"Social Constitutionalism" in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience of 1938

Author(s): Herbert S. Klein

Source: The Americas, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jan., 1966), pp. 258-276
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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 " IN LATIN AMERICA:
"SOCIALCONS'l'l'l'tJTIONALISM
THE BOLIVIAN EXPERIENCE OF 1938
tN LATIN AMERICAin the twentiethcentury,nationafternation
l hasrevisedits conceptsof constitutional law to takeinto account
the whole new realmof stateresponsibility for the economicand
socialwelfareof its citizens. Beginningmost dramatically with the
MexicanConstitution of 1917,LatinAmerican states have writteninto
theirconstitutionalchartersdetailedchapterson the socialresponsibility
of capital,theeconomicrightsof theworker,andthestateresponsibility
for the protectionandsecurityof the familyandfor the physicaland
mentalwelfareof all its citi%ensandclasses.In rewritingtheirnational
constitutions,the LatinAmericanshave deliberatelybrokenwith the
classicliberalconstitutionalismof the nineteenthcenturyand adopted
whatsomehavecalleda " socialconstitutionalist " position.This new
patternof thoughtemphasizes the positiverole of the statein assuring
the welfareof its citizens,andessentiallyreflectsthe over-allchanges
in twentieth-century LatinAmericanpoliticalideology,whichhasseen
the declineof liberalismandthe growthof Marxism andindigenismo.
In the majorityof cases,thesenew constitutions
social havebeenthe
work of radicalminorities, andtheirwritinghasprecededthe revolu-
tionarychangeswhichwere necessaryto securethe enactmentof the
new ideas of social justice. But these radicalinnovatorswere not
troubledby this problem,for they conceivedof theirconstitutions as
programs of actionfor the future.With the writingof thesedetailed
1 A detailednation-by-nationsurveyof these new social and economicprovisionsis
given in: Academiade CienciasEconlomicas, BuenosAires, Las clJusulaseconoco-
socialesen las constitucionesde America (2 vols.; BuenosAires, 1947-1948).On the
revolutionarycharacterand impactof the MexicanConstitutionof 1917,see: RussellH.
Fitzgibbon," ConstitutionalDevelopmentsin Latin America: A Synthesis,"Americfim
PoliticalScienceReview,XXXIX (June, 1945),518-520.
GeorgeI. Blankstenhas definedthis expansionof constitutionalscope in 20th-century
Latin America as a "fourth function" of constitutionalism."The classic view of
written constitutionsis that they are designedtO perfolm three functions: to limit
the power of government,to set forth the basic outlinesof its structure,and tO state
certainof the broadhopes and aspirationsof the constitutions'framers.Today many
of the constitutionsof LatinAmericaattempta fourth function:to rendermandatory
certainoperationsof governmentdesignedto contributetO the socialwelfare."George
I. Blanksten,"Constitutionsand the Structureof Power,"in Harold E. Davis (ed.),
Governmentand Politics in Latin America (New York, 1958),p. 237. This "fourth
" by LatinAmericanlegal theorists;
function" has been called" socialconstitutionalism
see: OscarFrerkingSalas," Las clausulaseconomico-sociales en la constitucionpolitica
de Bolivia,"in Academiade CienciasEconomicas,BuenosAires, Las clJusulas,p. 64.
258

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 259

programs of socialjustice,they consciouslyhopedto lay the guidelines

for all futuresocio-economic changeboth withinthe existingorder,
whichwas to be judgedby thesenew standards, and for the coming
revolutionary generations.
This was essentiallythe experienceof Boliviawhenin 1938she be-
latedlyjoinedwith the majorityof otherLatinAmericannationsin
revisingher constitutionallaw alongthese new lines. Priorto 1938
therehadexisteda basicuniformity in the numerous constitutionswhich
had guidedthe destinyof Bolivia.While an enduringconstitutional
charterhadnot beenenacteduntil1880,thiseleventhconstitution in the
shorthistoryof the Republicmerelyrepresented a variantform of a
constitutionalpatternwhichhadbeenestablished as earlyas the famous
BolivarConstitution of 1826. This patternprovidedfor a liberalform
of government with limitedpowersin relationto the individual, for a
attitudetowardthe economy,a centralized
laissez-faire republic,anda
relativelyindependentlegislaturetied to a powerfulpresidency.2In
commonwith the other constitutionsof nineteenth-century Latin
America,the emphasis was on the purelylegalisticdefenseof personal
propertyandlibertyagainstthe State,with no thoughtwhatsoeverto
definethe positivesocialfunctionsof the Statetowardsthe welfareof
1tSc1tlzens.
The Constitution of 1880,unlikeits predecessors, survivedfor over
fifty years,primarilybecauseof its associationwith the riseof a stable
politicalpartysystem.For with the adventof the War of the Pacific
(1880-1884),Boliviahad finallyand belatedlydevelopeda coherent
dualpartystructurewhichhadat its basea firmcomminnent to consti-
tutionallegalicy.The greatConservative and Liberalpartiesthat de-
velopedin thelatenineteenth century,andtheLiberalsandRepublicans
in the firstthirdof the tweniiethcentury,succeededin establishing a
uniquepoliticalandconstitutional stability,despitethe occasionalresort
to violence.4
2 For the constitutionsof Boliviasee: CiroFelix Trigo, Las constitucionesde Bolivia
(Madrid,1958). In most of these 19th-centuryconstitutionsand especiallyin the 1880
charter,provisionsfor a type of parliamentary governmentwere made throughcon-
gressionalright of interpellationand censorshipof the cabinet. William S. Stokes,
"ParliamentaryGovernmentin Laiin America,"AmericanPolitical Science Review,
XXXIX (June,1945),527-528.
3RussellH. Fitzgibbon,"ConstituiionalDevelopment,"pp. 511-518.
4 For the best generalpoliticalhistoriesof this periodsee: AlcidesArguedas, Historia
general de Bolivia (el proceso de b naciorslidad),1809-1921(La Paz, 1922), and
EnriqueFinot,Nueva historiade Bolivia(ensayode interpretaciotn sociolotgica)(2d ed.;
La Paz, 1954).

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260 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938

But this stabilitybrokedown underthe impactof the ChacoWar

(1932-1935), asthe generalpoliticalideologyof thenationchangedand
the traditional
politicalpartysystembrokeapart.This dissolutionof
the basiccomponentsof the olderorderhad a directimpacton the
nationalconstitution,andto reflectthesenew developments, and also
in animportant way to guidethem,the historic1880 charterwas over-
thrownandreplacedby theConstitution of 1938, a documentmarkedly
differentin tone, ideology,and provisionsfrom the nation'sprevious
* -

constltutlons.

