23, 2016
Digested by: Samson, Frances C.

Mr. X is a mayor facing two counts of Falsification of Public Documents for

allegedly falsifying the Certificates of Marriage of A&B, and C&D, certifying
therein that it was he who solemnized the said marriages when in fact it
was Mr. Y, their Local Civil Registrar. May the issue on the validity of the
marriages of A&B and C&D due to the lack of a formal requisite which is an
authorized solemnizing officer, be raised in the criminal proceeding?

Suggested answer:
No. The validity of the marriage cannot be collaterally attacked.

Under our laws and jurisprudence, validity of marriages may only be

questioned in a direct action. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.

In declaring that the one who solemnized the subject marriages had no
authority to do so would indirectly result in the declaration that said
marriages are void.

148
 Beso v. Daguman,
MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000
Digested by: Sayson, Karl Benedict N.

A and B got married, solemnized by MCTC Judge C in his residence in JPR

Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. After the wedding, the husband B
abandoned the wife A without any reason at all. Thereafter, A went to
Calbayog City and wrote the city Civil Registrar to inquire regarding their
Marriage Contract. To A’s surprise, she was informed by the Local Civil
Registrar of Calbayog City that her marriage was not registered, so she
wrote to Judge C to inquire. To A’s surprise again, she was informed that
the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by B and that no copy was
retained by Judge C. A then filed a complaint against Judge C, alleging that
the latter committed acts prejudicial to her interest such as: (1) Solemnizing
their marriage outside his jurisdiction; (2) Negligence in not retaining a
copy and not registering the marriage before the office of the local Civil
Registrar.

Judge C answered that during the date of the marriage, without prior
appointment, A and B unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent,
urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there,
first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to
fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, to go to another town
would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a
solemnizing officer and witnesses or sponsors; third, if the parties go
beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, A feared it would complicate
her employment abroad. Judge C argued that he is in good faith as he was

149
leaning on the side of liberality so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married. Was Judge C’s act of solemnizing
the marriage of A and B outside his jurisdiction proper?

Suggested answer:
No.
As provided in Article 8 of the Family Code, a marriage can be held outside
the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at
the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or (3)
upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either A or B was at the point of death
or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent Judge C that the marriage be solemnized
outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Considering that respondent Judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of
Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in Calbayog City.

If at all, Judge C’s acts only tend to degrade the revered position enjoyed by
marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country.

150
 Aranes v. Occiano
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002
Digested by: Servila, Shyril Ann A.

A filed a complaint against Judge O for Ignorance of the Law. Judge O

apparently, solemnized her marriage w/D outside of his jurisdiction and in
the absence of a marriage license.

Judge O in defense said that he carefully inspected the documents and

refused to conduct the ceremony and advised the parties to reset the
wedding after they have complied w/the marriage license. However due to
earnest pleas, visitors in attendance, preparations made, and of fear that
postponing the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of D, who
just suffered from a stroke, Judge O solemnized the marriage on the
assurance that they will comply w/the needed license that same day. Is the
judge guilty of solemnizing the marriage w/o a duly issued marriage license
and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Judge O should be held liable for administrative liability.

His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion, but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

151
In Articulo Mortis Marriages

Hilario v. Miranda,
G.R. No. 196499, Nov. 28, 2018
Digested by: Sesante, Monyeen Marie T.

Days before his death on Aug 20, 1974, A was already confined in X
Hospital. At 10 am that day, his neighbor and friend visited him stating that
he was not only seriously ill, but was in a comatose condition, could no
longer talk and was hovering between life and death or at the point of death
so to speak, and in his death bed, was his livein partner, S. Later at 4 pm, A
expired. M, the illegitimate daughter of A and S asserts that during his
lifetime, A married S on August 20, 1974, as shown in the marriage contract
and that the alleged marriage took place at San Nicolas Parish and allegedly
solemnized by one Rev. Fr. N.

Can the alleged marriage between A and S be considered as one done in

Articulo Mortis?

Suggested answer:
No. A cannot have given his consent freely.

Under Article 27 of the Family Code, in case either or both of the

contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid
even if the ailing party subsequently survives. Provided, the essential

152
elements of a valid marriage under Article 2 (legal capacity and consent
freely given) are present.

Whether the marriage took place inside X Hospital or in the church of San
Nicolas Parish, such marriage could not be considered legally valid for the
simple reason that one of the essential elements of a valid marriage which
is consent, to be freely given, was totally wanting or not present as said A
was then unconscious and under the comatose condition and was hovering
between life and death.

153
Marriages in Foreign Lands
Valid Bigamous Marriages

Republic v. Quiñonez
G.R. No. 237412, Jan. 6, 2020
Digested by: Sumalinog, April B.

After four years of marriage and begot 2 children, the wife (W) asked
husband’s (H) permission to travel to Manila to visit some relatives using
the money given by her father who received his retirement pay. The couple
constantly communicated with each other for the first three months
thru their cell phone. Later H resigned and transferred to another city
where he worked also as a security guard in the Hall of Justice.
He told W that as soon as she returns from Manila they would be living
together in said city, together with their children. Thereafter their
communication tapered off until it ceased altogether. Initially H thought
that W merely lost her cell phone so he inquired from her relatives in the
city where they first resided after their marriage. Someone informed H that
W was then already cohabiting with another man and would no longer
come back, out of shame.

For almost ten years H diligently tried to locate his wife, in the Visayas,
Metro Manila, and in some Southern Luzon provinces where she had been
seen according to her relatives. H also constantly communicated with W’s
relatives in their home city asking for information on her whereabouts.
When all his efforts proved futile, he decided to file a Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive death of W before the Regional Trial Court

154
(RTC) in order to dissolve their marriage and enable him to marry again.
The RTC granted his petition and declared that W is presumptively dead
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.

Subsequently, the Solicitor General as counsel of the Republic of the

Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari to annul said Judgment on the
ground that H’s efforts were insufficient to give rise to a “well-founded
belief” that she is already dead. The Court of Appeals (CA) however
sustained the ruling of the RTC, declaring W as presumptively dead. Is the
CA correct?

Suggested answer:
No. There appears to be no well-founded belief of the absentee spouse's
death, but only the likelihood that the absentee spouse does not want to be
found.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides for the essential requisites for a
declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 3 91, Civil Code; 2.
That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present
spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.

155
Citing the case of Cantor, the standard of "well-founded belief' is exacting;
it presupposes that the present spouse had exerted diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.

156
 Bobis v. Bobis
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Digested by : Sunico, Mary Claire Therese

Isagani contracted three marriages, first was with Maria. Without the said
marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, Isagani contracted
a second marriage with Imelda, later on, third marriage was contracted by
Isagani with certain Julia. Subsequently, Imelda filed a criminal case of
bigamy against Isagani. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the
ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Shortly, Isagani
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial court granted the motion
to suspend the criminal case.

Does subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a

previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy?

Suggested answer:
No. The subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy.

As ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before

the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of

157
being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. In addition, Article 40 of the Family Code states that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgement declaring such previous
marriage void.

In the case at bar, Isagani without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly
entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party
can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. For all legal intents and purposes
Isagani is regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with Imelda. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that Isagani entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question.

158
 Armas v. Calisterio,
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
Digested by: Tangpos, Jaime C.

X died intestate leaving several parcels of land. X was survived by M, his

wife. Thereafter, Y, the sister of X, filed a petition with the RTC claiming to
be the sole surviving heir of X, and alleged that the marriage of X and M is
bigamous because M did not secured the prior declaration of presumptive
death of her first husband, and thereby null and void. On the other hand, M
opposed and stated that her first marriage was dissolved because of her
first husband's absence, and his whereabouts being unknown for more than
eleven years before M contracted the subsequent marriage with X on May
1958, and that the law enforce during their marriage was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which took effect only on August 3, 1988.

Whether the Marriage between X and M valid notwithstanding the absence

of the Declaration of Presumptive Death?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The subsequent marriage between X and M is valid.

Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article

83 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:

159
 (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.

A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as

long as the prescribed period of absence is met.

The subsequent marriage between X and M, having been contracted during

the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of her first
husband due to its absence for eleven years.

160
 Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon
G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
Digested by: Toledo, Aubrey Angela S.

H and W contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon on April 25, 1955.

Later, on October 9, 1970, H filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a Petition to
declare W presumptively dead to which the CFI granted such petition on
December 10, 1970. Close to 13 years after his wife, W was declared
presumptively dead or on August 9, 1983, H contracted marriage with A in
Casiguran, Sorsogon. SSS cancelled the claim of A on her monthly pension
for death benefits on the basis that her marriage with H was void as it was
contracted during the subsistence of H’s marriage with W. A then protested
the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting that
her marriage with H was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful for all legal intents and purposes. Is A’s contention
tenable? Decide.

Suggested answer:
Yes. The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse
endures until annulled.

It is only the component court that can nullify the second marriage
pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the
missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. The two
marriages involved here falls under the Civil Code. Further, under the law,
a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or nu

161
either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code,
no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the absentee reappears, but no
step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by
court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance will not terminate such
marriage.

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify H and A’s marriage, A is
proclaimed to be rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of H.

162
 Celerina J. Santos vs. Ricardo T. Santos
G.R. No. 187061, Oct. 8, 2014
Digested by: Tolentino, Romil C.

On 2007, RTC declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos presumptively dead

after her husband, respondent Ricardo had filed a petition for declaration
of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. In his
petition, Ricardo alleged that when they move to Tarlac and things went
wrong with their financial status, Celerina left to work abroad as Domestic
Helper in Hong Kong and was never heard from her again; He claimed that
he exerted effort to locate Celerina; that it was 12 years from the date of his
RTC petition since Celerina left. He believed that she passed away. And in
2008 Ricardo remarried.

On the other hand, Celerina filed a petition that she learned about Ricardo’s
petition only sometimes in 2008 when she could no longer avail the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.

On the same year, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
court of appeal on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and
worked as a domestic helper abroad. It was not true that she had been
absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she left their conjugal dwelling
in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in 2008 to cohabit
with another woman. She was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to
oppose the petition declaring her presumptive dead.

163
Whether or not the declaration of appearance of a presumptively dead
spouse in accordance with Article 42 of the family Code is the proper
remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgement declaring presumptive
death.

Suggested answer:
An action for Annulment of judgement is proper when the declaration of
presumptive death is obtained fraudulently. It is the remedy when RTC’s
judgement, order or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner. Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance
under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is
actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive
death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death. She added
that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did
not disappear in the first place.She insisted that an action for annulment of
judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is...
obtained fraudulently.

164
 Republic v. Orcelino-Villanueva
G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
Digested by: Ungab, Junimark O.

Question:
Is an affidavit of reappearance necessary for the termination of the
subsequent marriage entered into by the present spouse in cases where a
declaration of presumptive death fraudulently obtained?

Suggested answer
No.

Article 42 of the Family Code provides, the subsequent marriage referred to

in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording
of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A
sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.

In cases where a declaration of presumptive death was fraudulently

obtained, the subsequent marriage shall not only be terminated, but all
other effects of the declaration nullified by a successful petition for
annulment of judgment. The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of

165
presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the
judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage
but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and
the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would
not suffice.

166
 Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621, Dec. 10, 2013
Digested by: Valde, Glean Myrrh A.

In 1997, H married W, and lived together as husband and wife in their

conjugal dwelling. In 1998, H left W after a violent quarrel. After more than
four years of not seeing or hearing from H, W filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of H. W claimed that she had a well-
founded belief that H was already dead. W alleged that she had inquired
from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as
her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding H, she
also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she
went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved
futile, prompting her to file the petition in court. The RTC granted her
petition. The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari filed by
the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General OSG. The CA dismissed the petition. Dissatisfied with the
ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari. Should
the petition for the declaration of presumptive death be granted?

Suggested answer:
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are
four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

167
 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years,
or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

A “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the

unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or
procedure in determining the same. W’s alleged “well-founded” belief fell
short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It
can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her
consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were
unintentional.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she
seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their

neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate
Jerry.

168
 Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was
there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief
other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-
laws about her husband’s whereabouts.

In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-
laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because
her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead.

169
 Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.
G.R. No. 199194, Feb. 10, 2016
Digested by: Valladores, Ara Joy C.

X filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife Y. In his

testimony, he said that he first met Y in 1991. They later became
sweethearts and on 1996, they got married in civil rites. However, they lived
together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Y went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months,
he did not receive any communication from Y. He likewise had no idea
about her whereabouts. While still abroad, X tried to contact Y’s parents,
but failed. X returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired
from Y’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not
know where she was. Because of these, X had to presume that his wife Y
was already dead. He filed the Petition so he could contract another
marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Is the alleged efforts of
X in locating his missing wife sufficiently support a “Well-founded belief”
that X’s absent wife (Y) is probably dead?

Suggested answer:
No.

The “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is

complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts
had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead.

170
In the case of Republic v. Cantor, the Court held that the present spouse
(Maria Cantor) merely conducted a “passive search” because she simply
made unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and
friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree of diligence and
reasonable search required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to
present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made
inquiries especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends,
(2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse’s purported
disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the
present spouse’s evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse
chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed
dead.

171
 Republic v. Catubag
G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018
Digested by: Darryl M. Vidad

Doctrines/ Legal Bases:

(1) Under Art. 41 of the FC, a petition for declaration of presumptive death
is a summary proceeding.
(2) Art 253 of the same Code likewise characterizes proceedings under Art.
41 as summary proceedings. (View in connection with Petition for
Certiorari via R65)

Question:
H and W are married in 2003 and had 2 children together. Sometime in
2006, while H was working abroad, W left their house and never returned.
H then flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. H inquired with
close friends and relatives and even sought the help of Bombo Radyo to
broadcast the fact of his wife’s disappearance. After almost seven (7) years
of waiting and searching, H filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife
declared presumptively dead. RTC granted the petition but the Solicitor
General elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65, contending that H failed to establish a well-founded belief that his wife
was already dead. However, CA dismissed the petition saying that SolGen
should have filed an MR with the RTC. Is the CA correct?

172
Suggested answer:
No. The CA is not correct in saying that an MR should have been filed first
in the RTC before resorting the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.

Petition for Declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse is a

summary proceeding pursuant to Art 41(2) of the Family Code in relation to
Art 253 of the same code. Consequently, parties cannot seek
reconsideration, nor appeal decisions in summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code because by express mandate of law, judgments
rendered thereunder are immediately final and executory under Art 247 of
the Family Code.

In the present case, a declaration of presumptive death of the absentee

spouse in governed by summary proceedings where MR cannot be filed as
the judgments are rendered immediately finals and executory, hence, the
CA is incorrect in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari of the SolGen
without filing MR first.

173
Marriages after a 1st Marriage

Castillo v. Castillo
GR No. 189607, Apr. 18, 2016
Digested by: Ybañez

X married Y in May 1972 without a valid marriage license and later on X

married again with Z in January 1979. When Z knew about the previous
marriage, he filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to
declare his marriage with X as void for being bigamous. The RTC grant the
petition and declare the marriage void for being bigamous because there
was no Judicial Declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the first
marriage when X contracted the second marriage with Z. The Court of
Appeals (CA), however, reverse the decision of the RTC saying that there is
no need for the Judicial Declaration of absolute nullity of marriage which is
void from the beginning for X to contract a second marriage because during
this time the Civil Code is the prevailing law and not the Family code. Is
Court of Appeals correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The Court of Appeals is correct.

Under the Civil Code, the Judicial declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage is not required to contract a second marriage if the first one is
void from the beginning if it had been contracted after the effectivity of the
Family Code then the Judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
required.

174
In the instant case, the marriage was contracted before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Therefore, there is no need for X to secure a Judicial
Declaration of absolute nullity of marriage to contract a second marriage.

175
 Villarica v. Villarica
G.R. No. 210764, April 15, 2015
Digested by: Yu Vega, CM

H and W are husband and wife. They were married on two occasions. The
first marriage was conducted in a civil ceremony in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
This marriage was registered with the local civil registrar of Meycauayan.
Sixteen (16) days after, the same parties, using the same marriage license,
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a church wedding held in Greenhills,
Mandaluyong. This second marriage, on the other hand, was registered
with the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong. W sought the nullification of
the second marriage. The RTC declared the second marriage between H
and W as null and void on the ground that H is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential martial obligations.

When H asked the civil registrar of Mandaluyong to enter into its civil
registry the decision of the RTC, the civil registrar of Mandaluyong refused
on the ground that the first marriage between H and W still existed as the
same was not a subject of the RTC decision. As such, H moved for the
amendment of the RTC decision to include the cancellation of their first
marriage. The RTC then ordered the local civil registrar of Meycauayan as
well as the National Statistics Office to cancel from their Book of Entries the
first marriage of the parties. The CA affirmed the RTC Order.

W sought to nullify the RTC decision pertaining to the cancellation of their

first marriage. W argued that a subsequent petition must be filed for the

176
nullification of the earlier marriage between the parties on grounds other
than psychological incapacity.

Is the argument of W correct?

Suggested answer:
No, the argument of W is not correct.

Substantial justice and equity allow the amendment of the trial courts
decision in declaring the parties' civil marriage null and void, and in
canceling the civil registry entries of both civil and church marriages of the
parties. Jurisprudence provides that considering the two marriages were
celebrated just several days apart, it would thus be pointless to conduct
further or other proceedings to nullify the first marriage which was not
included in the decision of the RTC, or to determine the existence of other
grounds for the purpose of declaring the first marriage as null and void.

Also, it would be the height of absurdity to consider H, on the one hand, as

psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential duties of a married
man insofar as his second marriage to W is concerned while, on the other
hand, consider him capable of doing so if it is to take account their first
marriage, which was celebrated a mere 16 days earlier.

It being absurd to have the church wedding annulled while retaining the
civil wedding and allowing it to subsist, the petition of W is denied.

177
 People vs. Odtuhan
GR No. 191566, July 17, 2013
Digested by: Figues, Maria Helen P.

After 13 years of marriage with J, E married N. A year later, E filed a

petition for annulment of his marriage with J. The court granted his
petition and declared his marriage void ab initio. Subsequently, N died. E
was charged with bigamy. He moved to quash on the ground that facts do
not constitute bigamy because a declaration of nullity of marriage with J
was obtained. Will the case for bigamy prosper?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The case for bigamy will prosper.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a

second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is

178
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Upon marrying N before obtaining first a judicial declaration of nullity of

his marriage with J, E committed bigamy.

179
 Capili v. People
GR No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Digested by: Abad, Nikki Noreen A

James is charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City for
allegedly contracting a second marriage while still married to Karla. In a
separate civil case, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring
the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between James
and Shirley on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
James then filed a Motion to Dismiss before the RTC of Pasig City praying
for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the
ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had
already been declared void by the RTC of Antipolo City. Does the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy?

Suggested answer:
No.
It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to
him until extinguished as provided by law.

It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by James from the
time he contracted the second marriage with Shirley. Thus, the finality of
the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not
impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

180
 Montanez v. Cipriano,
GR No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012
Digested by: Abangan, Stephanie V.

B was married with H1 in 1976, then subsequently to H2 in 1983 while the

first marriage was still subsisting. A petition for the annulment of B’s
marriage with H1 was filed on the ground of psychological incapacity of H1,
where the court later on declared the marriage null and void in 2003.

On 2004, information for bigamy was filed against B. Through a Motion to

Quash, the respondent alleged that her marriage with H1 had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003, thus there was no more marriage to speak
of prior to her marriage to H2 on 1983; that the basic element of the crime
of bigamy is wanting. Then further upon a Motion for Reconsideration, she
claimed that since she contracted her marriage in 1976, i.e., before the
Family Code, the Mercado Ruling (where the Court ruled that the
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated) was not applicable; and that that Article
40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this
will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of
nullity of a completely void prior marriage. The trial court dismissed the
information for bigamy.

1. Did the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justify the

dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against B?

181
 2. Was B correct in her contention as to the non-retroactive effect of the
Family Code?

Suggested answers:
1. No.

In the case of Tenebro v. CA,although the judicial declaration of the nullity

of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects.

In the case at bar, at the time the respondent contracted the second
marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally
dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact
that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy,
since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.

2. No.

In the case of Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or

182
acquired rights." It further explained that the fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial

declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his
cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage
and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
bigamy

Doctrine: What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he

contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

183
 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 150758, Feb. 18, 2004
Digested by: Abellon, Caryl Mae B.

Mr. X married Ms. A on 1990 which was officiated by Judge Y of Lapu-Lapu

City. A year thereafter, Mr. X informed Ms. A that he had been previously
married to Ms. B since 1986 and even showed a photocopy of the a
marriage contract between him and Ms. B. Invoking the previous marriage,
he left Ms. A for him to cohabit with Ms. B.

In 1993, Mr. X contracted another marriage with Ms. C. Upon the

knowledge of Ms. A of such marriage, she verified from Ms. B if indeed she
was married to Mr. X. Upon Ms. B’s confirmation in a letter that she is the
wife of Mr. X, Ms. A filed a case of bigamy against Mr. A.

Mr. A denied that he married to Ms. B. He alleged that he merely signed the
marriage contract to enable her to get the allotment from his employment’s
office and that upon his request from his brother for verification from the
Civi Register, his brother said that no record of such marriage was found.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding Mr. X guilty of

bigamy, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Mr. X then filed a petition for review contending that he should not be
guilty for bigamy because the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ms.
A on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacted from the celebration

184
of the marriage negating one of the requisites of bigamy - that the
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

Is the contention of Mr. X valid?

Suggested answer:

No. A person who contracts a subsequent marriage during the subsistence

of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy.

As held in the case of Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
ruled that insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned, there is no
reason to distinguish a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely
because its a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The State
seeks to protect the institution of marriage in recognition of its sacrosanct
character as a special contract between the spouses which its
permanence should be upheld. As soon as the second marriage was
contracted during the subsistence of a valid first marriage, the crime of
bigamy has already been consummated.

In this case, the declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Mr. X
and Ms.A on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
such marriage lacks the essential requisites for its validity. All the essential
and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were present, namely
their legal capacity and consent, and authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage license and marriage ceremony, respectively. Although its judicial

185
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as being husband and wife, the law still produces legal
consequences prior to the finality of the decision.

Therefore, upon the celebration of the marriage between Mr. X and Ms. A
during the subsistence of his marriage with Ms. B, Mr. X has already
committed bigamy.

186
Part 3, Book 1. Book on Void,
Defective, & Voidable Marriages

187
Legal Personality to File

Fujiki v. Marinay
GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Digested by: Acaylar, Franz Lawrence

F is a Japanese national who married M, a Filipina, in the Philippines. M

was not able to go with F to Japan. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other. M thereafter met S, another Japanese citizen. Without the first
marriage being dissolved, M and S were married in the Philippines. S
brought M to Japan. However, M allegedly suffered physical abuses from S.
She left S and started to contact F. F and M were able to reestablish their
relationship. F then helped M obtain a judgment from the family court in
Japan declaring her marriage with S void on the ground of bigamy.

Later in the Philippines, F filed a petition for Judicial Recognition of the

Foreign Judgment before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the petition
maintaining that F lacks personality to file the petition based on Sec 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC on the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which states that: “a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.”

It is of the RTC’s view that “the husband or the wife,” in this case is either S
or M, and not F.

Rule on the matter.

188
Suggested answer:
The view of RTC is misplaced.

The rule in A.M. No.02-11-10-SC that only the husband or the wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy. When Sec. 2(a) states that it may be filed
“solely by the husband or the wife” - it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage.Under the law, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the marriage of S and M were never valid in the first
place.

Additionally, in the Philippines, for courts to recognize foreign judgment

relating to the status of marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as
a fact under the Rules of Court. To hold that A.M No. 02-11-10-SC applies
to a petition for recognition is absurd because it will re-litigate the case
anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing judgments, which is to “limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.”

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of

the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides for who may file such petition, to
wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has

189
 been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.

In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the legal
personality to file the petition.

190
 Juliano-Llave v. Republic
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
Digested by: Alipayo, Queen Anne

T married E twice, initially under the Islamic laws and, subsequently, under
a civil ceremony. Since then, E has been representing herself to the whole
world as the wife of T, and upon his death, T’s widow. In their marriage
contracts, T’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’ Z and her son A filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage between S and E for
being bigamous. They averred that T married Z on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married E in
1993. According to E, T is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and
subsequent divorce with Z is governed by the Muslim Code. Is the marriage
between S and E bigamous?

Suggested answer:
Yes. T’s prior marriage to Z has been severed by way of divorce under PD
1083,the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit E. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
"marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already
ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of T and Z.

191
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code
in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted
under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this
effect. Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the
registration of mutual consent between Z and T will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws. Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in
effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of T’s prior
marriage which subsisted at the time E married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

192
 Mallion v. Alcantara,
GR No. 141528, Oct. 31, 2006
Digested by: Alo, Reynier

X filed with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity of his
Marriage to Y on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court
denied the petition, and likewise, it was dismissed to the Court of
Appeals. X filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the regional trial court contending that his marriage to Y was null and void
to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Y filed an
answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping. Is the action of Y tenable?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the action of Y is tenable.

Under Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by

prior judgment” or “estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment
as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to
res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of
auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different cause of action.

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their

marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects

193
therein. The Court finds then that the present action for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The
petition is denied for lack of merit.

194
 Bumatay v. Bumatay
G.R. No. 191320, April 25, 2017
Digested by: Amer, Sittie Farhannah H.

A allegedly married B on January 30, 1968, when A was 16 years old. The
marriage was solemnized before Judge D, in Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Prior
to the declaration of nullity of her marriage with B on September 20, 2005,
A married C's foster father, E, on November 6, 2003.

On November 6, 2003, while B was still alive and their marriage was still
valid and subsisting, A contracted another marriage with E in Malasiqui,
Pangasinan; When A contracted her second marriage with E, A knows fully
well that her first marriage with her first husband B, who is still living up to
today, has not been legally dissolved but existing.

On August 17, 2004, C filed a Complaint-affidavit for Bigamy against A.

In her Counter-Affidavit, A claims that she learned from her children (with
B) that B had filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Sometime in 1990, she was informed by her children that B had died in
Nueva Vizcaya.

Subsequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed by Prosecutor F on

November 8, 2004.

RTC-Dagupan City issued a Decision declaring as null and void the

marriage between A and B, the RTC-Dagupan City found that no marriage
ceremony took place between A and B as it was A's sister who had married

195
B and that, in fact, the signature appearing on the marriage certificate was
not A's signature but that of her sister's. Thus, to the RTC-Dagupan City,
there being no marriage ceremony that actually took place between B and
A, their marriage was void from the very beginning.

A filed a Motion to Quash the Information. Her motion was hinged on the
argument that the first element of the crime of bigamy - that is, that the
offender has been previously legally married - is not present. In support, A
attached a copy of the RTC-Dagupan City Decision declaring the marriage
between her and B void ab initio on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony between them and what transpired was a marriage by proxy.

RTC-San Carlos granted A's Motion to Quash, since the first marriage has
been declared void ab initio, there is no first marriage to begin with in
determining the foremost element of bigamy. The CA affirmed the RTC-San
Carlos' Order.

Decide the case.

Suggested answer:
C has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case. The
People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can represent the
People in criminal proceedings before this Court. And since the first
marriage has been declared void ab initio, there is no first marriage to begin
with in determining the foremost element of bigamy – such declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. The accused in this case

196
was, under the eyes of the law, never married to B at the time she
contracted the marriage with E.

Settled is the rule that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest, " who, in turn, is one "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to
the avails of the suit." Within this context, "interest" means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. To
be clear, real interest refers to a present substantial interest, and not a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
Here, the record is replete with indications that C's natural parents are
unknown and she was merely raised as the "foster daughter" of E, without
having undergone the process of legal adoption.

C was described as "claiming to be the adopted child of E but cannot

present legal proof to this effect". Finally, even in her own Reply C merely
denotes herself as "the only child of the late E," without, however,
presenting or even indicating any document or proof to support her claim
of personality or legal standing.

197
 Ablaza v. Republic
G.R. No. 158298, Aug. 11, 2010
Digested by: James M. Andrin

Petitioner X is brother of A. X alleged that the marriage between A and B

had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being
issued only on January 9, 1950. X insisted that his being the surviving
brother of A who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the
real properties acquired by A before his death, thereby making him a real
party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the
validity of the marriage between A and B at any time, even after the death
of A, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition for the reason that the petitioner is not a
party to the marriage which is affirmed by CA.

Is petitioner X, a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration

of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the
regime of the old Civil Code?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and

wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out
of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage.
Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at

198
the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the
marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains
void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in
force at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the
laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the
Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive

with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.

199
 Carlos v. Sandoval
G.R. No. 179922, Dec. 16, 2008
Digested by: Ang, Ammiel P.

X and Y are siblings who inherited parcels of land from their parents. X
died intestate. He was survived by his wife, A and their son, B. Thereafter,
the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land between them. However, Y commenced an action against A
before the court a quo with the causes of action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

In his complaint, Y asserted that the marriage between his late brother X
and wife A was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, A moved for
summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice
of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Y opposed the motion for
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing
the marriage. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of Y.

Can the nullity and annulment of a marriage be declared in a judgment on

the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment ? And may
another party initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages
aside from the spouses?

200
Suggested answer:
No.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration

of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even
judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has
been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said
Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the
trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the
spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of

marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.

With regard to the second question, the answer will be in the negative.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses
by stating:

201
 SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
(Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the
wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole
architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones
who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The
spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life
play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only
in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

202
 Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli
G.R. No. 173614, Sept. 28, 2007
Digested by: Bacalso, Hannah M.

Doctrine: The applicable law to determine the validity of two marriages is

the law in effect at the time of their celebration.

Question:
The heirs of A and B filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage of A and C , alleging that A and B were married in June 1962
and on May 1, 2004, B died. On August 26, 2004, A married C without the
requisite of a marriage license. A passed away six months later. They
argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a
woman who have been living together for at least five years without any
legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to C
and A. The heirs of A and B posited that the marriage of A to B was
dissolved only upon the latter's death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely
three months from the date of marriage of A to C. Therefore, C and A could
not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To
further their cause, the heirs raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to A’s serious illness which made its performance
impossible.

C, maintained that she and A lived together as husband and wife under one
roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted and C
sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the

203
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of
marriage between A and C

Suggested answer:
No.

Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003,
covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow
it.

The marriage of petitioner to A was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which

falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses,
not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.

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 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 167109, Feb. 6, 2007
Digested by: Bariquit, Joymee

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4,

1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States
of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years
of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months
after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope
in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since
Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner
Amor-Catalan filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of

action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was
denied.

The Regional Trial Court of Dagupan declared the marriage between

respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the
ground of bigamy. Subsequently the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

(1) Whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become
naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially
granted a divorce decree.

205
(2) Whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy

Suggested answer:
(1) The records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce. Before it can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.

(2) Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we
cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the
personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even
after the divorce decree becomes absolute.

206
 De Castro v. De Castro,
G.R. No. 160172, Feb. 13, 2008
Digested by: Vanessa Roa

H and W became a couple in 1991 and applied for a marriage license in

1994. When they went back to the Office of the Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
wedding despite absence of the marriage license, they executed an affidavit
dated March 13, 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for 5 years. They got married on the same day. However, they did
not live together as husband and wife. In November 1995, W gave birth to a
daughter, and supported the child on her own. W then filed a complaint for
support against H before the RTC. W alleged that she is married to H and
that the latter has a responsibility or obligation to financially support her as
his wife and their child. H denied that they are married and claimed that
the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a
fake. Is the contention of H correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes, H is correct.

Article 3 of the Family Code provides the formal requisites of marriage:

1. Authority if the solemnizing officer;
2. A valid marriage license;
3. A marriage ceremony

207
In the case at bar, the falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of W and H is void ab initio. However, H is entitled

to support.

208
 Garcia-Quiason v. Belen,
(Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer Quiazo. vs.
Ma. Lourdes Belen, for in behalf of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon)
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Digested by: Kimberly May Butao

X, represented by her mother Y, filed a petition for Letters of

Administration. X claims that she is a natural child of E having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents are both capacitated to
marry each other. X also impugned the validity of E’s marriage to A
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one F. Whether or not the X have
the right to impugn the marriage of E and A and whether or not the
marriage of E and A is void for being a bigamous marriage?

Suggested answer:
X has the right to impugn the validity of the marriage for E and A even after
the death of her father. X as the compulsory heir, has the cause of action for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of E and A, and
the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.

E and A’s marriage is Void. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, the
marriage shall be void from the very beginning, those bigamous or
polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41. Thus, having a legal
pediment because of the subsisting marriage of A to F, A and E’s marriage

209
being the subsequent one is a bigamous marriage and it is void from the
very beginning.

Wherefore, X was appointed to be the Administrator of her father’s

estate. A does not have any cause of action for her marriage to E is void
from the very beginning.

210
Inexistent Marriages

Morigo v. People,
GR No. 145226, Feb. 6, 2004
Digested by: Rheyz Pierce A. Campilan

A and B became sweethearts and married in the Philippines. They had no

marriage ceremony and they signed a marriage contract. Later on, B went
to Canada and acquired a divorce decree issued by the foreign court.
Believing that they have divorced, A married C. After having knowledge of
the subsequent marriage, B filed a case for bigamy against A.

Will the case prosper?

Suggested answer
No.

A marriage without a marriage ceremony makes it a void one. The mere

private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and does not require judicial declaration of nullity.

In this case, the bigamy case will not prosper since A and B were not
married under the law.

211
 Republic of the Philippines, vs. Merlinda L. Olaybar
G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
Digested by: Marie Concepcion Capoy

Olaybar, while requesting for a CENOMAR, discovered that she was already
married to a Korean National. She, thus, filed a Petition for the Cancellation
of Entries in the Marriage Contract under Rule 108 0f the Rules of Court,
especially the entries in the portion of the marriage contract containing
information about the “wife.” Olaybar impleaded the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. RTC granted the petition.
Petitioner (The Republic), however, moved for the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to
fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting
the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Is the petitioner (The Republic) correct?

Suggested answer:
No, petitioner is not correct. Rule 108 petition is allowed to correct or
cancel the entry in a registered marriage contract on the ground that the
marriage was fictitious.

212
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in
1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.

In this case, Olaybar was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that no

marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of the existence
of that marriage. Also, in filing the petition for correction of entry under
Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as
her alleged husband, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that
the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
Olaybar sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage
to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as established by the evidence. By ordering the cancellation and
correction of the portion in the marriage contract regarding the wife, the

213
trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.

214
Art. 35
Bigamy

Social Security Commission v. Edna A. Azote,

GR No. 209741, April 15, 2015
Digested by: Capute, Charlene C.

W and H, a member of the SSS, were married in civil rites and their union
produced six children born from 1985 to 1999. On April 27, 1994, H
submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with W and their three older children as
designated beneficiaries. Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, H submitted
another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as
additional beneficiaries. On January 13, 2005, H passed away. W filed her
claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It
appeared, however, from the SSS records that H had earlier submitted
another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries.
Consequently W’s claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as
beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor
children. W still filed a petition with the SSC insisting that she was the
legitimate wife of H. SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in
the forms submitted by the deceased. The SSC dismissed W’s petition for
lack of merit, citing Section 24(c) of the SS Law, it explained that although
H filed the Form E-4 designating W and their six children as beneficiaries,
he did not revoke the designation of LW as his wife-beneficiaries, and LW
was still presumed to be his legal wife. Is W entitled to the SSS benefit of H

215
considering that there was a previous subsisting marriage between H and
LW at the time of their marriage in 1982?

Suggested answer:
NO, W is not entitled to the benefits.

Under Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal
spouse of the deceased member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latter’s SSS benefits.

In the case at bar, there is a concrete proof that H contracted an earlier

marriage with LW as evidenced by their marriage contract. H even
acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4
designating LW as his spouse. It is undisputed that the second marriage of
H with W was celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in
force. For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.

Moreover, as outlined in Article 41 of the FC, W, without doubt, failed to

establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already
removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to H. Settled is the
rule that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. W could not
adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of H was either annulled

216
or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of LW’s presumptive death
before her marriage to H. What is apparent is that W was the second wife of
H. Considering that W was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of
a deceased member, thus she would not qualify under the law to be the
beneficiary of the death benefits of H.

217
 Vitangcol v. People,
G.R. No. 207406, Jan. 13, 2016
Digested by: Edgardo Arriesgado Ybanez

X married Y in July 1987. In December 1994, X married again with Z which

the latter did not know about the previous marriage of X. When Z is
cognizant of the first marriage he filed a criminal case of bigamy against X
for contracting second marriage with her without dissolving the first
marriage. As a defense, X contended that he cannot be liable for bigamy
because the first marriage is void having no evidence of the valid marriage
license. Is the contention of X correct?

Suggested answer:
No. The contention of X is incorrect.

X is still liable for bigamy because under our law a person cannot contract a
second marriage without securing a Judicial declaration of abosulte nullity
of the first marriage otherwise he will be liable for bigamy.

In this case, the absence of evidence of a valid marriage license does not
constitute a Judicial absolute nullity of the first marriage.

218
 De Guzman y Jumaquio v. People,
G.R. No. 224742, Aug. 7, 2019
Digested by: Castro, Aivy Mae R.

X and Y were married. After 13 years of marriage, X abandoned his wife and
children. Thereafter, a friend informed Y that X contracted a second
marriage with Z. Y secured a copy of X and Z's marriage contract and filed a
complaint against X for bigamy. X argued that his marriage with Y was void
because the copy of their Marriage Contract did not bear the solemnizing
officer's signature. The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to
show all the elements of bigamy and convicted X of bigamy. Is X guilty for
the crime of bigamy?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

As provided under the RPC, a person can be criminally responsible for

bigamy if:
(1) The marriage between the offender and the private
complainant is still existing;
(2) The marriage has not been legally declared to be
dissolved;
(3) The offender contracted a subsequent marriage while
his first marriage is still subsisting; and
(4) The second marriage has all the essential requisites for
its validity.

219
The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for
the purposes of remarriage. A person cannot unilaterally declare his
marriage void.

It is evident that X cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that
there was no legal impediment for him to remarry based merely on the
NSO's issuance of a Certificate of No Marriage Record. It is not enough for
X to assume that his previous marriage has been voided.

Therefore, X is guilty for the crime of bigamy.

220
 Sarto y Misalucha v. People,
G.R. No. 206284, Feb. 28, 2018
Digested by: Costillas, Vhinjealeen Mae

Redante and Maria Socorro were previously married. Sometime thereafter,

Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as a nurse. Maria Socorro then filed
for divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to sever her marital ties with
Redante. The divorce was eventually granted by the Supreme Court of
British Columbia. Redante then met Fe and subsequently culminated in
their marriage. Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro
returned to the Philippines and met with Redante. After learning of
Redante and Maria Socorro's meeting and believing that they had
reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home and filed a complaint
for bigamy against Redante. Redante admitted that he had contracted two
marriages but interposed the defense that his first marriage had been
legally dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign country.
Was Redante capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage?

Suggested answer:
No, Redante was not capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage.

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment

relating to the status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a
divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Before
it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. For the

221
purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself
must be presented and admitted in evidence.

Here, Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce as a fact or that it
was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to
Fe. The only piece of evidence presented by the defense to prove the
divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia. Since neither the divorce decree nor
the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of
divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce
which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends
it - and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be
ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the
capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His
liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

222
Lack of Marriage License

Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008
(Note: different case found under the assigned citation)

Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose A. Dayot

G.R. No. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008
Digested by: Cuenca, Joben Vernan C.

On November 24, 1986, X and Y were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. Then X contracted marriage with a
certain Z on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Y filed an action for bigamy
against X. Then on July 7, 1993, X filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC. He contended that his
marriage with Y was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
he and Y had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a
Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and
evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between X and Y was valid. X
filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the
Court of Appeals did not accept X assertion that his marriage to Y was void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license. X filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper
application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of

223
the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the
legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially,
he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him
and Y was false.

Is the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

Suggested answer:
Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the
requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Y executed
is merely a scrap of paper because they started living together five months
before the celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be
necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers
the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of

the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties.

224
The Court of Appeals granted X's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed
itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage
between X and Y is void ab initio.

225
 Nicdao-Carino v. Carino
G.R. No. 132529. Feb. 2, 2001
Digested by: Cuizon, Razel

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two

marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two
offsprings and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under
the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of
P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against
Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab
initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage
license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half
of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Is the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao void
for lack of marriage license?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the marriage is void.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
Nicdao and Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does

226
not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was
indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed
validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently
overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab
initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and
Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under
Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The
decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

227
 Abbas v. Abbas
G.R. No. 183896, Jan. 30, 2013
Digested by: Dacles, Darlene Marie B.

A, a Pakistani citizen, and B, a Filipino citizen, met and married in Taiwan.

A testified that when he arrived in the Philippines, he was at his mother-in-
law’s residence and was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of
the nature of said ceremony.

During the ceremony, A and B signed a document. A claimed that he did

not know that the ceremony was a marriage until B told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Cavite to apply for a marriage license,
and that he had never resided in that area.

In the marriage contract of A and B, it is stated that Marriage License

issued at Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple. On
the other side, X, a minister of the Gospel and a Brgy. Captain stated that
he is authorized to solemnize marriage and that he was doing it since 1982
and he is familiar with the requirements.

Whether or not the marriage of A and B is valid.

Suggested Answer:
No. The marriage was not valid.

Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3) of the Family Code is the states that:

228
 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which
are solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in
exception to those covered by the preceding chapter.

In the case at bar, B failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied
on the marriage contract and testimonies to prove the existence of the said
license. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided.

This marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,

having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.

229
The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to A, as it was B
who took steps to procure the same. As the marriage license, a formal
requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of A and B is void ab initio.

230
 Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013
Digested by: Dacuba, Model Kim A.

In September 1979, X married Y. In 1981, while Y left for the United States
of America, X developed a romantic relationship with Z. Z’s father was
against their relationship. In order to appease her father, Z brought X to an
office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. The relationship between X and Z soured. Z filed a bigamy case
against X. X on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged
marriage to Z as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Z
presented a marriage license allegedly issued to X. Was the marriage of Z
and X bigamous?

Suggested answer:
No. The marriage between X and Z was not bigamous. The second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Article
3(2) of the Family Code provides that one of the formal requisites of
marriage is a valid marriage license. The law explicitly provides that
absence of any of the essential and formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio (Article 4 of the FC).

In the case at bar, the marriage license presented by Z was not authentic as
in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the
alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never

231
complied with the formal requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no
bigamous marriage to speak of.

232
Art. 36, FC
VOID
Arrieta v. Arrieta
GR No. 234808, Nov. 19, 2018
Digested By: de Guzman, Princess Kay D.

Principle: The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the

failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier — negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time — warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it has abandoned it or declined to assert it

Question:
H and W were married in 1973. After 18 years of marriage, W left for the
United States due to her alleged “irreconcilable differences” with H wherein
she obtained a divorce decree and was subsequently married to Z.
Thereafter, H filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with W on the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial
Court. H claimed that W was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her marital obligations since she abandoned and refused to support her
family. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition declaring void ab
initio the marriage between H and W. After more than seven (7) years from
the said decision’s finality, W filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals claiming that the RTC Decision was rendered
without jurisdiction and tainted with extrinsic fraud. The Court of Appeals

233
granted the petition on the ground of denial of due process. Is the CA
correct?

Suggested answer:
No. Section 3 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states that if based on
extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from its
discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by
laches or estoppel. Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional
defect.

In the present case, H and W had an “open-book” arrangement, whereby

both knew and tolerated each other's extra-marital affairs and relationships
over the years. After W obtained a divorce decree in the US, H personally
informed her that he was planning to file a petition for declaration of nullity
of their marriage. When the judgment of the trial court become final and
executory, H even told W and her then boyfriend that they can marry in the
Phillipines since their marriage was already annulled. In view of these
circumstances, the Court is hard-pressed to believe that W had no
knowledge of the nullity of marriage proceedings filed by H against her.

Therefore, W cannot validly claim denial of due process because she is

already estopped to avail of a petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

234
 Republic v. Mola Cruz,
GR No. 236629, July 23, 2018
Digested by: Decena, Leona Mae

Liberato Mola Cruz and Liezl got married on 30 August 2002 in Bacolod
City. The couple lived for some time in Manila where Liberato worked.
Later, they moved to Japan where Liezl worked as an entertainer while
Liberato found a job as a construction worker. In Japan, Liberato noticed
that Liezl began going out of the house without his permission, gave him
cold treatment, and got angry with him for no reason. Liezl confessed to
Liberato her romantic affair with a Japanese man. The couple parted ways
but they eventually reconciled after Liberato wooed her back. One day,
Liberato found Liezl’s Japanese lover in their house. Liezl introduced him
to her lover as her elder brother. Because of Liezl’s threat to leave their
home, Liberato cooperated with Liezl’s charade and allowed her to share
her bed with her Japanese lover. Liezl left Liberato again for the second
time. Liberato tried to move on and left for Singapore to work. Although
abroad, he tried to woo his wife back, but he found out that Liezl already
cohabited with her lover. Liberato filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Based on the
psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Tudla, Liezl was
afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, characterized by excessive
emotionality and attention seeking. Information gathered from the spouses
and Liezl’s sister revealed that her disorder begun when she was an
adolescent and continued well into adulthood.
Will a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed with the court
prosper?

235
Suggested answer:
Yes, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage will prosper. The
Supreme Court declared that to entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration
of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse’s psychological incapacity was
grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved. In this case, the gravity of Liezl’s disorder is shown by
appreciating the totality of her actions after she got married. Liezl’s actions
exhibited such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the
marital bond and home; this cannot be expected from a married person
who reasonably understands the principle and responsibilities of marriage.
Thus, Liberato’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage should be
granted.

236
 Republic v. Javier
GR No. 210518, April 18, 2018
Digested by: Degamo

X filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and joint custody
of common minor child under article 36 of the Family Code before the RTC.
X alleged that he and Y (the wife) are psychologically incapacitated to
comply the essential obligations of marriage. RTC dismissed the petition for
failure to sufficiently establish the basis for the declaration of nullity of
marriage. Unsatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, X appealed the decision to
the CA contending that it is not necessary for Y to be personally examined
by the psychologist and that there was sufficient basis to support his (X)
own diagnosis of psychological incapacity. CA agreed with X, hence, this
petition by the Republic.

Is there sufficient evidence to support that X and Y are psychologically

incapacitated to carry out their marital obligations?

Suggested answer:
Yes. But only to evidence finding X psychologically incapacitated to
perform marital obligations.

Psychological Incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by gravity,

juridical antecedence and incurability.

As to Y’s psychological incapacity; there is no sufficient evidence

establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of the alleged

237
psychological incapacity. The psychologist did not personally examined Y
and that he was not equipped with sufficient information to reasonably
conclude that Y is suffering from chronic and persistent disorder that is
grave and incurable.

On the other hand, X was subjected to several psychological tests, as a

result of which, he was diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder.
The psychologist found that X lacked empathy, leading him to disregard
and ignore the feelings of Y. The tests also concluded that X’s disorder was
rooted in the traumatic experiences he had during his childhood. Other
manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-entitlement,
immaturity, and self-centeredness.

The factual circumstances taken together warrant the declaration that X is

psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at
the time of marriage to Y. Hence, sufficient to declare their marriage null
and void ab initio due to the psychological incapacity of X pursuant to
article 36 of the Family Code.

238
 Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr.
GR No. 188400, March 8, 2017
Digested by: Jeanilyn M. Dico

X and Y first met when they were students. They got married in 1984 after
being sweethearts for 5 years. Prior marriage, Y already noticed that X was
an introvert and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went
on with their marital life. His jealousy became so serve that he even poked a
gun to a 15 year old cousin and he treated Y like a sex slave who made the
latter feel maltreated and molested. In 1986, the couple quarrelled because
X suspected that Y was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, X
poked a gun at Y’s head. She left and never saw him again after that, and
supported their children by herself. In 1999, Y filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Dr. Lo, a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert witness. X
refused examination. Dr. Lo diagnosed him with "paranoid personality”
disorder based on information gathered from credible informants. He
recommended that Y and X's marriage be annulled due to X's incapacity to
perform his marital obligations.

RTC granted the petition but was reversed by CA. CA ruled that the
testimony of Dr. Lo was unreliable for being hearsay. It also disagreed with
Dr. Lo's finding that X’s behavior descended from psychological illness
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Y filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari to the SC. Rule on the petition.

239
Suggested answer:
The petition should be granted.

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to

comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations. The 1995 case of
Santos v. CA declared that it must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Moreover, Republic v. CA and
Molina, provided the guidelines to be followed when interpreting and
applying Article 36 of the Family Code. However, Marcos v. Marcos
emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person
and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is
that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party's psychological
condition. Similarly, Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-
examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay
or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist,
since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two
persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation
and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.

Thus, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must

give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental
disposition of the parties. Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by Y,
sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.
Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and
prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully
comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage.

240
 Kalaw v. Fernandez,
GR No. 166357, Jan. 14, 2015
Digested by: Ecarma, Kim

X sought the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Y on the ground
of psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed
expert witnesses who concluded that Y was psychologically incapacitated
based on X’s allegations of Y’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. They opined that Y’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to
the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
The RTC denied the petition, which ruling was approved by the Court of
Appeals, upon finding that what transpired between the parties was
acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children.
Furthermore, the two courts stated that the factual findings may be
grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that
voids a marriage.

Is psychological incapacity present in this case such as to necessitate the

declaration of the nullity of the marriage of X and Y?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

241
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.

Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read
and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its
application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be
on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

Here, more than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted
ways. By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms with the
awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law,
was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not
only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It
would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void
marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more
damage. It would be great injustice to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital

242
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. Our mandate to
protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society
does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to
promote family life.”

243
 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes
GR No. 185286, Aug. 18, 2010
Digested by: Elesterio, Dessa Marie V.

X met Y when they were both 19 years old. At that time, Y held a job in the
family business. X and Y eventually got married. They lived with Y’s parents
and they were supported by them. They had a child which made their
financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of Y were unsuccessful
and X became the breadwinner of the family. To make things worse, despite
the fact that X would undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, Y
remained unconcerned. They tried to attend counseling sessions but
nothing has changed. X confirmed that Y was having an extra-marital
affair.

X filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Y,

alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. During trial, three expert
witnesses were presented. They were unanimous in their findings that Y is
suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated
him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.

Should the marriage be declared null and void under Art. 36?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the marriage shall be declared void under Art. 36 of the Family Code
on the grounds of Psychological incapacity.

244
Under Article 36 of the Family Code, A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It is also well settled by jurisprudence that taking into consideration the

explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in
conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the
pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, the Court finds that the
marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity
termed “psychological incapacity” which pertains to the inability of the
parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially
towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe
love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support,
(Art. 68 Family Code)

In the instant case, the three expert witnesses have spoken. They were
unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from personality
disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties
to the marriage.

Y’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological

incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse;
(4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; And (6)
inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses.

245
 Halili v. Santos-Halili,
GR No. 165424, June 9, 2009
Digested by: Esparagoza, Keneth Jorge

X filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Y null and void on

the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations
of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a "joke."
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but
maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a
year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and
started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank
calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married
man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the
marriage was not "fake."

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed

personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality
disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Stephanie Abangan The
court a quo held that petitioner’s personality disorder was serious and
incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and
void.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on
the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish

246
petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
It was denied.

Decide.

Suggested answer:

The decision of the Regional Trial Court should be reinstated.

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this
Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological
incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a
case-to-case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals.

Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts,

despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
disposition of the parties.

