Evil Women and Dynastic Collapse Tracing

Quarterly Journal of Chinese Studies
Editor-in-Chief
Tongtao Zheng
Xiamen University
Executive Editor
Yu Zhu
Xiamen University
Editorial Assistant
Amy Sung
Xiamen University
Editorial Board
Huanhai Fang, Xiamen University
Shengli Feng, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shui-Lung Fung, BNU-HKBU United International College
Wei Hong, Purdue University, U.S.A.
Rulong Li, Xiamen University
King-Long Ling, National Taichung University of Science and Technology
Hong Liu, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Jinghui Liu, California State University, U.S.A.
Colin Mackerras, Griffith University, Australia
Shiu-Kee Shum, University of Hong Kong
Chung-Mou Si, University of Hong Kong
Shek-Kam Tse, University of Hong Kong
Ling Wang, University of Minnesota, U.S.A.
Jie Xu, University of Macau
Nora Yao, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Linsheng Zhang, Osaka Prefecture University, Japan
Tongtao Zheng, Xiamen Uinversity
Zhen Zou, University of Minnesota, U.S.A.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES
Volume 1 • Number 2 • Winter 2012
QJCS Articles
The Role of Civil Commercial Law in China’s “Socialist Market Economy”
IAN DUNCAN 1
Anarchism and the Question of Practice: The Role of the New Culture Movement in
the Innovation and Legitimation of Early Anarchist Ontology 1919-1927
THOMAS MARLING 14
From Exclusion to the Inclusive Sphere: Sun Yat-Sen’s Emancipatory Communication

and China’s Modernization
G. KENTAK SON 30
EU-China Political and Security Relations: Gaps, Challenges and Perspectives

JUST CASTILLO IGLESIAS 50
Evil Women and Dynastic Collapse: Tracing the Development of an Ideological Archetype
BRET HINSCH 62
Poems on Immortality in the Political and Social Contexts of Han China

ANNA SOKOLOVA 82
A Portrayal of Real Qing’s Empresses

JINGWEI LIU & HUANGHAI FANG 101
QJCS Reviews & Others

The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China, by Dieter Kuhn
HANG LIN 109
Fu Baoshi’s Yuntai Shan Tu: A Modern Interpretation of an Ancient Design

YULING HUANG 113
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1 (2), 1-13
ISSN: 2224-2716
Copyright © 2012 Overseas Education College of Xiamen University
The Role of Civil Commercial Law in China’s “Socialist

Market Economy”– The Development and Protection of
China’s Domestic, National and International Economy and
Trade, Including China’s WTO Membership1
Ian Duncan
Xiamen University, China
LAW - A VITAL PART OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CHINA
During the past six decades, China’s socialist revolution and China’s socialist market econ-
omy have lifted Chinese people from poverty under previous colonial exploitation, and will
soon see China become the world’s most powerful economy – with the world’s largest pop-
ulation and the world’s largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Throughout this period, the continuing development of China’s civil commercial laws
and China’s increasing participation in international trade have been integral components
of China’s socialist revolution, including China’s socialist market economy – the success
of which has seen China’s successful re-entry as a major power in the global economy and
global politics.
Since 1953, China’s twelve Five Year Plans have reflected and guided all aspects of
China’s economic and social growth, t he development of China’s domestic laws and Chi-
na’s increasing participation in overseas investment and international trade - including the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), which China joined on 11 December 2001.
Under the Twelfth Five Year Plan 2011- 2015, the focus of China’s legal framework
moved from the older primary objective of establishing a commercial law base that assisted
internal economic development and foreign trade, to now more focus on the internal so-
cio-economic problems which have emerged as a result of China’s rapid economic develop-
ment during recent decades.
Since the adoption of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform” and “Open Door” policies of the late
1970s and until recent years, China’s rapid economic development has been closely linked
to the foreign investment associated with those “reform” and “Open Door” policies, and
China’s increasing involvement in the global market.
Deng Xiaoping’s great leadership is generally credited with developing China into one
of the fastest growing economies in the world over the last 30 years, along with raising the
living standards of hundreds of millions of people in China.
To attract foreign investment, China needed a legal framework to protect the rights and
interests of foreign investors in China, and to also protect China’s rights and interests in
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Ian Duncan. E-mail: ianduncan@ozemail.com.au

2 DUNCAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 1-13
international trade. Laws were passed in China to improve the foreign business and invest-
ment environment. The Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Law was adopted in 1979
at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress. This was followed by many
further laws to promote and protect foreign investment in China.
Over recent decades, China has become economically very powerful and rich. How-
ever, since the adoption of the “reform” and “Open Door” policies of the late 1970s, the
resulting rapid economic development in China has also seen a widening gap between
the living standards of China’s “new rich”, city-based middle class people, and the many
poorer people living in rural areas of China. This widening gap has been evidenced by in-
creasing disparities in housing, health, education, social security, personal wealth and civil
unrest in rural areas of China. The Chinese Government recognized that if this gap between
China’s “new rich” people, and China’s poorer people remained uncontrolled and unrecti-
fied, it could lead to increasing civil unrest, which could jeopardize China’s great social and
economic achievements during recent decades.
At the Fourth Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress on 5 March 2011,
Premier Wen Jiabao delivered a Report on the Work of the Government. That report focused
on the macro control and steady and rapid economic development achieved under the Elev-
enth Five Year Plan 2006 – 2010 and on the current concerns of the Chinese Government,
including:
· imbalance in consumption and investment
· income disparity
· constraints resulting from environmental issues and resources
· lack of scientific and technological innovation
· an irrational industrial structure
· weaknesses in the agricultural sector
· the disparity in wealth between urban city and rural areas
· lack of qualified people in some industries
Consistent with Premier Wen Jiabao’s report, the Twelfth Five Year Plan 2011- 2015 fo-
cuses on four main areas:
· the need to undertake scientific development along with economic development
· closely integrating government control with market forces
· adopting a global perspective on domestic and international trade and commerce
· carrying out economic, political, cultural, social and legal reforms necessary to
promote and ensure social fairness and justice
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM
The development of China’s legal system over recent decades and China’s increased partic-
ipation in international legal systems and international trade, has been, and remains, a vital-
ly important aspect of China’s economic and social development.
China’s modern legal system was similar to the Continental civil law systems.
However, as a result of the rapid development of China’s economy and the accompa-
nying development of China’s legal system during the past three decades, China now has a
unique legal system, which now differs in many ways from both the Continental civil law
system and the Anglo-American common law system.
THE ROLE OF CIVIL COMMERCIAL LAW IN CHINA 3
The legal profession in China has three branches: judges, procurators and lawyers. All
new entrants to the legal profession are now required to have a Law degree (or equivalent
professional experience and knowledge) and to have passed the National Judicial Examina-
tion.
Similar to continental civil law jurisdictions, China’s laws are classified into groups of
similar types of laws. China has seven groups of laws:
· 38 constitution-related laws
· 33 civil and commercial laws
· 78 administrative laws
· 18 social laws
· 60 economic laws
· 10 procedural laws
· 1 criminal law
These national laws (falu) are enacted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) or
its Standing Committee. Under the Constitution of China, only the NPC and its Standing
Committee have the power to pass national laws.
These national laws are supplemented by a large quantity of subordinate laws and
regulations, which are issued at the national level by the State Council, the Ministries and
Commissions under the State Council, the People’s Bank of China, the Auditing Office and
other departments with administrative responsibilities directed by the State Council.
At local levels, subordinate laws and regulations are issued by People’s Congresses and
Standing Committees and people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions and mu-
nicipalities directly under the Central Government, and the larger cities.
The Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate also issue judicial
interpretations of laws. These are an important part of the legal system.
CHINA’S COURTS
The Supreme People’s Court is the highest court in China and is located in Beijing.
At the next level down are the 32 Higher People’s Courts located in the cities under
direct Central Government control (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) and in the
capital cities of the provinces and autonomous regions.
One level further down are the 409 Intermediate People’s Courts located in prefectures
of provinces and of autonomous regions, in autonomous prefectures, and in municipalities
under direct Central Government control.
At the lowest level down are the 3,115 Basic People’s Courts located in the counties
of provinces, in autonomous counties, and in municipalities and municipal districts across
China.
PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATES
The system of procurators is an integral part of China’s legal system and is a legacy of the
introduction of the Soviet-style legal system into China during the 1950s.
The People’s Procuratorates’ legal supervisory powers to review and challenge judg-
ments and rulings of China’s People’s Courts are a significant aspect of China’s unique
legal system. The People’s Procuratorates range from the highest-level Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, down to the thousands of local People’s Procuratorates in cities and towns
across China.
If a People’s Procuratorate at any level discovers that that any judgment or ruling made
by a People’s Court at the same level as that of the particular People’s Procuratorate in-
volves any of the grounds for challenge by the People’s Procuratorate as listed in Article
179 of China’s Civil Proceure Law, the People’s Procuratorate is required to lodge a Peo-
ple’s Procuratorate protest against that People’s Court judgment or ruling.
In 2008, People’s Procuratorates lodged protests against 10,966 civil judgments and rul-
ings by People’s Courts across China.
Following review, 7,347 of those civil cases were re-tried by the People’s Courts, re-
sulting in alteration of the judgment or ruling in 3,263 of those cases.
CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
On 11 December 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organisation. The
World Trade Organization (WTO) administers the global rules of trade between nations.
The main function of the WTO is to ensure that trade between nations operates as smoothly,
predictably, and as freely as possible.
China’s joining the WTO required and resulted in extensive reform of China’s civil
laws dealing with domestic and international commerce and trade.
To prepare for joining the WTO and to comply with the WTO Agreement, the WTO
Protocol of Accession and the agreements covered within the WTO, China’s Government
conducted extensive reviews of China’s domestic and international commerce and trade and
investment laws.
To attract foreign investment and to protect the interests of domestic businesses in Chi-
na doing international trade and commerce, China needed a legal system and laws which
protect the rights and interests of foreign investors and domestic Chinese businesses. Thou-
sands of China’s civil laws and regulations were amended before and after China joined the
WTO in December 2001.
China’s domestic economy and China’s international trade continue to grow at an im-
pressive rate. China will soon be the world’s largest economy.
With many other nations now undergoing economic development, it is increasingly
important for China to be able to protect China’s domestic and international commerce and
trade – including the efficient settlement of disputes resulting from other nations breaching
the rules of international trade.
China’s development of China’s internal/domestic arbitration and mediation procedures
has adopted many internationally adopted arbitration and mediation concepts and practices,
and is intended (as well as settling domestic commerce and trade disputes) to reassure for-
eign investors in China that commercial contract disputes in China can be resolved equita-
bly, inexpensively, and quickly – without having to resort to lengthy and commercially-dis-
ruptive litigation in the Courts.
China has developed an increasingly efficient system of arbitration and mediation to re-
solve and settle commercial and trade disputes within China – as an alternative to litigation
in the Courts.
The WTO member nations have also agreed on and established a system of dispute set-
tlement procedures to resolve and settle trade disputes between WTO member nations.
Since China joined the WTO as a member in December 2001, China has used these
WTO dispute settlement procedures on many occasions to protect China’s international
trade and China’s developing economy.
China’s rising living standards, rising wages levels and the focus on increasing domestic
consumption have been accompanied by increasing costs of production in China – which
has resulted in rapidly developing economies in other countries – such as India, Vietnam
and Indonesia, competing with China as desirable locations for the establishment and oper-
ation of manufacturing and service industries. This makes it even more important for China
to participate actively in the WTO to support and assist the global rules of trade between
nations to ensure that global trade flows as smoothly, freely and predictably as possible.
CHINA’S FIRST WTO DISPUTE – AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
China’s first use of the WTO dispute settlement procedures was soon after China’s acces-
sion to the WTO in 2001. That first dispute was WTO Dispute DS 252.
On 26 March 2002 China requested consultations with the United States of America (USA)
about tariffs imposed by the USA on steel products imports into the USA from China. The
USA called those tariffs “definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel prod-
ucts”. China complained and claimed that the USA was violating the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards and Articles.
Many other WTO members supported China, and also made similar complaints against
the USA. After the consultations failed to satisfy China, China’s complaint became a re-
quest to the WTO Disputes Settlement Body for the establishment of a panel. At the request
of China (and other supporting WTO member nations) on 25 July 2002, the WTO Disputes
Settlement Body established a WTO Panel to consider the dispute and to prepare a Report
to the members involved in the dispute.
On 11 July 2003 the WTO Panel gave its Report to the members, concluding that the
tariffs imposed by the USA on the steel products breached the WTO Agreement on Safe-
guards and Articles. The USA did not agree with the conclusions of the WTO Panel’s Re-
port. On 11 August 2003 the USA appealed to the WTO Appellate Body against the conclu-
sions of the WTO Panel’s Report.
On 10 November 2003, the WTO Appellate Body gave its decision, upholding the con-
clusions of the WTO Panel that the tariffs imposed by the USA on the steel products was a
breach by the USA of the USA’s obligations under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards and
Articles.
At the WTO Disputes Settlement Body meeting on 10 December 2003, the USA Gov-
ernment informed WTO members that on 4 December 2003 the President of the USA had
issued a Presidential Proclamation that terminated all of the tariffs imposed by the USA on
the steel products – which were the subject of this dispute.
The above example shows how the WTO Disputes Settlements Procedures protected
China’s steel industry after the USA breached a WTO Agreement. Since that first dispute
with the USA, China has also used the WTO Disputes Settlements Procedures on many
subsequent occasions to protect China’s international trade and China’s economy. The
WTO Disputes Settlements Procedures are very important to protect China’s international
trade – which is a vital component of China’s economy.
Below is a summary of some extracts from the WTO Disputes Settlements Procedures
- to show the structure of the WTO Disputes Settlements Procedures, and how the WTO
Disputes Settlements Procedures operate in a timeframe.
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION - DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
All Member countries (“Members”) of the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) have agreed
to use and be bound by the WTO’s UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (the “DSU”) to resolve international
trade disputes between WTO Members.
The DSU enables a WTO Member who believes that any other WTO Member is
breaching any aspect of international trade laws covered by any of the WTO agreements (a
“covered agreement”), to use the WTO dispute settlement rules and procedures to enforce
correct compliance with WTO agreements and law.
The “DSU” is comprised of 9 parts: Part I comprises 27 Articles (numbered from Ar-
ticle 1 through to Article 27), and 4 Appendices. Part I contains the basic processes and
timeframes for the settlement of disputes between WTO members. Part II comprises the Dis-
pute Settlement Rules and Procedures in the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Part III com-
prises Dispute Settlement Decisions of the Contracting Parties to the Gatt 1947 Referred to
in the DSU. Part IV comprises Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures in the Plurilateral
Trade Agreements. Part V comprises Rules of Procedure for the Meetings of the Dispute
Settlement Body. Part VI comprises Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on the Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Part VII comprises Working Proce-
dures for Appellate Review. Part VIII comprises DSU Practices. Part IX comprises Other
Decisions.
Each member nation of the WTO has agreed to all the dispute settlement rules and pro-
cedures contained in the Articles in Part I of the DSU. As an example of how the WTO’s
DSU is written, and how these rules and procedures operate, I set out below some extracts
from the contents of the Articles in Part I of the DSU.
Part I, Article 1 - Coverage and Application of the DSU.
Under Article 1, Appendix 1, of the DSU, the DSU rules and procedures apply to any
dispute between WTO Members pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provi-
sions contained in the WTO “covered agreements” listed in Article 1, Appendix 1, which
are:
(A) the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation,
(B) the Multilateral Trade Agreements covering Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, and
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and
(C) the Plurilateral Trade Agreements covering Trade in Civil Aircraft, Government
Procurement, International Dairy, and International Bovine Meat.
The DSU procedures are also subject to any “special or additional” dispute settlement
rules and procedures contained in any relevant and applicable “covered agreement” listed
in Article 1, Appendix 2. Those “covered agreements” are:
(A) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures,
(B) Agreement on Textiles & Clothing,

(C) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
(D) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994,
(E) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994,
(F) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
(G) General Agreement on Trade in Services,
(H) Annex on Financial Services,
(I) Decision on Certain Dispute Settlement Procedures for the GATS.
Under Article I.2, if there is any difference or conflict between the rules and procedures
contained in the Articles of the DSU and the “special or additional” dispute settlement rules
and procedures contained in any relevant and applicable “covered agreement” listed in Ar-
ticle 1, Appendix 2, the “special and additional” dispute settlement rules and procedures in
Appendix 2 prevail.
In a dispute involving rules and procedures under more than one “covered agreement”,
if there is a difference or a conflict between “special or additional” dispute settlement rules
and procedures of any “covered agreement” which is the subject of the dispute, and if the
WTO Members who are the parties to the dispute cannot agree on dispute settlement rules
and procedures within 20 days of the establishment of the “panel”, the Chairman of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“the DSB”) in consultation with the parties to the dispute,
shall decide the dispute settlement rules and procedures which shall apply to that dispute.
Article 2 – Administration of dispute settlement rules and procedures.
Article 2 of the DSU establishes the Dispute Settlement Body (“the DSB”) to adminis-
ter the dispute settlement rules and procedures of the DSU. The DSB has the authority to
establish panels, to adopt panel reports, to adopt Appellate Body Reports, to monitor the
implementation of decisions, rulings and recommendations of a Panel, or of an Appellate
Body.
Article 3 – General Provisions (below are some relevant extracts).
Article 3.2:
“…the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”
Article 3.3:
“…essential to the effective functioning of the WTO … is the prompt settlement of
situations in which a WTO member considers that any benefits accruing to it … under the
covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member.”
Article 3.7:
“The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dis-
pute.”
“In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settle-
ment mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are
found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.”
Article 3.8:
“In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered
agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or im-
pairment. This means there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an ad-
verse impact on other Member parties to that covered agreement.”
Article 4 - Consultations (below are some relevant extracts)

Article 4.3:
“If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, the Member
to which the request is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request
within 10 days after the date of its receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith
within a period of no more than 30 days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view
to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution.”
“If the Member does not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request,
or does not enter into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, … the Mem-
ber that requested the holding of consultations may proceed directly to request the estab-
lishment of a panel”.
Article 4.7:
“If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the
request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.
…”
Article 4.11:
“Whenever a Member other than the consulting Members considers that it has a sub-
stantial trade interest in consultations being held…, such Member may notify the consulting
members and the DSB… of its desire to be joined in the consultations.”
Article 6 – Establishment of Panels (below are some relevant extracts).
Article 6.1:
“If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the
DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB’s
agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.”
Article 11 – Function of Panels (below are some relevant extracts).
Article 11:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this
Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case
and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make
such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the
rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the
parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory
solution.”
Article 16 – Adoption of Panel Reports (below are some relevant extracts).
Article 16.4:
“Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report
shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB
of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report….”
Article 17 – Appellate Review (below are some relevant extracts).
Article 17.1:
“A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall
hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be comprised of seven persons, three of whom shall
serve on any one case.”
Article 17.2:
“The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, …”
Article 17.3:
“The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated
expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements gener-
ally. They shall be unaffiliated with any government. The Appellate Body membership shall
be broadly representative of membership in the WTO. …”
Article 18 – Communications with the Panel or Appellate Body (below are some rele-
vant extracts).
Article 18.2:
“Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential,
but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding shall
preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public.
…”
Article 20 – Time-frame for DSB Decisions (below are some relevant extracts).
Article 20.1:
“Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties to the dispute, the period from the date of es-
tablishment of the panel by the DSB until the date the DSB considers the panel or appellate
report for adoption shall as a general rule not exceed nine months where the panel report is
not appealed, or 12 months where the report is appealed. …”
Article 21 – Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings (below

are some relevant extracts).
Article 21.1:
“Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order
to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.”
Article 21.3:
“At a DSB meeting held within 30 days after the date of adoption of the panel or Appel-
late Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. …”
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES NOW FACING CHINA
One focus of China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan 2011- 2015 is the carrying out of economic,
political, cultural, social and legal reforms necessary to promote and ensure social fairness
and justice. This ongoing challenge includes a policy to reduce China’s economic depen-
dence on exports of products manufactured in China and to increase domestic consumption
of goods and services.
The ongoing economic turmoil in Europe and the lack of consumer confidence in many
developed nations has resulted a faster-than-anticipated slowing in the growth of the Chi-
nese economy, a faster-than-anticipated slowing of Chinese exports, a slowing of domestic
demand within China, and reduced employment growth in some areas of Chinese manufac-
turing. “Manufacturing activities softened again in May (2012), reflecting China’s deterio-
rating export situation” said HSBC chief China economist, Qu Hongbin.
The Chinese government has reacted to this situation by becoming more proactive in
promoting manufacturing and exports and infrastructure construction. A statement on a
Chinese government website on 23 May 2012, summarizing a decision of the State Coun-
cil, said that “We must proactively take policies and measures to expand demand and to
create a favorable policy environment for stable and relatively fast economic growth.”
That statement builds on Premier Wen Jiabao’s statement published on 20 May, 2012,
which emphasized the Chinese government’s increasing focus on promoting economic
growth – after April’s trade levels and industrial production figures were significantly be-
low the government’s planned levels and forecasts.
Mr. Zhang Zhiwei, Nomura International’s Chief Economist for China, based in Hong
Kong, recently said that China’s government will probably implement new economic stim-
ulus policies and projects in June 2012, including many key new infrastructure construction
projects that are vital to the overall economy and can facilitate growth, and speeding up
construction of existing railway, environmental protection and rural projects.
The impact on China’s economy of the economic turmoil in Europe and the resulting
damage to the world economy could depend upon the Chinese government’s response, in-
cluding stimulus policies – according to China International Capital Corporation (CICC),
which is China’s biggest investment bank.
CICC predicts that if Greece leaves the European Economic Zone, China’s economic
growth could slow to 6.4 per cent in 2012 (the lowest since 1990) without successful stim-
ulus policies.
In the currently uncertain and rapidly-changing global economy, Chinese manufacturing
industries are trying to buy imported raw materials at the lowest possible prices, to assist
them to remain competitive against manufacturing industries in other lower-cost develop-
ing countries.
At this same time, the overseas suppliers of those raw materials are trying to get higher
sale prices for those raw materials and the lower-cost manufacturing industries in those oth-
er developing countries are trying to sell their manufactured products at prices lower than
the manufactured products from China.
All these above global economic uncertainties, and the continuing dependence of Chi-
na’s economy on imports of raw materials and on the export of products and services from
China, emphasize the continuing importance for China of an effective system to regulate
international trade – the WTO.
LEGAL GOVERNANCE – AN ONGOING CHALLENGE FOR CHINA
The evolution of China’s civil commercial laws during recent years and China’s increasing
international trade and commerce, has been accompanied by increasing professionalism and
increasing levels of integrity throughout the Courts, the Procuratorates and the government
departments administering these laws.
Until recently, many aspects of civil and commercial laws in China were poorly, sub-
jectively and inconsistently enforced because of a lack of trained professional legal and
administrative personnel, and because of localized protectionism and corruption.
The previously endemic failure to prosecute breaches of laws, and failure to enforce
judgments and rulings, reflected the economic and legal infrastructure of regions in which
Courts and Procuratorates were located, inadequate numbers of legal professionals, com-
bined with the extent of corruption and protectionism at that local level – often due to the
financial dependence of the Courts, the judiciary and the Procuratorates on the local gov-
ernments that paid them.
During recent years the Chinese central government and China’s provincial govern-
ments have been proactively and successfully addressing this legal governance issue and
dealing with the underlying causes of corruption in order to establish and maintain a truly
independent judiciary and procuratorate. This is resulting in the independence, accountabil-
ity and integrity of China’s Courts and judiciary and procuratorate and greater uniformity in
the governance and administration of China’s laws – for the benefit of the Chinese commu-
nity and of China’s reputation in its international trade and commerce dealings.
CHALLENGES FACING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE
With China’s leadership needing to focus on and achieve economic development which will
assist social stability throughout China, China has no realistic alternative but to increas-
ingly integrate its socialist market economy into the global framework of commerce, trade
and financial networks. One problem in achieving this is that the Chinese Yuan is currently
undervalued.
One keystone of China’s globalization has been the manipulation and use of China’s
currency, the renminbi Yuan. China has always refused to allow the Yuan to “float” on in-
ternational currency markets, subject to international currency traders. This has been and
remains a very sensitive issue.
From 1995 until 2005, China “pegged” the value of the Yuan at approximately 8.3 yuan
to the US dollar. With the decrease in the value of the US dollar, this made products manu-
factured in China and then exported, cheaper for customers in the USA and Europe to buy
with their own currencies than products manufactured in those countries. This has resulted
in the complaints by the USA and other countries that China keeping the Yuan undervalued
relative to the US dollar is giving China an unfair trade advantage. The Peterson Institute
for International Economics recently estimated that the Yuan is undervalued by between 20
and 40 percent.
Also, because manufacturing industries always seek out the lowest salary levels and
production cost levels (which previously saw many manufacturers move from developed
countries to China), those same manufacturers and the employment they provide, will also
migrate out of China to other developing countries with lower labor and manufacturing
costs as China’s salary and manufacturing cost levels increase. This is an ongoing problem
for China.
China’s Foreign Direct Investment
In 2008, when the US economy was falling into recession, China had almost US$2 trillion
in US Treasury bonds, overseas direct investments, and other overseas loans. China did not
want to dump those US treasury bonds (which could have damaged China’s international
interests), so China therefore started focusing more on foreign direct investment in other
countries (FDI) as a method for China to put the huge amounts of money China had accu-
mulated through China’s trade surpluses back into the international financial structure.
China’s FDI in other countries involves China’s companies (many of them being gov-
ernment-owned companies) making equity investments in businesses in other countries,

entering joint ventures in other countries and buying assets in other countries. This has cre-
ated increasing concerns from many developed countries, which who see China’s FDI as a
threat to the economic and social interests of the country in which China wants to do FDI.
Between 2003 and 2008, China’s FDI in Australia’s extensive minerals deposits was
around US$43 billion. China’s FDI has also been buying Australian farms – causing
concerns in Australia about future food security for Australia. Many developed foreign
countries are now complaining that China should not have access to FDI in those foreign
countries while foreign investors are excluded from FDI in markets and industries in China
because China protects and maintains many of China’s mining and farming industries with
subsidies, and as state-run monopolies.
WTO Free-Trade Agreements
One aim of the WTO is to assist and protect free and sustainable trade between nations.
However, to protect their own economy in the currently uncertain global economy, many
nations, including China and Australia, are understandably reluctant to enter Free Trade
agreements, or to compromise their own national interests without what each regards as
adequate conditions to benefit their own nation. This is currently causing relationship prob-
lems between China and some other WTO member nations, including Australia.
For seven years Australia has been trying to negotiate a free-trade agreement with
China – similar to the Free-Trade agreement which operates between China and New Zea-
land. China and Australia have not yet been able to agree on the conditions of a Free-Trade
agreement, which is now causing tensions between China and Australia.
China’s negotiators are demanding that China’s government-owned companies should
be treated by the Australian government in the same way as private companies and should
be allowed easier conditions for investment in Australia. Some Chinese negotiators and
Chinese economists have also warned that Australia will be forced to allow Chinese gov-
ernment-owned companies to freely invest in Australia when the Australian resources and
commodities boom slows and Australia needs more foreign capital investment.
Some of Australia’s free-trade negotiators and some Australian politicians are now
calling for an end to the attempts to negotiate a Free-Trade agreement with China, and for
Australia to develop more trade with other developing Asian nations such as Malaysia,
Vietnam and Indonesia. However, many Australian producers continue to want a Free Trade
Agreement with China. These Australian producers claim that the fact that New Zealand
has a Free Trade Agreement with China gives New Zealand producers a big competitive
advantage over Australia.
Some Australian politicians are saying that Australian farmers can not compete with
China’s government-subsidised farm products. One Australian politician recently said that
“In China they subsidize their farm produce to the tune of AUD$147 billion each year in
China, yet they’re quite happy to come and buy up our farm land.” Senator Christine Milne,
the leader of Australia’s Greens Party (which holds the balance of power in the Australian
government) recently said the conditions demanded by China for a Free-Trade Agreement
with Australia were “completely unacceptable.” “This isn’t trade” she said. “This is about
moving into other countries, buying up land and water, producing food and sending it home
to the home country (China) when food is restricted in the global market. It’s the antithesis
of free trade and it distorts markets… We need to keep control of our own land and water
for our food production”.
Mr. Mei Xinyu, an economist at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation, which is affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, recently
said that “It is not good for Australia to have so many restrictions on mining investment in
Australia. They will change their attitude after a big drop of foreign investment.” Howev-
er, the Australian government has rejected China’s claim that Australia’s investment rules
discriminate against Chinese investment. The Australian government points out that invest-
ment in Australia of more than sixty billion Australian dollars (AUD$60 billion), mostly
from China government-owned companies, has been approved from more than 200 Chinese
companies since late 2007.
I believe a Free Trade Agreement will be successfully negotiated between China and
Australia – because each country recognizes that it needs the benefits of that agreement.
CONCLUSION
In the continuing evolution of China’s economy and the society it must support, the only
constant is change. The constantly changing factors within China, within the global econo-
my and within other countries, will continue to produce the many challenges which China
and other countries must face and resolve – if domestic and international economies are to
be able to support and serve the people of the world. The WTO, and its rules and proce-
dures, has a proven history of enabling WTO member nations to resolve disputes peacefully
– for the overall benefit of everyone.
I hope my above overview of the development of China’s legal system and China’s
membership of the WTO – which in my opinion have been both vital components of Chi-
na’s socialist revolution,and of China’s re-entry as a major power into the global economy,
is of interest, and is useful for you.
Author’s Biodata
Dr. Ian Duncan is a Professor of Law who is teaching at International College of Xiamen
University.
First Author’s Address

ianduncan@ozemail.com.au
ISSN: 2224-2716
Anarchism and the Question of Practice: The Role of the

New Culture Movement in the Innovation and Legitimation
of Early Anarchist Ontology 1919-19271
Thomas Marling
Peking University, China
Ontology has been an under-recognised aspect of historical approaches to the final years of anar-
chist organisation in China. Yet, as classical anarchist mantras were becoming practically divorced
from reality, adaptation of anarchism itself became a pressing concern. In response to broader
practical pressures, which were troubling the anarchist thought structure, a subjective, structuralist
and localised application of anarchist theory was placed at the forefront of an emergent debate be-
tween two anarchist factions, an old-guard of leftist classicalists and a younger group of modern,
conceptually malleable innovators. This article sets out to establish this group of younger anar-
chists within the movement proper as early proponents of anarchist ontology. This is a develop-
ment which is set within the wider context of the New Culture movement, whose influence on this
ontology is forwarded as one of both innovation and legitimation. It is postulated that aspects of
the New Culture, in synthesis with anarchism, created the ideological space required to act on the
theoretical boundaries of anarchism itself for the first time.
ABBREVIATIONS
WZFZYSX: Ge, M., Jiang, J., & Li, X. (Eds.). (1984). Wuzhengfu zhuyi sixiang ziliaoxuan
[Selection of materials on anarchist thoughts]. Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe.
GMD: Guomindang
INTRODUCTION
Considering the nascent stages that the movement was in when Li Shizeng (1907)
announced that the anarchist revolution was certain to be “one without end,” it is unlikely
that he could have foreseen the long-run high-water mark of pragmatism his observation
would represent for Chinese anarchism.2 Had he been available for comment by the time
of Ba Jin’s above statement some 20 years later, Li was more likely to have observed that
the anarchist revolution had become “one without change,” as for the vast majority of the
period between Li and Ba’s statements the Chinese anarchists embodied classical anarchism
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Marling. E-mail: tommarling22@gmail.com

2　Pusey has suggested that Li was influenced by newly emerging social-Darwinist theories is China when he
stated that “there is no affair of thing that does not progress … Revolution is nothing but the cleansing away of
obstacles to progress.” See Pusey (1983, p. 371).
ANARCHISM AND THE QUESTION OF PRACTICE 15
to the point of self-abnegation.3 By the 1920s, however, dissatisfaction emerged toward the
prospects for an anarchist project built on these dissociative foundations. Ontology became
the unspoken watchword a generation of anarchists looking to re-involve the movement
in the wider processes of the time. This was the case for Ba, who in 1927 was openly
forwarding an analysis which reflected both impatience with, and self-assurance toward,
the doctrine of anarchism itself.
The importance of this later-era trend toward ontological purposefulness has been lost
behind the broader narrative of the movement’s material decline occupying the historical
foreground. But with the dwindling of relevance bringing the validity and efficacy of clas-
sical anarchism’s dialectical responses into question, the final generation of anarchists faced
the task of actively and assertively adapting anarchism for the first time.4 This paper consid-
ers in detail how one group of younger anarchists looked to achieve this adaptation through
openly anti-canonical, anti-dialectical and situationalist approaches to anarchist doctrine.
Contextualising this period will offer a new perspective on the process. The final gener-
ation of anarchists were the first to fully engage with enlightenment influences, situated as
they were, ideologically, temporally and spatially, at the putative apex of early intellectual
modernisation in China.5 During the 1920s, urbanised anarchist organisations’ numbers
swelled with youth raised in the intellectual atmosphere of the May Fourth and New Cul-
ture movements. These anarchists’ direct contact with a pervasive intellectual atmosphere
grounded in concepts associated with New Culture liberalism - including pragmatism,
experimentalism, localism and evolutionism - will be forwarded as a crucial factor in the
innovation and legitimation of this early anarchist ontology.
The persistent characterisation has, at the very least, been that of a movement subject to
what Scalapino and Yu (1961) referred to as a “political pendulum,” which “could always
swing back under certain conditions, causing them to revert to orthodoxy” (p. 33).6 This
explicit assessment - that orthodoxy was derived from devotion to the strictures of classical
anarchism - represents an implicit assumption in much of the scholarship of Chinese anar-
chism. Yet the late 1920s saw the anarchists test the boundaries of an alternative orthodoxy,
as, contrary to the “political pendulum” theory, many younger anarchists clashed with an
3　A great deal of attention has been paid to espousers of classical anarchism in China, most notably Liu
Sifu (the “soul” of Chinese anarchism), the Tokyo and Paris anarchist groups, and the “Six No’s
Society” founded by Cai Yuanpei. Each of these factions succeeded in occupying a space more theoretical
than functional however - the Tokyo and Paris anarchist groups literally existed outside of China, whereas
Cai Yuanpei and Liu Sifu’s near-total non-involvement in anything from sedan-chairs to even the most
equanimous organisational structures led them to a position of equal abstraction, even as they operated within
China itself. See Dirlik (1993, p. 122) and Krebs (1998, p. 199).
4　Anarchist opposition to the state, nationalism and hierarchical organisation structures were all coming
under strain by the 1920s as the material pressures of nationalism and labour organisation were drawing
idealised approaches into discussions of idealised activity.
5　Various specialised approaches to Chinese modernity have placed the epicentre of modernity in some
combination of, or variation on - the 1920s, modernising cities (in particular treaty ports) and radical youth.
Some examples include Esherick (2000), Wenxin Ye (2000), Yue Dong (2006); Kai-wing Chow (2008) and
Mitter (2004).
6　Peter Zarrow’s preoccupation with rooting anarchism in a Daoist tradition seems to have prefigured
against a role for modernity in his narrative of Chinese anarchism. See Zarrow (1990).
16 MARLING QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 14-29
immovable object in anarchist essentialism. Their response was to direct themselves at

dismantling inherited “orthodox” applications of anarchist doctrine - and toward forming a
dynamic, adaptive and authoritative ontology. Ultimately, these anarchists would come to
equate orthodoxy with ontology, affording them the agency to act, not within or without,
but upon doctrinal boundaries; as subjects rather than objects of anarchism.
NEW CULTURE, NEW THOUGHT AND ANARCHISM
Subject-object relationships between doctrine and its adherents marked the discursive
epicentre of the political wing of the New Culture Movement during the 1920s. A new
generation of intellectual leaders criticised their forebears’ overreliance on doctrine as “a
death sentence to the cause of improving Chinese society” (as cited in Bishop, 1985, p.
369).7 Under the rubric of New Culture liberalism, the multiplicity of political doctrines
which had emerged in modernising China were no longer to be understood as a panacea,
and instead, genuine applicability was sought through investigation into their relevance to
practical issues.8
In arguing that the spirit of New Thought was a “critical attitude,” which undertook to
“oppose blind obedience,” this aspect of the New Culture Movement owed an intellectual
debt to the combined influence of Dewyan pragmatism, Hegel and Bertrand Russell.9 New
Thought’s distrust of determinism and conviction that political theories be studied in the
light of evolution, also shared fundamentally Dewyan principles. In this vein, a “genetic
method” was made integral to a revolution which was understood to be achieved through
“drop-by-drop reconstruction.”10
The traditional understanding of the anarchists’ relationship with these aspects of the
New Culture and beyond has been one of mutual dislocation. Dirlik (1993) has discussed
in detail anarchism’s (explicitly indirect) influence on the New Culture Movement, yet the
collective scholarship of the Chinese anarchist movement has appeared unwilling to allow
for any genuine reciprocity in this regard (p. 162). However, many facets of liberalism and
anarchism correlate; and the two ideologies occupied political spaces prone to overlap.11
Among the pioneers of New Culture liberalism, Hu Shi’s dedication to non-political
reform - advocating “no talking politics for twenty years; no political activity for twenty
years” - was a position which was shared with the anarchists.12 Chow Tse-tsung (1964), too,
has also pointed out that “people who advocated keeping remote from the politics of the
time... included at least three groups: certain scholars and intellectuals such as Hu Shih and
7　For a detailed discussion of this process see Furth (1972, p. 59-p. 69).
8　This is discussed in Chow (1967, p. 218).
9　For a first hand discussion see Hu Shi (1924, p. 1-p. 29); other academic studies include Min-chih Chou
(1984), Lei Yi (2006, p. 33-p. 50), Manicas (1982, p. 133-p. 158) and Grieder (1970).
10　A “genetic method” was first broached by Hu Shi in 1920, for this see Hu Shi (1920, p. 15-p. 25); the
concept of a “drop-by-drop reconstruction” was seemingly first mentioned in 1924. Hu Shi (1924, p. 378).
11　Dewey himself professed a strongly anti-authoritarian streak; Sidney Hook even characterised him as
“a cross between a philosophical anarchist and Robert Louis Stevenson,” a comment whose disposability
only mildly exaggerates some more systemic comparisons, Hook (1939, p. 18). For a further discussion these
comparisons see Manicas (2003) and Lothstein (1978, p. 55-p. 111)
12　This was a vow he would break repeatedly of course, but the ideal remains ideologically congruent.
Chang Tung-sun; merchant groups… and the anarchists” ( p. 223).13 These mutual apolit-
ical positions were rooted in both a comparable faith in the ‘universalisation of education’
( 教育普及 ) and a deeply-held humanitatsideal, which undergirded liberal reformism and
much of anarchism’s self-reliant moralism (Chan and Dirlik, 1991, p. 23).
Many younger anarchists also occupied a physical space which overlapped with that of
the New Culture Movement, both in their ties to the Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu-edited journal,
Xin Qingnian, in which anarchist articles often appeared; and in Dewey’s base at Peking
University (Bishop, p. 366). University President (before Hu Shi himself took over) Cai
Yuanpei was a quasi-anarchist, and the campus was a hotbed of anarchist activity.14 Many
prominent anarchists were based at Peking Univeristy including Liu Shipei and Li Shizeng;
as well as numerous anarchist journals, including Ziyou Lu (Freedom Record), Jinhua Zazhi
(Evolution), Xin ch’ao (New Currents), Guomin (The Citizen) and Fendou (Struggle);15
and the Peking University Students’ Weekly, edited by vocal anarchist Huang Lingshuang
(Zarrow, 1990, p. 222; Weston, 2004, p. 191).16
A new understanding of the anarchist relationship with New Culture liberalism will
undergird this discussion. That the final generation of anarchists were able to approach an-
archism through New Culture, as the epistemologies coalesced with no implicit exclusivity
between the two. This does not imply that these new approaches were taken up univer-
sally, however. In fact, a localised version of the wider “leftist-liberal” divide which had
emerged in the May Fourth community also materialised amongst the anarchists during the
13　For a further discussion of these comparisons see Sor-Hoon Tan (2004).

