SOCIOLOGY Vol. 28 No.

2 May 1994
435-454

PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE?

CONCEPTUALISING POWER AND RESISTANCE
WITHIN FOUCAULDIAN FEMINISM
D a v in a C ooper

A bstract This paper critically explores the ways in which power has been
conceptualised within Foucauldian feminism. I focus on two facets within this
framework: power as productive and power as relational. Although Foucauldian
feminism combines both, tensions between them exist, particularly when it comes
to understanding resistance. I argüe for the need to focus on a productive or
generative paradigm of power which perceives power neutrally as neither in-
herently oppressive ñor liberatory, yet with the capacity to be both. In this way,
power can be conceived of as ubiquitous and trans-historical without inhibiting the
possibilities for social change.

K ey w ords: power, Foucault, feminism, resistance, change, struggle.

In tro d u ctio n

In recent years, new, postmodern feminisms have developed which

challenge many of the traditional orthodoxies and aspirations of the women’s
movement. One aspect, integral to many of these new approaches, is a
reconceptualisation of power. No longer is power a demon to be vanquished
in pursuit of a feminist Jerusalem. Rather, the new Jerusalem requires an
acceptance of power, an acknowledgement that power cannot be destroyed or
abandoned, for it lies at the heart of all social relations and practices. As a
result, many feminists have begun to re-think their analysis of pornography,
prostitution, and sexuality within a framework which works, critically, with,
rather than against, power ‘to create a more porous and flexible system’
(Phelan 1990:438; cf. Barrett 1991:136). Yet, is it the case that power will
always be present? And, if so, to what extent can its role be transformed?
These questions are at the heart of a further question: what do we mean by
power? For whether or not power will always be with us, and whether this is
a good or bad thing depends entirely on our understanding of the concept.
In this paper I explore the ways in which power has been reconceptualised
within a branch of feminism I define as Foucauldian feminism - a theoretical
trajectory deeply influenced by the work of Michel Foucault (1978, 1980) and
subsequent writing that has utilised his frameworks. Foucault’s depiction of
power as a relation between forces (1980) resonated for feminists concerned
with the pluralistic and overdetermined nature of inequality: the intersection
of class, race and gender; while his work on the body and sexuality supported

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436 DAVINA COOPER

theory which emphasised the importance of power relations irreducible to the

sphere of State and economy. Nevertheless, even amongst feminists who have
drawn from his work, there has been ambivalence (e.g. Hartsock 1990;
McNay 1992:41). Thus, to talk of Foucauldian feminism is to talk of a
trejectory or paradigm that is unstable and in a constant State of flux. Any
pinning down, as I do in this paper, must, therefore, be seen as temporary
and contingent. In saying this, let me emphasise that this paper is not
principally an engagement with the work of Foucault himself but with the
way in which his framework has been taken up within a particular feminist
intellectual community.
My exploration is of three main questions. First, how is power understood
within Foucauldian feminism? Second, what tensions and difíiculties exist
in adopting this analysis? Third, can they be resolved within a broadly
Foucauldian feminist paradigm? In addressing these questions, my key
problematic is: how can power be conceptualised so that possibilities for
radical social transformation are not theorised out of existence. For this seems
to be the danger in arguing that power - defined as a process of domination -
is ever-present.
In exploring and analysing power, Foucauldian feminism adopts two
approaches: one stresses the relational aspects of power, while the other
focuses on power’s productivity. Diflerent writers have emphasised one or
other of these facets, and some theorists have worked to combine the two.
However, there is a tensión between these two dimensions. In this paper, my
argument is for the need to ‘decentre’ a relational paradigm of power for one
that conceptualises power as productive: the capacity to shape, facilitate and
generate practices, processes and social relations. In saying this I do not mean
to suggest that relational discourses are redundant, but rather that their valué
depends on deconstructing what such relations of power actually entail: e.g.
what does it mean to say that men as a class have power over women, and
how is this complicated by the intersectionality of diflerent forms of in-
equality? Broadly, my intention is to theorise power in a way that makes an
‘ethics’ of power possible; for if power can be both positive and negative,
rather than exclusively one or the other, then accepting its ubiquitous nature
does not undermine the possibility of developing strategies for change and
transformation.

P o w er w ith in F ou cau ld ian fem in ism

A F ram ew ork
Foucauldian feminists have drawn on Foucault’s challenge to orthodox
interpretations of power in four key ways {e.g. Sawicki 1991:21-4). First,
power is a phenomenon that is exercised rather than possessed. Second,
power is defined as productive rather than purely repressive. Third, it is not