247
 Azcueta v. Republic,
GR No. 180668, May 26, 2009
Digested by: Estorba, Ivy Eunice S.

Mari filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under

Article 36 of the Family Code against her husband Rodo, claiming that
Rodo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to
adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and
duties of a husband. She further complained that Rodo never bothered to
look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance.
Mari presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist, who testified that based
on the information gathered from Mari, she found that Rodo showed that
he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related
to masculine strivings. She explained that persons suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary
way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-
confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem
was also severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable because it
started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his
personality. Is the psychological incapacity of Rodo sufficiently proven?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

248
The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife; and (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

In the case at bar, Mari successfully discharged her burden to prove the
psychological incapacity of her husband. The findings of Dr. Villegas, as
explained by her during her testimony, is sufficient to support Mari’s
allegations. Her findings identified Rodo’s disorder and showed that his
disorder is incurable and existed even before marriage. Moreover, her
findings showed that the disorder is grave as it hinders him to comply with
the essential obligations of his marriage. Thus, the psychological incapacity
of Rodo has been sufficiently proven.

249
 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,
GR No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009
Digested by: Eyas, AC

Edward and Rowena first met in a gathering organized by the Filipino-

Chinese association in their college in January 1996. They eventually
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other and around 3
months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At
first, Edward refused to the idea as he was young and jobless but he
conceded through Rowena’s persistence. They left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; Edward providing their travel money and Rowena,
purchasing the boat ticket.

However, Edward’s P80, 000.00 depleted fast and lasted only for a month.
And as they could not find a job, they decided to go back to Manila in April
1996. Rowena proceeded to his uncle’s house and Edward to his parent’s
home. Rowena kept on calling Edward threatening him she would commit
suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.

The two eventually got married, he was 25 years old, and she, 20. They
continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a
prisoner – he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied and was
threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from
the house and stayed with his parents. In June 1996, Edward was able to
talk to Rowena and convince her that they should live with his parents.
Rowena was not convinced instead, she said it was better for them to live
separate lives. They then parted ways.

250
After almost 4 years, or on January 2000, Edward filed a petition before
the RTC of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on
the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void based on
Article 36 of the Family Code

Suggested answer:
Yes. The Court ruled that the marriage is null and void on the ground of
both parties' psychological incapacity.

In Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, the SC emphasizes the importance of

presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined
by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.

In the case at bar, the psychological assessment, which the Court

considered as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are
afflicted with personality disorders. The parties' whirlwind relationship
lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The

251
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner's behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent's, that of
the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth

assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe, and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.

252
 Antonio v. Reyes,
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Digested by: Figues, Maria Helen P.

After three (3) years of marriage, A filed a petition to declare his marriage
with B null and void. His petition alleged B as psychologically incapacitated
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code. He asserted that B persistently
lied on many things including her occupation, income and educational
attainment. Should the marriage be declared null and void?

Suggested answer:
Yes. A and B’s marriage should be declared null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code.

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to

understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them was further affirmed in the Molina case. Jurisprudence
since then has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologist who attested the constant lying and extreme jealousy
of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on
his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. The gravity
of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the

253
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage
without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological
liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on
love, trust and respect.

254
 Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 119190, Jan. 16, 1997
Digested by: Fontanosa, Alan Vincent II S.

X married Y sometime in 1988. Later on, the wife, Y, was surprised when X,
the husband, did not attempt to engage in sexual intercourse with her
despite both of them sleeping in the same bed for over a year. Eventually,
they submitted themselves for medical examination where it was found that
Y was perfectly normal, while X’s medical information was made
confidential. X was prescribed medicine, which was also made confidential,
and asked by the doctor to return, which he never did.

Y now seeks the annulment of the marriage, claiming that the defendant is
impotent or a closet homosexual as he did not even show his penis to her.
She further claims that X married her, a Filipino citizen, merely to acquire
or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.

A physical examination revealed that the defendant is capable of having

sexual intercourse with a woman.

If you were the judge, would you grant the annulment? Why?

Suggested answer:
Yes. If I were the judge, I would grant it on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of X.

255
First, the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party,
even the psychologically incapacitated, hence, the question of who refuses
to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Second, the medical examination revealed that X is capable of erection and

sexual intercourse Since he claims that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of Y, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his

or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.

Third, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Here, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he
professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,

256
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.

Based on the foregoing, I would grant the annulment.

257
Remand
Republic v. Romero
GR No. 209180, Sept. 11, 2019
Digested by: Gabor, Jlayda Carmel Y.

H married W in 1972. The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous

marriage often having violent fights. In 1998 H filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage citing his psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations. According to H he married W
not out of love but out of the desire to please the latter’s parents who were
kind and accommodating to him. He further maintained that he was not
prepared to comply with the essential marital obligations at that time as his
mind was geared towards finishing his studies and finding employment to
support his parents and siblings.

H presented Dr. P, a psychologist who testified that H suffered from

Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD) which gives him a
strong obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to
the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining to
his role as husband and father. According to Dr. P, H’s OCPD was the root
of the couple’s disagreements and the same is incurable.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals(CA). The Supreme court however reversed and set
aside the CA’s decision. H filed an MR and a Manifestation stating that the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila Had recently declared
the canonical marriage of H and W as null and void. The SC denied the MR.

258
H filed a second MR and attached to it a copy of the Judgment of the
Metropolitan Tribunal which had not been previously submitted due to the
alleged prohibition by the Archdiocese of Manila. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence anent
the authenticity of the canonical judgment.

Note:
The case has not been decided yet but the Supreme Court in this case
discussed that Art 36 of the Family Code draws its roots from the New Code
of Canon Law particularly Canon 1095. The High Court also mentioned that
Republic vs CA and Molina sets forth the guidelines on the interpretation of
article 36 and that these guidelines stressed the persuasive weight that
should be accorded to the decisions of the Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church.

It further stated that this is one instance where, in view of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.

The Court also stressed that the spirit and intent of Article 26 thus
behooves the court to consider the Canonical Judgment in the resolution of
the case. The court noted however that it cannot take cognizance of the
Canonical Judgment at this stage as it has not been properly authenticated.

259
Subtopic
NULL JUDGEMENT / PROCEEDINGS

Request to Nullify the Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity

of Marriage in Civil Case No. 04-2578, RTC Br. 15, Cotabato City,
A.M. No. 13-9-220-RTC, Nov. 20, 2013

There is no published full text of the decision regarding the above entitled
case in the official website of the Supreme Court
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions/)

- Garciano, Gerald W.

260
 Yuk Ling Ong, v. Co
GR No. 206653, Feb. 25, 2015
Digested by: Gaviola

Y, a British-Hong Kong National, was married to B, a Filipino. On 2001, B

filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity. When the summons is being served, the process server resorted
to a substituted service after several futile attempts to serve Y personally.
For Y's failure to file responsive pleading within the reglementary period,
the RTC issued a decision annulling the marriage.

In response, Y filed a petition for annulment of judgment claiming that she

was never notified of the cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC
decision be nullified on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Y said that B deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent
her from participating in the trial. There was also an invalid substituted
service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of
personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of
summons, and, that the alleged substituted service was made on a security
guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household.

Should Y's petition be granted?

Suggested answer:
Yes. Y's petition is meritorious.

261
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions
for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2
thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment,
that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of judgment is
an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another
opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but
because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to
a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.

Although the decision of the case has long reached its finality, the Court
must strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
The favorable judgment enjoyed by B cannot be categorized as a genuine
victory because it was fought against an adversary, who was ignorant of the
existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the victor in such a void
decision must also be undone.

262
Not void
Simundac-Keppel v. Keppel,
GR No. 202039, Aug. 14, 2019
Digested by: Gubalane, Rafael B.

In November 1972, AA left the Philippines to work in Germany as a nurse.

In the hospital where AA worked, she met RR, also a nurse and fellow
Filipino who had become a naturalized German citizen. They fell in love
and got married in Germany on 12 June 1976

After a few years of marriage, AA became attracted to another German

nurse and co-employee, GG. In the meantime, in February 1986, AA
became a naturalized German citizen. AA left Germany to go home to the
Philippines, where they planned to start over.

While in the Philippines, AA continued communicating with GG through

letters and telephone calls. In July 1987, GG's wife divorced him, and so GG
felt free to come to the Philippines to meet AA's family in September 1987.

In December 1987, AA returned to Germany to file divorce proceedings

against RR, and she obtained the divorce decree she sought in 1988. Shortly
thereafter, AA and GG got married in Germany on 30 August 1988 AA gave
birth in Germany to a daughter, whom they named LL.

In 1991, AA and GG entered into an agreement for the complete separation

of their properties.

263
Claiming that Georg was beating her up, AA and her two children left their
home in March 1996. On 26 March 1996, AA filed the instant petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of GG's alleged psychological
incapacity.

If you are the judge, decide on the petition for annulment of marriage on
the ground of GG's alleged psychological incapacity.

Suggested answer:
I will dismiss the petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of GG's
alleged psychological incapacity.

In light of both GG and AA being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time
of the filing thereof, under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner cannot
invoke Article 36 of the Family Code unless there is a German law that
allows her to do so. Philippine law finds no application herein as far as the
family rights and obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are
concerned.

AA overlooked that German and Philippine laws on annulment of marriage

might not be the same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of the
marriage due to psychological incapacity afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code might not be available for her. In the absence of a showing of
her right to this remedy in accordance with German law, therefore, the
petition should be dismissed.

264
 Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez
GR No. 226907, July 22, 2019
Digested by: Ke-e, Aive B.

Sometime in November 1990, A and B exchanged marital vows. However,

during their married life, couples have frequent fights. A filed a petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. A
presented a witness named C. C stated that B was irritable, was a "war
freak," and that whenever A and B would quarrel, respondent would throw
things at the petitioner A. Petitioner also presented Psychological
Evaluation Report (Report) of clinical psychologist DR. It was stated that
the psychological incapacity of the B is characterized by juridical
antecedence, as it already existed long before she entered into marriage
with A. Since it started early in life, it has been deeply embedded within her
system and becomes an integral part of her personality structure, thereby
rendering such to be permanent and irreversible. As based on the context
mentioned above, the undersigned recommends that their marriage be
declared null and void.

Can the marriage be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity?

Suggested answer:
No.

To be able to A entitled to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage,

the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's
psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time

265
of the marriage. In the present case, however, the totality of the evidence
presented by the petitioner fails to convince this Court that B suffered from
a psychological incapacity that is permanent or incurable, and that has
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Although B
respondent was said to have exhibited "dramatic, extroverted behavior"
who was "prone to insecurities and aggressive outbursts of emotions," these
characterizations fell short of proving that she was psychologically
incapacitated to assume her marital responsibilities. Thus, while this Court
commiserates with petitioner's predicament, the evidence on record does
not square with the existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated
by law and jurisprudence. A and B's marriage cannot therefore be declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

266
 Bautista, Jr., v. Republic,
GR No. 243899, June 10, 2019
Digested by: Lascuña, Rose Ann A.

WHAT ARE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE COURT IN

RENDERING A MARRIAGE VOID BASE ON THE GROUND
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY?

The Court explained psychological incapacity as follows:

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.

Further, psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the

obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with
them.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability.

267
Thereafter, in Molina, the Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
disposition of psychological incapacity cases, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating

268
 therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition.

In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her

essential obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a
medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown
to have existed at the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof
may only be evident after marriage.

Hence, failure to sufficiently prove the gravity, juridical antecedence or root

cause, and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity in accordance
with the guidelines set forth, the court correctly denied the claim.

269
 Castillo v. Republic
GR No. 214064, Feb. 6, 2017
Digested by : Librando, Ronald Anthony A.

As their parents were good friends and business partners, H and W started
as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, W
discovered that H sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The
couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the
intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married in Bani,
Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born
in 1992 and in 2001.

On June 6, 2011, W filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

before the RTC on the ground of psychological incapacity. W alleged that at
the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting her to believe that
the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, H resumed philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him
with different women.

W presented a clinical psychologist as an expert witness to prove that H

suffered Narcissistic Personality Disorder who then concluded that H is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
psychologist’s findings relied mainly on her interview with W and a
common friend.

270
Was W able to establish that H is suffering from grave psychological
condition that rendered him incognitive of his marital covenants under
Article 36 of the Family Code, thus will render their marriage void ?

Suggested answer:
No.

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional

immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as
psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

In the case at bar, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
that H’s sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. There was no other
evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, W did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on H's infidelity notwithstanding
the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw him with other women.

271
Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious
evidentiary value.

272
 Malilin v. Jamesolamin,
GR No. 192718, Feb. 18, 2015
Digested by: Magloyuan, Chasmere L.

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3)
children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of

marriage before the RTC alleging that at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its
essential obligations and responsibilities. Such... incapacity became even
more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear
manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent
rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a parent.

Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

Suggested answer:
No.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr., the Court

reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration

273
of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be... psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.

In the case at bar, Robert's evidence failed to establish the psychological

incapacity of Luz. First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage; second, the root cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically
identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial; third, the psychological
report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the

274
psychological incapacity of Luz; and lastly, the decision of the Metropolitan
Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz.

Hence, Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove

the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.

275
 Baccay v. Baccay,
GR No. 173138, Dec. 1, 2010
Digested by: Malinao, Deborah

X filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Regional Trial

Court rendered a decision in favor of Noel. On appeal by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. X contends
that the CA failed to consider Y’s (wife) refusal to procreate as psychological
incapacity. X insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital
sexual encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was
not psychologically incapacitated to procreate through marital sexual
cooperation. X further claims that there were other indicia of Y’s
psychological incapacity and that she consistently exhibited several traits
typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before
and during their marriage. X points out that Y would only mingle with a few
individuals and never with X’s family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Y
was also arrogant and haughty. The psychologist testified that persons
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to
participate in therapy session and would reject any form of psychological
help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable. On the other
hand, the OSG maintains that Y’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with X
did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs of
ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. Is the
marriage between X and Y null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code?

276
Suggested answer:
No.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides: A marriage contracted by any party

who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The phrase “psychological incapacity” is not meant to comprehend all

possible cases of psychoses—it refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. Psychological incapacity must be
more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance
of some marital obligations—an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and
void marriage.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), the
Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our

277
 laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees
marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be “protected” by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(1) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(2) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The

278
 manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(3) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against every one of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(4) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
“mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(5) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in

279
 regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(6) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxx
(7) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.

X’s evidence merely established that Y refused to have sexual intercourse

with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when
he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements
of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. Mere difficulty, it must
be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.

280
 So v. Valera,
GR No. 150677, June 5, 2009
Digested by: Joey Ross Maputi

After 19-year common-law relationship, Husband S and Wife V declared

their marriage vows before the Local Chief Executive of Caloocan City. Due
to misunderstanding arising from V’s interference of S’s business dealings,
falling out of love, V locked S out of his house and he found all his things
thrown out of the house, thus prompted to fifile the complaint. S alleged
that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal
requisites as he was induced by V to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a
blank application for marriage license.
S also claimed that V was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown in the Psychological Report of
Dr. G that V is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her
impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior Pattern are also evident in her
marijuana habit, gambling, and habitual squandering of S’s money. It must
be noted that V failed to answer the Summons and cooperate in the
proceedings. The RTC ruled in favor of S, however CA reversed the decision
for the simple reason that such disorders were not the root cause of her
incapacity to fulfifill the essential marital obligations.

If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case?

281
Suggested answer:
The petition must be denied for lack of merit and hold that no sufficient
basis exists to annul the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.

On the issue of lack of essential and formal requisites of marriage, it has not
been proved or validly ruled upon by the trial court. The CA cannot ruled as
well because there was no evidence and no RTC ruling that will specifically
point out. It only shown in the dispositive portion. Even if it had been a
valid issue before the CA, RTC’s declaration of nullity should be void for
violation of the constitutional rule that “ NO decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.

On the issue of RTC’s decision based on Art. 36 of the Family Code, the
totality of evidence presented failed to establish V’s psychological
incapacity. Take note that in Marcos v Marcos, it is not a condition sine qua
non that defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist for the declaration of nullity of marriage if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.

It is already a blindspot that RTC decide the case based on an indirect

psychological examination of the hearings and clinical interviews of S.
Moreover the alleged disorder was not shown to be of a serious nature and
to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It also considered that the couple have

282
been cohabiting each other for 19 years and thus have intimate knowledge
of each other at the time of the celebration of marriage though we cannot
discount the fact that it may still happened that psychological incapacity is
present at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In the absence of any
contradictory statements from V, the fairer approach is to read between the
lines of the Psychological Report and based on common human experience,
it is realistic to rule that these are physical manifestations of being tired of
each other, as to be tired and to give up on one’s situation and on one’s
husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness, neither can
falling out of love be so labeled that will warrant the nullity of marriage.

283
 Bier v. Bier
GR No. 173294, Feb. 27, 2008
Digested by: D.E.M.P. Maruhom

A and B were a happily married couple. However, three years into their
marriage, A has observed that B has grown cold and aloof towards him. She
started going out more with friends and even refused sexual relations with
him. B even became an alcoholic, a chain-smoker and started to neglect the
needs of A and the upkeep of their home. With her long absence in the
house, they frequently quarreled. B then suddenly left A for the United
States and was never heard of since.

One year after B left, A filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. B did not take
part on the proceedings and the trial of the merits of the case ensued. A
presented as evidence of his, his brother’s and a clinical psychologist's
testimony. The OSG manifested disfavor and argued that no persuasive
evidence was presented and for failure to comply with the Molina Doctrine.
The RTC granted the petition of A.

The OSG appealed the petition to the CA, and the RTC decision was
reversed. A raised a petition to the SC challenging the CA decision.

A argues that the Molina Doctrine is for guidance of the bench and the bar
only and not meant to be a checklist of requirements in deciding cases
involving psychological incapacity. He further adds that the root cause of

284
the psychological illness and its nature, and proof of its existence at the
inception of the marriage need not be strictly complied.

Is A correct?

Suggested answer:
No.

In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
that would render the person incapable of carrying out marital duties, and
rooted in history antedating the marriage although overt manifestations
emerge after the marriage. The psychologic condition must exist at the time
of the celebration of marriage. Even if the personal examination of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is no longer mandatory but
the totality of evidence must show the three characteristics of psychological
incapacity.

In case at bar, the report of the psychologist only relied on the information
given by A since personal examination of B was impossible. It also failed to
identify the root cause of the disorder stated in the psychologist’s report
and prove that it existed during the inception of the marriage. It shows that
the totality of B’s acts which includes habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking,
refusal to comply with marital duties and eventual abandonment, do not
tantamount to psychological incapacity. It shows they had a good start but
eventually fell out of love.

285
Hence, the RTC’s decision was erroneous for failure to show the gravity,
root cause and incurability of B’s psychological incapacity and the totality of
evidence failed to prove the psychological incapacity of B to comply with
marital duties.

286
 Republic v. Cuizon-Melgar
GR No. 139676, March 31, 2006
Digested by: Montecillo

N and E were married in Dagupan City. Since the birth of their first born, E
the manifested immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family.
Subsequently, N filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the
ground of E’s psychological incapacity.

Summons were served by personal service on E, but he did not respond.

Then RTC rendered the marriage null and void. The Office of the Solicitor
General filed an appeal and said that the evidence presented was
insufficient under Art. 36 of the Family code.

Was the evidence presented enough to rule the marriage null and void
under Art. 36 of the Family Code?

Suggested answer:
No. The evidence was not enough.

Under Art. 36 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

287
In the present case, N alone testified in support of her complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, E was
already suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. In fact, N admitted in her testimony that her marital woes
and E’s disagreeable behavior started only after the birth of their firstborn
and when E lost his.

Thus, it was not sufficiently proved that E was really incapable of fulfilling
his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely
physical.

288
 Marcos v. Marcos
GR No. 136490, Oct. 19, 2000
Digested by: Neri, Jillandro

Petitioner married Respondent in 1982 and they had five children. They got
married twice, first was on September 6, 1982 and on May 8, 1983 and
blessed with five children. After the downfall of President Marcos,
respondent left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not succeeded. Due to respondents failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, respondent would hit and beat plaintiff. Respondent would
also inflict physical harm on their children. In 1992, they were already
living separately. On October 16, 1994, when Plaintiff saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. Respondent then turned
violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came
to her aid. On October 17, 1994, plaintiff and their children left the house
and sought refuge in her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, plaintiff
submitted herself to medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage in the RTC
assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, Brenda (petitioner) filed a case for the nullity of the
marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos (respondent) has
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void
under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner contends that CA is wrong and that testimonies and

289
results of personal medical examination of respondent is determinative of
the latter’s psychological incapacity.

a. Is plaintiff correct?
b. Suppose the petitioner together with her common children, her
sisters and social worker testified that indeed respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, be admitted as evidence together
with medical examination as part of the Totality of Evidence.

Suggested answers:
a. No. The three basic requirements are the following:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by 1.) gravity 2.)
juridical antecedence ,and 3.) incurability.

The foregoing guidelines do not require that physician examine

the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified”. What
is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition.

b. No. The totality of the evidence she presented does not show
such incapacity. Although Supreme Court is convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and
may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no

290
showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be traced be attributed to

the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed.
It was during this period that respondent became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left
the family. Respondent’s alleged psychological illness was
traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that
his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused

with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

291
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
GR No. 108763, Feb. 13, 1997
Digested by: Oñas, Arlene Marie

H and W got married. They begot a child named A. After one year of
marriage, H showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a
husband and a father since he spend more time with his friends on whom
he squandered his money. He depended on his parents for aid and
assistance and was never honest to W regarding their finances.

H got relieved from his work and since then W had been the sole
breadwinner. They had a very intense quarrel as a result of which their
relationship was estranged. W resigned from his work and lived with her
parents. Few weeks later, H left W and A. H had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations
which W thought that it would be best for the couple to have their marriage
null and void.

Did the act of H constitutes psychological incapacity.

Suggested answer:
No, the act of H does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by, to

wit:
(a) gravity;
(b) juridical antecedence; and

292
 (c) incurability.

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.

In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent merely showed

that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. There is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at
the time of marriage celebration.

What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of

irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it
is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.

Thus, irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality do not

constitute psychological incapacity.

293
 Santos v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 112019, Jan. 4, 1995
Digested by: Arcelli Onod

X, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army first met Y in Iloilo City. The
two eventually exchanged vows in 1986 and gave birth to a baby boy. The
couple lived in Y’s parents’ house where they would quarrel over the
frequent interference by Y's parents into their family affairs and over a
number of other things. Y left for the United Sates of America to work as a
nurse in 1988. Seven months after her departure, Y called up X for the first
time and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract. She
never did. When X got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
with, Y but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get Y to
somehow come home, X filed with the regional trial Court a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code” on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Does Y's failure to return home, or at the very least to communicate with X
for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?

Suggested answer:
No. The factual settings in this case, in no measure at all, can come close to
the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.

294
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

295
Article 45

Oropesa v. Oropesa
G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012
Digested by: Oropel, Oliver John R.

X filed a petition to be appointed as guardian over the property of his

father, Y, alleging that Y had suffered a stroke, had been sickly for 10 years
and that his judgment and memory is already impaired; that Y is already an
“incompetent”. X presented his sister and Y’s nurse to testify, but failed to
formally offer his documentary evidence. His documentary evidence would
have consisted of certificates of title and tax declarations. The trial court
dismissed the petition upon Y’s filing of a demurrer. Is the trial court
correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the trial court is correct.

Under Sec. 2, Rule 92, the word “incompetent” includes persons, not being
of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and
manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation.

It has been held that a finding that a person is incompetent should be

anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence. In another case, it was
also held that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not

296
necessary and that the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence
establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice.

In this case, X failed to formally offer his documentary evidence and his
proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies. These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of X’s cause of action. Also, the
documentary evidence of X does not in any way relate to his father’s alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself. Therefore, the trial court was
correct in dismissing the petition.

297
 Crewlink v. Teringtering,
G.R. No. 166803, Oct. 14, 2012
Digested by: Ma. Baby P.Pañares

(Note: This is a Labor Case but in the decision the Supreme Court,
it specifically defined INSANITY)

Question:
Define insanity as ground for annulment of marriage.

Suggested answer:
The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the
mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know
what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person’s
mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the
insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane,
or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the
witness’ own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such
as a psychiatrist.

298
 Almelor v. RTC, Br. 254, Las Pinas City,
GR No. 179620. Aug. 26, 2008
Digested by: Papas

After 11 years of marriage, X filed a petition to annul her marriage with Y on

the ground that Y was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. During the trial, X testified that Y was a harsh disciplinarian,
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered, and was heavily dependent on his
mother for decision-making. Further, she added that Y concealed to her his
homosexuality. She once caught Y talking to a man affectionately over the
phone. Her suspicions were confirmed when she saw Y kissed another man
on the lips. And when confronted, Y denied everything.

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Art. 36. But
rather due to fraud by reason of Y's concealment of his homosexuality,
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

Is the trial court correct when it declared the marriage as null and void due
to fraud by reason of Y's concealment of his homosexuality?

Suggested answer:
No. It is found that there was no concealment of homosexuality done by Y.

To nullify an existing marriage, there are requisites, which are provided by

the Family Code. As expressly stated in Art. 45 part 3 of the Family Code,
‘That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely

299
cohabited with the other as husband and wife.” It was not proven that
Manuel concealed his homosexuality, which would eventually lead to fraud.
The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a
marriage. It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In this case,
however, it is not proven that annul is a homosexual. The lower court
should not have taken the public’s perception against Y' sexuality. His
peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an indication of his
homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to
prove so. Even granting that Y is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in
the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Y hid
such sexuality from X and that Y’s consent had been vitiated by such

300
 Alcazar v. Alcazar
G.R. No. 174451, Oct. 13, 2009
Digested by: Parcon, Junfe S.

W was married to H. A few days after their marriage the spouses went to
their abode in Tondo but did not leave together as H is about to leave for
Riyadh, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While in
Riyadh, H never communicated with W neither by phone nor by letters.
After more or less 2 years of having no news from her husband W visited H
parents in Mindoro and there she was informed that H had been living with
his parents since his arrival. Under the circumstances, W filed a petition for
annulment of marriage under paragraph 5 of Article 45 of the Family
Code, on the ground of Psychological Incapacity, that H was Physically
Incapable of consummating their marriage.