14　Scalapino and Yu have noted that “during this period, anarchist thought and writings penetrated deeply
into student circles at Peking University and elsewhere. Student journals such as Chin-hua (Evolution),
Hsin ch’ao (New Currents), and Kuo-min (The Citizen), carried the mixture of Anarchist, Socialist, and
democratic ideas that were now flowing into China” in Scalapino and Yu (1961). One of the ways in which
New Culture intellectuals and anarchists were likely brought together is through work-study organisations.
Weston (2004, p. 19 notes that the Beijing Work-Study Corps could claim Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu as
members alongside many younger anarchists.
15　Freedom Record was a product of the “Truth Society” (Shishe) at Peking University, a group of
primarily Guangzhou anarchists studying at the university, there was only one issue; Weston (2004, p. 135).
Evolution was a publication of the Evolution Society, an umbrella organisation which incorporated three
smaller anarchist groups at Peking University, three issues were published, Zhang Yunhou et al., (1979, p. 181-
p. 192). Fendou was founded by Yi Junzuo, Zhu Qianzhi and Guo Chuliang; Weston (2004, p. 191).
16　It is worth at this point noting some of the titles of these journals as indicative of some of the new
approaches to anarchism that we will be discussing – “Evolution” and “Struggle” being good examples.
The Peking University anarchists were evidently preoccupied with questions of progressive transformation,
which, as we will come to see, were separate aspects of a wider pragmatic liberal turn for a younger generation
of anarchists germinating in an environment steeped in these ideals.
mid-1920s.17 While the “post-leftist anarchists,” as we will refer to them, appear to have
selectively incorporated liberalist ideals into an emergent assertive approach to anarchist
doctrine, the “leftist” anarchists professed the classical anarchist distrust of reformism and
experimentation.18 Whilst the 1923 debate between Wu Zhihui and Shen Zhongjiu marks
the ostensible core of this division within the movement, this article will be focusing in-
stead on a group of younger anarchists who developed in a more radically subjective and
ontological direction.19
A LOCALISED, EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ANARCHISM
The principle aspect of post-leftist anarchism was a developing subjective dynamism

toward the inherited doctrinal pillars of anarchism itself, and a reemphasising of presence
and locality when it came to the application this doctrine to a Chinese setting. In engaging
with the duality of intellectual piety and practical necessity, and the validity of anarchist
unilateralism, the post-leftist anarchists faced the same implicit dilemmas as the wider New
Culture community. A focused sense of subjectivity also informed the prevalent attitude
of “ceaseless experimentation” toward inherited ideologies which had emerged during the
New Culture Movement. Both post-Kantian notions of subjective application and New
Thought pragmatism would depend on an analogous “spirit of fansi (reflection), pipan
(critique) and (zijue) self-consciousness” (Fung, 2010, p. 10).
Under this rubric, Dewey and Hu Shi’s disciples in China looked to find constructive
autonomy at the boundaries of apostasy, in which transgression functioned not only as
a necessary digression but also as a means to test the limits of a practice. The subjective
approach of the post-leftist anarchists certainly bears the hallmarks of the contemporary
atmosphere of experimentalism, as in Wei Huilin’s section of “Anarchism and the Question
of Practice,” in which presence is placed in the centre of the discussion on practicality.
An anarchist is not an exceptional person or a scholar who just plays with words. It is
a person that has been freed from the old social system and morals, making efforts to be
develop himself fully. The anarchist movement is about ‘people’ but not about pious peo-
17　The schism between Shen Zhongjiu and the younger anarchists fits into another wider discussion which
was occurring at the time, the “debate between science and metaphysics,” which began in 1923. The
defenders of science in this discussion again read as a relative who’s who of the ideological core of Liberal
Reformism amongst the older May Fourth radicals, including Wu Zhihui. The wider resonance of the debate
is also well understood; Zarrow considers it to be a debate over “not so much science versus metaphysics
but how to define roles for the scientific and the spiritual or intuitive; not so much West versus East but how
to selectively adapt; not so much determinism versus free will but how to balance inner and outer freedom”.
Chow Tse-Tsung, (1967, p. 335) and Zarrow, (2005, p. 179 own emphasis) respectively.
18　It would be tempting, when we come to reference Shen Zhongjiu, to have him tacitly represent a
premodern faction of the anarchist movement. In fact, Shen was a supporter of anarchist youth and labour
organisations, as both a founding member of the Federation of Shanghai Syndicates and as editor of one of
the prominent Zhejiang anarchist journal Tides in Education, and later as editor of Geming Zhoubao, both of
which often provided platforms for some of the more radical voices in the movement. Shen is referenced in
Wen Hsin-Yeh, (1996, p. 164) and McGowan (1991, p. 138).
19　The primary source material for these anarchists will be a symposium entitled “Anarchism and the
Question of Practice.” ( 无政府主义与实际问题 ), the original text is reproduced in full Ge et al., (1984, p.
826-p. 849) and cited in Dirlik, (1993, p. 258-p. 259).
ple who harbour simple beliefs… Although anarchism has become systematic and detailed
through the efforts of several smart antecedents, it is not yet absolutely correct or rigid. We
should think it over through the truths we have experienced and the problems nowadays.
The anarchism I refer to here is closely connected to the practical problems of our time.
The reason why our past movements ended in failure is that they failed to take action
based on practical situations. It is completely incorrect to think that the anarchist movement
is just a movement of morality alone (Ge et al., 1984, all further quotations are my own
translation unless otherwise indicated).
The dilemma presented by needing to selectively adapt anarchism whilst remaining
anarchist lay at the heart of the post-leftist incorporation of New Culture pragmatism. Con-
sider what Wei disavows here, inherited universal standards and the reliance on piety and
morality ahead of practicality and locality, but not anarchism itself. Both the awareness of
the anarchism/anarchist duality and the resultant sense that critical approaches could be a
constructive means by which to overcome doctrinal rigidity while continuing to pursue an-
archism, were drawn from New Culture, and instrumental in allowing such an act upon the
boundaries of orthodoxy in the decline phase.
In support of the claim that anarchism was “underdeveloped,” Wu Kegang belies the
influence of New Culture, focusing in particular on the abstracted dislocation which the
movement had come to embody, associated with an overreliance on classical anarchist
mantras. By establishing that the failings of the anarchist forebears were rooted in this ideo-
logical piety and sloganeering, and by disavowing “doctrine, theory and principles” ( 主
义 , 理论 , 学说 ), his analysis once again represents an open reflection the wider culture
of localism and anti-essentialism of which it was a part.
The reason why anarchism is underdeveloped is that we pay too much attention to doc-
trine, theory and principles, but neglect reality and action.
This is a common fault of the anarchist party in the world, and China is no exception.
However, we should try to control it. Anarchism is a civilian movement, but Chinese anar-
chism is totally unrelated to civilians. Phrases like ‘splendid individualism’, ‘we should put
our hopes in the great past or ideal future,’ and ‘escape from the depressing reality and into
utopia’ should not have been uttered by anarchists (Ge et al., 1984). 20
New Culture’s notion of scientific subjectively was of particular importance to the an-
archist movement (as opposed to, say, Marxism) because it actively subverted the kind of
pure/impure binaries which undergird classical anarchism. As this subjectivity took hold
among the younger anarchists, the dialectical nature of classical anarchist tropes, here
referred to as anarchism’s “idealism”, became a common point of departure. Although an-
archism was never directly stated to be impractical, the repeated criticism of the doctrinal
intransigence and monotheism of the previous generations of anarchists functioned as a by-
word for this realisation. In the place of this outmoded idealism, as Ba Jin indicates below,
facts could determine the future direction of an anarchism which the post-leftist anarchists
had taken rhetorical ownership of.
Although we can not deny that some articles in the publications of Chinese anarchists
have neglected the facts and just deduced everything from one principle, it does not repre-
20　The reference to “escape from the depressing reality and into utopia” is potentially a transliteration of
the classical anarchist slogan “another world is possible”.
sent all the comrades of anarchism.

The reason Kropotkin could systemize anarchism is not because that he was an extraor-
dinary thinker but because he was born in the time that capitalism was broken and the pro-
letariat was active. Kropotkin has never said that any part of anarchism was created by him,
so we certainly can not take his principles as something sacred (Ge et al., 1984).
As a manifesto of constructive transgression in response to this awareness; each of
these statements embodies the call and response between an abstracted, but looming, anar-
chist legacy and practical necessity. In fact, in all of the above statements, the authors ap-
pear acutely aware of the boundaries of classical western anarchism, and critically appraise
their relevance to a Chinese situ. This was an appraisal which was bolstered through the
adoption of the ideals, and even in many cases, the terminology of New Culture liberalism.
The ontological conviction borne of these appraisals stands in stark contrast with the
leftist anarchists, as evidenced in Shen Zhongjiu’s (1924) response to Wu Zhihui. The left-
ist response relies on oppositional binaries, reducing the dualities of the time to a value
judgement informed solely by the perpetuated theoretical strictures of classical anarchism.
‘Presence’ and ‘absence’ are always opposite. Presence of government and absence of
government; Presence of private property and absence of private property; which are obvi-
ously adverse. I am not smart enough to understand how a person holds two opposite opin-
ions and goes in for two adverse movements… It is strange that Mr Wu [Zhihui] advocates
the combination of doctrine and following personal considerations at the same time (Ge et
al., 1984).
By juxtaposing Wu’s actions as a contradiction between “personal considerations” and
a conversant piety to doctrine, Shen is speaking to the fundamental contradictions which
we have established. His is a judgement made from within the dialectical boundaries of
classical anarchism, reducing ideological transgression to the typical (and oft-perpetuated)
narrative of ethical subordination.
Although New Culture pragmatism functioned as part of an affective reconceptuali-
sation of anarchism and ultimately a re-situation of the place of power in the relationship
between anarchism and the anarchists, rarely did the post-leftists openly reject the episte-
mological foundations of anarchism. The focus on practical problems which the anarchists
made central to their discussions was a pursuit of complexity, a refusal to frame the diver-
sity of the contemporary Chinese environment through delimiting dialectics of opposition.
When the younger anarchists talked of “practical problems,” “neglecting facts” and “an
overreliance on principles,” they were not simply aping these aspects of New Culture but
utilising them to modify the discursive field of Chinese anarchism, to establish a space for
their ontology.
New Culture’s reinforcing of the importance of localism also provided a framework by
which the younger anarchists could prioritise action over inaction and, much like Bakunin,
“throw themselves into the whirlpool” of the times.
What I have said does not mean that there is something wrong with the principle of
anarchism, rather to express that a principle is not everlasting and almighty. Furthermore,
anarchism is the product of practical mass movements, so it can not go without reality.
Practically speaking, anarchism is not a kind of fancy that can transcend time.
If we want to be true revolutionaries, we should throw ourselves into the whirlpool like
Bakunin, and lead the tide of revolution into the ocean of anarchism (Ge et al., 1984, own
emphasis).
Ba Jin’s statement speaks to a new development in the conceptualisation of anarchism,
formed in the atmosphere of the New Culture. This was the supra-historical nature of clas-
sical anarchism, that in existing outside of the fetters of setting and practical necessity it
was able to “transcend the times” ( 超时代 ) of which it was a part. Unwilling to perpetuate
this pedestal, the post-leftist approach endeavoured to draw anarchism into the practical and
the complex.
The post-leftist position was that while incorporating pragmatic and subjective ap-
proaches may stand in relative antithesis to the oppositional binaries which anarchism often
relies on, it did not necessarily subvert to the ethical underpinnings of anarchism itself. This
conclusion holds deep parallels in the ontological approaches of postanarchism, broadly
sketched here by Saul Newman (2010).
Postanarchism is not a transgression or a movement beyond the terms of anarchism; it
does not leave anarchism behind but, instead works within it as a constant engagement with
its limits, invoking a moment of an outside in order to rethink and transform these limits. In
doing so it modifies the discursive field of anarchism without actually abandoning it (p. 5,
own emphasis).
What we have looked to establish is that this approach is not limited to those with an
innate understanding of poststructuralism, but rooted in problematics and solutions funda-
mentally comparable across any generation of anarchists. For the post-leftist anarchists, the
classical binaries had resulted in a rigid and outmoded anarchist movement, a future was
required in which action would become prioritised over inaction and malleable, contingent-
ly divergent understandings of orthodox anarchist activity were brought to the fore.
REVOLUTION AND REFORM
The intellectual atmosphere of the 1920s was also characterised by a pervasive collective
faith in evolutionism (Popp, 2007). This valorising of the political and social relevance of
jinhua ( 进化 ) - a rhetorical conflation of the new evolutionary concepts of Darwin and
Spencer with evolutionary determinism - was a further factor in the developing ontology of
post-leftist anarchism (Xiaobing Tang, 1996, p. 230).21 Its oppositional counterpart however,
bianhua ( 变化 ), is a more fitting description of the classical anarchist preoccupation with
singular and total revolution; in which incremental progress eventually leads to an impasse
requiring the totalising immediacy of revolution.22 Zarrow (1990) summarises the attitude
of the previous generation’s leaders along these lines when he notes that “Liu [Sifu]
fundamentally saw nothing inevitable about progress… Liu and He Zhen did not believe in
21　Tang has suggested that this was comparable to a Hegelian anthropomorphic notion of development in
which “collective human experience in time appears to undergo the same stages of growth as human life”. In
fact, Li Shicen, editor of the anarchist journal People’s Bell (or Tocsin) [Possibly Li Shizeng, although he was
not the editor], associated himself with the evolutionary ideals of Henri Bergson, stating that,“His [Darwin’s]
so-called origin is nothing less than the vital impulse of life, and this impulse is hidden in our consciousness to
stimulate and encourage ourselves to incline toward creative paths constantly…Bergson, however, considers
fitting to be no more than illustrating the tortuous and unsteady path of evolution” Leo Ou-fan Lee (1990, p.
118).
22　Ibid.(p. 117); Schwartz,(1964, p. 46).
incremental improvement. They believed in revolution” (p. 99).

The concept of jinhua would subvert this reliance on immediacy and totality - allowing
for a new conception of anarchist revolution achieved through staged diachronic tactics.
This evolutionary form of revolution was forwarded with particular directness by Zhu
Qianzhi in his article “Prophecy of Universal Revolution” ( 宇宙革命的预言 ), in which
these new evolutionary understandings were set up as the antithesis of both dialectics and
the classical anarchist “growth-revolution-growth” dynamic, a migration which Zhu disre-
gards as “nihilism” ( 虚无主义 ).23
Nihilism is based on dialectics, thinking that the evolution of the universe is a kind of
migration that turns nothing to existing, and existing to nothing. Universal revolution is a
kind of evolutionary progress. What’s more, evolution is always heading for the true, the
good, and the beautiful. The range of revolution will expand wider and wider as snowball
runs. From middle class revolution to the fourth class revolution; from political revolution
to anarchic revolution, the climate of revolution never stops. Universal revolution meets the
needs of the true, the good, the beautiful, so it simply fits the theory of evolution (Ge et al.,
1984).
The characterising of revolution as an ‘ever-widening snowball’ ( 滚雪球一般，越
滚越大 ) marks a parallel inspiration, alongside pragmatism, for the ontological approach-
es which were being fostered. When revolution is neither a linear nor a totalising project,
those goals which are outside of a purist anarchist understanding and even those which
seem to initially work against an anarchist future, are increasingly justifiable as quantita-
tive changes become prioritised ahead of qualitative ones. The disavowal of dialectics - a
recurrent theme of evolutionary approaches to anarchism - is symptomatic of the influence
of both jinhua and experimentalism, as once again essentialist responses were put aside in
favour of an embracing of complexity.24
In the atmosphere of New Culture, many anarchists began to incorporate terms such
as struggle, development and adaptation, without apparent stigma. Even older totemic an-
archists like Wu Zhihui were unafraid to approach evolutionary concepts with heretofore
absent commitment, as in Wu Zhihui’s (1924) “Postscript” in Freedom Record.
Today we are in the transitional stage of republicanism and anarchism. From dawn to
dusk, will it take a hundred years? A thousand? No one can yet say, for we only know it
will take a long time. But if we acknowledge the infinitude of the universe, then the number
of years it will take is just from dawn to dusk (cited in Zarrow, 1990, p. 82).
By 1928, Li Shizeng, too, would justify both his membership in the GMD and his con-
tentious interpretation of Sun Yat-Sen’s Three People’s Principles, through a progressive
conceptualisation of revolution in his article “Xianjin Gemingzhi Yiyi” [ 现今革命之意
义 , The Meaning of Present-day Revolution] (cited in part in Dirlik, 1993, p. 270). Whilst
23　Presumably this was a response to the leftist faith in dialectical materialism during the New Culture - Qu
Qiubai for instance was the “first teacher of dialectical materialism” in China after his return to the country
in 1923, as referenced in Bo Mou (2008, p. 520-p. 521).
24　In terms of ascertaining the physical links with New Culture on statements such as this, it is worth noting
that Zhu was - to return to our point on the physical proximity of pragmatism and anarchism - one of the
editors of the Beida-based journal Fendou (Struggle), and was a student in the law department during the New
Culture heyday; for more on this see Weston (2004, 191).
Zarrow (1990), too, has pointed out that, “Wu [Zhihui]’s emphasis shifted from fast and
easy solutions to long and complex struggles,” neither he nor Dirlik have chosen to tie these
developments into a collective dynamic within the broader movement proper (p. 220).
As with Zhu Qianzhi, the participants in the “Anarchism and the Question of Practice”
symposium also reject the evolution-revolution-evolution teleology, referring instead to the
conflation of evolution and revolution. Take Ba Jin, who explicitly states that evolution is
not just the maker of revolution but that they are essentially one and the same - a conclu-
sion which is justified once again through the situationalist necessities of a specifically Chi-
nese setting.
Revolution doesn’t collide with evolution. Shao Keli has said: ‘Evolution and revolu-
tion are successive activities of the same phenomenon; evolution comes before revolution,
and then evolves into revolution.’ The realization we must make is that anarchism can not
be achieved in a short period of time, but will be achieved after constant revolutions and
reconstructions. In the present environment of China, it is impossible for us to realize the
ideal of anarchism immediately.
Although the result of the Russian Revolution is far away from the expectations of the
former revolutionaries, we have to confess that Russia is much better than Czarist Russia.
If you studied revolutions throughout history, you would find that the result of each revo-
lution was far removed its expectations. In the French Revolution, the brave masses, even
women, took up arms to fight against their oppressors. But what was the result? Did they
just want to set up a capitalist government? ‘Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité’ were their slogans.
But how much has been realized between the Napoleonic Government and now? What kind
of time would we be in if there had not the French Revolution had not taken place? (Ge et
al., 1984)
Although the allusion to diachronic approaches is not as explicit as in Zhu’s article, the
above statement clearly ties together a longer-term perspective with a less essentialist (again,
a return to the ‘is-pole’ concept) juxtaposition of revolutionary failure and success.
Wei Huilin’s contribution to the same symposium echoes Ba in its favouring of contin-
gent approaches and progressive non-linear development ahead of waiting for a totalising
revolution.
We can not say like a determinist that some social system is an inevitable journey be-
fore the realization of anarchism, which will delay the arrival of our goals. This claim will
just prolong the old system, one which ensures antagonism between the dominator and
the dominated. What we should do is realise our ideals based on the present truths and the
tendencies of our time. We all know that the progress of the human beings comes from the
efforts people take gradually. We don’t plan to build an anarchist society suddenly, but we
can try to get as much freedom and happiness as possible as we do so (Ge et al., 1984).
That the classical anarchist conviction, that only certain situations are legitimate precur-
sors to anarchist revolution could be brushed aside as “determinism” ( 定命论 ), is indica-
tive of the assertiveness which was manifesting itself among the younger anarchists. In this
regard, the influence of New Culture is once again tangible, as the use of determinism (in
particular as a pejorative) had emerged as part of the critique ideological piety in only the
preceding ten years.25

The interplay between evolution and pragmatism is worth noting in the above state-
ments. Much as with Zhu Qianzhi, the dialectical overturning of power which anarchism
prioritises was considered subjectively by the post-leftist anarchists and understood to be
incongruent to the contemporary Chinese setting. In place of this outmoded idealism, each
of these statements returns to our repeated pattern of approaching doctrine pragmatically
and prioritising localised and necessitated responses ahead of inherited approaches.
The converse faith in spontaneous and total anarchist revolution would remain a per-
sistent identifier within those advocating a leftist anarchist position group, which included
the fervent belief that the conditions for a total anarchist revolution were imminent and that
revolution could be achieved through commitment and purity of ideals alone. Shen Zhong-
jiu saw progression as a linear act toward anarchism, in which divergence was characterised
as “regression” ( 退步 ).
It is a form of progress to develop from the Nationalist Party to anarchism, which surely
deserves praise. However, if we change from anarchists to nationalists, we can only say that
it is a kind of regression.
In my opinion, we should know the difference between revolution and reformation if
we want to understand revolution. First, they both seek for evolution and alteration, but rev-
olution seeks for complete and fierce change while reformation seeks for partial and slow
alteration. The evolution from revolution is always more fierce than that from reformation,
which can last for hundreds of years. Reformation changes the old state and old power
gradually while revolution overturns them fundamentally. Secondly, they adopt different
methods. Reformers often compromise with the old society in a moderate way… Third, the
reformers often mix themselves with the targets to be reformed, and sometimes they coop-
erate; Revolutionaries adopt adverse attitude to their targets… Revolution always changes
with the times (Ge et al., 1984).
In characterising evolutionary and adaptive ideals merely as a means to justify ideo-
logical capitulation and opportunism, it is clear that the perpetuation of the ethical pedestal
of singular revolution remained a key aspect of Shen’s understanding of “true anarchism.”
Shen’s analysis - that a revolutionary self-defines by relying on oppositional binaries ( 表示
敌对的行动 ), and that reformism always acts as a veiled cover for ethical dalliance - has,
at various junctures, been retrospectively associated with ideological and moral purity of
purpose by anarchist historians.26
For the post-leftist anarchists, their diachronic understanding of an anarchist hereafter
became one that was less utopian and less singular; the typically precise anarchist pro-
gramme for the future was replaced with collective and continuous negotiation and refine-
ment. This sense that purist and singular understandings of revolution were becoming an
25　The prevalence of both “economical determinism” and “historical determinism” is in fact an

intriguingly under-realised aspect of analyses of the New Culture, and worthy of further study.
26　Consider the following passage from Dirlik (1993, p. 198); “Anarchists demand our attention, not for
who they were or what they accomplished, but because against a revolutionary strategy that presupposed
a necessary compromise of revolutionary goals in order to confront the demands of immediate political
necessity, they reaffirmed a revolutionary consciousness that provides an indispensable critical perspective from
the Left.” I would also like to note this does not say “not only for who they were,” although this would
seem far more reasonable.
anachronism is evident in Wu Kegang’s direct disavowal of the singular essential tactic,

associating it with a more a time of more ideological certainty and less practicality within
the movement.
“Better none than imperfect. A ‘pure’ anarchist movement should not take part in any
movements unrelated with anarchism.”
I had the same thoughts as above three years ago, but now I have the courage to confess
that I was wrong. I did not know revolution at all then. Any revolution can never be of pure
anarchism. I assert that we don’t need to talk about revolution any more if we wait until
there is anarchist revolution… There has never been and will never be a revolution con-
trolled only by one doctrine (Ge et al., 1984). 27
Throughout this period evolutionary approaches were associated with the decentering
of power relationships. The twin notions of reformism and decentred power structures are
closely intertwined in anarchist theory, and it is worth noting their chronological equiva-
lence.28 Saul Newman (2001) has noted that the “notion of dispersed power renders the idea
of revolution as the final, dialectical overturning of power an anachronism… once the stra-
tegic picture of concentric circles or hierarchies is dropped, so is the idea that revolutionary
change can be distinguished qualitatively from reformist change” (p. 79). In the case of the
post-leftist anarchists, even distinguishing revolution from evolution had become a misno-
mer; they believed them to be one and the same.
FORMING ORTHODOXY FROM HETERODOXY
Beyond providing the framework around which the post-leftist anarchists structured their
new approach to anarchist doctrine, there remains a secondary aspect to the importance
of New Culture ideology and terminology to post-leftist anarchism. The epistemological
framework offered by the New Culture functioned as an alternative source of legitimacy
for the younger anarchists as they distanced themselves from their more conservative
counterparts and adopted a heterodox position toward anarchism. As the essentialism at
the heart of the movement was reducing divergent approaches to ethical subordination,
New Culture provided the kind of externally-legitimated structure and identity which was
required if this heterodoxy were to become orthodoxy.
That both the leftists and post-leftists looked to the terms revolution and revolutionary
as territorial spaces to be claimed on behalf of their understandings of anarchism was syn-
ecdochic of their mutual desires to determine the nature of orthodoxy. Take for instance,
Shen Zongjiu’s characterisation of a platonic revolutionary -
Revolutionaries always try to build up a brand new power to fight against

the old society. Before the revolution succeeds, the old society usually
frustrates the new power in many ways, but revolutionaries never com-
promise with the old society (Ge et al., 1984; own emphasis).
27　It is potentially illuminating that Wu cites 1923 - the year of the “Debate Between Science and
Metaphysics” and Wu Zhihui and Shen Zhonjiu’s defining debate as the turning point in which he began to
look at anarchism from outside of the boundaries of the ‘pure and impure’ divide; Schwartz (1986, p. 433).
28　For a discussion on the decentering of power in Early-Modern China see Fitzgerald (1996, p. 70-p. 80),
Rankin (2000) and Bodenhorn (2002) among many others in an expanding field.
And compare with that of Wu Kegang’s -
I believe that China is truly in the midst of revolution. This revolution

seems to have no direct relation with anarchism, it is not a pure revolution
from anarchism’s perspective. However, are there no other revolutions
besides a purely anarchist revolution? Now China is in the time of revolu-
tion, so the anarchist party should take part in it if they are revolutionaries
(Ge et al., 1984; own emphasis).
Although revolution marks the apex of these passages, both are imprecated within a
more resonant question – what is orthodoxy? For the leftists, orthodoxy was to embody
purity of conception and dedication, the revolutionary as antithesis of the reformer. The
post-leftist orthodoxy however was scaffolded by the broader ideas drawn from the New
Culture.
Shen Zhongjiu’s attempts to reduce divergence to ethical subordination are indicative
of a desire to rhetorically set the boundaries of anarchist orthodoxy; but the younger anar-
chists too, with the epistemological backing of the New Culture Movement in place, were
able to be assertive. New Culture gave structure to a comprehensive anarchist identity, one
which was not predicated on reaction or contrarianism but on a complete and yet diver-
gent understanding of what it meant to be an anarchist. That these two groups attempted to
rhetorically establish and justify their understandings of orthodoxy is indicative of our key
assumption, that neither side was reactionary or short-termist, that instead they harboured
fundamentally divorced visions for anarchism, both epistemologically complex concep-
tualisations, fully-rounded and yet existing at the relative extremes of a holistic anarchist
nomenclature.
CONCLUSION: THE SYSTEMATISATION OF ANARCHISM
The majority of the anarchists in China do not come from the civilian population, so
we don’t understand the lives, feelings, needs and wishes of civilians. Our anarchism is
translated from western books, so our enterprise is merely a theoretical one. We don’t
understand civilians, and they don’t understand us (Ge et al., 1984).
- Ba Jin, “Anarchism and the Question of Practice,” (Ge et al., 1984)
Tackling anarchism’s doctrinal essentialism required the post-leftist anarchists to, in
Cohn’s (2006) words, identify themselves “(diachronically) with the historical movement
as well as (synchronically) with their living cohort” (p. 15). When these younger anarchists
referred to anarchism as an “abstract theory” which was translated from western books,
they were expressing more than an identification with, but also a collective dialogue be-
tween, the synchronic requirements of the anarchist movement and the diachronic doctrine
of anarchism.29 That these anarchists were emboldened to enter into this participatory di-
alogue ensured that this generation neither clung to the perpetuated relevance of classical
anarchism, nor abandoned the movement itself.
Instead, a flourishing of possibility took place, the possibility of recalibrating anarchism
in a manner which would make it more effective without leaving it behind. The incorpo-
ration of non-foundational, post-structuralist and developmental ontology - referred to
internally as ‘systematisation’ ( 无政府主义系统化 ) - was the means by which to achieve
this.
We must have our own organization to fight against our enemies, which should have
two functions: One is to set up the foundations of the future society; the other is to cope
with some of the problems of the particular period. Now our primary problem is the sys-
tematisation of anarchism, which is the practical problem of all anarchist movements (Ge
et al., 1984).
As a choice of wording alone, systematisation reflects two conclusions we have drawn
regarding the post-leftist anarchists. First, that their approaches were part of a rational
attempt to overcome the deficiencies of the existing culture, rather than a reactionary ab-
errance. Second, this ontological approach was understood as a refinement of anarchism, a
duty to make it better, rather than a tacit abandonment. As the post-leftist outlook repeat-
edly asserted a more participatory role for the anarchists themselves in the application of
anarchism it also looked to reconceive of the role of anarchism, rooted in a more participa-
tory anarchist paradigm which no longer spent so much time on the sidelines.
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Author’s Biodata
Tom Marling is currently a Senior Research Scholar at Peking University. His research cen-
tres on subaltern reinterpretations of Western radical doctrine, with a particular focus on the
Chinese anarchist movement.

tommarling22@gmail.com
ISSN: 2224-2716
From Exclusion to the Inclusive Sphere:

Sun Yat-Sen’s Emancipatory Communication and China’s
Modernization1
G. Kentak Son
King’s College London, U.K.
Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication ended cultural, economic and political oppression in
China by countering class and racial hierarchies. Sun reunified the dichotomised Chinese identity
and consolidated Chinese citizenship by encouraging everyone to actively participate in exchang-
ing and debating cultural, economic and political ideas in the inclusive sphere of communication
at various transnational locations. This paper argues that the first Chinese republic of 1911 was
a corollary of Sun’s emancipatory communication and praxis in the inclusive sphere. Sun rec-
ognised that the dichotomisation of Chinese identity was caused by two systems of exclusion:
endogenously, it was caused by the Confucian class structure sustained by the tripartite powers of
the Manchu monarchy, bureaucracy and aristocracy, which effectively excluded underprivileged
Chinese from the access to social and geographical mobility; exogenously, it was caused by the
racial taxonomy deployed by Western capitalists, who were exploiting China and the Chinese
people for profit. Sun was convinced that this exclusionary oppression could be abolished only by
including everyone. However, previous research on Sun Yat-Sen has mainly been from a political
perspective, focusing on him as a revolutionary instigator. There is a need to locate him from a
cultural perspective in relation to his belief in emancipation and inclusion. This paper aims to
explore the formation, development and effects of Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication to
elucidate the connection between his emancipatory communication and the aspiration to freedom
and equality among Chinese citizens.
INTRODUCTION
Class and Race
In late 19th-century China, the Manchus and the Western capitalists were the two dominant
powers, and they oppressed the Chinese people through systems of exclusion such as
the Confucian class system and the Western racial hierarchy. The Manchus, armed with
Confucian institutions and legal obligations, imposed an absolute class system based on
categorisation by occupation (de Bary, 2008; Levenson, 1964; Weber, 1968). The Western
capitalists, on the other hand, imposed a racial hierarchy as they discursively produced a
racial taxonomy based on skin colour (Barnes, 2005; Dikotter, 1992; Hillier, 2005). With
their coercive power, the Manchus subjugated the Chinese through the rule of law and on
penalty of death, while the Western capitalists forced China to open its ports to the opium
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to G. Kentak Son. E-mail: kentakson@gmail.com

SUN YAT-SEN: FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSIVE SPHERE 31
trade (Fairbank, 1986; Goldman, 2000, Hsu, 2000). After China’s defeat in the Opium
Wars, which was followed by unfair port treaties and then yet another defeat in the first
Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the Qing Dynasty was finally terminated in the 1911 Xinhai
Revolution, during which Sun Yat-Sen was the key leader in the overthrow of the Manchu
regime.
Foucault (1980, p. 92) provides his analysis of power as follows: ‘We have two
schemes for the analysis of power. The contract-oppression schema, which is the juridical
one, and the domination-repression or war-repression schema for which the pertinent op-
position is not between the legitimate and illegitimate as in the first schema, but between
struggle and submission.’ The Manchu sovereign and Western capitalist powers in tandem
achieved the total submission of China and its people through mechanisms of power such
as exclusion. Foucault classifies systems of exclusion into two types: external and internal.
Foucault (1971) delineates the rules of exclusion through which the production of discourse
is ‘controlled, selected, organized and redistributed’, emphasising that these take the forms
of prohibition, division and rejection, and the opposition between true and false. He identi-
fies three complementary and interrelated types of prohibition: ritual, with its surrounding
circumstances; the privilege or exclusive right to speak of those surrounding circumstances;
and the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular subject. The Chinese ruling
class and Western capitalists implemented rituals and extraterritoriality as external systems
of exclusion, and the inculcation of Confucianism and the application of Western science as
internal systems of exclusion.
In terms of internal systems of exclusion, Foucault (1980, p. 106) stresses that the func-
tions of discipline, author and commentary are predominant ‘bearers of a discourse that
speaks of a rule, but this is not the juridical rule deriving from sovereignty, but a natural
rule, a norm’, pointing out that the fact that ‘mutations and transformations in knowledge
may be reliant upon institutional support and distribution, tends to exercise a sort of pres-
sure, a power of constraint upon other forms of discourse’ (Foucault 1971, p. 11).
The inculcation of Confucianism through texts and narratives also functioned to con-
tinuously reproduce Confucian values (de Bary, 2008; Levinson, 1964; Weiming, 1994).
For example, the Confucian class system, which was based on occupation, was used as a
barometer of social esteem, thereby producing the ‘other’ class and reconfirming the Con-
fucian values of the class hierarchy itself.2
Meanwhile, Western science helped to promote racial taxonomy by discursively pro-
ducing meanings and representations of race, utilising biology and its applications. Foucault
(1980, p. 93) claims: ‘effects of truth through the internal and external systems that power
produces and transmits, in turn, reproduce power; hence we have a triangle of power, right
and truth’. He goes on: ‘We are subjected to the production of truth through power, and we
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.’
Thus from a Foucauldian perspective, the class and race hierarchy in China was a de-
marcating system of internal and external exclusions which helped to maintain the privileg-
2　Tiles (1992) further argues that Confucius desired on the model of a family in a feudal society, the structure
based on the relations of loyalty owed by inferiors to those stationed above them in a stable hierarchy. And even
if they are excluded or silenced, those who are not merely comfortable with but have invested in the status quo
resist the civic republic ideal.
32 SON QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 30-49
es of the dominant powers. However, Smart (1994, p. 5) claims that Foucault’s conceptu-
alisation of the relations of power has been a source of considerable controversy, since it is
with the means by which power is exercised, and the effects of its exercise, that Foucault is
primarily preoccupied, rather than with answering the question ‘what is power and where
does it come from?’ Smart (ibid.) instead suggests another interpretation of the Foucauldian
analysis of power: that it conceptualises power not just as a property or possession which
excludes, represses, masks or conceals, but as a complex situation or relation which pro-
duces reality.
Callinicos (1993, p. 9–p. 11) argues that racism remains one of the main features of ad-
vanced capitalist societies, while revolutionary Marxists, who regard racism as a product of
capitalism that serves to reproduce that social system by dividing the working class, declare
that it can be abolished only through a socialist revolution. Thus race and class have been
demarcating and divisive systems of exclusion throughout history.3
Foucault argues that the rationale of a war of the races was initially, and most fun-
damentally, a resistance to sovereignty, whether that of the monarch, the class system or
imperial domination. The idea of ‘race struggle’ was originally developed as a political
narrative designed to refute notions of the ‘divine’ or ‘natural’ right to power; therefore the
notion of a war of the races is considered one of the roots of the class struggle itself (Hook,
2007, p. 231). The concepts of race and class were culturally, economically and politically
constructed so that hierarchical exclusion could be utilised to maintain the division between
the dominant powers of the Manchus and Western capitalists on the one hand, and the sub-
ordinated, such as the underprivileged Chinese, on the other.
Although the notion of ‘race’ became a cultural and geographical principle of gover-
nance for Western capitalists, it had not previously been attached to any essential or bio-
logical meaning (Dikotter, 1992, p. 31–p. 36). Utilising race was the prerogative, argues
Foucault, of the sociobiological sciences of the 19th and 20th centuries, and state adminis-
trative technologies of race with rudimentary racial classification or systematic segregation
gave rise to a set of affective responses and identifications (Hook, 2007, p. 219–p. 231).
The exclusion of the Chinese by the Western racial hierarchy represents the application
of power to knowledge of the human body, both economically and politically. Thus what
Foucault calls bio-politics was employed and implemented for the purpose of making eco-
nomic profit from Chinese bodies, and this was made possible with the support of Western
science.
POWER AND IDENTITY
This section examines the forms of exclusion utilised by the Manchu and Western capitalist
powers, and their effect on Chinese identity. Beneath the tripartite powers of monarchy,
3　Calinicos (1994, p. 18) claims racial differences are invented and forms of racial oppressions are various;
however, racial oppressions are distinctively different from, for example, religious oppressions as the victim of
the latter can change her/his religion while the former cannot.
bureaucracy and aristocracy,4 Confucian institutions categorised the underprivileged