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 437

centralised in a State or single apparatus but present throughout social

relations. Fourth, it is not an entity that can simply be overthrown. Let me
briefly discuss these each in turn.
First, power is not a resource that belongs to individuáis or groups, where,
if some have more, others will automatically have less, but is rather ‘incor-
porated in numerous practices’ (Barrett 1991:135). People exercise power
through the effect their actions have on others’ actions. For example, in the
context of femininity, this might take the form of writing or publishing
magazine beauty articles that lead other women to buy new cosmetics, clothes
or engage in muscle-toning exercises. In this sense, power operates by
structuring the field of choices, decisions, and practices (see Hoy 1986).
Forcé, therefore, is deemed the antithesis of power, since the ‘essence’ of
power is the ‘activated’ subject’s own sense of agency.
Working within a Foucauldian framework, Sawicki (1991:21) links this
exercise of power to the notion of power as relational, that is, it operates as a
social relation of inequality between forces: men and women, black women
and white women, lesbians and heterosexuals. Conceptualising power in this
way means that a reverse relationship must be possible, originating with those
subject to power. This has been identified as the possibility of resistance or
counterdiscourse: ‘[W]herever there is a relation of power it is possible to
modify its hold’ (Sawicki 1991:25). I return to the issue of power as relational
below. However, at this point it is worth considering whether such an
approach avoids a ‘zero-sum’ framework; that is, whether an increase in
power of certain forces is matched by a decrease in power of others. For
whilst the forms of power and nature of relationships may change, arguably
the balance between individuáis or social forces remains reducible to zero.
A second tenet of a Foucauldian approach to power is the notion of power
as productive (Fraser 1989:18; Sawicki 1991:21-3). That is, through its
various mechanisms or ‘technologies’, power shapes, creates and transforms
social relations, practices and institutional processes. Implicit, and sometimes
explicit, in this argument is the notion that control and dominance work more
successfully by creating certain possibilities than simply by denying others (it
is unclear whether this is power ‘thinking’ strategically or whether power in
fact has little choice).
Power’s productivity, as opposed to its repressive, proscriptive role, has
been explored by a number of feminist writers, including Smart (1989) in the
context of law, Ferguson (1984) in the area of bureaucracy, and Bartky (1988)
who explores how power disciplines and shapes women’s bodies, movement,
and expressions. Two techniques are perceived as key: the ‘panopticon’ and
the confessional. Applied to women, the panopticon is a metaphor for
women’s internalisation of the view of the ‘other’ to produce self-monitoring
subjects. Forcé is rarely required to maintain standards of femininity, for
women ensure their own conformity to such norms. This kind of internalis­
ation can be differentiated from ideology because it does not necessarily

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438 DAVINA COOPER

imply a belief in the valúes or knowledge promulgated by the ‘other’. Just as

prisoners may not believe in the guards’ rules but internalise them anyway,
so many women may be disciplined by the ‘other’s’ gaze irrespective of their
own ideological perspectives. The number of feminists, for instance, who
‘unwillingly’ find themselves removing ‘unwanted’ body hair or dieting
illustrates this process. Alongside the panopticon is the confessional: the
social urge to explain, justify and seek forgiveness for intimate feelings,
decisions and actions. Played out in women’s magazines, doctors surgeries,
friendship networks and counselling sessions, with its emphasis on both the
speaking and witnessing (listening) subject, the confessional presents itself as
the liberational antithesis of power - the route to freedom and autonomy -
rather than as power’s vehicle (Phelan 1990:436; cf. McNay 1992:45-6).
Foucauldian feminists who have focused on power’s productive properties
tend to concéntrate on the ways in which regimes construct knowledge,
bodies and subjects, rather than on the nature of the power relationship.
Thus, the identity of those exerting power is often marginalised. Indeed,
Bartky (1988:74) argües that depersonalising power is important if we are to
understand power at its most effective, where the disciplinarían is everyone,
yet no one in particular. ‘Knowledge’ and disciplinary pow er-th at is, the
ability of social structures to shape roles, expectations and behaviour-
operate well because they are fundamentally anonymous; thus an impression
is created of femininity as voluntary, natural and sensible (Bartky 1988:74).
To try and find an agent would be misguided. For instance, the notion that
the streets at night are dangerous for women does not origínate and cannot be
blamed on particular men. Rather it is the product of certain discourses and
truths that both men and women circuíate and that have the effect of
engendering fear in women and disciplining their movements.
A third aspect of a Foucauldian feminist approach towards power entails a
‘bottom up’ analysis. Sawicki makes this point (1991:21), arguing that power
does not origínate from a single source such as the sovereign or law, but runs
throughout the capillaries of society. Therefore, to understand how it
operates, it is important to analyse power relations at their most micro level.
Feminist and gay male theorists, for instance, have used this approach to give
explorations of the family and sexuality some explanatory distance from
macro systems and sites of power, such as the economy and the State. Yet,
at the same time, such an approach also causes possible difficulties for
Progressive sexual theorists. If power is not the result of a sovereign’s
commands, if it is both productive and a relation between forces in a myriad
of social settings, then it is difficult to see strategically and theoretically what
would lead to power’s ‘overthrow’ locally and more generally.
Tensions about this understanding of power have surfaced for feminists
over the question of sexuality. If power is ubiquitous then it is not possible
to develop, in our current society, prefigurative, power-less sexual relations
(Butler 1990; discussion in McNay 1992:30). Yet, what does it mean to say

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 439

power is everywhere? Does it mean: (i) that power is currently present within
all social relations; (ii) that one cannot achieve personal liberation by simply
wishing power away (as some sexual ‘radicáis’ criticise radical feminists for
doing around their own sexual practices); (iii) that social liberation (freedom
from power) will not come from ‘overthrowing’ macro structures such as the
State or capitalism; or (iv) that power will a lw a ys be with us? These are
critical, heavily contested questions. Yet how they are answered depends, as I
suggested above, on the way power is conceptualised. Clearly, we have some
choice in the way we understand power. Therefore, having set out key
elements of a Foucauldian feminist approach, I wish to consider first its
strengths and then its weaknesses.