The primarycausesfor these changesin the fundamental political

orderof the nationwas the introductionof Marxistand indigenist
ideologyin the 1920's,5andthe disastrous
defeatsufferedby Boliviain
its warwith Paraguay.Becauseof the utterincompetence andcorrup-
tion of the civilianand militaryleadershipduringthe war, and their
cynicismin causingit, thereoccurreda revoltagainstthis traditional
leadershipon the partof the youngergenerations.The revoltof this
so-calledgeneraciondel Chacowas initiallytoo confusedin its own
thoughtclearly-toformulatea coherentideologyor leadershipof its
own. Butin its rejectionof the olderorderandfranticsearchingin a
multitudeof ideologicalbywaysto createa new nationalpoliticallife
thisnew generation completelyunderniinedthe traditional
patternsand
prepared the way for the greatrevolutionarychangesof the following
decades.6
At firstmanyof the returningveteransjoinedinnumerable
splinter
groupswhichstressedmoderatesocialreformin one formor another.7
Othersattemptedto work with leadersof the olderorderwho were
6 Guillermo Francovich, El penszrmento bolivano en el siglo xx (Mexico, 1956),
pp. 83 ff.

6 For a discussion of the ideology and forms of expression of the new Chaco War
generation see: Francovich, Pensamiento boliviano, pp. 82-83; Augusto Cespedes, El
dictador suicida, 40 anos de historia de Bolivia (Santiago de Chile, 1956), p. 143; Fernando
Diez de Medina, Literatura boliviana (Madrid, 1954), pp. 342, 358 ff.

7A host of such groups were formed as early as 1934, the most important ones in
La Paz being Beta Gama-whose members included EIernan Siles Zuazo, Victor Andrade,
and Jose Aguirre Gainsborg-(El Diario, August 11, 1935; El Diario, July 25, 1935) and
the Celula Socialista Boliviarza, under the direction of Enrique Baldivieso and Carlos
Montenegro (La Razo'n, October 2, 1935; El Diario, October 3, 1935). These two groups
in turn merged and formed the nationally important Confederacion Socialista Boliviarza
in November, 1935, which by early 1936 was known as the Partido Socialista. For the
moderate reform program of these "Baldivieso Socialista," as they later came to be
called to distinguish them from the other various socialist positions, see: Confederacion
Socialista Boliviana, Programa unificada (La- Paz, 7 de diciembre de 1935); also El
Diario, November 23, 1935.

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 HERBERT
S. KLEIN 261

sympatheiicto the new tone of politicallife,8and still othersplotted

withlike-minded juniorarmyofficerveteransto set up a corporate type
of stateor a confusedversionof a moderatesocialistone.9But despite
the diversityof organizational forms,thisnew politicalmovement of the
Chacogeneration hadcertainthemeswhichwerecommonto allfactions.
Amongthese,of course,wasa strongnationalism. Butthisnewnational-
ism differedmarkedlyin tone fromthe pre-warchauvinistic territorial
nationalism, for it wasessentiallyaneconomicnationalism andexpressed
itself in absolutehostilityto foreigncapital,as represented by such
firmsasStandard Oil. Alongwiththiseconomicnationalism, therewas
a generalcommitment to somekindof basicsocialreform.Whilesome
wishedto see only the urbanmestizo and white middleand lower
classesbenefited,otherssoughtsocialvindicationnot only for these
groupsbutfor the minersandIndiansaswell,acceptinganddeepening,
in thislatteraspect,the positiontakenby the extremefringeof pre-war
radicalMarxistandindigenistthinkers.l°
From 1935to 1938thesevariousprogramsand ideologiesmingled
anddispersed, onlyto uniteagain.A generaltoneof reformwasnever-
thelessparamount in the politicalambient,andin May, 1936,the more
reform-minded youngerarmyofficersdecidedto carryout the over-
throwof the civiliangovernmentin alliancewith someof thesenew
politicalsplintergroupings.Withtheestablishment of the militaryjunta
underthe leadershipof Col. DavidToro, therewas initiateda new
impetusto reformwhichthe militarytriedto capitalize uponby calling
the new regimea government of "militarysocialism."11
8 A classicexampleof this was the pre-warpoliticalleader BautistaSaavedra, who
renamedhis Republicanparty the PartidoRepublicanoSocialistaand announcedhis
adhesionto historicmaterialism, as opposedto liberalism.BautistaSaavedray Edmundo
Vazquez,Manifestoprogrzna,Donde estamosy a donde debemosir (La Paz, 30 de
septiembrede 1935),p. 6.
9 For the ideology of the ofBicer class in referenceto fascismand corporatism,see:
PedroZilvetiArce, Bajoel StgZtO de la barbar1e(Santiagode Chile,1946),pp. 23ff.
10As early as the 1920'sthe radicalTristanMarof [GustavoAdolfo Navarro]was
expoundinghis revolutionarythesis,"=aerras al indio, minasal estado."For the fullest
developmentof his ideas on Boliviansociety and institutions,see: Tristan Marof,
La tragediadel altiplano(BuenosAires, [1934]). A typical pre-warradicalgroupwas
the Grupo Tupac Amaru which advocatedviolent overthrow of the government,
nationalization of the mines,and collectivizationof the soil by a revolutionaryworker-
peasantcoalition.Tupac Amaru'spre-warprogramis reprintedin Rene CanelasLopez,
"El sindicalismoy los sindicatosen Bolivia,"RevistaJurtdica(Cochabamba), Ano VIII
(Junio de 1946), pp. 74-75;for its anti-warpropaganda,see: Grupo Tupac Amaru,
Mcmifesto,La gnctoriao la muerte(al puebloboli%rano: soldados,estudiantes,obreros)
(N. P., [ 1934]) .
11The best generalsurvey for the governmentsof " militarysocialism" is: Porfirio
Diaz Machicao,Historiade Bolivia,Toro, Busch,Quintanilla,1936-1940(La Paz, 1957).