Chinese classes into a hierarchy of respect according to occupation – in descending order,
shi, nong, gong and shang ( 士农工商 ) – of which the relatively privileged top tier of shi
was occupied mostly by the Manchus. Levenson (1964, p. 36) remarks of this system: ‘it
was characteristically Confucian, on the one hand, to retain the old term, and on the other
hand, to moralize it; to moralize it was to civilize it, quite literally.’
The underprivileged Chinese in the bottom three occupations were mostly denied access
to education and social mobility, and were expropriated by the hegemonic power groups of
monarchs, aristocrats and bureaucrats. While exclusion by occupation was a strict cultural
and political system based on Confucian values, it was also fundamentally influenced by
the economic interest of taxation,5 as shown by the fact that the lowest status of merchant
(shang, 商 ) was transformed into an elite status when merchants increased their tax pay-
ments in the late Qing period (Rankin, 1971; Rowe, 1984). Thus economic interests were
closely related to cultural and political power within the system of exclusion, suggestive of
the Foucauldian notion of circulating power.
On the other hand, Western capitalism’s emphasis on taxonomical race helped to estab-
lish a foreground for the colonisation of China; it provided a facile justification for territo-
rial expansion through the colonisation of the ‘other’ race by means of military coercion.
Consequently, the capitalists’ cultural and political power was closely connected to their
economic interests. One of the corollaries of this was coolie labour, which gave birth to the
modern migratory history of the Overseas Chinese. However, the system of exclusion was
also applied to the Overseas Chinese, as they had to undergo cultural, economic and politi-
cal exclusion by both the Chinese government and their host nations.
Power
Manchu sovereignty signified absolute power, requiring the total submission of the
Han Chinese. Sovereign power centred on the Manchu monarchy, which wielded both
punishments and prerogatives, and controlled and dominated its Chinese subjects (Mitter,
2002; Waldron, 1991; Zarrow, 2004). In addition to the law, Confucian ceremonies and
rituals also fortified the sovereign power, and aligned it with the Qing aristocrats and
bureaucrats. This situation is well expressed by Foucault (1980), who points out that even
regional and local institutions become the ‘capillaries’ of sovereign power.
Further analysis of Manchu sovereign power demonstrates what Foucault (1977, p. 35–
p. 36) emphasises as the ‘application of power’ in ‘how power commences from its external
4　Levenson (1964, p. 44-p. 46) argues the aristocracy under the Manchu regimes was the monarchy’s tool
to check the bureaucracy: To preserve his power, the monarch needed private bureaucratic agents more than
aristocratic consumers. Levenson further claims that these agents should form a personal corps, depending on
the monarch for honor and place, therefore approaching the despotic ideal in bureaucracy, which Confucian-
ists resisted, insisting that, in the end, not princes and dukes but eunuchs and simple Manchus became the cen-
tralizers’ tools.
5　Levenson (1964, p. 28) conceives that the central state, as the universal tax-gatherer, ideally inhibiting in-
stability, had a basic though ambiguous value to a power-seeking bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, perennially suspi-
cious of imperially backed strong men, with their infinitely various ideas for checking private aggrandizement
in land, was a feudalizing force.
visage, then establishes direct and immediate relationship with its object, its target, its field
of application, where it installs itself and produces its real effects’. In the case of China,
although the external visage was the sovereign power of the Manchu monarchy, it was in
fact the Confucian institutions – which lay beneath the external visage of sovereign power
and were supported by the aristocrats and bureaucrats – that enabled Manchu sovereignty
to produce its real effects of power. Thus Manchu sovereign power made use of the con-
flict between the competing agents of the bureaucracy and the aristocracy to oppress the
Chinese through the Confucian class system. Levenson (1964, p. 44–p. 46) argues that the
aristocracy under the Manchu regime was the monarchy’s tool to keep the bureaucracy in
check. Thus the troika of Manchu monarchy, Qing bureaucracy and aristocracy became, in
Foucauldian parlance, the ‘permanent agents of domination with polymorphous techniques
of subjugation’.
Foucault (1980, p. 93) argues that that there are manifold relations of power which per-
meate, characterise and constitute the social body, and that these relations of power cannot
themselves be established, consolidated or implemented without the production, accumula-
tion, circulation and functioning of a discourse; there can be no possible exercise of power
without a certain economy of language and discourse of truth which operates through and
on the basis of this association. Thus Foucault emphasises that power must be analysed as
something which circulates.
In this sense, from the external visage of the Qing central sovereign power to the capil-
laries of aristocrats, bureaucrats and institutions, Confucian moral values and ethical practic-
es fettered the underprivileged class in the manner of a chain. In other words, the privileged
class of the aristocracy and bureaucracy was the vehicle of power, not its point of applica-
tion, through which the discourse of Confucian moral and ethical values was produced, cul-
tivated and inculcated in order to maintain the Confucian class system of exclusion.
Identity
Foucault elaborates two systems of exclusion: external and internal. The external
mechanisms that produce exclusion are the social procedures of prohibition, which
correspond roughly to the taboos, rituals and privileges of the speaking subject. Indeed,
rituals, kinship and religion were vital to the maintenance of Chinese structures of power,
as Watson (1988, p. 4) emphasises: ‘Chinese identity is based on participation in various
shared rituals.’
Harrison (2000, p. 4–p. 7) further argues that Chinese identity grew out of the cultural
and conceptual changes of the early 20th century. Given that ethnicity and nationalism are
historical and cultural constructs, rituals and ceremonies would seem to be the most obvi-
ous themes through which to look at the changing nature of Chinese identity, as ethnicity
and nationalism are products of the classification of individuals into groups through inclu-
sion and exclusion. The Manchu regime also used the exclusionary tactic of polarising the
Manchus and Han Chinese by prohibiting intermarriage and free movement – and even by
forcing physical assimilation through hairstyles, which was another form of oppression.
On the other hand, Western capitalism based its colonial strategy on making profit by
combining military coercion with racial taxonomy. However, race and skin colour had not
always been linked in the Western mind, as the Chinese were categorised primarily as white
by the Europeans, and the paleness or brownness of Chinese people’s skin carried connota-
tions of their occupations: for example, peasants’ swarthy skin colour was caused by their
long hours working in the field. Among the Chinese themselves, differences in skin colour
produced another division between labourers and the privileged class: the former were
called ‘black-headed people’, a label that established a symbolic distance between the peas-
ants and the landed class (Dikotter 1992, p. 11).6
However, Western scientific discourse, which was increasingly obsessed with classify-
ing the ‘differences of the others’, produced a new socio-political construct of race on the
basis of the biomedical discovery of melanin, a physiological agent that affects skin colour
(Barnes, 2005; Hillier, 2005; Pitts-Taylor, 2008). Thus Western scientific knowledge pro-
duced a new skin colour-based racial taxonomy, which economically and politically bene-
fited Western capitalists by attaching a biological hierarchy to race.7 This demonstrated the
capitalists’ desire for power, as Bauman (1988, p. 45) argues: ‘We shall conquer and subju-
gate nature, rule over the laws of physics and have power over things.’
Chinese identity was thus affected and shaped: endogenously, both by external mech-
anisms of exclusion such as Confucian rituals and ceremonies, and by the internal incul-
cation of Confucian values and classism; exogenously, by the external mechanism of ex-
clusion by Western capitalists’ extraterritoriality, and by the internal mechanism of racial
taxonomy, which was supported by Western science.
Thus the dominant class of the Qing dynasty and Western capitalists utilised both in-
ternal and external systems of exclusion, not only by coercion, but by articulating and con-
structing subjective cultural, economic and political meanings so as to valorise and distrib-
ute Confucian classism and capitalist racism in a subject-object relation. A unified Chinese
identity was not only non-existent but impossible to form, as it was systematically dichoto-
mised by the polarisation between the dominant and underprivileged classes, and between
the Han and the Manchus.
LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE
Foucault (1971, p. 8) delineates the rules of exclusion through which the production of
discourse is ‘controlled, selected, organized and redistributed’, introducing the concept
of implicit power and arguing that the layers of language give rise to two other forms of
discourse, those on the surface and those underneath it: ‘There is commentary on surface,
and below it, there is the text, whose primacy is presupposed by commentary to exist
hidden beneath the marks visible to all’ (1971, p. 47). On the other hand, Liang Qichao
(1930, p. 13) metaphorically describes the explicit power of institutions that are not in
agreement with the general public as awkward at best: ‘when an institution [has] roots [that]
are not among the people but from the top, it is like plucking the flowers of a neighbor to
6　Dikotter (1992, p. 155) claims what many Chinese intellectuals contested was the belief in white superiority,
by quoting Wu Zelin’s (1932, p. 2-p. 3) comment; ‘In Shanghai, for instance, many of the most mediocre
Englishmen despise noble-minded, erudite scholars. They believe that a race with a yellow skin and straight hair
is absolutely not of their kind and can definitely not surpass their level of superiority!’
7　Callinicos (1994, p. 29) claims that racist ideology survived abolition, and indeed received further theoreti-
cal elaboration during the nineteenth century in the shape of the pseudo-scientific biology of races which drew
on a vulgarized version of Darwin’s theory of natural selection.
embellish the dying branches of one’s own tree; there can be no life.’
These comments by Foucault and Liang contrast the implicit and explicit power of
language and discourse, offering a glimpse of why the intertwined discursive formation of
power-knowledge can easily come to form an internal system of exclusion: implicitness is
not displayed on the surface, and therefore it blends into the system easily, without much
resistance. As such, the implicit power of language enables the discursive production and
reification of class and race underneath the layers of authored texts. Said (1983, p. 216)
succinctly explicates the construction of discourse by relating it to the external mechanism
of exclusion, arguing, ‘the will to control in society and history has also discovered a way
to clothe, disguise, rarefy and warp itself systematically in the language of truth, discipline,
rationality, utilitarian value, and knowledge.’ He (2002, p. 108) again enlightens us by
pointing out the relationship between power and knowledge in language and discourse; ‘over
and above every opportunity for saying something, there stands a regularizing collectivity
[…] called a discourse.’
The dominant class, be it the ruling Manchus or the Western capitalists, constantly tried
to inculcate the subjugated with language and discourse. Countering this implicit power of
exclusion, Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication created unity and coherence among
Chinese people through the discourses of minzu and pan-Asianism, directly and explicitly
challenging the internal systems of exclusion that were implicitly producing the discursive
construction of class and race. Thus Sun defied the rules of exclusion and instead offered to
make transparent the layers of language by which the production of class and race discourse
was controlled, selected, organised and redistributed.
In communication, language and discourse are inextricably connected to each other, and
both are susceptible to mechanisms of exclusion under the influence of power. As discussed
earlier, in the late Qing period, the powers of the Manchu regime and Western capitalists
utilised language and discourse to implicitly marginalise the underprivileged Chinese for
the purposes of subjugation. DeFrancis (1972, p. 31) points out that, apart from the domes-
tic exclusion of Chinese individuals by the state, there was also the Chinese state’s xeno-
phobic exclusion of foreigners through language: he points to the Qing government, which
sought to implement its exclusion policy by impeding missionaries and other Westerners in
their attempts to acquire the Chinese language. Thus linguistic relations are connected to
particular systems of power-knowledge specific to their historical juncture.
At the same time, however, the dualistic mechanisms of the system – exclusionary or
inclusive – of language and discourse were contingent upon the intentions of the pow-
er-holders as well as upon the resistant willpower of the subjugated. The possibilities of
inclusive mechanisms of language and discourse were also revealed by Sun Yat-Sen’s
emancipatory communication, which sought to include the very underprivileged Chinese
subjects who were being excluded by the Qing ruling class and Western capitalists.
While Sun Yat-Sen was positively influenced by both traditional Confucian knowl-
edge and Western medical science in his youth (Sun was a physician by training), he also
recognised that both Confucian institutional and Western medical discourse implicitly pro-
duced and supported class and racial hierarchy, obstructing the social mobility and equality
of the underprivileged Chinese. Sun consequently identified the common underlying appa-
ratus that maintained the influence of hegemonic power as language and discourse,8 which
implicitly produced the social, political and economic exclusions of the underprivileged.
Sun’s strategy was therefore to eliminate linguistic and discursive ‘othering’ by including
the excluded underprivileged Chinese in the domain of his emancipatory communication.
Levenson (1964, p. 49) argues that the most effective tool for centralising power em-
ployed by the Confucian bureaucracy was language, by means of which they exerted a
subtle power over common or uneducated people through complicated grammar and am-
biguous content in both Classical Chinese and guanhua (officials’ language, 官話 ). It is
relevant here to note that Bourdieu (1991, p. 45) regards the apparent permanency of the
rules of spelling, ‘correct’ pronunciation and grammar as the result of social struggles be-
tween different class groups over language.
In the same vein, pidgin English carried racial implications of the subaltern and mimic-
ry, thus implicitly establishing a racial hierarchy. After the Opium War Treaty, Bolton (2003)
argues, Chinese pidgin English seems to have filtered down to the Chinese working class,
and it became a representation of class and cultural identity through which the colonists de-
marcated ‘otherness’ to marginalise and exclude those who spoke English differently from
themselves. Pidgin English and racial discourse combined with Western colonialism and
capitalism to effectively exclude the Chinese people by linguistically categorising them as
subaltern at best, and the economy of racial hierarchy eventually benefited the capitalists
materially through, for example, the opium trade and coolie labour. Thus exclusion by pid-
gin English was used first to capitalise on the difference of the ‘other’, and then to implicit-
ly support racialised colonisation for the purposes of political and economic exploitation.
Foucault (1980, p. 194) introduces the notion and application of power relations to the
system of power-knowledge in language and discourse. Hook (2007, p. 103) stresses that,
from the Foucauldian perspective, language can be used as a tool to discursively produce
different kinds of power, and productive power creates not only linguistically, but through
discourses, institutions, laws, scientific statements and philosophical, moral and philan-
thropic propositions.
While Manchu sovereign power officially used Classical Chinese for written communi-
cations and guanhua for spoken communications among the inner circles of the dominant
class of bureaucrats and aristocrats, the effects of class division through Confucian moral
and ethical discourse reified the class structure, which was based on occupation in the de-
scending order of scholars, warriors, peasants, artisans and merchants, thus producing rigid
social barriers and immobility.9 Through the Confucian language system, Manchu sover-
eign power, in collaboration with the Qing aristocracy and bureaucracy, thus discursively
8　According to those who hold the view that the stagnation of Chinese society prevented any further change
in the writing often illustrate their point by citing that conflicting approaches to the script on the part of the
literati and of the ordinary people. According to this view, the tendency among the scholars was to freeze the
ideographs in the accepted form or even to make them still more complex. In addition to using the square style
of script for purposes of publication, the literati also evolved an extremely difficult running hand known as‘grass
writing’ (DeFrancis 1950, p. 6)
9　Wang (2011, p. 115) argues, because there was no question of using the national or folk language to replace
a language of empire, the vernacular movement did not arise out of a confrontation between a native language
and an imperial one, but was rather oriented toward its own confrontation in values between the poor and the
‘aristocrats’ and between the vulgar and the refined.
produced the Confucian class system, which played a pivotal role in excluding and subju-
gating the underprivileged Chinese on the basis of the Confucian taxonomy of occupation.
This reconfirms the Foucauldian analysis of power that ‘it not only subjugates but enables
the object by granting power’ (McGuigan 1996, p. 177).
Meanwhile, Western science contributed to the production of hierarchical race. Accord-
ing to Foucault, race became the source of prerogatives in the sociobiological sciences of
the 19th and 20th centuries, and in the technologies of government that sought to utilise
them (Hook, 2007). At the same time, race discourse and the colonialism of Western im-
perial powers mark a point of departure from the absolute power of Manchu sovereignty
towards what Foucault named ‘disciplinary bio-power’ applied to Chinese subjects. This
disciplinary bio-power in effect governed the racially different subject through the ‘grid
of soft power’ that ran through the capillaries of the discursively produced ‘other’ race,
through colonial education or subaltern administration. Hence the idea of biological race
was largely implied with the rise of the modern imperial regime equipped with bio-power.
Inclusive Communication
Both Foucault with his ‘theory of discourse’, and Habermas with his ‘discourse ethics’,
share the view of language as a constitutive component of social and cultural worlds.
However, Habermas is critical of Foucault’s notion that it is permeating power and its
interventions that produce exclusions in communication.10 While Foucault’s perspective
tends to problematise language and discourse in their function as hegemonic power in
society, Habermas’s approach to discourse tries instead to offer the possibility to produce
intersubjective meanings between articulator and participants through cooperative
communication.
Habermas (2001) asserts that the culture sciences are fundamentally and structurally
oriented towards the production of mutual understanding and agreement between commu-
nicating subjects who reciprocally recognise each other as intentional subjects who share
meanings; thus he emphasises cooperative understanding.11 For Habermas, when subjects
arrive at a mutual understanding, the performative attitude regulates the transition while
retaining the consistency of meaning, and participants in communicative action can pursue
their aims only cooperatively. Therefore the means of success are not at the disposal of the
individual agent, but are dependent on the cooperation of communicating ‘others’ (Cooke,
1994, p. 12).
Habermas (1990) also argues: ‘the meaning of sentences, and the understanding of
sentence meanings, cannot be separated from language’s inherent relation to the validity of
statements. Speakers and hearers understand the meaning of a sentence when they know
10　McGuigan (1996) argues mutual understanding can be reached, and is modeled by Habermas in terms of
the ideal speech situation of universal pragmatics; McGuigan further points out such a claim opens up the space
for distinguishing between discursive interaction which is heavily power-laden and, hence, distorted, on the
one hand, and communicative arrangements that are comparatively unrestrained by force, on the other hand.
This also helps distinguish notions of communication between Foucault and Habermas.
11　Given culture is not clearly defined nor is it easy to reconcile universal applicability with cultural relativism
(UNESCO 1998), cultural rights are not universally accepted, unlike economic rights whose status is firmly en-
trenched in international law (Steiner and Alston 2008).
under what conditions it is true.’ Thus we understand the meaning of a word when we
know what contribution it makes to the capacity for truth of a sentence formed with its help
(Myles, 2010, p. 72). For Habermas, communication is another form of rationality – a com-
municative rationality – which is not a subject-object relation, but a subject-subject relation
between communicating actor and interacting participant. He emphasises the necessity of a
place where new insights and knowledge can be developed and transferred, and where indi-
viduals can be socialised into fully developed personalities maintaining society as a social
fabric regulated by norms, institutions and conventions (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003, p. 4).
In this regard, Habermas’s insistence on truthfulness in communication and on coop-
erative understanding between actor and participants shares the praxis of Sun Yat-Sen’s
emancipatory communication: Sun’s inclusive sphere was the domain of cooperative com-
munication among Chinese actors and participants, and in fact my notion of Sun’s inclusive
sphere derives from the Habermasian concept of the ‘public sphere’ in which there is ‘un-
fettered’ communication among the citizens who exchange political thought and debate for
a civil society.
However, Sun Yat-Sen’s inclusive sphere and Habermas’s public sphere fundamentally
differ in one respect: membership. The core of Sun’s inclusive sphere lies in the inclusion
of those excluded and marginalised by class and race hierarchy, for emancipation from the
contamination and colonisation of freedom and equality. The Habermasian public sphere,
on the other hand, is exclusively for communication among elites in Western Europe, pri-
marily for their own social, economic and political interests. Hence Sun Yat-Sen’s inclusive
sphere departs from the Habermasian notion of the public sphere in its membership, as the
former includes everyone for the sake of China’s autonomy –particularly those who have
been excluded – regardless of class, gender and age, and across transnational locations.12
Hence Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication demonstrates how Foucault’s no-
tion of exclusion through class and race hierarchy can be countered by Habermas’s notions
of rationality and cooperation in inclusive and cooperative communication. Habermas be-
lieves it is possible for human beings to communicate with one another without exercising
coercion or manipulation. Mutual understanding can be reached, and this underpins Haber-
mas’s notion of communicative action, opening up a new space to distinguish discursive
interventions that are heavily influenced and distorted by power in Foucault’s sense from
communicative arrangements that are comparatively unrestrained by force (McGuigan,
1997).
RATIONALITY AND COMMUNICATION
As Flybvjerg (1998, p. 210) points out, the essential tension between Habermas and
Foucault is between the normative and the real, rationality and power relations, consensus
and conflict. Habermas believes there is an alternative interpretation of power relations in
communication; our rational capacity may be used both to establish valid standards and to
answer more difficult questions (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003). The central idea in Habermas’s
12　David Strand (2011) argues that the Chinese Revolution of 1911 engendered a new political life - one that
began to free men and women from the inequality and hierarchy that formed the spine of China’s social and
cultural order.
The Theory of Communicative Action (1981, 1987) is that communicative rationality is

anchored in the social forms of human life, and this claim is defended by means of the
contemporary philosophy of language and science (Honneth & Joas, 1986). Additionally,
and more specifically to language and discourse in communication, Eriksen and Weigard
(2003, p. 4) assert that the main tenet of Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action
is that our communication through linguistic utterances may be regarded as speech acts; the
theory implies that we continuously have to take a yes or no position on the specific validity
claims which are implicit in utterances. These central ideas in Habermas’s The Theory of
Communicative Action provide an opportunity to analyse how the explicit positioning in
one’s utterance reveals one’s rationality and can defy the effects of implicit power relations
in language and discourse.
In the case of Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication, his rationality in arguing
and debating for freedom and equality for the underprivileged Chinese demonstrates that
what he uttered in the inclusive sphere was what he enacted and performed in his commu-
nication. Habermas seeks to defend the concept of communicative rationality by means of
a specific conception of validity claims in speech. In the same vein, Sun Yat-Sen’s emanci-
patory communication was for rational and cooperative communication, as he often spoke
in public to defend freedom and equality, which were threatened and colonised by the hege-
monic powers of the Manchus and Western capitalists.
Communicative rationality for Habermas is not a subject-object relation but a sub-
ject-subject (intersubjective) relation between communicating (actor) and interacting (par-
ticipant) individuals, yet there is a difference between subject-centred and intersubjective
rationality. According to Habermas (1987, p. 294), the subject-centred rationality initiated
by Kant and developed through Hegel and Marx has been unable to develop the much
sought-after rational and universal foundation for social institutions, and this is because
they have all worked within a tradition he calls ‘the philosophy of the subject’. Flybvjerg
asserts (1998, p. 213–p. 214) that, for Habermas, the path towards a rational constitution
and the establishment of a bulwark against relativism is a reorientation from earlier philoso-
phers’ focus on subjectivity to intersubjectivity (Habermas, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1993) in ap-
proaching modern problems. This argument is in agreement with Sun Yat-Sen’s philosophy
and the nature of emancipatory communication, in that the latter seeks to establish an inter-
subjective path to a cooperative understanding between the dominant and the subjugated by
including the excluded, a communicative emancipation from the subject-object relation.
Human rationality ‘proper’, i.e. the ability to lead one’s own action, is guided by a com-
mon understanding of reality, a consensus established through linguistic dialogue; by the
term communicative action, Habermas refers to action which is linked to such linguistic
validity claims, i.e. action which is oriented towards interaction on the basis of a consensus
about those claims (Habermas, 1984, p. 101). In addition to consensus, Alexander (2011,
p. 54) supports the necessity of argument, stressing that Habermas defines rationality as the
quality that makes action defendable against criticism; therefore, to be rational, acts must
rest upon criticisable validity claims. Flybvjerg (1998, p. 213–p. 214) also suggests that
argumentation ensures that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a co-
operative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argu-
ment; empirically, Habermas sees the new social movements as agents of a communicative
rationality of change in the public sphere.
The Public Sphere of Inclusion
The public sphere is a realm in which individuals gather to participate in open discussion,
where no one enters into discourse with an advantage over another; this is the central
theme of Habermas’s The Structural Transformation (1961, 1989).13 However, Habermas’s
intention to merge history and theory in the notion of the bourgeois public sphere lacks
fair criteria for assessing the public, such as equality in gender, class and race. In this
regard, Okin (1992) problematises the absence of women from political arenas, while
Walby (2009) expands the citizenship of women to the boundary of the public sphere,
arguing discontentedly that equal citizenship of women never existed in the public arena.
Even though the literate bourgeois public of the 18th century took on a political role in the
evaluation of contemporary affairs, particularly state policy, Outhwaite (2009) declares it
omitted the general public, who also needed to know what the state was doing or failing to
do and to influence it as far as they could. The public sphere, therefore, is required to realise
the rights of the public to participate.
Sun Yat-Sen’s inclusive sphere satisfies this requirement of the public sphere, in that
it included everyone in the rights of Chinese citizens. Bauman (2005, p. 77–p. 78) argues
that space is public insofar as those who are allowed or likely to enter it are not preselected,
that no passes are required and there is no registration of comers and leavers; presence in
public space is therefore anonymous, and those present in public space inevitably tend to be
strangers to each other as well as to the people in charge of the space.
This claim also problematises Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, as its availabil-
ity is exclusive to the male bourgeois class. Bennett (2007, p. 142) therefore emphasises
the need to look at Habermas’s historical account of the public sphere through the lens of
Foucauldian enquiries in an attempt to relocate the public sphere. The Habermasian public
sphere lacked equality of the public in its membership, which Sun’s inclusive sphere grant-
ed to everyone. While Sun Yat-Sen’s inclusive sphere originally derived from a Haberma-
sian notion of the public sphere, it marks a point of departure in that the former includes
everyone in the communicative sphere, regardless of gender, age and social status, as long
as he/she voluntarily joins the inclusive sphere of communication as an equal citizen for the
purpose of emancipating China and the Chinese people.
Habermas (1989, p. 43–p. 51) argues that the 18th century was a crucial period in the
rise of rational and critical argument among the bourgeoisie, and he recognises the contri-
bution of the bourgeois public sphere, including the development of the mass media. How-
ever, Briggs (2009, p. 61) points out that the Habermasian notion of the public sphere has
been criticised for its ‘utopian assessment’, and this criticism can be extended to its failure
to take full account of the underprivileged class, who did not have equal access to the status
of the public.
EMANCIPATORY INCLUSION
Sun’s utterance about ‘slaves of more than ten masters’ elucidates the core motive behind
13　Regarding the public sphere, Kant conceived of public debate as the domain of philosophers, not of com-
mon people, considering the rise of secret societies such as the Freemansons to be the result of the restriction of
public debate, but did not consider the propertyless, or those who were not free citizens (Holub 1991, p. 4)
his emancipatory communication: the statement was in fact about Sun’s emancipatory
interest and the class and racial hierarchy that denied human freedom and equality. The
implementation of Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication had three phases: first,
defying the subject-object relation between the dominant and the underprivileged; second,
reunifying the dichotomised Chinese identity by promoting social mobility and racial
equality, which would form the subjectivity of the Chinese; finally, consolidating citizenship
in an autonomous modern nation-state to establish an intersubjective understanding. Hence
Sun’s emancipatory communication directly expressed his belief in the inclusion of the
‘other’, and was implemented over three phases in relations of communication: subject-
object, subjective and intersubjective.
Emancipation is a comprehensive concept that refers to release not only from institu-
tional authority, but also from the moral authority of norms and beliefs (Nederveen 1989, p.
53). This concept can be applied to emancipation from the class and racial hierarchy, which
was an institutional tool to exclude the underprivileged Chinese, the norms and beliefs of
which were inculcated and sustained by the Qing authorities and Western capitalists. Ulti-
mately, emancipation from the internal and external mechanisms of exclusion (in Foucault’s
terms) which demarcate and separate the ‘other’ enabled the Chinese to achieve autonomy
and equality.
As Nederveen (ibid.:52) emphasises, the ultimate goal of emancipation in the West-
ern public sphere is freedom and autonomy: for the bourgeoisie first, and then for the un-
derprivileged class, whose emancipation coincides with the advent of rational society. In
the case of Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication, however, the initial target group
was primarily the underprivileged Chinese, as they were the ones excluded from freedom
and autonomy, subjugated by the class and racial hierarchy, and ‘slaves of more than ten
masters’. The meaning of emancipation throughout Sun’s communication signifies the ex-
tension of political and economic rights to non-privileged groups, and the core field of his
emancipatory communication was an ‘inclusive sphere’. In other words, Sun’s notion of
emancipation is equal to his passion to emancipate the Chinese from exclusion by the class
and race hierarchy, and to grant economic and political rights to the subjugated and exclud-
ed.
Habermas distinguished three main types of cognitive interest (Nederveen 1989, p. 49–p.
50): technical, practical and emancipatory, of which the last element – emancipatory inter-
est – was to form the basis of Critical Theory. Habermas argues (1984, p. 6) that in modern
society the development of instrumental rationality was at the expense of other dimensions
of rationality. Max Weber (1946) saw an effective but totally dehumanised social ideal
in the breakthrough of modern, calculating, purposive rationality, which gave way to the
manipulative dominion of instrumental reason (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972; Horkheimer
1947). Nederveen (ibid.) claims that the Critical Theorists also adhered to a wider norma-
tive concept of reason – a concept of liberating reason; this was the inner tension of Critical
Theory - its simultaneous disenchantment with and hope for liberation by reason. Rational-
ity was understood to lead to both reification and emancipation.
Habermas’s subsequent notion of emancipation was an emancipatory rationality in the
form of communicative acts. This notion is an elaboration of the initial idea of emancipato-
ry interest, and language and communication became central to this new conceptualisation
of the rational foundation of Critical Theory and emancipation, signifying a ‘linguistic
turn’. The ideal of emancipatory interest was non-coercive, rational communication, the
basis of the ideal of a free, democratic society. Holub (1991, p. 8–p. 9) argues that rational
discourse is free from both domination and linguistic pathology and that it is oriented to-
wards intersubjective understanding, asserting that consensus is precisely the type of activi-
ty appropriate to the public sphere.
Sun Yat-Sen’s communication is emancipatory because his intersubjectivity allowed
underprivileged Chinese to consolidate citizenship so as to free themselves from the con-
straints imposed by pathological exclusion. Thus intersubjective communication for the
purposes of emancipation from human pathologies was birthed by Sun Yat-Sen to achieve
a consolidated citizenship based on free and equal rights. This is also in line with Laclau’s
notion of overcoming the dichotomic dimension to arrive at the transparency dimension;
Laclau (2007, p. 1–p. 4) argues that there is only the absolute coincidence of human es-
sence with itself, and there is no room for any relation of either power or representation.
Thus Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication eliminated power, abolished the subject/
object distinction, and re-established the contingent relationship between power and op-
pression through emancipation.
Emancipation from Pathologies
It is relevant to analyse the concept and usage of emancipation from a medical perspective,
given that Sun Yat-Sen was a physician by training. In his writing he often compared the
condition of China’s health to that of the Chinese body;14 Sun’s diagnosis of China was
that it was suffering from the pathologies of social, economic and political exclusion, that
human autonomy and equality were denied, and that only the emancipation of China and
the Chinese people could secure a complete recuperation from the pathological chains of
power that discursively produced and systematically sustained classism and racism. This
concept corresponds to the Habermasian notion of pathologies of modernity, in that the
complexity of the societal system overtaxes individuals’ power to coordinate their actions
(Cooke, 1994, p. 6).
This notion of human pathology and Sun Yat-Sen’s intention to restore the health of
China and its people further validate the authenticity of his emancipatory communication,
as he primarily aimed to cure the ailing underprivileged class, which was suffering from the
pathologies of classism and racism.15 For Sun Yat-Sen, emancipation meant equality and au-
tonomy following a complete recuperation from the pathologies caused by exclusion. And
as a medical doctor, Sun prescribed China and Chinese people an inclusive sphere of com-
14　Sun Yat-Sen (1994, p. 130), in the speech to Xiaoshing Business Association on Aug 23, 1916, declares:
‘Every effort should be made to improve public health and hygiene; for knowledge about our physical body
should be the first form of educational instruction, and as our personal hygiene improves, our minds will per-
form better, and then our knowledge can reach a higher level. At present, our country does not belong to a sin-
gle person but to all the people. Since we realize the nation belongs to all the people, every single person is fully
responsible for whether the country is strong or weak’.
15　In the editorial of the first issue of Mingpao in Tokyo on November 26, 1905, Sun emphasizes: ‘In to-
day’s China, which is still in the grip of the unremedied poisons of a millennium of despotic rule, the ravages
of an alien race, and the oppression of foreign countries, the principles of nationalism and democracy must not
be postponed for another moment (Sun 1994, p. 40)’.
munication to unfetter them from the internal and external pathologies of exclusion, and to
provide an intersubjective relation in communication, which had been intervened in by the
hegemonic powers.
After initial treatment with his emancipatory communication in the inclusive sphere,
Sun’s subsequent efforts to form opinions and consensus by suffrage, in order to reunify the
dichotomised Chinese identity and consolidate citizenship, were intended to ensure that the
first Chinese nation-state would have a healthy body. The underprivileged Chinese, with
their various economic backgrounds across transnational locations, actively exchanged po-
litical and economic ideas in the inclusive sphere created by Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory
communication, and forged solidarity for a civil society,16 which signified a complete recov-
ery from the pathologies of class and racial exclusions. Habermas defines emancipation in
strict procedural terms until opinion and will-formation in the public sphere become gen-
uinely unfettered (Cook, 2004, p. 152–p. 154). Therefore emancipation is what was really
required to eradicate the pathologies of exclusion.
Coexistence
Sun Yat-Sen’s inclusion of the Overseas Chinese directly countered the class and racial
hierarchy, through which multiple exclusions of the Overseas Chinese were imposed
by the foreign capitalists and host nations as well as by the Manchu regime. While the
Opium War catalysed labourers’ emigration to meet the needs of Western capitalists for
their new territorial expansion and exploitation, in traditional China migrants had always
been regarded as potential traitors or political conspirators (Blusse 1986; Wang 1991,
2000). The Qing regime’s concern was about political conspiracy among the Overseas
Chinese, who communicated in barbarian languages, were believed to be assisting the
British invaders, and were held partially responsible for China’s defeat (1976, 1985).
Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication with the praxis of the inclusive sphere in
transnational locations played a pivotal role in consolidating Chinese nationalism through
the concept of minzu in order to include all Chinese, regardless of occupation, birthplace,
place of residence, or class, by virtue of all of which they had previously been excluded.
Equality and freedom through inclusion were the two ultimate objectives of Sun Yat-Sen’s
emancipatory communication.17
Sun Yat-Sen first conceived and concretised the concept of minzu, and then further de-
veloped the concept of Greater Asianism, which encompassed all Asians, based not on their
16　On the other hand, the Marxian analysis of the notion of civil society should not be conceived as a unity,
but rather as a contradictory entity composed of classes that is necessarily antagonistic to one another, and sees
the public sphere as an arena of conflict (Holub 1991, p. 5)
17　Sun cautions nationalism should not be confused with discriminating others. He says in a speech given to
celebrate the first anniversary of the Min Pao Dec 2, 1906 in Tokyo: On the other hand, we should recognize
that nationalism does not mean discriminating against people of a different nationality; it simply means not al-
lowing such people to seize our political power (1994, p. 42). Also, Sun Yat-Sen in his ‘A History of the Chi-
nese Revolution’ written in January of 1923, says: ‘My principle of Nationalism takes our ancestral legacy
and develops it to greater brilliance. Toward the Manchus, I do not seek revenge, urging rather that we coexist
with them within China on terms of equality. This is how the principle of nationalism deals with the various na-
tionalities within our borders (1994, p. 252)’.
shared skin colour but on the cultural uniqueness of Asia. Hence his emancipatory commu-
nication rejected racial hierarchy and exclusion. Wang (2011, p. 31) discusses Sun’s Greater
Asianism – which was conceived in order to counter Western taxonomical racism – arguing
that it was based on cultural uniqueness, and emphasising that Sun insisted that Asia had its
own culture and principles: what Sun called ‘the culture of the kingly way’ (wangdao, 王道 )
was distinct from ‘the culture of the hegemonic way’ (badao, 霸道 ), which Western capi-
talists practised. Sun’s notion of pan-Asianism signifies the coexistence of multi-minzus in
Asia, with freedom and equality.18
Sun Yat-Sen proposes that the first Chinese republic will be made up of the five minzus
of Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Muslim and Han. Duara contemplates the possibility that the
principle of minzu is constitutive of the nation within a larger nationalist narrative of com-
mon historical experience against imperialism (Unger, 1996, p. 53). Thus was inaugurated
the inclusion of different ethnic groups as citizens of the Chinese republic, opening the ini-
tial phase of a multicultural nation-state based on nationalism. However, Duara problema-
tises Sun’s minzu discourse for its method of inclusion, as it focused on the consolidation of
identity solely on the basis of the uniqueness of Chinese-ness, ignoring the truly multicul-
tural aspect of a modern nation.
Wang (2011, p. 32) argues that Sun clearly saw the relationship between nationalism
and the concept of race: he saw in nationalism the logic of both resistance and power. Thus
when he appealed to the notion of minzu to legitimise national independence, he also in-
voked the notion of Greater Asianism, which offers not only a schema for transcending
imperialism through self-determination, but also a multinationalism that transcends the
homogeneity of ethnicity, culture, religion and belief. Additionally, the inclusion of ev-
eryone through minzu inspired nationalism19 in order to reunify the dichotomised Chinese
identity proved to be procedurally efficient, according to Sun’s planned three phases of es-
tablishing the modern nation-state; first eradicating the subject-object relation on the basis
of self-identity as Chinese, next forming a subjective identity as autonomously Chinese,
and finally establishing an intersubjective relation. In addition, the minzu discourse was an
element in Sun’s emancipatory procedure to include the underprivileged, and that was a
prerequisite for cooperative understanding. Hence Sun’s discourse of minzu and pan-Asian-
ism defied the exclusionary mechanisms of power (in Foucault’s terms) by transcending
the Western capitalists’ construction of racial taxonomy. In defying the Confucian class
and Western racial hierarchies, which discriminated against the underprivileged by both
demarcating and excluding them as ‘other’, minzu and pan-Asianism culturally included
every ethnic Chinese and Asian in autonomy and equality. Thus the power of exclusion was
eradicated by Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication, directly and explicitly coun-
tering the Confucian class and Western racial hierarchies, which were implicitly produced
18　Minzu is one of the three principles of the people; the early Sun’s principles were originally four; Auton-
omy, Agency, Democracy and Livelihood, showing his will to expel the Manchus, restore the Chinese rule,
establish a republic, and equalize the land. Through Minzu, a nation of multiracial coexistence ( 多民族主义
的国 ) such as the five races united in the Chinese nation was conceived (Hsu 2000).
19　Gellner (1973, p. 11) argues nationalism is a movement which conceives the natural object of human loy-
alty to be a fairly large anonymous unit defined by shared language and culture. However, he emphasizes, in
modern societies, culture does not so much underline structure: rather it replaces it.
and sustained by language and discourse, and leading to an intersubjective communication

shared by equal and free citizens in the inclusive sphere.20
CONCLUSION
Rational communication exists only on equal and autonomous terms, independent of

the implicit power relations of exclusion and subjugation by language and discourse.
Intersubjective relations through cooperative understanding in communication can only
be achieved by emancipation, as no coercive or exclusionary mechanism in language and
discourse can produce rational communication. Therefore only the voice of the articulator,
and the willingness of the participants to listen, rationally argue and explicitly debate in the
inclusive sphere, can produce a consensus of opinion.
The main tenet of Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication was the inclusion of
everybody, particularly of those who were underprivileged and excluded by the powers of
social norms, rituals, conventions and coercion, as equality and autonomy were contaminat-
ed by class and racial hierarchy. Habermas’s (1984) core concept of communicative action
shares with Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication the notion that humans must com-
municate intersubjectively for a civil society, despite the constant pressure of intervening
power-knowledge in Foucault’s sense.
Speakers and hearers as social actors and participants understand the meaning of a sen-
tence when they know it is true, despite situations in which implicit power in Foucault’s
sense is constantly at work to threaten true communication as Habermas understands it. Sun
achieved an ideal emancipatory communication which was undistorted and rational in the
inclusive sphere, reconnecting the dichotomised Chinese identity and consolidating citizen-
ship.
Given the implicit power relations of language and discourse in communication, Haber-
mas’s ‘emancipatory interest and rationality’ shares the ultimate goal of Sun Yat-Sen’s
emancipatory communication, which is an autonomous human being in a free society.
Emancipation is a comprehensive concept that refers to release not only from institutional
authority but also from the moral authority of norms and beliefs. In Sun Yat-Sen’s emanci-
patory communication, the task included the abolition not only of institutional systems of
exclusion such as Confucian class and Western capitalist racial hierarchies, but also of their
discursively produced classism and racism. Therefore Sun’s emancipatory communication
also became a cultural, economic and political emancipation that granted freedom and
equality to Chinese subjects.
Chinese identity was dichotomised by systems of exclusion through language and
discourse, and Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communication presented coherence and inter-
action instead of demarcation and separation. Thus Sun Yat-Sen’s emancipatory communi-
cation, by overcoming the Foucauldian notion of power – the power of the Manchu sover-
eignty, of Western capitalists, and of language and discourse, brought in the Habermasian
20　Sun Yat-Sen (1994, p. 260) evaluates the 1911 revolution; the results of this campaign have been, first, the
eradication of more than 260 years of shame and humiliation, according complete equality to all of the na-
tion’s ethnic groups, so that no longer will one group lord it over the others, and second, wiping out every
trace of a monarchical dictatorship that had lasted for more than four thousand years, so that democratic gov-
ernment would hence be introduced.
notion of unfettered communication with the intention to cooperatively understand others,

which establishes an intersubjective relation in communication.
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Author’s Biodata
G. Kentak Son is currently a Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London, U.K. and his
research topic is Sun Yat-Sen’s contribution to China’s modernization. He has an M.A. in
linguistics from New York University, an M.B.A. in international finance from Columbia
University, and a M.Sc. in Sociology/Gender from the London School of Economics and
Political Science in the UK. G. Kentak Son is currently supervised by Professor Xinzhong
Yao and Professor Nicholas Bunnin.

kentakson@gmail.com
ISSN: 2224-2716
EU-China Political and Security Relations:

Gaps, Challenges and Perspectives1
Just Castillo Iglesias

Osaka University
The European Union’s relevance in East-Asian political and security issues, developed mainly
during the last two decades, remains limited and relatively low profile. After these two decades,
the persistent gap between rhetoric and materialized joint action remains existent. However,
since its formalization, the EU-China ‘Strategic Partnership’ has achieved a significant deepen-
ing and widening in both recognized potential for further cooperation as well as in concrete joint
action. Yet, points of tension still exist, mainly coming from disagreements in terms of values
and conception of the international system. The significant rise of China and its increasing pres-
ence in international affairs has brought about, for the EU, a significant challenge. On the one
hand, strengthening and deepening its relations with China is a necessary condition for the EU
to consolidate its role as an international actor; while on the other hand, China’s strong demands
for respect on national sovereignty and to be regarded in terms of equality, challenge the EU’s
traditional value-based diplomacy. Paradoxically, China, because of the challenges it presents for
the EU alongside with the necessity and determination to strengthen this relation, may be becom-
ing a driving force for the consolidation of the EU’s personality as a foreign and security actor.
Thus, this article will first give a historical overview of EU-China relations since the end of the
Cold War; secondly, it will review the main challenges and gaps still present in the bilateral rela-
tions; and finally, it will evaluate the perspectives and possible future direction of this important
‘Strategic Partnership’.
INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) has been consolidating its emerging role as a global political and
security actor with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the later formulation of the European Security Strategy
(ESS) in 2003 and the most recent creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)
with the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.
The EU’s vision as a political and security actor is based on promoting effective glob-
al multilateralism and on providing what the EU considers universal public goods: good
governance, promoting integration in myriad international organizations and regimes, and
making respect for Human Rights, democracy, peace and development internationally rec-
ognized values and goals. In line with such objectives, the EU has primarily adopted what
can be considered a value-based diplomacy and has doted itself with a wide array of condi-
tionality mechanisms. For its relations with third countries considered of core importance,
the EU has developed so-called ‘Strategic Partnerships’. This term , despite not having a
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Just Castillo Iglesias. E-mail: c-just@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp
EU-CHINA POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONS 51
fixed definition, implies an engagement with third countries in terms of equality with the
objective of jointly addressing and have close collaboration on issues of common and glob-
al interest, developing and maintaining permanent dialogues on all dimensions of foreign
policy, policy coordination, among others (Odgaard & Biscop, 2007, p. 54, p. 60). Despite
the seeming clarity in defining its goals, the EU’s foreign and security policy dimension
continues to be formulated through a complex intergovernmental mechanism that makes
consensus or agreement among its Member States mandatory. Thus, the EU has been com-
monly defined as a sui-generis international actor.
In addition, the EU’s foreign and security policy continues to be motivated by a double
objective. The first one, of an internal nature, follows the logic that, effectively develop-
ing relations with third actors globally contributes to the formation and consolidation of a
uniquely European foreign and security policy (speaking with one voice). The second one,
of an external nature, obeys to the perceived necessity for the EU to forge and strengthen its
international actorness as a response to the global shifts of power and in sight of a progres-
sive loss of relative weigh for Europe in international affairs.
In relation to this latter point, and particularly when considering its relations with Chi-
na, the EU faces a crucial challenge. On the one hand, the EU-China ‘Strategic Partnership’
has been effectively developed in the course of the last two decades with relative general
success. The extent of mutual trust, cooperation and joint initiatives has widened and deep-
ened from an initial situation dominated by commercial ties into an extensive catalogue of
common objectives, dialogues and collaboration schemes (European Union EEAS, 2012a,
2012c). At the same time, China’s unprecedented rise and economic dynamism has con-
tributed to raising the country’s profile as a major global and regional power. China stands
internationally as a strong advocate for effective multilateralism, equality in international
relations and respect for national sovereignty. For the EU, this brings about a new situa-
tion, especially if contrasted with its bilateral relations with many other third countries, par-
ticularly the US, Canada and Japan. China brings about a myriad of new challenges, which,
taken into account together with its population, economic potential and geopolitical impor-
tance, often put in evidence the current limits of the ‘Strategic Partnership’ and the need to
reconcile, and find the common denominator between the values and principles vested into
this partnership by China and by the EU. Yet, this is not necessarily a negative situation for
the European side. China has historically presented itself as a convinced supporter of the
European integration process and has recognized the EU as a potential valuable partner in
the post-Cold War order with whom it shared the aim of helping effective multilateralism
to prevail in the new global order (Chen, 2010; Pan, 2010; Reinoso, 2012). Likewise, given
the challenges it presents for the EU along with the European will to strengthen this rela-
tion, it is important to consider that China may become a driving force for the consolidation
of the EU’s personality as a foreign and security actor at a steadier path than ever before.
At the same time, it is important to keep in sight that any analysis of EU-China relations
is not complete without addressing the historical difficulties that this partnership has had
to match discourse with outcomes. The EU-China ‘Strategic Partnership’, and similarly
the EU-Japan, has been recurrently characterized by the presence of gaps between rheto-
ric, i.e. the objectives defined for cooperation and the official discourse; and action, i.e. the
outcomes actually achieved in contrast with the defined objectives, either in terms of joint
policy or in any form of actual collaboration.
52 IGLESIAS QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 50-61
Hence, this article will first briefly review the history of EU-China relations and, sec-
ondly, will analyze the scope and challenges posted by the rhetoric-action gaps, with the
objective of drafting some perspectives on the near future of this EU-China ‘Strategic Part-
nership’.
CHINA-EU POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONS
The EU (then EEC) and China initiated their bilateral relations over three decades ago. At
that time, contacts were motivated by a growing interest in enhancing bilateral trade and
economic ties, while political and security-related aspects were left out of the incipient
bilateral dialogue. In the post-Cold War context, the EU had more interest in deepening its
relations with other Western countries or Japan than in forging a true Partnership with Chi-
na. However, with the progressively increasing global importance and presence of China
in international affairs, alongside a growing interest in multilateralism resulting from the
perception of ‘multipolar moment’ that emerged with the end of the bipolar order and the
optimism that followed, the EU initiated the move towards a more comprehensive, deep
and far-reaching collaboration with China, that in turn, helped eased China’s international
isolation.
In general terms, the first decade of EU-China relations was dominated by commercial
and economic issues under the framework of the 1978 and 1985 trade agreements (Europe-
an Commission, 2001; European Union, 1985). In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square
events of 1989, the relations cooled considerably, leading to significant political stalemates
that would repeat with the Taiwan Strait crisis of the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, in such a
crisis context, the EU sought a new opportunity to engage with China, deciding to reinforce
and emphasize on the diplomatic dimension of the bilateral relations, outlined in the EC’s
Communications “A long-term policy for China-Europe relations” of 1995 and “Building a
Comprehensive Partnership with China” in 1998 (ibid.). These steps on the EU side led to a
significant development of the political relations and ultimately meant a functional expan-
sion of the policy-areas and issues covered in EU-China relations, from merely commercial
and business issues to political and military areas. It allowed the start of the annual Bilater-
al Summit, triggered subsequent diplomatic visits, the Ministerial Troika2 meetings, the Hu-
man Rights Dialogue framework, as well as the establishment of sectorial working groups
and dialogues in over 50 subject areas (European Union EEAS, 2012b). After this new
bilateral engagement, the punitive measures against China initially adopted by the EU in
the aftermath of the Tiananmen events were soon deemed temporary and eventually lifted,
with the exception of the arms embargo that remains in place to date. Nevertheless, despite
the positive impact that this turn has had in the overall course of EU-China relations, the re-
newed EU diplomatic assertiveness has not been free from disagreements. On the Chinese
side, the official line has considered the EU’s approach to be, in some occasions, interfer-
ing excessively in Chinese internal affairs and, thus, undermining its national sovereignty.
From the EU’s perspective, on the other hand, issues related with the conceptualization of
2　The Troika Meeting is generally attended on the EU side by the President of the EU General Affairs and
Foreign Relations Council (Foreign Minister of the Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency),
the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and European Commissioner for
External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy; and by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
democracy and respect for human rights, among others, have been interpreted as the major
source of disagreements.
Since 2003, after setting up an agenda for pushing forward and deepening their political
relations, the EU and China mutually recognized each other as ‘comprehensive strategic
partners’. From the EU perspective, the envisaged objectives for the Strategic Partnership
with China were defined in the following five points:
1. engaging China further in the international community through an upgraded politi-
cal dialogue;
2. supporting China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and re-
spect for human rights and democracy;
3. integrating China further in the world economy by bringing it more fully into the
world trading system and by supporting the process of economic and social reform under
way in the country;
4. making better use of existing European financial resources;
5. raising the EU’s profile in China (European Commission, 2003).
In its updated Communication of 2003, the European Commission focused its action to-
wards China in developing ‘shared responsibilities in promoting global governance’, since,
according to the Commission, China could play a fundamental role in reconciling the in-
terests of developing and developed countries, and in promoting peace and stability in Asia
(ibid.).
At the same time, the so-called strategic dialogues have become a significant part of
EU-China relations, through which there has been a substantial amount of consultation,
talking and coordination. Recently in 2012, the third round of dialogues was launched.
Concerning these dialogues, the EU has also designated series of ambitious core areas in
which it aims to develop joint action with China. Such issue areas are:
1. human rights concerns
2. combating illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings
3. combating organized crime
4. regional issues (reconciliation between the two Koreas, cooperation with regard
to Burma, negotiated solution to the territorial claims in the South China Sea, the Taiwan
issue)
5. disarmament and limiting arms proliferation and exports
6. promoting multilateral dialogue on security (preventing conflicts at regional and
international level)
Arguably, while this gives the Strategic Partnership a solid basis to develop, by listing
a range of issues in which there are shared interests. Some of these issues are far beyond
the acting capacity and interest of the EU in Asia (case of the Taiwan Straits and of the
Korean Peninsula) and beyond the interest of China in its foreign action, which is strongly
positioned against intervention in what it considers other countries’ internal affairs (cases of
Burma and Korea).
From the EU perspective, the engagement with China is generally seen with positive
eyes. China is not perceived as a threat given that there are no opposed strategic interests
between both (Scott, 2007, p. 18). However, arguably, the relations with China pose for
the EU a notable dual challenge. On the one hand, given its geopolitical and economic im-
portance, and as a major global player, particularly taking into account China’s Permanent
Membership at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a core institution for the
effective multilateralism and rule-based global order that the EU aims at promoting, China
is not only another third-country partner for the EU, but one with whom a fully functional
‘Strategic Partnership’ is a condition sine qua non for consolidating the EU’s global actor-
ness and for the achievement of the EU’s foreign policy vision of effective multilateralism
(Odgaard & Biscop, 2007, p. 61). On the other hand, among the Strategic Partners, China
is the one that most directly challenges the EU’s norm-based diplomacy and questions
whether the values the EU promotes are essentially European or have universal validity and
applicability.
The existing divergences along these points and, to a further extent, the core differences
existing in regards to some fundamental values give place to misperceptions, gaps of mu-
tual understanding and ultimately become obstacles for moving the Strategic Partnership
towards more action-oriented collaboration. On the Chinese side, this problem is widely
recognized by the country’s academic community, which in numerous occasions have de-
termined that the EU should ‘give up its ambition to influence Chinese domestic action or
behavior’3, stop aiming at imposing European political values and system to China and that
the EU must “stop clinging to its Eurocentric concepts on ideological and political issues
such as human rights, humanitarianism and ‘universal values’”(Cui, 2010, p. 397; Ding,
2009). On the other hand, the EU’s diplomatic mission to China welcomes what it recog-
nizes as Chinese advancement in areas such as human rights or environmental protection.
The EU acknowledges that there are still significant differences in regards to many issue
areas, but it welcomes Chinese advances and progress towards its acceptance of the values
that the EU aims at spreading4.
Also from the Chinese perspective, the Strategic Partnership with the EU is an import-
ant element to implement the Chinese vision of effective multilateralism, aimed at creating
a peaceful, stable and prosperous environment for China to develop, update its capabili-
ties, reap the benefits of globalization and ultimately realize its potential as global power
(Odgaard & Biscop, 2007, p. 68; Zhang, 2009). For China, the EU is seen as an attractive
alternative to the US, and a valuable partner with whom to counterbalance American hege-
mony (Reinoso, 2012; Zhou, 2009). Moreover, as China remains a developing country, the
Strategic Partnership with the EU is seen as an interesting partner in the fields of scientific
and technological collaboration, as well as a model of regional development and conver-
gence.
In terms of security and political relations, the 2003 ‘EU Policy Paper’ of the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs states China’s high regard of the collaboration with the EU and
its future potential:
“The common ground between China and the EU far outweighs their disagreements.
Both China and the EU stand for democracy in international relations and an enhanced role
of the UN. Both are committed to combating international terrorism and promoting sustain-
3　The prevalence of such sentiments, which are widely gathered in the Chinese literature regarding EU-China
relations was commented and acknowledged to the author in an interview at the Department of European
Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing in March 2012.
4　As recognized by a High-Level EU official at the European Commission’s Delegation to China, in an
interview in March 2012.
able development through poverty elimination and environmental protection endeavors”

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2003).
At the same time, developing the Strategic Partnership with the EU is seen by China
as an opportunity to project the image of a peaceful ‘civilian power’ that advocates for di-
alogue, consultation and rule-based mechanisms for conflict resolution rather than making
use of power politics. Nevertheless, the Chinese commitment to multilateralism, preemi-
nent role of the UN and non-intervention is still strongly determined by its historical and
current context as an international actor, to a greater extent than its official rhetoric tends to
convey (Li, 2007, p. 48-p. 52). Historically, China has come a long way in order to be grad-
ually accepted as a responsible global player and this is an image it aims at maintaining and
improving.
In any case, it is of justice to say that, according to this vision as a valuable partner in
multilateralism, China has long supported the process of European integration and devel-
opment of the EU’s personality as a global actor (Zhang, 2009). China aims at the EU to
develop a genuinely European foreign and common security policy that is essentially in-
dependent from the transatlantic relations and from the US (Reinoso, 2012). This fact has
revealed itself most clearly during the proposal in 2004-05 to lift the EU arms embargo
imposed on China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square events of 1989 in exchange
for recognized advancements by China in matter of human rights5. Despite that no internal
EU consensus was reached at that time, with the UK and France as major Member States
in favor of lifting the ban and Germany among others opposing it, the suspicions and dis-
approval arisen in Washington and Tokyo ultimately played a significant role in motivating
the continuation of the ban. This gave place to a certain Chinese disenchantment with the
EU, which was perceived as unable to maintain an independent stand from the US interests
or to effectively reach a consensus among its Member States within the complex intergov-
ernmental system of decision-making in the EU’s CFSP (Liu, 2007, p. 121), what China
has categorized as ‘the flaws’ of the EU as a foreign policy actor (Ding, 2009).
Since the establishment of the EU-China Strategic Partnership in 2003, however, prog-
ress has certainly been made. The Strategic Dialogue framework has given place to some
concrete results, such as the 2004 Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Con-
trol, and also upon the basis of the existing dialogue, joint anti-piracy actions in Somali
waters are being carried out successfully under the framework laid by the growing common
interest in enhancing cooperation in maritime security issues (Larik & Weiler, 2011). Nev-
ertheless, evidence supports that, besides the healthy trade and economic relations, the most
significant outcomes of this Strategic Partnership continue to be mainly manifested in paper
rather than in concrete action (Berkofsky, 2005). A turn towards pragmatism based on the
dialogues and policy adjustments must be undertaken in order to be able to call this bilater-
al relation a true Strategic Partnership. At the same time, fundamental differences between
China and the EU remain in place. Besides the most problematic and obvious differences
of understanding regarding human rights and democracy, not only in the international arena
but also in their application to China properly, fundamental differences still exist in the way
that both the EU and China conceive multilateralism, the preeminence of the UN System
and the rule of law. In other words, the Chinese conceptualization does not necessarily con-
5　Including the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976.
cur with the Western or European one, in which Western values are interpreted as having
universal validity as the moral core of the UN System to rule the conduct of States6 (Li,
2007). To a certain extent, the Chinese strong bid for multilateralism and respect for nation-
al sovereignty does not only obey to its conception of international affairs, but also to its
most recent history in which the country has had to come a long way to be perceived as a
trustful and responsible power.
In any case, the EU and China have taken steps towards the consolidation of their
Strategic Partnership, which is manifested primarily in a well-developed and extensive
framework of political dialogues in over 50 issue areas (European Union EEAS, 2012b).
Some more discreet advances have been made in terms of policy materialization or joint
action, although the need for a pragmatic turn is recognized in both sides (Berkofsky, 2005;
Chen, 2010; Zhang, 2009). Nevertheless, considering that China and the EU do not have
any directly opposed strategic interest, and that both have mutually recognized the other as
a key partner for the consolidation of their role as global players, further advancements in
EU-China bilateral relations are expected to come.
CHALLENGES, THE RHETORIC-ACTION GAP AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU’s involvement in East-Asian political and
security issues has remained low profile since its formalization about two decades ago. In
this case, the Strategic Partnership between China and the EU has been characterized by a
recurrent gap between rhetoric and policy materialization is been widely recognized in the
existing literature (Berkofsky, 2005; El-Agraa, 2007). The causes leading to such gaps are
complex and mutually interdependent, often related to the EU’s limited capacity as a for-
eign and security policy actor as a result of its intergovernmental decision-making mecha-
nisms and sui generis structure, although the disparity of values and expectations between
China and the EU is a core element for understanding how such gaps come into existence
and the necessary steps that have to be accomplished in order to close the gap.
Arguably, it is on the perceptions or conceptual levels (see table 1) where the most sig-
nificant differences exist between the EU and China. On one hand side, the EU’s official
rhetoric identifies China as an influential and non-threatening global power, with whom co-
operation is desirable and actively sought. This obeys to the fact that the EU perceives the
potential of China as a key partner to support European aims of effective multilateralism,
something that acquires a special relevance when considering China’s condition as a Per-
manent Member of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, European perceptions of
China’s democratic deficits and the need for improvement in Human Rights issues motivate
the prevalence of a value-charged approach on the EU side. Nevertheless, despite there
might be different understandings in their respective worldviews or in the meaning attached
to the concept of effective multilateralism, the EU identifies myriad shared interests with
China, especially when it comes to terms of global stability, multilateralism and shared re-
sponsibility. EU officials recognize today that important steps have been achieved for the
6　This fact reveals its evidence in the certain competition that has emerged in the African continent between
EU and Chinese aid. Although Chinese aid has a recognized high degree of efficiency in delivering tangible
results, it raises certain criticisms among Western powers due to its non-conditionality under the umbrella of
respect for national sovereignty.
consolidation of this partnership, and express the hope that with time, existing differences
will minimize7.
TABLE 1
Causes of Gaps in EU-China Relations (Self-Elaboration).
EU-China Strategic Partnership
• China is seen as a major power / very influential partner

• China a peaceful and non-threating partner
• China as a key partner to fulfill the EU’s multilateralism aspirations (e.g. the
PRC is a Permanent Member at the UNSC)
Perception • Acknowledgement of many shared interests
(from EU side) • China has deficits in democracy/human rights: should converge towards
European values
• EU aims at further integrate China as a responsible partner globally
• Often emphasis is put on different values
• Growing importance of China for Europe (e.g. EU/Eurozone crisis)
• The EU is a valuable partner for China’s ambitions of effective multilateralism,

and to a certain extent for counterbalancing the US position in Asia and globally
• Myriad common objectives identified
• China has supported strongly the European integration process (interest in EU
Perception
becoming a balancing independent player)
(from Chinese side)
• EU as a complex entity / many issues preferred to be addressed bilaterally with
member states
• Perception that the EU’s policy of value-diplomacy is counterproductive. EU
postulates itself as a high-moral bearer.
• A comprehensive network of bilateral dialogue on myriad issues: including

human rights and climate
Cooperation
• Problems have also occurs within multilateral fora
outcomes
• Relatively limited joint policy (notable exception Joint Anti-Piracy operations
in Somali waters)
On the other hand, Chinese official rhetoric towards the EU often grants the Union
the status of a ‘Superpower’. While perhaps this is an overstatement, it reveals that China
regards the EU as an influential global power and as a potential key partner. In this sense,
it can be argued that China would expect the EU to further consolidate its Foreign and Se-
curity actorness and capabilities and adopt a truly independent stand from the Transatlantic
Alliance; thereby the EU becoming another counterbalancing actor in the international
system and especially towards the US preeminent position in East-Asia. At the same time,
Chinese official speech identifies that myriad common objectives are shared with the EU
and manifests its will to continue strengthening bonds, as the EU discourse does, although
7　As recognized by a High-Level EU official at the European Commission’s Delegation to China, in

an interview in March 2012, “China is progressively moving towards the acceptance of what we consider
universal values, despite a long road is still ahead”.
that a common understanding in sensitive issues such as Human Rights, Democracy and the
universal validity of Western values is far less clear (Petchsiri, 2004; Tian, 2009).
Chinese academic writings as well as official rhetoric often regard the EU’s value diplo-
macy as an interference with Chinese domestic affairs and calls upon the EU ‘not to lecture
China how to behave’ or ‘stop imposing European political values and system into China’;
arguing that if the EU considers the Strategic Partnership with China a framework for col-
laboration among equals, the EU should avoid identifying itself as a bearer of higher moral
values. Besides that, the EU is perceived on the Chinese side as a complex and bureaucra-
tized actor, with whom cooperation requires a process of learning and socialization8. De-
spite this complexity, the EU is perceived by the Chinese as having an added-value parallel
to the relations with the Member States although the bilateral relations between these and
China continue to be considered of great importance.
Besides these differences in worldviews and at the perceptions level, it is important to
notice the relevance of the structural environment and external events that have shaped the
course of EU-China relations, in order to understand better the perpetuation of the rheto-
ric-action gaps (Pan, 2010). Alongside with the mentioned limited actorness of the EU as
a foreign and security policy actor, those cooperation objectives that have effectively been
transformed into joint action or joint policy are, generally speaking, those in which a direct
common interest for all the involved parties is identified and where consensuses on the EU
side are easier to reach. These are issues where there is a common direct interest for China,
the EU, as well as for the most influential EU Member States. An illustrative example of
this is the ongoing negotiations for mutual support in environmental issues within multilat-
eral fora, the joint anti-piracy actions conducted in Somali waters or the incipient coopera-
tion on new security threats such as human trafficking or cyber-security. However, when it
comes to more complex issues, such as the recurring proposals for lifting the EU-imposed
arms embargo on China, the European side fails to reach a common position through the
intergovernmental decision-making system, given the disparity of opinions of the most
influential Member States. In such case, the UK, France, Italy among other countries with
relevant military industry, argue in favor of lifting the ban and thus, of regarding China as a
mature responsible international actor. On the other hand, Germany and the Nordic states,
among others, generally adopt a position favoring the imposition of conditionality and thus
oppose the lifting of the ban without ensuring that certain conditions will be guaranteed
(Fox & Godement, 2009, p. 3-p. 5). Self-evidently, in a complex case such as the lifting
of the arms embargo, external pressures also play a significant role, as it is in this case the
concerns expressed by the US and Japan. This example can also be extended to former
projects, such as the Euro-Chinese cooperation on the Galileo Satellite Navigation System,
which raised some American concerns about a possible technology transfer to China that
could be applicable to the development of military technology.
Nevertheless, without denying the complexities involved in finding a mutual under-
standing and a solution to these points, EU-China relations have been maturing and forging
a better mutual understanding. Proof of that is that political stalemates of the scale of the
8　As recognized by Chinese scholars at the Department of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences in Beijing in a series of interviews with the author in March 2012.
aftermath of the Tiananmen events of 1989 have not occurred again, despite some minor
ups and downs in the bilateral relations.
On the other hand, somehow paradoxically, the challenges that are posted to the EU by
the growing relevance of China in both economic, political and security aspects and as an
international actor, may be progressively becoming a catalyst and a driving force for a fast-
er European integration on the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy: i.e. the chal-
lenges posted by China, in terms of involuntarily making evident the EU’s weaknesses and
the need for a more coherent policy formation mechanisms that can bridge the inefficiencies
of the current intergovernmental system, and also by remaking the need for a major capac-
ity of action on the EU side may increase the sense of urgency in European governments
to grant the Union a stronger personality and capacities as a global player in order to be an
effective player in today’s world. As an example of this, in the last decade, with the consol-
idation of the post-Cold War international system and the emergence of new international
threats that operate trans-nationally and are of global concern, the range of issues urging for
international shared responsibility, such as climate change, terrorism, international crime or
cyber-terrorism, has grown. Thus, developing joint action and effective cooperation from
the already existing extensive framework of bilateral dialogues is a possible and necessary
step. Moreover, the increased trade ties between Europe and China and the relevance of
China as a partner in the context of the current Eurozone crisis make only more evident the
necessity for the EU to gain further capacity to act in a coordinated and capable manner in
the relations with third countries.
To a certain extent, it can be argued that EU-China relations remain stuck in the past (Fox
& Godement, 2009, p. 1-p. 3). The EU’s value-based diplomacy towards the China remains
largely driven by the idea that effective engagement with China will eventually bring this
country towards the acceptance and assimilation of Western or European values that the
EU regards as universal. However, further debates about such issues are arguably infertile
when it comes to fostering and deepening cooperation and mutual understanding. Given the
myriad existing common challenges and tangible objectives for cooperation, which have al-
ready been recognized on both parties, political commitment will have to concentrate from
now on finding the common grounds and on establishing effective cooperation in those
regimes where benefits are most directly beneficial and where there is a lower potential for
disagreements. The acceptance of common values as well as the respect for those that differ
will only come with time, better mutual understanding and strong political will.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has reviewed the development of EU-China relations since its formalization
over two decades ago. The EU’s low-profile engagement in East-Asia in terms of political
and security issues is explained by a series of existing gaps between the objectives set for
cooperation and its actual materialization in joint action or policy. Such gaps have its ori-
gins both in the EU’s complex and often limited capacity as a foreign and security policy
actor, as well as in difference in values, perceptions and worldviews. Nevertheless, through
the recognition of the existence of such gaps, the need for a pragmatic turn and a more pos-
itive engagement is recognized. Although the acceptance of different viewpoints and values
will be necessary, the common interests and challenges are myriad, thus, there is place for a
successful deepening and widening of cooperation, given that there is enough political will.
At the same time, effectively engaging in cooperation in those regimes where mutual gains
are easily recognized may trigger a spillover effect and help palliating the negative effects
of the differing perceptions and values. Conclusively, gaining better mutual understanding
and political commitment will be necessary to make the EU-China Strategic Partnership
more fruitful. Nevertheless, both the EU and China are to gain from further cooperation:
the EU has a unique chance to boost its political integration process in terms of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, while for China, a more coherent and strong EU is to
become a more valuable partner in pursuing effective multilateralism and addressing global
challenges.
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Author’s Biodata
Just Castillo Iglesias (BA, MA in European Studies, MA in East-Asian Studies) is a PhD
Candidate at the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) of Osaka University,
Japan. His field of research interest is East-Asian Security and International Relations as
well as EU-China and EU-Japan Political and Security Relations.

c-just@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp
ISSN: 2224-2716
Evil Women and Dynastic Collapse: Tracing the Develop-

ment of an Ideological Archetype1
Bret Hinsch
Foguang University, Taiwan
Imperial historians long assumed that an evil woman shares much of the blame for the fall of each
dynasty. Western Zhou writings hint at a negative female force during the late Shang dynasty.
During the Warring States era, this figure became personified as Daji. Writers also inserted anal-
ogous evil women from other eras into their discussions of history. During the Western Han, the
evil woman theme was systematized and elaborated into long dramatic narratives with pointed
ideological content. Due to the influential writings of Sima Qian and Liu Xiang, the assumption
that an evil woman can bring down a dynasty became a staple of classical Chinese historiography.
During the Western Han dynasty, influential scholars argued that powerful women can
negatively influence government, even portraying them as a major cause of dynastic
collapse. Because this belief became mainstream just as historical narrative was coming to
maturity, its impact on both historiography and gender relations was enormous. Moreover,
it had significant political impact, as this notion was used to criticize powerful women and
justify their exclusion from affairs of state.
Views toward the mechanics of dynastic collapse and female culpability in these di-
sasters, evolved considerably through the centuries until a standard model emerged during
the Western Han. Accompanying this development, key scholars gradually reinterpreted
historical narratives to frame destructive female influence as a general historical pattern. In
particular, they claimed that Daji 妲己 , a consort of the last king of Shang, was instrumen-
tal in bringing down that dynasty, taking her as a paradigm of the evil woman who destroys
her state (Raphals, 1998, p. 63). When discussing the decline and fall of governments in
other eras, they sometimes invented analogous female figures, making the powerful evil
woman into a standard historical archetype. The earliest writings about Shang history, how-
ever, only hint at this evil woman. She initially appeared as a shadowy and nameless figure
on the outermost fringes of historical consciousness, very gradually evolving into a clearly
personified character with a significant role.
Not coincidentally, the development of this character paralleled more general changes
in ideas about women. The changing Daji myth reveals increasingly critical views about
women’s proper political role, with early vague admonitions against female influence on
affairs of state gradually becoming amplified into an explicit vision of an iniquitous woman
inciting dynastic cataclysm. The emergence of the Daji character also reveals how ideas
about gender infiltrated discussions of political history and the dynastic cycle to become a
standard component of orthodox Chinese historiography. Although some key texts on the
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Bret Hinsch. E-mail: bret_hinsch@hotmail.com

EVIL WOMEN AND DYNASTIC COLLAPSE 63
matter have probably disappeared, it is nevertheless still possible to trace the evolution of
this idea and see how it became a standard concept in politics and gender discourse.
SHADOWY BEGINNINGS
The beginnings of the Daji archetype can be traced back to a nebulous figure briefly men-
tioned in Shangshu 尚書 . As this work’s authors sought to legitimize the traumatic con-
quest of Shang by Zhou, they emphasized the degeneracy of the late Shang by describing
the depravities of King Zhou 紂 , last ruler of Shang, in great detail. Shangshu alleges that
women participated in this poisonous decadence. As a centerpiece of Western Zhou ideol-
ogy, the mandate of heaven provides interpretive context for these images of Shang deca-
dence. Although the ruler himself was seen as primarily responsible for keeping or losing
the support of heaven, women were also held partially culpable. A brief passage describes
the female relation to mandate of heaven and the historical process.
“The king said: ‘The ancients had a saying, “The hen does not crow at
dawn. At dawn the hen is exhausted at home.” Now the king of Shang has
accepted a woman’s words and put them to use.’”
王曰 : 古人有言曰 : 牝雞無晨。牝雞之晨，惟家之索。今商王受
惟婦言是用。(Kong, 1995, Vol.11, p. 158, Mushi 牧誓 )
The antiquity of this text, and the importance of the issues it addresses, lent Shangshu
immense moral authority. Every line was subject to memorization and intense scrutiny by
generations of scholars. Even though this early reference to women in relation to dynastic
collapse was brief and ambiguous, its ultimate influence was immense.
As is often the case with Shangshu, the archaic language is extremely terse, making in-
terpretation difficult. My translation follows the standard zhuan 傳 commentary. Although
the zhuan reading may in fact be somewhat different from the author’s original intention,
this is how the passage was ultimately understood. Drawing on narratives about the fall of
Shang from his own day, in hindsight the zhuan identifies the woman in question as Daji,
even though Shangshu never mentions her by name. The zhuan commentary also explains
that this passage stresses that a woman’s proper place is in the home, while public matters
fall within the purview of men, a division frequently summed up by the phrase “men and
women are separate” (nannü you bie 男女有別 ) (Hinsch, 2003b).
The author criticizes women obliquely through a colorful metaphor attributed to a pop-
ular saying, a common device in early literature. Folk adages not only ornamented the text
but also appealed to conventional wisdom and common sense. Here the author implies that
skepticism toward female influence is not limited to elite wisdom or the opinion of a specif-
ic thinker, but represents a broad cultural consensus on the matter. Any reasonable person
ought to admit that a ruler who takes advice from a woman is a fool, and any woman bra-
zen enough to offer such advice has exceeded the proper boundaries of her station.
The authors of Shangshu dwell on King Zhou’s misdeeds, such as taking advice from
women, to legitimize his overthrow. Portraying the Shang as hopelessly corrupt proves that
they deserved their unhappy fate. However, there was yet another reason for excoriating the
dynasty’s last king in exhausting detail. Although Shangshu stepped around the particulars
64 HINSCH QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 62-81
of King Zhou’s death, and the eventual orthodox account described him immolating himself
on a hecatomb of luxurious fripperies, some ancient authors assumed that he was executed
by King Wu 武 of Zhou. The latter version of his death is obviously far more plausible. Not
only would it make sense for King Wu to kill his enemy, but the poetic justice of self-cre-
mation in a bonfire of vanities seems suspiciously apt.
As the Zhou had at times previously acknowledged fealty toward Shang, the possi-
bility that King Wu committed regicide against his titular lord shocked later generations.
Although Wu was held up as a great moral paragon who swept away an evil dynasty and
replaced it with virtuous rule, his legacy was tainted by suspicions of disloyalty. The mag-
nification of King Zhou’s misdeeds to melodramatic extremes may have been intended to
rescue King Wu from ignominy.2 To this way of thinking, even if Wu had killed his suzer-
ain, King Zhou’s outrageous crimes justified this severe measure.
The proverb about the weary hen should be read against this historical and ideological
background. Following this passage, the writer launches into a detailed denunciation of
King Zhou’s more conventional crimes. When viewed within the larger rhetorical frame-
work, it becomes clear that accepting influence from a nameless “hen” was just one of
many mistakes which cost King Zhou the mandate of heaven. Inserting this offense within
a long list of moral lapses heightens its impact while emphasizing its seriousness. The read-
er comes to understand that listening to a woman’s advice is not merely foolish but, for a
ruler, potentially fatal.
Interestingly, the unnamed “hen” is not portrayed as evil or even wrongheaded. King
Zhou is not criticized because he listens to a bad woman. Instead, the proverb implies that
listening to the opinions of any woman, whatever her character, is always a grave error. In
this manner, the passage presents a radical critique of female involvement in politics. Wom-
en should have absolutely no advisory role in government, regardless of their integrity or
wisdom.
Nowhere does this passage mention Daji by name. The customary assumption that the
hen symbolizes Daji dates to the zhuan and other commentaries written down many cen-
turies later. In fact, this interpretation reads quite a bit into the text. Late Shang monarchs
seem to have been polygamous, so even if there really was a final queen of Shang named
Daji, the hen image does not necessarily refer to her (Chou, 1970-1971, p. 356; Keightley,
1999, p. 29). Nevertheless, this passage marks the hazy beginnings of the Daji myth. It
became the kernel around which subsequent thinkers built up a detailed narrative detailing
female culpability in dynastic collapse.
In addition to this influential passage, the authors of Shangshu further shaped early
views of powerful women by associating yin 淫 (licentiousness) with both women in gener-
al and the fall of Shang in particular.3 This work repeatedly uses yin to refer to moral trans-
2　Zhou writers debated the significance of the death of King Zhou, describing King Zhou’s regicide in
very different ways. Mencius famously wrote that the killing of King Zhou was execution (zhu 誅 ) and not
assassination (shi 弒 ). (Meng, 2:221, 6:271). For similar views see Han, 44:925 and Guan, Vol.19, p. 376. Not
everyone accepted this view. Xunzi (Xun, 18:388-9) implies that King Wu’s killing of King Zhou was the
murder of a superior.
3　Of course yin was not an exclusively female failing, and early texts use the term in other contexts as well. For
example see Kong, Vol.11, p. 154-p. 155 (Taishi 泰誓 B).
gressions or acts which exceed the bounds of propriety. The zhuan commentary explains
that “yin means exceeding.”4 The commentator Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574-648) elaborates
by noting that “yin means exceeding due measure, so it is exceeding.”5 The zhuan gives a
concrete example of this sense of yin in relation to hunting. “Frequent playing and hunting
are the customs of transgression.”6 These commentaries suggest that initially yin was un-
related to gender. Over time, however, the transgressive sense of yin became closely asso-
ciated with female excess, eventually developing into a stock term for describing immoral
women.
Although “transgression” might not sound very serious to modern ears, Shangshu por-
trays this failing as extremely dangerous. One passage warns that yin can lead to a king’s
destruction (Kong, Vol.10, p. 145, Xibo kan Li 西伯戡黎 ). Elsewhere it threatens to bring
down the wrath of heaven. “The way of heaven [rewards] goodness with blessings [and
punishes] transgression with disaster.”7 The fall of the Xia dynasty, supposedly brought
about by immorality, was believed to prove this assertion.8 Shangshu accordingly classes
yin together with other major evils that might bring on dynastic dégringolade: arrogance,
transgression, boasting, and luxury.9
Although yin was never considered an exclusively female fault, it became closely as-
sociated with women quite early. A list of King Zhou’s crimes in Shangshu includes the
accusation that he “did strange tricks and transgressive feats to please women.10 This use
of yin imbued later stories about bad women with the sense that they had exceeded both
normative gender roles and proper moral bounds.11 For example, Liu Xiang uses the term
yin fifty-two times in Lienü zhuan 列女傳 as a stock condemnation of negative female be-
havior. Subsequent authors followed his lead and continued to use yin largely in connection
with female misconduct.
DEVELOPING THE THEME
The next surviving reference associating women with the destruction of Shang comes from
the Mozi 墨子 , a text on ethics and other matters composed during the early Eastern Zhou.
This work elaborates on mandate of heaven theory by exploring the belief that natural
disasters express profound moral and political truths (Qin, 1994). Portent specialists held
that Heaven sometimes communicates its displeasure by using unnatural events to warn an
immoral ruler and his ministers of impending doom (Huang, p. 11-p. 15). One passage in
4　淫過也 . Kong, Vol.4, p. 53 (Da Yu mo 大禹謨 ).

5　“淫者過度之意故為過也 .” Kong, Vol.4, p. 53 (Da Yu mo 大禹謨 ). Kong Yingda also explained that
“yin is transgression” 淫為過 . Kong, 16:243 (Wu yi 無逸 ).
6　常遊戲畋獵是淫過之風俗 . Kong, 8:115 (Yi xun 伊訓 ).
7　天道福善禍淫 . Kong, 8:112 (Tang gao 湯誥 ).
8　In his commentary, Kong Yingda specifically connects this phrase with the fall of Jie of Xia. Kong, 8:113
(Tang gao 湯誥 ).
9　驕淫矜侉矜 . Kong, Vol.19, p. 292 (Bi ming 畢命 ). Qin 矜 can mean either boasting or arrogance. Kua
矜 can refer to either boasting or luxury.
10　作奇技淫巧以悅婦人 . Kong, Vol.11, p. 156 (Taishi 泰誓 C).
11　Kong Yingda describes the standard transgressive customs (yin feng 淫風 ). “There are four transgressive
customs: commerce, eroticism, games, and hunting.
“ 淫風四貨也色也遊也畋也 . Kong, 8:115 (Yi xun 伊訓 ).
Mozi lists some of the strange omens that presaged the end of the Shang dynasty: the sky
rained earth and flesh, the nine tripods moved, ghosts moaned, and so on. These abnormal
events are interpreted as expressions of Heaven’s displeasure toward King Zhou and
premonitions of his destruction. Two of these omens involve women. According to the first,
at the end of the Shang “female demons came out at night” (fuyao xiao chu 婦妖霄出 )
(Mo, 1987, Vol.19, p. 139). Whereas in later eras yao referred to a bewitching evil beauty,
here it seems to describe something far more strange and monstrous. The second portent
involves gender inversion: “there were women who were men” (you nü wei nan 有女為男 )
(Mo, 1987, Vol.19, p. 139).
Although this enigmatic statement might refer to some sort of supernatural sex change,
it more likely refers to an inversion of gender roles as women became involved in stereo-
typically male activities. With this reading, the line becomes “there were women who acted
like men.” Historic Shang consorts indeed seem to have taken part in military and political
affairs, so perhaps this statement represents a faint collective memory of a time when wom-
en participated in public activities later considered a male domain (Chang). If so, the Mozi
is pointing to excessive female power as one reason for the dynasty’s annihilation.
Unfortunately, this interpretation encounters a major difficulty. The Mohists probably
knew almost nothing about the mechanics of Shang government, which had collapsed many
centuries earlier. So instead of referring to authentic Shang customs, perhaps this portent
had a far more general intent. It might illustrate a belief that during the reign of King Zhou,
all aspects of heaven and earth had gone awry in response to his outrageous immorality. In
this case, gender inversion would be a sign of impending disaster rather than its cause.
The Mozi took the development of the evil woman myth even further by generalizing
the female harbinger of doom into a standard fin-de-siècle archetype. This text links togeth-
er four evil kings from different eras who all brought their state to ruin, emphasizing that
the forces of dynastic collapse described in Shangshu were not specific to Shang but instead
constitute a universal historical process. This sweeping historical vision eventually inspired
later thinkers to invent an evil woman to match the evil king presiding over the fall of each
dynasty.
While Shangshu blames the fall of Shang and Xia on the terminal rulers Zhou and Jie
桀 , the Mozi adds two new villains. First, King Li 厲 of Zhou lost heaven’s mandate and
died in exile after fleeing his court. According to inscriptional evidence, his primary crime
was originally seen as an excessive fondness for music, but Shiji 史記 blames him for a far
broader range of sins, including consorting with naked women (Guo, 1954, p. 63b; Sima,
1979, Vol.4, p. 147). And the infamous King You 幽 , final ruler of the Western Zhou, was
traditionally held personally culpable for the collapse of his state. Significantly, the Mozi
mentions the four bad rulers Jie, Zhou, Li and You in tandem eleven times, making this
wicked tetrad a focus for Mohist discourse about political failure.12
It seems that Mohists emphasized these four doomed rulers as dramatic counter-exam-
ples to their own moral and political teachings. The text brands them the “cruel kings of
the three dynasties” (sandai baowang 三代暴王 ) and accuses them of numerous offenses:
harming others, acting like strongmen, lacking benevolence, overturning the alters to land
12　Mo, Vol.3, p. 11-12, Vol.4, p. 20-p. 21, 9:49, 9:55, 27:186, 28:192, Vol.37, p. 253, Vol.37, p. 259, Vol.47, p.
405, Vol.48, p. 418, 49:428. This sentiment is repeated in Junan 舉難 of Lüshi chunqiu. Lü, 8:1309.
and grain, practicing cruel punishments, ignoring affairs of state, neglecting the common
people and being generally evil. To the Mohist way of thinking, their fate graphically
demonstrates what happens when monarchs do not rule in accordance with the supreme
principle of love (ai 愛 ). Discussing four rulers from different eras who lacked this cardi-
nal Mohist virtue emphasized the importance and universality of this tenet.
Although the Mozi stresses the violent cruelty of failed monarchs, it also repeats the
assertion that a ruler’s dissolute lifestyle can also bring ruin. The four evil rulers are faulted
for obsession with frivolous pleasures such as music, hunting, and drinking instead of af-
fairs of state (Mo, 1987, Vol.37, p. 253, Vol.48, p. 418).
This reinterpretation of dynastic collapse had an immense impact on later generations.
Most importantly, the Mozi took the discussion forward by associating bad rulers from four
different eras and blaming them for common faults, thereby highlighting the idea that a rul-
er’s moral failures can ruin a state. Of course this emphasis on commonalities ignored the
differences among these men, reducing them to analogous moral types. Sima Qian and Liu
Xiang eventually picked up this interpretation of dynastic ruin, making it a centerpiece of
their own visions of the past.
In one passage, each of the four rulers is associated with two bad officials who share
their culpability. Later texts such as Yanzi chunqiu 晏子春秋 elaborated on this belief that a
bad official can encourage a weak-willed ruler to indulge in disastrous iniquity (Mo, 1987,
Vol.3, p. 11-12). Although the Mozi does not yet associate the four kings with evil queens,
the immoral official was a prototype of the evil queen who emerges in later writings (Yan,
1977, 1:1). In both cases, someone close to the ruler incites his worst instincts, resulting in
his destruction.
The Guanzi collection, which was probably edited together from earlier documents
during the early Western Han, contains a passage that builds on earlier ideas associating
women with dynastic ruin.13 The section titled Qizhu qichen 七主七臣 mentions the promi-
nence of women immediately prior to the fall of two dynasties. Among a long list of crimes
committed by the wicked rulers Jie of Xia and Zhou of Shang, the author accuses them of
“exalting women” (gui furen 貴婦人 ) and each is said to have kept three-thousand female
musicians (Guan, 1983, Vol.52, p. 827). The women that Jie and Zhou “exalted” are not
named, nor is it clear what this word implies. Though this text is extremely ambiguous, it
strengthened the rhetorical condemnation of prominent court women seen previously in
Shangshu and Mozi.
The Chuci 楚辭 collection contains two roundabout references to a baleful female pres-
ence at the end of Shang. The cryptic text Tianwen 天問 consists of a long series of ques-
tions that the author considered interesting. Two of these queries concern Shang women. The
first asks, “[Concerning] that person of King Zhou: who made him chaotic and confused?”14
This passage might possibly refer to one of his wicked officials such as Elai 惡來 (whose
name literally means “evil arrives”). Alternatively, it might possibly refer to a woman, which
is how the standard commentators interpreted it. If so, this would continue the earlier tradi-
tion of blaming women for exerting a harmful influence on the final ruler of Shang, thereby
helping to bring that dynasty to an end. However, interpreting the nameless person in the
13　For a textual history of this collection see Rickett, p. 3-47.