S tren gth s o f a F ou ca u ld ia n A pproach

Foucauldianism has helped precipitate a shift away from resource theories
of power which, in the context of feminism, have often analysed power as
something men possess to suppress or dominate women (see for general
discussion Eisenstein 1984). Whilst this may sometimes be an appropriate
analysis, Foucauldian feminism has been useful in detailing difíerent ways in
which power operates to achieve its gendered effects. Its focus on the ‘how’
of power has facilitated analysis of the ways in which women (and men) are
subjected to power without being deflected into arguments about whether
certain men, who are, for example, black, working-class and gay, have more
power than white, middle-class, heterosexual women. Deploying a productive
approach to power also avoids debate about whether women’s gain in power
will be matched by men’s equivalent loss.
Second, a Foucauldian approach emphasises the socially constructed nature
of interests, desires and choices - an important aspect of modern feminism.
Foucauldianism, by centring power, provides an explanatory framework that
denaturalises and contests an essentialist subjectivity. Thus, heterosexuality,
motherhood, romance - choices, desires, and behaviour which seem to reflect
women’s ‘true self - are not only socially constructed, but the result of a
power that is most effective when ‘agency’ appears strongest. Clearly,
feminists have not depended on Foucault’s work for these insights, ñor were
Foucault’s own ideas developed in a vacuum. Nevertheless, particularly in
the area of sexuality, Foucault’s emphasis on power’s productivity has
challenged many, including feminists, who seek to libérate a pre-existing
libido or set of interests.
Yet to argüe in favour of social constructionism raises the question: is there
anything which is not socially constructed? This raises two interconnected
issues. First, what role do environmental and physical factors play? And
second, how fluid are social meanings? The apparent idealism of social
constructionism has led some feminists to question poststructuralist work in
this area. Yet, while some such writing does seem to discount biological and
physical determinacy altogether, this is not inevitable in a Foucauldian

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440 DAVINA COOPER

feminist approach. This does not mean we need to treat physical and
environmental factors as ‘constraints’ on social constructs or meanings.
Rather, we can adopt an approach which perceives the relationship between
physical and social as dialéctica^ each influencing and informing the other.
Thus, lesbianism and heterosexuality, for example, emerge as social pheno-
mena which shape, and are shaped by, bodily desires, and which are
understood within interpretative schema that not only impact upon practices
and desires but are also constituted by them.
Parallel to questions concerning the beyond of social constructionism are
those concerning the beyond of power. Yet in Foucauldian feminism’s
centring of power - the ehow’ of inequality - little is automatically said about
w h y certain things do or do not happen, ñor about their implications. Power,
as developed within this framework, is only a partial answer to certain
questions. It needs to be seen in conjunction with the interrelationship of
social and physical conditions at particular historical junctures in order to
explore questions of interests, needs and wants. Many feminists have done
this, using Foucault’s work as a methodology through which to explore
historical practices. However, when theorised more discretely, what has been
developed is a kind of metaphysics of power. Yet, such a theorisation often
lacks clarity, and we are left with a question to which I later return: what
exactly is power?
The third contribution of a Foucauldian approach which treats power as
productive is the interrogation of transgression as radically enabling (Sawicki
1991:38). This is a controversial point. For some, Foucauldianism has
appeared to validate the political importance of breaching prohibitions,
particularly sexual ones. For example, transvestism might be perceived as
transgressing injunctions on appropriate gender identity, or sadomasochism
as contesting the forbidden nature of sex as fantasy. Yet, if power creates as
well as prohibits, engaging in apparently proscribed behaviour may not be
inherently challenging since it may simply be acting out what is in fact an
effect of power. This analysis is important in challenging theories of sexuality
which perceive breaking injunctions as a primary form of resistance or social
struggle. Whilst it is possible that such acts are transgressive, by focusing on
proscriptions and injunctions rather than the productive aspects of power,
individuáis may be ignoring far more significant forms of control or
inequality.

T ensions a n d D ifficu lties

As I set out at the start of this paper, a major tensión within Foucauldian
feminism’s conceptualisation of power concerns the perception of power as
both productive and relational. How easily can these two approaches co-exist?
Many feminists drawing on Foucault have emphasised one or other aspect.
Work on discourse and discipline has, in my view, tended to emphasise the
productive aspects of power, while feminists who use Foucault to understand

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 441

the pluralistic nature of power, in terms of race, class, gender etc., have
focused on the relationship between different forces. In the context of
exploring how power operates, the development of these two f o c i has been
relatively unproblematic. The difficulty really arises in theorising conflicts
and resistance, when it becomes increasingly difficult to weld the two facets
together without reconceptualising what a Foucauldian approach to power
might mean.

P o w er as P ro d u ctiv e
One of Foucault’s most famous statements is that ‘[W]here there is
power there is resistance5 (1978:95). However, if we start with a productive
approach to power, it appears difficult to understand how resistance can be
inevitable since, presumably, power has the capacity to create subject identi-
ties who accept or internalise their position. Conscious (as opposed to
unintended) resistance, in contrast, requires subjects to recognise the exercise
of power for what it is. Is resistance then the effect of ‘faulty5 production -
power generating wants and desires it cannot meet - or the result of layers of
discourses which create different and contradictory subject positions? This
raises a further question: what exactly is it that power creates? In the
case of femininity, is it acquiescence, agreement? Does power provide the
preconditions for ‘freely5 given consent, or does it ensure practices are
internalised at a level too unconscious for assent to be realised?
Part of the difficulty in conceptualising power as productive in relation to
resistance is that much of the discussion of power’s effects on bodies,
subjectivities and desires tends to amalgámate rather than fracture power.
Thus, power’s productivity is sometimes treated as a single, ongoing process
that fundamentally re-shapes the subjects located within its path. In this way,
the relationship between different acts of power on the same subject or body
is neglected. Explorations of the construction of male homosexuality illustrate
this point. Drawing on Foucault, a number of writers have explained male
homosexuality as the product of ‘psy5 discourses. For instance, Sawicki
(1991:100) writes, ‘[A]s a “homosexual author” Foucault was also a product
of the disciplinary technologies that constituted modern notions of . . . sexual
identity5. Yet, whilst these particular technologies may have influenced
perceptions of male homosexuality and the production of the male ‘homo-
sexed5 body, it seems unlikely that their power can alone explain the
development of gay male identities. This is not simply a matter of intro-
ducing a notion of reverse discourse or resistance. Rather, as I suggested
above, a theorisation of the effects of any form of power needs to explain how
it combines and interacts not only with other forms of power, but also with
physical conditions and existing processes, practices and relations to produce
specific effects at given junctures. Thus, the impact of ‘psy5 discourse needs
to be considered in conjunction with the ongoing concerns, identifications,
lifestyles and practices of homo-erotically and homo-socially identified men.