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262 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938

But whilea host of administrativereformsof a mildsocialistnature

cameforthfromthe government, andtendedto clarifysomeof the key
issuesaffectingthe nation,a majorplatformfor theirdiscussionand
resolutionhadscillnot developed,for thejuntatendedto relyonlyupon
itselfandits smallcoteneof supporters.l2 Nevertheless,
underits rule,
in everycity of the republic,cafegroupingsappeared anddebatedthe
issuesof socialjustice,13nationalstudentmeetingsbecamesounding
boardsfor the questionsof the type anddepthof reformsneededby
the nation,14
andfinallythelaborandveterans' movements tookon ever
morepoliticallycommittedpositionstowardradicalreform.l5Bowing
to this pressureanddiscussion,the Toro government in Novemberof
Also see: HerbertS. Klein," DavidToro andthe Establishment of ' MilitarySocialism'
in Bolivia,"HispanicAmericanHistoricalReview,XLV, 1 (February,1965),pp. 25-52.
12 For a full discussionof all these variousreforms,see the ministerial reportscol-
lected in: Republicade Bolivia, DepartamentoNacional de PropagandaSocialista,
Informepresentadopor el senor coronel presidentede la «untamilitarsocialistade
gobiernoal ejercitonacional(La Paz, 1937).
13 Aside from the moderategroupingsalreadynoted, there were a host of more
radicalorganizationswhich promotedfar more revolutionaryideologies. Among these
organizationsthe most importantwere: Grupo de Izquierdaof Cochabamba(led by
Jose AntonioArce and RicardoAnaya);BloqueIntelectualObreroAvanceof Oruro;
FrentePopulrrof Potosi;the PartidoObreroRevolucionario andmuchlaterthe Partido
SocialistaIndRependiente both of La Paz.
14The impact of the war on the student movementwas clearly seen in the IV
CongresoNacional de Estudiantesheld in late 1938. Buildingon innumerablelocal
universitystudentmeetings,it becamea platformfor the full elaborationof a most
revolutionaryset of ideologicalpositions,andendedby advocatingthe overthrowof the
existingorderby a worker-student alliance.See El Diario,January4, 1939;and Alberto
CornejoS., Programas politicosde Bolivia(Cochabamba, 1949),pp. 297-300.
15 The Bolivianlabor movement,which had been smotheredby Salamanca at the
outbreakof the ChacoWar, stronglyrevivedin 1934and 1935,and by 1936was able
to organizeits first nationalconfederation,tlle Confederacion Sindicalde Trabajadores
de Bolivia. The foundingcongressof the CSTB also reversedhistoriclaborpolicy in
Bolivia and advocatedoutrightaffiliationwith the small radicalgrupossuch as those
in Oruro,Potosi, and Cochabambainto FrentesPopularesand direct involvementin
elections,etc. El Diario, December3, 1936. Also two years later the CSTB finally
broke Bolivianisolationand becamea foundingmemberof Vicente LombardoTole-
dano'sinter-AmericanCoBfederacionde Trabcrjadores de AmericaLatina. Augustin
BarcelliS., Medio siglo de lUC1JaS sindicalesrevolucionarias en Bolivict,190S-19SS(La
Paz, 1956),p. 146.
The major Chaco War veteransorganizationwas the Legio'nde Ex-Combatientes
which was founded in late September,1935. El Diario, October 3, 1935. Although
primarilymutualistin aim and apoliticalby originalprogram,the LEC, becauseof its
size and intimateidentificationwith the generacio'n del Chaco,becamea majorpower
in the nationalpolitical scene and had an importantcontrol over the directionof
governmentaffairs. More franklycommittedto direct politicalaction throughparty
politicswere the smallerANDES (Asocictcion Nacionalde Ex-Combatientes Socialista)
and the AEP (Asociacionde Ex-Prisio1eros).For the programof AEP, see El Diario,
August12, 1936;for thatof ANDES,see ANDES,Programapolgtico(La Paz, 1937).

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 263

1936finallyannounced thatit wouldcalltogethera constitutional con-

ventionto drafta nationalcharterwhichwouldreflectthe new ideas
abroadin theland. A Constitutional ReformStudyCommission wasset
up and electionswere promised,thoughthe juntacontinuouslypro-
crastinated on thisissue.l6
This was essentiallythe situationwhen the Toro governmentwas
quietlyreplacedby the regimeof Lt. ColonelGermanBuschin July
of 1937.17This change-over at firstbroughtfew new developments in
the youngerandleftistgenerations, for Buschwas probablythe most
typicalrepresentative of thisgeneration's confusedstateof mind. Des-
peratefor somekindof regeneration hadno
of society,he nevertheless
clearideaof howthiscouldbe achieved,andin hislackof coherentplan
he constantlyshiftedback and forth from corporatestate ideas,to
economicliberalism, backagainto moderate socialism,andfinallyended
with a personalstyle dictatorship.But despitethis confusion,Busch
rapidlyset aboutimplementing the formergovernment's plansfor a
constitutional conventionand by November,1937,issueda call for
electionsof conventiondelegates(senatorsanddeputiesto meetat first
in a unicameral body) for March,1938.18
The convocation of thisassembly on May24, afterthreeyearsof non-
parliamentary government, was a majoreventin itself. But evenmore
importantwas the rolethisconventionhadas a clarifyingforcein the
greatrevolutionary movement whichhadtakenholdof the nationsince
the outbreak of the Chaco War. A truly extraordinary congress,the
gamutof its representation ranfromarchconservatives andrepresent-
tives of the oligarchy-veterans of the politicalbattlesof the past-to
quasi-Communists who hadneverbeforeheldpoliticaloffice. For the
first iime in Bolivianhistory,authenticworkingclassleadersheld a
seatin the nationalcongressand someof the nation'sgreatestleftist
intellectualspresentedthemselvesas deputies.Futureleadersandpast
politicianswerepresent,andmanywho wouldneverhavebeenelected
but for the use of governmentforce at the polls,includingone rural
Indianpeasant.loWith almostuniversalaccord,the traditiorlal parties
16 For the establishment of the ConstitutionalReform Commission,see El Diario,
October1, 1936,and for the electoralpromises,see El Diario,November3, 1936.
17 Es Diario,July 14, 1937.
18 El Diario,November23, 1937.

19This very unusualcompositionof the Conventionwas due to stronggovernment

for the conventionelections,the scatteredmoderate
pressureat the polls. In preparation
and radicalleftist political elementshad joined forces with the labor and veterans
movements-theLEC and CSTBwere both permittedto run their own candidateslike
regularparties (El Diario, August 28, 1937)-to form a temporaryelectoralcoalition

