GV FLORIDA TRANSPORT INC V.
HEIRS OF BATTUNG
(PATGAL)
October 14, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Art. 1763
Petitioner: GV FLORIDA TRANSPORT INC
Respondents: HEIRS OF ROMEO BATTUNG JR
SUMMARY:
Romeo Battung was on board Petitioner’s bus from Isabela bound for Manila.
When the bus reached Nueva Ecija, the bus driver stopped to check the tires. A
man seated on the fourth row stood up and shot Battung. They brought him to the
hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival. Heirs instituted case for breach of
contract of carriage stating that driver and conductor failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the transport of its passengers. RTC held them liable.
CA affirmed. The issue is whether or not GV Transport may be held liable for the
death of Battung. The SC ruled that they are not liable. the Court clarified that
where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due to any defect in the
means of transport or in the method of transporting, or to the negligent or willful
acts of the common carrier's employees with respect to the foregoing - such as
when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which the carrier
had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent — there would be no issue
regarding the common carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable
care, as well as competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such,
the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil
Code should not apply. The applicable provision is Art. 1763 which states that "a
common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." No
danger was shown to exist in this case so as to impel petitioner or its
employees to implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of
its passengers. There was also no showing that during the course of the trip,
Battung's killer made suspicious actions which would have forewarned petitioner's
employees of the need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the
passengers. records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four
men ride petitioner's bus (two of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the
bus driver, Duplio, saw them get on the bus and even took note of what they were
wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men
and have them pay the corresponding fare, which Daraoay did. They observed the
diligence required and hence, are not liable.
DOCTRINE: A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission
FACTS:
1. In the evening of March 22, 2003, Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (Battung)
boarded petitioner's bus with body number 037 and plate number
BVJ-525 in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila.
2. Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the
ride.
3. When the bus reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the
tires.
4. At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood
up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion.
5. The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and
thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was pronounced
dead on arrival.
6. Hence, respondents filed a complaint on July 15, 2008 for damages in
the aggregate amount of P1,826,000.008 based on a breach of contract
of carriage against petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.)
1. Respondents contended that as a common carrier, petitioner and its
employees are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring
the safety of passengers; and in case of injuries and/or death on the
part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at fault and, thus,
responsible therefor.
2. In their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they had exercised
the extraordinary diligence required by law from common carriers.
In this relation, they claimed that a common carrier is not an
absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung's death should be
properly deemed a fortuitous event.
7. RTC ruled in respondents' favor
1. ordered petitioner, et al. to pay compensatory damages for unearned
income; actual damages; and moral damages.
2. The RTC found that petitioner, et al. were unable to rebut the
presumed liability of common carriers in case of injuries/death to its
passengers due to their failure to show that they implemented the
proper security measures to prevent passengers from carrying
deadly weapons inside the bus which, in this case, resulted in the
killing of Battung. As such, petitioner, et al. were held civilly liable
for the latter's death based on culpa contractual.
8. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in toto
1. killing of Battung cannot be deemed as a fortuitous event,
considering that such killing happened right inside petitioner's bus
 and that petitioner, et al. did not take any safety measures in 5. Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or
ensuring that no deadly weapon would be smuggled inside the bus. negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is
injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing
9.

The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1) the accident was not due to negligence of the carrier, but was an act of God; and (2) even if negligence was attributable to defendants, their liability had been discharged

ISSUE: Whether or not GV Transport, et al is liable - NO

10. Spouse

evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the

presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the
Decision dated May 31, 2013 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97757 are hereby REVERSED by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for damages filed by injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
respondents heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr. is DISMISSED for lack of 6. In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code
merit. Commission and Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and
operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.
RATIO: 7. Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a
transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but
NO PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER 1756 (CONCEPTS that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests
ONLY U CAN GO STRAIGHT TO #8) upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that
the law requires.
1. The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, 8. In Pilapil v. CA, the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by
firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting the passenger was in no way due:
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, 1. to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
offering their services to the public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e., transporting, or
extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers, 2. to the negligent or willful acts of the common carrier's employees
pursuant to Art 1733 1and 1755. 2 " with respect to the foregoing - such as when the injury arises wholly
2. In this relation, the disputable presumption based on Art. 17563 may also from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no control
be overcome by a showing that the accident was caused by a fortuitous of or prior knowledge to prevent —
event. there would be no issue regarding the common carrier's negligence in its
3. The law does not make the common carrier an insurer of the absolute duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent employees in
safety of its passengers. (4-7 from Mariano v Callejas) relation to its transport business; as such, the presumption of fault/
4. Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not apply
care, vigilance, and precaution in the carriage of passengers by 9. In this case, Battung's death was neither caused by any defect in the
common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can means of transport or in the method of transporting, or to the negligent
provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged or willful acts of petitioner's employees, namely, that of Duplio and
with due regard to all the circumstances. Daraoay, in their capacities as driver and conductor, respectively.