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442 DAVINA COOPER

It is important not to simply see the latter as passive recipients of dominant

discourses or as subjects whose only act of political agency is in responding
to domination.
So far, in talking about power as productive, I have focused on its ability
to construct its subjects. Yet what impact does power have on those
exercising it?1 To what extent are they also transformed by its operation?
These questions are difficult to answer within the productive paradigm set
out by some Foucauldian feminists, since, as I have discussed above, they
tend to either ignore or reject the notion of agents of power or to depict them
as not particularly significant. However, if power concerns a relationship
between social forces (and not just between power and its subjects) then it
seems plausible that those exercising power (the forces or agents of domin­
ation) are also affected by its exercise. This is an important issue in analysing
conflict, for it suggests that in the deployment of power it is not only those
subjected who are in a State of flux, but rather all forces involved, since all
undergo change. Yet, how do those exercising power change? What effect
does power have on their bodies, choices, identities etc.}
To address these questions we need a sophisticated analysis of power that
does not conceptualise it as the static exercise of a binary relationship - A
exercises power in relation to B, B responds by resisting A - but rather
perceives struggle, conflict and power as infinitely more complex and over-
determined. In this way, power is not ontologically privileged. Rather, it
is something deployed or exercised by forces - both dominant and sub-
ordinate - that possess agency despite the fact they may be affected by the
overdetermined outcomes of both their own and others’ exercises of power.
In arguing that subordinate forces also exercise power, I would question
whether their resistance therefore should be seen as the antithesis of power.
A more useful approach might be to see it as a motivation for power’s
deployment. By this I mean that those who resist are exercising power as
much as their oppressors; otherwise, by what means do they resist? However,
the notion of subjugated forces exercising power problematises the equation
of power with domination, an equation largely retained by Foucauldian
feminists.

P o w er as R ela tion a l
Relational approaches to power have an intuitive advantage, for they reflect
a principal way in which power is generally understood: as a relationship of
inequality. They also draw attention to those exercising power since, as a
relational concept, it becomes meaningless if the focus is only on the
subjected. However, one potential limitation of a relational approach is that it
tends to equate power with domination and subordination. Indeed, if one
thinks of power as a relationship between two or more forces it becomes
difficult to conceptualise this relationship in any other way. This is evident in
Foucauldian feminist work which perceives resistance as integral to power

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 443

(McNay 1992:110; Sawicki 1991:25), for if power meant something other

than domination, e.g. Audre Lorde’s erotic energy (1980), it would make little
sense to talk about the inevitable potential within all power for resistance.
Yet, if we accept that the relationship of power may produce resistance, to
what extent does power determine the form resistance takes? Arguably, there
are, in any given situation, a plurality of possible responses, so what factors
will determine the choice of response actually made? Notions of counter-
discourse tend to suggest a mirror relationship. A relationship of power is
combatted by its reverse. Similarly, the emphasis on resistance rather than
transformation implies a kind of closure achieved by power, that is, sub-
ordinated groups can only respond to the power relationships that exist rather
than looking beyond them. Sawicki (1991:27) sets out the words of one
commentator who claims that, for Foucault, freedom lies in rebelling against
the ways in which we have been defined, classified and categorised.
Utopianism is, henee, perceived as naive idealism, while the valúes that
inform the struggle against power are deemed to be the converse of dominant
valúes.2 For example, lesbians resist condemnation through discourses of
valorisation - ‘gay pride, lesbian strength’. This focus on mirroring as a key
response to oppression is apparent in the current popularisation of the
term ‘oppositionaP in comparison to the relative demoting of ‘socialist’ or
‘feminist’. Struggles are defined in relation to power, they cannot exist in a
relationship of exteriority to it.
Whilst I would accept that struggles are shaped by the relationship
between different forces, and that no demands or interests exist in a vacuum,
nevertheless, the contení of subjugated agendas cannot be ‘read o ff from
power, particularly if power is identified as more than a single binary
relationship between A and B. This assertion involves two things. First, any
contestation of domination is shaped by a range of factors; and, second, such
factors may inelude a set of valúes or long-term aspirations (Hermán 1993).
Although we cannot predict or determine the achievement of future goals,
ñor understand the world outside currently existing conceptual frameworks
or social meanings, it is still possible to opérate according to valúes which go
beyond a simple reversal of the present status quo.
Whether this is desirable is a matter of political contestation. However,
some of the arguments of theorists such as Sawicki (1991) seem to suggest
one is either against domination or for it. For instance, in relation to sexual
radicalism (1991:44), she suggests that if lesbian feminists do not join with
‘other oppressed sexual minorities’ then they are Ccapitulat[ing] to more
conservative forces’. An alternative analysis is that there may be a conflict of
valúes between some lesbian feminists and other sexual minorities that makes
such alliances difficult. Yet such a disjunction does not mean that either
group necessarily shares their valúes with the sta tu s quo, although it is
possible that each does in different ways, e.g. lesbian feminists maintain the
connection between love and sex, whilst sadomasochists emphasise power,