14　彼王紂之躬，孰使亂惑 . Hong, Vol.3, p. 112; Hawkes, p. 132.
question as specifically female reads quite a bit into the text. This interpretation seems to
have been the product of hindsight, from a time when the standard model of history assumed
negative female influence on a dynasty’s final evil ruler.
The second relevant question in Tianwen is easier to interpret. “There was a beguil-
ing woman of Yin 殷 . How was she ridiculed?”15 This sentence repeats the word huo 惑
(confusing or beguiling) seen in the earlier question, which probably explains why the first
question is traditionally read as a reference to a woman. In this case, however, the sexual
term “beguiled” is probably a better translation than the more general term “confused.”
This passage implies that an unnamed woman of Shang led a man astray. As the second half
of this leading question makes clear, the author considers this temptress worthy of criticism
and even ridicule. So Chuci associates women with the decline of Shang, but only in a gen-
eral manner. As in previous writings, no specific female villain is mentioned by name. Nor
does she directly perform evil deeds. Her crime consists of exerting harmful influence on a
prominent man, presumably the final king of Shang.
THE EVIL WOMAN GETS A NAME
The influential third century BCE thinker Xunzi 荀子 had by far the greatest impact on
ideas about female malfeasance at the end of the Shang. He inherited a nebulous female
villain from previous writings and assigned her a name and specific identity, thereby
creating a concrete historical character. Henceforth the woman who led King Zhou to ruin
was known as Daji 妲己 . Having a tangible character made the theme of pernicious female
influence on a doomed monarch far more concrete and compelling. Now that the evil
woman of Shang had a specific identity, she could be the subject of detailed narratives to
describe her actions and flesh out her personality.
Xunzi pairs Daji with a comparable woman named Moxi 末喜 , another newly-minted
temptress identified as the consort of Jie of Xia. Xunzi’s comparison of these two evil con-
sorts seems to have been informed by the Mozi, which associated analogous figures from
different eras to argue that dynastic ruin is always brought about by an immoral ruler. Xun-
zi follows the Mozi in singling out Jie and Zhou as archetypal evil final rulers who lose the
heavenly mandate and thereby meet with destruction. However, he revises this historical
model by associating these monarchs with suitably wicked consorts, Moxi and Daji.
In ancient times, Jie of Xia and Zhou of Shang were bewildered rulers
of men. Jie was bewildered by Moxi and Siguan and was not familiar with
Guanlong Feng. They seduced his heart and made him behave chaotical-
ly. [Zhou] was bewildered by Daji and Feilian and was not familiar with
Weizi Qi. They seduced his heart and made his behavior chaotic.
昔人君之蔽者、夏桀殷紂是也。桀蔽於末喜斯觀而不知關龍逢。
以惑其心而亂其行。桀蔽於妲己飛廉而不知微子啟。以惑其心而亂
其行。16
15　殷有惑婦，何所譏 . Hong, Vol.3, p. 114; Hawkes, p. 133.

16　Xun, 21:475. The second mention of Jie is obviously an error. The final half of the passage describes King
Zhou.
Moxi and Daji are placed beside two evil officials, Siguan and Feilian, emphasizing
both their importance and their immorality.17 Using two specific characters to personify
harmful female influence gives women some of the blame for the fall of Xia and Shang,
and for dynastic collapse in general.
According to the Xunzi, the negative influence of Moxi and Daji was indirect, as they
contributed to the dynasty’s fate via the ruler. In particular, they made these powerful men
behave “chaotically” (luan 乱 ), a nebulous charge that can refer to misconduct in either
personal life or affairs of state. This was not a new accusation, as the Mozi identifies chaos
in government “from Jie and Zhou onward.”18 However, Xunzi reinterprets this theme by
apportioning part of the blame for chaos, and subsequent dynastic collapse, to women.
Despite the sudden prominence of Daji and Moxi, their names do not appear in any
surviving texts prior to the Xunzi. Where did these characters come from? Daji has no
transmitted precedents. Although her name does not mean anything, it is probably a hom-
onym for daji 怛己 (“grieved for herself”). The term moxi can mean “final happiness,” “ul-
timate happiness,” or perhaps “peripheral happiness” unrelated to moral development. So
Daji’s name seems to describe her unhappy end while the name of Moxi sums up her dan-
gerous allure. Both names seem suspiciously appropriate, suggesting that Daji and Moxi are
fictional inventions created expressly to embody the female role in dynastic collapse. Xunzi
pairs Moxi with an obscure figure named Siguan. This person, presumably an evil official,
does not appear in the classics or early histories. It seems that Siguan was invented to serve
as a rhetorical foil to Feilian, mentioned elsewhere as an evil official of the late Shang, so
that accounts of the two dynasties could be perfectly parallel.
Looking over this evidence, it seems most likely an Eastern Zhou writer, perhaps Xunzi
himself, created Daji, Moxi, and Siguan to lend the moralistic theory of dynastic collapse
more rhetorical power. Although Siguan proved unpopular and languished in obscurity,
later writers picked up Daji and Moxi and gave them increasing prominence. Thereafter the
Daji myth steadily gathered momentum, gaining influence as it became increasingly elabo-
rate.
The Xianshi 先識 section of the Qin dynasty Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 collection fol-
lows Xunzi by associating Daji with King Zhou. This text repeats the enumerations of
King Zhou’s misdeeds which first appeared in Shangshu. However, Xianshi revises tra-
ditional rhetoric by adding Daji’s misdeeds to the inherited list of King Zhou’s mistakes.
As in Shangshu, the Xianshi accuses King Zhou of numerous crimes: fomenting chaos,
drunkenness, turning away a virtuous official while favoring bad ministers, unfair rewards
and punishments, arbitrariness, and murder. Nestled among this long litany of offenses is
the accusation that “Daji ruled.”19 Here Daji stands accused of overstepping her proper
station by becoming personally involved in the mechanics of government. Unlike earlier
versions depicting a nebulous female presence who influences the ruler, here the sinister
wraith emerges as a specific character who commits evil directly. Given the brevity of this
17　Feilian is identified elsewhere as a wicked official of King Zhou. Meng, 6B:117, 6B:118.
18　Mo, Vol.48, p. 417. Also see 35:241, Vol.36, p. 248. A number of subsequent writers, including Xunzi,
picked up this compelling theme of evil final kings as harbingers of chaos. Xun, Vol.4, p. 64, 26:589; Han,
Vol.37, p. 830, 40:888, 49:1040; Guan, Vol.23, p. 441; Lü, 16:945.
19　妲己為政 . Lü, 16:946.
comment on Daji, it is not clear why it was bad for her to participate in affairs of state. Did
she favor foolish policies? Or was the participation of a woman in government inherently
harmful? The specific moral and political implications of female involvement in politics
were left to subsequent authors to explore.
The evil consort myth extended beyond this single character. As historical writing
developed, narratives about the past began include various evil consorts who harmed the
state, clearly modeled after Daji. To understand the rise of the evil consort archetype, it is
insufficient to simply reify Daji as an ideal type and trace her development through histo-
ry.20 Related narratives transplanted this theme to other eras and situations.
The Zuozhuan 左傳 includes a number of stories which seem to have been influenced
by the Daji narrative. Although this text describes wise women who encourage rulers to be
virtuous, in places it associates female beauty with political catastrophe.21 Perhaps the most
famous example comes toward the beginning of the text (Legge, 1991, p. 1, p. 5; Watson,
1989, p. 1-p. 3). Lady Jiang 姜 , consort of the Duke Wu 武 of Zheng 鄭 , took a dislike to
her elder son the future Duke Zhuang 莊 . She begged her husband to make her younger
son Duan 段 the heir. The duke refused, and Zheng eventually succeeded his father to the
throne. Lady Jiang then asked Zhuang to give Duan control of a strategic city, which he
could use to undermine Zhuang’s power in the region. Duan planned to attack the capital
city, and Lady Jiang was to open the gates to him. However, Zhuang found out about the
plan and attacked first, sending Duan fleeing into exile.
The so-called Woman of Qi 齊 similarly meddled in the order of succession. She turned
Duke Xuan 宣 against Ji 伋 , his rightful heir, to secure the throne for her own son. Eventu-
ally she convinced Xuan to plot the assassination of Ji. (Legge, 1991, p. 66-p. 67; Watson,
1989, p. 14-p. 15). In a similar case, Lady Li 驪 convinced Duke Xian 獻 of Jin that his
heir had tried to poison him, hoping to gain the throne for her own son. The heir hanged
himself, and the duke’s other sons, including the famous wanderer Chonger 重耳 , fled into
exile (Legge, 1991, p. 113-p. 114; Watson, 1989, p. 23).
Besides bringing the state into chaos through intrigues, powerful women destabilized
politics in other ways as well. Wen Jiang 文姜 , consort of Duke Xiang 襄 of Qi, commit-
ted adultery with her brother Duke Huan 桓 of Lu . When her husband complained, she
arranged his murder (Legge, 1991, p. 69-p. 70; Watson, 1989, p. 17). And Wen Ying 文贏
(originally from Qin) convinced her stepson the duke of Jin to foolishly send three captured
Qin commanders back to their state, allowing them to continue the fight against Jin (Legge,
1991, p. 222, p. 225; Watson, 1989, p. 71-p. 72).
The rhetoric of these sorts of narratives is obviously far more subdued than the Daji
myth. When imagining high antiquity, readers willingly suspended disbelief. For more re-
cent events, however, historians had to present more realistic stories. Nevertheless, these
Zuozhuan stories attest to the penetration of the evil consort archetype into mainstream his-
torical discourse. Although the details differ, all of the women featured in these narratives
are depicted as harming their state by encouraging a ruler to behave foolishly. Daji was no
20　The most famous example of the ideal type method is Lovejoy (1936). Problems with Lovejoy's method,
and the advantages of a more comprehensive approach, are discussed in Skinner, p. 3-35.
21　Schaberg, p. 153, 225. Li (2007), p. 147-60 argues that Zuozhuan often portrays women as sensual and
transgressive.
longer a single historical figure, but had become generalized into a stock female archetype
whose epigones appeared regularly in narratives about the past.
DAJI NARRATIVES
A fully-developed Daji legend emerged during the Han, just as the standards of orthodox
historiography were being instituted. Fluent historical narrative, a comprehensive theory of
the historical process, and the literary models which eventually coalesced into the genre of
standard history (zhengshi 正史 ) all matured at this time. During this time of intellectual
ferment, scholars integrated ideas about the negative influence of Daji and her ilk into
seminal works that would be studied and imitated for the remainder of dynastic history,
thereby exerting a major influence on the fundamental contours of Chinese gender discourse.
Sima Qian 司馬遷 (135-87 BCE ) and Liu Xiang 劉向 (79-8 BCE) each constructed
sweeping historical narratives that depicted powerful women performing stereotypical
roles. They elevated women in importance by integrating them into the heart of historical
discourse, showing them as participants in key moments of history. Both authors held high-
ly nuanced views of female character and behavior, and it is impossible to distill a unitary
“position of women” or “view of women” from their works. Each portrayed a wide range
of women from the past, both good and bad. As Shiji 史記 and Lienü zhuan 列女傳 include
many positive examples of female behavior, it is clear that both authors considered wom-
en capable of self-cultivation and moral achievement. Even so, they also emphasized that
putatively historical women sometimes exerted a devastating influence on affairs of state.
Significantly, their theories about the role of women in dynastic collapse were largely ex-
trapolated from the myth of Daji. Taking this primal villain as their template, Han authors
concocted stories about analogous evil consorts in other fin-de-siècle periods, inserting a
Daji-like character at the end of every era.
Most importantly, in defining a clearly delimited place for women within the mandate
of heaven ideology, both Sima and Liu accepted the idea that evil women play a role in
dynastic collapse. As seen above, this belief was far from new. Various versions of the idea
had been expressed, usually in a relatively inchoate form, since the Western Zhou. Howev-
er, with the redaction of grand historical works during the Han, legends of evil women were
finally articulated in detail through extended narratives. Sima and Liu lent this viewpoint
new considerable rhetorical sophistication, influencing not just historiography but political
discourse as well.
Sima Qian was the first Chinese writer to advance a lengthy and systematic vision of
the roles that great women play in history. His detailed narratives about the rise and fall of
dynasties worked out the implications of the theory of dynastic change first expressed in
ancient Western Zhou writings, which had become accepted as orthodoxy. In brief, Sima
depicted each dynasty as having been founded by an exemplary first ruler who fostered mo-
rality and harmony throughout the realm. However, as virtue cannot be maintained indefi-
nitely, the quality of rulership inevitably declined. Each dynasty’s final ruler lost heaven’s
mandate through outrageous depravity, bringing destruction to his decayed state.
In most respects, Sima Qian’s dynastic theory took ideas about the fall of Shang from
Shangshu and framed them in more general terms. However, he revised this traditional
view of history in one major respect. Alongside the rulers and officials at the center of the
historical process, he also gave their consorts noteworthy roles in the rise and fall of dynas-
ties. According to Sima’s paradigm, the virtuous first king of each dynasty is paired with
an equally good queen, while the final evil ruler is goaded toward destruction by a woman
who is just as wicked.
The rise of Xia was through Tushan, and the exile of Jie was due to
Moxi. The rise of Yin was through Yousong, and the murder of Zhou was
from favoring Daji. The rise of Zhou was through Jiangyuan and Daren,
and the capture of King You was from licentiousness with Baosi.
夏之興也，以塗山而桀之放也。以末喜殷之興也，以有娀紂之殺
也嬖妲己。周之興也，以姜原及大任，而幽王之禽也，淫於褒姒。
(Sima,1979, Vol. 49, p. 1967)
This view of women is far from misogynistic. Like his men, Sima Qian’s women are
morally autonomous beings who can do either good or bad. An unusually good woman
took part in the establishment of each dynasty, a time when governance enjoyed a moral
zenith. And the dynasty’s fall is attributed to the malfeasance of both an evil ruler and his
female counterpart. Sima replicated the Daji tale using analogous female characters from
other eras, turning the evil woman into a standard archetype. Although this historical model
recognizes the influence of female goodness, it also dramatically emphasizes the potential
for harm by prominent women, highlighting the hazard of female influence at court.
In Sima Qian’s eloquent description of the fall of Shang, Daji makes a brief appearance.
Ruler Zhou was discerning, quick witted, and had extremely acute hearing and sight.
He surpassed other men in strength and could wrestle wild animals with his bare hands. He
knew enough to keep criticism at a distance, and he was sufficiently eloquent to prettify his
shortcomings. He surpassed all men and officials in ability and towered above the whole
world in renown, and so he considered everyone beneath him.
He loved alcohol and licentious pleasures, and favored his consorts. He loved Daji and
obeyed what she said. This being the case, he had his musicians create a constant stream
of new lewd music. There were the dances of the northern villages and extravagant plea-
sures. He raised taxes to build the Deer Terrace and used grain to pay for a giant bridge. He
collected dogs, horses, and rarities to fill the palace. He constructed Sandy Hill and garden
terraces, and obtained many wild animals and birds of flight to place there. He neglected
the ancestors and gods but assembled toys at Sandy Hill. He made a lake full of wine, hung
meat from trees, and had naked men and women chase each other in their midst during long
nights of drinking.
The common people looked on with hatred and there were rebels among the nobles.
Zhou then increased the punishments and used the hot greased pole. He employed the
Western Count Chang, Earl Jiu, and Earl E as his three great ministers. Earl Jiu had a favor-
ite daughter whom he sent in to Zhou. His daughter did not like lewdness, which angered
Zhou, so he killed her and pickled Earl Jiu. Early E was a strong fighter and quick witted in
argument, so Zhou also had Earl E made into dried meat. When the Western Count Chang
heard of this, he secretly lamented it. Earl Hu of Chong heard about this and informed
Zhou, who imprisoned the Western Count at Youli. Officials of the Western Count traveled
far and wide, begging for beautiful women, rarities, and fine horses to present to Zhou, so
he pardoned the Western Count.

[…]
Then King Wu of Zhou led the nobles to chastise Zhou. Zhou also
sent out troops to Muye. On the jiazi day, Zhou’s soldiers were defeated.
Zhou went in, ascended the Deer Terrace clad in jewels and jade, walked
into a fire and died. Then King Wu of Zhou cut off Zhou’s head and hung
it atop the great white banner. He killed Daji, released Jizi from prison,
erected a tomb for Bigan, and compiled a list of the villages of Shang.
帝紂資辨捷疾，聞見甚敏 · 材力過人，手格猛獸 · 知足以距諫，
言足以飾非 · 矜人臣以能，高天下以聲，以為皆出己之下。好酒淫樂，
嬖於婦人。愛妲己，妲己之言是從。於是使師涓作新淫聲，北里之舞，
靡靡之樂。厚賦稅以實鹿臺之錢，而盈鉅橋之粟。益收狗馬奇物，
充仞宮室。益廣沙丘苑臺，多取野獸蜚鳥置其中。慢於鬼神。大冣
樂戲於沙丘，以酒為池，縣肉為林，使男女倮相逐其閒，為長夜之飲。
百姓怨望而諸侯有畔者，於是紂乃重刑辟，有炮格之法。以西伯昌，
九侯，鄂侯為三公。九侯有好女，入之紂。九侯女不熹淫，紂怒，殺之，
而醢九侯。鄂侯爭之彊，辨之疾，并脯鄂侯。西伯昌聞之，竊嘆。
崇侯虎知之，以告紂，紂囚西伯羑里。西伯之臣閎夭之徒，求美女
奇物善馬以獻紂，紂乃赦西伯 ...... 周武王於是遂率諸侯伐紂。紂
亦發兵距之牧野。甲子日，紂兵敗。紂走入，登鹿臺，衣其寶玉衣，
赴火而死。周武王遂斬紂頭，縣之大白旗。殺妲己。釋箕子之囚，
封比干之墓，表商容之閭。22
Daji had come a long way from her beginnings as a nameless apparition. As in Shang-
shu. Sima Qian’s narrative carefully itemizes the mistakes leading up to the ruin of a great
dynasty. But unlike that ancient prototype, Sima assimilates Daji into the standard ideology
of dynastic decline, giving her a part in this catastrophic process. Even so, Daji’s role in
Shiji should not be exaggerated. Compared to King Zhou she is still basically a bit player
in a much greater drama. Daji appears overtly only twice. First it is said that King Zhou
“loved Daji and obeyed what she said.” This statement comes at the head of a long list of
his crimes, implicitly emphasizing this dangerous lapse. Significantly, Sima does not assert
that Daji ordered King Zhou to do bad things or gave him foolish advice. The simple fact
that a monarch loved a woman so much that he obeyed her is a serious blunder in itself.
Daji is again visible at the end of the story with her execution by the vengeful King
Wu. Sima Qian lists the killing of Daji among Wu’s righteous acts immediately after the
conquest of Shang. In fact, the execution of a woman for political reasons was extremely
unusual. Such extreme punishment implies that Daji was guilty of unforgivable crimes.
In addition to Daji, Sima describes more obscure female influences on King Zhou as
well. These women hark back to the shadowy forces mentioned in Shangshu. First he notes
that King Zhou favored his consorts, a statement paired with the observation that he was
fond of drinking. Drunkenness is one of the main criticisms that the authors of Shangshu
22　Sima, Vol.3, p. 105-106, 108. Of course the unabridged passage is much longer, as I have excised a large
section describing King Zhou’s other crimes.
level at the Shang, so mentioning women in tandem with inebriation is in fact a very seri-
ous charge. Sima Qian then unveils the famous scene of naked couples fornicating among
an extravagantly wasteful lake of ale and forest of meat. In a society where the consump-
tion of both meat and alcohol was associated with solemn ritual occasions, such profligacy
seemed utterly outrageous (Kieschnick, 1988, p. 22-p. 23). This shocking scene implies
that a ruler should keep women at a proper distance lest he be tempted to dissipate himself
in sexual debauchery.
Sima Qian also accuses King Zhou of an excessive love of luxury, an offense tradition-
ally cited as one of the main reasons for the fall of Shang (Lü, 1997, Vol.3, p. 265). Not
only was an opulent lifestyle wasteful, but addiction to extravagance degraded his character
as well. Women participate in this morally corrosive luxury when King Zhou receives a
number of beauties as part of the Western Count’s ransom. Here, beautiful women are por-
trayed as analogous to expensive baubles and fine horses. By reifying beautiful women into
an enervating luxury, Sima suggests that they can ruin the ruler’s character. Men motivated
by the acquisition of beautiful things, whether jade ornaments or seductive women, are
likely to have little regard for virtue.
Of course Sima Qian does not portray women in entirely negative terms. Most notably,
the daughter of Earl Jiu 九 insists on maintaining her chastity at the cost of her life. This
character is an early prototype of the female martyr willing to sacrifice herself to maintain
her purity, a theme later developed in considerable detail in Liu Xiang’s hagiographies.
Nevertheless, the honorable example of Earl Jiu’s daughter is insufficient to balance out the
overall impression of female iniquity. In general, Sima portrays women at the end of Shang
as dangerous, licentious, and sexually charged, constantly coaxing men toward immorality.
The obvious question confronting modern readers is – why did Sima Qian give pow-
erful women such a negative role in history? To answer this question, it is important to
remember that he was working within the confines of inherited ideas. Sima did not invent
Daji. However, by inserting her and other women into a detailed narrative of the fall of
Shang, he made female malfeasance far more visible. This new emphasis on women’s role
in history reflects the realities of the Han system of government. Although consorts and
their kinsmen were rarely prominent in the Zhou states, the new imperial system raised the
ruler’s consort to unprecedented importance. Having served as an official, Sima Qian was
intimately familiar with the roles women played in government of the time.
There are several reasons for the unusual importance of elite women during the Han (Qin,
1995). First, centralization of authority and refinement of bureaucratic technique made
control of the court much more significant than before, opening up new opportunities for
ambitious women with links to the ruling line. Second, due to the custom of class endoga-
my, Zhou rulers usually married women from prominent families who lived in other states.
A woman’s noble kinsmen were tied to their lands. As they usually could not leave their
fief, they could not assume positions of influence in the distant state of a daughter, niece,
or sister (Thatcher, 2007, p. 41-p. 44; Gao, 1991, p. 28-p. 33, p. 65-p. 73). In contrast, Han
dynasty consort kinsmen were free to take up residence in the capital and participate as
major players in government. Finally, a special kinship bond between maternal uncles and
sororal nephews gave a consort’s fathers and brothers a rationale for seizing power (Hinsch,
2003a). With power comes responsibility, and also danger, so Sima Qian’s recalibration of
the historical model to emphasize the importance of women was most likely a response to
the greater prominence of elite women within the relatively new imperial system, a phe-
nomenon that he witnessed first hand.
Sima Qian also had a personal reason for detesting women’s influence on government.
He may have blamed female meddling for his infamous castration. After the defeat and
surrender of General Li Ling 李陵 (d. 74 BCE) to the Xiongnu, an enraged Emperor Wu
blamed Li for the debacle and members of the court immediately joined in the chorus of
condemnation. Sima Qian, however, bravely defended Li Ling as an honest general who
had inexorably succumbed to an overwhelming enemy force. The prickly monarch took
this rationalization as an implicit condemnation of General Li Guangli 李廣利 (d. 88 BCE),
who had fought the Xiongnu without success. As Li Guangli was the brother of the influ-
ential Lady Li 李 , known to history as Empress Xiaowu 孝武 , the mercurial Emperor
Wu became enraged by this imagined slight to her family honor. As punishment, Sima was
offered the choice of execution or castration. He chose the disgrace of mutilation so that he
might fulfill his filial duty by finishing the epic history begun by his father.
Lady Li was a lowborn singer who had come to the attention of Emperor Wu because
of her beautiful voice. Like Daji and other evil mythic women of antiquity, Lady Li’s
charms were purely sensual. Due to her influence on the ruler, her brother Li Guangli at-
tained a high position at court, eventually embroiling Sima in the scandal that ended in his
castration. So it seems that by condemning powerful women of antiquity, Sima was likely
influenced by his own resentment toward the powerful Lady Li. Personal tragedy jaundiced
Sima Qian’s view of powerful women, leading him to portray female iniquity as a major
feature of the historical process.
DAJI AND BIOGRAPHY
Liu Xiang drew on his considerable erudition and literary talents to create the most
elaborate manifestation of the Daji myth. Like Sima Qian, Liu believed that key women
influence a dynasty’s rise and fall. By building up narratives around these women, instead
of just employing them as minor characters in a larger historical narrative, Liu lent the
female role in history new visibility. In the Lienü zhuan collection of narratives about
exemplary women, Liu rewrote the fall of Shang from Daji’s standpoint. By placing Daji
at the center of dynastic collapse, she became a far more significant player in the fall of
Shang.
Daji was the consort of King Zhou, who favored her. Zhou surpassed other men in tal-
ent and strength and could wrestle wild animals with his bare hands. He knew enough to
keep criticism at a distance, and he was sufficiently eloquent to prettify his shortcomings.
He surpassed all men and officials in ability and towered above the whole world in renown,
and so considered everyone beneath him.
He loved alcohol and licentious pleasures, and never left Daji. He valued whatever Daji
praised and destroyed whatever she disliked. He created new lewd music. There were danc-
es of the northern villages and extravagant pleasures. He accumulated collected rarities in
the rear palace. Flattering officials and the myriad women obtained everything they desired.
He piled up grain into a hill, let alcohol flow until it became a pond, hung up a forest of
meat, and had naked men and women chase each other in their midst during long nights of
drinking. Daji loved it.
The common people looked on with hatred, and there were rebels among the nobles.
Zhou then instituted the punishment of the hot greased pole. He had a pole greased, put hot
coals around it, and ordered criminals to climb to the top. When they slid down into the
coals, Daji laughed.
Bikan reproved him saying, “If you do not cultivate the standards of the former kings
but implement a woman’s words, disaster is imminent.” Zhou was angry and considered
this statement evil. Daji said, “I have heard that the heart of a sage has seven cavities.”
Thereupon they cut out his heart and examined it. He imprisoned Jizi, but Weizi left.
Subsequently King Wu received the mandate and raised troops to chastise Zhou. They
fought at Muye, and Zhou’s armies turned their spears downwards. Then Zhou ascended
the granary terrace, put on bejeweled clothes, and killed himself. At this King Wu enforced
Heaven’s punishment and cut off Daji’s head and hung it atop a white banner, in the belief
that the destroyer of Zhou was a woman.
Shangshu says, “The hen does not crow at dawn. At dawn the hen is exhausted at
home.” Shijing says, “Our lord trusts the crooks, and their violence foments chaos. They do
not serve him loyally, but are his bane.” So it was said of this.
The elegy says, “Daji mated with Zhou. She seduced him to bring his
self-cultivation into chaos. Since Zhou lacked virtue, they compounded
each other’s errors. They pointed laughingly at execution by fire, and
remonstrating scholars were cut open and imprisoned. Thereafter he
was defeated at Muye and Shang was overturned for the Zhou dynas-
ty.”
妲己者，殷紂之妃也。嬖幸於紂。紂材力過人，手格猛獸，智足
以距諫，辯足以飾非，矜人臣以能，高天下以聲，以為人皆出己之下。
好酒淫樂，不離妲己，妲己之所譽貴之，妲己之所憎誅之。作新淫之聲、
北鄙之舞、靡靡之樂，收珍物，積之於後宮，諛臣群女咸獲所欲，
積糟為邱，流酒為池，懸肉為林，使人裸形相逐其閒，為長夜之飲，
妲己好之。百姓怨望，諸侯有畔者，紂乃為炮烙之法，膏銅柱，加之炭，
令有罪者行其上，輒墮炭中，妲己乃笑。比干諫曰：不脩先王之典法，
而用婦言，禍至無日。紂怒，以為妖言。妲己曰：吾聞聖人之心有七竅。
於是剖心而觀之。囚箕子，微子去之。武王遂受命，興師伐紂，戰
于牧野，紂師倒戈，紂乃登廩臺，衣寶玉衣而自殺。於是武王遂致
天之罰，斬妲己頭，懸於小白旗，以為亡紂者是女也。書曰：牝雞
無晨，牝雞之晨，惟家之索。詩云：君子信盜，亂是用暴，匪其止共，
維王之邛。此之謂也。頌曰 : 妲己配紂，惑亂是修。紂既無道，又
重相謬。指笑炮炙，諫士刳囚。遂敗牧野，反商為周。 (Liu, 1981,
Vol.7, p. 144-p. 145; O’Hara, 1971, p. 187-p. 189)
Comparing Liu Xiang’s reinterpretation of the Daji myth with the earlier Shiji version,
it is clear that Liu took the basic details and even much of his language from Sima Qian
while changing key features to suit his own ideological goals. Overall, the story has been
compacted and simplified to highlight Daji’s role in the fall of Shang. Whereas Sima Qian
followed Shangshu in attributing numerous crimes to King Zhou, in Liu Xiang’s version
these misdeeds have been pared down to center on those directly involving Daji. Moreover,
while Sima shows Daji as a fairly marginal figure with indirect influence on events, Liu
puts her at the center of the action.
Sima Qian had posited a link between evil women and dynastic collapse, but in Liu
Xiang’s revision the importance of this relationship has been magnified immensely. King
Zhou has become Daji’s pawn. She is to blame for his luxurious decadence and sexual
misconduct because King Zhou “valued whatever Daji praised.” He instituted cruel punish-
ments for her entertainment and killed a righteous official at her suggestion. Dating back
to Shangshu, King Zhou had been accused of cruelty and decadence, but traditionally these
faults had been seen as his own. Liu Xiang shifts much of the blame to Daji by portraying
her as the inspiration for King Zhou’s misdeeds.
Liu Xiang made another important ideological adjustment to the story. In previous
versions, King Zhou lost Shang’s heavenly mandate. However, Liu Xiang implies that
Daji was largely to blame for this catastrophe. After describing the crimes that King Zhou
committed under Daji’s influence, Liu notes that “subsequently King Wu received the man-
date.” The implications of this rereading of the fall of Shang are profound. By centering his
narrative on a female character, Liu implies that heaven responds to the behavior of con-
sorts as well as rulers. In this reassessment of politics and history, women have become far
more important to the process of dynastic rise and fall than ever before, for good or ill.
Liu Xiang frames his revision of heavenly mandate theory more generally in a long
speech attributed to an old woman of Quwo 曲沃 , mother of an official of Wei 魏 . As is
often the case, Liu uses a character’s monologue to set forth his own views on a particular
issue. Here the old woman pithily sums up the roles that good and bad women play at key
points in history.
The rise of Xiang was by Tushan and its fall was by Moxi. The rise
of Yin was by Youshen and its fall was by Daji. The rise of Zhou was by
Taisi and its fall by Baosi.
夏之興也以塗山，亡也以末喜。殷之興也以有【莘】，亡也
以妲己。周之興也以太姒，亡也以褒姒。 (Liu, 1981, Vol.3, p. 69;
O’Hara, 1971, p. 98)
This statement assigns enormous importance to powerful women. Unlike Sima Qian’s
earlier synopsis of rise and fall, men are completely absent from this brief outline of dy-
nastic history. Instead, women are responsible for rise and fall. Of course Liu’s character is
probably deliberately overstating the matter to achieve maximum rhetorical impact. Almost
everywhere else, Liu Xiang portrays men as the primary agents of historical change. Even
in his story of the fall of Shang, Daji does not commit evil deeds herself but instead goads
a foolish and pliable man toward ruin. The old woman of Quwo’s statement should be read
as an assertion that the morals of powerful women are an important factor that helps deter-
mine the fate of a ruling house, but not the only reason for dynastic rise and fall.
Although Liu Xiang injects a quotation from Shijing 詩經 into each narrative in Lienü
zhuan for rhetorical effect, here he also adds one from Shangshu.23 In an appropriate twist,
just as Liu Xiang brought the Daji story to an apex of refinement, he paid tribute to her
primal origins by citing the Shangshu quotation about the exhausted hen. By juxtaposing
the earliest and most developed versions of the paradigmatic evil consort, Liu demonstrates
how much the archetype had developed over the centuries. From a vague specter hovering
on the edges of historical consciousness, the evil woman has become a visible cause for the
fall of dynasties.
Liu Xiang further adjusts the historical implications of evil female consorts by position-
ing them within a novel conceptual framework. Even when Liu employs the same details as
Sima Qian, the overall context is different, thereby altering their significance. Whereas Si-
ma’s descriptions of evil women appear as part of far larger narratives about the decline and
fall of dynasties, Liu reorients them as independent stories about individual women. This
shift in focus puts far more stress on the role of evil women in dynastic collapse, promoting
them to the ranks of major historical figures.24
Although most of the stories in the Lienü zhuan collection deal with female exemplars
who embody major virtues, the final chapter in the transmitted version consists of a themat-
ically linked series of narratives that, when read in tandem, explore Sima Qian’s assertion
that a bad consort can help bring down a state. This catalogue of female immorality is far
more detailed and dramatic than anything in Shiji. No reader can come away from this
chapter with any misconceptions regarding Liu Xiang’s position on the matter. He believed
that allowing a bad woman to influence government would lead to utter disaster.
Liu Xiang’s views of powerful evil women should be seen in relation to his overall
view of history. Like Sima Qian, Liu held that all dynasties are ephemeral. His view of the
mechanics of rise and decline, however, differed somewhat from that of his predecessor.
Following the standard views of Chunqiu 春秋 scholarship, Liu held that a state passes
through three successive ages (shi 世 ). Each stage in the cycle is initially marked by vir-
tue and harmony, with the state gradually dissipating into depravity and chaos (Liu, 1988,
Vol.3, p. 86; Zhang, 2000). This general historical vision informed his writings about evil
women in the final chapter of Lienü zhuan. Although Liu seems to have regarded the rise
and decline of dynasties as akin to an inexorable natural process, humanity can nevertheless
influence the length of each phase in the cycle. If the ruling elite remains virtuous, the pos-
itive phase will last longer; when they become wicked, decline immediately ensues. Liu fit
Sima Qian’s narratives of prominent women into this revised historical model, using their
stories to show how female conduct can either lengthen the era of dynastic stability or else
hasten decay.
As with Sima Qian, Liu Xiang’s personal experiences at court also prejudiced him
against consorts involved in affairs of state (Hinsch, 2005, p. 148-p. 149, p. 153-p. 154).
Like other members of the educated elite, he was appalled by Emperor Cheng’s 成 unseem-
23　For discussions of Liu Xiang’s liberal use of Shijing quotations in Lienü zhuan see Ikeda, p. 135-p. 136;
Yamazaki, p. 26; Zuo (2003); Li (2003). For the centrality of Shijing quotations to early discourse see Brashier, p.
249-p. 284.
24　Moloughney, p. 5 notes the biographical focus of historical writing as a defining characteristic of Chinese
historiography. Of course the integration of biography and history gave historians more regard for the
importance of key actors.
ly infatuation with the lowborn beauty Zhao Feiyan 趙飛燕 . Born to a poor family and
orphaned at an early age, she entered the palace as a common entertainer. After catching
the emperor’s eye she rapidly rose to the top ranks of his favorites. Feiyan introduced her
winsome younger sister to the ruler, and Zhao Hede 趙合德 became another favored impe-
rial concubine. The sisters were deeply involved in court intrigue and managed to depose
Empress Xu 許 , after which Zhao Feiyan was promoted to empress (Au, 2007; Raphals, p.
78-p. 86). The sight of a lowly dancing girl becoming empress, not to mention her disrup-
tive machinations, disgusted status-conscious courtiers such as Liu Xiang. Given what Liu
witnessed at court, it is easy to understand why he presented the throne with a narrative col-
lection stressing the dangers of evil consorts. Ban Gu 班固 cited this antipathy to particular
women at court to explain why Liu wrote Lienü zhuan for imperial perusal (Ban, Vol.36, p.
1957-p. 1958).
Liu realized that his dynasty was dangerously degenerate, and as a loyal scion of the
house of Liu he hoped to save the Han from utter ruin. Like so much Chinese historical
writing, Liu used the past to express thinly-disguised criticisms about the present. He did
not intend Lienü zhuan to be an objective work of history or biography, but instead crafted
narratives about ancient women to serve as persuasive rhetorical tools intended to influ-
ence contemporary affairs. Daji was not just an evil ancient consort who brought down the
Shang dynasty. In Liu Xiang’s hands she also represented Zhao Feiyan. By stressing the
catastrophic results of Daji’s meddling, he issued an oblique warning to the besotted Em-
peror Cheng. Readers of the late Western Han and each subsequent generation have found
the Daji myth so compelling because it could be used to draw parallels with powerful wom-
en of their own day. Due to this standard mode of reading, drawing parallels between past
and present, the Daji myth could become newly relevant to each generation.
Liu Xiang and Sima Qian may have written about powerful women in response to par-
ticular events in their own day, but the ultimate influence of their views was long lasting.
They expressed their fears of evil consorts so persuasively that their views became integral
to mainstream Chinese gender discourse. Cosmology and metaphysics were increasingly
used to justify the belief, supposedly demonstrated by history, that female influence on
prominent men can be morally corrosive. Thereafter, prominent historians and officials as-
sumed that female influence on politics could lead to catastrophe. Moreover, the Daji myth
continued to evolve, becoming increasingly elaborate and infiltrating popular culture. Daji
had become one of the most infamous villains in the canon of Chinese literature.25 Critics
of female power in general, or a specific female enemy in particular, now had a sophisti-
cated justification for excluding women from politics. The ultimate influence of this highly
developed anti-female ideology on Chinese gender discourse was profound.
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Author’s Biodata
Bret Hinsch received a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Yale University and a Ph.D. in
History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. His research focuses on gender
issues in Chinese history. He is currently a professor in the department of history, Foguang
University, Taiwan.

bret_hinsch@hotmail.com
ISSN: 2224-2716
Poems on Immortality in the Political and Social Contexts

of Han China1
Anna Sokolova
Chongqing University, China
This paper is based on my research for an MST degree candidate thesis entitled ‘Becoming a
Reader of Han China Songs and Ballads: Poetry on Immortals in Social and Political Contexts of
Han China’, Chongqing University, 2012. The research for the thesis and the following paper was
funded by the Travel Library Grant from the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) in
February, 2011.
Corpus of Han poems on Immortals is extensive. It includes early anonymous songs preserved
by the Yuefu Music Bureau, a large number of conventional court poems, and more complicated
meditations on immortality ascribed to some individual authors of Late Han China. All these piec-
es had direct or indirect connection with the cult of immortality represented by various rituals and
ceremonies in different sectors of Han society. This paper analyses how these songs were con-
nected with the actual cult of immortality and how the conventional contents of these poems were
changing along with the process of disapproval of the cult of immortality.
Apart from general problems of composition, attribution and dating of the poems on Immortals of
Han era, the current research deals with analysis of the following political and social questions:
what were the connections between the ancient immortality and longevity beliefs, the philosoph-
ical school of ‘Tao’, the religion of Taoism and the court ceremonies; how the political and social
circumstances under Emperor Wu’s reign initiated the establishment of the Yuefu Music Bureau;
what were the political reasons behind the popularity of immortality cult and related ceremonies
at Han courts. These questions are important to answer in order to understand how the social and
political situation determined the emergence and development of the literary tradition of the poet-
ry on Immortals which proved to be much more durable than the real cult of immortality.
INTRODUCTION
Immortality is an important category for understanding Han China. First, it was associated
with ancient longevity and immortality cults, and with Taoist philosophy in its different
ends. Endless life was a higher aim for many emperors, the aristocracy, and men of letters
in early China, in both a literal and a metaphorical sense. In addition, immortality cults
played a role in politics and were an essential part of an emperor’s court life, just as poetry
was. Thus, the theme of immortality became one of the primary themes of early Chinese
poetry.
In his prologue for Omen of the World, Stephen Owen (1985) says about the rules of
reading ancient Chinese poetry:
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Anna Sokolova. E-mail: annasokkolova@yahoo.co.uk

POEMS ON IMMORTALITY IN HAN CHINA 83
Worlds of the mind have been lost along with the civilization that supported them. We
can never recover and inhabit those worlds with certainty: we can never be Chinese read-
ers of an earlier century. […] Voices still speak in those poems: we cannot expect them to
speak to the corners of this late world; it is we who must be changed to hear them (p. 4-p. 6).
Owen (1985) suggests that each time we read a Chinese poem we must become a read-
er of it, a reader adequate to its historical and philosophical contexts, not less than to the
linguistic and poetical rules of reading. To this end, we will examine the corpus of poetry
on Immortals of the Han era from the early times of their uncertain origin (around the sec-
ond part of the second century B.C.) to the time of the Late Han Dynasty and the period of
transition to the Three Kingdoms Dynasty. These poems represent a ‘shared’ poetic practice
with common motifs derived from earlier folk songs, which then evolved into scholarly
authorized poetry expressing more complex ideas about life and death within a standard
pattern of earlier poetry on Immortals. This poetry manifested the notions and beliefs of the
surrounding world, giving the later reader insight into the historical context; but this same
historical context became an essential part of an adequate interpretation of these poems.
Here poetry and history closely collaborate. Poetry starts to act as a historical document, or,
at least, to demand that a vast historical background be taken into consideration to interpret
it. When reading these ancient poems we are able to perceive the nature of certain social
phenomena through their contextualizing in poetry; on the other hand, we uncover, or, on
occasion, disapprove certain social and historical contexts within poetic discourse.
In the current research I do not analyze the stylistic peculiarities of the songs, except
for some general questions of composition, but I try to read these poems in a historical per-
spective to understand what were the relations between the existing cult of immortality of
Han era and the poems on Immortals of the same period.
Firstly, I describe general characteristic features of the songs as part of Chinese classi-
cal poetry. I look at these poems as pieces of one ‘shared’ poetic practice as they came to us
recreated by Qi and Liang scholars in the third century BC.
Secondly, I discuss the origin of the immortality cult, as well as of related practices and
beliefs of Han era, their functions in multi-level Han society, the reasons of their extreme
popularity at Han courts, and their relation with the new arising religion of Taoism. High-
lighting these questions helped understand that there were compelling political reasons
behind the cult of immortality and poems on Immortals. I also refer to legendary Emperor
Wu famous for his great concern for immortality in order to prove that he also had rational
political motifs behind his obsession.
In the final part, I analyze several selected poems to illustrate the theoretical material.
I have chosen four different poems: two of them represent typical development of a plot
within standard patterns; in two other poems we can see intersections of different sub-
themes within a general theme which proves that the attitudes to the concept of immortality
were becoming more ambiguous by the end of Han era. I give an example of one autho-
rized poem ascribed to Cao Pi, which took its roots in earlier anonymous songs and ballads,
to see how low register poetry was becoming a more complex literary phenomenon by the
end of Han period.
In this research, I refer to primary and secondary sources. Primary sources mainly in-
clude original Chinese poems and their commentaries as well as papers of Chinese scholars
on Han poetry on Immortals and Han religious cults. Secondary sources include transla-
84 SOKOLOVA QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 82-100
tions of the poems into English and Russian languages, research by European scholars on
Han poetry, society and religion. The largest part of this paper is based on previous research
by Anne Birrell, Stephen Owen, Boris Bakhtin and Jean-Pierre Dieny in the parts on the
analysis of the poems; and on works by James Legge, Michael Loewe, Ying-shih Yu and
Gary Shalton Williams for the questions concerning historical, philosophical and religious
aspects of the problem.
THE GENRE OF THE YUEFU POETRY. PECULIARITIES OF COMPOSITI, PROB-