1 Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

2Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

3Art.1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
10. Instead, the case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the
surreptitious act of a co-passenger who, after consummating such crime,
hurriedly alighted from the vehicle
II. Art. 1763 APPLIES
1. Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision
is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that "a common carrier
is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission."
2. Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of
diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in assessing the
existence of any culpability on the common carrier's part.
3. the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes
reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person
would have observed when confronted with a similar situation.
1. The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance
of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence."
4. Fortune Express v. CA was cited by the CA in supporting its decision,
but the case does not apply to the facts at bar.
1. In Fortune, the common carrier had already received intelligence
reports from law enforcement agents that certain lawless elements
were planning to hijack and burn some of its buses; and yet, it failed
to implement the necessary precautions to ensure the safety of its
buses and its passengers.
2. Common carrier's failure to take precautionary measures to protect
the safety of its passengers despite warnings from law enforcement
agents showed that it failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in preventing the attack against one of its buses
5. No similar danger was shown to exist in this case so as to impel
petitioner or its employees to implement heightened security
measures to ensure the safety of its passengers.
6. There was also no showing that during the course of the trip, Battung's
killer made suspicious actions which would have forewarned petitioner's
employees of the need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the
passengers.
7. In Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, has held that common
carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the
passengers they take in will not bring anything that would prove
dangerous to himself, as well as his co-passengers, unless there is
something that will indicate that a more stringent inspection should be
made
1. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him
anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not
to speak of his own.
2. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which
each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual
search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and
nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar.
3. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a
passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but
beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed.
4. But when there are sufficient indications that the
representations of the passenger regarding the nature of his
baggage may not be true, in the interest of the common safety of
all, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not
necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but to
conduct the needed investigation consistent with the rules of
propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights of the passenger.
8. In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to
let four (4) men ride petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be
Battung's murderers), the bus driver, Duplio, saw them get on the bus
and even took note of what they were wearing.
9. Moreover, Duplio made the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these
men and have them pay the corresponding fare, which Daraoay did.
10. During the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which
would rouse their suspicion that the men were armed or were to carry
out an unlawful activity. With no such indication, there was no need for
them to conduct a more stringent search (i.e., bodily search) on the
aforesaid men
)
 CARIAGA v. LTB (PATTY)
December 29, 1960 | J. Dizon | Action and Damages in case of Breach
PETITIONER: Edgardo Cariaga et al.
RESPONDENTS: Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Manila Railroad Company
SUMMARY: An LTB bus from Manila to Laguna met an accident in Bay, Laguna
when it was in a train crossing. The bus did not slacken its speed despite two long
and two short whistles from the train and even if from a distance of 100 meters from
the crossing the bell was rang until the train crossed. The accident caused 6 wheels
of the train to be derailed, the engine of the bus wrecked, the death of the driver,
and the severe injuries of the passengers, one of which was Edgardo Cariaga.
Edgardo underwent operation where there was a removal of the right frontal lobe
of his brain and that a tantalum plate was made to cover the right frontal part of his
head. Although LTB paid 16k for hospital expenses, Edgardo’s parents still sued
LTB for 312k as actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages for Edgardo
and 18k for his parents. Lower court held that since it was the negligence of LTB’s
bus that caused the accident, LTB is liable for 10k as compensatory damages.
Issue are whether or not the LTB driver is liable – YES; and whether or not the
compensatory damages be increased – YES.
The bus driver was liable due to the circumstances stated above. Plus, there was
actually another LTB bus ahead at the crossing but that one stopped and allowed
the train to pass by so nothing happened.
On compensatory damages, finding that Edgardo is now in a helpless condition,
virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally – the amount is increased to 25k.
However, moral damages and attorney’s fees are deleted because this claim is based
on a breach of contract and not one of quasi-delict which allows for the giving of
moral damages as can be seen in Article 2219. As for the parents’ claim for actual
and compensatory damages – this cannot be given to them since they are not parties
to the breach of contract nor can they invoke quasi-delict since they were not injured
in the collision.
