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Keenan
Source: James F. Keenan, “Sin,” in Moral Wisdom: Lessons and Texts from the Catholic Tradition, 2nd edition (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 45-65.
Through a series of steps I want to wear down some long-standing presuppositions that we have about
sin. Then I want to propose a new notion of sin.
When I was about seven years old, like other Brooklyn Catholics, I already knew a great deal about my
faith. We studied the Baltimore catechism and were tested weekly. We had May crownings, the Feast
of All Saints when we dressed as our namesakes, first communions, confirmations, and Friday
benedictions (where, along with “Tantum Ergo,” we sang “An Army of Youth”). My mother was in the
Rosary Altar Society, my father was in the Knights of Columbus, and I was an altar boy. We knew
Latin, understood what a maniple was, and kept a sacrament of the sick kit at home. We were Roman
Catholic.
While most of the time being a Roman Catholic was an uplifting experience, it was when sin and
confession were introduced into our lives that we came into contact with what philosophers call
“existential anxiety.” Probably the greatest anxiety circled around making a good confession or,
rather, failing to make one.
I remember walking to school with a seven-year-old classmate considering the case of someone who
forgets to tell all their sins in one particular confession and then the next time goes to confession and
forgets to tell those sins yet again and how all the subsequent confessions would be bad just as the
first one was. I feared it happening to me. I remarked to my friend, “And how could I ever remember
to redo all those confessions?” Then, just as we were about to cross the street, in the middle of my
angst-ridden monologue, my friend shared with me his ultimate fear: “Just imagine being hit by a car
and not being in the state of grace!”
Catholic life in the late 1950s had a certain give and take. You always felt the give, but you also felt
the take, and sin and hell were the takes. We worried about sin and confession a lot.
At one point I learned what a mortal sin was and how we commit it. It needed to be a grave act,
committed with full knowledge and full consent of the will. These seemed to me to be significant
conditions. After one Sunday mass I was walking home with my grandmother when I asked, “Grandma,
I’ve been thinking about mortal sin. Who could ever do something really big and wrong, really mean
it, and really want to do it? It just seems awfully hard to do all three.” “You’re right, Jimmy. It’s very
hard to commit a mortal sin.” No more consoling words could have been spoken.
Not surprisingly, years later I became a moral theologian. In my years of study, I found a text that
contradicted my grandmother. It was in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. He asked whether St.
Peter sinned mortally when he denied Christ. Thomas’s answer was remarkable. But before reading
his answer, consider what your answer to the question might be: grave matter, full knowledge, and
full consent. Did Peter sin mortally? He was denying Christ. That was definitely grave matter. Did he
have full knowledge, however? With a lot of anxiety pumping through Peter, could he fully
understand what he was really being asked? Did he have the presence of mind to recognize the gravity
of his sin? Furthermore, could he possibly have had full consent? Certainly, he did not want to be in
that situation; he did not want to deny Jesus. Could we ever call his consent “full”? Without full
knowledge and full consent, could Peter have sinned mortally?
SURPRISED BY SIN
But let us look to the scriptures again. How well do people know of their sinfulness? In the Gospel
stories people are surprised to find out how sinful they are. This is extraordinary. Think for instance of
the Last Judgment again. The goats ask, “But when did we not feed you? When did we not visit you?”
They are clueless about their self-understanding as sinners. Similarly, the rich man is ignorant of his
impending fate. He did not know he’d go to hell for not caring for Lazarus. Listen to him: “Father
Abraham, tell my brothers,” he pleads from Hades. Or what about the priest and the Levite who pass
the wounded man in the Good Samaritan parable? Do they see what we see, that they have failed to
be neighbors? Do we see anywhere within the parable someone stopping them and telling them,
“Hmm, you two better realize that you just sinned by passing by the wounded man on the road”? Or
again, the Pharisee with the publican. Does the Pharisee know the judgment of arrogance being
attributed to him in his prayer? I’m always surprised at how dense the scriptural characters are about
the state of their souls: they do not recognize their sinfulness. So why do we think that we recognize
our sinfulness?
SOCIAL SIN
This definition of sin as the failure to bother to love takes a lot of individualism out of sin, because it
highlights the call to love and therefore acknowledges the many ways that we are all related.
This notion of sin then is compatible with social sin. In fact, this notion of sin gives those who support
the concept of social sin an even greater claim on us, simply because such a notion of sin would have
to be inevitably social: If sin is the failure to bother to love, what sin would not be social?
All sin is social. Wherever people are suffering, we need to ask ourselves, are we adequately attuned
to their needs? But that question leads us to another question. If sin is pervasive and deceptive, then
we cannot simply ask ourselves whether we are adequately attuned to their needs, because inevitably
Study Questions
How do you define sin? What is for you a good example of sin?
Why is it important to understand not only that we are called to love, but that we sin? Do you think people are willing to
see that they are sinners? Do you think we should just see ourselves as good?
Do you think we primarily sin from strength or weakness? Why is it that so many people think that we sin from weakness?
What movies can you think of that try to show us that we are indeed living in a self-deceptive world?
Are you hope-filled that we can work for a more just world?
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES
1. I should note that invariably those with poor self-esteem and other truly burdensome dispositions read this and are not helped. They think I am
suggesting that they should think worse of themselves. But I am not. It helps us to remember the old saying that virtue is the mean between extremes.
Thus, courage is the mean between cowardice and foolhardiness. Similarly, we have a tendency to over- and underestimate ourselves. Those with low
self-esteem underestimate themselves. My warning is for those of us (myself included) who overestimate themselves.
2. James F. Keenan, “The Problem with Thomas Aquinas’s Concept of Sin,” Heythrop Journal 35 (1994): 401–20.
3. John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 32.
5. David Burrell and Stanley Hauerwas, “Self-Deception and Autobiography,” in Truthfulness and Tragedy, by Stanley Hauerwas, Richard Bondi, and
David B. Burrell (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 82–100.
6. Franz Böckle, Fundamental Moral Theology (New York: Pueblo Publishing, 1980).
7. I do not mean by the failure to bother to love the example of being angry with someone. That may or may not be out of love. The issue in these
chapters on sin and conscience is not how we love rightly, a very big issue indeed, but rather whether we love in the first place.
8. Martin Luther King Jr., “Letter from Birmingham City Jail,” in A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James M.
Washington (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), 289–302; Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York:
Scribner, 1960).
9. On the different understandings of this parable, see Gilbert Meilaender, “Grace, Justification through Faith, and Sin,” in Ecumenical Ventures in
Ethics: Protestants Engage Pope John Paul II’s Moral Encyclicals, ed. Reinhard Hutter and Theodor Dieter (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 60–
83.