LEM OF ATTRIBUTION AND DATING OF THE POEMS ON IMMORTALITY
Firstly, I shall dwell upon the yuefu poems on Immortals as the earliest pieces of anony-
mous corpus of poetry on different topics including ‘elixir of life’, or ‘immortality’ songs,
and ballads. Yuefu poetic corpus is considered to be one of the most ancient song folklore
preserved up to our time and it belongs to what we call now an ‘early Chinese classical po-
etry’.
The period of the poems belonging to ‘classical poetry’ is uncertain: it starts from no
earlier than the first century B. C. and lasts till late third century. The corpus of Chinese
classical poetry, apart from anonymous yuefu, includes the anonymous ‘old poems’,2 the
pieces from the Li Ling3 corpus and much of the five syllable verse by known poets through
the first part of the third century.
Tradition insists that the organization named Music Bureau was charged with collecting
popular songs, writing sacrificial and ritual music and texts and performing rites. The date
of establishment of the Music Bureau is uncertain. Traditionally, Emperor Wu has been ac-
cepted for the founder in 112 BC. The collected songs, both popular songs and hymns per-
formed at court ceremonies, became known by the name of the Music Bureau itself, yuefu,
all poems having originated in or had connection with the Music Bureau were referred to
as yuefu, irrespective of style and form (Williams, 1973, p. 5). Though, this approach to
the origin of the genre of yuefu is orthodox; now scholars express contrary opinions on
this problem. For example, Joseph. R. Allen argues that the historical origin of the genre
arose from the conventions of intratextuality among the literati. According to Allen (1997),
“The literati poems are […] not secondary, but rather primary in defining and sustaining the
genre. The ‘original’ yuefu poems owe their existence as members of the genre to those lat-
er imitations and intratexts they create” (p. 9).
The origin of the yuefu genre remains under dispute. The very phenomenon of poetic
genre was a product of the Qi and Liang, and before that the sense of genre was very loose.
We also cannot be sure about oral origin of these songs and we cannot be even sure if there
was originally instrumental accompaniment at all, in spite of classification of Guo Mao-
2　 ‘Old poems’, gu shi shi-jiu shi, is an anthology of Chinese poems, consisting of nineteen poems col-
lected during the Han Dynasty.
3　 Li Ling (died 74 BC) was a Han Dynasty general, who served under the reign of Emperor Wu. He was
captured and held in long captivity in north central Asia by the Xiongnu. Several poems attributed to him
were named Li Ling Si Han [Li Ling Thinks Han], or Li Ling belong to Chinese classical poetry. They be-
came very popular during the 13th and 14th centuries as the Southern Song dynasty was collapsing under
northern pressure, then came under Mongol control during the Yuan dynasty. This made the main issue
brought up by their stories particularly relevant: should one serve to non-Han rulers.
qian4 based on instruments which might accompany the songs. We know too little to judge
about it. What we know for sure is that the governmental organization Music Bureau was
established during the Han period and that the later poetical genre, yuefu, was associated
with it in later centuries.
Gary Williams (1973), in his thesis entitled Oral Nature of Yue-fu, enumerates the pos-
sible functions of the Bureau:
Traditionally the functions of the Music Bureau were the following: to prepare and
perform ceremonial music and hymns for sacrifices and official court ceremonies; to gath-
er and collect popular songs in order to get a feeling for and measurement of the attitudes
and responses of the citizenry regarding the government; and to prepare music which could
have an educational and transforming effect on young people and non-Chinese, the barbar-
ian (p. 24).
Yuefu songs and ballads were traditionally supposed to be the earliest poetry of lower
social classes, popular poetry opposed to the court elitist poetry. Birrell (1988) cites Angus C.
Graham, who gives a description of the luxury life of rich people of Han era:
They [rich citizens] lived in storied, timbered mansions which were profusely carved
and decorated in vivid colors. Silks and embroideries softened and brightened the interiors.
[…] Apart from their enjoyment of court entertainment, they often had their own orchestras
and entertainers with dancers, acrobatics, juggling (p. 67).
Later Birrell (1988) notes, that “These popular ballads provide written evidence of the
imbalance between certain sectors of Han society. [...] The songs and ballads remind us of
people […] whose own life was likely to be spent in poverty. The lack of merry, carefree
songs and ballads testifies to the ordinary person’s miserable lot” (Ibid).
Suggestion that the songs were of popular origin explains their simple diction and con-
test. These songs are often compared to European ballads in the boundaries of comparative
research. Birrell (1988) gives a general description of the songs falling into the category
‘popular’:
Chinese song or ballad of the Han era [...] is relatively simple in diction, content, and
point of view; it may either tell a story of a narrative ballad, or convey an emotion as a lyri-
cal ballad; it may describe action or feeling with numerous musical devices, such as repeti-
tion and refrain; it’s title usually includes a term relating to song or melody (p. 9).
Although, the songs of yuefu are numerous,5 the poems on Immortals constitute a
smaller part in compare with mote extensive sections of songs about love, marriage, home-
land, political broadsides, anti-war songs, burial songs, fables in verse and others. Some of
the songs are hard to put in a one particular category. The songs on Immortals have much
in common with the songs on other themes, but, at the same time, they are distinct from all
other songs. Birrell (1988) notes, that several songs are written in a liturgical style suggest-
4　 Guo Maoqian compiled the Anthology of Yuefu Poetry in the twelfth century, it contains almost all of
the surviving Music Bureau style the Han dynasty through the Tang dynasty and to the Five Dynasties.
5　 There are some fifty-five hundred poems under 12 categories in the anthology of Guo Maoqian. He
divided the songs into 12 categories and there was not a separate category for songs about immortality cult,
the division was partially thematic, mostly the author based the division on the musical setting. Music was
lost and now there is still no one commonly accepted thematic classification of yuefu poetry. The figures
are taken from Allen. See Allen (1992, p. 39)
ing that they might have been a part of a particular cultist rite. As such they constitute some
of the earliest pieces in the repertoire of the occult, of Taoist religion and reclusion (p. 66).
Though, the songs of yuefu corpus are supposed to have been popular at the beginning,
this traditional opinion has been argued by many scholars. For example, Graham suggests
that the concern for immortality was initially elitist and then spread to common men, “The
Taoist religion [...] extended the promise of immortality from the elite patron of magicians
and alchemists to the common man” (as cited in Birrell, 1988, p. 66).
Birrell (1988) adds, that “Some of the ancient songs are difficult to place in the evolu-
tion of the cult of immortality from elitist to generalized practice” (Ibid.).
Notwithstanding, as we will see later, the cult of immortality was popular for a long
time before the period under discussion in all sectors of Han society; as well as Taoism was
a very wide category which could mean many various phenomena connected with immor-
tality and longevity beliefs. Probably suburban rituals also used songs as an accompani-
ment as well as elitist rituals did. However, the biggest amount of the songs preserved to
the present day is elitist. As Owen (2006) puts it, “generally this poetry is of uncertain ori-
gin but it appeared in history in the informal poetry of the elite” (p. 6). Since that time, the
second century, we know only elitist poetry on Immortals, though, until the end of the third
century, it remained fundamentally poetry in a low register, ‘popular’ in a sense, though, ‘it
took on relatively high register forms on certain social occasions, and finally was preserved
and became ‘classical’’ (Owen, 2006, p. 6).
Yuefu songs on Immortals were the original songs which constituted the conventional
patterns for the later poetry on relevant topics. Number of songs was growing with the pop-
ularity of the cult of immortality, but most of the songs were convention variants of a once -
set patterns accompanying the court ceremonies. After the original yuefu popular songs and
before the appearance of a new approach to the theme of immortality by individual poets,
these poems were typical court poems.
Interrelation between all numerous but alike songs on Immortals of Han era, as well as
their organization and composition seem to be very complicated, especially to a modern Eu-
ropean reader. The main ‘difficulty’ of these poems lays in the tradition of their attribution
and dating. These poems became embedded into a certain historical account and if it will be
detached from the poems they will partially lose their meaning. It is important to remember
that we do not know when these poems were composed and how they were changing over
the centuries before some variants of them were fixed in textual records which we have
now. Lu Qinli, great scholar of the third century, author of monumental anthology Poetry of
the Pre-Qin, Han, Wei, Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties, started a tradition to at-
tach early classical poems to authors and arranging them in chronological sequence, but his
scholarship also contained alternative attributions and textual variants. We do not know the
quality of the manuscripts Lu Qinli and other Qi and Liang scholars were coping, probably
those manuscripts had passed through multiple copying and included transcriptions of early
oral texts. This poetry comes to us through reproduction - by those who knew the poem and
passed it on, by musicians who might perform the poem, and by scribes and literary an-
thologists of a later era. All of these people in situations of reproduction took the liberty to
change the text to suit their needs (Owen, 2006, p. 6). Poetical texts could circulate without
a name and only when it became a part of a system where names are assigned, decided, and
arranged in chronological order (Ibid.) they get the status ‘anonymous’. We can come to a
conclusion that Han and Wei poetry which we know now is also a creation of Qi and Liang,
and now it is impossible to make any boundaries between them.
The authorship of the poems on Immortals which were ascribed to some authors later is
questionable. We cannot take these poems as poems in usual sense, as independent creation
of a poet but we can take them as a commonly shared poetical practice, pieces of a certain
pattern with certain rules, habits, sequences of exposition, set of possibilities (Owen, 2006, p.
15). Owen suggests determining this phenomenon as ‘composition by theme’:
We can easily list a limited set of themes […] composed before the last decades of the
third century. In thinking of themes, the figure of the roadmap is useful. Some themes seem
to lead easily into other themes; sometimes at a particular point one could go in various di-
rections-these are contiguous thematic ‘territories’. [...] In their thematic unfolding, topics
have a sequence that is more or less variable, but the process involves expectations that cer-
tain things will be mentioned in a roughly predictable order (Owen, 2006, p. 16).
We instantly can recognize a theme of a poem when we read it. It is more difficult to
recognize the boundaries of a poem. Owen calls it ‘segmentary composition’:
Segmentary composition is combining formally distinct segments into a longer text.
This is clearest in a kind of yuefu that we will call ‘compound yuefu’, In some cases the
segments are combined with close thematic coherence, but in other cases the two compo-
nents have no clear relation to one another. In some cases, distinct components have been
combined and the long interpretive tradition has been able to reconcile them into a single
‘poem’ (Owen, 2006, p. 20).
Later, we will analyze an example of ‘segmentary composition’ in the poem ascribed to
Cao Pi.
Poems on Immortals fall into general conventions of classical Chinese poetry described
above and, at the same time, these poems have their own peculiarities as they were close-
ly connected with the cult of immortality and relevant ceremonies. The connection of the
songs with actual immortality beliefs and practices became looser when the common poet-
ical patterns started to be transformed in different ways by later individual poets. Although
the poems on Immortals were an independent phenomenon, their connection with the cults
and beliefs of Han era largely determined their contents and composition. To a certain ex-
tent these poems reflected the state of social credibility to the cult of immortality as well as
they expressed the changing attitude to the very idea of immortality in Han society. In the
next chapter I will refer to the origin of the cult of immortality, its relation with the religion
and philosophy of Taoism and the spread of the related rites and ceremonies in Han society
in order to describe general ideological and religious background for an emergence of the
poems about immortality.
CULT OF IMMORTALITY OF HAN ERA: ORIGIN, CONNECIO WITH THE RE-

LIGION OF TAOISM AND THE PILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL OF ‘TAO’, SONGS
ON IMMORTALITY AS PART OF RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES AND RITES
Though the concept of immortality may be considered to have arisen together with the re-
ligion of Taoism, this is not actually the case. Immortality cults existed from very ancient
times in China without links to any religion or philosophical school. Only in the late Han
period did they start to be assimilated with Taoist religion; initially, immortality was not
an entirely Taoist category. Opinions differ about whether the concept of immortality is
originally Chinese or borrowed. 6 Most scholars agree that the idea of eternal life developed
naturally from the desire for longevity during the Spring and Autumn Period. ‘In general,
during the Western Chou period (1122-771 B. C.), people only prayed for limited longev-
ity and natural death. But during the Ch’un –ch’iu period (722-481 B. C.), people became
more avid and began to pray for escape from old age as well as ‘no-death’’(Yu, 1964-1965, p.
24-p. 25).
The approximate dates and area of emerging of immortality cults have been more or
less clearly defined. For example, Hsu-Chung –shu (1964-1965) states:
The idea of immortality came into existence rather late. Not until the early Eastern
Chou period (eight century B. C.) was there, either in literary references or in bronze in-
scriptions, any trace of the idea that man could preserve his physical body permanently.
From the eighth century on such terms as nan-lao and wu-ssu abound in prayers for bless-
ing in bronze inscriptions (p. 26).
The use of these terms marks the beginning of the idea of physical immortality. 7
From the time when the concept of immortality appeared, it began to develop into a so-
cial phenomenon with a complex structure.8 The main division of terms can be traced from
the end of the Warring-States period, when there emerged a new conception of immortality
that differed considerably from the traditional understanding of it. To achieve immortality
did not mean to live endlessly in this world as a man, but to leave this world as an immortal
(Yu, 1964-1965, p. 89). Loewe (1982) expresses a similar idea:
In the first place there was a longing for physical immorality, for the continuation of the
life in the world of the flesh without suffering the failures, corruption, and distraction of the
body. At the same time, however, a belief was developing that maintained it was possible to
attain the bliss of an endless life in the totally different circumstances of another world; and
6　The view that the concept of immortality is native is a common one; there are many sources in which
the researcher refers to this fact with absolute certainty. For example, see in Kohn: ‘While a large portion
of Taoist mysticism can be traced back to Buddhist concepts and practices, the idea of eternal life is deeply
rooted in the native Chinese, Taoist tradition.’ (See Kohn, 1190, p. 625). Same idea is supported by many
scholars, including Tsuda Sokichi, Takeuchi Yoshio, Ku Yen-Wu, Uchida Tomo, Obuchi Ninji, Lu Ssu-
mien and many others.Though, this is the most common viewpoint, it is still open to question. There are
scholars who support the opinion that cult of immortality is of foreign origin. This idea is supported by
Cien-Yin-ko, Wen I-to, Hsu-Chung-shu and others.
7　Here we must differentiate between immortality and longevity. See in Ying-Shih Yu: ‘The idea of
longevity is a very old one, originating in time immemorial. In Chou bronze inscription, shou (longevity) is
found to be by far the most popular term in prayers for blessing (See Yu, 1964-1965, p. 87)’ and ‘Longevity
may be said to be one of the most ancient and universal worldly desires of the Chinese people’ (See Yu,
1964-1965, p. 87).
8　There existed numerous approaches to understanding immortality of early times and rendering different
shadows of meaning into other languages. See in Ying-Shih Yu: ‘The Chinese concept of immortality
contains some subtle differences which its English equivalent fails to convey. Under the general label of
immortality a number of terms such as ch’ang-sheng (long life), pu-ssu (no death), pao-shen (preservation
of the body), tu-shih (transcending the world), teng-hsia (ascending to the distant place), ch’eng-
hsien (becoming an immortal), etc. may be grouped together… Although they may all be rendered as
immortality, they refer to immortality on different levels.’(See Yu, 1964-1965, p.87-p.88)).
the characteristics of those who attained a non-worldly immortality of this type were those
of the ascetic or the hermit ( p. 89).
This is how the prototype of an ascetic or a hermit, which later became an important
category for the whole Chinese poetry and culture, appeared. At first, however, and during
the period we are interested in, immortality was mainly understood in a literal sense, and
this claim for eternal life stimulated the development of numerous techniques and methods
united by the general designation of alchemy.
These methods included breathing exercises, certain sexual practices, meditation,
trance, diet, the taking of herbs and drugs, alchemy, and the consumption of certain (poi-
sonous in some cases) minerals (Birrell, 1988, p. 65). Many of these methods, especially
the consumption of poisonous minerals, led to a number of deaths among emperors, which
became one of the main factors giving rise to disapproval of the immortality cults.9
In a number of literary sources we can find two different predicates, reclusive and Tao-
ist, equally referred to the same poems. These terms became interchangeable. Here arises
a question if we can call early poems on Immortals Taoist or not. The question is puzzling
because it is hard to give a clear definition to the very phenomenon of Taoism of Han era.
Traditionally, as it has been accepted, there are two main ways of understanding Taoism.
Legge (1980) suggests that actually there were two absolutely different phenomena coexist-
ing under one name:
Traditionally, there are two main ways to differentiate meanings of Taoism, the first one
is philosophical idea of Tao, the Way, and the second one is the religion of Taoism they had
different time and reasons to emerge. […] It has two different applications; first, to a pop-
ular and widely spread religion of China and then, to a system of thought in the remarkable
treatise called the Tao-The-King. In other words, Taoism is the name both of a religion and
a philosophy (p. 159-p. 160).
The religion of Taoism, which appeared much later, was closely associated with the
philosophical school under the same name. Hereby, there arose confusion in the definitions
of Taoism. Loewe (1982) notes:
According to writers of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., whose works are known to
us as the Tao-te-ching and the Chuang-tzu, the Tao was the secret whereby the whole uni-
verse and its workings could be understood, and whereby an individual could best comply
with its rhythmical processes. The principle soon acquired social and political applications,
but in its origin it is best understood as a mystical concept, born of a creative imagination
of a few intellects. As such it must be sharply distinguished from Taoist religion, which
grew up from entirely different motives, but which came to be associated with the authors
of Taoist mysticism (p. 124).
Loewe (1982) concludes that, although, now we differentiate two main understand-
ings of Taoism, in Han time such boundary did not exist. Taoism covered a wide variety of
9　As alchemists’ experiments lead to death of many emperors and persons connected with court, the
understanding of the immortality cult transformed from literal to metaphorical, there appeared the idea
of inner alchemy where elixir of life was understood not as an immortality of body but as a spiritual
immortality. Following to this theory the elixir of life could be created in the body of the recluse with the
help of inner spiritual practices. For detailed description of this transformation of beliefs see Torchinov
(2007, p.33-p.35)
meanings and concepts:

Very different phenomena which aim was achievement of immortality or longevity can
be called Taoist, either cults, or philosophy, or religion are meant. As well as the concept of
Tao, the Way is sometimes is not clearly used and can mean different things. It can mean
simply the techniques, leading to the achievement of immortality, or a divinity (Ibid.).
The same idea is expressed by Owen (2006) who underlines the existence of immortali-
ty cults at different levels of society, from local cults to the political elite:
These tainted interests actually covered a broad spectrum, from philosophical reflection
on the Way, to the techniques of immortality practiced and professed by adepts (fangshi), to
local cults, some of which seem to have had religious practices that were distinctly offen-
sive to the political elite, taking them as a single category (‘Daoism’) except their refusal to
take the orthodox politics of the imperial state as the central issue in life’ (p. 140).
In this respect, we can call these early poetical pieces on immortality of Han China Tao-
ist as they were related to immortality cults and practices and thus they fall under the broad
definition of ‘Taoist’ of Han era.
We can conclude that by the second century different religious cults and practices coex-
isted among elite as well as among common people. These cults gradually started to be as-
sociated with the philosophical school of Taoism, alchemy and a number of other practices,
although, initially they were independent of any philosophical schools and had very ancient
roots. The second century was also the time of appearance of the religion of Taoism which
was later associated with the philosophy of Tao, immortality cults and the very idea of im-
mortality.
To present the ways of performing the cults in different sectors of Han society is not the
aim of this research; in addition, most information preserved about it is mainly related to
the court rituals and ceremonies. It is known for sure that the ceremonies of various layers
of society were commonly accompanied by hymns and songs composed for these occa-
sions. Therefore, we can conclude that the songs on Immortals were of different origins -
popular and elitist, depending on the cults. Though, only the poetry of elite was preserved
to the present day, except for the rare pieces of some popular songs composed for the sub-
urban rites which were collected and preserved by the Music Bureau as they contained al-
lusions to Taoist world. It is important to notice that even these early popular songs came to
us in a collection preserved by the governmental organization, the Music Bureau, for some
governmental interests of the Han court. In the next chapter, I shall specify some of these
interests in order to understand the reasons for establishment of the Music Bureau and col-
lecting and presenting songs on immortality at Han courts during Emperor Wu’s reign and
in later centuries.
GREAT CONCERN FOR IMMORTALITY: POLITICAL REASONS BEHIND ‘A

SEARCH FOR IMMORTALIY’ OF THE GREATEST HAN RULERS. MUSIC
BUREAU AND POETRY ON IMMORTALS AS PART OF HAN POLITICAL LIFE
Among all religious rituals of the multi-layered Han society, many were a part of the court.
Many rulers were involved in the belief in immortality and sometimes even obsessed with
it, like legendary Emperor Wu (156-87BC) of the Former Han. He became famous for his
obsession in later centuries, and it is probably for his very claim for immortality that he is
still best known among all the Han rulers. He is an important figure for understanding the
connection between the ruler, the contemporary politics, religious cults and the poetry of
Han court.
It is evident that the concern of an Emperor with the religious ideas of his time charac-
terized him as a competitive ruler. Loewe (1994) suggests that the image of Wu Emperor as
the greatest Han ruler arose especially from his great concern with ritual cults:
There is also a further hint that the emperor’s personal powers were not of a practical,
immediate nature. Of all the emperors of Former Han (202BC-8AD), Wu-ti is credited with
the greatest vigor, personality and achievement; but on inspection it appears that the major-
ity of actions in which he took a personal part were neither political nor military; they were
concerned with religious cults. On the other hand, greater emphasis was being placed on
the divine nature of imperial sovereignty and Heaven’s part in ensuring dynastic continuity,
but only a relatively small number of emperors can be shown to have taken an active, per-
sonal part in controlling China’s destinies (p. 111).
Emperor Wu is famous for his association with fang-shi, Taoist adepts. One of the ad-
epts named Li Shao-chun is known to have a great influence on the emperor. Noburu Koni-
shi notes:
Li Shao-chun skilfully took advantage of this character of emperor Wu and tried to
take part in the nation’s largest affairs. The emperor listened for his word, made a search
for hermits and indulged in producing god from cinnabar and from other medicines. Thus
the fang-shi forcefully connected the Fang-shih ceremonies, ceremonies during which they
prayed for the long life of the nation, with the son of Heaven’s immortality (As cited in
Loewe, 1994, p. 111).
The connection between fang-shi and the worshiping of the Supreme One, Tai-I, means
that Taoism influenced the kindling of interest in and shaping of state ceremonies and rit-
uals which were growing in importance. This might suggest that the Emperor saw for the
bureau a special role which may have become infused with the concept of an ideal king.
Noburu Konishi concludes, that “Tai –I and Hou-tu came to be worshiped at the Fang-
shih’s advice, but the Yueh-fu was established at the office where they administered the
music and dancing used in this worship” (as cited in Williams, 1973, p. 26).
Music and dancing became an essential part of court ceremonies. Ceremonies were nu-
merous; Music Bureau provided them with songs. Hou Han Shu records a typical celebra-
tion held at court:
The Hundred Officials were celebrating the New Year. More than two thousand tan
were presented, and they proclaimed long life. A cup was placed in front of the Imperial
throne. The Szu-k’ung (Minister of Works) offered his soup. The Tai-szu-nung (Chief Min-
ister of Agriculture) presented rice. Dinner music was then performed, and the Hundred
Officers received gifts. While feasting they greatly enjoyed themselves (Williams, 1973, p.
28).
It could have been on such occasions that the songs could be performed. Konishi argues
that the performance of Taoist songs and hymns at these ceremonies reinforced the useful-
ness of a Music Bureau, but an affective argument may also be proposed that the Emperor
viewed the ceremonies as a vehicle by which he could give further credence to his rule. He
could, by enacting rituals and sacrifices, project the image of sanctified ruler (as cited in
Williams, 1973, p. 31).
Apart from creating an image of a competitive ruler, there could be some other polit-
ical reasons for turning to the cult of immortality and to creation of such an organization
as Music Bureau. Williams (1973) gives a historical highlight of the events which could
be the reason for this. The most important aim of the early years of Han dynasty was the
strengthening of the state and the consolidation of central power which met a resistance of
merchants and noblemen. Williams (1973) states:
Booth noblemen and merchants who felt their interests were countered by government
measures put up stiff resistance. Han Kao Tsu and his successors re-established the system
of vassal kingdoms and marquisettes. The distant areas which were impossible to effective-
ly control were assigned to vassals who were either strong military leaders or members of
the collateral branches of ruling family. This kind of reward could serve to maintain loyalty
toward the central government and its interests and to bring under control areas of great
distance from the capital. However, newly assigned vassals soon became a threat to gov-
ernment as well, and emperors who succeeded Kao Tsu forced to attempt the liquidation
of vassals by diminishing their lands and appointing central government representatives to
rule over the territories (p. 32-p. 33).
From the passage cited above it becomes clear that Emperor Wu was faced with a seri-
ous financial crisis. He had to take measures which he found in establishment of the state
monopolies. Williams (1973) continues:
Since new sources of revenue were needed, he imposed the system of state monopolies
on certain products which could yield an adequate profit with little expenditure. A govern-
ment was forced with on the minting of copper pieces which was gainful because of the
income it brought in and the standardization on currency it affected. Government monopo-
lies on salt and iron were instituted in A. D. 119. Later liquor was put under the control of a
licensing system (p. 34).
Williams (1973) concludes, that “during this period of internal struggles, the need for an
ideology which could underpin and sanctify the government was keenly felt. The perpetua-
tion of an official organization which could control and manage the study and performance
of rites and sacrifices was essential and pertinent to the prestige of the dynasty” (p. 37).
Whenever the popularity of the immortality cult arose in later centuries, there were po-
litical reasons behind. At the end of the Eastern Han immortality cult also played extremely
important role in the political life because it started to be associated with new religion of
Taoism which in many ways determined contemporary politics. Owen (2006) claimed:
The end of the Eastern Han saw millenarian Taoist uprisings and a Taoist state in
west-central China (under the Five-Pecks-of-Grain sect, wudoumi, headed by Zhang Lu)
that lasted until 215. […] Taoism, however, was part of contemporary politics in the most
direct sense, and a claim of Taoist empowerment was also potentially a political claim (p.
161).
For these reasons extensive corpus of poetry on Immortals circulated at court as an
essential attribute of court ceremonies under the reign of many emperors of Han Dynasty.
For example, Cao Cao (155-220) and Cao Pi (187-226) are famous for composing poems
on Immortality, at least, these poems were ascribed to them in later centuries. According to
Owen (2006):
He [Cao Cao] could also have composed such poems precisely because he was a
tough-minded politician. In this age knowledge of heavenly mysteries was one possible
basis for political power…In the political context, this reputation takes on a certain rich-
ness: such songs could be performed in the court for visitors with Taoist interests with a full
knowledge that Cao Cao composed them (p.162).
We can see that the poems of immortality were of a great importance for the Han courts,
as these poems were part of the court ceremonies, which, in their turn, were part of con-
temporary politics. Great concern for immortality of legendary Emperor Wu and of other
famous Han rulers had some political reasons behind; however, this fact does not exclude
the possibility that their belief in immortality could be real. Patterned songs on Immortals
were standard and alike as attributes of the court political ceremonies, until they became
a more complicated poetical phenomenon in later individual poetry. In the next chapter, I
shall look at different types of poems on Immortals of different periods of Han era to trace
this process.
ANALYSIS OF THE SELECTED POEMS ON IMMORTALS
In this chapter I refer to several selected poems on Immortals which represent the most
popular types. As the volume of this research is limited, I had to choose only four songs,
three of yuefu corpus, representing typical development within a standard patterns and
intersections of different sub-themes within a general theme. The fourth poem is an example
of an authorized poem, attributed to Cao Pi. This poem named ‘Snapping the Willow’ took
its roots in earlier anonymous songs and ballads on the relevant theme. It illustrates how
low register poetry became a more complex literary phenomenon by the end of Han period.
I have already given some general characteristics of the songs on immortality of Han era
in the first chapter, but it is important to dwell upon the possible ways of developing a
standard poem on immortality before looking at concrete poems in more detail.
The popularity of the immortality cults at Han courts influenced the development of a
tradition of court poetry on Immortals with certain rules, ornament and structure. Most po-
ems are concerned with two basic themes: the first one focuses on the acquisition of a drug
(the elixir of life); the second one describes the ‘heavenly journey’. In the standard version
of the poems that focus on the drug, the protagonist climbs a mountain, encounters one or
more Immortals, and receives a drug from him, or is taken to a place where he can acquire
it. The ‘heavenly journey’ variation features a speaker who usually flies up to Heaven. He
first goes to Taishan or Kunlun to pay his respects to the Queen mother of the West and her
consort, the Eastern Father. He then encounters one of the famous Immortals, usually Red
Pine, who serves as his guide, taking him around to see the sights of Heaven, usually the
stars. There are a number of possible topics here: there may be a heavenly feast with music;
he may receive the drug of immortality or magical techniques; he may look back toward his
home.10
The themes were recognizable and standard, though they might have been overlapping
in different ways. They all contained a typical iconography of the Immortals which was
also highly elaborated and specific: an Immortal often has long ears, he rides a white deer,
the landscape for him is a lonely high mountain, the metal is gold, the main jewel is jade,
10　 See detailed description in Owen (2006, p. 141)

and the food is cinnabar, hallucinogenic fungi, pure dew and so on.11 Nevertheless, early
anonymous poems were models for later literati imitations. ‘Long Song’ of yuefu corpus is
a good example of a typical early song on immortality.
Long Song
An immortal went riding a white deer,

his hair was short, and his ears so long!
He led me up Taihua Mountain
Where I picked magic fungus and obtained a red streamer.
I am to the host’s gate
And offered a jade box of drugs.
The host swallowed these drugs,
His body grew daily more healthy and strong.
The white of his hair turned black again,
And expanding his years, his span was long. (Owen, 2006, p.24)
Like in other early songs, passages here do not cohere. Ann Birrell (1988) notes that
it is not clear whether the set is comprised of a one long piece, three or two pieces (p. 68).
This is possibly an example of a ‘compound yuefu’ described in the first chapter but all the
pieces treat the theme of immortality. Though, these pieces, or a single poem, as we take it
now, represent a possible standard way to develop the theme: the speaker meets the Immor-
tal who brings him to the sacred Taihua Mountain where he takes magic drug expanding
years. All necessary attributes are also here: white dear, an Immortal with short hair and
long ears, magic fungus and ‘jade box of drugs’.
It is doubtful that all the attributes had a relevant grounding in real Taoist cults. For ex-
ample, lore about legendary figures and human beings who had become an Immortal (the
Yellow Emperor, Wang Ch’iao, Ch’ing Sung [Red Pine]), and others, evolved in the poetry
(Graham, 1981, p. 176). These figures were often mentioned in early poetry, though very
few of those designated as Immortal appearing in the early poetry seem to be associated
with the legends that gather around them in more specialized Taoist works (Owen, 2006, p.
139). This suggests that in poetic discourse the cult of immortality was a different phenom-
enon from that in a public discourse already in earlier times.
We can feel different attitudes to the concept of immortality already in the earliest po-
ems. The poem cited below is included into yuefu corpus and has all the recognizable ele-
ments of an early poem on Immortals but we can feel that immortality here is understood
more like spiritual category rather than physical immortality.
Walking out of Hsia Gate, A Ballad
A by-way leads past an empty hut;

The good man always lives alone.
At death he attains the way of holy immortals,
11　 Detailed description of the attributes of the immortals can be found in: Graham cited in Birrell (1988,
p. 65)
On high he leans up against the heavens.

After he visits our Royal Father and Mother,
He goes to live in the folds of Mount T’ai.
Going four or five leagues away from heaven
He meets on his way Red Pine for companion.
“Hold the reins, drive for me!
Take me up to Heaven to roam!”
Up in Heaven what is there?
Rows and rows of planted white elm,
Cassia trees lining the way are growing,
Green dragons face to face bow down (Birrel, 1988, p.39)
Here is a cohesion between the title and the contents which is also common feature of
some Han songs and ballads. Hsia Gate, the western gate of the Loyang city does not fea-
ture in the piece. It is possible that the title originally belonged to another, earlier song, and
either its content resembled its narrative, or parts of it were borrowed to make a new com-
position (Birrell, 1988, p. 69).
We begin with the speaker as a mere mortal, living away from society. Perfecting him-
self, he flies up and then, after ‘paying respects’, he is taken on a tour of the heavens.
Here we can see that the immortality becomes a divine aim for a mortal man. We can
see the description of a hidden way, the way of ‘Tao’ which leads to the heavens after
death. ‘A by-way leads past an empty hut;/The good man always lives alone’-it means that
a recluse who has lived in holiness and purity has died and now is in on his sacred way, ‘Tao’,
way to the heavens. All the symbols and attributes of Immortals in this poem are easily
recognizable.
The peculiarity of this poetic piece is in its understanding of the concept of immortal-
ity: here it is closer to a later spiritual understanding, immortality as endless life of a soul,
which was represented in later reclusive and religious Taoist poetry.
In spite of the fact that we know about some political motifs behind the cults of immor-
tality in Han era, we still never can be sure what was the real attitude of a poet writing on
immortality to the subject of his poem; in other words, we don’t know whether those au-
thors really believed in possibility of eternal life.
We can see that even in the earliest pieces the themes overlapped, and it is sometimes
hard to put a poem into a certain category. Another theme of poetry closely associated with
immortality poems is so called ‘feast’ or ‘carpe diem’, which proclaims the brevity of life.
This category is a creation of modern scholars. Actually, when we read a poem from the 2nd
or the 3rd century, it is hard to decide whether it should be classified as a poem on Immor-
tals or a feast song. As late readers of these early poems we can see how feast poems and
poems on Immortals coexist in a dialogue in historical perspective. In poems on Immortals
there is a request for eternal life; in feast poems there is hint of disapproval of this possi-
bility. These songs simply exhort one to catch the moments of happiness, as they are few
and life is short. In feast poems, as in the anonymous yuefu song cited below, we have all
the necessary components of a poem on immortals. A dramatic note of alarm echoes in the
poem, however, hinting that the promise of immortality is deceitful. We can feel how the
belief in immortality starts to be controversial within poetry, as it was in real life. Famous
yuefu ‘Grand!’ clearly illustrates it:
Grand
Great hardship in days to come,

The mouth parched, the lips dry.
Today we take our pleasure,
And we should all be merry.
I passed through all the fabled hills,
With magic fungus waving.
The immortal Qiao the Prince
Offered me a pill of drugs.
I regret that my sleeves are too short,

When I draw in my hands I feel the cold.
I’ am ashamed that I have no Lingche
To pay his debt to Xuan of Zhao.
The moon sinks, Shen stretches across sky,

The northern dipper hangs crossways.
Kin and friends are at the gate,
Hungry, not yet having chance to eat.
The days of joy are still too few,
Days of woe, terribly many.
How can we forget our cares?-
Play the zheng and sing drinking songs.
The eight lords in Huainan,
The essential Way brings no bother.
Just hitch up your six dragons
And roam for fun at the edge of clouds. (Owen, 2006, p. 42)
Dieny notes that the stanzas on Immortals in ‘Grand!’ are weaved together with other
themes in quite a unique way. All these themes belong to the feast; but while a certain kind
of coherence is missing, all the sequences of themes and topics (apart from the unique third
stanza) have parallels elsewhere. [...] Through repetition, sequences of topics and themes
can come to seem ‘natural’, even if they are not from a later perspective, ‘logical’. Famil-
iarity has its own logic, and in the context of the poetry of this period, feasting, mortality,
patronage, and the quest for immortality all crossed at numerous intersections (as cited in
Owen, 2006, p. 146).
Though, there are all the essential components in this poem. We do not know who trav-
eled through the mountains and to whom the drug was offered, but we know the speaker
occupies the role of host in what is essentially a feast song. The final stanza does not men-
tion taking the drug, but roaming in the clouds implies it.
As we have suggested earlier, the cult of immortality was controversial, poetically as
well as in public discourse. The celebration of immortality often carried with it a hint that
the promise of drugs and immortality was deceitful. This negative move could occur within
a fully developed poem on the immortals. In the text of ‘Snapping the Willow’, attributed
to Cao Pi, the negative move is cruder than in the previous anonymous yuefu. The speaker
meets two Immortals. After taking the drug, he sprouts wings and flies; but the perspective
attained turns to rejection of the Immortals and their Way.
Cao Pi, Snapping the Willow
How high west mountain is!-

So high, virtually without limit.
Up there are a pair of immortal lads,
They do not drink and do not eat.
They gave me a drug in a pill,
It glowed with all five colors.
Four or five days after I swallowed the elixir
My body grew wings.
I rose lightly riding the drifting clouds,
All of a sudden I had gone millions of leagues.
I let my gaze rove over all in the four seas,
Vast and vague, there was nothing I recognized.
They claim Peng Zu lived seven centuries, so far, how can one trace it back?
Lao Dan went off to the Western Barbarians
And even now he has never returned.
Qiao the Prince made use of hollow phrases,
Red Pine left us empty words.
The perfect man can tell true from false,
The fool loves deceptive lore.
I brood on matters in the past-
They are a muddle with thousands of positions.
The philosophers are full of absurdities
I will observe the Way of the Sage. (Owen, 2006, p. 51)
This poem can be divided into two segments. The first one is a fully developed vari-
ation on the theme of receiving the elixir of life. Though, the poem ends up by rejecting
the Immortals. This is also so called ‘compound yuefu’, with, as Owen calls it, a ‘segmen-
tary composition’ which was mentioned in the first chapter. In other words, we cannot tell
whether this is ‘one poem’ or ‘two poems’ set in counterpoint. It is extremely hard to inter-
pret this poem if we do not know if this piece was initially composed as a single poem, or if
two different poems were combined later. Owen demonstrates how depending on these two
possibilities our understanding of the poem will vary greatly:
If we believe this is ‘a poem composed by Cao Pi’, we will describe it as a poem in
which Cao Pi ‘rejects the Immortals’. If, however, it is not the construct of an ‘author’ mak-
ing an argument, but rather a particular combination of thematically opposite segments,
a combination that has been preserved (whether that combination was done by Cao Pi or
musical specialists), then we have something rather different. [...] Because the second seg-
ment is so clearly a negation and rejection of the first segment, the principle of combination
is coherent. Despite this difference, however, in both cases the segments can stand inde-
pendently (Owen, 2006, p. 148-p. 149).
Irrespective of the complicated structure of this poem, this poem, or at least the second
part of it (in case if this is a compound yuefu) stands independently from the earlier con-
ventional poetry. It represents a sophisticated meditation on immortality as on the legacy
of the ancient sages which turned to be deceitful for a mortal man. We can see here a total
disapproval of the belief in immortality not only within someone’s individual experience
but also within a broader historical context as this poem is not a single one of its kind. The
motifs of disappointment in the promise of endless life, turning to the ‘fest’ themes within
a poem on Immortals became a permanent components of the poems on immortality of late
Han dynasty, although, they still were composed for the court ceremonies. The strict bound-
aries and conventions of earlier models started to be erased.
We can judge, even by these four pieces, how within the ‘shared’ poetical practice
there arose multiple variants of standard versions of a set theme. Meditations about life and
death became more complicated and went far beyond the conventions of the earlier original
samples. Growing changes in the poetical conventional patterns reflected changes in the ap-
proaches to the ideological phenomenon of immortality.
CONCLUSION
The theme of immortality in Chinese history, philosophy and literature has been a subject of
an uncountable number of researches. Han era was the time when the ideas on immortality
occupied minds of the greatest thinkers, poets and politicians. Such an interest, apart from
possible real belief in endless life, was also determined by social and political reasons
described above in this research. As a result of this great concern for immortality in Han
era, we have an extensive poetic legacy, which have no analogues in the world literature.
Poems on immortality determined development of later Chinese classical poetry in
many ways, it is undoubted that motif of immortality has been important during the whole
history of the Chinese poetry. In Russian sinology in the beginning of the twentieth century
there appeared the concept of a poet – Taoist which was introduced by Prof. V. Alekseev
in his research about the poem of Sikong Tu. 12 Alekseev (2008) claims, that “Art of many
Chinese poets is imbued with Taoist ideas or closely connected with them” (p. 16).
Taoist ideas are inseparably connected with meditations on life and death. It is hard to
enumerate the poets, including the most praised poets of the Golden Century, who wrote
on these themes or in a style of the old yuefu songs on Immortals. Among these poets are
Meng Haoran, Li Bo, Du Fu, Li He, Li Shangyin and many others. The motifs of immortal-
ity in their poetry have roots in ancient songs on immortality of Han era.
In this paper I have examined Han poems on Immortality at the intersection of philolo-
gy, history and philosophy, in the political and social contexts of Han China which have de-
termined their appearance and development. This theme is very wide and can be developed
12　 Prof V. M. Alekseev (1881-1916) supported his thesis entitled ‘Chinese Poem about the Poet: Stanzas
of Sikong Tu’ in 1916. In this research Alekseev carried out profound research on the poetry of Sikong
Tu’s ideas of Taoist nature of artistic inspiration.
in many directions. Current research deals only with general problems of origin, functions
and further development of conventional poems on Immortals laying at the basis of the
tradition of poems on immortality in Chinese classical poetry. The analysis has proved that
poems of immortality and cults of immortality of Han era were two independent phenome-
na but at the same time they were inextricably intertwined. In spite of insurmountable dif-
ficulties of attribution and dating and, therefore, understanding of these poems, the process
of disapproval of immortality cults can still be traced through their texts. Gradually these
poems went beyond conventions in their mixture of sub-themes, especially in their dramat-
ic combination of the feast and immortality themes. To this end, they represent the earliest
pieces of a unique and long-lasting tradition of Chinese poetry.
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Author’s Biodata
Anna has obtained her Master in Ancient Chinese Literature from Chongqing University
in 2012. She is currently obtaining her Master degree in Chinese Studies from Oxford
University. Her research interests include Chinese Religions, Pre-modern Chinese Poetry,
and Cultural Comparative Studies.