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 264 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938
andrighiistpressattackedthisunwashedandunletteredconvention
a shameanda mockeryto the naiionalhonor.20Yet, despite as
the inex-
perienceof the majorityof its delegatesanddespitethe fantasticmulii-
plicityof conflictingideologiesandpositionsexpressed, the Convencion
Norcionalof 1938wasto createthe firsttrulyrevolutionary
in Bolivianhistorysincethe establishment consiicution
of republicangovernment.
In accordwith the ratherunusualnatureof the Conveniion, the first
sessionbeganwithanuproarovertheswearingin of the deputies.Many
of the radicalintellectuals and laborleadersrefusedto swearby the
traditional Catholicoath,and,muchto the chagrinof the traditional
press,21 swore,likeCarlosMediancelli, deputyfor Potosianda
of its powerfullocalFrentePopular," by the causeof the member
by Boliviaandby humanity."Mediancelli proletariate,
was followedby " camara-
das" Arratiaand Sinani,who likewisesworeloyalty to the
classesandto theircauseandideals.Onedeputyevenswore" by working
who is the greatestsocialist." Once the uproarover these Chnst,
29
radical
procedures hadsubsided,the Conveniionsettleddown to the process
of organization and to the irnmediate eleciionof Presidentand Vice-
President for a four-yearterm. On the 27thof May,as was expected,
theConvention, by almostunanimous vote, electedBuschto the presi-
dencyandEnriqueBaldivieso tO the vice presidency for a termto last
until1942.23
Now the greatdebatebeganover the meaningof the Convention
andwhatits aimsshouldbe for the new Constitution whichit proposed
towrite. Fromthe very beginningof its firstpreliminary sessions,the
knownas the Frente Snico Socialistain February,1938. Pledged
listof candidates,it backedthe Busch governmentand had to presenta united
thelatter as representinga governmentparty. El Diario, reciprocalsupportfrom
February18, 1938. With the
government showingstrongpreferencefor the new grouping,many of the
politicalpartieswithdrewfrom the race (El Diario,February27, 1938)and traditional
electionssaw a majorvictory for the Frenteslate throughoutthe the March
March 15, 1938.In the actualcompositionof the convention,of the nation. El Diario,
parties,the Genuine Republicanshad no representatives, threegreatpre-war
the Liberalstwo, and the
Republican Socialistsa somewhatgreaternumber. El dictador,p. 166.
C!espedes,
20 See, e. g., El Diario,May 25, 1938;
El Diario,May 26, 1938;Ciro Felix Trigo, Las
constituciones,p. 130; Cespedes,El dictador,p. 167. Also see the bitter
AlcidesArguedas,who was defeatedfor a senateseat for La Paz in the remarksof
who labeledthe majorityof the 1938Conventiondeputiesas "little men Convention,
without past,withoutdistinction,almostilliterateand in truth obscure,withoutnames,
cant persons,anonimities. . .", etc. Alcides Arguedas,Obras reallyinsignifi-
Mexico, 1959),I, 1214-1215. completas (2 vols.;
21 El Diario,May 26, 1938.

22 ConvencionNacional de 1938,
Redactor de la CotPvencion
Paz, 1938-1939),I, 31. This work is hereaftercited as Redactor.Nacional (S vols.;
La
23 Ibid.,pp. 74, 76.

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 265

speakersat the Conventionandthe delegatesthemselveshadshowna

markedsenseof awareness on thesequestions.Almostall believedthat
they werecreatinga bravenew worldfor the generation of the Chaco,
andthatthe bloodof the Chacowasbeingturnedintoa greatconstruc-
tive vote of protestagainstthe old orderby this singulargathering.
The Ministerof Government ColonelCesarB. Menachohadexpressed
justthis sentimentas the representativeof the juntawhen he greeted
the Convention in its firstmeetingby declaring:
We are living, senoresConvencionales, in an unquestionably historic
moment.The ChacoWar hascreateda new collectiveconscience,and
a clearreflectionof that evolutionmustbe the work which you will
realizewithinthis chamber.... We are at the pointin which events
seem to pauseperplexed,in orderto take new impulsewith a total
rejuvenation of theirspiritualandmaterialforces. We find ourselves,
exactly,at the historicalpointfromwhichit fallsto us to look behind,
to severelyandhonorablyre-examine ournationalpast. It corresponds,
therefore,to the talentandsagacityof the legislatorsto extracta con-
structivephilosophywhich must be within that retrospectivestudy
[andwith this new philosophy]to rectify our trajectoryas a people
- and a nation. Do not forget that by the ideologicalbedrockwhlch
you will uncover,surely,the NationalConventionof 1938will orient
the generations for fifty yearsto come.24
This sametheme,of the potentialof the conventionto finallymold
the restlessChacofermentinto a coherentideology,was also clearly
echoedby thesocialistRenatoRiverlnwhenhe acceptedthe presidency
of the Convention.He demandedthat "the sensibilityof the new
orientations who defendedthe nationalsover-
of the representatives,
eigntyin the bloodyfieldsof the Southeast,"musttakeinto account
the socialunrestwhichafflictedBoliviaandthe worldof theirday,and
reworkthe naiionin the lightof them.25
and moderatesocialistleader
To the newly electedVice-President
was:
the Convention
EnriqueBaldivieso,
not the traditionalexpressionof the numericalvote, nor of the arith-
metic democracy.It representsa new spirit,it is the depositoryof a
new conscienceandhasthe imperative mandateof a peoplethat,in the
anguishof the war,in thattragicshock,by force of painandheroism,
hasdiscoveredthe lieswhichit livedandnow seeksthe truthandwants
justice. From this comes the mandatewhich the honorablenational
representativespossess;it is not commonparliamentary power, but
a mandateto moldinto deedsthe intentionsof the collectivesoul.26
24 Ibid., p. 3.
25 Ibid., p. 20.
26 Ibid., p. 83.

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 -

BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938
266
It remainedfor a leftistintellectual,
however,to give a concreteand
percepiiveprescription for the needsandaimsof the new body. In a
majorspeech,to which most of the delegateslaterpaiddue homage
andwhichtheywereconstantlyquoting,the novelistAugustoCespedes
outlinedthe tasksof the Convention to be the eleciionof a permanent
executive,the writingof a constitution, andthe settingof the tone of
the new politicalerato follow.27The firstproblemhadalreadybeen
solvedby theJuntade Govierno,he said,andthesecondwoulddevelop
out of the long sessionsto come;however,the thirdrequiredcareful
attentionnow, beforethe taskwas begun. The Conventionwas there
not only to turnthe militarysocialistruleinto a de jurestatus;it had
to changecompletelythe chaoticpatternwhichToro andBuschhad
developedandto establisha creativede jureregimewhichwouldnot
be forcedto relyuponthewhimsof theArmy,butupona solidfounda-
tion of socialistciviliangovernment.The "socialism " of the military
was fraudulent andit hadonly frustrated the truesocialistneedsof the
peoples,whichtheConvention wouldhaveto satisfyin thenew order.28
He sawBoliviaas a colonialnationunderimperialist domination, made
up ot two generatlons:
. . . one whichtriesto maintainthe colonialorganization and another
which wants to found a nationality,ef3Tective and free, economically
free. Our crisisis complex,it is a crisisof two generationsagainsta
world of change.The oldergeneration,which even now is dominant
in politics,the economy,finances,society,thoughnot in literaturein
whichwe new writershavetakencharge,thatancientgenerationwants
to resolvenew problemswith traditional systems.... And for its part,
the new generationhasstill not been ableto makefor itself a system
of convictions. . . andit vacillatesbeforea realitywhich is still con-
ductedandorderedby the convictions,by the laws,by the creeds,and
aboveall, by the economicinterestsof the old capitalismof the old
generation.

