Royal Institute of Philosophy

African Philosophy
Author(s): G. Salemohamed
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 58, No. 226 (Oct., 1983), pp. 535-538
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750866
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 African Philosophy
G. SALEMOHAMED

Professor Bodunrin's 'The Question of African Philosophy' (Philosophy,

April i98i) at the same time as it denies the existence of African philosophy
is a defence of Western philosophy.1 Heidegger, Nietzsche, and continental
philosophers writing today, for whom philosophy is metaphysics, European,
ultimately Greek and even founded in the Greek language, would agree
with him that autochthonous African thought-systems are not philos-
ophical. They would not agree with him as to the criteria he advances for
judging whether something is philosophical or not. Nor would they, by
virtue of the definition they give to philosophy (European, etc.), agree with
the characteristics he assigns to it-e.g. that philosophical ideas are relevant
to all men (p. II7)} Some would even argue that in purporting to be of
universal relevance, (Western) philosophy is a sub-class of ideology and
myth, both these being defined restrictively as the universalization of what
is particular-particular, that is, to a culture.
Among the criteria put forward by Professor Bodunrin for deciding on
the philosophical nature of a body of thought, the most important, as they
emerge from his encounter with ethno-philosophy, African philosophical
sagacity, etc., are the following: logical argument, rigour and systemati-
zation, conscious creation, criticism and argument. But these are properties
as much, say, of sociology as of philosophy. They are the usual criteria for
demarcating academic from non-academic discourses. If it is on academic
grounds that Bodunrin wishes to limit the inclusion of, or to rule out
altogether, ethno-philosophy and the other strands of putative African
philosophy, he should say so. He would then have to condemn much of
literature, the bulk of this being, in addition to everything he says about
native African thought, deliberately emotional and illogical.
Besides, as I have already indicated, it is not the case that there is
general agreement within Western philosophy about the criteria applicable
to philosophy. What Bodunrin and some schools of philosophy fasten on to,
others repudiate, and seek to construct their philosophies precisely out
of such a repudiation. There is no clearer example of this trend than in
France today where, following in the footsteps of Nietzsche and Heidegger,
but also borrowing liberally and eclectically from Hegelian philosophy,
Freud, Marx, and 'marginal' philosophers like Bataille, a whole generation
of 'deconstruction' philosophers seek to undermine what they regard as

1 But in fact a particular tradition in Western philosophy as I show later.

Philosophy 58 I983 535

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Discussion

the presuppositions of philosophy.2 Not just its criteria, concepts, norms

and theories, including those of rationality and logic, but the very notions
of criteria, concepts and norms ...
What I wish to point out is simply this: when Bodunrin speaks of
philosophy he has in mind only the British-American philosophical
tradition. Although he is quite happy that this should co-exist in African
universities with continental philosophy, he does not investigate from the
latter point of view what might be the merits of including in the philo-
sophy curricula of African universities everything that he at present
rejects. I suggest a valid case can be made out for ethno-philosophy in
particular.
Recent developments in post-Husserlian and post-Heideggerian
phenomenology and hermeneutics have shown to what extent fruitful
dialogues can be established between philosophy and ethnography or
ethnology. Heidegger himself, towards the end of his career, sought
contacts with Eastern (Asian) thinkers. Today the bias is more towards
African and Amerindian ethnographic material. On the one hand, ethno-
graphers and ethnologists may bring to the philosopher's attention issues
that constitute the 'unthought' of his intellectual tradition and force him to
reflect on them. On the other hand, the philosopher, whilst acknowledging
the usefulness and validity of what he is asked to face up to may turn on
the theoretical system that ethnology/ethnography articulates to point to
salient aspects of the latter's rootedness in the same tradition. An example
of this is Jacques Derrida's dismantling of the conceptual apparatus set up
by Levi-Straussian structural anthropology. Derrida shows, among other
things, that Levi-Strauss's famous distinction between the 'bricoleur'-
mythical thought including, for Levi-Strauss, philosophy3-and the
engineer-scientific thought, including structural anthropology-is nothing
more than a badly re-worked version of the philosophical distinction
between the empirical and the conceptual (the a priori).4 He concludes that
Levi-Strauss is doing philosophy without being quite aware that he is
doing so.
My summary of Derrida's criticism of Levi-Strauss does not show what
his own philosophy nevertheless owes to Levi-Strauss. This is not impor-
tant here. What is important is this: that contacts between philosophers and
others, especially when they share a common aim of overcoming their own
cultural prejudices (ethnocentrism) are vital for the development of

2 The names here are legion: Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, etc.
3 C. Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
i966), Ch. 9.
4 For Husserl, philosophy begins with the de jure/de facto (the a priori and the
empirical) opposition; V. Descombes, Le Mgme et L'Autre (Paris: Minuit, I979),
i65.

536

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 Discussion

philosophy. They are also crucial to an understanding of other cultures.

I mean understandings not judging, because the latter is what inevitably
follows from any attempts to impose criteria on other thought-systems no
matter how acceptable these may be within the terms of their own theo-
retical constructs (Anglo-American philosophy).
It might be argued that ethno-philosophy--at least if Bodunrin is right-
is not theoretically elaborate and sophisticated like ethnology. But that, I
would argue, is its chief advantage. Not overlaid with too many inter-
pretations or theoretical elaborations it is closer to an original social-
cultural experience. A phenomenologically orientated philosopher, con-
cerned with origins, but concerned equally with looking at others as others,
must find it irresistible for that very reason.6
But even assuming there is nothing in ethno-philosophy that might
interest the philosopher, phenomenologist or not, I cannot agree with
Bodunrin's dismissal of it. His argument is: ethno-philosophy may ulti-
mately achieve philosophical status. In the meantime it has no business
being part of a philosophy syllabus. The whole tenor of his argument is that
ethno-philosophy can become philosophy only as a variant of Western
philosophy. I suggest it cannot ever even become that. Bodunrin's pre-
scription will guarantee this. For Bodunrin, what ethno-philosophy lacks
is a tradition. More specifically it lacks a written tradition. He cites Socratic
philosophy in support of his contention. What he glosses over is that
writing-Plato's writing about Socrates-was not alone responsible for the
establishment, the spread, and eventually, the permanence of a Socratic
tradition. There was also the creation of Plato's academy at Athens until
the Emperor Justinian closed it in 529.
There is an institutional prerequisite for the establishment of any
intellectual tradition.7 For philosophy the institution is primarily the educa-
tional system and above all, the universities. Is the lack of an institutional
base-in colonial times as well as now-the reason why ethno-philosophy
has not reached the maturity required of it by Bodunrin? Is ethno-philo-
sophy, even in its nascent form, likely to be of some use to established

5 Understanding in the sense in which Gadamer uses it: as a 'fusion of hori-

zons', an openness to the other which does not require 'theoretical objectifi-
cations'; H. G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeunetics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, I977,) xxii-xxvi.
6 'Husserl's question . . . is the question of the origin of the world. It is, no
doubt, the question involved in myths, religions, theologies, and ontologies,
where it is not yet scientifically elaborated'; P. Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of
His Phenomenology (North Western University Press, I967), 25.
7 M. Foucault, Histoire de la Folie a l'Age Classique (Paris: Plon, i96i), much
of which is concerned with the institutional preconditions of Cartesian
rationalism.

537

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Discussion

philosophy? How can the latter be of use to the former? These are far more
important questions to ask, and far more fruitful enquiries may follow
from them than from asking what habits of thought Africans must adopt
... in order to qualify as Western thinkers?

Loughborough University

538

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