annasokkolova@yahoo.co.uk
ISSN: 2224-2716
A Portrayal of Real Qing’s Empresses1
Jingwei Liu & Huanghai Fang

Xiamen University, China
The Legend of Zhen Huan sets off an upsurge on "palace-infighting" shows, which is rooted in
China's thousand-year culture and becomes a metaphor for the real world. However the characters
and events in the series sometimes fail to be in line with the historical facts. In this paper, the au-
thor briefly introduces the system of Qing Dynasty's empress via literature analysis method: their
establishment, responsibilities and demises. They enjoyed the highest rank of the imperial con-
cubines; however, being involved in the patriarchal society, they had no power to determine their
own destiny.
The Legend of Zhen Huan, one of the latest television series featuring “palace-infighting”,
has garnered high ratings as well as stirred controversies since early 2012 (Yang, 2012).
The show revolves around Zhen Huan, a newcomer to the emperor's harem. An innocent
and pure girl at the beginning of the series, Zhen finds herself caught up in fierce infighting
among the concubines. Using her wits and sometimes unscrupulous methods, Zhen fights
her way into the emperor's heart, eventually becoming the empress dowager.
Over the past year, films and television series about imperial harem take up a large
share of cultural market in the mainland, such as My Fair Princess, War and Beauty, and
The Palace. However, some of the characters and events in the series distort historical facts,
thus misleading the audience, even “demonizing of the real world”. This paper provides an
overview and information of Qing’s empresses. Some viewpoints will also be presented at
the end of the paper for the approaching.
In classical Chinese, the legal wife of the emperor was named as “Hou”. Since Qin
& Han dynasty, they were called the empress, honored with “mother of all the people”.
During their everyday life, they run and manage the routine of the harem. Before the troops
of Qing dynasty went all the way to the Shanhai Pass and established its dominance, the
rank system of concubines were not well organized; as time went on, this system gradually
improved, as was recorded in Draft History of Qing (Zhao, Miao, & Ke, p. 530-p. 569),
Annals of the Eight Banners (Er, 1739), etc.
According to the precedent reference system, the number of the concubines was strictly
limited. There was one empress, one Imperial Noble Consort (Huangguifei), two Noble
Consorts (Guifei), four Consorts (Fei), six Imperial Concubines (Pin) at a given time, below
these ranks were concubines without fixed number (Zhang, 1929, p. 4). From the empress,
legal wife of the emperor, to the humble concubines, glories were discrepant, such as the
number of servants, dress and personal adornment, gifts from the emperor, etc. If a certain
concubine received more monarch’s favor, she would gain extra treatment; nevertheless,
the glory that the empress enjoyed could never be matched.
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Jingwei Liu. E-mail: xmliu1990@qq.com

102 LIU QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 101-108
Since having made Peking their capital, the imperial family selected the Forbidden
City for habitation, which was divided into two parts by the Gate of Celestial Purity. Out-
er palace served as enthronement of the emperors, ceremonies which marked other great
occasions such as the Winter Solstice, The Chinese Lunar New Year, and conferral of the
title of empress. Inner court, where Emperors lived with their families and attended to state
affairs, was more close to the daily life. During Qing dynasty, the empress chose the Palace
of Earthly Tranquility as their main residence (only several of them did live in it, and since
the Emperor Yongzheng, it was used mostly for bridal chamber, sacrifice and worshipping
of Shamanism). Flanking the Palace of Earthly Tranquility and another two main structures
are palaces and halls, in which concubines and princes lived (Wang, 1980, p. 48-p. 49).
According to the royal provisions, concubines ranking Consorts (Fei) or above could live
separately in a certain palace and those who stayed at a lower status have to share a wing-
room with others.
ESTABLISHMENT OF EMPRESSES
To establish an empress, three approaches were taken: wedding, conferral and posthumous
conferral. As long as one of the three solemn ceremonies was held, the legal empress was
established.
The great wedding. Throughout the Qing dynasty, four emperors held their matrimonial
ceremonies with great magnificence in the Forbidden City. The matrimonial ceremony,
along with the enthronement, was the peak in an emperor’s life. As the idiom goes, “run
the family in unison, manage the nation in order, and peace will prevail throughout the
universe”, the Chinese attach high importance to the wedding, believing it could make the
young emperors grow up enough to deal with political affairs and consolidate their rule.
Draft History of Qing recorded the great imperial weddings of Emperor Shunzhi (aged 14),
Kangxi (aged 11), Tongzhi (aged 17) and Guangxu (aged 18), and their five noble brides.
Particularly, the Emperor Shunzhi experienced twice, standing alone from all the other em-
perors. This was because his first legal wife-Lady Borjigit, also his cousin, failed to win the
heart of the young husband. Emperor Shunzhi berated her as spoiled, wasteful and arrogant,
thus revoking her title of empress soon. Three years later, the Forbidden City saw another
great wedding, and the surname of the new empress was also Borjigit.
The most distinguishing feature of matrimonial ceremonies, undoubtedly, was luxury.
The ceremony contained a series of cumbersome procedures, namely, exchanging betrothal
presents, conferring the title of empress, meeting the bride, drinking wedlock wine and so
on. After being given the stamp and rescript indicating her noble status, new empress start-
ed playing a role on the stage of the empire.
Conferral. Based on the Veritable Records of the Qing, the number of empresses estab-
lished by conferral was 11, with 40% of the total. Furthermore, there are two modes to con-
fer an empress:
(I) Somebody who got married to a Manchu prince and became wedded wife (not con-
cubines) would be conferred empress after the death of the former emperor, as long as her
husband inherited the throne.
Four empresses were crowned by this means: Empress Duan Wen (Lady Borjigit, Em-
peror Hong Taiji's wife), Empress Jing Xian (Lady Ulanara, Emperor Yongzheng's wife),
A PORTRAYAL OF REAL QING’S EMPRESSES 103
Empress Xian Chun (Lady Fuca, Emperor Qianlong's wife) and Empress Shu Rui (Lady Si-
tara, Emperor Jiaqing's wife). Owing to the long reign of the former emperor, his successor
enthroned at a relatively old age, so a conferral ceremony rather than a great wedding was
needed.
(II) Per imperial regulations, there was only one Empress at any given time. How-
ever, that did not prevent others from being elevated to that position after the death of an
existing empress. Totally 7 concubines elevated and got to the highest rank in this way:
Empress Zhao Ren (Lady Niohuru, Emperor Kangxi's wife), Empress Yi Ren (Lady Tung-
giya, Emperor Kangxi's wife), Lady Ulanara (Emperor Qianlong's wife), Empress He Rui
(Lady Niohuru, Emperor Jiaqing's wife), Empress Shen Cheng (Lady Tunggiya, Emperor
Daoguang's wife), Empress Quan Cheng (Lady Niohuru, Emperor Daoguang's wife) and
Empress Zhen Xian (Lady Niohuru, Emperor Xianfeng’s wife).
Posthumous conferral. Posthumous conferral is the third access to establishing an em-
press, also along with two modes.
The wedded wife of a Manchu prince who lived a short life and died before her hus-
band’s enthronement would be given the posthumous conferral. Two empresses were estab-
lished after their death: Empress Mu Cheng (Lady Niohuru, Emperor Daoguang's wife) and
Empress De Xian (Lady Sakoda, Emperor Xianfeng's wife).
As to another mode, being one of the concubines, she gave birth to the successor, and
was made the empress dowager after the enthronement of her son. She is accordingly
known posthumously as an empress. 6 people conferred empress in this way were listed
below: Empress Zhuang Wen (Lady Borjigit, Emperor Hong Taiji's wife), Empress Kang
Zhang (Lady Tunggiya, Emperor Shunzhi's wife), Empress Gong Ren (Lady Wuya, Em-
peror Kangxi's wife), Empress Sheng Xian (Lady Niohuru, Emperor Yongzheng's wife),
Empress Yi Chun (Lady Weigiya, Emperor Qianlong's wife) and Empress Qin Xian (Lady
Yehenara, Emperor Xianfeng’s wife).
Yet there are two striking exceptions exist. Empress Xiao Xian, Lady Donggo and Em-
press Jing Cheng, Lady Borjigit, who had no right to the title Empress by law and tradition,
were established for separate reasons. The former, being extremely love by Emperor Shun-
zhi, died as an Imperial Noble Consort and was posthumously elevated to empress (Zhon-
ghua Book Company, 2008, p. 375-p. 389). As for the latter, she took responsibility for the
upbringing of dead Empress Quan Cheng's son, who would become the Emperor Xianfeng,
and also gave birth to Prince Gong, the future highest-ranking official. Before her imminent
death, Prince Gong issued a false order in Xianfeng's name granting her the title of empress
dowager (Zhonghua Book Company, 2008, p. 2268-p. 2701).
RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPRESSES
As far as we know, the thoughts of the three cardinal guides, along with the five constant
virtues, occupied a significant position in feudal ethical code of ancient China, which asked
for total obedience to the emperor, husbands and family elders. Furthermore, two systems
existed in the feudal society: the political system and the family system. The former, taking
the imperial authority as the core, differentiated social classes by duties and the salary of
a government official; however the latter, taking the authority of the husband as the core,
linked the individuals of different social classes together by consanguinity and affinity. In
the family system, ranks still existed, like grandparents, parents, grandchildren, etc.
Being the wife of the emperor, the empress was endowed with the power from both po-
litical system and family system, and went beyond the role of the spouse in ethics.
As to a polygamous family, the wife quarterbacks the housekeeping and shares the
husband’s favor equally among his concubines. The empress, head of the imperial house-
hold, enjoyed a sacrosanct position in the imperial palace, and during the Qing dynasty,
was made in charge of all the court ladies. It was prescribed that the empress had the right
to punish those concubines who got out of line, so as to keep the imperial harem in order-
liness and harmony. They could even constrain private life of the emperor to some degree,
for instance, selecting the person whom the emperor slept with. As was recorded in mem-
oirs, Empress Daoguang advocated thriftily not only in the imperial harem but all over the
country, and his second legal wife, Empress Shen Cheng, had a high intensity of support
for him. She had chastised Consort Quan and Imperial Concubine Xiang, two concubines
beloved by Daoguang in the Palace of Earthly Tranquility publicly, for their wasteful and
extravagant behaviors.
As to the empire, the empress was a motherly mode and was revered by all the common
people, leading the way for them in etiquette and manners. She was a symbol of the majes-
ty and legitimacy of the nation, not merely the emperor’s principle and legal wife. Empress
Xian Chun once went to the Altar to the Goddess of Silkworms located in northern suburb
of Peking, stripping leaves off the mulberry trees and feeding silkworms, thus setting an
example to the women nationwide.
The Manchu imperial family regarded the empress as the foundation of the human eth-
ics and consolidation of the reign basis. Emperor Qianlong even related it with the steadi-
ness and prosperity of the empire. So they had always been placing heavy emphasis upon
the glory of the empress, such as the matrimonial ceremony, the coronation and posthu-
mous coronation of empress, etc. This perception comes down in one continuous line from
the Confucian thought that one should first cultivate individual moral character, next run
the family unison, then manage the nation in order, and last peace will prevail throughout
the universe.
In the traditional society of China, agriculture was the pillar industry without any doubt,
leaving an indelible imprint on arts, morality, political thought, philosophy, etc. Particularly,
since women were never the main force in agricultural industry, they occupied lower status
than men. As the saying goes, innocence is the virtue for women, they rarely had right to
learn in schools, take imperial examination (i.e. Keju test), participate in politics and even
appear in public. The empresses of Qing dynasty were no exception. Although they run and
manage the routine of the harem, honored with “mother of all the people”, they had to de-
pend on their husbands thoroughly and were forbidden to join in the administrative decision
and execution (Wakeman, 1985). Monotony of everyday life accompanied them.
From a sociological perspective we can observe that the empress were an organic part
of the social structure. Since the social background changed, the rights and responsibilities
of the empress’ were dissimilar in the whole Qing dynasty (Young, 1969, vol.36). When the
emperor was too young to deal with threats from social turbulence or evolution such as the
rise of secret societies and wars with European countries, the empress (empress dowager)
started to obtain the equal power as the emperor did, even exceeded the male dominators.
Take Empress Zhuang Wen, Lady Borjigit, as an example. She was the mother of Hong Tai-
ji's successor, Emperor Shunzhi, and grandmother of Shunzhi's successor, Emperor Kangxi.
She wielded significant influence in the Qing imperial court during the reigns of her imma-
ture son and grandson. Known for her wisdom and political insight, Empress Zhuang Wen
is a respected figure in the history of the Qing Dynasty. Another example is Empress Qin
Xian, namely Empress Dowager Cixi. Selected by the Emperor Xianfeng as an imperial
concubine in her adolescence, she gave birth to his son, who became the Emperor Tongzhi
upon Xianfeng's death and installed her nephew as Emperor Guangxu, contrary to the rules
of succession, after the death of Tongzhi. As Wang (2010) said, Cixi was a powerful and
charismatic woman who unofficially but effectively controlled the Manchu Qing Dynasty
in China for 47 years, from 1861 to her death in 1908. This requires a specialized discus-
sion (Zhonghua Book Company, 2008, p. 3313-p. 3389).
DEMISES OF EMPRESSES
Demise indicates the expiration of the empress; however, the record of history about her
still goes on. In Qing Dynasty, obsequies of the emperor and the empress are addressed as
"Xiong Yi", sharing the same importance with enthronement, matrimonial ceremony and
Wanshou Festival, i.e. the emperor's birthday.
Based on “Events of the Qing Reign”, a severe process was followed. Before her immi-
nent death, the empress was initially cleaned up and covered with body powder by eunuchs
and servant maids. Subsequently, she was dressed in the luxurious cerement which massive
pearl and jewels attached on. The memorial services were undoubtedly indispensable after
her demise. The obeisance was given by the living emperor, imperial concubines, descen-
dants and the officials. After being put into the coffin ceremoniously, the corpse was in-
terred amidst the mausoleum in an astrologically favorable time. Particularly, if the empress
expired long after her husband, a solely mausoleum complex near her husband’s needed to
be built; otherwise, she would be interred amidst the tomb the emperor prepared for him-
self.
After the empress’ death, a posthumous name, also commonly called respectful name,
would be given to her by the court. In ancient China, a posthumous name has a long history
dating back to Zhou Dynasty and is used almost exclusively instead of one's personal name
or other official titles during his life. Viewing the posthumous names of 26 empresses of the
whole Qing dynasty, we can find them highly stereotypical: The character of "filial" (xiao)
is always initial, which reflects the basic ruling ideology of the Qing court; the second word
is the core, distinguishing one empress from another, and takes the last character of her
husband’s posthumous name as an ending, e.g. Empresses Xiao Jing Xian and Xiao Sheng
Xian are two spouses of Emperor Yongzheng, whose posthumous name ends with “Xian”.
Successors would also increase the number of characters in posthumous name for her in
festival days and other special occasions, expressing adoration and fondly remembering to
her. Such characters added later are also stereotypical.
The number of characters in posthumous names was different, while most of the em-
presses have names in between 14 to 16 characters. A small proportion of them are excep-
tion for complex and diverse reasons. Take Empress Xiao Xian, Lady Donggo for exam-
ple, the total number of whose posthumous name was 11 (Dennerline, 2002, vol.9). As is
mentioned above, Lady Donggo was posthumously elevated to empress and given a grand
posthumous name; however, it was against the customs of the Manchu court. Ignoring her
legitimacy, Shunzhi’s successors refused to add characters for Lady Donggo and did not
take the last character of her husband’s posthumous name as an ending.
REVIEW AND CONCLUSION
The introduction of Qing dynasty’s imperial harem has revealed two kinds of inequalities,
which are components of the feudal clan system.
Initially, inequality exists between males and females. In the Book of Changes, i.e.
Zhouyi, the great work of Philosophy in ancient China, the author likened males to the sky
while females to the earth, stated that “the sky stays above and the earth comes down, and
everything in nature obtains its appropriate position; status of men and women are dis-
tinguishing, and explicit divisions of labors appear”, along with the saying “only do men
enjoy a higher status than women can achieve social harmony”. In patriarchal society, par-
ticularly in East Asia, males took the leadership of the whole clan; the wives are husband's
appendants to some degree.
Inequality between the legal wife and concubines comes next. Polygyny, or the “Di-shu
system” is the core of the marriage system during feudal China. The Chinese character “Di”
signifies the legal wife and her descendants, while “Shu” stands for concubines and their
descendant. The inequality exists in various aspects, as is mentioned above, the empress,
i.e. the legal wife of the emperor, has advantages over other concubines in the number of
servants, dress as well as personal adornment, etc. Her son is more likely to be conferred
the crown prince and inherit the throne. On the other hand, inequality on the status brings
opportunities of the promotion and demotion. As for the plot in the series, concubines forge
alliances and cliques, fighting each other in the hope of gaining favor with the emperor.
Though not all of these meet the historical facts, viewers would love to analyze the truth
behind the scenes of the power conflicts.
REFERENCES
Dennerline, J. (2002). The Shun-chih Reign. In W. J. Peterson (Ed.), Cambridge History of China (Vol. 9,
Part 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Er, Y. (1739). Annals of the Eight Banners (Biography of Women I, p. 1029-p. 1045). Jilin: Jilin Literature
and History Press.
Seagrave, S. (1992). Dragon lady: The life and legend of the last empress of China. New York: Vintage
Books.
Wang, S. (1980). The establishment of the empresses in Qing dynasty. Palace Museum Journal, 1980(3),
40-48.
Wang, L. (2010). Empress Dowager Cixi and Queen Victoria. Guoxue, 2010(2), 20-24.
Wakeman, F. (1985). The great enterprise: The Manchu reconstruction of imperial order in seven-
teenth-century China. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
Young, M. B. (1969). The rhetoric of empire: American China policy, 1895-1901. Harvard University
Press.
Yang, J. (2012, May). Soap’s conniving concubines draw official fire. Global Times, May 21. Retrieved
May 30, 2012, from http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/710437/Soaps-conniving-concu-
bines-draw-offical-fire.aspx
Zhao, E., Miao, Q., & Ke, S. (1927). Draft history of Qing (Biography I, p. 530-p. 569). Shanghai: Zhong-
hua Book Company.
Zhonghua Book Company. (2008). Qingshilu (Memoir of Emperor Shunzhi, p. 375-p. 389). Shanghai:
Zhonghua Book Company. (Original works edited by the apponited officals of the Qing dynasty)
Zhonghua Book Company. (2008). Qingshilu (Memoir of Emperor Daoguang, Vol. 4, p. 2668-p. 2701).
Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. (Original works edited by the apponited officals of the Qing dy-
nasty)
Zhonghua Book Company. (2008). Qingshilu (Memoir of Emperor Xianfeng, Vol. 5, p. 3313-p. 3389).
Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. (Original works edited by the apponited officals of the Qing dy-
nasty)
Zhang, C. (1929). Biography of the Empresses, Consorts and Concubines (Vol. 2, p. 4-p. 58). Shanyin
Pingshi Yinghuaguan.
Name list of the Qing dynasty’s emperors and empresses:
Temple name Full name Chinese era name Spouse Spouse’s Clan
Empress
Borjigit
Aisin-Gioro Hong Duan Wen
Qing Taizong Chongde
Taiji Empress
Borjigit
Zhuang Wen
Demoted
Borjigit
Empress
Empress
Borjigit
Hui Zhang
Qing Shizu Aisin-Gioro Fulin Shunzhi
Empress
Donggo
Xiao Xian
Empress
Tunggiya
Kang Zhang
Empress
Heseri
Cheng Ren
Empress
Niohuru
Aisin-Gioro Zhao Ren
Qing Shengzu Kangxi
Xuanye Empress
Tunggiya
Yi Ren
Empress
Wuya
Gong Ren
Empress
Ulanara
Aisin-Gioro Jing Xian
Qing Shizong Yongzheng
Yinzhen Empress
Niohuru
Sheng Xian
Empress
Fuca
Xian Chun
Aisin-Gioro Ulanara, the Step
Qing Gaozong Qianlong Ulanara
Hongli Empress
Empress
Weigiya
Yi Chun
Empress
Sitara
Aisin-Gioro Shu Rui
Qing Renzong Jiaqing
Yongyan Empress
Niohuru
He Rui
Empress
Niohuru
Mu Cheng
Empress
Daoguang Tunggiya
Aisin-Gioro Shen Cheng
Qing Xuanzong
Minning Empress
Niohuru
Quan Cheng
Empress
Borjigit
Jing Cheng
Empress
Sakoda
De Xian
Aisin-Gioro Empress
Qing Wenzong Xianfeng Niohuru
Yizhu Zhen Xian
Empress
Yehenara
Qin Xian
Aisin-Gioro Empress
Qing Muzong Tongzhi Alute
Zaichun Zhe Yi
Aisin-Gioro Empress
Qing Dezong Guangxu Yehenara
Zaitian Ding Jing
Author’s Biodata
Jingwei Liu, male and born on Oct. 25, 1990, now is an undergraduate of School of Public
Affairs, Xiamen University, majoring in sociology. Mr. Liu’s attention focuses on Chinese
Culture and Intercultural Studies. Huanhai Fang, Ph.D. of Fudan University, professor of
Overseas Education College, Xiamen University. Dr Fang’s research focuses on Teaching
Chinese as a Second Language and Cognitive Linguistics.

xmliu1990@qq.com
ISSN: 2224-2716
Kuhn, D. (2009). The age of Confucian rule: The Song transformation of China.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reviewed by: Hang Lin1, University of Würzburg, Germany
The Song dynasty [960-1279] not only marks a decisive rupture in China’s history but also
a fascinating period in East Asian history. However, despite the considerable scholarly
output in Song studies since the 1970s, a comprehensive appreciation of the history of
China’s Song Dynasty in English had been lacking until very recently. About the same time
when the long-awaited volume on Song history in the Cambridge History of China series
hit the shelves in the first half of 2009,2 the Harvard University Press placed forth a series
of six books on the history of imperial China with Dieter Kuhn’s fourth volume The Age of
Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China.
Similar to the Cambridge volume, Dieter Kuhn's study of Song history is subdivided
into two parts: a brief but succinct chronological survey of political history followed by
topical chapters addressing developments and transformations in the socio-economic, in-
tellectual and cultural history of Chinese society, and some of the neighboring non-Chinese
states such as the Khitan Liao 遼 (907-1125), Jurchen Jin 金 (1115-1234), and Tanguts Xi
Xia 西夏 (1038-1227), roughly between 960 and 1279. The book begins rather convention-
ally with a political history in the respective periods. In the first chapter, the author reviews
the ninth-century pre-Song past, illustrating the state of the lands the Song dynasty inherit-
ed upon its establishment. Chapter Two emphasizes the achievements of the first three Song
emperors. The following chapter narrates the successive large-scale reforms launched by
Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989-1052) and Wan Anshi 王安石 (1021-1089) in the eleventh-cen-
tury and the collapse of the Song regime under Jurchen incursions. The fourth chapter then
highlights the major moments in the rise and fall of the remnant Song court in the southern
half of its former territories from 1127 to 1279. As shown above, the first chapters of the
book generously cover the most famous events regarding the Song emperors, chief council-
ors and other political actors, taking the reader on an exploration of the major transforma-
tions in the political and geopolitical landscape and in interstate power relations during four
centuries of Chinese history. Although most of these accounts were brief, Kuhn provides
the book with a lively narrative and presents the Song political history in a lively and en-
gaging style.
The overwhelming focus of this book, apart from political events, is fixed on other
spheres which shaped Song history, as Kuhn ventures into intellectual, economic and social
history. Chapter Five focuses heavily on Confucianism, indicating the origin of the book’s
title. The following chapters describe Song’s examination and education systems (ch. 6),
rituals such as marriage and funeral customs of Song Chinese and their non-Han neighbors
(ch. 7), the expansion of new styles of literature, painting and ceramics (ch. 8), daily life in
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Hang Lin. E-mail: hang.lin@uni-wuerzburg.de

2　Denis Twichett and Paul Jakov Smith Hang, ed., The Five Dynasties and Sung China and Its Precursors,
907-1279 AD, vol. 5, part one of The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
110 LIN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 109-112
the capitals of Kaifeng and Hangzhou (ch. 9), advances and innovations in technology (ch.
10), the financial policies and taxation systems (ch. 11) and colorful accounts of private
lives and fashions in the Song (ch. 12).
As the title of Kuhn’s book suggests, Song China was fundamentally a Confucian state.
However, some Song specialists may feel that the ideas of Zhu Xi, the Cheng brothers and
other Neo-Confucianist ideas have not been discussed with enough intensity (p. 101-p. 106)
while more attention was paid to Buddhism and Daosim (p. 106-p. 112). What Kuhn seems
to emphasize here is that the evolution of Neo-Confucianism during the Song took im-
mense account of Buddhism and Daoism. In effect, this was necessary as many Confucians
in early Song responded vigorously to the “new problems and challenges presented by the
flourishing influence of Buddhism and Daoism in Chinese culture” (p. 100). Kuhn notes
that the relationships between Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism were so close that
Song Confucians “faced a religious reality that could not be ignored but asked for a com-
patible answer” (p. 112). In other words, the philosophical innovation of Song’s intellectual
society was to reform Confucianism, taking into account the popularity of Buddhism and
Daoism. In turn, the Buddhist canon integrated Confucian filial piety.
The main strength of Kuhn’s study lies in his detailed and vivid socio-economical and
cultural accounts in the Song period. For instance, the Song conception of city design rep-
resents “a change of urban paradigms” (p. 191) because the Song capitals were designed
to accommodate markets and night time activity, as opposed to the Tang when these activ-
ities were “regulated and confined to sections of cities together with red light districts” (p.
189). As a result of Song’s “open cities,” its Kaifeng population increased drastically from
“809,000 people” in the 980s to “about 1.3 million in 1103” (p. 195). Both in Kaifeng and
Hangzhou, trade and commerce flourished, the proliferation of workshops, markets and
family business were “without parallel elsewhere” (p. 209). Restaurants of various kinds
catered to “all sorts of guests and tastes” and recreation and pleasure establishments made
“the capital never rest” (p. 203).
Based on a wide range of primary and secondary scholarship on textual and material
sources, the text moves from the description of more common themes like popular enter-
tainment to subject matters sometimes overlooked in survey histories; such as marriage
customs (p. 138-p. 142), funeral practices (p. 148-p. 154), or health care (p. 271-p. 275).
Compared to earlier works aimed at a general audience, such as Jacques Gernet's Daily Life
in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion3 or Mark Elvin's The Pattern of the Chinese
Past,4 Kuhn’s book offers a more complete bibliography along with many more citations
to primary and secondary literature. Meticulous accounts accommodated in the book show
that Kuhn is particularly good on topics that deal with material culture that are broadly con-
ceived, such as farm production (p. 213-p. 220), weaving skills (p. 220-p. 224), transport
canals (p. 224-p. 230), mines (p. 230-p. 232), currency (p. 234-p. 244), clothing (p. 263-p.
266), sedan chairs (p. 255-p. 256), cosmetics (p. 256-p. 261) and the like. He has written a
3　Jacques Gernet, Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion: 1250-1276 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1962).
4　Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).
THE AGE OF CONFUCIAN RULE: THE SONG TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA 111
large body of academic literature which is devoted to the developments of technology and
material culture in China, such the volume on textile technology in Joseph Needham’s stan-
dard work Science and Civilisation in China,5 A Place for the Dead,6 a comprehensive re-
search on Song graves and tombs based on careful survey of archeological discoveries and
Die Kunst des Grabbaus,7 a pioneer work on Khitan Liao’s unique practices of reshaping
Chinese-style dome-shaped tombs, to name only a few.
Another one of many strengths of this book is the tasteful integration of Song’s neigh-
bors, Liao, Jin and Xi Xia, throughout the work. Regarding the treaties Song signed with
the respective neighbors, Kuhn sides with those Song officials who pragmatically opted
for indemnified peace, willing to tolerate de facto coexistence with other alien states. He
argues that the annual payment of tribute sets “a precedent for coexistence on the basis of
peaceful bilateral relations for generations to come” (p. 46), crediting Song's prosperity in
part to the long peace. Moreover, Kuhn juxtaposes his discussions on Buddhism in Song (p.
108-p. 110) with similar religious practices in Liao and Jin, as well as comparing marriage
customs of the Khitan and Jurchen (p. 146-p. 148) with the Han Chinese (p. 138-p. 142).
Indeed, the era between the 10th and 13th century marks one of the most decisive ruptures
in the history of China. China experienced under the Song, an economic and cultural apex
in its history, but the late medieval age was also a time when tribal regimes of the northeast
renewed their incursions and became a menace for the Song.8 Kuhn reminds us the impor-
tance and necessity to include Song’s non-Han neighbors in our observation of Song China
because “China” did not exist as it was understood before or since, but rather a territory
divided among different ethnic nations and states.
Apart from occasional anachronisms and pinyin transliteration errors, for example, the
Four Books had not yet been separated out and established as standard canons for the Civil
Service Examinations in the eleventh century (p. 129) and Mei Yaochen appears wrongly as
Mei Yaozhen (p. 260), Song historians may take issue with some of the larger interpretive
claims. The relationships between “Neo-Confucian rationality” (p. 279) and Song’s explo-
ration of the natural and material world (p. 102), as well as changes of Chinese conception
of world order in the context of political and to some extent also cultural coexistence with
“barbarian” conquest states, may also be disputed. Of course, we must bear in mind that the
main aim of these Harvard series is to reach out to more general readers than Song special-
5　Dieter Kuhn, Textile Technology: Spinning and Reeling, vol. 5, part IX of Science and Civilisation in China
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
6　Dieter Kuhn, A Place for the Dead: An Archaeological Documentary on Graves and Tombs of the Song
Dynasty (960-1279) (Heidelberg: Edition Forum, 1996).
7　Dieter Kuhn, Die Kunst des Grabbaus: Kuppelgräber der Liao-Zeit (907-1125) (The Art of Tomb
Architecture: Dome-Shaped Tombs in the Liao) (Heidelberg: Edition Forum, 1998).
8　On the diplomatic relations between the Song and its neighbors, see for example Christian Schwarz-
Schilling, Der Friede von Shan-Yüan (1005 n. Chr.): Einbeitrag yur Geschichte der chinesischen Diplomatie
(The Peace of Shan-Yüan, 1005 A.D.: A Contribution to the History of Chinese Diplomacy) (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1959); Jing-shen Tao, Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1988); David Curtis Wright, From War to Diplomatic Parity in Eleventh-Century
China: Sung’s Foreign Relations with Khitan Liao (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
112 LIN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 109-112
ists, and in this sense, Kuhn rises to this challenge successfully. In summary, Dieter Kuhn’s
The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China offers a picturesque por-
trait of Song China full of skillful syntheses, intriguing observations and provocative argu-
ments, to both professional historians as well as the wider public.
Author’s Biodata
Hang Lin is currently a PhD candidate in Chinese history at the University of Würzburg,
Germany. His research focuses on the cultural history and material culture of Medieval
China, in particular the Song, Liao and Jin dynasties.

hang.lin@uni-wuerzburg.de
ISSN: 2224-2716
Fu Baoshi’s Yuntai Shan Tu:

A Modern Interpretation of an Ancient Design1
Yuling Huang
Fu Baoshi, a modern master of Chinese painting, painted a series of three paintings of Yuntai
Mountain between 1940 and 1942. These paintings were produced based on Gu Kaizhi’s design
described in the text Hua Yuntai Shan Ji 畫雲臺山記 (Record on Painting Yuntai Mountain). Gu
Kaizhi was a fourth century Chinese master known for his figure painting and literary talents. In
1933, Japanese scholar Ise Senichiro alluded in his writing that Gu Kaizhi was the earliest known
Chinese landscape painter. This statement propelled Fu Baoshi to embark a decade long quest to
investigate the accuracy of this statement. After a period of intensive study of Gu Kaizhi and Hua
Yuntai Shan Ji, Fu altered his opinion from questioning Ise’s statement, to stressing the significant
role of Gu Kaizhi in the development of Chinese landscape painting. Fu’s study of Hua Yuntai
Shan Ji and his relentless devotion to the subject of Gu Kaizhi resulted in his reassessment of the
role of Gu Kaizhi. This paper is intended to explain the reason for his dedication to this subject
and how he analyzed the text to recreate Gu Kaizhi’s design. It also strives to demonstrate the re-
lationship between textual materials (art history writings) and the actual art practice.
Fu Bao Shi (1904-1965), an artist of many genres, was one of the masters of modern
Chinese painting. His achievements as a seal carver, an art historian and ink painter have
exceeded many of his contemporaries. His art history writings reflect his intellect in
analyzing textual sources to reconstruct new narratives of Chinese art. His body of work
in landscape, figure, history and propaganda paintings also exemplified his abilities to
assimilate various sources, including art of the east and the west, history, art history and
politics, to enrich his artistic vocabulary. Fu’s career and work also provide an excellent
study of the convergence between art history and art practice. His landscape paintings of
Yuntai Mountain (Yuntai Shan Tu) (Fig. 1) best illustrate his knowledge of art history and
his genius in assimilating this knowledge into his art practice.
Figure1. Fu Baoshi,Yuntai Mountain, 1941, Ink & Colors on Paper, Nanjing Museum, China.
1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Yuling Huang. E-mail: yh35209@aol.com

114 HUANG QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES, 1(2), 113-129
Gu Kaizhi 顧愷之 (c.344-406), a Six Dynasties painter known for his painting and
literary talents, was a master of Chinese figure painting. His The Admonitions of the In-
structress to the Court Ladies scroll represents one of the earliest achievements of Chinese
figure painting. Gu also wrote three known essays-- Lun Hua 論畫 (On Painting), Wei Jin
Shengliu Huazan 魏晉勝流畫贊 (Famous Paintings of Wei and Jin Dynasties) , and Hua
Yuntai Shan Ji 畫雲臺山記 (Record on Painting Yuntai Mountain). These texts are record-
ed in Lidai Minghua Ji 歷代名畫記 (Record on Famous Paintings in Successive Dynasties)
by Tang dynasty (618-907) critic Zhang Yanyuan 張彥遠 (c. 815-877). Lun Hua discusses
painting techniques2. Wei Jin Shengliu Huazan evaluates twenty-one paintings by Wei (220-
265) and Jin (265-420) dynasties artists. Hua Yuntai Shan Ji is an instructional text with
regard to arranging landscape elements in a composition while focusing on the Daoist tale
of Zhang Daoling 張道陵 and his followers.
In 1933, Ise Senichiro 伊勢専一郎 published Ko Kaishi yori Kei Kō ni itaru: Shina
sansui gashi 自顧愷之至荊浩支那山水畫史 (From Gu Kaizhi to Jing Hao: history of
Chinese landscape painting) in which he discussed the development of Chinese landscape
painting from Gu Kaizhi to Jing Hao 荊浩 (c.855-915). Ise alluded to Gu Kaizhi as the
founder of Chinese landscape painting. He asserted landscape scenes in Chinese painting
were first seen in Gu’s The Admonitions scroll (Fig. 2), but it is Gu’s Hua Yuntai Shan Ji
that fully reveals the style of Gu’s landscape work.3 Fu Baoshi, then probably more accom-
plished as a seal carver than a painter, questioned Ise’s statement and disparaged Ise’s inac-
curate reading of his materials.
Figure 2. Gu Kaizhi (c.345-406, Attri.), Hunter, Detail from The Admononitions of the
Instructress to the Court Ladies, Ink & Colors on Silk, British Museum.
2　Fu Baoshi actually thought Zhang Yanyuan transposed the content of Lun Hua for that of Wei Jin Shengliu
Huazan. This opinion was also supported by another prominent modern Chinese art historian Yu Jianhua.
3　See Ise (1933, p. 14).
FU BAOSHI’S YUNTAI SHAN TU 115
This incident propelled Fu’s nearly decade long intense study of Gu Kaizhi. Fu is the
first Chinese artist to give a detailed reading of Gu’s Hua Yuntai Shan Ji and inspired much
subsequent scholarship of this text.4 His research on Hua Yuntai Shan Ji ignited the excite-
ment of 20th century scholars on the possibility of rewriting the history of Chinese land-
scape painting. Fu’s paintings of Yuntai Mountain are the apex of his preoccupation with
this subject. This article is intended to explain the reason for his dedication to this subject
and how he analyzed the text Hua Yuntai Shan Ji to create his paintings of Yuntai Moun-
tain. It also strives to demonstrate the relationship between textual materials (art history
writings) and the actual art practice.
FU BAOSHI AS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ART HISTORIAN
Fu’s career as an art historian began in 1925 and was a prolific writer. He spent seven
months to finish Guohua Yuanliu Gaishu 國畫源流概述 (A Survey of the Origin of
National Painting) and took him a month to complete Moyin Xue 摹印學 (A Study of Seal
Carving) in the following year.5 In 1929, he finished Zhongguo Huihua Bianqian Shigang
中國繪畫變遷史綱 (An Outline History of the Transformation of Chinese Painting), and
published it in 1931.6 In this work, Fu describes Gu Kaizhi as a superb figure painter and
lists ten of Gu’s Daoist painting recorded in the Xuanhe Huapu 宣和畫譜 .7 He mentioned
Gu’s three treatises and considered them representing the aesthetics and art practice of Jin
dynasty.8 However, he discussed only briefly the importance of Gu’s Lun Hua and barely
touched the rest of the two essays.
It was not until 1933 after Ise Senichiro published his book, that Fu began obsessively
to investigate the life of Gu Kaizhi and his Huan Yuntai Shan Ji. What excited Fu Baoshi to
conduct this intensive research project was the possibility of rewriting the history of Chi-
nese landscape painting and redefining the role of Gu Kaizhi, who is traditionally known as
a figure painting master. Ise indicated in his book that The Admonitions scroll painted by
Gu Kaizhi announced the beginning of Chinese landscape painting. He also stressed that it
is Gu’s Hua Yutai Shan Ji, though hardly studied by scholars in the past, truly reveals the
style of Gu Kazhi’s landscape work.9 Nevertheless, Ise’s appreciation of Hua Yutai Shan Ji
was not because the text illustrates a realistic landscape but instead it “conveys the spirit
and character of the artist”.10
After reading Ise’s book, Fu quickly wrote an article and raised five questions challeng-
4　Twentieth century Chinese scholars like Yu Jianhua, Pan Tianshou, Ma Cai, Wu Lifu, Wen Zhaotong, etc
have written articles about Hua Yuntai Shan Ji. Scholars in Taiwan and mainland China in recent decades also
have been interested in this text and have written about Hua Yuntai Shan Ji.
5　See Ye (2004, p. 5).
6　Ibid, p. 6.
7　See Fu, Zhongguo Huihua Bianqian Shigang (1986, p.26-p.27).
8　Ibid, p. 26
9　See Ise (1933, p. 14).
10 Ibid, p. 19.
ing Ise’s statement.11 He disagreed with Ise’s declaration of Gu Kazhi as the earliest master
of Chinese landscape painting. Fu considered Gu Kaizhi was primarily a figure painter. Fu
also opposes to Ise’s claim that Chinese landscape painting is unnaturalistic and unable to
distinguish the distance between objects. He disputed over the date of Tang dynasty artist
Wang Wei and Ise’s comparison of the Northern and Southern Schools of landscape paint-
ing. Lastly, Fu criticized Ise’s reading of the classical texts of Chinese painting theories,
including punctuations and interpretations.
Between 1935 and 1942, Fu Baoshi wrote and published many articles. In 1942, Fu
described himself as spending more time researching art history than painting for the past
ten years.12 In 1940, he published Jin Gu Kaizhi Hua Yuntai Shan Ji Zhi Yanjiu 晉顧愷之
畫雲臺山之研究 (Study of Hua Yuntai Shan Ji by Jin Dynasty Gu Kaizhi) and wrote Shi-
tao Sankao 石濤三考 (Examining Three Issues on Shitao). His Zhongguo Gudai Shanshui
Huashi de Yanjiu 中國古代山水畫史的研究 (Study of the History of Ancient Chinese
Landscape Painting) published in 1942 summarizes his nearly a decade of research on the
history of Chinese landscape painting.
In the epilogue of the 1960 edition of this book, he suggested it was Ise’s research that
triggered his determination to challenge this difficult text.13 After seven years of research
and numerous discussions with his literary friends including Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892-
1978), he was able to publish his study of the text. Fu Baoshi was the first Chinese scholar
to delve into the content of Hua Yuntai Shan Ji. In the article Jin Gu Kaizhi Hua Yuntai
Shan Ji Zhi Yanjiu, Fu nullified his previous idea addressed in his 1933 article which ques-
tioned the role of Gu Kaizhi as a landscape painter. Instead, he began to share a similar
viewpoint with Ise. Although still uncertain whether Gu Kaizhi was the progenitor of land-
scape painting, Fu insisted Gu’s important role in the development of Chinese landscape
painting. Fu believed Hua Yuntai Shan Ji demonstrated that the history of Chinese land-
scape painting, especially of painting theories, can be traced back to Han (202 BCE-220
ACE) and the early Six Dynasties period which surpassed Xie He, who created the Liu Fa
六法 (Six Treatises) of Chinese painting.14
Xie He’s Liu Fa is probably the most dominant text when discussing the impact of Chi-
nese painting theories on works of art, both in Chinese and Western scholarships. While
Hua Shanshui Xu 畫山水序 (On Painting Landscape) by Zong Bing 宗炳 (375 － 443),
Zhang Yanyuan’s Hua Shanshui Shushi 畫山水樹石 (On Painting Landscape, Trees, and
Rocks) in Lidai Minghua Ji, and Jing Hao 荊浩 (ca. 870-930) Bi-Fa Ji 筆法記 (Notes on
Brush Method), are also popular texts on Chinese landscape painting. Zong Bing’s Hua
Shanshui Xu is often considered the earliest extant text in discussing the art of landscape
11　Ye Zonghao in Fu Baoshi nianpu indicated this article was first written in Japanese in 1933 but was not
published in Japan until May 1936. Fu Baosi translated his article in 1935 and submitted to Dongfang Zazhi 東
方雜誌 (vol.32, no.19, Oct 1935). This article was also repinted in 1991in He Huaishuo (ed)., Jindai Zhonguo
meishushi lunji 近代中國美術史論集 . See Fu, Lun Gu Kaizhi zhi Jing Hao zhi shanshui huashi wenti (1991,
p.3-12).
12　He expressed this in an article Ren wu Chongqing huazhan zixu 壬午重慶畫展自序 , written for his solo
exhibition in Chongqing in 1942.
13　See Fu, Zhongguo Gudai Shanshui Huashi de Yanjiu 中國古代山水畫史的研究 (1960, p. 51). The
epilogue was originally written in 1958.
14　Ibid, p.14-15.
painting. This work written slightly later than Gu Kaizhi’s Hua Yuntai Shan Ji, expresses
Zong’s views on the intimate relationship between landscape and artists, and the art of land-
scape painting. While Hua Yuntai Shan Ji demonstrates a more practical aspect of how to
actually design and create a landscape image to tell a story. The text is a design manuscript
by a 4th-5th century artist.
GU KAIZHI HUAN YUNTAI SHAN JI
Zhang Yanyuan in Lidai Minghua Ji describes the problems with Hua Yuntai Shan Ji as
“There have been many errors after centuries of transcription. I could not acquire a genuine
(good) version to verify its accuracy ( 自古柱傳脱錯，未得妙本勘校 ). This probably
partially explains the reason that the text seems scarcely being studied in the past since it
first appeared in Lidai Minghua Ji. Omissions and mistranscriptions have created much
confusions and difficulties for understanding the text.
The text illustrates the legendary story of Zhang Tianshi testing his followers if they
were capable of receiving divine revelations to transcend from the earthly world. The cli-
max of this legend is only two among his more than two hundred disciples Wang Chang 王
長 and Zhao Sheng 趙昇 were able to receive the secret transmission and ascend to heaven
with their master Zhang Tianshi.15 Yuntai Mountain is the legendary site where the founder
of Daoist establishment Zhang Daoling 張道陵 (or Zhang Tianshi 張天師 ) trained his dis-
ciples and practiced his sect Tianshi-dao 天師道 . The legend took place in Yuntai Moun-
tain which is now located in the east of Cangxi County 蒼溪縣 in the Sichuan province.
Although there are several other mountains named Yuntai 雲臺 in Sichuan, Jiangsu and
Shanxi provinces, they have no apparent relationships with Zhang Daoling16.
Lidai Minhua Ji is recorded in several different later publications starting from
the Ming dynasty. The text of Hua Yuntai Shan Ji consequently also has different ver-
sions. The following text is from Wangshi Huayuan 王氏畫苑 by Ming writer Wang
Shizhen(1526-1590), which is also used by Ise Senichiro for his research.17 The text is as
follows:
山有面則背向有影可令慶雲西而吐於東方清天中凡天及水色盡用空
青竟素上下以暎日西去山別詳其遠近發跡東基轉上未半作紫石如堅
雲者五六枚夾岡乘其間而上使勢蜿蟺如龍因抱峰直頓而上下作積岡
使望之蓬蓬然凝而上次復一峰是石東鄰向者峙峭峰西連西向之丹崖
下據絕磵畫丹崖臨澗上當使赫巘隆崇畫險絕之勢天師坐其上合所坐
石及廕宜磵中桃傍生石間畫天師瘦形而神氣遠據磵指桃回面謂弟子
弟子中有二人臨下到身大怖流汗失色作王良穆然坐答問而超昇神爽
精詣俯眄桃樹又別作王趙趨一人隱西壁傾岩餘見衣裾一人全見室中
使輕妙冷然凡畫人坐時可七分衣服彩色殊鮮微此正蓋山高而人遠耳
15　See Ge (1991, p.30-31). This book was first published in the 4th century and repinted in 1991.
16　See Yuan, et al. (2005, p. 229).
17　The text of Hua Yuntai Shan Ji is also found in Hua Ji 畫記 [Record of painting], Huaxue Quanshi 畫學
全史 [The complete history of painting], and Peiwen Zhai Huapu 佩文齋畫譜 [Painting manual from Peiw-
en-zhai Studio], and others. Some words vary in different versions of the text which adds to the confusion and
difficulty in understanding the text.
中段東面丹砂絕崿及廕當使嵃 < 山戔 > 高驪孤松植其上對天師所壁