A trial ensued, after the conclusive report from the public prosecutor’s
office that there was no collusion between spouses.

During the trial, W presented her testimony and was corroborated by her
mother’s testimony. W also presented T, a clinical psychologist, to support
her claim.

T arrived on a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life

between W and H was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder
that H is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly
assume and comply with essential roles of obligations as a married man.

301
The psychological incapacity of H is characterized by juridical antecedence
as it already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it already
started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes
an integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be
permanent and incurable.

The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic

cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and
commitment does not and will no longer exist between them. With due
consideration of the above-mentioned findings, T recommends, the
declaration of nullity of marriage between H &W.

Despite the evidence presented RTC denied her petition and the decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, concluding that the acts of the
respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the
latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their
marriage do not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity. Decide.

Suggested answer:
Dismiss the petition.

Paragraph 5 of Article 45 of the Family Code refers to the lack of power to

copulate. Incapacity to consummate marriage denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the
husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect
in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and

302
inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental
block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically
incapable of performing the marriage act.

It is settled that whoever alleges that his spouse is psychological

incapacitated has the burden of proving not just to prove that his/her
spouse suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders him “truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In this case, it can be perceived as a married couple being apart too long,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and
distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife. To be
tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily
signs of psychological illness.

303
 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 132955, Oct. 27, 2006
Digested by: Perez, Shana Alexandra P.

Tom, a security guard, married Trina in Palawan. They consummated their

marriage afterwards. After four years, the former filed with the trial court a
petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Trina, who was already pregnant at that
time. Trina prayed for the dismissal and argued that Tom freely and
voluntarily married and stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month
after their marriage. She also presented letters as an expression of love and
concern from him.

Tom asserted that he did not freely consent to be married. He mentioned

several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded
fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. He alleged that
there was lack of cohabitation during their marriage. In addition, he also
invoked fraud when he was made to believe by Trina that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married and that he could not have
impregnated her because he did not have an erection during their tryst.
Thus, he prayed for the annulment of marriage on the ground of vitiated
consent. Whose petition or motion should prevail?

Suggested answer:
Trina should prevail.

304
The lack of cohabitation is not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the
validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence.

In this case, Tom failed to justify his failure to cohabit with Trina on any of
those grounds. His allegation of fear was not concretely established and
that the apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. Given
his employment, it is reasonable to assume he knew how to defend himself
or avoid harm. He neither informed the judge about his predicament prior
to solemnizing their marriage. Arising from the fact that it took him four
years to file an action, anchored Trina’s contention that he freely
cohabitated with her.

On the grounds of fraud, Tom must present evidence of any reference to his
inability to copulate.

Therefore, Tom freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that
no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, and
the petition be dismissed.

305
Divorce
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna,
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Digested by: Ponce, Junalyn S.

AA, a Filipino, obtained a divorce decree for his marriage with BB who is
also a Filipino, in the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic and married CC on the same date. AA and CC returned in the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife. While living with CC,
AA established a law firm and bought properties such as condominiums
under the firm's name. When AA died, DD, his son of his first marriage,
took over his share of the condominiums and other books and leased to EE.
CC then filed a case against the heirs of AA claiming that such properties
were acquired during the existence of their marriage. Because AA and CC
have no children, CC claimed that she is the only owner of the shares of
such properties. Is the marriage of AA and CC valid in order to entitle CC to
any rights of the property?

Suggested answer:
No. The marriage of AA and CC is void for being bigamous.

The Civil Code adopts nationality rule in which Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are

306
residing abroad. The only two types of defective marital unions under our
laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

In this case, while it is true that the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the
First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic issued a divorce decree to AA dissolving his marriage
to BB, such decree however, did not dissolve the marriage of AA to BB in
the Philippines in conformity with the nationality rule and our laws do not
recognize absolute divorce. Thus, the marriage of AA and CC is void for
being bigamous on the ground that the marriage of AA and BB still subsists
until the death of AA. Ergo, the share of AA on the properties of the law
firm as well as his other properties pertained to the heirs of AA and not of
CC.

307
 Republic v. Obrecido III
G.R. No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
Digested by: Regala, Mary Licel I.

Co married MV on 1981. They were blessed with a son and a daughter, KS

and LK. In 1986, MV left for US bringing along their son KS. A few years
later, Co discovered that his wife MV had been naturalized as an American
citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Co learned from KS that MV had obtained a divorce

decree and then married another man. Co filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code.

Can Co remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

Suggested answer:
Yes, Co may remarry.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 provides that where a marriage between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine law.

The provision should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,

at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Fiipino citizens, but later

308
on, one becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alient spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

309
 Galapon v. Republic,
G.R. No. 243722, Jan. 22, 2020
Digested by: Reyes, Sarah Patricia P.

X, a Filipina and Y, a South Korean national got married in Manila on

February 27, 2012. Subsequently by mutual agreement they divorced in
South Korea. The divorce was confirmed by the Cheongju Local Court in
Korea and thereafter X filed before the RTC a Petition for the Judicial
Recognition of a Foreign Divorce. The RTC granted the petition,
recognizing the divorce decree obtained in Seoul, Korea. A motion for
reconsideration was file by the OSG, which was subsequently denied by the
trial court. An appeal to CA was initiated by the OSG and in its ruling, the
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA held that the
divorce decree in question cannot be recognized since it was obtained by
mutual agreement. X moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA. Hence, the present petition to the Supreme Court. The controversy is
anchored on the interpretation of Article 26 paragraph 2 as applied to
divorce decree obtained by the foreign spouse and Filipino citizen. Is the CA
correct?

Suggested answer:
No. The CA and OSG were incorrect. The petition was granted. The decision
of the RTC was reinstated.

By virtue of Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code the petitioner was

declared capacitated to remarry under Philippine law, applying the recent
case of Manalo decided by the Court en banc extending the scope of the said

310
provision to even cover instances where the divorce decree is: i) obtained by
the foreign spouse; ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and Foreign spouse;
and iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.

311
 Catalan v. Lee
G.R. No. 183622, Feb. 8, 2012
Digested by: Reyes, Robin R.

A was a naturalized American citizen. After obtaining divorce in the from

his first wife, B, he contracted second marriage with C.

Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Does it have the effect of the divorce obtained by A in the United States not
recognizable in the Philippines?

Suggested answer:
No.

According to the Supreme Court in Catalan Vs. Lee, it is true that owing to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law.

312
In this case, the divorce obtained by A in the United States is recognizable
in the Philippines if he show proof of its validity under the law of the United
States.

313
 Republic v. Manalo
GR No. 221029, April. 24, 2018
Digest by: Roa, Vanessa

A, a Filipino citizen was married to a Japanese national, B filed a case for

divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree was granted. A
now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and B from the Civil
Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname and so she filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the RTC of City D. The RTC
denied her petition saying that the divorce she obtained in Japan should
not be recognized based on Art. 15 of the New Civil Code stating that “the
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.” Is the RTC correct?

Suggested answer:
No.

Under Art. 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires a valid divorce
obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who filed the divorce
whether a Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse.

In the case at bar, since A validly obtained the divorce decree in Japan, it
should also be recognized in the Philippines.

314
 Rondo v. Civil Registrar General
G.R. No. 223628, March 4, 2020
Digested by: Rodriguez, Gericah May

Edna and Katsuhiro validly celebrated their marriage in Japan according to

Japanese Laws. Years later, they both obtained a mutual divorce agreement
capacitating Katsuhiro to remarry. Edna filed a petition for judicial
recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines and asked that the Trial
Court direct the Civil Registrar to annotate the same in her Marriage
Certificate. The Trial Court dismissed the petition on the ground that under
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the foreign divorce should have been
obtained by the alien spouse and not by mutual agreement. Is the decision
of the Trial court proper?

Suggested answer:
No. The application of Article 26 on mixed marriages should be relaxed
when rigid application hinders substantial justice for these rules are meant
to facilitate the administration of fairness and justice. Although the article
provides that the divorce should be obtained by the foreign spouse, it would
include divorce obtained by mutual decision as long as such decree
capacitates the foreign spouse to remarry.

315
Legal Separation
Siochi v. Giozon
G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010
Digested by: Rufin, Desiree Mae O.

Elvira filed a petition for a legal separation against her husband Alfredo.
She filed a notice of lis pendens on “Property A”, which was annotated.
While the case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario entered into an
agreement to buy and sell the property. However, Alfredo failed to comply
with the stipulations.

The RTC rendered a decision decreeing the legal separation of the spouses
and held that “Property A” is a conjugal property. Alfredo executed a Deed
of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter without annotating
the previous lis pendens. By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed
in his favor by his daughter, Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional
Realty, Inc. (IDRI). This prompted Mario to file a complaint to declare the
sale to IDRI as null and void. The court in its order, rendered that the
conveyance of the property to Mario was done without the consent of the
wife Elvira and thus null and void. Also, Alfredo’s one-half (1/2) undivided
share has been forfeited in favor to their daughter by virtue of the decision
in the legal separation.

Is the one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property forfeited in favor

of their daughter based on the ruling of the RTC in the legal separation
case?

316
Suggested answer:
No. Only Alfredo’s share in the net profits is forfeited in favor of their
daughter.

Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership.

Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of their daughter is not Alfredo’s share in

the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the
conjugal property. Net profits is the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

317
 Fajardo v. San Miguel-Fajardo
G.R. No. 214807 (Notice), December 3, 2014.
Digested by: Ruiz, Lorenzo O.

In 1962, X and Y were married in a civil ceremony. Thereafter, they had 3

children, and residents of the United States of America (USA). Then, X
migrated to the USA where they had since resided for several years.
Sometime in 2008, X went home to the Philippines for a vacation.

In 2009, while in the USA, Y received news that X was living-in with
another woman. This prompted Y to confront X over the phone whom the
latter admitted and even confessed to having impregnated Z, his paramour.
Y also discovered that X had purchased a house for Z, where the two have
been staying, and that X had not gone home for a week due to the birth of
his son with Z.

Fed up with X’s extra-marital affair, Y filed before the RTC a Petition for
Legal Separation with Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and Permanent
Protection Order which granted by the same court and affirmed by the CA.
Aggrieved, X raised the arguments in the SC that the RTC and CA erred in
ruling that all the properties of the parties belong to their conjugal
partnership; and the RTC and CA erred in resolving the case without fully
apprising the petitioner of his right to counsel which in effects violates his
right to procedural due process. Decide the case.

Suggested answer:
The petition must be denied.

318
The court was constrained to declare that petitioner miserably failed to
comply with the mandatory provision of Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended. While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in
stone, it is equally true that strict compliance with the Rules is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Unfortunately for petitioner,
failure to file within the reglementary period to file the same is fatal to his
appeal since it is petitioner’s duty to strictly comply with the rules of Court
and to be vigilant in protecting his right, thereby making the relief prayed
for unavailing.

319
 Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong
G.R. No. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006
Digested by: Hannah Sabal

X and Y were married, they have three children. Y filed a Complaint for
Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code4 before the
RTC. Y claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and X
quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
X would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and
he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete
wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of
these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; X
would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies
using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop X from hitting the
children, he would turn his ire on her and box her. X denied that he ever
inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or
whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.

RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation. CA affirmed in toto

the RTC decision

The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were

uncontroverted and credible. That the physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct were brought to bear upon Y by X have been duly established by Y
and her witnesses. These incidents were not explained nor controverted by
X, except by making a general denial thereof. Consequently, as between an

320
affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be accorded to the
affirmative assertion.

Did the CA commit error of law disregarding clear evidence repudiating

private respondent’s claim of repeated physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct on the part of petitioner?

As between the detailed accounts given for Y and the general denial for X,
the Court gives more weight to those of the former. As a final note, we
reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening
the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however does
not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family,
as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put
into operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the
enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes
the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. As Y has
adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court
has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant
her the relief she is entitled to under the law.

321
 De Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553, Feb. 23, 1960
Digested by: Salubre, P.

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Flourenciano were married in a religious

ceremony in Nueva Ecija around April 1938. They’ve been living as
husband and wife and begotten children who were living with Jose. During
their marriage, Jose discovered that Serafina engages illicit relationships
with men including Jose Arcala. Because of Serafina’s infidelity, Jose
decided to send Serafina to city to study beauty culture however instead of
bringing back the trust that have lost, Jose again discovered that Serafina
has been going out with several men aside from Jose Arcala. Thereafter,
Serafina finished her studies and decided to leave her family. They’ve been
living separately since then. After some time, Jose then again surprisingly
discovered that his wife has been living with another man named Nelson
Orzame. Jose signified his intentions of filling a petition for legal separation
to which Serafina conformed to it provided that she will not be charged
with Adultery in a criminal action. Thus, a petition for legal separation was
filed. Despite demands from the court, Serafina made no answer to the
same, the court defaulted her. In an investigation, Serafina reiterated her
conformity to the legal separation and even admitted her sexual relations
with Nelson.

Will the petition for legal separation prosper even with Serafina’s
confession?

322
Suggested answer:
Yes, the petition for legal separation will still prosper amidst Serafina’s
confession.

Article 101 of the Civil Code provide as a general rule, that a decree for legal
separation will not be promulgated upon confession of judgement or
stipulation of facts. Confession of judgment normally happens when the
defendant appears to court and confesses the right of the plaintiff to
judgement or files a pleading simply agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.

In the case provided, even if Serafina admitted her sexual relationship with
Nelson, however this won’t hold water. As much as there is an evidence
independently with her statement, nevertheless her confession does not
tantamount to confession of judgment provided under the law. The grant of
the petition relies on the evidence presented by the plaintiff and not with
the defendant’s confession. Furthermore, what the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendants confession.

323
 People v. Schneckenburger
G.R. No. 48183, Nov. 10, 1941
Digested by: Samad, Azisa

Schneckenburger and Cartagena after seven years of martial life agreed for
reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately, and
executed an instrument embodying their agreement. Schneckenburger,
without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil
court of Mexico. Schneckenburger contracted another marriage with Julia
Medel, since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of
Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court,
complainant herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for
bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other concubinage in
the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction
of the accused. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused
interposed the plea of double jeopardy.

Whether or not Schneckenburger is guilty of the crime concubinage.

Suggested answer:
No. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint
in which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto
y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the purpose for which it was
executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage
within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be
no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to
illicit acts of the other. Consent bars the offended party from instituting a

324
criminal prosecution in case of concubinage that has been given expressly
or impliedly after the crime has been committed.

325
Part 4, Book 1. Marital Properties,
Rules of Use, Management, &
Disposition

326
Donations In the Context of Marriage

Valencia v. Loquiao
G.R. No. 122134, Oct. 3, 2003
Digested by: Samson, Frances C.

In 1944, the spouses AB executed a donation propter nuptias in favor of

their son, X and his bride, Y (later on referred to as spouses XY) for 4
parcels of land, 1 male cow, and 1/3 of the former’s conjugal house. After
the deaths of spouses AB, one of their six children, C, took possession of
one of the parcels of land covered in the donation propter nuptias with
permission from spouses XY. Later, C’s daughter, Z, took over and has
possession over such land. Meanwhile, the spouses XY registered the
donation propter nuptias with the Office of the Register of Deeds where a
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in their name.

Some time later, the children of spouses AB, including spouses XY,
executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights where it contained
a statement that X as well as his other sibling "have already received our
shares in the estates of our parents, by virtue of previous donations and
conveyances” and thus were not made parties of the deed.

Ten years later, Z filed a case for annulment of title against spouses XY
alleging among others, that the donation did not observe the form required
by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a
separate public instrument.

327
Was the requirement of acceptance in the donation propter nuptias
complied?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a
public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described.45 However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that
"acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts”. Further,
under the New Civil Code, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance
"is not necessary for the validity of these donations.” Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.

Since the donation propter nuptias was executed before the effectivity of
the New Civil Code, the Old Civil Code applies in this case. As a
consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the
determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter
whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the
donation is unaffected in either case. Even if the provisions of the New Civil
Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the
same. As earlier shown, even the implied acceptance flowing from the very
fact of marriage between the respondents, coupled with the registration of
the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No. 18383, constitutes substantial
compliance with the requirements of the law.

328
 Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111717, Oct. 24, 1994
Digested by: Sayson, Karl Benedict N.

A is married to B. Without A’s marriage to B being dissolved, A contracted

another marriage with respondent C with whom he begot a child
respondent D. Subsequently, A met petitioner E, who had been estranged
from her husband. A then courted E and won her heart because up until A’s
death, they have lived together in a duplex apartment. A bought the duplex
apartment and in the deed of sale and transfer certificate, A was described
as single. A then executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of
petitioner E in which a transfer certificate was issued in E’s name.

A died and upon learning of such death, respondents C and D came home
from the US. C claimed ownership of the duplex apartment in which E had
been living. C and E met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to
settle their dispute failed. C and D thereafter brought this case to the RTC,
seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to E, alleging that the
deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of
her as the legitimate wife of A. E claimed that she and the late A had
purchased the property in question using their joint funds which they had
accumulated after living together for 14 years and that she was a purchaser
in good faith. To whom therefore should the ownership of the duplex
apartment belong?

329
Suggested answer:
It should belong to E.

The resolution of this case hinges on the validity of A’s marriage to

respondent C If that marriage was valid then the property is part of their
conjugal partnership of A and C and the latter is the proper party to
question the validity of the sale to E. Otherwise, if the marriage is not valid,
C cannot bring this suit.

Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides that any marriage subsequently

contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless: (1) the first marriage was annulled or
dissolved; or (2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead after four years
from the occurrence of any of the events enumerated in Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.

Petitioner E had shown that when A married C, A’s previous marriage to B

was still subsisting and, therefore, his second marriage was bigamous.
What applies therefore in this case is the general rule. A had a valid,
subsisting marriage to B, so his subsequent marriage to respondent C was

330
void for being bigamous. Consequently, there is no basis for holding that
the duplex apartment is the property of the conjugal partnership of A and C
because there was no such partnership in the first place. Until otherwise
shown in an appropriate action, the sale to E must be presumed. Petitioner
E’s ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale executed with all the
solemnity of a public document and by a transfer certificate of title issued
in her name and E is in possession of the property.

Indeed the property in question was acquired by A during a long period of

cohabitation with E petitioner which lasted for 14 years. While petitioner E
knew respondent D to be A’s son, there is nothing to show that she knew A
to be married to C. To the contrary, A represented himself to be single. As
far as petitioner E was concerned, D could have been A’s child by a woman
not his wife. There is, therefore, no basis to rule that E is not a buyer in
good faith of the property because she could not have known that A was
married to C.

331
 Sumbad v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106060, June 21, 1999
Digested by: Servila, Shyril Ann A.

After the death of his wife, A, in 1936, G lived in common-law relationship

with M to whom on April 2, 1974 he donated a certain parcel of
unregistered land. G himself passed away on December 24, 1977. From
1982 to 1983, M sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of
private respondents. Private respondents purchased the lots on the strength
of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, M, to be
the owner of the property in question and thereafter planted different kinds
of fruit trees and plants on the lots purchased by them. On July 24, 1989,
petitioners E and B brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of
deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private
respondents. They alleged that they are the children and compulsory heirs
of the... spouses G and A of Bondoc. Petitioners further alleged that from
1982 to 1983, M, without their knowledge and consent, sold lots included
within the Sum-at property to private respondents... prior to the sales
transactions, private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property
did not... belong to M but to the heirs of G, this notwithstanding, private
respondents proceeded to purchase the lots in question M. Petitioners
contend that the deed of donation, dated April 2, 1974, is void for the
reason that it was made in violation of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art.
87 of the Family Code. Is the contention of the petitioner correct?

Suggested answer:
The contention of the petitioner is incorrect.

332
Article 133 provides that every donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation
takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply
to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing.

The prohibition in Art. 133 extend to common-law relations. Indeed, it is

now provided in Art. 87 of the Family Code:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

333
 In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pete
Roxas de Jesus v. De Jesus
G.R. No. 168733, March 27, 2006
Digested By: Sesante, Monyeen Marie T.

Z was married to Y. They had 3 children: A, B, and C. In 1977, Z emigrated

to the USA, obtained a divorce decree against Y, then married X. Z only
became a US citizen in 1988. Z died in 1994. In his will, he instituted X and
disinherited Y, A, B, and C. After trial, the probate court held that even as
the will is extrinsically valid, it is intrinsically void for containing illegal
dispositions and institution of an heir. CA held that the decedent was not
yet a citizen of the United States at the time he obtained the divorce decree
against Y. Being a Filipino, Z could not at the time validly obtain a divorce
decree. Since the first marriage still subsisted at the time Z married X, the
second marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void. X argues that the
pronouncement of her marriage with Z as bigamous does not detract from
the fact that Z had intended to leave something for her, entitling her to at
least the free portion of the Z’s estate.

Is X entitled to the free portion of the estate?

Suggested answer:
No. X is not entitled to the free portion of the estate.

Under Article Article 739 of the Civil Code, donations made between
persons in a state of adultery or concubinage are void. Article 1028 of the

334
same code mandates that the same prohibition be similarly applied to
testamentary provisions.

Since the courts have made the factual finding that the marriage between X
and Z was bigamous, necessarily, X and Z are considered as having been in
a state of concubinage in the context of Article 739. Significantly, a
conviction for adultery or concubinage need not be had before the
disabilities mentioned in paragraph (1) of Article 739 may effectuate.

335
ACP & CPG
Quiao v. Quiao
G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Digested by: Sumalinog, April B.

Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner

Brigido B. Quiao. The spouses Spouses Rita and Brigido had no assets when
they were married in1977. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor
of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment
of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido therefore was held not entitled to
any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership because he
is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
period. After more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.

The RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right
to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and
43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

336
Brigido claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of
the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines
net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on

dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. –Art
129 will govern.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the

properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of

gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute
community? NO.

Suggested answers:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time
of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in
so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is

337
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code.

2. While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the
same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to
due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community
assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived
of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the

husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92
of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And
when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass
is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.

338
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be
divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the
legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the net profits shall
be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal

partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband
and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts
or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that
the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of
them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective
heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing
will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,

339
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the
guilty party’s favor.

340
 Abrenica v. Abrenica
G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012
Digested by: Sunico, Mary Claire Therese

Erlando, Danilo and Abelardo are partners in the Law Firm. Later on,
Danilo and Abelardo filed two separate cases against Erlando to return
partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and
sought to recover from Erlando retainer fees that he received from two
clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained.
The Court ordered Erlando to remit to the law firm specific amount plus
interest and to return and render a full accounting of the amounts he
received under the retainer agreement.

Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had
levied on properties belonging to his children and his second wife Joena.
Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and her step-
children owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied and
that it was under their Absolute Community Property. She also insisted that
she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot
covered, which formed part of the absolute community of property. In
addition, they assert that Joena’s right to due process was also violated
when she was not made a party-in-interest to the proceedings in the lower
courts, even if her half of the absolute community of property was included
in the execution of the judgment rendered.

341
A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the law firm for
Erlando’s properties, he has been previously married to another woman but
their marriage has already been dissolved.

Does Joena have the right to claim the properties?

Suggested answer:
No, Joean have no rights to claim the properties under the Absolute
Community of Property.

As a general rule provided in Article 91 of the Family Code, the community

property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time
of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. One of the
exceptions provided is under Article. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code which
excludes from the community property, the property acquired before the
marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage; and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of that property.
In the case at bar, Erlando had a first wife and they had three children. This
means that Erlando has legitimate descendants from the former marriage
in such case the properties acquired by Erlando from the previous marriage
is excluded in the community property with his second wife. Thus, Joean
the second wife cannot claim neither these two vehicles nor the house and
lot belong to the second marriage.

342
 Francisco v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 177667, Sept. 17, 2008
Digested by: Tangpos, Jaime C.

An order was rendered declaring the marriage of C and M a nullity and

Compromise agreement was entered into by the estranged couple was
approved transferring by way of deed of donation to Siblings X and Y, as co-
owners, subject to conditions. The agreement covers the House and Lot
covered by TCT in the name of the estranged couple, C and M. Meanwhile,
a case for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachment was filed by
spouses G, against H and M ordering them to vacate the premise and to pay
the fees. Pending appeal, an order was issued granting the spouses G a
notice of sale by execution covering the House and Lot covered under the
compromise agreement. The grandmother of the, acting as guardian for the
Siblings X and Y learned about the execution, and thereafter, filed an
urgent motion to stop sale by execution, claiming that they are the rightful
owner the subject property, the parents already waived their rights to the
property through compromise agreement, M's obligation did not benefit the
family, and Lastly, The obligation was incurred from the joint effort of H
and M.

Whether the Property covered by the compromise agreement be made

answerable for the obligations incurred by M?

Suggested answer:
No.

343
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that
purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances means that the
conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife's personal
obligation.

Considering that the foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in

this case as the liability incurred by M arose from a judgment rendered in
an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner H.

Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Notice of Levy on

Execution,there was already annotated on the title the following
inscription:
1. Nullification of Marriage
2. Transferring the property by way of deed of donation to
Siblings X and Y, as co-owners.

Similarly in this case, M, who was then already living separately from C,
rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and H's own benefit. In fact, when
they entered into the lease agreement, M and H purported themselves to be
husband and wife. Spouses G’ bare allegation that Siblings X and Y lived
with M on the leased property is not sufficient to support the conclusion
that the judgment debt against M and H in the ejectment suit redounded to
the benefit of the family of M and C and Siblings X and Y.

344
From the foregoing, it is clear that both M and C have waived their title to
and ownership of the house and lot in favor of Siblings X and Y. The
property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of
legal basis.

345
 Buado v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009
Digested by: Toledo, Aubrey Angela S.

Spouses H and W filed a complaint for damages against A for her civil
liability arising from criminal offense of slander on April 30, 1984. Trial
court rendered a decision to let A pay for damages. Later on, it was
discovered that A’s personal properties are insufficient to satisfy the
judgment. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of A. An auction
sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale
was issued in favor of Spouses H and W. After almost one year, the husband
of A, B, filed a complaint for the annulment of certificate of dale and
damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.
He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction
sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of A amounted to
P40,000 only. The spouses H and W obtained the P500,000 worth of
property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition
of B.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the RTC and help
that RTC Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the
respondents in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they said
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for
reversing the decision given by the RTC.