DOCTRINE: Edgardo’s claim for moral damages and attorney’s fees is rejected
because the claim is not one based on quasi-delict as covered in Article 2219 but
one of contractual breach of carriage – to bring him safely and without mishaps.
FACTS:
1. LTB, drive by Moncada, left Manila for Lilio Laguna.
a. On board was Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th year medical student in UST.
b. At 3 pm, when the bus reached the poblacion of Bay laguna where
the national highway crossed a railroad track, the bus bumped the
engine of a train passing by.
c. This caused the 6 wheels of the train to be derailed, the engine of
the bus to be wrecked, the instant death of the driver, and severe
injuries to its passengers including Cariaga.
2. Edgardo was confined in 3 hospitals. First in San Pablo City Hospital then
the Delos Santos Clinic then in the UST Hospital.
a. He was unconscious for the first 35 days after the accident.
b. There was removal of fractured bones which lacerated the right
frontal lobe of his brain.
c. A tantalum plate was made to cover the right frontal part of his head.
3. LTB paid 16k hospital expenses and gave 10-peso allowance for Edgardo’s
subsistence.
a. The present action is filed in order to recover the sum of 312k as
actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages for Edgardo
and 18k for his parents.
b. LTB contended that the accident was due to the negligence of
Manila Railroad Company (MRC) as it failed to provide a crossing
bar at the point of the accident. Hence, a cross-claim on MRC was
filed.
4. Lower court held that it was the negligence of the bus driver that cause the
accident and hence ordered LTB to pay 10k as compensatory damages and
dismissed the cross-claim against MRC.
a. The Cariagas wanted more than 10k so they appealed.
b. LTB contended that the train driver whistled only when the collision
was about to take place instead of at a distance of 300 meters from
the crossing and in not ringing the locomotive bet at all.
c. Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the
damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but
who acted in good faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural
and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of
the same Code, have been duly proved.
i. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages
suffered by Edgardo Cariaga consisting of medical,
hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75
are within this category.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the LTB bus driver was negligent – YES
2. Whether or not the compensatory damages be increased – YES
RULING: Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellant LTB.
RATIO:
1. The LTB bus driver was negligent.
 a.
It was stated in the testimony of a witness c/o MRC that the train direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal viewpoint
engineer sounded 2 long and 2 short whistles and upon reaching from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
about 100 meters from the highway, he sounded the whistle which servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of
lasted up to the time the train was about to cross it. But the bus the new), which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care
continued and did not slacken its speed. in their selection of supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to
i. All passengers of the train and that of the bus stated that obligations arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to extra- contractual
they heard the whistle, so for sure the bus driver should obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article
have heard it too. relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA.' and not to CULPA
b. In fact, there was another LTB bus which arrived ahead at the CONTRACTURAL.'
crossing but it heeded the train’s warning by stopping and allowing h. The other cases used by the Cariagas do not apply in this case for
the train to pass hence nothing happened to that bus. the claim of moral damages since those cases were decided before
c. LTB failed to prove that the train engineer was violative of a the new civil code.
provision in the MRC charter when it “failed” to ring the bell. i. The claim of the Spouses Cariaga for actual and compensatory
2. Yes, compensatory damages on the part of Edgardo shall be increased to damages is likewise without merit. In so far as LTB is concerned,
25,000 (from 10,000). the present action is for breach of contract of carriage to which said
a. His right forehead was fractured necessitating the removal of spouses are NOT a party and neither can premise their claim on
practically all of the right frontal lobe of his brain. negligence or quasi-delict since they were not themselves injured as
b. Because of the injuries, Edgardo’s mentality has been so reduced a result of the collision.
that he can no longer finish his studies as a medical student; that he
has become completely misfit for any kind of work; that he can
hardly walk around without someone helping him, and has to use a
brace on his left leg and feet.
c. Removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of Edgardo reduced
his intelligence by about 50%; that due to the replacement of the
right frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to
lead a quite and retired life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed
in or dented it would cause his death."
d. This is how the SC described Edgardo: He is now in a helpless
condition, virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally.
e. The Court include the income Edgardo could earn if he would have
finished medical school because this could have been foreseen by
the bus at the moment of his boarding.
f. Edgardo’s claim for moral damages and attorney’s fees is rejected
because the claim is not one based on quasi-delict as covered in
Article 22191 but one of contractual breach of carriage – to bring
him safely and without mishaps.