Hence we shouldnot be surprisednor disconsolateif we find that

fromthe ChacoWar the revolutionary generationdid not come forth
perfectlyequippedwith ideasand solutions.That rather,becauseit
participated
in the catastrophe, which disturbedits psychicunity, its
convictionin old beliefsand its serenity,it cameforth with desires,
with passions,not with plans,normethods,norsystems....29
In thisstateof ideologicaldisorganzation,
the word" socialism " had
becomea beaconfor thisrestlessgeneration.But,chargedCespedes,it
wasa wordexploitednotonlyby thelegitimate left,butby the defeated
27Ibid., p. 59.
28 Ibid., pp.60-61.

99Ibid., pp. 63-64.

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 267

militaryleaders,manyof whomweretruerevolutionaries, but mostof

whomwereopportunists. Toro sabotaged the true socialistmovement,
accordingto the radicalCespedes,and Busch,he thought,mightstill
continueto do the sameif the Convention didnot bindhimby creating
a new constitutional andpoliticalorderwhichwoulddominateall mili-
taryelements.30 In this,Cespedesreflectedthe extremedistrustthatthe
far left felt for the military,evenin its mostradicalform. As for his
othersentiments, he represented an authenticvoiceof the left speaking
to his fellow generationof youngrevolutionaries, andwhile Cespedes
wasfarfromevenrepresenting the majorityof the extremeleft-he him-
self being somewherebetweenthe moderateand far wings-yet he
clearlyperceivedthe historicmomentin which the entiregeneration
found itself and calledfor the Conventionto breakthis ideological
anarchyof the post-waryearsandgive truemeaningto the revolution-
ary Splrit of the age.
However,the very background which Cespedesso ably described
preventedthe left fromreachingany majorunityat thispoint,or any
revolutionary control.In the hecticmonthsof the 1938Convention, it
founditself ableto expressonly a part of the leftistplatformin the
new constitutionand,as for its own organization, it continuedin the
chaoticfashionof the immediate post-waryears.For the left hadonly
beenjustnurturedto a developmental stage,andit neededthe crucible
of consistent defeatandfrustration to forgeit intoa revolutionary move-
mentof overwlielming power.But while the left never organizeditself
coherentlyenoughin all its radicaland moderatewings to dominate
fully the Conventionproceedings, it nevertheless took full advantage
of the debatesto proposeand propagandize for all the revolutionary
ideasabroadin the land,expressing mostof themfor the firsttimein
Bolivianhistoryin the hallowedhallsof the Legislative Palace.
Havingelectedthe executiveand beenwell versedon its role, the
Conventionin the monthsof May andJuneandpartof July became
embroiled in organizationalproblemsandin a hostof left-overbusiness
fromthe lastthreeyearsof non-parliamentary government.While an
oldhoc Constitutional Commission begangoingover the minorityand
majorityconstitutional projectswhich the Toro Constitutional Com-
missionhad issuedafterseveralmonthsof work,31alongwith several
30 Ibid-,pp. 64ff
31This commission's project, which heavily stressed the corporate state ideology of
the Toro period and was strongly influenced by German-Italian ideas in this aspect
(El Diario,January 28, 1937,February 2, 1937), was merely presented to the Convention
by Busch without formal endorsement, thus giving the Convention full freedom to
work up its own charter. El Diario,June 9, 1938, June 10, 1938.

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268 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938
full-scaleconstitutional schemespresented by the Conventioneers them-
selves,the Assemblyitselfspentits timedebatingsuchthingsasrailroad
workers'pensions,specialpensionpleasfromveteransandwidows,and
a hostof localpublicworksprojects.
This seemingindecision,alongwith the fact that severalconserva-
tive representativeswantedto preventthe Conventionfromever con-
sideringa new Constitutioll, playedinto the handsof the conservative
press,andespeciallyEl Diario,whichbeganlabelingthe Convention as
a wasteof taxpayers' moneyanda do-nothingorganization. So bitter
didtheseattacksbecomethatby July,El Diarioitselfwascomingunder
full-scaleattackin the Convention,with manyof the representatives
callingfor outrightsuppression forsuchslanders andafull-scale confisca-
iion of the newspaper, whichthey calledan organof the Oligarchy.
In this,the Conventionreceiveda sympathetichearingfromthe new
Ministerof Government in the BuschCabinet,CaptainEllasBelmonte,
one of themostpoliticallycommitted of thejuniorofficers,andstrongly
inclinedtowarda Fascistposition.32
Givingfull supportto the Convention's hostilitytowardEl Diolrio,
Belmontenotedthat while the law of the landfavoredfree press,he
believedthatthe pressshouldbe controlledandcensuredfor the social
good.33The left supportedtheseconsiderations andone deputynoted
thattheentireconceptof a freepresswasa mockerywhenonly 300,000
Boliviansoutof 2.7millionscouldevenread,andchargedthatin Bolivia
the newspapers merelyrepresented economicpowergroupsandwere
but toolsfor foreignimperialism.34 Leadingdeputiesin the newspaper
attackwereEguinoZaballa,FernandoSinani,who calledfor the con-
fiscation,and Waldo Alvarez,who chargedthe paperwith beingan
organof thePatinointerests.35
In responseto thisattack,El Diario increasedthe tempoof its cam-
paignagainstthe Convention,callingfor its outrightdissoluaonas a
uselessorgan.After bitterdebate,the Conventionapproveda censor-
ship law,36which broughtthe resignationof threeciviliansfrom the
cabinet.37 Busch,however,rejectedthe resignations, promisingnot to
32Belmontewas one of the foundersof the famoussecret militarylodge known as
RADEPA which cameto powerin the mid-1940's
underVillarroel.ZilvetiArce, Bajo el
signo, pp. 23S.
33 Redclstor,II, 151-152.

341bid.,p.153.