Is the obligation of A arising from her criminal liability chargeable to the

conjugal partnership?

346
Suggested answer:
No. A’s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article

122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute
community where liabilities incurred by either souse by reason of a crime
or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of
gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the

civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by A
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Conjugal property
cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.

347
 Ugaldi v. Yassi
G.R. No. 130623, Feb. 29, 2008
Digested by: Tolentino, Romil C.

On February 15, 1951 Lorea Ugalde and Jon De Ysasi got married before
municipal Judge of Negros Occidental. The petitioner and respondent did
not execute marriage settlement before the marriage. On April 1957 they
got separated. Hence on May 26, 1964 the respondent allegedly contracted
another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith. After several years the
petitioner filed for a motion for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains against the respondent. In particular the petitioner asked for her
conjugal share in respondent’s inheritance as per settlement of state of
respondent’s parents.

The Trial court and Court of appeals both denied the petition of Ugalde.

Is there was a valid marriage between them absent of a valid marriage

license?

Suggested answer:
No. There is no valid marriage between the petitioner and respondent;
therefore there is no conjugal property to dissolve.

The existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid

marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was
null and void, and no community of property was formed between them.

348
 Munoz, Jr., v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 156125, Aug. 25, 2010

Digested by: Ungab, Junimark

A complaint for annulment of sale, before the RTC was filed by the
surviving heirs of Pedro Ramirez against another heir, Amado Ramirez,
Erlinda’s brother. The Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-
square meter residential house and lot in the name of the petitioner,
Francisco Muñoz. The residential lot in the subject property was previously
in the name of respondents, Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos. The
petitioner introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject
property since it was registered in Erlinda’s name; the residential lot was
part of a large parcel of land owned by Pedro Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla,
Erlinda’s parents. Is the property paraphernal?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Article 116 of the Family Code provides, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted
or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot
from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be

349
excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of
each spouse. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive
paraphernal property.

350
 Dewara v. Lamela
G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011
Digested by: Valde, Glean Myrrh A.

H and W were married before the enactment of the Family Code. H and W
were separated-in-fact because W went to work in the US while H stayed in
the Philippines.

In 1985, H, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of W, hit R.

R filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against H before the MTCC. The MTCC found H guilty of the
charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment and to pay
civil indemnity for the damages.

The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and it became final and
executory. So, the writ of execution on the civil liability was served on H,
but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name.

R requested the City Sheriff to levy on Lot which is registered in the name
of W, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of H. In the execution sale,
there were no interested buyers other than R. The City Sheriff issued a
certificate of sale to R to satisfy the civil liability in the decision against H.
W sought the annulment of the sale and the annulment of the issuance of
the new TCT because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive
property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of H.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

351
 1) Is the subject property the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita
or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo?
2) May the property be subject to levy and execution sale to answer for
the civil liability adjudged against H in the criminal case for serious
physical injuries, which judgment had already attained finality?

Suggested answers:
1) All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or
the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-
in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval
shall not affect the conjugal partnership. There is no dispute that
the subject property was acquired by spouses Hand W during their
marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were
married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not
execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations.
Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property
applies to the lot in question.

2) Yes. Even after having declared that the subject lot is the conjugal
property of spouses H and W, it does not necessarily follow that it
may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for
debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses.
Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal
partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for,

352
or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Article 163 of the Civil Code provides
that Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband
or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership.
However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and
indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil
Code have been covered. Nonetheless, at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned. The
enumeration listed in Article 161 should first be complied with
before the conjugal partnership may be held to answer for the
liability adjudged against H.

353
 Imani v. Metropolitan Bank Trust & Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 187023, Nov. 17, 2010
Digested by: Valladores, Ara Joy C.

XY signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with

6 other co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank
whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding Six Million Pesos. CPDTI incurred an indebtedness of
₱100,000.00 and ₱63,825.45 to which it defaulted in paying Metrobank.
Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no
avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and
its sureties, including XY. After due proceedings, the court rendered a
decision in favor of Metrobank and the sheriff levied a property owned by
XY and filed to consolidate the title to its name. XY opposed, stating that it
is part of her conjugal property.

Is the contention of XY proper?

Suggested answer:
No.

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this

presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.

354
The fact that the land was registered in the name of XY married to ZY is no
proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing.

Indubitably, XY utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property

belongs to the conjugal partnership.

355
 Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank
G.R. No. 183918, Jan. 15, 2014
Digested by: Darryl M. Vidad

Doctrine: Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property

of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is
owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not
overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the
husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required
before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. This presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

Question:
H executed an SPA in favor of his X, his brother, to mortgage his share in a
property in order to secure a loan. This loan extended by E bank in 1989
was fully paid by X in 1992. However, in 1996, X and their mother obtained
another loan over the same property which they failed to pay. E bank tried
to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Consequently,
a case ensued. H claims that E bank was negligent in approving the loan
and in accepting the subject property as security for the loan. H also blames
respondent for not conducting a more in-depth inquiry before approving
the loan since it should have been alerted by the fact that the mortgage
contract was executed without the consent of his wife even though the
property is registered under H’s and X’s name. Is there negligence on the
part of E bank?

356
Suggested answer:
No, there is no negligence on the part of E bank.

The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a

registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further. Moreover, the
presumption under Art 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is
in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved.

In this case, E bank had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates
of title of the properties mortgaged. As to the presumption, it only applies
to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In
essence, when the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and
there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse,
this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
Hence, this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved and does not make E bank negligent at all.

357
Charges to ACP & CPG

Ayala Investment and Development Corp., v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118305, Feb. 12, 1998
Digested by: Anor, Jennifer L.

Alfredo Ching, Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) Executive Vice President,

executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). When PBM failed to pay the loan, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Ching. The court ordered
PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of
P50,300,000 with interests. A writ of execution was issued on three of the
conjugal properties of Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching, and the sheriff
scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied. Spouses Ching opposed
the enforcement of the judgment on the ground that the subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership. Is their contention
valid?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the
extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.

358
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.

359
 Ching v. Court of Appeals
Feb 23, 2004 G.R No. 124642 Feb 23, 2004
Digest by: Arapan, Jemar E.

ABC Company obtained two loans from DEF bank. X, ABC’s Executive
Vice-President, executed a continuing guaranty with DEF for the payment
of the loans. ABC defaulted on the payments, and the Trial court issued a
writ of preliminary attachment against X and all his properties. Y, X’s wife,
filed a motion to set aside the levy on attachment, alleging that the 100,000
shares of stocks were acquired during marriage out of conjugal funds. X
and Y allege that the surety obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of
X’s profession or business.
May the shares of stocks be levied in order to answer for the loans
guaranteed by X?

Suggested answer:
No. Art. 121 of the Family Code state that the conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:

(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife,
also for the same purpose, in the cases she may legally bind the
partnership.

In this case, respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of

petitioners was benefited by X’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of ABC.

360
The contract of loan was between ABC and DEF, for the benefit of ABC. No
presumption can be inferred from the fact that when X entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would thereby be benefited. DEF was burdened to establish that such
benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

361
 Paquito V. Ando v. Andresito Y. Campo, et al.
G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011
Digested by: Baguio, May Irma

X is the president of X Corporation, an independent labor contractor. A, B,

C and D were hired by X Corporation as pilers or haulers. However, they
were eventually dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal
dismissal and some money claims with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) against X Corporation and X in a representative
capacity as president. NLRC ruled in favor of the dismissed employees. X
Corporation and X were directed to pay for the separation pay and award of
attorney’s fees. X Corporation and X appealed to NLRC, which affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision. Successively, the dismissed employees moved for
its execution. NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of
Personal Property over the conjugal property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of “ ‘X’ xxx married to ‘Y’ ”. X then filed an
action for prohibition before the RTC. X contended that the property
belonged to him and his wife Y. Hence, it could not could be levied for
reason of a judgment obligation incurred by him, in his representative
capacity and X Corporation. RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed X
to file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff.

Whether or not the conjugal property of X and his wife Y can be a subject of
the execution to answer for the judgment obligation incurred by X
Corporation and X in his representative capacity?

362
Suggested answer:
No, the conjugal property of X and his wife Y cannot be a subject of the
execution to answer for the judgment obligation incurred by X Corporation
and X in his representative capacity.

Deeply rooted is the jurisprudence which provides that the power of the
NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff,
therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that
of the judgment debtor.

In the instant case, the property sought to be levied does not belong to the
judgment debtor, X Corporation and X in his representative capacity, but it
does personally belong to X and his wife Y as reflected on the TCT. X may
indeed be considered a "third party" in relation to the property subject of
the execution.

Hence, the conjugal property of X and his wife Y cannot be a subject of the
execution to answer for the judgment obligation incurred by X Corporation
and X in his representative capacity. Consequently, NLRC cannot execute
its judgment over the said property.

363
 Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corp Wilfrido Martinez, Miguel
Lacson, and Ricardo Lopa
GR No. 143382, November 29, 2006
Digested by: Baje, Beverly Keren Lou B.

Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez,

applied for a P12, 000,000 credit accommodations with Security Bank and
Trust Company. The Security Bank and Trust Company approved the
application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent
corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by
individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo
A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with the corporation
for the payment of the loan. The corporation was not able to pay all its debt
balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. The
Security Bank and Trust Company filed a complaint against Mar Tierra
Corporation and individual respondents. The Regional Trial Court issued a
writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal
house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the
benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement

entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party?

Suggested answer:
No.

364
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Jurisprudence further provides that, in acting as a
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, the direct
recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts
an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption
that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On
the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction
cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family.

In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
Security Bank and Trust Company and Mar Tierra Corporation, was solely
for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity
agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit.
Security Bank and Trust Company had the burden of proving that the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the
transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.

365
Therefore, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for an indemnity
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party.

366
 Go v. Yamane
G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006
Digested by: Baldivia, Xyra Jane B.

During their marriage, Muriel and Leo acquired a property lot which was
registerd in the name of Muriel. The services of Atty. Guillermo were
acquired by Muriel and her sisters to recover from C Corporation the
balance of the purchase price of the sale of the exclusive property of Muriel
and her sisters.The recovery was done during the marriage. The Spouses
property lot was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney’s fees. Atty Guillermo
filed a motion for execution of a charging lien.

Can the subject property answer for the charging lien of Atty Guillermo?

Suggested answer:
No, the conjugal property cannot answer for the charging lien.

Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when
she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver
the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these
circumstances in the present case means that the conjugal asset may not be
bound to answer for one of the spouse’s personal obligation.

The expenses incurred by Muriel for the recovery of the balance of the
purchase price of her paraphernal property are her exclusive responsibility.

367
This piece of land may not be used to pay for her indebtedness, because her
obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges against the conjugal
partnership. Moreover, her rights to the property are merely inchoate prior
to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

368
 Pelayo v. Perez
G.R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005
Digested by: Bongalos, Monica Marie

David conveyed two parcels of land to Perez. Loreza, wife of David,

witnessed the execution of the Deed but signed only on the third page in the
space provided for witnesses.

Perez insisted Loreza to sign the first two pages of the deed but the latter
refused. Because of her refusal, Perez was not able to register the land.
Hence, Perez instituted a complaint for specific performance against David
and Loreza.

David claimed that the Deed was only simulated. David and Perez only
made it appear that Perez, a known activist/leftist, bought the land in order
to scare the illegal occupants therein, hence, the intentional omission of
Loreza’s signature so that the Deed could not be registered.
David maintained that the Deed was without his wife’s consent. Hence, it is
void.

Was there marital consent to the sale of the conjugal property?

Suggested answer:
Yes, there was marital consent.

The law provides that the husband cannot encumber any real property of
the conjugal property without the wife’s consent. The wife may, during the

369
marriage, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract the husband
entered into without her consent.

In the case at bar, Loreza knew of the full import of the transaction between
Perez and her husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale,
she, in effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal
property.

Also, despite Perez’s repeated demands for Loreza to affix her signature on
all the pages of the deed of sale, Loreza still did not file a case for
annulment of the deed of sale. Thus, if the transaction was indeed entered
into without Loreza’s consent, it is quite puzzling that she did absolutely
nothing to seek the nullification of the assailed contract.

370
Acts of Ownership, ACP or CPG

Amada Cotoner-Zacarias v. Sps. Alfredo

and the Heirs of Paz Revilla
G. R. 190901, November 12, 2014
Digested by: Cabrillos, L.

Spouses W and H filed a case against Mrs. A for Annulment of Sales and
Transfers of Title and Reconveyance of Property with Damages involving
their conjugal property, a 15,000 sq meter unregistered land located at
Silang, Cavite for allegedly disposing of said property by forging their
signatures in the “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa” or Deed of Sale document.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the spouses, declaring the sale
void and the reinstatement of the title/ tax declaration as well as the
possession of the subject property. It was proven by evidence that the
signature of H was indeed forged.

Mrs. A appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA where it sustained the
trial court’s decision. Hence, she filed a Petition for Review before the SC.
Mrs. A argued that the lower court never declared that the signature of W in
the document was forged, and considering that the property is conjugal in
nature, the one-half share of W should not be declared as void.
Is the contention of Mrs. A correct?

Suggested answer:
No.

371
Art. 172 of the Civil Code provides that the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by
law.

Also, Art. 96 of the Family Code provides in part that the administration
and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the common properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration, but these powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse.

Although the trial court did not declare whether the signature of W was
forged or not, W’s signature alone would not bind the subject property, as
the law requires that in disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property,
there must be authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse.

372
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., v. Pascual
GR 163744 February 29,2008
Digested by: Calibugan, Rudeza Sheena A.

Spouses A and B were married in January 1985 and during their union,
bought from Spouses XYZ a 250-square meter lot with a three-door
apartment located in Makati City. In 1994, B filed a suit for the declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. In 1997, B along
with Spouses RST, obtained a Php 58 million loan from Bank M. In order to
secure the obligation, B and Spouses RST executed several real estate
mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including the subject lot. Among the
documents B submitted to procure the loan were a photocopy of the
marriage-nullifying decision of the RTC and a document denominated as
"waiver" that A purportedly executed in favor of B. When B and the Spouses
RST failed to pay their loan obligation, Bank M initiated a foreclosure
proceedings over the properties. Getting wind of the foreclosure
proceedings, A filed in June 2000, before the RTC a complaint to declare
the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property and alleged that the
property, which is still a conjugal property, was mortgaged without his
consent.

Is the property in contest form part of the conjugal properties of A and B?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the disputed property is conjugal.

373
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife,' applies. This article,
however, does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds
of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear.

The declaration of nullity of marriage between A and B does not ipso facto
dissolve the regime of community of property of the spouses. While the
declared nullity of marriage severed the marital bond and dissolved the
conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the
liquidation and partition of the partnership. In this pre-liquidation
scenario, Article 493 of the New Civil Code shall govern the property
relationship between the former spouses. Under this provision, B has the
right to mortgage or even sell her 1/2 undivided interest in the disputed
property even without the consent of A. However, the rights of Bank M, as
mortgagee, are limited only to 1/2 undivided portion that B owned. The
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided
portion of the lot is null and void, A not having consented to the mortgage
of his undivided half.

374
 Fuentes v. Roca
G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Digested by: Carillo, Gerard Joe

A and B got married in 1950. In 1988, A sold a parcel of land he inherited

from his mother to Spouses C, with the help of an attorney, without the
consent of B. Through a questionable affidavit of consent, A, Spouses C,
and A’s attorney finalized the sale on January 18, 1989. Eight years later,
and upon the death of A and B, their children filed an action for annulment
of sale and reconveyance of the land against Spouses C on the grounds that
the sale to the spouses was void since their mother did not give her consent
to it. Does the Old Civil Code apply, or will the Family Code apply in this
case? If so when will a wife’s action, who gave no consent to her husband’s
sale of conjugal real property, prescribe?

Suggested answer:
The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code.

The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Furthermore, the Family
Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal
partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Article 124 of the Family
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void.

375
In the case at bar, when A sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on
January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already
the Family Code. Almost a year after the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988.

Therefore, the Family Code applies. And their action to assail the validity of
the sale is imprescriptible.

376
 Flores v. Lindo
G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
Digested by: Cuadra, Arthcris T.

Principle:
Mortgage of property within the community or the conjugal partnership is
void if done without the consent of the other spouse. Nevertheless, the
execution of special powers of attorney perfects the contract of mortgage. In
other words, the SPA cures the defect of the mortgage.

Question:
On October 31,1995, W was able to obtain a loan secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over a real property under her and his husband's name H but
without the consent of the former. Partial payments were made by her
through checks but the same were dishonored. As a result, the creditor filed
a complaint against the wife.

The RTC dismissed the case as the mortgage was, in the eyes of the court a
quo, void for having been executed without the necessary consent of the
husband, despite the SPA executed later by the husband for the wife. It
must be noted that the SPA was executed on November 4, 1995, only a few
days after the wife entered into the contract of loan with mortgage.
According to the RTC the subsequent execution of the SPA cannot be made
to retroact to the date of the execution of the real estate mortgage.

Did the court commit any error in dismissing the case and what is the effect
of the execution of the SPA, towards the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage?

377
Suggested answer:
Yes, the court acted in error.

Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers
of the administration do not include disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also
state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

In this case, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed on October
31,1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on November 4, 1995.
Hence, the execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

378
 Heirs of Go v. Servacio
G.R. No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011
Digest by: De Asis, Quejarra R.

A conjugal property with a total area of 17,140sq/m was owned by Spouses

Go. After the death of the Wife Martha Go, Protacio, Sr (husband) and Rito
(son) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560sq/m to Servacio.
However, the petitioner-heirs demanded the return of the property on the
ground that sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of
the conjugal property between Protacio, Sr. and Martha, under Article 130
of the Family Code, was null and void. Is the sale of the portion of the
property which belonged to the conjugal property prior to the liquidation
valid?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that disposition by sale of a portion of the
conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation
mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said
portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to
another heir of the deceased spouse.

In the herein case, upon Martha’s death, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio,
Sr. and the other heirs of Martha with respect to her share in the assets of
the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although
becoming a co-owner with his children could not yet assert or claim title to
any specific portion of the Martha’s share without an actual partition of the

379
property being first done. Then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Marta’s share.

Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as
co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily
void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.

380
 Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
Digested by: de la Cruz, John Aron Gil B.

Uy and Rosca cohabited with each other and bore children out of their
relationship. During the cohabitation, Rosca purchased with her
paraphernal funds a parcel of land for which a title was issued indicating
“Rosca, married to Uy.” The couple were not legally married and later on
physically separated due to an alleged affair by Uy with another woman.
Rosca later on sold the said land to Buena without the consent of Uy. Uy
then questioned the validity of the sale alleging that it was made without his
consent. Was the consent of Uy necessary such that the sale shall be
rendered invalid?

Suggested answer:
No.

The law provides that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. The co-ownership shall not include property
purchased through one’s paraphernal funds.

In this case, Rosca successfully proved that she purchased the subject
property with her paraphernal funds. The indication in the title stating

381
“Rosca, married to Uy'' does not legally entitle Uy to be a co-owner of the
property. Thus, Rosca being the sole owner of the subject property, does
not need Uy’s consent to dispose of the same. The sale was therefore valid.

382
 Heirs of Jarque v. Jarque
G.R. No. 196733 November 21, 2018
Digested by: Dela Pena, Jefferson

X and his co petitioners are the successors of R, one of the Children of L

and S.

Lot-B, the property in issue is owned by L and S, who lived together as

husband and wife. L died in 1946. After the death of L, S took charge of all
the deceased’s properties. S executed acts of ownership, including the act of
selling the property Lot-B was reacquired by D, the granddaughter of S,
when the latter asked her to repurchase the property.

When X died, they questioned the ownership of D on the whole property,

arguing that S did not have the right to execute ownership on the whole
property and thus the subsequent selling and repurchasing was invalid and
produced no rights to D.

Did S have the right to take charge on all of her husband’s property?

Suggested answer:
No.

Under the Old Civil Code, the default property regime of the husband and
wife is the conjugal partnership of gains. This includes:

383
 (1) Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition
is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only;
(2) Property obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses
or of either of them; and
(3)The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the
marriage, derived from the partnership property, or from that which
belongs separately to either of the spouses. Unless proved otherwise,
properties acquired during the marriage are considered partnership
property.

Upon the death of either spouse, the conjugal partnership is dissolved. The
surviving spouse is entitled to his or her ½ share in the partnership, while
the remaining half belongs to the estate of the deceased which will be
inherited by his forced heirs.

L died in 1946, prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code. At the time of
his death, the governing law as to the property relations between husband
and wife and the successional rights among the decedent’s heirs is the Old
Civil Code.

L and S, having lived together as husband and wife, are presumed to have
been lawfully married. When L died and the partnership was dissolved, S
acquired her ½ share in the conjugal partnership, while the other half
devolved to the estate of L.

384
In turn, their four children succeeded to the 2/3 of the estate of L as his
forced heirs. On the other hand, S’ successional rights over the estate of L
was limited to the usufruct of the legitimate children’s share.

Facts are absent that show that it was either the exclusive property of L or
the paraphernal property of S. Hence, it belongs to the conjugal
partnership, to be divided equally between them or their estate upon the
dissolution of marriage. However, it was not shown that a partition was
effected between S or the heirs of the estate of L.

The absence of a partition between the estates of S and L resulted in a co-

ownership between S and her children over the properties. This co-
ownership remained and continued even when the Civil Code took effect on
August 30, 1950. Thus, the Civil Code provisions on co- ownership now
govern their rights.

385
Property Regimes, Dissolution
Villaranda v. Villaranda
G.R. No. 153447, Feb. 23, 2004
Digested by: Dela Victoria, Keeu Emmanuell Q.

Vicente and his wife Ana inherited a 64.22 square - meter property located
at Divisoria Cagayan De oro City. Honorio, who happens to be Vicente’s
Brother, on the other hand owned a 500 square – meter portion of a
property located at Macasandig, Cagayan De Oro.

Years Later on July 6 1976, both Vicente and Honorio agreed and issued a
Deed of Exchange which provided that Vicente agreed to convey to Honorio
the 64.22 square – meter property in exchange for the 500 Square – meter
property in Macasandig. Ana’s Signature was not found on this Deed of
Exchange. Consequently, Honorio took possession of the property and
constructed a building thereon.

However, it was discovered by Honorio and his wife that the property in
Macasandig cannot be used or disposed because Vicente has failed to
delineate the specific 500 square – meter portion of the property. They
brought an action for Specific Performance before the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan De Oro City and asked that Vicente be compelled to follow the
agreement as mentioned in the Deed of Exchange.

Vicente on the other hand argued that the Deed of Exchange was void as it
did not contain the Signature of Honorio’s Wife, Ana.

386
Is the Deed of Exchange valid?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the Deed of Exchange is valid. The provisions of the Civil Code are
applicable to the case at bar, since the Deed of Exchange had been entered
into prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the absence of the
wife’s signature on the Deed made it only voidable, not void.

In the case at bar, the Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the
Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied
prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to give them retroactive effect
is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code, are applicable
to the present case. The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio and Ana’s
conjugal properties. According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with
Article 173 of the same Code. The latter states that an action to annul an
alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. Videlicet,
the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband’s alienation or
encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely
voidable.

Therefore, since the records are absent of any action to annul the transfer
made by Honorio, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable.

387
 Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.
G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
Digested by: Derecho, April C.

Spouses X and Y and others were prosecuted for murder. RTC rendered a
consolidated decision acquitting X of the charge for insufficiency of
evidence but finding Y and another persons guilty as charged and sentenced
them to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages. Which was affirmed by
the CA with modification. A writ was issued which resulted in the levy of
real properties registered in the names of spouses. Spouses filed a motion
to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were
conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of X hence it cannot be levied and
executed upon because they married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Spouses further contend that under the Civil Code their default
property regime is conjugal partnership of gains. Can conjugal properties of
spouses X and Y can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Y’s
civil liability in the murder case.

Suggested answer:
Yes. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their
conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to
have acquired vested rights in specific assets.

388
It is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach
back and automatically convert into absolute community of property
relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988
excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.

However, Article 105 of the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal
partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of
gains under the Civil Code.

Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in

deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of X and Y may be held to
answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Y in the murder case. Its Article
122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them
be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before

the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as
the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of

389
the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.

Since X does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Y has no exclusive property
of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the
murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have
been covered. Those responsibilities are as follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of
this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by
the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one
of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or
minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional, vocational, or other activity for self-
improvement;

390
 (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement;
and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
found to be groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the

foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

Contrary to X’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the

criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Y, which "at the time of
liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

391
 Grande v. Antonio
G.R. No. 206248, Feb. 18, 2014
Digested by: Derecho, April C.

A and B live together as husband and wife while B was still married. Their
illicit affair bore two sons X and Y. The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry. When their relationship turned sour, B left for the
United States with her two children. This prompted respondent A to file a
Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors. The RTC RTC ruled that sole parental authority and physical
custody should be to A. However, CA reversed and grand custody to B with
visitational rights to B. However, CA further ordered that surname of A
should be entered as surname of X and Y in the Civil Registry. Can A
compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation?

Suggested answer:
No.

Art. 176 of RA No. 9255 provides that illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document

392
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that Art. 176 gives illegitimate children
the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It
is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who
is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.

393
 Noveras v. Noveras
G.R. No. 188289, Aug. 20, 2014
Digested by: Christian Dominic Diola
Civil Law Review: Property Regimes, Dissolution

X and Y got married on 1988 in Quezon City where they did not execute any
marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage, they then
subsequently resided in California, USA where they eventually acquired
American citizenship and begot two children. They now own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. In 2001, X returned to the Philippines. In
2003, X cohabited with Z. Upon learning this fact, Y obtained a decree of
divorce from the Superior Court to California in June 2005 and
subsequently filed a petition for Judicial Separation in the Philippines.
How should their properties be distributed?