g. There was this whole discussion on quasi-delict and breach of
contract and Cangco but I’m just going to put this one here: 'It is
important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all,
from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant
to exercise due case in its performance. That is to say, its liability is

1
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and
02 PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. V. LEGASPI (DE CASTRO)
December 23, 1964 | Regala, J. | Actions and Damages in Case of Breach
PETITIONER: PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,
FACTS:
(PANTRANCO)
RESPONDENTS: HON. GREGORIO A. LEGASPI, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, PUA PIAN, ROLLY PUA, AIDA PUA, GLORIA PUA,
CHUA TECK and CRISPINA BREGUERA
SUMMARY:
Private respondents alleged that Aurora Breguera, Welly Pua and Memia Chua
boarded at Dasol, Pangasinan, Pantranco Bus (Bus 1) bound for the town of
Alaminos of the same province. Before reaching Alaminos and just after rounding
a blind curve, the bus driver, "by reason of his gross negligence, serious
imprudence and wanton recklessness, collided with another oncoming passenger
truck bus (Bus 2), likewise owned and operated by defendant (Pantranco),"
causing the Bus 1 to turn turtle several times and that as a result of the accident,
Aurora Breguera and the child Welly Pua suffered injuries from which they died
shortly after the accident, while Memia Chua died instantaneously. Respondents
prayed for damages, however Pantranco contended that the accident was purely
a force majeure beyond its control. It also alleged that "it is an established
concern." During trial, the court ordered Pantranco to produce in court the
company’s ledgers and financial statements for respondents to inspect, examine
and photograph. This was opposed by Pantranco on the ground that its financial
capacity is not in issue. The issue in this case is W/N the documents, consisting of
general ledgers and financial statements of the company, are immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue of negligence and that to allow their production would be
to sanction inquisition or "fishing expedition" into the financial records of the
company. The SC ruled that it is material. Independently of its financial capacity,
the common carrier, if liable, must be made to pay the minimum amount. But if
its financial ability is such that it can pay a greater amount of indemnity as
demanded by the circumstances of the case, then certainly it should be made to
pay more than P3,000. Its financial standing in such a case is material. This is what
respondents, as plaintiffs in the civil cases below, have sought to do. As earlier
stated, they sought the production of the ledgers and financial statements of
Pantranco in connection with their allegation that "defendant (Pantranco) is
financially well-established having enormous assets and a huge income." That is
why in the prayer of their complaints, they asked the court, not for the minimum
indemnity of P3,000, but for such indemnity for the death of Aurora Breguera,
Welly Pua and Memia Chua, as the Court may find proper and reasonable."
DOCTRINE:
Independently of its financial capacity, the common carrier, if liable, must be
made to pay the minimum amount. But if its financial ability is such that it can
pay a greater amount of indemnity as demanded by the circumstances of the case,
then certainly it should be made to pay more than P3,000. Its financial standing in
such a case is material.
1. Two Civil Cases were filed against the Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc.
(Pantranco) in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for the recovery of
damages for the death of Aurora Breguera and Welly Pua, wife and one-year
old child, respectively, of respondent Pua Pian, and for the death of Memia
Chua, 18-year old daughter of respondents Chua Teck and Crispina Breguera.
2. Respondents alleged that Aurora Breguera, Welly Pua and Memia Chua
boarded at Dasol, Pangasinan, Pantranco Bus No. 334, bound for the town of
Alaminos of the same province.
3. They averred that before reaching Alaminos and just after rounding a blind
curve, the bus driver, Arsenio Osorio, "by reason of his gross negligence,
serious imprudence and wanton recklessness, collided with another
oncoming passenger truck bus No. 306, likewise owned and operated by
defendant (Pantranco)," causing Bus No. 334 to turn turtle several times and
that as a result of the accident, Aurora Breguera and the child Welly Pua
suffered injuries from which they died shortly after the accident, while
Memia Chua died instantaneously.
4. Respondents prayed for various amounts of damages
5. Pantranco contended that the accident was purely a force majeure beyond its
control. It also alleged that "it is an established concern."
6. The issues having been joined, the cases were tried jointly. During the trial,
respondents asked the court to order the office manager of Pantranco to
produce in court on December 5, 6 and 7, 1962, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m.,
the company's general ledgers and financial statements for the years 1959,
1960 and 1961, for respondents to inspect, examine or photograph.
7. The motion was opposed by Pantranco on the ground that its financial
capacity is not in issue.chanroblesvirtualawlib
8. In an order dated January 18, 1963, the court directed Pantranco to make the
documents available in its office on January 29 and 30, 1963, without the
need of producing them in court.