85 El Diclrio,July 18, 1938,July 16, 1938.

36 Redclstor, II, 253-254;Diaz Machicao,Toro, Busch, Quintznillclsp. 83.
37 El Diario, July 15, 1938.

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 269

carrythe law into effectagainstany newspaper.38 Also underextreme

pressurefrom the newspapersand other traditionalgroups,Busch
droppedBelmontefromthe Cabinetandreplacedhimwith hispersonal
friendandmoderate GabrielGosalvez.89
politician,
With someof its hostilityrelievedby the outburstagainstEl Diario
andwiththe workof the ad hoc Congressional Commission completed,
the Convention settleddownto the longprocessof workingout a new
constitution for the nation.One of the firstarticlesto be discussedand
onewhichledto oneof themostsignificant debatesof theentireperiod,
was the articlewhichestablished the socialnatureof privateproperty.
Whilethe conservatives wereopposedto any butthe classicdefinitions
of inviolabilityof privateproperty,40 the moderateand extremeleft
demanded thatBoliviaconformto the more modernEuropean andLatin
Americanconstitutions, particularlythe Mexicanone of 1917,andlimit
classicliberalconceptsof propertywith the provisothat it fulfill a
socialfunction.
Whilethe finalarticlewasa moderate statementbetweentheopinions
of thesetwo groups,41 the radicalleft took advantage of the debateto
propose some rather revolutionary reforms. Under the leadershipof
Balcazar, EguinoZaballa, VictorPazEstenssoro, andespeciallyWalter
GuevaraArce, the radicalsproposeda formulawhosefirstpartread:
"The Stateguarantees the rightof propertyso longasit fulfillsa social
function,"42 andin thesecondpartcalledfor outrightlandreform.This
secondpartof theirprojectedarticlecalledfor the expropriation of
unproductive latifundiasandtheirparcelingout amongthe agricultural
peasantswho workedthem.48WalterGuevaraArceevenwent further
and chargedthat to breakup the latifundiasinto smallindividually
ownedplotswouldbe to returnto the liberalideasof the past,andthat
they shouldratherbe workedon a collectivebasisby the localIndian
co7¢unidades; in short,he advocatedcollectivization of agriculture.44
38 El Diario,July 16 1938.
89 El Dizio, J@y22, 1938.
40 See, e. g., El Diano, Jlily 27, 1938.
41 Article 17 states: " Pnvate propertyis inviolable,providedthat it fulfills a social
function;expropriationcan be imposedfor reasonof public utility, being authorized
consistentwith the law and previousjust indemnification."(The oicial text of the
pp. 421455). Other arecles
constitutionis reprintedin Felix Trigo, Las constituciones,
of the final constitution,however, considerablydeviatedfrom the moderatetone of
this pariiculararticle, and providedfor a far more leftist interpretationof private
propertyand governmentcontrol;see especiallyaracles6b, and 106-130.
42 Redactor,II, 529,the Espinozaproyecto.

48 Ibid.,p. 530.
44 Ibid.,pp. 533-535.

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270 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938

That theseideaswere evenadvocatedandhotly debatedin a national

BolivianCongresswas indicativeof the majorchangesin the political
atmosphere which had occurredas a resultof the ChacoWar, and
whilethey were not acceptedby the majority,theirvery propagation
indicatedthatthe farleft hadat lastachievedanimportant publicvoice
in the nationalpoliticallife.
Whileanticlericalismwasendemicin theoldLiberalparty,themoder-
atesandlefiistssucceededin givingit a new impetusinto the economic
realm.Overthe objectionsof theright,theysuccessfully proposedthat
all Churchpropertywould henceforthbe consideredas equalto all
otherformsof privatepropertyandsubjectto the sametaxations,in-
debtedness, restrictions,
etc. Evenon thisissuethemoreradicaldeputies
advocatedthe wholesaleconfiscationof all Churchpropertyand its
devolution to Statecontrol,a movewhichwasrejectedbythemajority.45
Nor were the internalproperty-holders the only groupconsidered
by the Convention.In a stronganti-imperialist frameof mindafterthe
recentconfiscationof the StandardOil (Company,46 the Convention
passed,with surprisingly little debate,articleswhich declaredthat no
foreignenterpriseoperatingin Boliviacouldappealto foreignpowers
in their disputeswith the Stateand that they were to be considered
boundby all thelawsregulating nationalcompanies;thatno foreigner
47

couldown, lease,etc. any soil or subsoilrightsto any propertywithin

fifty milesof the frontier;48andfinallythatonly the Stateor its repre-
sentativescouldexportoil fromBolivia,whetherpubliclyor privately
produced.49 In the debateover this latterarticle,therewas even an
unsuccessful call by the farleft for the inclusionof the wordminerals?
thusproposingthatall tin wouldbe sold abroadby the State,andnot
by theprivatecompanies.50
As deputyVictorPazEstenssoro noted," the monopolyof exporta-
tion of mineralsby the Stateis the only measurecapableof operatinga
45See debate,ibid., pp. 615-635.
46This had been carriedout by the Toro governmentin March, 1937. El Dierio,
March16, 1937.For a surveyof the whole issuesee: HerbertS. Klein," AmericanOil
Companiesin Latin America: The BolivianExperience,"Inter-Americorn Econo7tic
Affairs,XVIII (Autumn,1964),47-72.
47 Articles18 and 110of the Constitution.
48Article 19.
49 Article109.

50 Redactor,IV, 91. The convencionales also attackedthe penchantof privateroad

builders,notablyNicholausSuarezin the OrienteandSimonPatinoon the Altiplano,of
preventingthe publicfrom usingtheir roadsand specificallyprovidedthat any road in
the nation,whetherpubliclyor privatelybliilt,was open to the free use of all (Article
26). For this debatesee Redactor,II, 600ff.

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 271

radicaland profoundrevolutionin the social-economic structureof

Bolivia."Thereis no questionthatthisrepresented the closestthingto
outrightnationalization,andprobablywas the mostfeasibleimmediate
planwhichtheleft couldhopeto pass.ButevenPasEstenssoro realized
thatthe left did not havethe powerto implementsucha radicalpro-
cedureand notedthat the miningsuperestado, as he calledits would
neverallowsuch a law to be put into practiceandwould " put into
play all its resourcesto avoidthatit be carriedinto effect,and,as it
hasa powergreaterthanthatof the Stateitself,it is capableof creating
preventing
a difficultsituation, themoderatelysocialistConstitutionthat
we arevotingfrombeingsanctioned andpromulgated." 51

Thiswholedebateledto a majorattackon theentireminingindustry,

withsharpcriticisms of thelaborconditionsat the mines,52 on the flight
of capitalandsmallreturnsto the State,on the international holdings
of Patino-especially in FarEasterntin mining-whichit was charged
led to his anti-Bolivianactionsin the recentdepression, andon the im-
personalnatureof the miningsuper-state whose real powers lay outside
the nation.53 of overturning
As to the possibilities the radicallegislation
proposed, AugustoCespedes notedthatif theConvention approved such
legislation,the Executivewouldbe empowered to carryit through,and
evenif thiswereunsuccessful, at leastthe prescription for futureaction
hadbeenproposedandwouldbe carriedoutby othersat a latertime,as
the MexicanConstitution of 1917had been.54While the majorityof
the deputieseventuallydefeatedthisproposition, it wasfarfromburied
by the rightist opposition,and within a yearit became the mostcrucial
politicalissueof the day.55
Whiledefeatedon manyrevolutionary proposalsof immediateaction,
the leftistelementsin the Conventionnevertheless succeededin having
writteninto the Constitution for the firsttimein Bolivianhistorythe
generalsocialistprinciplethat the Stateshouldassumedirectcontrol
overthe economyof the naiionso as to insurethe humandignityof
chapteron the " EconomicandFinan-
its citizens.In the Constitution's
cial Regime,"Article 106 openedby declaringthat " The economic
regimeshouldessentiallyrespondto principlesof socialjustice,which
51Ibid.,IV, 91-92.
52Ibid.,p. 95.
531bid.,pp.96ff.
54 Ibid.,p. 104.

into the famousJune 7th decreeof the Buschgovern-

55 This idea was incorporated
ment in 1939. See Diaz Machicao,Toro, Busch, QuintaniZb,pp. 101-102;Cespedes,
El dictador,p. 202.