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444 DAVINA COOPER

difference and sexual control. Thus, in complicating an analysis of resistance

and social transformation, we also need to complícate (and reconsider) both
the identity of dominant and subjugated forces as well as the contení of
hegemonic social relations, e.g. what attitudes to the eroticisation of violence
a re dominant? In addition, simply because something is hegemonic may not
make it in evita b ly a target for attack by Progressive forces, who may argüe
instead for its extensión, e.g. democracy or formal equality.
Tensions in the way power, resistance and conflict have been theorised go
to the heart of a more fundamental problem to which I have referred several
times: what exactly is power? Despite the substantial discussion on how
power operates in much Foucauldian feminist writing, what power actually is
remains relatively unaddressed. As a result, various confusions abound: for
instance, the relationship between power as productive and power as positive
or Progressive. Some writing by Foucauldian feminists seems to assume that
the opposite of power as repression is a kind of positive power (Phelan
1990:424; Woodhull 1988:168)- a n approach that would seem to contradict
the equation of power with domination and subordination. Yet not only can
power produce reactionary effects, but the extent to which repressive and
productive power can be treated as antinomies is questionable, for if power
produces certain outcomes, others will be proscribed or repressed and v ice
versa . This interchangeability is apparent in the forms of disciplinary power
that privilege heterosexuality for women over and above other sexual choices.
Such power can be perceived both as working ‘positively’ to produce women
as heterosexual subjects and as prohibiting other subject positions: celibate,
lesbian, bisexual.
These ambiguities in defining power are reflected in the writing of
Foucault himself. Again, despite prolific discussion and theorisation,
Foucault provides little clear and constant guidance as to what power actually
means. An effect of this absence is paradoxically to give power a material
reality or presence that Foucault intellectually rejected. Yet power is not
something that exists. It is an explanatory or normative device that can draw
attention to (and create) certain aspects of social relations whilst decentering
or ignoring others. This is evident, for example, in Foucault’s approach
which down-plays the control or authority that can be exerted by the State or
sovereign, and which sees the ability to say ‘no’ as only one manifestation of
domination.
Thus, whilst Foucault’s approach to power may be useful, it does not
speak the ‘truth’ about power. For instance, whether or not power en-
compasses forcé is simply a political matter concerned with where the
boundaries of power are drawn. There is no pregiven ontological answer.
Indeed it is important to acknowledge power’s own disciplinary and
discursive production. How we understand power will be shaped by the
social, political and physical environment within which we live, and, in turn,
power will help to shape our environment at the level both of interpretation

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 445

and social practice. Thus whilst we can reconceptualise power as a political

strategy, such a strategy is both a response to and rooted in our own
historical conditions.

R ethink ing P o w er W ithin F ou cau ld ian F em inism

Despite the confusión over what power means, what comes through
clearest within Foucauldian feminist writing is a sense of power as
ubiquitous, trans-historical and inextricably tied to relations of domination
and subordination. Thus, even though some writers emphasise power’s
productivity and positive efíects - most particularly resistance - power itself
is principally seen as the organisation of inequality. What are the implications
of this approach? And, more generally, to what extent is power inevitable
both now and in the future?
If power’s productive aspect emerges out of, and is predicated on, a
relation of subordination and domination between groups of people, it is
arguable that power might disappear. For there is no reason why such
relations of inequality should remain for ever. However, if power’s pro­
ductive character is centred, and the relational aspect is deemed simply a part
of power’s productivity - that is, power works through the relation between
its ‘technology’, e.g. the panopticon and the subject - then it seems unlikely
that power will vanish, unless the motivation for, and existence of, its
technologies evaporates as well. It is unclear, though, what would lead to this
occurrence. Within a Foucauldian feminist analysis, the exercise of power is
largely self-perpetuating; the agents of power, to the extent they exist, are as
much caught within the system as everyone else. And for resistance to lead to
the disappearance of power it would have to generate anarchic practices,
since, otherwise, any success would just lead to the substitution of new forms
of discourse or disciplinary regulation. Thus, within a Foucauldian feminist
framework which perceives the ontology of power as first and foremost
productive, escape from power is practically impossible. With this comes the
seeming inevitability of subordination and domination: of inequality.
But is this the only conclusión we can reach? Is it possible to theorise
power as productive within a broadly Foucauldian feminist framework in a
way that makes inequality either not inevitable or else conceptually re-framed
to lose its particular denigratory implications? I would like to start by
proposing an approach to power which explores power as the facilitation of
particular outcomes, processes and practices. Such facilitation also ineludes
the maintenance of sta tu s quo relations which may occur through actors’
explicit exercise of power (such as by resisting particular changes), through
the withholding of information, or through less voluntaristic forms, such as
discourse (the production of meaning) and discipline. As I discussed earlier
in this paper, these latter forms can work to maintain the status quo without

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446 DAVINA COOPER

any particular action on the part of those forces who domínate. This
approach provides an alternative way of understanding what Lukes (1974)
describes as second and third dimensional power - that is, the mobilisation of
bias to ‘organise out’ conflict and the suppression of particular ‘real’ interests.
Although the definition of power I am utilising here is a productive one, it
does not make the language of power relations redundant. Yet, rather than
the latter referring to a particular power relationship between forces - which
seems rarely to exist in any complex situation, except at the level of
metaphysics - or between technologies of power and their subjects which, I
think, adds little, a discourse of relations refers to the relative access and
ability of different forces to exercise power effectively v is á v is each other or
some other being or entity.
In taking a productive approach to power, conflict is decentred (cf. Sawicki
1991:25). Thus, my analysis differs from that of Foucault (1978: Part 4) who
argües power always entails conflict in the form of resistance because it
is ‘exercised from innumerable points in the interplay of non-egalitarian
relations’ (see also Foucault 1980:142). Removing antagonism or conflict as
essential to an understanding of power may seem a paradoxical choice within
a radical approach; however, I have done so to avoid the series of problems
that arise as soon as non-observable conflict is brought into an analysis.
What do I mean by this? In P o w e r: A R a d ica l View (1974), Lukes, who
adopts a conflict model of power, argües that power works most effectively in
situations of latent conflict, when competing positions are stopped from being
raised or even, at the furthest extreme, rendered unthought. Yet how can this
latter be demonstrated? How can one show that decisions are being made
contrary to people’s interests when even they themselves are unaware that
this is the case? Luke’s response is to construct a counterfactual: to reveal
what people would want if their material conditions were less oppressive. Yet
this is to assume that interests precede power, that people have specific,
definable interests which power can repress but not truly eradicate. However,
if we are working with a paradigm in which power constructs certain interests
and ‘organises out’ others, then to point to a conflict between ‘objective’
interests as evidence of the workings of power is problematic. First, because
how do we define such real interests? People’s wants and desires, although
physically informed and experienced, will always be shaped by the society
within which they live. How helpful is it therefore to talk about some kind
of a-historical interest that exists outside of social relationships? Second,
although in a different situation (the counterfactual) there might be conflict
between the same people, how much does that tell us about the present
situation? Moreover, the requirement to find such a conflict in situations
where it is not apparent deflects attention from the capacity to minimise or
remove conflict through the construction of shared knowledge, desires,
interests and valúes (Foucault 1978).
Decentering conflict from a model of power brings us closer to some