Suggested answer:
As a rule, in the absence of a marriage settlement, as in this case, the
system of absolute community of property shall govern. Therefore, The net
assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines shall be divided equally between them, and they should each
give their children their presumptive legitimes which is ½ of their share of
the properties in accordance with Art. 102 of the Family Code in relation to
Art. 888 of the New Civil Code.

With respect to their properties in the USA the Philippine courts did not
acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia.
Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well

394
as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

395
 Siochi vs. Giozon
A.M. No. RTJ G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010
Digested by: Dungog, Yasie T.

X wife filed with the RTC a petition for legal separation against Y her
husband. Subsequently while the case was pending, Y entered into
anagreement to buy and sell to Z the 3,000 sq. parcel of land in the name of
Y married to X.

Z already paid the earnest money of 5 million, however Y instead executed a

deed of donation of his property in favor to his daughter C and they
subsequently sold it to IDRI. Thus, Z filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale, with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary
rstraining order.

Can the husband sell the conjugal property, being the sole administrator,
without consent of the wife?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 24 provides that “The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

396
In this case, husband Y cannot validly sell the property to Z without the
consent of X wife.

397
Article 50, 35(6) liquidation

Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City

GR No. 122749, July 31, 1996
Digested by: Edemne, Mardelyn D.

Tony and Wella were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. Tony sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code in the Regional Trial
Court. On July 29, 1994, the trial court granted the petition and ordered
that the marriage of Tony and Wella is null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity and
spouses are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code,
within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.

However, Tony argued thatArticles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code in

relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the same Code should be held controlling
to govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initioby reason of psychological incapacity and Article 147
of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.Are the arguments of Tony meritorious?

Suggested answer:
No, the arguments of Tony are not meritorious.

398
Article 147 of the Family provides that, when a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has
clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly
provides that:
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivo his
or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of
the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall
forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their
common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all
of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of
nullity of the marriage.

In the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them,

the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51
and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute

399
community or the conjugal partnership of gains of the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages.

In light of the foregoing, a void marriage, as in this case, regardless of the

cause thereof, including psychological incapacity, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the same
provision of Article 147 of the Family Code.

400
 Elna Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr
G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003
Digested by: Egos, Czareeve, Y.

In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, X moved in to Y’s

residence and lived with him. During the time they lived together, they
purchased a condominium unit on installment. They got married in 1985.

In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between X and Y void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of
their conjugal properties. The properties were divided and the custody of
children was awarded to X, being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, X is
directed to transfer ownership of the condominium unit because it was
declared to have been the exclusive property of Y, considering that the said
condominium was purchased on installment basis by Y with his exclusive
funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell.

X filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an

order that Art. 147 of the Family Code should apply, being the marriage
void ab initio. However, the court reminded X of the previous agreement in
dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling
regarding the condominium unit. X filed special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its Decision dismissed
the petition for review for lack of merit.

401
Is the condominium unit an exclusive property of Y considering foregoing
facts?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides that when a man and a woman who
are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to
the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of their family and of the household.

In the case at bar, assuming arguendo that X did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household.

402
Hence, Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a
co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.

403
 Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 127358, March 31, 2005
Digested by: Elnar, Melinda C.

Mr. B filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the

ground of psychological incapacity of his wife Mrs. C which was granted by
the court. The court ordered Mr. B to pay Mrs. C one-half or P1,837,667.89
out of his retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
notwithstanding that said retirement benefits are gratuitous and exclusive
property of Mr. B and also to deliver to Mrs. C one-half of his shares of
stock with the Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies
although said shares of stock were acquired by Mr. B before his marriage to
Mrs. C and are therefore again his exclusive properties. Mr. B claims that
the court decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence. In Mr.
B correct?

Suggested answer:
No, Mr B. is not correct.

In case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable

and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42
and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not
apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,

404
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership as reflected in
Article 147 of the Family Code.

405
 Alain Diño v. Ma. Caridad L. Diño
GR No. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011
Digested by Elumbaring, Jeric M.

A husband filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his

wife, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code,
and was later on granted by the trial court whose decision reads in the
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Did the trial court err when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

406
 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under

Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made
by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

407
 Yu v. Reyes-Caprio
G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
Digested by: Enerlan, Edwin A.

X filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Y. Y, moved

to submit the case for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations(incidental issues) were mere consequences
of the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

X opposed the motion arguing that the incidental issues and the issues of
declaration of nullity of marriage can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved.

RTC judge Reyes granted the motion of Y, saying that the main cause of
action is the declaration of nullity of marriage and the incidental issues are
mere ancillary incidents there to. X moved for reconsideration but denied,
X then filed for certiorari with the CA. CA affirm the judgment of the RTC.

Should the petition of nullity of marriage be resolved first before the

evidence on custody, support, and property relations be accepted?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Consistent with section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the court finds it is

more prudent to rule first the declaration of nullity of marriage on the

408
ground of each party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations.

If the court eventually finds the respective petitions of both parties to

nullify their marriage meritorious on the basis of either or both of the
parties is psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital
obligation then the parties shall proceed with Article 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.

Before a final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued, and

pending such ruling on the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage,
the court finds no legal ground at this stage, to proceed with the reception
of evidence in regard to the issues on custody, support, and property
relations, since these are mere incidentals of the nullity of the parties
marriage.

409
 Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr., v. Eden Villena Aguila
G.R. No. 202370, Sept. 23, 2013
Digested by: Fuentes, Piccola C.

Juan and Eden got married on September 7, 1985. On June 7, 1986 they
gave birth to their daughter. After five (5) months, Juan left their conjugal
dwelling and has not communicated with Eden or their daughter since.

October 7, 2003 Eden filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage citing under Article 36 of the Family Code psychological
incapacity and such petition states that they have no conjugal properties
whatsoever. On May 7, 2007 the Regional Trial Court nullified their
marriage and provides dissolution of their conjugal property, if any.

Four (4) months after, of the same year, Eden discovered properties
registered under Juan married to Rubina which then she filed a
manifestation and motion. However, Juan alleged that Eden already waived
her rights on the discovered properties. The Regional Trial Court directed
Juan and Eden to partition by proper instruments of conveyance the
properties in question which the Court of Appeals further affirmed. Are the
properties discovered by Eden acquired during her marriage with Juan thus
falling under their conjugal property and thus subject for partition between
them?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the properties discovered by Eden proved to be acquired during the
validity of her marriage with Juan. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties

410
were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity
of Juan and Eden’s marriage. The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive
of the civil status of the registered owner.

411
 Marietta N. Barido v. Leonardo V. Nonato
G.R. No. 176492, Oct. 20, 2014
Digested by: Gamao, Arthelly D.

In the course of the marriage between B (wife) and N (husband), they

acquired property consisting of a house and lot. When their marriage was
declared void in the ground of psychological incapacity, N asked B for
partition for their co-owned property, but B refused. N filed a complaint for
partition. B argues that the property has been sold to their common
children. The RTC, applying Article 129 of the Family Code ordered: (1)
equitable partition of the house and lot, (2) to reimburse the children of the
amount paid by them, and (3) delivery of presumptive legitimes. The CA
ruled that Article 147 of the Family Code is applicable, but the disposition of
the RTC was still correct.

Does a marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity

governed by Article 129 of the Family Code which provides for the
procedure in cases of dissolution or by Article 147 which covers the effects
of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations?

Suggested answer:
Article 147 applies.

Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of
void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. This particular kind of
co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal

412
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must
be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void.

Here, all these elements are present. The term “capacitated” in the first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have
existed on the part of either N or B. They lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.

413
Liquidation, Art. 147 or 148

Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993
Digested by: Gimena, PLK

Delia, an OFW working in Saudi Arabia was married to Roberto on

November 29, 1976. In 1983, Roberto became unemployed and depended
on Delia for subsistence. While in Saudi Arabia, Delia purchased real and
personal properties out of her personal earnings with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00 under the possession and administration of
Roberto. However, sometime that year, Delia learned that Roberto has been
previously married to Emerlinda on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid
and subsisting and had another woman other than them whom he was
cohabiting with. Delia sought to be the sole and executive owners of said
properties on the ground that their marriage is null and void?

Is Delia entitled to the ownership of said properties upon the liquidation of

their assets?

Suggested answer:
Yes, Delia is entitled to the ownership of the properties.

As provided under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each other as husband and wife live
under a void marriage, the properties acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

414
Moreover, when only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to their surviving descendants. In the absence of any
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.

In this case, as an incident to their void marriage, Delia who is the innocent
spouse is entitled to the properties in the absence of any of their
descendants.

415
 Ocampo v. Ocampo
GR 198908, Aug. 3, 2015
Digested by: Ligutan, Ruel Eduard P.

X and Y got married on 16 January 1978. But the marriage was soon to be
dissolved when on 10 September 1990, X filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Y, before the RTC, on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Three years after the RTC
granted the petition and declared the marriage as null and void. To
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains, the trial court directed the
parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties, and
if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with
regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of
their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced
evidence in support of their respective stand. Subsequently, the trial court
rendered decision stating that the properties declared by the parties belong
to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing. X assailed the Order stating that Y
did not contribute and should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
Is X’s contention correct?

Suggested answer:
No. X is incorrect.

Jurisprudence provides that in a void marriage, as in those declared void

under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article

416
148 of the Family Code. Article 147, applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void. As a rule, under this provision
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares.

In the case at bar, X failed to show that the properties were acquired solely
on her own efforts. The properties acquired during their marriage are
presumed conjugal. Hence, Y should be given his equal share as a co-owner
of the said properties.

417
 Paterno v. Paterno
G.R. No. 213687, Jan. 8, 2020
Digested by: Luansing, Annielou L.

Simon and Dina were married in 1987. After a decade, however, Simon left
the family abode and filed a petition before the RTC seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Dina on the ground of the latter's psychological
incapacity. The petition was granted.

The proceedings, however, for the liquidation, partition, distribution of the

common properties and the delivery of their children's presumptive
legitimes remained pending. In such proceedings, the following are the
properties which Dina alleged were admitted by both parties to be co-
owned by them: (1) House and lot in Ayala Alabang Village; (2)
Condominium unit in Rockwell; (3) Club membership at the Riviera Gold
and Country Club; (4) Shares of stock in Little Gym; (5) Shares of stock in
Mamita Realty; (6) Dodge Caravan; (7) Paintings by various known artists;
(7) Pieces of accent furniture; and (8) Collection of books by various known
authors.

Simon objected to the characterization of the said properties as being

admittedly co-owned, and contended that while the Ayala Alabang and
Rockwell properties were purchased during the parties' union, portions of
the mortgage payments for these properties have been made after they
separated in fact solely from his exclusive funds. Thus, such payments
should not be considered part of the co-owned properties and must be
adjudged to belong to him exclusively.

418
Is Simon correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.

This notwithstanding, it must be borne in mind that the presumption that

the properties are co-owned and must be shared equally is not conclusive
but merely disputable.

Applied in this case, equal sharing of the entire properties is not possible
since the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were still being amortized
when the parties separated. As such, Dina's equal share shall only pertain to
the paid portion before their separation, for in this peculiar kind of co-
ownership, the partnership is considered terminated upon the parties'
separation or desistance to continue said relations.

419
 Paterno v. Arcaya-Chua
G.R. No. 180226, April 26, 2017
Digested by: Abdul Jomar P Magandia

The spouses P and L had been living together for more or less ten years
until P left the family home in June 1998. Two years after, the husband filed
a case for the declaration of absolute nullity of his marriage and this was
granted. The decision attained finality, leaving the issue regarding the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the union. L
wanted her ex-husband to testify on his other alleged possessions and
earnings since 1998 and thereafter until the formal severance of their
marital ties. L argued that despite already being separated de facto, as long
as a couple remains married (in paper), pending a court declaration of
nullity of their union, all the properties gained by each in the meantime
before the judicial declaration will be included in the co-ownership regime.
Are the properties acquired by P after the declaration of absolute nullify of
their marriage still included or still part of the co-ownership of P and L?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides that when a man and a woman who
are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

420
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

In the case at bar, it should be reminded of the legal effect of a confirmation

of a void ab initio marriage: it is retroactive to the time when the marriage
ceremony transpired. In short, after the trial court declared the nullify of
the marriage, it is as if as if no marriage took place. This means then that
during their ten-year cohabitation, P and L lived together merely as
common-law spouses. This is where Article 147 comes in, dealing with
those "properties acquired while they lived together . . . obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry. . ." and the joint effort includes "the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household." Obviously, the
'cohabitation' of the parties will definitely not include the years since P left
L and the family home.

421
 Bangayan v. Bangayan
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013
Digested by: Manalili, Genesis Caesar C.

B married A in Caloocan City and had three children. B developed a

romantic relationship with S who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by B. S’s father was against the relationship. S
brought B to an office in Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. S, knowing B’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered. The relationship of B and S ended when S
left for Canada. B asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with S in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the
case. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer. Is B
correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes. B and S is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states: In
cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.

422
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith. B and S cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.

423
Cohabitation

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Digested by: Roncesballes, Vhal

H and W are married, during their marriage, H acquired several real

properties including a 700 square meter parcel of land. The deed of sale
over the said property was signed by H alone as vendee; one of the signing
witnesses to the deed of sale was petitioner K, when the TCT was issued, it
was named under the name of H married to K. During this acquisition, K is
legally married to L. When H died, W sought for the cancellation of the
transfer certificate, she alleged that she was the surviving spouse of H and
was erroneously registered and made in the name of H married to K. K
denied the allegation that the subject property was acquired by H and W
during their marriage and claimed that they were married and lived
together as a married couple and that their union produced a son.

K argued that the subject property is owned in common by her and H since
it was acquired during their cohabitation and article 148 of the family code
provides for the sharing of properties acquired by persons united in a
defective marriage

Is C correct?

Suggested answer:
No.

424
Under article 147 of the Family code, When a man and woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal, meanwhile article 148
of the Family code states that If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited xxx The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

A man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions
but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community
of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case
law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner K has a subsisting marriage with
another man, a legal impediment which disqualified K from even legally
marrying H.

425
 Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. de Batocael
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001
Digested by: Menil, Mario Josshua C.

Francisco and his wife Zosima were the registered owners of two lots in
Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-
in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in
which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco
registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after
his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin
Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and
store. The relationship between Cirila and Francisco were marred with
controversies. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they
slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that
Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper
and that Francisco was too old for her. Francisco later on died and made a
donation inter vivos ceding a portion of the lot together with his house to
Cirila, who accepted the donation. The deed stated that the donation was
being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over
the past ten years.” The heirs filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration
of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and
damages. They alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco
and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Was the donation made void under Art. 87 of the Family Code?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

426
The donation made was void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law

relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the
testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of
“Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit
and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not
demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –
employee. Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women
holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of donation
by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

427
 Republic v. Dayot
G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008
Digested by: Montallana, Kessey N.

In 1986, Jose and Felisa were married through the execution of a sworn
affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and
being unmarried they have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. In 1993, Jose filed a complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that he did not execute the
sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years. Asserting further that the said affidavit was false,
since they have only been living together for five months immediately
preceding the alleged marriage.
Was the marriage between Jose and Felisa void ab initio?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio for not
complying with the requisite marriage license.

Article 35 of the Family Code provides:

The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered by the
preceding chapter;
xxx

428
In the case at bar, Jose contends that the affidavit was false since he and
Felisa only lived together for five months and not five years which is the
required cohabitation period under Article 34 of the same code to be
exempt form procuring the required marriage license.

Therefore, the marriage of Jose and Felisa cannot fall under the exemption
from marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code and accordingly
is considered void ab ignition as pronounced in Article 35 of the same code.

429
 Ninal et.al.v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Digested by: Navarrete, Andrew M.

X was married to Y on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely A,

B and C, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by X to Y, the latter died on
April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of G. One year
and eight months later, X and respondent Z got married without any
marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived
together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
X died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of X and
respondent Z alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional
rights.

Is the second marriage of Pepito valid?

Suggested answer:
No. The marriage of X and respondent Z is void for absence of the marriage
license.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their

430
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio. However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided
in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an

affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the
time of X’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent Z, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, X and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both X and respondent Z had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, X marriage to respondent Z is still void.

431
Part 5, Book 1. Family Ties and the
Paternity & Filiation of Children

432
No Suit without Earnest Efforts

Edwin N. Tribiana v. Lourdes M. Tribiana

G.R. No. 137359, September 13, 2004
Digest by: Nuneza, Aladin Rolando A.

E and L are married. One year after their marriage. E left their conjugal
home with their 1 year and 4 months old daughter, K. Depriving L her
lawful custody of their children. L filed a complaint for habeas corpus
against E. E filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that L
failed to alleged earnest effort to compromise in her complaint before filing
the complaint as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code. L filed her
opposition E’s motion claiming that there were prior effort to compromise
but it was a failure. L attached the copy of the Certification to File Action
issued by the barangay since the previous efforts to compromise with E
have failed. Is the contention of E valid?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 151 of the Family Code provides:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
must be dismissed.

433
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.

In this case, although L failed to allege in her complaint that she resorted to
compromise but she attached a Barangay Certification to File Action on her
opposition to the motion of E. This effectively established that the parties
tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. Evidently,
Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the
Family Code.

434
 Esquivias v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119714, May 29, 1997
Digested by: Oppus, Johvin Dave E.

A was the owner of a piece of land and the house standing thereon. B, C,
and D were the children of A and were named beneficiaries thereof. A deed
of absolute sale for the house and lot was executed by A and Atty. X. X
being the husband of B. Several years later, another deed of sale was
executed by A to C for the house and lot, and prior to such sale, C filed a
free patent in his name covering the entire property and was approved later
on and a certificate of title was issued. It also turned out that D filed a free
patent and succeeded and a certificate was issued in D’s name.

Atty. X discovered that the subject land was titled in the name of C and D. X
filed an action for reconveyance and damages before the RTC. RTC ruled in
favor of X. Not satisfied by the decision, C and D elevated the case to the CA
which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the case on
basis of its finding that there was no compliance with the mandatory
requirements of Art. 222 of the new civil code. Was the CA correct in their
decision?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 222 of the Civil Code provides that no suit shall be filed or
maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but the same

435
has failed but Art. 222 must be construed in the light of Article 217 which
states that “family relations” include only those (a) between Husband and
wife, (b) between parent and child, (c) among other ascendants and their
descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters.

Atty X is not included in the enumeration of Art 217, as he is only a brother-

in-law of C and D by virtue of his marriage to B. X relationship is based on
affinity and not on consanguinity and thus a stranger with respect to the
family of his wife, as such the mandatory requirement of “earnest effort
toward a compromise” does not apply to him.

436
 Martinez v. Martinez
G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005
Digested by: Ouano, Jansen Ynrik V.

H executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the

property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely A, B, and C
designating B as administrator of the estate. In October 1997, H died. A
then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September
1996 where it appears that the land was sold to B and his wife X. A filed a
complaint against his brother B and sister-in-law X for the annulment of
the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses B and X wrote to A
demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused
to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful
detainer against A. A argued that the unlawful detainer case should not
prosper by reason that the complaint failed to state a condition precedent,
namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement of the matter
between members of the same family had been exerted, but that none was
reached. However the matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation
and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper
of the spouses B and X that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been
made but the same proved futile. Will the complaint for unlawful detainer
against A prosper?

Suggested answer:
Yes, the case for unlawful detainer will prosper.

437
Art. 151 of the Family Code states that no suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
the same have failed. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this
provision applies to suits "filed or maintained between members of the
same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however,
be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:

"Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters."

In the case at hand, X, the A’s sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the
case. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her
husband and the B. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of
those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that the
petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151
because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding
against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan
Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings,
no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairman’s
issuance of a certificate to file action. Hence the case will prosper.

438
 Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., v. Acuña
G.R. No. 154132, August 31, 2006
Digested by: Paquera, E.
Suit between family members; requisite of earnest efforts to compromise

A, private respondent (filed with the RTC of Caloocan a complaint against

bank H, his wife B, the spouses O and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan
City for cancellation of mortgage. A contended that he did not secure/sign
any loan from bank H, or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; and
B was acting in conspiracy with bank H and the spouses O, (who were
benefited from the loan), made it appear that he signed the contract of
mortgage and he could not have executed the contract because he was
working abroad. Bank H filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of FC where it is
provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. It further contends that since the complaint does not contain any
fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made
prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.

A allegedly argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member of
the same family as contemplated under Art. 150 of FC failure to allege in
the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by
the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss. He asserts that since three of the party-defendants are not

439
members of his family the ground relied upon by bank H in its Motion to
Dismiss is inapplicable RTC denied motion to dismiss. Court agreed with
the private repondent A. Bank H filed a motion for partial reconsideration.
RTC again denied motion of partial reconsideration ruling that failure to
allege in complaint that earnest effort towards a compromise were made by
plaintiff is not a ground for motion to dismiss.

Whether or not lack of earnest efforts to compromise is a ground for a

motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties
who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit.

Suggested answer:
Yes. Instant petition should be dismissed.

Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:

“No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
must be dismissed”.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party
to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a
condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.

440
The Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would
make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the abovementioned cases
inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the present
case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the
Civil Code are clear that the provisions apply to suits involving "members of
the same family" under Article 150 of the FC:

ART. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and
descendants; and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half
blood; and Article 217 of the Civil Code:

ART. 217. Family relations shall include those: (1) Between husband and
wife, (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their
descendants, (4) Among brothers and sisters.

Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under
Article 151 of te Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exlusively
between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that
the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same
family.

441
 Heirs of Favis, Sr., v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 185992, January 15, 2014
Digested by: Paraz, Gaudelou U.

R was married to P with whom he had 7 children. When P died, R took G as

his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, E. Later on, R married
G. R then executed an affidavit acknowledging E as one of his legitimate
children.

R died intestate in 1995. However, prior to his death, R allegedly executed a

Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his
grandchildren with G. Claiming that the said donation prejudiced their
legitime, the children of R with P filed an action for annulment of the Deed
of Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property.

The trial court ruled nullified the Deed of Donation. An appeal was
interposed before the CA and insisted on the validity of the Deed of
Donation. The appellate court dismissed the nullification case for failure to
make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been, as
mandated in Article 151 of the Family Code.

Was the appellate court correct in its decision?

Suggested answer:
No.

Article 151 of the Family Code provides:

442
 Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made,
the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.

The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer
to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with.

However, the appellate reliance on this provision is misplaced. The error of

the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept
within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1
of Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law
that no suit between members from the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a
ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a

443
motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim."

Further, the Court made it clear that it made clear that a failure to allege
earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members
of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the
statement of a cause of action – such defect may however be waived by
failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the
defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court.

Even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, it is safe
to say that the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility
of a compromise, has been served. The case showed that compromise was
never an option insofar as the respondents were concerned. The
impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was shown not alone by
the absence of a motion to dismiss but on the respondents’ insistence on
the validity of the donation in their favor of the subject properties.

444
Family Home
Spouses De Mesa v. Spouses Acero
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
Digested by:Ramirez, Gerald S.
Doctrine:
While family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 are indeed automatically deemed to be family homes and
thus exempt from execution by operation of law, nevertheless, well-settled
is the rule that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by
the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period.

Question:
Sps A and B purchased a property on April 17, 1984 while they were still
merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was then later
constructed on the subject property, which the spouses thereafter occupied
as their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.
Later, A obtained a loan from C in the amount of ₱100,000.00, which was
secured by a mortgage over the subject property. A and B failed to pay the
loan so the subject property was sold on public auction; C was the highest
bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.

C agreed to leased the property to Sps A and B for some time but A and B
again reneged on their payment despite several demands. C then filed an
ejectment suit. On trial, MTC and later RTC ruled in favour of C and
ordered spouses A and B to vacate the property for failure to assert their
right at a reasonable time. A and B however refused insisting that, a prior

445
assertion that the subject property is a family home is not required before it
can be exempted from execution. Is the contention of Spouses A and B
correct?

Suggested answer:
No.

While family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 are indeed automatically deemed to be family homes and
thus exempt from execution by operation of law, nevertheless, well-settled
is the rule that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by
the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period
thereafter even though the Rules of Court did not prescribe a specific period
within which to claim the exemption. Hence, it is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable

time to lapse before claiming that the subject property is a family home and
its exemption from execution and forced sale under the Family Code. In the
light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not
assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time.

446
 Eulogio v. Bell
G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Digested by: Resit, Yves M.

Spouses B sold their 329-square-meter residential house and lot (family

home) to Spouses E. Spouses B’s Children, as beneficiaries of the family
home, filed a complaint for the annulment of contract of sale against
Spouses E as the subject property was sold without the former’s written
consent.

The Trial Court (RTC) decided in favor of Spouses B’s Children, but ordered
Spouses B to pay Spouses E P1,000,000.00 (the selling price) plus interest
of 12% per annum. Moreover, the RTC made a determination that the
subject property was indeed a family home, and there was no proof that its
value had increased beyond the statutory limit of P300,000.00 due to
voluntary improvements made by Spouses B.

As the Decision had attained finality, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution
and ordered the execution sale of the family home for the satisfaction of
money judgment in favor of Spouses E. Can the family home of Spouses B
be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code?

Suggested answer:
No, the family home of Spouses B cannot be sold on execution.

Article 160 of the Family Code provides that xxx “The court shall so order
(the execution sale) if it finds that the actual value of the family home

447
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution.” To warrant the execution sale of Spouses B’s family home
under Article 160 of the Family Code, the following facts need to be
established: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase
resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the
persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries;
and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under
Article 157.

Here, none of these facts were present, more so that the RTC had made a
determination with finality that there was no proof that the value of the
family home had increased beyond the statutory limit of P300,000.00 due
to voluntary improvements made by Spouses B.

448
 Cabang v. Basay
G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009
Digested by: Anna Katrina M. Rodriguez

Simeon Cabang had established his home over the property of registered
owner Felix Odong and he had been in continuous, open, peaceful and
adverse possession of the same parcel of land since
1956 up to present. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay
bought the subject property from the heirs of Felix
Odong and upon discovery that Simeon was actually
occupying the lot, they filed a complaint for recovery
of property. Appellate court ruled in favor of Basay. When it was elevated
to the SC, Cabang argued that the lot cannot be subject of motion for
execution. Rule on the matter.