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272 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938

haveastheiraimto securefor allthe inhabitants

a dignifiedexistenceas
humanbeings."Andto achievetheseaims,it provided;
The State will be able to regulate, through law, the exercise of com-
merce and industry,with overridingpower, when the secunty or public
necessiocyrequire it. It will also be able in these cases to assumethe
supreme direciion over the naaonal economy. This interveniion will
be exercisedin the form of control, inducementor direct management.56
The left alsosucceededin placinginto the Constitution the proposi-
tion that the Staterecognize(i. e., legallyguarantee)the free associ-
ationof a professionalandsyndicalnature,andthe collectivecontract
of labor.57The rightto strikeas a meansof legitimatedefenseby the
workerswas acknowledged 58and despitethe criesof destroyingcon-
fidencein foreigncapitalmarketsand forcingall nationalbusinessto
close,59the Conventionapprovedthe call for legislationto determine
the participationof workersandemployeesin the profitsof the enter-
prises.6°In a ratherpackedarticle,6l the Consatuiiondeclaredthatthe
Statewouldprovideobligatorysecurityfor accidents,sickness,forced
work stoppage,maternity,etc., and that it would declareminimum
hours,wages,annualvacations,andmedicalbenefits.In short,thatthe
governmentwould establishcompletesocial legislationto deal with
the protectionof laborandwelfareof the people.
In keepingwiththissocialaim,theConvention, withonly a minimum
of debate,wrote up an entirechapterin the Constitutionon " The
Family."This chapterproclaimed Stateresponsibility for the health,
education,andwelfareof the child,of the equalityamongall children
(of legalor non-legalunion),andthe placingof matrimony, the family,
andmaternityunderthe protectionof thelaw.62Anotherchapterdeal-
ing with the " CulturalRegime" declaredthat educationwas one of
the pnmefunctionsof the State,officiallyincorporated into the Con-
stitutionthe system of universicyautonomy,and proposeda State
scholarship programanda planfor the promotionof nationalculture.63
The essential
aimof theConvention in allof thesearticlesandchapters
56 Article 6 on rights of citizens,providedthat aXpersonshad the fundamental
right
"to dedicatethemselvesto labor,commerceand industryonly on conditionthat they
do not prejudicethe collectivegood."
57 Article 125.
68 Article 126.

69 Redactor,IV, 215ff.
60 Article 127.
61 Article 122.
62 Articles131-134

63 Articles154-164.

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 273

wasto committhe Statedefinitively to full responsibility for the health,

education,and welfareof all its peoples. And as one constitutional
scholarnoted,the Constitution of 1938" hasbeen,with absolutecer-
tainty,thefirstmodification of socialimportance whichourCharterhas
experienced sincethe initiationof republican life...." 64 Whereasall
previousconstitutional conventions hadbeenconcernedwith delimiting
the formsandpowersof the centralgovernment andwith definingthe
powersof the nationalandlocal administrations, involvingthemselves
in classicliberaldefinitionsof limitedconstitutional government,the
1938 Conventionirrevocablybrokethis mold. For the first time in
republicanhistory,it was proclaimedthat the functionof the State
was to providefor the completesocialwelfareof all its citizens.The
classicliberallaissez-faire minimalgovernmentwas now replacedby
thesocialistconceptsof anactiveStateintervening in all areasof life, to
providefor the collective good of itS citens. The deputiesof 1938
were initiatinga whole new methodof constitutional writing,which
hasbeenproperlycalled" socialconstitutionalism."
Whilemanyrightistsheldthatsuchsocialissuesshouldnotbe written
intoa constitutional charter,butshouldratherbe reservedfor secondary
legislation,the left refusedto give ground.Overandover again,they
claimedthatsuchconceptshadto be writtenasminutelyaspossibleinto
the basicnationalcharter,andthatevenif thistype of legislationwas
not immediately enacted,the Constitution of 1938,unlikethe previous
constitutionsof Bolivia,hadto providea blueprintfor the futureand
ascompletea statement aspossibleon thegoalsof thenewrevolutionary
generations.And while the right continuallysucceededin watering
down the morerevolutionary aspectsof such legislation,nevertheless
a fundamental beginningwas made,a beginningthat, over and over
again,wouldbearrichfruitin the yearsto come.
As the debateprogressed, two roughgroupings beganto be discerned
on majorissues.Thesewere,firstof all,a Right,composedof the few
Liberalselected,plusthe few clericsin theAssembly,andbasedheavily
on the grupooriental.Thislattercoalitionwasmadeup of mostof the
delegatesfromthe easternlowlandprovincesandhada distinctlycon-
regionalist
servative, orientationwitha stronganti-Indian bias. Further,
therewere the splinterRepublicolno Socialistol Antipersonollistolled by
GabrielGosalvez,which stood against the more leftist tendencies of
the Saavedra-dominated wing of the old Republican party.
The Left was madeup of a coalitionof smallpartiesof various
64 Oscar p. 64.
FrerkingSalas," Las clausulas,"

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274 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938

orientations. ThisLeftcoalition,knownvariouslyasthesectorizquierda
or sectorobrero,includedsuch laborleadersas FernandoSinantand
WaldoAllrarez,the local FrentePopulargroupof Potosi,the Grupo
Izquierdaof Cochabamba, anda recentlysalvagedleft-winggroupof
formerBaldiviesosocialistsknownas the PartidoSocialistaIndependi-
ente (PSI). This lattergroup includedsuch figuresas Victor Paz
Estenssoro, AugustoCespedes,andW<llterGuevaraArce,andwas to
be the directprecursor of the MovimientoNacionalistaRevolucionario.
At the extremeendof thisleft sectorweresuchintellectuals as Alfredo
Arratiaof thePopularFrontof Potosiand,surprisingly, consideringhis
latercareer,WalterGuevaraArce of the PSI,both of whomled the
fightfor landreform.
A leaderin the earlierdemandfor breakupof the latifundias,Walter
GuevaraArce was also a key figurein the Convention's extremely
iinportant debateovertheproposedchapteron "Peasantry " whosefirst
articlecalledforlegalizingtheancientIndiancomunidades, which,since
pre-Columbian times,had formedthe basicunit of the agricultural
population(that is, of three-quartersof the nation)and which since
the beginningof the Republican erahadbeendeniedall legalrightsby
the Boliviangovernment.65
GuevaraArceandAlfredoArratia,in theirdefenseof the comunidad
and attackson the latifundias, poundedout the thesisof Mariategui,
thattheproblemof theIndianis theproblemof land,andnot a question
of educationor anythingelse.66To RepublicanSocialistchargesthat
the countrywas underpopulated and that thereforethere existedno
problemof land reform,as the officialpartyplatformread,67 and to
Orientollistols
chargesthat the entireproblemwas one of colonization,
the left bitterlyrepliedthatthe problemof landreformwasa vitalone
forBoliviaandonethatcouldnotbe denied.68 Guevara Arcedemanded:
65 At firstbasingitself on the Liberalbeliefsof SimonBolivar,who soughtto createa
small propertiedpeasantryin his famousdecreesof Trujillo and Cuzco of 1824and
1825respectively(Miguel Bonifaz,"El problemaagrariaindigenaen Boliviadurante
la epoca republicana," Re7nstade EstudiosJuridicos,Politicosy Sociales[Sucre],VIII,
no. 18 [diciembrede 1947], 66-73), the republicanlegislationestablishedthe non-
recogriitionof the juridicalexistenceof the comunidad,which was chargedwith being
a reactionaryinstitution.This legal atiitudepermittedthe whitesand cholosin practice
to destroythe propertyrights of these communitiesand to dramaticallyexpandthe
latifundiasystemwith the open aid of the State,which refusedto protect in law the
propertyrightsof the comunidad.See: Anuro UrquidiMoralessLa comrunidad indt-
gena (Cochabamba,1941), pp. 79ff.; also Jose Flores Moncayo,Legislaciora boliviana
del indio, recopilacion182S-19S3(La Paz, [l953]).
66See, e.g., Redactor,V, 213-215. Also see: Jose CarlosMariategui,7 ensayosde
interpreracion de la realidadperaana(6th ed., Lima,1958),pp. 29ff.
67Redactor,V, 270.
68 Ibid., pp. 270-272.

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 S. KLEIN
HERBERT 275

'<How to resolvethe problemof the Indian?The HonorableArraita

hasalreadyindicatedit. The solutionis not in educatlnghim;theprob-
of
lem of the Indianis the problemof the land.... Therearernillions
menwithouta pieceof earthagainstpersonswho haveenormouspor-
iions of unworkedland. The essentialthing is that the Indianhave
land...." 69
GuevaraArcewent on to threatenprophetically thatif the Conven-
tion did not make these constitutionalprovisions for peacefulland
reformthensomedaya revolutionary socialistpartywouldarrivewhich
by bloodwould imposean even morerevolutionary solutionon the
nation. " If todaywe do not makethis pacificrevolution,tomorrow
will come the violentrevolution...." The actuallegislationthey
70

proposedfor the campesino, astheleftistsdeliberatelycalledtheIndians,

wasa majorpieceof radicallegislationwhichwouldhaverecognized not
only the legal personalityof the comunidad,7l but proposedoutright
landreform,providingthat 50 Indianscouldsolicitfor the expropria-
latifundiawhichwouldbe turnedoverto themby
tion of a particular
the State.72In the ratherheateddebatethe free-laborsystemof pon-
gueaje wasattackedharshlyby theleft,to thepointwhereonedeputy
73

of the so-calledsectorobreroalludedto the factthatpO?^gOS wereused

for morethings than manual laborby the polcena society, an allusion
which causeda completebreakdownof the sessionand a temporary
expulsionof the deputy.74Attackedboth in and outsidethe hallsof
the PalacioLegislatiso,chargedwith communism andbeingwreckers
of privatepropency,andunderthe threatsof government the
closure,75
left lost groundand the nght wing of the Convention succeeded in
wipingout the poriionsof the Campesino Chapterwhichprovidedfor
landreformandspecialconstitutional protectionfor the Indian.They
succeededin replacingthemwith watereddown piousdesiresto im-
69 Ibid.,p. 277. Smost all of the depuneswere constantlyreferringto the Mencan

Constitutionof 1917when dealingwith the problemof foreign investmentand the

Indian,and GuevaraArce even went so far as to quotedle worksof FrankTannenbaum
on the MexicanRevolution,ibid., p. 281.
70 Ibid.,p. 282.

71 Article 165.

72 Redactors V, 283-285.
73 For a descriptionof this harshsystem see: Rafael A. Reyeros,El pongueaje,la

serfuidz4mbre personalde los indios boliviznos(La Paz, 1949); and RembertoCapriles

Rico and GastonArduz Eguia, El problemasocial en Bolivia,condicionesde vida y
de trabajo(La Paz, 1941),pp. 4243.
74 Redactor,V, 287-289.

75 Ibid.,p. 335

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276 BOLIVIAN
CONSTITUTION,
1938

proveeducationandlegislateon thesesubjects,takingintoaccountlocal
regionaldifferences.76
Now, underintensepressurefrom Buschwho, temporarily leaning
to the right,threatened adjournment, the Convention hastilycompleted
theconsistution in thelastdaysof October,1938. Thus,afterfivehectic
monthsof tremendously creativeactivity,the ConvencionNolcional
quietlydissolveditself andthe naiiononce againreturnedto the rela-
tivelyquietdaysof non-parliamentary government.
But the end of the Convention in no way endedits impact.For, as
the earlyspeakershad rightlypredicted,the Conventionhad set the
toneandprovidedtheguidelines forthe futuregenerationsof thenation.
It hadfinallyand definitivelydestroyedthe classic-styleconsiitutional
charterof economicliberalismand limitedconstitutional government,
andopenlyproclaimed the positiverole the governmentmusttake in
providingfor the welfareof its peoplein all aspects.Thiswasunques-
tionablythe mostbasicideawhichemergedin the nationalconscious-
nessin the post-warperiod,andit was this desirewhichthe conven-
cionalessucceededin writingintothe fundamental charterof the nation.
The Constitution of 1938wasin essencea catalogof humanrightsand
socialresponsibilities.That this revolutionarynew constitutionwould
not endureas long as the 1880charterit replaced,was clearlyrecog-
nizedby the menwho wroteit, for they fullyrealizedthatnew genera-
tionswoulddefinein far moreradicaltermsthe needsandobligations
of theState.Butevenasnewconstitutions werewrittenin thefollowing
decades,they represented, morethananythingelse,appendages to the
1938charter,appendages which reflectedthe ever growingpowerof
the leftistandlabormovements in Boliviansociety.
HERBERT
S. KIEIN
Unitversity
of Chicago,
Chicago,Illinois

76Amcles 166 and 167.

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