Francisco v.

HRET

Fact:
The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings being
held by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.

The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with other associate
justices, is by Joseph Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good form but was later on dismissed due to lack of
substance.

Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period less than
the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives. This
was initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other representatives.

This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the
constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised similar
issues. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in culpable violation of
the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment proceedings
against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year away from the filing of the
second proceeding.

Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the impeachment
proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or administer impeachment
proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court interrupts and inquires about the
proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and
balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress and is a political
question.

Issue:
1. w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?
2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it?

Held:
1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is
unconstitutional. Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to the
impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-year bar provided. No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of one year. The
term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts when a complaint is filed with
the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives. It is not initiated during the time when it
is verified by the other members of the House or when it is given to Senate for hearing.
2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it will
disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches of government, and that
the SC has vested interest in the issue.

The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle
controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to check if
there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or office of government. In this
petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is questioned, no one has the
power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of constitutionality other
than the SC. Given such, even if the legislative that commences and administers impeachment
proceedings, it is not a bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if constitutionality is
involved.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs.COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 
G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.

FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same
resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under
Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in
the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions
collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one
Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno
denied the request. In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum recommended to the
CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the
plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank
and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of
the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with
appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a
Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading
scheme be censured.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,
creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management? 

HELD:
CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the
CHR’s alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the
approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC
and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial
matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions
therein. The CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the
genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as the law’s designated
body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation
of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great
respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of
Appeals,we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity
of Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.  284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such
law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member
of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called
Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for
all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
 
 
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check
as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
 
Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in
refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
 
 
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources
 of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present
case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse
for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires
or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in
the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be
always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to
do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any
other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while
there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
 2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

 
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and
to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.