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 447

feminist approaches which focus on the ‘power to . . .’ (Hernes 1987). Within

this kind of approach, power is not a zero-sum competition, ñor solely
repressive or prescriptive. Rather, it facilitates, enabling Progressive as well
as reactionary and regressive developments to take place (Flammang 1983).
This is not to suggest that power does not frequently involve conflict ñor to
underestimate its cióse relationship to antagonism. However, instead of
focusing solely on the ways in which power produces conflict through the
precipitation of resistance, I would like also to emphasise the ways in which
power is deployed within existing situations of conflict by different forces,
and the ways in which different forms of power deflect or ‘organise out’
conflict.

A P a ra d igm o f P o w er
Foucauldian feminists have tended to focus on two particular modes of
power: knowledge and discipline. Within the historical context of late
twentieth-century Britain, I would like to extend their analysis to focus on
four. These are: ideology, forcé, discipline, and resources (Brown 1992).
Although I discuss them separately, these modes, and the processes and
relations through which they work, are closely entwined, overdetermined by
each other and the social context of modern life. Resources, forcé, and
discipline, for instance, cannot be understood except through ideology.
However, my objective in separating them - in constructing what in many
ways is an artificial schema - is to explore and differentiate the many ways in
which effects are generated. For example, whilst resources such as money
may only be understood through ideology, changes in the meaning given to
money is a different process to changes in its allocation or distribution.
The first mode, ideology, I use to refer to the range of interpretive
frameworks and meanings through which social relations, practices, and
society generally are both constituted and understood. Since the world can
only be known through ideology, the term carries no perjorative con-
notations. It is not in opposition to truth, Science or materialism (Foucault
1980:1180), but ñor is it entirely free floating. As I discuss above, physical
entities, although understood only through ideology, at the same time impact
upon and shape meanings within a long-term historical process.
The second mode, forcé, refers to the subjugation of the will or the body
of another by physical or psychological means: coerción, threats, violence, e t c .
(cf. ‘perjorative power’ Brown 1992:22). Including forcé within a paradigm of
power conflicts with a Foucauldian approach which tends explicitly to
exelude it (Phelan 1990:425). However, I would argüe that forcé is an
important means of shaping and determining outeomes. The notion of power
acting on and through the voluntaristic actions of others presents only a
partial picture of the ways in which bodies are re-formed or subjected.
The third mode, discipline, is a complex and contested concept despite its
popularity within Foucauldianism. Dews (1987:161) describes discipline as a

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448 DAVINA COOPER

system of micro-power relations that are essentially non-egalitarian and

asymmetrical, Fraser (1989:22) as the tactics and technologies of disciplinary
organisations such as management, surveillance and control. Walzer (1986), in
turn, discusses discipline as the production of normality and abnormality.
Fraser’s approach seems somewhat tautological and raises the question: what
are disciplinary organisations? I nevertheless find it a useful starting point.
However, I would widen her definition beyond organisations (Bartky 1988:
75) to encompass social systems whose rules, practices, and procedures
impact upon the ways in which people, institutions and social life opérate.
Such an impact principally occurs through a process of internalisation which
makes the ‘discipline’ seem natural, irresistible, in some instances favourable,
or simply renders its subjects unaware of the process of internalisation.
Finally, resources are a mode of power that works through its ability to
create a material advantage that can be acquired and possessed, for instance,
legal rights, skills, money and property. This also might seem in conflict with
a Foucauldian approach which rejects the notion of power as a resource.
However, in this framework, I am suggesting the converse: that resources are
a form of power, in that they are a way of impacting upon social processes,
outcomes, decisions, etc. They also do not necessarily need to be zero-sum
since I am conceiving of them within a framework which does not reduce
power to social inequality: domination/subordination. Whilst some may
involve a zero-sum process, given a particular logic, e.g. rights, or within our
particular social context, money (although this too in some ways is constantly
expanding, although arguably the power it generates is not); others, such as
skills, can be shared and developed without any concomitant loss, except
perhaps in their market valué. Most, although not all, resources possess an
exchange valué, that is, they can be traded either for other resources or to
achieve particular Services or outcomes. Thus, they are both the product and
generator of power.
Modes of power are abstract entities. Therefore I will briefly set out the
schema I am adopting to conceptualise how they actually opérate in practice.
First, they work through historically specific forms or ‘technologies’ (I use
the two terms interchangeably to refer to the means by which modes of
power opérate) to create effects. Although there is considerable overlap
between the technologies of different modes, key forms of ideology might be
language, knowledge and culture. For forcé, they could be physical strength,
military might and criminal sanctions; for discipline: surveillance, hierarchical
structures and discourse; and for resources: money, legal rights (McNay
1992:44) and time. Second, as well as modes and technologies of power, there
are also the sites (geographical, institutional, systemic) across and through
which power operates, such as the courts, army, economy, welfare State, and
the body. These sites shape the form power takes, for instance, disciplinary
power deployed within the military will be of a different character to that
within the home or school. Finally, there is the level of effects, that which