以成磵磵可甚相近相近者欲令雙壁之內淒愴澄清神明之居必有與立
焉可於次峰頭作一紫石亭丘以象左闕之夾高驪絕萼西通雲臺以表路
路左闕峰似巖為根根下空絕並諸石重勢巖相承以合臨東磵其西石泉
又見乃因絕際作通岡伏流潛降小復東出下磵為石瀨淪沒於淵所以一
西一東而下者欲使自欲為圖雲臺西北二面可一圖岡繞之上為雙碣石
象左右闕石上作孤遊生鳳當婆娑體儀羽秀而詳軒尾翼以眺絕磵後一
段赤岓當使釋弁如裂電對雲臺西鳳所臨壁以成磵磵下有清流其側壁
外面作一白虎匍石飲水後為降勢而絕凡三段山畫之雖長當使畫甚促
不爾不稱鳥獸中時有用之者可定其儀而用之下為磵物景皆倒作清氣
帶山下三分倨一以上使耿然成二重
FU’S READING OF “HUAN YUN TAI SHAN JI”
Perhaps due to the difficulty of the text, it has been misunderstood as a manuscript for
illustrating a Daoist work. However, less than one fourth of the text is devoted to the
activities of Zhang Tianshi and his disciples. The rest of the text is dedicated to illustrate
the landscape surrounding the small group of people. Fu believed the text is quintessentially
a design of a landscape painting. The text containing verbs such as ke 可 (can), shi 使 or
dangshi 當使 (should) throughout the essay suggested to Fu that Hua Yuntai Shan Ji was an
instructional text for painting the work.
He thought this classical text should be divided into five sections18. The first, third and
the fourth sections of the text illustrate mountain scenes on the right (east), the middle and
the left (west) of the composition. The second section focuses on the figures, while the fifth
section gives general instructions on the entire painting. A key issue central to the under-
standing of the text is the numbers of figures in Gu’s design. Ise pointed out that there were
three figures in the text, Zhang Tian-shi and his two pupils, but Fu identified there were two
other disciples as well19.
The following English translation is based on my study of Fu Baoshi’s analysis, my
reading of the original text and occasionally referencing on other scholars’ works.20 I also
juxtapose the same text recorded in Ise’s publication and Fu Baozhi’s writing to show their
differences.
First Section
山有面。則背向有影。可令慶雲西而吐於東方清天中。凡天及水
色。盡用空青。竟素上下以暎。日西去山。別詳其遠近。發跡東基。
18　Other scholars such as Yu Jianhua read the text slightly differently. Yu also divides the text into five sec-
tions, but has a different way of dividing the sections. In this paper the text is divided based on Fu Baoshi’s
analysis.
19　Fu, Zhongguo gudai shanshui huashi de yanjiu (1960, p.17-p.18).
20　Other scholars include Yu Jianhua, Wu Lifu, and Yuan Yougen. The author of this paper reviewed all the
writings of these scholars to translate this text. However, when encountering a slightly different interpretation,
Fu Baoshi’s interpretation would take precedence.
轉上未半。作紫石如堅雲者五六枚。夾岡乘其間而上。使勢蜿蟺如龍。
因抱峰直頓。而上下作積岡。使望之蓬蓬然凝而上。次復一峰是石。
東鄰向者峙峭。峰西連西向之丹崖。下據絕磵。畫丹崖臨澗上。當
使赫巘隆崇。畫險絕之勢。（伊勢）
山有面，則背向有影，可令慶雲西而吐於東方清天中。凡天及水色，
盡用空青，竟素上下以暎日（之）。西去山，別詳其遠近，發跡東基，
轉上未半，作紫石如堅雲者五六枚，夾岡乘其間而上，使勢蜿蟺如
龍，因抱峰直頓而上。下作積岡，使望之蓬蓬然凝而上。次復一峰，
是石 ( 在 ) 東鄰向者，峙峭峰西，連西向之丹崖，下據絕磵。畫丹崖，
臨澗上，當使赫巘隆崇，畫險絕之勢。21（傅抱石）
The mountain has different views. If the front views are facing the
sun, there would be shadows in the back. One can paint the clouds rising
from the west and slowly moving toward the eastern sky. Both the sky
and the water can be painted with sky blue throughout the silk surface to
reflect their colors and the gradual movements of the clouds.22
Paint to distinguish the distances between the mountains, which begin
from the east and extend toward the west. Before reaching the middle
section of the mountain range, draw five to six purple rocks shaped like
solid clouds. The mountain ridges are increasingly jutting upward, like
dragons embracing the narrow mountain peaks, twisting, writhing, and
turning upward towards the sky. Paint the lower mountain ridges under-
neath to emphasize the monumental mountain mass above. To the west, it
connects to another mountain range, where the perilous cliffs are accom-
panied by the inaccessible stream. Draw the dangerous cliffs and rushing
water to illustrate the hazardous environment of mountain landscape.
Second Section
天師坐其上。合所坐石及廕。宜磵中桃傍生石間。畫天師。瘦形
而神氣遠。據磵指桃。回面謂弟子。弟子中有二人。臨下到。身大怖。
流汗失色。作王良。穆然坐。答問而超昇。神爽精詣。俯盼桃樹。
又別作王趙趨。一人隱西壁傾巖。餘見衣裾。一人全見。室中。使
輕妙冷然。凡畫人。坐時可七分。衣服彩色殊鮮微。此正蓋山高而
人遠耳。中段東面。丹砂絕萼及廕。當使嵃 < 山戔 > 高驪。孤松植
其上。對天師所壁。以成磵。磵可甚相近。相近者。欲令雙壁之內。
淒愴澄清。神明之居。必有與立焉。（伊勢）
天師坐其上，合所坐石及廕，宜磵中，桃傍生石間。畫天師，瘦
形而神氣遠，據磵指挑，回面謂弟子。弟子中，有二人臨下，到（倒）
身大怖，流汗失色。作王良，穆然坐，答問。而超（趙）昇神爽精
詣，俯眄（盼）桃樹。又別作王趙趨。一人隱西壁傾巖，餘見衣裾，
一人全見，室中使輕妙冷然。凡畫人，坐時可七分，衣服彩色殊鮮，
21　The characters in parenthesis are the words Fu Baoshi changed from the text recorded in Lidai Minghua Ji
to reflect what Fu thought was the original meaning of the text.
22　The image is supposed to be painted on a silk surface. Therefore, it is probably not designed for a wall or
architectural space.
微此 “ 不 ” 正，蓋山高而人遠耳。中段東面，丹砂絕萼（崿）及廕，
當使嵃 < 山戔 > 高驪，孤松植其上，對天師所 “ 臨 ” 壁以成磵。磵
可甚相近，相近者，欲令雙壁之內，淒愴 “ 澄 ” 清，神明之居，必
有與立焉。23（傅抱石）
The Master Zhang Tian-Shi sits by the cliffs sheltered by a large
tree. A peach tree grows by the stream under the cliffs. Draw the Master
with slim stature but high spirit pointing to the peach tree by the stream.
With his back to the viewer, he talks to his disciples. Wang Liang sits
calmly responding to the master’s questions, while Zhao Sheng appears
clear-minded looking toward the peach tree with intense concentration. 24
Two other disciples are terrified and perspire awfully.
Wang and Zhao have left the scene. 25 One is partially hidden by the
west side of the cliffs, while the other can be fully seen. The place feels
tranquil and serene. When painting figures, seated figures should be one
seventh of the height of standing figures. Clothing should be painted with
bright colors. Need to follow this principle to create an effective image.
Figures should appear small from the distance contrast to the tall and
massive mountains.
At the eastern side of the middle section of the composition, a dan-
gerous cliff of reddish-brown rocks dominate the landscape and provide
sanctuary for the group. Make the cliff towering and treacherous and with
a lone, large pine tree growing above the cliff. A stream nearby, opposite
the cliff where the master is sitting, flows to the valley. The two cliffs are
close to create a space of mystery and sanctification where deities would
reside.
Third Section
可於次峰頭作一紫石。亭立以象左闕之夾。高驪絕崿。西通雲臺。
以表路。路左闕峰。似巖為根。根下空絕並諸石重勢。巖相承以合。
臨東磵。其西石泉又見。乃因絕際作通岡。伏流潛降。小復東。出下磵。
為石瀨。淪沒於淵。所以一西一東而下者。欲使自然為圖。（伊勢）
可於次峰頭作一紫石亭丘（立），以象左闕之夾高驪絕崿，西通
雲臺，以表路（道）路。左闕峰，似（以）巖為根，根下空絕，並
諸石重勢，“ 與 ” 巖相承，以合臨東磵。其西石泉又見，乃因絕際作
通岡，伏流潛降，小（水）復東出，下磵為石瀨，淪沒於淵。所以
一西一東而下者，欲使自欲（然）為圖。（傅抱石）
23　The characters in quotes are the words that Fu Baoshi thought should be added to the text.
24　Wang Liang 王良 should be Wang Chang 王長 , but it was not been clarified until scholar Yu Jianhua
discovered this error later. Fu still refers to this figure as Wang Liang. Fu considered the text “chao sheng 超昇
should be the figure Zhao Sheng 趙昇 , one of Zhang Tianshi’s pupils
25　Fu changed his previous opinion that Wang and Zhao’s second appearance suggesting a separate work.
Instead, he claimed that it is like an ancient wall painting showing two consecutive episodes of the same event.
Fu decided to separate the two figures further away from the first group of figures to distinguish them from the
Wang and Zhao earlier appearance.
A tall dark-purple rock can be painted on top of the western mountain

range as if creating a watchtower on the left, opposite to the mountain
of the tall pine tree. A path leads to the Yuntai Pavilion in the west. The
mountain on the left (west) appears as if raised by the boulders and below,
the water looks as if a void in the picture. It continues downward to the
heavy rocks, extends across the smaller rocks, and then merges with the
water of the next (eastern) stream. There is also a spring to the west of the
stream by the edge of the open valley. Its water runs through many pieces
of rocks, goes underground, and reemerges on the east side. The current
continues through pebbles and enters the quiet, deep pool. Water flows to
the east and the west reflecting the scenery of a natural environment.
Fourth Section
雲臺西北二面，可一圖岡繞之。上為雙碣石。象左右闕。石上作
孤遊生鳳。當婆娑體。儀羽秀而詳。軒尾翼以眺絕磵。後一段赤岓，
當使釋弁如裂電。對雲臺西鳳所臨壁。以成磵，磵下有流清。其側
壁外面。作一白虎。匍石飲水。後為降勢而絕。（伊勢）
雲臺西、北二面，可一圖（岡）岡（圍）繞之。上為雙碣石，象
左右闕，石上作孤遊生鳳，當婆娑體儀，羽秀而詳，軒尾翼以眺絕磵。
後一段赤岓，當使釋弁如裂電。對雲臺西鳳所臨壁以成磵，磵下有
清流。其側壁外面作一白虎，匍石飲水，後為降勢而絕。（傅抱石）
A mountain range with a pair of standing steles can be painted sur-
rounding the north and west sides of Yuntai Pavilion. Two steles are like a
pair of watchtowers guarding right and left. Paint a phoenix with beautiful
feathers and elegant flying movement on each of the rock. They raise their
tails with dignified appearance while overlooking the stream underneath.
Further behind this mountain range, steep mountain peaks loom in the
background. Cascading water (from the steep peaks) provides fresh wa-
ter running at the bottom of the valley. Paint a white tiger crouching and
drinking the water by the side of the mountain peak. The mountains de-
scend and end the composition.
Fifth Section
凡三段。山畫之雖長。當使畫甚促。不爾不稱。鳥獸中。時有用之者。
可定其儀而用之。下為磵。物景皆倒作。清氣帶山下。三分倨一以上。
使耿然成二重。（伊勢）
凡三段山，畫之雖長，當使畫甚促，不爾不稱。鳥獸中時有用之者，
可定其儀而用之。下為磵，物景皆倒作。清氣帶山下三分倨一以上，
使耿然成二重。（傅抱石）
There are three sections of the mountains. Although the composition
is quite long, it needs to be carefully constructed to capture the viewer’s
attention. Otherwise, it would not be a successful image. Birds and ani-
mals can be painted to enliven the scenery if necessary. The lower section
is streams. There should be reflection of the landscape in the water. The

clouds surround the mountain at near one third height of the mountain. It
divides the mountains into two sections and creates depth to the vista.
THE MAKING OF YUNTAI MOUNTAIN
After resolving the questions he had with the text, Fu began to create a work based on
Gu’s design. Fu thought the focus of the text was the section that described the Daoist
Zhang Tianshi and his pupils’ activities. However, the detailed description and precise
arrangements of the landscape elements make the text a design of landscape painting.
He believes Gu designed his composition from right to left in a hand scroll format and
emphasized the psychological reactions of the figures in the composition. He further
divided the text into forty-three subsections26 and created his version of the image.
Figure 3. Fu Baoshi. Yuntai Mountain, 1940, Ink on Paper, Painted as an Illustration for Zhongguo
Gudai Shanshui Huashi de Yanjiu (Study of the History of Ancient Chinese Landscape Painting).
Fu divided the text into forty-three sections. The forty-three subsections are as follows:
1. The mountain has different views. If the front views are facing the
sun, there would be shadows in the back. 山有面，則背向有影。
2. One can paint the clouds rising from the west and slowly moving
toward the eastern sky. 可令慶雲西而吐於東方清天中。
3. Both the sky and the water can be painted with sky blue throughout
the silk surface to reflect their colors and the gradual movements of the
clouds. 凡天及水色，盡用空青，竟素上下以暎日（之）。
4. Paint to distinguish the distances between the mountains, which be-
gin from the east and extend toward the west. 西去山，別詳其遠近，發
跡東基。
5. Before reaching the middle section of the mountain range, draw
five to six purple rocks shaped like solid clouds. The mountain ridges are
increasingly jutting upward, like dragons embracing the narrow mountain
peaks, twisting, writhing, 轉上未半，作紫石如堅雲者五六枚，夾岡乘
其間而上，使勢蜿蟺如龍，
26　Fu, Zhongguo gudai shanshui huashi de yanjiu (1960, p. 19).

6. and turning upward towards the sky. 因抱峰直頓而上。

7. Paint the lower mountain ridges underneath to emphasize the mon-
umental mountain mass above. 下作積岡，使望之蓬蓬然凝而上。
8. To the west, it connects to another mountain range, where the per-
ilous cliffs are accompanied by the inaccessible stream. 次復一峰，是石
( 在 ) 東鄰向者，峙峭峰西，連西向之丹崖，下據絕磵。
9. Draw the dangerous cliffs and rushing water to illustrate the hazard-
ous environment of mountain landscape. 畫丹崖，臨澗上，當使赫巘隆
崇，畫險絕之勢。
Second section:
10. The Master Zhang Tian-Shi sits by the cliffs sheltered by a large
tree. 天師坐其上，合所坐石及廕，
11. A peach tree grows by the stream under the cliffs. 宜磵中，桃傍
生石間。
12. Draw the Master with slim stature but high spirit pointing to the
peach tree by the stream. 畫天師，瘦形而神氣遠，據磵指桃，
13. With his back to the viewer, he talking to his disciples. 回面謂弟
子。
14. Two disciples are terrified and perspire awfully. 弟子中，有二人
臨下，到（倒）身大怖，流汗失色。
15. Wang Liang sits calmly responding to the Master’s questions. 作
王良，穆然坐，答問。
16. While Zhao Sheng appears clear-minded looking toward the peach
tree with intense concentration. 而超（趙）昇神爽精詣，俯眄（盼）桃樹。
17. Wang and Zhao have left the scene. 又別作王趙趨。
18. One is partially hidden by the west side of the cliffs. 一人隱西壁
傾巖，餘見衣裾，
19. And the other can be fully seen. 一人全見，
20. The place feels tranquil and serene. 室中使輕妙冷然。
21. When painting figures, seated figures should be one seventh of the
height of standing figures. Clothing should be painted with bright colors.
Need to follow this principle to create an effective image. Figures should
appear small from the distance contrast to the tall and massive mountains.
凡畫人，坐時可七分，衣服彩色殊鮮，微此 “ 不 ” 正，蓋山高而人遠耳。
22. At the eastern side of the middle section of the composition, a dan-
gerous cliff of reddish-brown rocks dominate the landscape and provide
sanctuary for the group. Make the cliff towering and treacherous 中段東
面，丹砂絕萼（崿）及廕，當使嵃 < 山戔 > 高驪，
23. and with a lone, large pine tree growing above the cliff. 孤松植其
上，
24. A stream nearby, opposite the cliff where the Master is sitting,
flows to the valley. The two cliffs are close to create a space of mystery
and sanctification where deities would reside. 對天師所 “ 臨 ” 壁以成磵。
磵可甚相近，相近者，欲令雙壁之內，淒愴 “ 澄 ” 清，神明之居，
必有與立焉。
25. A tall dark-purple rock can be painted on top of the western moun-
tain range as if creating a watchtower on the left, opposite to the mountain
of the tall pine tree. 可於次峰頭作一紫石亭丘（立），以象左闕之夾
高驪絕崿，
26. A path leads to the Yuntai Pavilion in the west. 西通雲臺，以表
路（道）路。
27. The mountain on the left (west) appears as if raised by the boul-
ders and below, the water looks as if a void in the picture. 左闕峰，似（以）
巖為根，根下空絕，
28. It continues downward to the heavy rocks, extends across the
smaller rocks 並諸石重勢，“ 與 ” 巖相承，
29. and then merges with the water of the next stream. 以合臨東磵。
30. There is also a spring to the west of the stream 其西石泉又見，
31. by the edge of the open valley. 乃因絕際作通岡，
32. Its water runs through many pieces of rocks, goes underground
and reemerges on the east side. The current continues through pebbles
and enters the quiet, deep pool. 伏流潛降，小（水）復東出，下磵為石瀨，
淪沒於淵。
33. Water flows to the east and the west reflects the scenery of a natu-
ral environment. 所以一西一東而下者，欲使自欲（然）為圖。
34. A mountain range with a pair of standing stele can be painted sur-
rounding the north and west sides of Yuntai Pavilion. 雲臺西、北二面，
可一圖（岡）岡（圍）繞之。
35. Two steles are like a pair of watchtowers guarding right and left.
Paint a phoenix with beautiful feathers and elegant flying movement on
each rock. They raise their tails with dignified appearance and elegant
movements while overlooking the stream underneath. 上為雙碣石，象
左右闕，石上作孤遊生鳳，當婆娑體儀，羽秀而詳，軒尾翼以眺絕磵。
36. Further behind this mountain range, steep mountain peaks loom in
the background. 後一段赤岓，當使釋弁如裂電。對雲臺西鳳所臨壁以
成磵，
37. Cascading water (from the steep peaks) provides fresh water run-
ning at the bottom of the valley. 磵下有清流。
38. Paint a white tiger crouching and drinking the water by the side of
the mountain peak. 其側壁外面作一白虎，匍石飲水，
39. The mountains descend and end the composition. 後為降勢而絕。
40. There are three sections of the mountains. Although the composi-
tion is quite long, it needs to be carefully constructed to capture the view-
er’s attention. Otherwise, it would not be a successful image. 凡三段山，
畫之雖長，當使畫甚促，不爾不稱。
41. Birds and animals can be painted to enliven the scenery if neces-
sary. 鳥獸中時有用之者，可定其儀而用之。
42. Lower section is streams. There should be reflection of the land-
scape in the water. 下為磵，物景皆倒作。
43. The clouds surround the mountain at near one third height of the
mountain. It divides the mountains into two sections and creates depth to
the vista. 清氣帶山下三分倨一以上，使耿然成二重。
My research indicated Fu created three paintings of Yuntai Moutain between 1940 and
1942.27 For each painting, Fu included Gu Kaizhi’s Hua Yuntai Shan Ji in his inscriptions.
The first painting (Fig. 3) was done in 1940 as an illustration to his publication Zhongguo
gudai shanshui huashi de yanjiu (Study of the History of Ancient Chinese Landscape Paint-
ing). The second piece (Fig. 1), currently in the Nanjing Museum collection, was executed
in 1941 and exhibited in the U.S. in 2011-1012.28 Moruo, Sheng Yimo, Xu Beihong and Hu
Guangwei all wrote colophons for Fu’s work.29 Guo Moruo also composed four poems for
this painting.30 A third work (Fig. 4), now probably in Taipei, was painted in 1942 and titled
Yun Tai Shan Tu in seal script. The first and third pieces were done in ink, while the Nan-
jing piece was painted in ink and light colors.
Figure 4. Fu Baoshi,Yuntai Mountain, 1942, Ink on Paper. Anonymous Collection.
The images of three painting are slightly varied from one another. The first work was
loosely executed probably due to it was mainly used as an illustration. The three figures on
the cliff, Zhang Tianshi and his two disciples appear larger in the first piece than those in
the Nanjing collection (Fig. 5). This group of figures is also more centrally located in the
composition compared to the earlier piece. The figure Zhang Tianshi in the first work is
facing the viewers, while in the Nanjing piece he is seen in rear view. The two phoenixes in
the first and second pieces were painted on the steles, but they become sculptures standing
on top of the steles in the last work (Fig. 6). These changes reflect the process of Fu’s read-
27　Although Fu has never talked that how many pieces he had created for this subject, it is believed that Fu
created at least three paintings of the same subject, Yuntai Mountain. Ye Zonghao’s Fu baoshi nianpu also
confirms that Fu created three different works between 1940 and 1942.
28　This painting was shown in the exhibition “Chinese Art in an Age of Revolution: Fu Baoshi (1904-1965)
in Cleveland Museum of Art in October-December, 2011 and travelled to The Metropolitan Museum of Art in
January-March 2012.
29　Ye, Fu Baoshi nianpu (2004, p. 45).
30　Fu, Zhongguo gudai shanshui huashi de yanjiu (1960, p.47-p.49).
ing and comprehension of Gu’s text.
Figure 5. Left: Fu Baoshi, Yuntai Mountain (detail), 1940. Right: Fu Baoshi, Yuntai Mountain (detail), 1941.
Figure 6 Left: Yuntai Mountain (detail), 1940. Center: Yuntai Mountain (detail), 1940. Right: Yun-
tai Mountain (detail), 1942.
HUA YUNTAI SHAN JI AND SIX DYNASTIES LANDSCAPE PAINTING
Fu’s inscriptions in the paintings reveal his admiration for Gu Kaizhi. He indicated that
he has been studying the text which Zhang Yanyuan referred to as having many errors
and Zhang was unable to find an accurate version. Fu stated that for more than a thousand
years, Chinese believed landscape painting can be traced back at the earliest to the Sui
dynasty artists Yang Qidan 楊契丹 and Zhan Ziqian 展子虔 ( c. 550-604). This was based
primarily on Zhang Yanyuan’s writings. Fu however, came to the conclusion that the
elevated thoughts and careful design in the Hua Yuntai Shan Ji, which dates back more than
fifteen hundred years, demonstrates Zhang’s accounts were inaccurate. Fu remarked that his
paintings of Yuntai Mountain could hardly achieve the grandeur of Gu Kaizhi, but he only
wished to recreate the spirit of Gu’s vision.
If we analyze Hu Yuntai Shan Ji closely, we would probably admire the text as much as
Fu Baoshi. The design extends the image vertically and horizontally with intention to cre-
ate balance and variety in the scene. Different scenes are juxtaposed between the east and
the west, or right and left of the composition. Gu creates visual interest on the composition
with expansive mountain view and the deep valleys, and contrasting the dangerous cliffs
with rapid streams to the gradual moving clouds. The various height and distance of moun-
tain ranges creates rhythmic quality. The design is a lyrical, solemn mountain landscape
regardless of the urgent activities of the Master demanding trials to his disciples.
Fu Baoshi’s Yuntai Shan Tu is unlike the primitive Six dynasties landscape described
in Zhang Yanyuan’s Lidai Minhua Ji “water cannot sail boats, or figures are larger than the
mountains” (“ 水不容氾，或人大於山 ). 31 However, Fu insisted that Hua Yuntai Shan
Ji demonstrated an excellent landscape design not subordinate to any narrative or human
figures in the painting. 32 He disagreed with Zhang’s accounts on Six Dynasties landscape
painting and pointed out Zhang Yanyuan’s mistakes in Lidai Minhua Ji. 33 He referred to
a statement “Dai Bo (371-396) was a better landscape painter than Gu Kaizhi” (“ 戴勃山
水勝於顧 ”), made by a Liang dynasty ( 梁 502-557) critic Sun Changzhi 孫暢之 .34 This
statement suggested to him that there were many painters specialized in the subject of land-
scape during Gu’s time. 35 Fu further pointed out that Gu Kaizhi, in his essay Lun Hua 論
畫 (On Painting), explicated the degree of difficulty in painting various subjects and ranked
landscape as the second difficult genre next to figure, which indicated landscape was an im-
portant category during the Six dynasties period. 36
Fu criticized Zhang’s negligence in recognizing the importance of Hua Yuntai Shan Ji
and the role of Gu Kaizhi in Chinese landscape painting. Fu is convinced that the careful
composition and planning of the landscape elements in Hua Yuntai Shan Ji, are evident
of the development of Chinese landscape had reached popularity. Furthermore, the social,
political and religious environments during the Six dynasties period, especially the rise of
Daoism and landscape poetry, seem to support his assumption. Fu argued that landscape
scenes during the Six dynasties period had gradually evolved from serving political and
religious purposes to becoming a spiritual sanctuary that allowed artists to endow their
thoughts and feelings to their painted subjects. This ability of transferring one’s feeling to
their subjects ( 遷想妙得 ) is what Fu Baosi most admired of Gu Kaizhi.
Fu thought Gu’s writings strongly influenced artists and art historians of six dynasties
period and may have inspired writings like Xie He’s Liu Fa 六法 . He praised Japanese
scholar Omura Seigai 大村西崖（1868-1927）for recognizing the importance of Hua
Yuntai Shan Ji as it provides a wonderful material to understand the art of the Jin dynasty
(265-420).37 Fu believed Zhang’s accounts on Six dynasties landscape painting created a
31　Tang critic Zhang Yanyuan in his treatise “Lun Hua Shanshui Shushi” 論畫山水樹石 [On Painting
Landscape, Trees, and Rocks) in the Lidai Minghua Ji indicates the style of landscape prior to Tang tends to be
“figures painted lager than the mountains 人大於山”.
33　See note 1.
34　This statement is found in Shu Hua Ji 述畫記 (Record of Recounting Painting) attributed to 孫暢之
recorded in the Lidai Minghua Ji. “Fu Baoshi mentioned this statement to prove his points and to show
Zhang’s negligence in his writing.
36　“When painting, figures are the most difficult subject followed by those of landscape and animals like
dogs and horses. Building and structures have definite shapes and are easier to draw, but are difficult to convey
emotions through because artists are unable to transfer their feelings onto these subjects.” ( 凡畫，人最難，
次山水，次狗馬，臺榭一定器耳，難成而易好，不待遷想妙得也。) However, Fu believed this sen-
tence should be part of the text in Wei Jin Shengliu Huazan 魏晉勝流畫贊 (Famous Paintings of Wei and Jin
Dynasties) rather than in Lun Hua 論畫 (On painting), see note 1.
misunderstanding about the achievement of Six dynasties landscape painting. He hoped his
research on Hua Yuntai Shan Ji and the image he produced based on his research could en-
able scholars to reevaluate the origin and development of Chinese landscape painting.
Does Fu’s Yuntai Mountain genuinely reflect Gu Kaizhi’s design, or does it resemble
more or less a work of Shitao, whose work Fu admired tremendously? Perhaps it resem-
bles a landscape of the Lingnan School, which was a popular style from Fu’s time. Should
the landscape image in Gu’s Hua Yuntai Shan Ji be more similar to the landscape depicted
in The Admonition scroll (Fig. 2), or a more realistic image like Spring Outing 游春圖
(Fig. 11) attributed to Sui dynasty artist Zhan Ziqian 展子虔 ? Based on Fu’s paintings of
Yuntai Mountain, the style of landscape is by no means similar to that in The Admonition
scroll. Perhaps, it is closer to a more realistic style of Zhan Ziqian, despite that Zhan’s work
is about one hundred fifty years later than Gu Kaizhi’s. Does this imply that Fu is confi-
dent that Gu’s painting of Yuntai Mountai should display similar characteristics as seen in
Zhan’s work, or may we say Fu paintings of Yuntai Mountain are completely his own?
In fact, whether or not Gu Kaizhi actually painted a picture of Yuntai Mountain, most
scholars would agree that his Huan Yuntai Shan Ji reveals a more realistic treatment of
landscape than Zhang Yanyuan thought Six Dynasties artists achieved. For example, he em-
phasizes the treatments of light and shadows in the mountains, an appropriate proportion of
figures to their surroundings and the attention to the reflection of landscape in the water. In
addition, he also stresses the psychological state of the figures, the necessity to enliven the
scenery with animals (a tiger) and birds (phoenix), and to paint the landscape to exhibit the
characters of a natural environment.
Hua Yuntai Shan Ji unveils the design process of a fourth century artist who is also
traditionally known as a master of figure painting. A 20th century artist of many genres, Fu
Baoshi recognized the significance of this text and undertook the challenge of studying the
difficult text for the first time. His research not only sparked his own interest in probing
the history and development of Chinese landscape painting but also inspired generations of
Chinese scholars to investigate the significance of the text up to the present time.
Although we may not be able to claim Hua Yuntai Shan Ji as the beginning of the Chi-
nese landscape painting nor Gu Kaizi as the first landscape painter, Hua Yuntai Shan Ji is no
doubt the first recorded essay revealing how landscapes were portrayed in the early history
of Chinese painting. Fu Baoshi’s writings on Gu Kaizhi, Hua Yuntai Shan Ji and the ensu-
ing paintings of Yuntai Mountain demonstrate the curiosity, talents and the perseverance of
a 20th century master.
REFERENCE
Fu, B. (1991). Lun Gu Kaizhi zhi Jing Hao zhi shanshui huashi wenti [Issues with the history of Chinese
landscape painting from Gu Kaizhi to Jing Hao]. In H.-S. He (Ed.), Jindai Zhonguo meishushi lunji
[Essays on the history of modern Chinese art]. Taipei: Yishujia Chubanshe.
Fu, B. (1986). Ren-wu Chongqing huazhan zixu [Thoughts for the opening of Chongqing painting exhi-
bition in the year of ren-wu ]. In Z. Ye (Ed.), Fu Baoshi meishu wenji [Essays on art by Fu Baoshi].
Yangzhou: Jiangsu Wenyi Chubanshe.
Fu, B. (1960). Zhongguo gudai shanshui huashi de yanjiu [Studies on the history of ancient Chinese land-
scape painting]. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Meishu chubanshe. (Original work written 1958)
Fu, B. (1986). Zhongguo huihua bianqian shigang [The history and development of Chinese painting]. In Z.
Ye (Ed.), Fu Baoshi meishu wenji [Essays on art by Fu Baoshi]. Yangzhou: Jiangsu Wenyi Chubanshe.
Ge, H. (1991). Shen xian zhuan [The biographies of the immortals]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
He, H.-S. (Ed.). (1991). Jindai Zhonguo meishushi lunji [Essays on the history of modern Chinese art].
Taipei: Yishujia Chubanshe.
Ise, S. (1933). Ko Kaishi yori Kei Kō ni itaru: Shina sansui gashi [The history of Chinese landscape paint-
ing from Gu Kaizhi to Jing Hao]. Kyoto: Touhou Bunka Gakuin Kyoto Kenkyusho.
Ye, Z. (2004). Fu Baoshi nianpu [The chronology of Fu Baoshi’s life]. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chuban-
she.
Yuan, Y. et al. (2005). Gu Kaizhi yanjiu [Research on Gu Kaizhi]. Beijing: Minzhu Chubanshe.
Author’s Biodata
Yuling Huang is an independent scholar and Asian art consultant from the United States.
She specializes in modern Chinese art, Chinese and Japanese painting from the 19th century
to early 20th centuries. Ms. Huang has more than a decade of curatorial and teaching
experience at various institutions in the United States.

yh35209@aol.com
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Quarterly Journal of Chinese Studies

Volume 1 • Number 2 • Winter 2012

From Exclusion to the Inclusive Sphere: Sun Yat-Sen’s Emancipatory Communication

EU-China Political and Security Relations: Gaps, Challenges and Perspectives

Poems on Immortality in the Political and Social Contexts of Han China

A Portrayal of Real Qing’s Empresses

QJCS Reviews & Others

Fu Baoshi’s Yuntai Shan Tu: A Modern Interpretation of an Ancient Design

The Role of Civil Commercial Law in China’s “Socialist

LAW - A VITAL PART OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CHINA

1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Ian Duncan. E-mail: ianduncan@ozemail.com.au

DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM

CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

CHINA’S FIRST WTO DISPUTE – AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION - DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES

(B) Agreement on Textiles & Clothing,

Article 4 - Consultations (below are some relevant extracts)

Article 21 – Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings (below

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES NOW FACING CHINA

LEGAL GOVERNANCE – AN ONGOING CHALLENGE FOR CHINA

CHALLENGES FACING CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE

China’s Foreign Direct Investment

ernment-owned companies) making equity investments in businesses in other countries,

WTO Free-Trade Agreements

First Author’s Address

Anarchism and the Question of Practice: The Role of the

1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Marling. E-mail: tommarling22@gmail.com

immovable object in anarchist essentialism. Their response was to direct themselves at

NEW CULTURE, NEW THOUGHT AND ANARCHISM

13 For a further discussion of these comparisons see Sor-Hoon Tan (2004).

A LOCALISED, EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ANARCHISM

The principle aspect of post-leftist anarchism was a developing subjective dynamism

sent all the comrades of anarchism.

REVOLUTION AND REFORM

incremental improvement. They believed in revolution” (p. 99).

preceding ten years.25

25 The prevalence of both “economical determinism” and “historical determinism” is in fact an

anachronism is evident in Wu Kegang’s direct disavowal of the singular essential tactic,

FORMING ORTHODOXY FROM HETERODOXY

Revolutionaries always try to build up a brand new power to fight against

And compare with that of Wu Kegang’s -

I believe that China is truly in the midst of revolution. This revolution

CONCLUSION: THE SYSTEMATISATION OF ANARCHISM

grove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.

ence in China. Metaphilosophy, 35(1-2), 44-64.

First Author’s Address

From Exclusion to the Inclusive Sphere:

Class and Race

1 Requests for reprints should be sent to G. Kentak Son. E-mail: kentakson@gmail.com

POWER AND IDENTITY

bureaucracy and aristocracy,4 Confucian institutions categorised the underprivileged

LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE

RATIONALITY AND COMMUNICATION

The Theory of Communicative Action (1981, 1987) is that communicative rationality is

The Public Sphere of Inclusion

Emancipation from Pathologies

and sustained by language and discourse, and leading to an intersubjective communication

Rational communication exists only on equal and autonomous terms, independent of

notion of unfettered communication with the intention to cooperatively understand others,

Alexander, J. C. (2011). Performance and power. Cambridge: Polity Press.

First Author’s Address

EU-China Political and Security Relations:

Just Castillo Iglesias

CHINA-EU POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONS

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Ian Duncan. E-mail: ianduncan@ozemail.com.au

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Marling. E-mail: tommarling22@gmail.com

13　For a further discussion of these comparisons see Sor-Hoon Tan (2004).

25　The prevalence of both “economical determinism” and “historical determinism” is in fact an

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to G. Kentak Son. E-mail: kentakson@gmail.com

7　As recognized by a High-Level EU official at the European Commission’s Delegation to China, in

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Bret Hinsch. E-mail: bret_hinsch@hotmail.com

4　淫過也 . Kong, Vol.4, p. 53 (Da Yu mo 大禹謨 ).

13　For a textual history of this collection see Rickett, p. 3-47.

15　殷有惑婦，何所譏 . Hong, Vol.3, p. 114; Hawkes, p. 133.

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Anna Sokolova. E-mail: annasokkolova@yahoo.co.uk

10　 See detailed description in Owen (2006, p. 141)

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Jingwei Liu. E-mail: xmliu1990@qq.com

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Hang Lin. E-mail: hang.lin@uni-wuerzburg.de

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Yuling Huang. E-mail: yh35209@aol.com

26　Fu, Zhongguo gudai shanshui huashi de yanjiu (1960, p. 19).