9. Pantranco asked for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the court
in an order dated February 7, 1963
10. And so Pantranco filed this petition for certiorari, charging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court.
11. We gave due course to the petition and upon the filing of a bond for P1,000
issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
12. Under Section 1 of Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court., a party may ask
for the production of documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, "which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are
in his possession, custody or control."
13. The objection here is that the documents, consisting of general ledgers and
financial statements of the company, are immaterial and irrelevant to the issue
 of negligence and that to allow their production would be to sanction
inquisition or "fishing expedition" into the financial records of the company.
14. Under Section 1 of Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court., a party may ask
for the production of documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, "which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are
in his possession, custody or control."
15. The objection here is that the documents, consisting of general ledgers and
financial statements of the company, are immaterial and irrelevant to the issue
of negligence and that to allow their production would be to sanction
inquisition or "fishing expedition" into the financial records of the company.
ISSUE/s: W/N the documents, consisting of general ledgers and financial statements
of the company, are immaterial and irrelevant to the issue of negligence and that to
allow their production would be to sanction inquisition or "fishing expedition" into the
financial records of the company. (No, they are material for purposes of the indemnity
to be paid in relation to its financial ability).
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the writ of
preliminary injunction is dissolved without pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
1. We do not agree with petitioner. To be sure, Rule 27 permits "fishing" for
evidence (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 109 [1963]), the only
limitation being that the documents, papers, etc. sought to be produced are
not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce
them and that
2. Article 2206 of the Civil Code states:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. ...
3. Article 2206 applies in case of death caused by the breach of contract by the
common carrier (Art. 1764). It fixes the minimum indemnity for death at
P3,000, which the courts may increase according to the circumstances. It is
in fixing a greater amount of indemnity that courts may consider the financial
capacity of the common carrier, along with such other factors as (1) the life
expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, (2)
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or beneficiary, (3) loss of support, (4) loss of
service, (5) loss of society, (6) mental suffering of beneficiaries, and (7)
medical and funeral expenses.
4. Indeed, under Commonwealth Act No. 284, it is provided that -
SECTION 1. - The civil liability or the death of a person shall be fixed
by the competent court at a reasonable sum, upon consideration of the
pecuniary situation of the party liable and other circumstances, but it
shall in no case be less than two thousand pesos. (Emphasis ours)
5. Of course the minimum amount of P2,000 as fixed in this law
(Commonwealth Act No. 284) must now be deemed increased to P3,000, but
the point is that in fixing a greater amount of indemnity, the pecuniary
situation of the party liable may well be considered along with other elements
6. This point should dispose of petitioner's contention that the liability of the
common carrier cannot be made to depend on its pecuniary capacity. Of
course, independently of its financial capacity, the common carrier, if liable,
must be made to pay the minimum amount.
7. But if its financial ability is such that it can pay a greater amount of indemnity
as demanded by the circumstances of the case, then certainly it should be
made to pay more than P3,000. Its financial standing in such a case is
material.
8. Parenthetically, it may be added that a study of the revised Civil Code shows
that a new title on damages (Title XVIII, Articles 2195-2235) has been added.
9. This evidences a great expansion of the classes of damages under the revised
Civil Code in line with the modern trend on social legislation. These new
provisions embody some principles of the American law on the subject
10. This is what respondents, as plaintiffs in the civil cases below, have sought
to do. As earlier stated, they sought the production of the ledgers and financial
statements of Pantranco in connection with their allegation that "defendant
(Pantranco) is financially well-established having enormous assets and a
huge income."
11. That is why in the prayer of their complaints, they asked the court, not for the
minimum indemnity of P3,000, but for such indemnity for the death of
Aurora Breguera, Welly Pua and Memia Chua, as the Court may find proper
and reasonable." Their request therefore was for a good cause and the
respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion in granting it.
 VILLA REY TRANSIT INC. v. CA (CHUA) bus owned and operated by Villa Rey Transit, driven by Laureano Casim, left
Feb. 18, 1970 | Concepcion, C.J. | Actions & Damages Lingayen Pangasinan for Manila
2. Deceased Policronio Quintos Jr was a passenger, sitting on the first seat,
PETITIONER: VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., second row, right side of the bus.