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 449

power impacts upon and transforms. These inelude social meanings, cultural
practices and relations, bodies, choices, and decisions, as well as, at a more
general level, sites, forms and modes of power themselves.
In setting out the process of power in this way, my intention is not to
regimentedly categorise particular aspeets of social life. Many phenomena can
be understood as operating as both technologies and terrains, as well as
being effeets of power. For instance, the State, in its different institutional
apparatuses, could be seen as a site of power; it might also be deemed to
describe a particular power form (or forms), and it is also aífected or
impacted upon by social forces exercising power. In constructing categories
or conceptual schemata, the question is whether they assist in understanding
social practices and relations, not as an end in themselves. I will therefore
apply the framework I have set out to issues of ageney, inequality and social
change.
In discussing power as modes, it might seem as if human ageney is once
more being marginalised (Hoy 1986). And indeed,within this framework, the
abstract existence of modes - the generation of effeets - is probably beyond
human volition (Waltzer 1986). It is doubtful whether we can, for instance,
stop outeomes or processes from being shaped generally by social meanings
or resources (although, in the long-run, the efficacy of different modes may
change, so that some, such as forcé, become redundant). Similarly, although
the ways in which power is actually exercised tends to be the result of human
volition - for instance, choosing to deploy resources such as money or legal
rights (and therefore the nature and strength of these technologies may
change) - they reach us as the historical condensation of past actions. Thus,
to paraphrase Marx, we rarely start from scratch in choosing or determining
the forms or technologies through which we exercise power.

S o cia l Vectors a n d the E xercise o f P o w er

The question of volition in the exercise of power is closely linked to issues
concerning social inequalities of race, class and gender. For, in suggesting
that power is the facilitation of outeomes, processes and practices, questions
of access to power are raised. In common with Foucauldian feminists, I
would argüe that access to, and the deployment of, power is not exclusively
determined by possession of economic strength or masculinity, ñor is it the
monopoly of a club of individuáis identified today as white, middle-class,
heterosexual men.
In general, most modes of power are not deployed exclusively by one set of
forces but are accessible, albeit unevenly, to different collectivities located
along ‘social vectors’ (Rubin 1984) of class, race, gender, etc. However, in
saying this I am not suggesting a pluralist framework of power, for power is
not evenly distributed. Between forms of power, access operates to accentuate
rather than diminish inequality, since the ability to deploy one form of power
will tend to facilítate access to others. For instance, within the home, women

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450 DAVINA COOPER

may have disciplinary and ideological power in relation to their children.

However, men’s economic and physical power may work to undercut this
and, over a period of time, to invest them as fathers with greater ideological
and disciplinary authority as well.
Gender, race, class and other social vectors, are thus important in under-
standing who has access to power as well as the nature of such access (e.g.
Brown 1992; McNay 1992:11). However, the issue is not solely one of
capacity to d ep lo y technologies of power. Social vectors also affect the
character of the technologies deployed within any given mode, as well as their
impact. This is evident in the different forms, sites and effects when forcé is
used by the State, working-class men, and mothers. In the case of discursi ve
technologies of power such as knowledge, not only is there not equal access
but the production of narratives (discourse) from the perspective of the
subjugated are likely to hold at best a marginal position (Phelan 1990:433;
Sawicki 1991:26; Weedon 1987:111). Thus, we need to consider not only who
has access to the production of discourse, but also the gendered or raced
nature of the discourses they deploy, and of the hierarchy within which they
opérate.
Social vectors therefore shape the exercise of power at all stages - from
questions of access, the form and nature of power, through to the terrain on
which it is operating and the subject matter with which it interacts to
produce change or to maintain the sta tu s quo. In contrast to Brown (1992:11),
I do not conceptualise race, gender and class, e t c . as modes of power
themselves, but rather as characterising each aspect of the power process.
Although it is important to maintain the sense of continuity and systematicity
in the operation of gender, class, etc. that ‘modes’ provides (Eisenstein
1988:19) - that is, they are not recreated from scratch at different points
within the power process - at the same time, the notion of mode, as I am
using it, seems too essentialist or, perhaps, function-oriented to describe the
ways in which race, class, and gender opérate. First, by suggesting a coherent
class, it might minimise the degree of variation that occurs when, for
example, race interacts with different sites, technologies, etc. Second, the
concept of mode implies a permanency I do not wish to convey. On the
contrary, setting out the ways in which power is raced and classed hopefully
draws attention to the different ways in which social vectors of inequality can
also be challenged. It is to this that I now turn.

R esistin g the P ro d u ctio n o f In eq u a lity

As I have discussed above, within a productive paradigm of power,
resistance or social contestation is not inevitable.3 However, the inability of
any particular operation or exercise of power to produce a totalising outcome,
or to eradicate all other or previous deployments of power means that the
possibilities for resistance or opposition may not necessarily be ‘organised
out’ (Bartky 1988:82; McNay 1992; Phelan 1990:428). Struggle may involve a

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 PRODUCTIVE, RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 451

number of things. It may pose a challenge to the objectives for which a

particular technology of power is being deployed, e.g. ‘men’s’ rather than
women’s ‘rights’, contest differential access to power, e.g. to money, manage-
ment positions, the media, or challenge the existence and/or nature of certain
power-forms, e.g. disciplinary structures such as schools, prisons and fae­
tones. Struggle may also involve consciously using existing forms of power to
transform social processes, e.g. through criminal ‘justice’ legislation, or to
generate different outeomes, e.g. the development of equal opportunity
policies. Yet how far can the deployment of particular forms of power by
oppositional forces go? This is a question at the heart of sceptical responses
to the transformative potential of currently existing technologies such as legal
rights (McNay 1992:43-5; Smart 1989).
Whilst women may be able to use legal rights to achieve very specific,
potentially beneficial outeomes, such a juridical strategy may not impact
significantly on the gendered nature of other forms of power. This is not to
suggest that effeets will not pervade other forms: probably they will, although
the actual nature of the effeets may be very difñcult to predict. For instance,
the achievement of particular legal rights, such as equal pay, may well impact
(detrimentally or beneficially) upon women’s economic power, domestic
labour, sexuality, knowledge and political power. However, the positive
effeets of achieving specific legal rights for women will probably be limited.
First, because they are unlikely to deal with the relationship between
different social vectors, for example, the impact on women not only of gender
relations but of race and class as well (Williams 1990). In addition, the
impact will be diminished if contestations do not also take place elsewhere.
Without such changes, legal rights will be battling against other technologies
of power which remain differently gendered. Although they will impact upon
them, the character and meaning of such legal rights will also be affected by
those other forms.
In addition, challenging the contení of particular laws or creating new ones
may not address questions of legal form (Hunt 1985:23), and it may be the
form of law - its norms, reasoning, culture and processes - rather than any
specific content which impaets most on gender relations (Smart 1989:20-21,
91-2). On the other hand, one might argüe that this external/internal
approach may minimise the ways in which the content and form of particular
power technologies are symbiotically connected. For instance, is the ‘racing’
and ‘gendering’ of the female legal subject a question of form, content or
both?
The interdependeney of form and content is evident in Smart’s argument
that feminists should both challenge legal definitions and delegitimise legal
power (1989:165). However, will a challenge to law as a technology of power
weaken the impact of reforms to its content, e.g. anti-discrimination legis­
lation, since law’s influence will have been lessened? Alternatively, one might
argüe that by forcing the law to absorb other discourses and new definitions,

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452 DAVINA COOPER

its authority and power as a self-referential system grounded on certain,

specified principies will be undermined, although an alternative legal frame-
work may be strengthened.4

C onclusión

In this paper I have explored some of the tensions within a Foucauldian

feminist approach to power, in particular the difficulties emerging from a
perspective which sees power as both relational and productive. An outcome
of this unión has been an understanding of power which combines the
ubiquitous characteristic of a productive framework with the dominance/
subordination focus of a relational approach. Thus, social inequality is both
inevitable and everywhere.
My objective has been to reconceptualise this relationship to consider the
possibilities for a less pessimistic unión. I have therefore chosen to focus on
pow er as the production, facilitation or maintenance o f particular outcomes,
processes, or social relations. In this way, pow er does not have inevitable
negative connotations. W h eth er it operates in a Progressive or reactionary
way depends on its form , the terrains on which it operates, and on the nature
o f those exercising and subject to pow er w ithin a given social and historical
moment.
Another way of conceptualising this is to argüe that even if ‘domination’
and ‘subordination’ remain with us, their character might change. Thus,
instead of being the effect of traditional disciplinary relations or the deploy-
ment of forcé, they might refer to the process by which certain decisions,
choices and desires take precedence - ‘domínate’ - based on other, more
oppositional technologies. Such technologies of power could inelude new
kinds of knowledge grounded in different epistemologies, alternative cultural
truths, or radical democratic processes (Cooper 1993b). In other instances,
change might concern the accessibility of particular power forms, e.g. in the
case of resources, where redistribution rather than reconceptualisation might
seem the priority. Transformation also depends on changes in the relationship
between power and social vectors so that issues such as race, class and gender
either no longer characterise the mode, form, terrain or effeets of power or do
so in ways that do not constitute inequality.
The extent to which such changes are possible is a contested issue. The
point of this paper has been, however, to show how it is feasible to theorise
power in a way that allows for, rather than impedes, their possibility whilst
still accepting power as ubiquitous and inevitable. Yet, as I said at the
beginning, power is an essentially contested concept. It can mean many
things; thus, to deploy it in a way that still allows for radical social change
may be to play semantic games, whilst saying little about the way the world
‘actually’ operates. There is some truth in this. However, earlier I also stated

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 PRO DUCTIVA RELATIONAL AND EVERYWHERE? 453

that the way in which power is conceived is a political issue, highlighting

certain social relations and marginalising others. Conceptualising power is
also political in the ways in which it structures social strategies. If power is
theorised in a way that dampens struggle, then it may be of less use to those
seeking change than a framework which allows for resistance and trans-
formation and sees future social relations as, whilst contingent, without
theoretical closure.

Acknow ledgem ents

I would like to thank for their suggestions and comments Susan Boyd, Didi
Hermán, Terry Lovell, Alan Norrie, and the anonymous reviewers of S ociology.

N otes
1. I do not mean to suggest here that some people are subjects of power, whilst
others exercise it, but rather what the relation is at any given moment. As
Phelan States (1990:429), none of us are simply victims or oppressors.
2. Though see Phelan (1990:433) for a discussion of Foucault which suggests that
simply reversing hierarchies of valué, e.g. what is good/bad, is of limited benefit.
3. The extent to which resistance and other forms of social contestation, such as
the drive for transformation, differ is questionable. In a context of permanent
instability, saying ‘no’ to change, Le. resistance, will not retain the status quo
ante but precipita te outcomes that will probably inelude subsequent struggles.
Thus the diñerence between resistance and transformative struggle may have
more to do with the style of engagement with power than with the nature or
quality of the outeome.
4. I am grateful to Didi Hermán for this point. It is also possible, however, that
opening law up to other discourses would increase its legitimacy and authority
as a democratic apparatus. Whether this would be beneficial or problematic
depends on what one is actually critiquing in an analysis of law.

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B iogra phical n ote:

DAVINA COOPER is currently a lecturer in the School of Law,
University of Warwick.

A ddress: School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL.

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