Suggested answer:

Cabang is not correct.

Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed

constituted on a house and a lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. It is likewise a given fact that the
family home must be constructed on property owned by the persons
constituting it. Since the property on which the alleged
family home stands is owned by the Odongs, their
continued stay on the subject land is by mere
tolerance of the late Felix Odong.

449
 Patricio v. Dario
G.R. No. 170829, Nov. 20, 2006
Digested by: Rojas, Eliza Fe V.

On July 5, 1987 Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his

wife, Perla G. Patricio (Perla) and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario
(Marc Dario) and Marcelino G. Dario III (Dario III). One of the properties
he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building built thereon. After the two sons Marc Dario and Dario III
extrajudicially settled the estate, petitioners Perla and Marc Dario advised
respondent Dario III of their intention to partition the subject property
where family home is constituted. On October 2, 2002, the court ordered
the partition. On a motion for reconsideration, respondent Dario III
refused on the ground that the subject property which is the family home
cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary, his 12-yr old son and
grandson of decedent Marcelino, is still living therein. He claims that as
long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such
until the beneficiary becomes of age. Petitioners countered that the subject
property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late
Marcelino V. Dario only until the 10th year from his death and furthered
that, at the time of the death there was no more minor beneficiary to speak
of because Marc Dario and Dario III were already of age. Is the partition of
family home proper?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

450
Article 159 of the Family Code provides that “the family home shall
continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless if whoever
owns the property or constituted the family home.”

Based on the foregoing rule, if there is no more beneficiary left at the time
of death, the family home will be dissolved or cease, because there is no
more reason for its existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in
the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of the
10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home
continues until the beneficiary becomes of age.

In the instant case, there are no more minor beneficiaries existing after the
lapse of 10 years. The 12-year old son of Dario III and grandson of the
decedent is not a proper minor beneficiary of the subject family home.

Under Article 154 of the Family Code, the beneficiaries of a family home are
the following:
1. The husband and the wife or an unmarried person who is the head
of the family;
2. Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living
in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for
legal support.

451
The 12-year old son of Dario III is the grandson of the decedent. Also, he
has been living in the subject family home within 10 years from the death of
decedent. However, he cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The
liability for legal support falls primarily on his parent, herein respondent
who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents. . It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and
who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from
that of his parents, being of legal age.

In the case at bar, 10 years had already lapsed since the death of the
decedent and there are no more minor beneficiaries existing, therefore,
partition of subject family home is proper.

452
 Arriola v. Arriola
G.R. No. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008
Digested by: Sanchez, Lloyd

X, Y and Z are the heirs of decedent A. X is a legitimate son of A from A's

previous marriage. Y is the second wife of A, and Z is their child. A judicial
order of partition was issued on the properties of A. The heirs failed to
agree on how to partition a subject lot. A sale through public auction was
sought, however, Y and Z refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject lot. The house in question was made by A where he
lived with Y and Z prior to his death five years ago. Y and Z argued that the
house is not included in the auction because the subject of the auction was
only the lot. Is the house included in the auction of the subject lot?

Suggested answer:
No. The house and the subject lot where it stands is not included in the
auction because it is a family home.

Under Article 159 of The Family Code, the family home shall continue to
exist despite the death of the spouses for a period of 10 years or for as long
as there is a minor beneficiary. The heirs cannot partition the same unless
the court finds compelling reasons therefore.

In the present case, the subject lot with the house is a family home. A family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. Although the house within the lot is an accessory to
the subject lot, the law guarantees the continued existence of a family home

453
after the death of one of the spouses for a period 10 years. Decedent A died
five years ago, the family home shall continue to exist for another 5 years or
for long as there is a minor beneficiary.

Thus, the subject house and lot is not part of the properties to be judicially
partitioned and cannot be part of an auction sale.

454
 In re: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
CERTIFICATES OF LIVE BIRTH OF YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE
TINITIGAN AND AVEE KYNNA NOELLE BARCELOTE TINITIGAN
G.R. No. 222095, August 07, 2017
Digested by: Talaboc, Adrian Martin L.

On 24 June 2008, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote, petitioner, bore a child

out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan, respondent,
in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth of their
child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give
birth in a hospital. On 24 August 2011, Bercelote bore another child with
Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not
register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal
charges, thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan. When her first child
needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally
decided to register the births of both children. The Local Civil Registrar of
Santa Cruz approved the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace
Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, after submitting proof that the
National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on file.
However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births
to the NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live
birth with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the
children in their office. Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the
cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without
her knowledge and participation, and for containing erroneous entries. On
28 February 2013, the RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote and ordered the

455
cancellation of the subject birth certificates. However, the CA reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the registrations of the
children's births, caused by Tinitigan and certified by a registered midwife,
were valid. Barcelote filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Will the petition prosper?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

In the instant case, it shows that the children were born outside a valid
marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011,
respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and
Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote.
The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children
is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been "Barcelote" and not
"Tinitigan." The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname

456
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the
word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the
part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional
upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.

457
 Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz
GR No. 191936, June 1, 2016
Digested by: Tiamson, Jerwin C.

V co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with S. On

November 11, 2002, S died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088
was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, was issued in
the name of the V by virtue of a Deed of Sale whereby S allegedly sold her
portion of the property to V for P300,000.00.

A and B, children of S's brother, T and F, instituted the action for

Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with
Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, V averred that A and B have

no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are
illegitimate children of T. As such, they have no right over S's estate
pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives
of their father and mother. Moreover, V contends that the certificates of live
birth of A and B do not conclusively prove legitimate filiation, albeit,
without offering any evidence to the contrary. The certificates of live birth
contain no entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or
illegitimate filiation, making said documents unreliable and unworthy of
weight and value in the determination of the issue at hand. V states that in
the A and B's certificates of live birth, only the signature of F appears, and
that they were not signed by T. She argues that the birth certificate must be

458
signed by the father in order to be competent evidence to establish filiation,
whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Is the contention of V that the birth certificate must be signed by the father
in order to be competent evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate
or illegitimate tenable?

Suggested answer:
No. V’s contention is untenable.

The law provides that the declaration of the physician or midwife in

attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth
in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty
days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth
or by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the

following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant;
(c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; if) and such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and

sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father

459
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or
to give therein any information by which such father could be identified

A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries in

public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer. Thus,
being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
in them.

In the case at bar, V's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by
the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does
not find support in law and jurisprudence. Under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,
the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be
sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the
birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant,
or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.

The fact that only the signatures of F appear on said documents is of no

moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of A
and B's fact of birth as legitimate children.

Therefore, contention of V that the birth certificate must be signed by the

father in order to be competent evidence to establish filiation, whether
legitimate or illegitimate is untenable.

460
 Arbolario v. Court of Appeals
VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE
ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION ARBOLARIO, CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and
Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO SALHAY, Petitioners, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO, ORPHA
COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 129163. April 22, 2003
Digested by: Tiempo, Christian Philip A.

The original owners of the controverted lot spouses Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan had five (5) children and two of them were (1) Agueda
Colinco and (2) Catalina Baloyo.

The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely,
Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three
daughters, Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.

The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their
union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario,
who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue. However, Juan Arbolario
consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this
cohabitation was born Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe
Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to
hereinafter as "Arbolarios’). It is significant to note that all the foregoing
were born well before the year 1951.
Later, the Colincos, Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and
Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of

461
Anselmo and Macaria, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987, where they adjudicated upon themselves
their proportionate or ideal shares in O.C.T. No. 16361.

On May 9, 1988, the Arbolarios filed Civil Case No. 385 for Cancellation of
Title with Damages’, against the Colincos. The Arbolarios claim that they
succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister,
Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the
distribution of the aforesaid lot. They maintain that it is incorrect to declare
them illegitimate on the unproven allegation that Catalina Baloyo had
signed the Declaration of Heirship in 1951. They aver that this 1951
Declaration does not contain her signature and that she died in 1903. Are
the Arbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from
Purificacion Arbolario?

Suggested answer:
Yes. There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan
Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because
Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does not follow
that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively
married to the woman who bore his children.

A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to

establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. There is no presumption of
legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction (Article 261, New Civil Code);
and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the
dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of the spouses must

462
introduce such evidence to prove his or her allegation as per Sec. 4, Rule
131, Rules on Evidence.

It is the Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly contracted

subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But this,
they have miserably failed to do. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a
relationship that must be judicially established. Therefore, in the absence of
any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and
Catalina Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan
Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to
conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the
Arbolarios was extra-marital. And consequently, Voltaire Arbolario, Et Al.,
are illegitimate children of Juan Albolario.

463
 Basbas v. Basbas
G.R. No. 188773 September 10, 2014
Digested by: Anor, Jennifer L.

Severo Basbas had a son named Valentin. During Severo’s lifetime, he

acquired Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. In 1995, the heirs of
Valentin discovered that Lot No. 39 was issued in the names of Crispiniano
Basbas and Ricardo Basbas. Apparently, in 1987, Crispiniano and Ricardo
filed a Reconstitution of Title for Lot No. 39 and a new title was issued
under their names. They claimed that they are great grandchildren of
Severo and inherited Lot No. 39 from their father Felomino Basbas, son of
Nicolas and that Nicolas received Lot No. 39 as his share in the estate of his
father, Severo. Claiming to be the only heirs of Severo, Crispiniano and
Ricardo executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Severo and
adjudicated Lot No. 39 to themselves. The heirs of Valentin filed an Action
for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with Damages against Crispiniano
and Ricardo before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

The MTC ruled that the heirs of Valentin fully established their filiation
with Severo, but Crispiniano and Ricardo’s claim of heirship through
Nicolas was wanting evidence. It concluded that Crispiniano and Ricardo
are not legal heirs of Severo and that assuming Nicolas was the son of
Severo, he must have been an illegitimate child, so his filiation should be
first established before he can claim to be an heir.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the action involves settlement
and distribution of the estate of a deceased person as well as filiation and

464
heirship. Accordingly, before the action can be resolved, the matter of
heirship should be adjudicated first in a probate court. Is the court correct?

Suggested answer:
No.

Valentin’s long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of

Severo, need no longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration
of heirship as envisioned by the Court of Appeals. There is no need to re-
declare his status as an heir of Severo.

And, contraposed to the fact that Valentin’s status as a legitimate child of

Severo is already established, Nicolas’ status as a purported heir of Severo
can no longer be established, Nicolas’ right thereto expiring upon his death.

Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent’s end that Nicolas was

born of a valid marriage, only that he is Severo’s son. Nonetheless, even if
respondents were minded to establish the status of Nicolas, whether he is a
legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.

Article 165, in relation to Articles 173 and 175, of the Family Code and
Article 285 of the Civil Code state:

Art.165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are

illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.

465
Art.173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have
a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Art.175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the

same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must
be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Art.285.The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought

only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or
both parents recognize the child.

Thus, there is no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the

heirs of Severo in order to resolve petitioners’ Action for Annulment of Title
and Reconveyance of the subject property.

466
 Aguilar v. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
Digest by: Arapan, Jemar E.

Spouses X and Y died intestate. Z claimed he is the only son and sole
surviving heir of X and Y. Z filed a case for mandatory injunction and
damages against W, Y’s sister, who was in possession of the title of the
properties left behind by X and Y. W denies that Z is the son of X and Y. W
claims that Z is a mere stranger which X and Y raised out of generosity, and
not a natural or adopted child of X and Y. Z presented multiple evidence,
such as a notarized SSS E-1 form where X acknowledged Z as his son, and
his wife and aunt as witnesses to prove his claim. The trial court and CA
decided in favor of W.

Does Z’s Evidence establish his filiation with X and Y?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Art. 172 of the Family Code states that the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) An Admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In this case, the SSS E-1 Form is sufficient to establish Z’s filiation to X, the
same being an express recognition in a public document.

467
 Joanie Surposa Uy vs. Jose Ngo Chua
G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
Digested by: Baguio, May Irma C.

X begot A and B from his illicit affair with Y. He even attended to Y when
she was giving birth to A. He was the one who instructed that A’s birth
certificate be filled out with other names as father and mother. X financially
supported A and B. He had consistently and regularly given A allowances
before she got married. He provided employment to A. He required her to
work on his family business. A and B became known to the Chinese
community as X’s illegitimate children. X was present on most of A’s
special occasions. Prior year 2003, A filed a Petition for the issuance of a
decree of illegitimate filiation against X. X and A eventually entered into a
Compromise Agreement which was approved by the RTC. The Compromise
Agreement shows that A declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no
blood relationship or filiation between her and X. X even bound himself to
pay A and B P2,000,000 as a gesture of good will but without admitting
liability. With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the Decision of RTC
was declared final and executory. In 2003, she again filed before the RTC a
Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against X. X
filed Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision from the case
for the Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against
him had already been barred by res judicata. The RTC granted the
demurrer which resulted in the dismissal of the case. Subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration was denied. A then filed Petition for Review under Rule
45.

468
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement on status and filiation entered
into between X and A, which was duly approved by the RTC, constitutes res
judicata in the latter case?

Suggested answer:
No, the Compromise Agreement on status and filiation entered into
between X and A, which was duly approved by the RTC, does not constitute
res judicata in the latter case.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Article 2035 of the Civil Code provides that
no compromise upon the civil status of persons, future support and future
legitime shall be valid. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to
declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of
the parties. Moreover, one requisite for res judicata to serve as an absolute
bar to a subsequent action is the court rendering prior decision must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

In this case, the Compromise Agreement between A and X is, in a way,

waiving the future support and future legitime of the former. Being
contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement is void ab
initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. Obviously, it would
already be beyond the jurisdiction of the court to legalize what is illegal. A
judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.

469
Hence, the Compromise Agreement on status and filiation entered into
between X and A, which was duly approved by the RTC, does not constitute
res judicata in the latter case.

470
Impugning Legitimacy
Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao
G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002
Digested by: Baje, Beverly Keren Lou B.

Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with William Liyao from
1965 up to William’s death in December, 1975 even though Corazon is still
legally married but living separately to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao
himself was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of his
cohabitation with Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with the
company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage- Enrique
and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo. In 1974, they begot a child, William
Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William Liyao paid for all the expenses for the
subsistence of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her two children
from her subsisting marriage during their cohabitation. William Jr. was
said to be in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child
of said William Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such
child by the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the death of his alleged
father, William Jr. prays that he be recognized as an illegitimate child and
an heir by the family of the deceased from his subsisting marriage. The
deceased’s legitimate children on their part, alleges that the deceased could
not have fathered petitioner for their father and mother have never been
separated.

May William Jr. impugn his legitimacy with that of his mother’s subsisting
marriage and establish his claim of filiations with the late William Liyao?

471
Suggested answer:
No.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of
children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of
legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil
Code provides that children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
to be legitimate. In this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be
caused: (1)By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that husband
and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
and (3) By the serious illness of the husband.

In the case at bar, the fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately
from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and
born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning

472
the legitimacy of the child may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the certain conditions. Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent
and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had
admitted or recognized his paternity.
Therefore, William Jr. cannot impugn his legitimacy with that of his
mother’s subsisting marriage and establish his claim of filiations with the
late William Liyao.

473
 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005
Digested by: Baldivia, Xyra Jane B.

Gerardo and Maria were married and had a child, Jose. Later on, Gerardo
filed an annulment on the ground of bigamy after knowing that Maria was
previously and is still married to Mario. The annulment prospered and as a
result, it declared their child, Jose, to be an illegitimate child. Maria moved
to change Jose’s surname to her maiden name as he is now considered an
illegitimate child. Moving forward, the court ruled and held that Jose was
not the son of Maria to Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.
Hence, Jose is declared to be the legitimate son of Maria and Mario.

May Gerardo impugn the legitimacy of Jose? On what instances may the
legitimacy of a child be impugned?

Suggested answer:
No, Gerardo may not impugn the legitimacy of Jose.

Article 167 of the Family Code mandates: "The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.”. A minor cannot be deprived of
his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even
much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines
who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of
the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are

474
merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be
what the law says and not what a parent says it is.

Article 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following

grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification of either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence.

Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has
no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma.
Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in

475
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

476
 Reyes v. Mauricio
G.R. No. 175080, Nov. 24, 2010
Digested by: Bongalos, Monica Marie

Libra and her daughter, Lea, alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late
Lucio, who was the lawful tenant in a land owned by Reyes. When Lucio
died, Reyes caused the preparation of a Kasunduan to terminate tenancy,
with him and Libra as parties.

Libra (now deceased), represented by Lea, filed a complaint before the

DARAB for annulment of the Kasunduan, arguing that it was executed
without Libra’s consent.

As an incidental issue to the annulment case, Lea’s legal standing as a party

was assailed by Reyes. Reyes submitted that the complaint was rendered
moot with the death of Libra, Lucio’s sole compulsory heir. He contended
that Lea is a mere ward of Lucio and Libra, thus, not a legal heir.

Can the Court rule on Lea’s filiation?

Suggested answer:
No, the Court cannot rule on Lea’s filiation.

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. The legitimacy

of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose.

477
Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the husband or his heirs within the periods fixed in
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code.

478
 Eugenio San Juan Geronimo v. Karen Santos
G.R. 197099, September 28, 2015
Digested by: Cabrillos, L.

A, claiming to be the only child of the deceased spouses X and Y filed a

complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession against
B, the brother of X. A alleged in her complaint that with the death of her
parents, the property located in Bulacan belonging to her parents was
passed on to her by the law on intestacy being the only child and sole heir of
the spouses.

B countered that A is not a child of X and Y. He contends that the spouses

X and Y were childless and took in as their ward A who was in truth, the
child of Y’s sister. B further contends that the birth certificate of A was a
simulated document which had irregular features which showed that it was
tampered.

The trial court ruled in favor of A. It found that A duly established her
filiation by the certificate of live birth which was presented as
evidence. The trial court held that to be allowed to impugn the filiation and
status of A, B should have brought a separate action for the purpose under
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. Since he failed to file such action,
A alone is entitled to the ownership and possession of the subject land
owned by the deceased spouses.

When appealed, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action
to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these

479
two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage,
or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the civil registry.
The CA found no evidence or admission that Y indeed gave birth to A on a
specific date, however, was able to adduce secondary evidence to prove
one’s legitimate filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code via open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and hence agreed
with the lower court as to A’s filiation.

Thus B filed a petition for certiorari before the SC stating that the lower
court’ s reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code is totally
misplaced and that it should be read in conjunction with the other articles
in the same chapter on paternity and filiation of the Family Code. The said
rule contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a
man’s child, and the father [or, in proper cases, his heirs] denies the child
filiation; and not to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at
all of a particular couple.

Is B’s argument tenable?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Jurisprudence dictates that a careful reading of Article 172 of the Family

Code would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that
a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations
where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.

480
The issue raised by B is not that A is not the legitimate child of his deceased
brother X and his wife Y, but rather that A is not the child of the deceased
spouses at all. Hence, Article 172 cannot be applied in this case since the
article refers to action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and
prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife.

481
Illegitimate Filiation

Barcelote v. Republic
GR 222095 August 7, 2017
Digested by: Calibugan, Rudeza Sheena A.

On June 24, 2008, ABC bore a child out of wedlock with a married man
XYZ in her relative's residence in Sta Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was unable
to register the birth of their child, whom she named YG-A, because she did
not give birth in a hospital. On August 24, 2011, she bore another child with
XYZ, whom she named JM-A. Again, she did not register his birth and
thereafter lost contact with XYZ. When her first child needed a certificate of
live birth for school admission, ABC finally decided to register the births of
her children. The Local Civil Registrar of Sta Cruz approved the late
registration after submitting proof that the National Statistics Office has no
record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of births

with NSO, ABC was informed that there were two certificates of live birth
with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in
their office. The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil
Registrar of Davao City state different first names with XYZ's last name,
who was also listed as the informant in both birth certificates.

ABC filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth
certificates registered by XYZ without her knowledge and participation, and

482
for containing erroneous entries. RTC granted the cancellation of the birth
certificates. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Question: Is the RTC correct?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides that

illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. The registration caused by XYZ is not valid. Section 5 of Act
No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, provides that the
declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth, or, in
default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register...In case of an
illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly
by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth
certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father
recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an
illegitimate child by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who
conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Clearly, the subject birth
certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law
respecting registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact
that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to surname of the children

483
is incorrect since it should have been that of the mother, the subject birth
certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.

484
 Dela Cruz v. Gracia,
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Digested by: Carillo, Gerard Joe B.

A and B lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Unfortunately, B died. After almost two months, A, gave birth to a child.
Hence, A applied for registration of the child’s birth, using B’s surname, in
the Office of the City Civil Registrar in Antipolo City, in support of which,
she submitted (1) Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Affidavit of Acknowledgment
executed by B’s father; and finally (3) An “Affidavit to Use the Surname of
the Father (AUSF)” and attached therewith is an unsigned document
entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which B, supposedly during his lifetime,
wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:

“I am B…
x x x
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED A. WE MET EACH OTHER IN
OUR HOMETOWN. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE
FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL.”

If you are the civil registrar of their city, would you approve of A’s
application?

485
Suggested answer:
Yes. The handwritten note can be considered as proof of filiation.

In the case of Dela Cruz v. Gracia, (G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009) The
Supreme Court has ruled that, in case of a private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made, the rule should be as follows:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.

In the case at bar, considering that A, upon her application, submitted the
autobiography, clearly accompanied by a Certificate of Live Birth, and
an Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed from B’s father, it should suffice
that the claim of filiation to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent, since all evidences corroborate and coincide.

486
 Montefalcon v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
Digested by: Cuadra, Arthcris T.

In 1999, petitioner X filed a Complaint about acknowledgment and support

against respondent Y before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son S is
the illegitimate child of Y, she prayed that Y is obliged to give support to co-
petitioner S, whose certificate of live birth Y signed as the father. According
to petitioners, Y only gave a total of P19,000 as support for S since S was
born in1993. Y allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance
despite repeated demands. Petitioner X added that she and Y are not legally
married and that Y has his own family.The RTC ordered Y to acknowledge S
and to pay P 5000 monthly. Before the appellate court, Y argued that the
trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it “never” acquired
jurisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month
support, which was allegedly “excessive and exorbitant.” The appellate
court granted Vasquez’s contention.

Is Y is obliged to give support to co-petitioner S?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. Under Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) through the record of birth

487
appearing in the civil register or final order; or (2) by the admission of
filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

S record of birth is an authentic, relevant, and admissible piece of evidence

to prove paternity and filiation. Y did not deny that S is his child with X. He
signed as the father in S certificate of live birth, a public document. He
supplied the data entered in it.

Thus, it is competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its

preparation. If the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the
first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for
acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation.
Petitioners were able to prove that.

488
 Perla v. Baring
G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012
Digested by: De Asis, Quejarra R.

The respondents, a mother (Perla) and her minor son (Randy) filed a
complaint for support against the alleged petitioner-father, Antonio. Perla
presented as evidence Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child to support the
claim. Further, Randy claimed that he met him for the first time in the
house of his Aunt Lelita, where he was vacationing, where he called Antonio
"Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged him. When Randy asked
him for support, Antonio promised that he would support him. Randy
further testified that during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelita’s place, the
latter treated him as member of the family.

However, Antonio denied all the allegations and that such information has
discrepancies and the evidence was neither signed by him. Is illegitimate
filiation established to grant support for Randy?

Suggested answer:
No, the illegitimate filiation is not established; hence, support should not be
granted.

The Supreme Court ruled that the rules establishing filiation are found in
Art. 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:

489
 (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.

In this case, the certificate of live birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father has no probative value to established Randy’s filiation to Antonio
since the latter had not signed the same, where such signature is a
requirement under Article 172. It is settled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of said certificate.

Further, neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate

filiation. That instance where he met Antonio cannot be considered as

490
indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). To prove
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed
to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only
the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.”

To emphasize, the father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous

and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here, except for that singular
occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating
Randy as his son.

Therefore, having cleared that respondents failed to establish Randy’s

illegitimate filiation to Antonio, the latter should not be ordered to support
Randy.

491
Filiation, Legal Implications

Gotardo v Buling
G.R. No. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012
Digested by: de la Cruz, John Aron Gil B.

Gotardo and Buling, workmates, had an intimate relationship which led to

frequent sexual intercourse. As a result, Buling eventually got pregnant.
Gotardo heard about the news and was glad about it. He then promised to
marry Buling. Preparations for the marriage were made but Gotardo
backed out. Later on, Buling gave birth to their child, Gliffze. Gotardo failed
to provide support for the child. Thus, Buling filed a Petition for
Compulsory Recognition and support Pendente Lite against Gotardo
claiming that the latter is Gliffze’s father. Sexual relationship with Gotardo
alone was proven by Buling by evidence while the former merely raised
denials and alleged promiscuity and infidelity by Buling. Was the paternity
of Gotardo proven such that he may be compelled to provide support?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

Jurisprudence provides that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares

supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the
putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
father.

492
In this case, Buling established a prima facie case that Gotardo is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man at the time of her conception. The mere denials
and allegations of Gotardo without evidence failed to defeat Buling’s claim.
Furthermore, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged
to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Thus, filiation being
beyond question, Gotardo is likewise legally liable to provide support.

493
 People v. Abella
G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010
Digested by: Dela Pena, Jefferson

X, armed with a Balisong and under the influence of liquor, entered the
house of AAA. There, with force and intimidation, he raped AAA, who was
of feeble mind.

Thereafter, when AAA noticed that her stomach was getting big, told her
mother about the incident. Later on, AAA gave birth to a baby girl.

X was subsequently arrested and charged for the crime of rape. The
Regional Trial Court found him guilty of rape. The Court of Appeals
Subsequently affirmed the Decision. The Supreme Court likewise affirmed
the decision of the lower court.

What is the liability of X on AAA and her child?

Suggested answer:
X should acknowledge the offspring and support it.

Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person found guilty of
rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced:
1. To indemnify the offended woman;
2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent
him from so doing;
3. In every case to support the offspring

494
In the case at bar, X was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the
Supreme Court of the crime of rape against AAA. Because of the act, AAA
bore a child. Therefore, as provided by law, the child should be
acknowledged and supported by X.

495
 People v. Gersamio
G.R. No. 207098, July 8, 2015
Digested by: Dela Victoria, Keeu Emmanuell Q.

Two Separate informations were filed against Gersamio charging him with
rape committed on 1999 and on August 28 2002 against AAA. It was
discovered that AAA’s first sexual ordeal started only when she was 13 years
old and was repeated several times thereafter. The last date of incident
occurred on Aug 28 2002. It was said that AAA was brought behind the
house near a coconut tree and was ravaged by the appellant while pointing
a knife at her neck. AAA suffered in silence as she was afraid for her life.

It was only on Sept 2 2002, where BBB whom is AAA’s grandmother

noticed that AAA was pregnant due to the sudden changes in her physical
appearance. It was only then that AAA divulged that appellant Gersamio
was the father of her child. BBB then approached appellant Gersamio at his
house and confronted him regarding what he did to AAA. BBB would just
like to keep the matter among themselves and merely asked the appellant
to acknowledge and support the child of AAA. Later on it was discovered on
September 2002 that AAA was already 5 months pregnant.

The Appellant however denied the accusation leaving no other choice but
for AAA and BBB to seek the help of the courts.

Can the Court compel appellant Gersamio for Support?

496
Suggested answer:
No, the court cannot order appellant to acknowledge paternity and to
support AAA’s child in the absence of evidence thereof.

In this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when she
was medically examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that
happened on 28 August 2002 was not the cause of that pregnancy. Though
there were allegations of repeated rape from 1999 up to 28 August 2002,
only two Informations for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in 1999 and
on 28 August 2002. And, the appellant was acquitted for the rape
committed in 1999 for prosecution’s failure to specify with certainty the
exact month in 1999 the offense was committed.

Therefore, the appellant cannot be ordered to recognize and to support

AAA’s Child.

497
 Grande v. Antonio
G.R. No. 206248, Feb. 18, 2014
Digested by: Derecho, April C.

A and B live together as husband and wife while B was still married. Their
illicit affair bore two sons X and Y. The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry. When their relationship turned sour, B left for the
United States with her two children. This prompted respondent A to file a
Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors. The RTC RTC ruled that sole parental authority and physical
custody should be to A. However, CA reversed and grand custody to B with
visitational rights to B. However, CA further ordered that surname of A
should be entered as surname of X and Y in the Civil Registry. Can A
compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation?

Suggested answer:
No. Art. 176 of RA No. 9255 provide that illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove

498
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

However, jurisprudence dictates that Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the
right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is
not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.

499
 Republic v. Trinidad Capote
G.R. No. 157043, Feb. 2, 2007
Digest by: Christian Dominic Diola
Civil Law Review: Filiation: Legal Implication

Respondent Trinidad Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Respondent Capote
claimed that Giovanni Gallamaso is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso, the former used the surname
of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them. The
father, Diosdado, from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present,
failed to take up his responsibilities to him on matters of financial, physical,
emotional and spiritual concerns. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he
stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of
his mother’s surname. Will Giovanni be entitled to have his surname
changed to that of his mother’s surname?

Suggested answer:
In the case of In re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang, the court held that Illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother’s
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name

500
and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged child.

Therefore, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never

recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her
child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father.

501
 Recto v. Trocino
A.M.No. RTJ-17-2508, November 7, 2017
Digested by: Dungog, Yasie T.

Judge H issued an ex parte TPO (Temporary Protection Order) in

relation to a case for Child Custody pursuant to the Family Code granting
the temporary custody for 15-month-old child X to A's former live-in
partner Y.
In protest, A filed administrative complaint against Judge H contending
that the latter erroneously granted the TPO under RA 9262 for the
following reasons:
1. This remedy could not be availed by a man.
2. Y has no standing to institute an action in behalf of complainant's 15
month-old X because being illegitimate.
3. Only A has parental authority on the child X being the natural
guardian.

Is the issuance of TPO by Judge H valid pursuant to the Family Code?

Suggested answer:
Yes. The issuance is valid.
The TPO was sanctioned by A.M.No. 04-10-11-SC as an ancillary remedy
incident to the petition for custody filed by Y and in behalf of his minor son
X. Judge H asserted that the ex parte TPO was issued after careful
evaluation not only of the material allegations in the petition but all other
circumstances relevant to the welfare and best interest of the minor

502
offended party, and that was issued judiciously in complete good faith,
devoid of any grave, whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion.

503
 Tonog v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122906, Feb. 7, 2002
Digested by: Edemne, Mardelyn D.

Dinah gave birth Faith, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar. They
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar’s parents and sister in the latter’s
house where the infant, Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.A year
after the birth of Faith, Dinah left for the United States of America where
she found work as a registered nurse. Faith was left in the care of her father
and paternal grandparents.

Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Faith in the Regional Trial
Court. The trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as
legal guardian of the minor, Faith.Dinah filed a petition for relief from
judgment and the trial court issued resolution granting petitioner’s motion
for custody of their child.

Given that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should
have final custody of the child, you are asked to rule on the temporary
custody of the minor, Faith.

Suggested answer:
In the case of Dinah B. Tonog v. CA, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002,
the Supreme Court granted Edgar, the father of Faith, to retain in the
meantime parental custody over his daughter. The Court further ruled that
the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and

504
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment, bearing in mind that the
welfare of the said child is the controlling factor.

In Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: parents’ right to custody over their

children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides
that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their
unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights, "to keep them in
their company." In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child
relationship encompasses much more than the implication of ascendancy of
one and obedience by the other.

A word of caution: the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in this case

should not be interpreted to imply a preference towards the father, Edgar,
relative to the final custody of the minor, Faith. Nor should it be taken to
mean as a statement against petitioner’s, Dinah, fitness to have final
custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the
present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor
should remain with her father while the case is still pending for final
judgment of the trial court.

505
DNA Testing
CASE

Estate of Rogelio G. Ong v. Minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz,

Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007
Digested by: Egos, Czareeve, Y.

A Filipina while married to a Japanese National, cohabited with a Filipino.

From this live-in relationship, X, a minor was born. A few months after X’s
birth, the Filipino father abandoned his live-in Filipina partner and their
alleged daughter X, so a complaint for compulsory recognition was filed
with the RTC.

RTC ruled in favor of the Filipina mother and her minor daughter X. It was
held that while the legitimacy of a child is presumed when conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents ( Filipina and Japanese) as
provided by Article 164 of the Family Code and even if the mother may have
declared against the child’s legitimacy(Article 167), such was impugned by
evidence in consonance with the provisions of Article 166 of the Family
Code, since the Japanese husband was living outside of the Philippines and
no evidence was shown he ever arrived in the country preceding the birth of
X. The RTC declared X to be the illegitimate child of the Filipino thus
awarding support pendente lite.

The Filipino elevated the case to CA and while the case was pending, he
died and substituted by his Estate. The Ca then granted the appeal however

506
remanded the case to the RTC and directing the parties for DNA analysis to
determine the paternity of X instead of declaring X as the legitimate child of
the Filipina and the Japanese husband.

Petitioner (Estate of the Filipino) after denial of the motion for

reconsideration raises the petition to the SC with the contention that DNA
analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of the Filipino.

Is the contention meritorious?

Suggested answer:
No, the contention is without merit.

Article 172 of the Family Code on Proof of Filiation provides that the
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate

filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or

507
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.

Hence, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for
purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument
is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court

may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; XXX

From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not
ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material
originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body
fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

508
 Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
Digested by: Elnar, Melinda C.

Jesse filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing. The name of Jesse’s father was not
stated in his birth certificate. His mother told him that his father is Jesus.
Jesus averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because
Jesse could not have personally known the matters that were alleged
therein. Jesus also argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father. The RTC dismissed Jesus’
arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test noting that the
new Rule on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at
the courts instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest
in the matter in litigation. Further, the RTC remarked that the allegation
that the statements in the petition were not of Jesse’s personal knowledge is
a matter of evidence. Jesus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which
ruled in his favor. Among others, the CA held that a DNA testing should not
be allowed when Jesse has failed to establish a prima facie case. Is the CA
correct?

Suggested answer:
No, the CA is not correct. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are 4
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties
have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A
party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when
the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of

509
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. More essentially,
it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing
order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by
the Trial Court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.

At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing
without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s
attention. Hence, a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the
DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of
the test. The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.

510
 Rosendo Herrera v. Rosendo Alba, et al.,
GR No. 148220, June 15,
Digested by: Elumbaring Jeric M.

In a petition for compulsory recognition, the trial court ordered the

supposed father to submit to a DNA paternity testing. The latter assailed
the order, arguing that DNA tests are not valid probative tools to determine
filiation. Did the court err in issuing the assailed order?

Suggested answer:
No. The court did not err in issuing the order.

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:

511
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.

So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of

paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in
science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be
limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity,
although inconclusive on paternity.

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is
without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.

512
Adopted Children
In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Digested by: Enerlan, Edwin A.

Petitioner X was married to Y but were childless. Minor children, were

entrusted to them whose parents were unknown. In 1998 Y died. X then
married to an American citizen.
On December 2000, X decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under R.A. 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a
child.
The trial court dismissed the petition. Was the petitioner who has
remarried can singly adopt?

Suggested answer:
No. Petitioner cannot singly adopt.

The law requires that husband and wife shall jointly adopt and this is
mandatory except in three instances which were enumerated in section 7, of
R.A. 8225.
First. The child to be adopted is the legitimate child of petitioner or
husband.
Second. The child is the illegitimate child of the petitioner, and
Third. Petitioner and the husband are legally separated from each
other.

None of these instances were present in this case.

513
 Diwata Ramos Landingin v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
Digested by: Fuentes, Piccola C.

Diwata, an American Citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for

adoption on February 4, 2002. She petitions to adopt three (3) children
namely Elaine, Elma, and Eugene who are the natural children of her
brother Manuel and his wife Amelia.

Diwata alleged in her petition that when Manuel died the children were left
to their grandmother, Maria, who is Diwata’s biological mother since the
children’s mother Amelia left for Italy and re-married, has children, and no
longer communicated with her children with Manuel. The children of
Manuel and Amelia are being financially supported by Diwata and her
children, who are all working and independent, and other relatives abroad
as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000 which then gave rise to her
petition to adopt the three (3) children which the latter gave their written
consent to the adoption. She further added in the petition that she is
qualified since she no longer has biological children to support, has a part-
time job as a waitress, pays a housing loan, and her brother Mariano also
signified that he is willing and committed to support the minors while in
the petitioner’s custody. Will Diwata’s petition for adoption be granted by
the court without their biological mother’s written consent?

Suggested answer:
No, Diwata’s petition will be denied. She failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia, the children’s biological mother, to the adoption. When

514
she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect where section 9 provides that if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. Despite Diwata claiming that the biological mother of
the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should have adduced the
written consent of their legal guardian.

Furthermore, the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of

the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should
also be carefully evaluated and considered. The adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted children, in keeping with the
means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the

Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam
to the DSWD, Diwata is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the
latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of
the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-
time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a
month. Diwata’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the
latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo,
Guam, but the same is still being amortized.

Diwata likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the
adoption proceedings. It is indeed doubtful whether she will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the
US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While she claims

515
that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings,
the Office of the Solicitor General is correct in stating that the ability to
support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a
legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do
not prove nor support Diwata’s allegation that her siblings and her children
are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors.

516
 Isabelita S. Lahom v. Jose Melvin Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
Digested by: Gamao, Arthelly D.

IL and JL, a childless couple adopted IL’s (the wife) nephew and brought
him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for
adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name of the child
from JMS to JML. The turn of events revealing JMS callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted IL to file a petition in
Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued
way back on 1972. When IL filed said petition there was already a new law
on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption
Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption,
being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

May the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after

the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
adopter’s action prescribed?

Suggested answer:
No.

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of

the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it

517
was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had
already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil
Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by IL after RA 8552 had come
into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the
right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in
the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather
a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed
by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

518
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will
and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.

519
 Bartolome v. Social Security System
G.R. No. 192531, Nov. 12, 2014
Digested by: Gimena, PLK

John Colcol was the adopted son of Cornelio Colcol. John worked as an
electrician at Scanmar Maritime Services Inc. onboard the vessel Maersk
Danville. However, an accident occurred onboard whereby steel plates fell
on John causing for his untimely death. Now, his biological mother,
Bernardina Bartolome filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with
the Social Security System at San Fernando City, La Union contending that
(a) she is the sole remaining beneficiary; (b) at the time of John’s death he
was childless and unmarried; and (c) John was still a minor when his
adoptive parent died less than 3 years after the grant of the adoption
decree. However, SSS denied her claim arguing mainly that Bernardina is
no longer considered as John’s parent.

Does the biological mother, Bernardina, qualify as John’s dependent

thereby entitled to the death benefits?

Suggested answer:
Yes, Bernardina qualifies as John’s dependent.

Article 190 of the Family Code provide for some instances when biological
parents are able to inherit from the adopted, to wit:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide

520
 the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then
the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

In the case at bar, it must be noted that John was still a minor at the time of
his adopter’s death which means that the parental authority is deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents. This supposes that the
biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child
who was the subject of adoption. Thus, certain rights or ties between the
adoptee and the biological parents still attach by virtue of the blood
relation.
Therefore, Bernardina qualifies as John’s dependent and entitled to such
claim.

521
 Oribello v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 163504, Aug. 5, 2015
Digested by: Ligutan, Ruel Eduard P.

T was twice married. His first wife was E. However, their marriage was
dissolved pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of California. One
year after, T married B. T died intestate several years after his second
marriage. Four years after T’s death, R instituted an Action for Partition
against B, anchoring on the theory that she is an adopted daughter of T by
virtue of a decree of adoption. B alleged that this decree was fraudulently
obtained by R’s natural father, A. And that such decree was void ab initio.
The trial court dismissed the action for partition. In its decision, it held that
R is not a co-owner of the subject properties. R appealed from this decision,
citing that the trial court erred in declaring her as not a co-owner, because
she was an adoptee of the deceased.

Is R correct with her contention in her appeal?

Suggested answer:
No. R is not correct.

In a similar case, the Supreme Court held that as the plaintiff, she had the
burden of proof, as the party demanding the partition of property, to
establish her right to a share in the property by preponderance of evidence,
but she failed to provide the factual basis of her right to the partition
warranted the dismissal of her claim for judicial partition. The trial court

522
found that she did not satisfactorily establish her co-ownership of the
properties left by the deceased.

In this case, the trial court did not negate the adoption decree, but simply
determined whether or not the claim of R to the partition of the property of
T was competently substantiated by preponderance of evidence. What the
trial court thereby settled was only whether R was a co-owner of the
property with B.

523
Support
Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic
G.R. No. 189516, June 8, 2016
Digested by: Luansing, Annielou L.

Edna Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco Otamias were married in

1978. They had 5 children. Due to the alleged Francisco’s infidelity, they
decided to separate and their children were all in the custody of their
mother. Edna, then, filed a complaint against Colonel Francisco before the
Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna
demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias'
retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where
he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and their
children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by the parties as a
compromise agreement. In 2003, Francisco retired. However, the AFP
suddenly decided not to honor the agreement and informed Edna that a
court order was required for the AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of
Assignment. Heeding this, Edna filed before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro,
Misamis Oriental an action for support. The trial court ruled in favor of
Edna, et al. and a Notice of Garnishment was eventually issued.

Can Colonel Otamias' pension benefits be executed upon for the financial
support of his legitimate family?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

524
Art. 194 of the Civil Code provides that support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Spouses, legitimate ascendants and descendants are among those
who are obliged to support each other.

Furthermore, in consonance with the doctrine of waiver under Article 6 of

the same code, when Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he
effectively waived his right to claim that his retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belonged to
Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits
does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of
his family to receive support.

525
 Nepomuceno v. Lopez
G.R. No. 181258, March18, 2010
Digested by: Abdul Jomar P Magandia
A, represented by her mother M filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for recognition and support against F. A relies, in the main, on
the handwritten note executed by F which reads:
“I, F, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the
amount of ₱1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month
for a total of ₱3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to A,
presently in the custody of her mother M without the necessity of
demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the
child and my income.”

F contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by A is an

explicit statement made by him that he is the father of A; that absent
recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to
support from the putative parent; that the supposed payment made by him
of A’s hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during
the trial; and that A’s claim of paternity and filiation was not established by
clear and convincing evidence.

Does the claim for recognition and support have legal basis?

Suggested answer:
No.

526
Under Article 195 of the Family Code, subject to the provisions of the
succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter

A’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner
as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination
of her filiation.

Herrera v. Alba summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on

establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

527
In the instant case, the above quoted note does not contain any statement
whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not
within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.

The only other documentary evidence submitted by A, a copy of her

Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

At bottom, all that A really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to

provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her
claim of filiation.

528
 Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 163209, Oct. 30, 2009
Digested by: Manalili, Genesis Caesar C.

C married E, son of P and F. C bore E three children. C, Edward and their

children resided at the house of P and F in Makati City. E's family business,
which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family
expenses. C had no steady source of income. On October 1990, C
abandoned the Makati City residence, bringing the children with her (then
all minors), after a violent confrontation with E whom she caught with the
in-house midwife of E’s grandmother in a very compromising situation.

C, for herself and her children, sued P, F, and E in the Regional Trial Court,
of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. If you were the
Honorable Presiding Judge, would you rule in favor of C?

Suggested answer:
I will rule in the affirmative. However, by limiting P, F and E’s liability to
the monthly support needed by the three children only.

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to

provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners
themselves admit as much - they limit their petition to the narrow question
of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental
Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon
default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or

529
suspension during the children's minority. Because at the time P, F, and E
sued for support, C and E exercised parental authority over their children,
C submit that the obligation to support the latter's offspring ends with
them.

The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only

upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide
sufficient support. This inability of E and C to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal and maternal lines, following the ordering in
Article 199.

530
 Lim-Lua v. Lua
G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013
Digested by: Marc Daniel Uykingtian

X filed an action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Y. In her

prayer for support pendent lite for X and 2 of her children. Y contended
that X and her children are not entitled to support for they do not maintain
a separate dwelling; Y also argues that certain expenses already incurred by
X and her children may be deducted from the total support.

a. Is X and her children entitled for support?

b. Expenses incurred by X and her children may be deducted from to
total support?

Suggested answer:

a. Yes.

Under Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for

sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the

preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to
and from place of work.

In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise

consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial
and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and
emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3)
the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-
monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and
well-being of the child.

531
 b. No

The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a decree to
pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and
the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he
cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily
made directly to the children. However, special considerations of an
equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his
indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her.

532
 Lacson v. Lacson
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006
Digested by: Menil, Mario Josshua C.

Edward had two daughters with Lea named Maowee and Maonaa.
Sometime after the birth of the youngest daughter Maonaa, their father left
the conjugal home. The sisters and their mother, for a period of eighteen
(18) years shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. Ever
since their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband for support even
when the latter has promised to give such, in fact she has accumulated a
hefty amount of loan from her brother Noel. Years later, Lea filed a
complaint against Edward for support in the RTC. Edward posited of lack
of regular income and unproductivity of the land he inherited, not neglect,
accounted for his failure to give regular support. The RTC granted Lea’s
petition and was affirmed by the CA. Are the daughters entitled for support,
including support in arrears?

Suggested answer:
Yes.

The court could not confer judicial approval upon petitioner’s posture of
trying to evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters simply
because their mother did not make a "formal" demand therefor from him.
Petitioner’s insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly
pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply
with such obligation through a note in his own handwriting.

533
To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during
their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from
him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult
during the period material to get in touch with him.

For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made
sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the
sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor
commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what
would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to
comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation
is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it
were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of support in
arrears had been made in this case and said so in its decision As for Noel if
he can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner, Article 207 of
the Family Code provides:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails
to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person
may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of
reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.

Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical

relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another.

534
Parental Authority

Hebron v. Loyola
G.R. No. 168960 July 5, 2010
Digested by: Montallana, Kessey N.

Two parcels of land were owned by Januario and Remigia the

administration of which was entrusted to Encarnacion. All the heirs if
Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject
properties during Encarnacion’s administration thereof. With the latter’s
death, the administration was assumed by her daughter Amelia. By the
time partition was demanded, Candida was the only living child of Januario
and Remigia. While manifesting her conformity to the partition, Amelia
claimed that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have already relinquished
their shares in consideration of the financial support extended by
Encarnacion. The RTC ruled in favor of the partition disregarding the claim
of defendant that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have waived their
share. The CA upheld the ruling of the RTC saying that the spouse cannot
relinquish the hereditary shares of their children.

Was the CA correct?

Suggested answer:

Yes. The CA was correct in saying that the spouse cannot relinquish the
hereditary shares of their children.

Article 980 of the Civil Code states that “the children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal
shares.”

In the case at bar, the spouse had no authority or had acted beyond her
powers in conveying the undivided share of her minor children in the
property involved in this case. She should have first secured permission
from the court before she alienated the portion of the property in question
belonging to her minor children.

535
Thus, the CA is correct in upholding the RTC’s decision.

536
 Cherith Bucal v. Manny Bucal
G.R. No. 206957, June 17, 2015
Digested by: Navarrete, Andrew M.

X, Petitioner and Y, Respondent were married on July 29, 2005 and have a
daughter Z. In 2010 X filed against Y a Petition for the Issuance of a
Protection Order base on VAWC Law. X specifically prayed that the RTC
issue in her favor a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). Respondent Y, in
his pleading never prayed for visitation rights. While Y was present during
the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor
filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief.
After due proceedings, the RTC issued a TPO granting the above-
mentioned reliefs. However, Y was given visitation rights every Saturday. X
filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order, seeking the reversal of the grant
of visitation rights. Y filed an Omnibus Motion praying among others that X
be cited for contempt for failure to abide by the visitation rights granted to
him. X opposed Y’s Omnibus Motion, alleging that after she filed her
petition, Y personally appeared before the court but did not file any
pleading, nor oppose the prayer in her RTC Petition.

Whether the court may grant a relief which was not prayed for in the
pleading?

Suggested answer:
No, the court cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleading.

537
It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a case. The
rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Teston, viz: “Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to
be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of
the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure
of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.”

The records do not show that Y prayed for visitation rights. While he was
present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither
manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking
for such relief.

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights
by the RTC in favor of Y, as contained in the PPO, and reiterated in its
assailed Orders, being both unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which
deserves correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari.

538
 Rosales v. People
G.R No. 173988, October 8, 2014
Digested by: Nuneza, Aladin Rolando A.

MM is a seven-year-old, Grade 1 student hurriedly entered his classroom

when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher FF, who was asleep on
a bamboo sofa. Aroused from her sleep, FF asked MM to apologize to her
but instead of apologizing he proceeded to his seat. FF felt disobeyed, went
to MM and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits
and pushed him to the floor. MM fell and his body hit a desk. As a result, he
lost consciousness. FF proceeded to pick M up by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor. MM, went home crying and told his
mother about the incident. His mother and reported the incident to their
Barangay and later on filed a complaint against FF in RTC. FF opposed the
complaint she characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline that
she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the
child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco
parentis.

Is act of FF came under the doctrine of loco parentis?

Suggested answer:
No.

Loco parentis is a special parental authority exercise by a school

administrator, teacher or individual engaged in childcare. Article 233 of the
Family Code states that the person exercising substitute parental authority

539
shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents
and shall in no case the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged
in childcare exercising special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child.

In this case, FF is a school teacher and could duly discipline MM as her

pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent
and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.
She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of
disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely
prohibited by no less than the Family Code.

540
 Caram v. Segui
G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014
Digested by: Oppus, Johvin Dave E.

A had an amorous relationship with B and eventually, A became pregnant.

Due to financial difficulty and the embarrassment of having a 2nd
illegitimate child, A lied to B by stating that she had an abortion but in fact
A proceeded with the delivery of the child C and intend to let C be adopted.
A voluntarily surrender C by way of Deed of Voluntary Commitment to
DSWD. Months after, B died not knowing C. A told the family of B about C
and sympathized with her and vowed to help her recover C. A wrote a letter
to DSWD asking for the suspension of C’s adoption proceeding and stating
that she wants her family back. DSWD responded by a memorandum
informing A that C is legally available for adoption and had attained finality
three months after she signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which
terminated her parental authority and effectively made C a ward of the
state.

A filed a petition for issuance of writ of amparo before the RTC stating that
DSWD acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the
enforced disappearance or forced separation of C and depriving her
custodial rights and parental authority over him. Is A’s alleged enforced
separation from C constitutes an enforced disappearance within the context
of the Amparo Rule?

541
Suggested answer:
No.

Under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851, It enumerated the elements

constituting “enforced disappearance”:
(b) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form
of deprivation of liberty;
(c) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(d) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and,
(e) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

In this case, DSWD never concealed C whereabouts and A received a

memorandum by the DSWD that C was in the custody of his adopters and
also that DSWD presented C before the RTC during the hearing. Therefore
no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as
the third and fourth elements are missing.

A accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from c and placing

the latter up for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting

542
custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over
a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a
ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

543
 Becket v. Sarmiento, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30, 2013
Digested by: Ouano, Jansen Ynrik V.

H, an Australian was previously married to FW, a Filipina they begot A.

In 2006, FW filed a case against H for VAWC followed by a suit for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. For his part, H commenced criminal
charges against FW one was for adultery.

Judgement was rendered based on a compromise agreement in which FW

and H agreed among others that H shall have full and permanent custody
A, then five (5) years old, subject to the visitorial rights of FW.

After sometime, H obtained a divorce from FW in Australia. This

notwithstanding, the yearly Christmas visits continued. In the 2010 visit, H
consented to have A. stay with his mother even after the holidays, provided
she returns the child on January 9, 2011. January 9 came and went but A
remained with FW.

FW moved for reconsideration of the court’s order that grants H permanent

custody over their child, praying that it be set aside insofar as it directed her
to return the custody of A to H. Judge X grants FW ‘s motion and issued
another order giving FW provisional custody over A. Is Judge X correct in
granting provisional custody of A to FW?

544
Suggested answer:
Yes.

The well-settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to
which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected,
unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. In the light of the foregoing,
Judge X was correct in granting the custody of A to his mother, FW.

545