RESPONDENTS: THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, 3. 4:55 am, vehicle nearing the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in
Barrio Sto. Domingo, in Pampanga
PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. QUINTOS
a. Bus hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay
4. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to
SUMMARY: On March 1960, Quintos was riding Villa Rey’s bus, when the said
the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus.
bus frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. The protruding end of
5. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of the
the bamboo pole at the rear part of the cart penetrated the windshield of the bus
bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of
and landed at Quintos’ face. He died of traumatic shock due ot cerebral injuries.
Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his seat and was
Respondents are sisters and heirs of deceased. They brought this action for breach
sprawled on the floor
of contract of carriage. TC and CA found that death was due to negligence of
6. The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the left side of his face was
driver. ISSUE: W/N the damages awarded by TC and CA were correct – YES.
fractured
The determination of indemnity to be awared has no fixed basis. Much is left to
7. He suffered other wounds and was rendered unconscious due to severe
the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved,
cerebral concussion.
and so it has been said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring
8. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men
the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by
who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus (which passed by) and
precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
brought them to the provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for
particular facts and circumstances of each case. Other factors usually considered
medical assistance.
are pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary, loss o support, loss of service, loss
9. Quintos died at 3:15pm on the same day due to traumatic shock due to
of society, mental suffering of beneficiaries and medical and funeral expenses.
cerebral injuries
Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason
10. Surviving heirs of Quintos (the Quintos sisters) brought this action against
has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a
petitioner for breach of contract of carriage and damages including atty’s fees.
purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule.Damages consist not of the full
11. Villa Rey contends that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event
amount of his earnings but of the support they received or would have received
a. Rejected by the trial court and CA which found that accident was
from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner’s agent.
due to negligence of driver
In fixing the amount of that support, we must reckon with the necessary expenses
12. Trial Court ordered (and CA affirmed) Villa Rey to pay P63,750.00 as
of his own living, which should be deducted from his earnings. Only net earnings,
damages for breach of contract of carriage resulting from death of Quintos
not gross earnings, are to be considered that is the total of the earnings less
13. Case was appealed for amount of damages recoverable by respondents
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and
ISSUE:
other incidental expenses.
1. WoN the amount of damages was correct – YES
DOCTRINE: The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a
RULING: Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of Appeals are hereby
deceased person has therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the
court considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. It
said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a is so ordered.
human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular RATIO:
facts and circumstances of each case. 1. The determination of such amount depends, mainly upon two (2) factors,
Earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by namely:
wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire a. (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
money, "less the necessary expense for his own living. computed and
b. (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents should
be fixed.
FACTS:
2. The first factor was based by RTC and CA upon the life expectancy of
1. At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960 – Isuzu First Class passenger
 Quintos which was placed at 33-1/3 years – he being ober 29 years of age his future income.
(around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the time of his death c. Upon the conclusion of his training period, he was supposed to have
a. By applying the formula (2/3 x [80-30] = life expectancy) adoped in a better job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of more, if not — considering the growing importance of trade,
Combined Experience Table of Mortality. commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income level
3. Villa Rey maintains that the court should have acted in accordance with of officers and employees therein — much more.
Alcantara v. Surro, in which the damages were computed on a four (4) year 7. We are mainly concerned with the determination of the losses or damages
basis, despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of sustained by the Private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the
his death, and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings,
a. This case is not controlling because in that case, none of the parties but of the support they received or would have received from him had he not
had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent
trial court in making its award of damages. Both parties appealed, 8. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary
but only as regards the amount thereof expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings.
b. The plaintiffs assailed the non-inclusion, in its computation, of the Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of
bonus that the corporation, which was the victim's employer, had damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net
awarded to deserving officers and employees, based upon the profits earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary
earned less than two (2) months before the accident that resulted in expense for his own living
his death. 9. the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of
c. The defendants, in turn, objected to the sum awarded for the fourth that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received
year, which was treble that of the previous years, based upon the a. only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered. That is
increases given, in that fourth year, to other employees of the same the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in creation of such
corporation. earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.
d. Neither this objection nor said claim for inclusion of the bonus was
sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the same had not thereby laid
down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation
of damages
4. The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased
person has therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court
considering the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said
that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a
human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case.
5. Life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in fixing
the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not the
sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has been given
to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely
arbitrary standard. such as a four-year rule.
6. Villa Rey also contends that the damages awarded will have to be paid now,
whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later.
a. This argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the
reasons why the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed
basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in
litigations like the one at bar
b. BUT unlike in the Alcantara case, the lower courts did not consider,
in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase