Basic Principles of Criminal Law

Basic Principles of Criminal Law
DAN PERUELO CALICA

Basic Principles of Criminal Law
1. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where

there is no law punishing it.
2. The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of

sovereignty. Each State has the authority, under its police power,
to define and punish crimes.
3. Police power is exercised by the legislative branch.
Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

4. A basic limitation on the State’s power to punish crimes is the
due process clause, which requires that penal laws should be
published before these take effect and should be clear and
unambiguous.
5. No ex post facto laws and bills of attainder shall be enacted.
6. Philippine criminal law is general, territorial and prospective in

character.
7. Penal laws are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.

Nullum crimen
nulla poena sine
lege

Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege
Applicable here is a familiar maxim in criminal law: Nullum
crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is no law
punishing it. [Potenciana Evangelista v. People, G.R. Nos. 108135-36, 14
August 2000]

There are no common law crimes
in the Philippines
In the Philippine Islands, there exist no crimes such
as are known in the United States and England as
common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here
unless it is made so by law. [United States v. Taylor, 28
Phil. 599 (1914)]

United States v. Taylor
28 Phil. 599 (1914)
Carson Taylor was charged with libel for defamatory statements made
against a lawyer, Ramon Sotelo. He was alleged in the Information to be the
acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher of the Manila
Daily Bulletin.
The Supreme Court clarified in this case that there are no common law
crimes in the Philippines. We had a libel law at that time, Act No. 277, which
defines and punishes libel but also identifies the persons who can be held
liable thereto, namely, the author, editor or proprietor. Since no evidence
was presented that Taylor was any of these officers, he was acquitted of the
crime charged.

Sources of Philippine Criminal Law
1. Act No. 3815 (1932) or the Revised Penal Code and

amendments thereto
2. Special penal laws
3. Penal provisions in other laws
4. Local ordinances

Two scenarios covered by Article 5 of
the Revised Penal Code
1. When the act charged before the court is not covered

by any law but the court believes it should be punished
2. When the penalty to be imposed is excessive

Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered
by the law
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem

proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. [REV.
PEN. CODE, art. 5]

Duty of the court in case of excessive penalties
When a strict enforcement of the provisions of the Revised

Penal Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed
proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence.
[REV. PEN. CODE, art. 5]

Penalties that may be imposed
No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not

prescribed by law prior to its commission. [REV. PEN.
CODE, art. 21]

Corpuz v. People
G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014
Lito Corpus undertook to sell on commission the jewelries owned by

Danilo Tancoy worth Ninety Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00). Despite
demand, he did not return the jewelries or the value thereof.
Corpus was charged and convicted of estafa by the trial court and
sentenced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional in its
medium period as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period as maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction but modified the penalty
to 4 years and 2 months to fifteen (15) years.

Congress responded to Corpus v. People by
enacting Republic Act No. 10951
Republic Act No. 10951 was enacted by Congress
and signed into law on 29 August 2017 in response to
Corpus v. People. It has drastically amended the Revised
Penal Code, specifically on the classification of felonies
and fines and the prescribed penalties for majority of the
crimes therein which has been applied retroactively by
the Supreme Court even to final and executory
judgments.
Republic Act No. 10951
Republic Act No. 10951 has drastically amended the

Revised Penal Code, specifically on the classification of
felonies and fines and the prescribed penalties for
majority of the crimes therein which has been applied
retroactively by the Supreme Court even to final and
executory judgments.

Classification of felonies according to severity
(Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 10951)
Less Grave Light Felonies

Grave Felonies
Felonies
Capital penalties and Penalties which in Arresto menor or
those which are their maximum fine not exceeding
afflictive period are P40,000
correctional

Classification of fines
(Revise Penal Code, as amended by RA 10951)
Correctional
Afflictive penalty penalty Light penalty
does not exceed
exceeds One less than Forty
One million two
million two hundred thousand
thousand pesos
hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) (₱40,000)
(₱1,200,000) but is not less than
Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000)

Comparison of fines between RPC and RA 10951
Penalty Under RPC Under Rep. Act No.
10951
Afflictive Exceeds P6,000 Exceeds P1,200,000
Correctional P200 to P6,000 P40,000 to P1,200,000
Light Less than P200 Less than P40,000

Comparison of fines in some crimes
Treason Sedition Direct Assaults Falsification by
public officer
RPC Not to exceed Not exceeding Not exceeding Not more than
P20,000.00 P10,000.00 P1,000.00 P5,000.00
RA 10951 Not to exceed Not exceeding Not exceeding Not more than
P4,000,000.00 P2,000,00.00 P200,000.00 P1,000,000.00

Comparison of penalties for Estafa, Art.315(1)(b),
in RPC and RA 10951
Arresto mayor Aresto mayor Prision Prision Prision mayor
in medium and in maximum correcional in correcional in in its maximum
maximum period and its minimum maximum to period plus
periods Prision and medium prision mayor additional 1
Correcional in periods in minimum year for every
minimum period P10,000
period
RPC P200 and More than More than More than More than
below P200 to P6,000 P6,000 to P12,000 to P22,000 (PM
P12,000 P22,000 to RP)
RA 10951 P40,000 and More than More than P1.2 More than P2.4 More than P4.4
below P40,000 to M to P2.4 M M to P4.4 M M plus 1 year
P1.2 M for every P2M

Comparison of penalties for Malversation of
public funds or property in RPC and RA 10951
PC in medium PM in PM in RT in medium RT in its RP
and maximum minimum and maximum to and maximum maximum
periods medium RT in periods period
periods minimum
periods
RPC P200 and More than More than More than More than
below P200 to P6,000 to P12,000 to P22,000 (RT
P6,000 P12,000 P22,000 to RP)
RA 10951 P40,000 and More than More than More than P2.4 More than More than 8.8 M
below P40,000 to P1.2 M to M to P4.4 M P4.4 M to
P1.2 M P2.4 M P.8.8 M

Comparison of penalties for theft in RPC and RA 10951
AMenor to AMayor Full AMayor in PC in PC in PM in its Additional
AMayor or Extent medium to minimum medium and minimum penalty but
Fine PC in and medium maximum and not
Minimum periods periods medium exceeding 20
period periods years
RPC P5 and More than More than More than More than More than One year for
below P5 to P50 P50 to P200 P200 to P6,000 to P12,000 to each
P6,000 P12,000 P22,000 P10,000
above
P22,000
RA 10951 P500 and More than More than More than More than More than One year for
below P500 to P500 to P20,000 to P600,000 to P1.2 M to each P1M
P5,000 P20,000 P600,000 P1.2 M P2.2 M above P2.2M

Retroactive effect of Rep. Act No. 10951
This Act shall have retroactive effect to the extent that

it is favorable to the accused or person serving sentence
by final judgment. [REP. ACT NO. 10951, sec. 100]

Transitory provision of RA 10951
For cases pending before the courts upon the

effectivity of this Act where trial has already started, the
courts hearing such cases shall not lose jurisdiction over
the same by virtue of this Act. [REP. ACT NO. 10951, sec. 101]

Hernan v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017
Ophelia Hernan was charged and convicted of Malversation of public funds

and property for the measly amount of P11,300.00. She was sentenced by the RTC
to 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days.
The Sandiganbayan affirmed his conviction and modified his sentence to 6

years and 1 day to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days. The judgment became final and
executory.
Hernan moved to reopen his case to enable her to present evidence, but this
was denied by the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court still reopened the
case in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 10951.

The Supreme Court applied retroactively Rep. Act No. 10951 as it reduced the
penalty which was imposable on Hernan. The Supreme Court even noted that she
could now apply for probation as the penalty that was eventually imposed on her
was 6 months to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Rule of law v. Rule of justice
While we must follow the rule of law, we must

actually aspire for the ideal, which is the rule of justice.
The ultimate goal of a just society is the rule of justice, not
just the rule of law. There may be wide gaps between the
rule of law and the rule of justice. [2019 Commencement
Speech of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Ateneo Law
School]

State authority to
punish crimes and
limitations thereto

The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an
attribute of sovereignty.
Each State has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish
crimes. [People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120 (1922)]
The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty.

[People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120 (1922)]
The right and prosecution for a crime is one of the attributes that by a
natural law belong to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common
will of the members of the society to look after, guard and defend the interests of
the community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen
and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights. [United States v. Pablo, 35 Phil. 94
(1916)]

Fundamental powers of the State
The inherent powers of the State are: (a) Police

Power; (b) Power of Eminent Domain; and (c) Power of
Taxation.
Police power is the most pervasive, the least limitable

and the most demanding of the three powers.

Police power
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and
the general welfare. [People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, 18 September
2009]

Who exercises police power?
The power to define crimes and prescribe their
corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and
inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain
social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature
may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights
have been abridged. [People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364,
18 September 2009]
Constitutional provisions
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy. [CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 5]
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the

Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. [CONST. (1987), art. VI, sec. 1]

Congress has delegated its legislative power to
local government units through the local
sanggunians or councils which can enact
ordinances to promote the general welfare of
its constituents.

General welfare clause in the
Local Government Code of 1991
Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. [REP. ACT NO. 7160
(1991), Sec. 16]
Local legislative power
Local legislative power shall be exercised by the

sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the
sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang
bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay
for the barangay. [REP. ACT NO. 7160 (1991), sec. 48]

Local sanggunians may enact ordinances
imposing criminal penalties
1. The sangguniang barangay may enact ordinances to promote the general welfare, prescribe
fines not exceeding P1,000.00 and adopt measures to prevent and eradicate drug addiction, child
abuse and juvenile delinquency [REP. ACT NO. 7160 (1991), sec. 391(a)(1), (17) & (20)]
2. The sangguniang bayan may enact ordinances to: (i) maintain peace and order and prevent
lawlessness, disorder, riot, violence, rebellion or sedition and impose penalties for the violation of said
ordinances, (ii) imposing a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or an imprisonment for a period not
exceeding six months or both in the discretion of the court for the violation of a municipal ordinance,
(iii) to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill-repute, gambling
and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money and property,
drug addition, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution
or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to
the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the municipality, and (iv) protect the environment and
impose penalties for acts which endanger the environment; [REP. ACT NO. 7160 (1991), sec.
447(a)(1)(ii), (iii), (v) and (vi)]

3. The sangguniang panlungsod may enact ordinances to: (i) maintain peace and
order and prevent lawlessness, disorder, riot, violence, rebellion or sedition and impose
penalties for the violation of said ordinances, (ii) imposing a fine not exceeding
P5,000.00 or an imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both in the
discretion of the court for the violation of a city ordinance, (iii) to prevent, suppress and
impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy,
mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill-repute,
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain
money and property, drug addition, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
the inhabitants of the municipality, and (iv) protect the environment and impose
penalties for acts which endanger the environment; and [REP. ACT NO. 7160 (1991),
sec. 458(a)(1)(ii), (iii), (v) and (vi)]

4. The sangguniang panlalawigan may enact ordinances to: (i) maintain peace
and order and prevent lawlessness, disorder, riot, violence, rebellion or sedition and
impose penalties for the violation of said ordinances, (ii) imposing a fine not exceeding
P5,000.00 or an imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both in the
discretion of the court for the violation of a city ordinance, (iii) to prevent, suppress and
impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy,
mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill-repute,
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain
money and property, drug addition, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
the inhabitants of the municipality, and (iv) protect the environment and impose
penalties for acts which endanger the environment; [REP. ACT NO. 7160 (1991), sec.
468(a)(1)(ii), (iii), (v) and (vi)]

Tests of a valid ordinance
1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6. It must not be unreasonable. [Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994]

Ordinances should not contravene a statute
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of
Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. [Magtajas
v. Pryce Properties Corp., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994]

People v. Siton
G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding

penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power
of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.
G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994
The sangguniang panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted

ordinances prohibiting the operation of casinos in the city and the
issuance of business permits to its operators. The Supreme Court held
that this contravened Presidential Decree No. 1868 creating the
PAGCOR. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowered cities to
prohibit illegal gambling and other prohibited games of chance, not
gambling which is allowed by law, including those operated by
PAGCOR.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City
G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017
The curfew ordinance of the City of Manila was

declared unconstitutional as it imposed the penalties of
fine and imprisonment on violating minors despite the
prohibition on imposition of penalties for status offenses
under Section 57-A of Republic Act No. 9344. The
ordinance thus contravened a national statute.

Limitations on power to
enact penal legislation

Due process and the void
for vagueness doctrine

Right to due process
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law [CONST., art. III, sec.
1]

Void for vagueness doctrine
In exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime,
the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what
acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain
understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to
avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-
vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law”. [People
v. Siton]

Another take on the doctrine
The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. [Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 421 SCRA 290 (2001)

When is a law considered vague?
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. [Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 SCRA 290 (2001)]

Test in determining whether law is vague
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is

void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice.
[Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 SCRA 290 (2001)]

Facial challenge v. As-applied challenge
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers

only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities. [Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010)]

A facial challenge is not allowed
against penal statutes
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. Thus, it is applicable only to free speech cases.
However, a facial challenge against a penal statute is not
allowed. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. [Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 421 SCRA 290 (2001)]

An as-applied challenge is allowed
to invalidate penal statutes
The Supreme Court clarifed its ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan in

Southern Hemisphere Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council.
It clarified that, while a facial challenge is not allowed against a penal

statute, “it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-
Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there
was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety.“ It stressed that
"statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only
'as applied' to a particular defendant.” [Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010)]

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
421 Phil. 290 (2001)
Former President Joseph Estrada was charged with violation of
Republic Act No. 7080 or the Plunder Law. He filed a Motion to Quash
alleging that the law is void for being vague as the words “combination” and
“series” were not defined in the law. The Supreme Court held that the
Plunder Law is not vague.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general

terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will
is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words

of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152259, 29 July 2004
Alfredo Romualdez, brother-in-law of the former President Ferdinand

Marcos, was charged with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 for
intervening in several government contracts. He filed various motions to
dismiss and to quash the Information against him, arguing that Section 5 of
the Anti-Graft Law is void for being vague. It therefore violates the right of an
individual to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him.
The Sandiganbayan denied his motion to quash. The Supreme Court

affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s ruling.

While the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that facial challenge
applies only to free speech cases and not to criminal statutes, it proceeded to
examine the validity of the law as applied to Romualdez. It said: “[a]s
conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be
examined only "as applied" to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should
not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.”
It then declared that Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It

penalizes certain presidential relatives who "intervene, directly or indirectly,
in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government.“
This provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad," because it can easily be
understood with the use of simple statutory construction.
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary

acceptation, which is to "to come between."

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.
v. Anti-Terrorism Council
632 SCRA 146 (2010)
This case involves six petitions praying for the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of
2007. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions as certiorari was not the
proper remedy, there was no actual case or controversy and the petitioners
have no legal standing.
The Supreme Court, however, clarified its ruling in Estrada v.

Sandiganbayan and Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan that, while a facial challenge
is not allowed against a penal statute on the basis of the void for vagueness
doctrine, an as-applied challenge by a defendant charged with the crime
defined and punished in the law in a particular case may be allowed.
Effectivity of penal laws

Laws shall take effect only after publication
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. [CIV. CODE (1950),
art.2]
Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
[EXEC. ORDER NO. 292 (1987), sec. 18 ]

Act No. 3815 or the Revised Penal Code
took effect on 1 January 1932 pursuant to
Article 1 thereof

What needs to be published in
the Official Gazette
1. All legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
2. All executive and administrative issuance of general application
3. Decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by said
courts to be of sufficient importance to be so published
4. Such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to
be published by law
5. Such documents or classes of documents as the President shall
determine from time to time to have general application or which he may so
authorized to be published [EXEC. ORDER NO. 292 (1987), sec. 24 ]

Rationale for publication
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by
means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can
be bound thereby. [Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)]
The clear object of the above-quoted provision [Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 638] is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. [Tañada v. Tuvera, 136
SCRA 27 (1985)]

Pesigan v. Angeles
129 SCRA 174 (1984)
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers, were charged with violation
of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A for transporting 26 carabaos and a calf
from Camarines Sur to Batangas. While E0 626-A was signed on 25 October 1980,
it was published in the Official Gazette only on 14 June 1982. The carabaos were
confiscated in Camarines Norte on 2 April 1982.
The Supreme Court held that EO 626-A should not be enforced against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because it is a penal regulation published more than two
months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars
and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby.
Since a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A involves a confiscation and

forfeiture provision or sanction, it is a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that
the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette
before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.

Tañada v. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the publication of

presidential decrees, letters of instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of administration and administrative orders issued by the former
President Ferdinand Marcos on the basis of the people’s right to be informed on
matters of public concern and on the principle that for laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. Article 2 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 638 enumerates the documents that need to be published in
the Official Gazette, including all important legislative acts and executive and
administrative orders.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision [Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 638] is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non
excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public

nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law
that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.

Tañada v. Tuvera
146 SCRA 446 (1986)
This is the Resolution to the Motion for Reconsideration filed on the

first Tañada v. Tuvera case. Petitioners asked these questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?

The Supreme Court held that the term "laws" should refer to all laws
and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published.
The Supreme Court agreed that publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws.
The publication must be made in the Official Gazette. While there are
proposals to publish it also in a newspaper of general circulation, the
Supreme Court cannot go into the wisdom of the law.
Finally, the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as

possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.

Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military
Shrine Service Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
G.R. No. 187587, 5 June 2013
On 7 January 1986, former President Marcos issued Proclamation No.

2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded Barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition. Handwritten
therein was the words Western Bicutan. However, as published, Western
Bicutan was not included.
Applying the ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Supreme Court ruled that
it cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No.
2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force
and effect.

Ex-post facto law

Constitutional proscription
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be

enacted. [CONST., Art. III, sec. 22]

Exception to the prospective application
of penal laws
Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same. [REV.
PEN. CODE, Art.22]

Kinds of ex post facto laws
An ex post facto law is one which:
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punished such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and
6. deprived a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. [In re. Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429 (1970)]

In re. Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.
35 SCRA 429 (1970)
This involves a petition for declaratory relief asking for the declaration of
the rights and obligations of the parties under Republic Act No. 6132 or the
Constitutional Convention Act of 1971. There were various objections raised
against the law, including that it was an ex post facto law.
The Supreme Court, after enumerating the various kinds of ex post facto
laws, declared that Rep. Act No. 6132 was not one. While it is true that Sec. 18
penalizes a violation of any provision of Rep. Act No. 6132 including Sec. 8 (a)
thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the
law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that
remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall
apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23 directs
that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval.
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto
G.R. No. 145184, 14 March 2008
The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding
Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its composition and functions.
Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply provides the frame
of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal
laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot
be characterized as ex-post facto laws.
U.S. v. Diaz-Conde
42 Phil. 766 (1922)
Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria Conde were charged with violation
of Act No. 2655 or the Anti-Usury Law, which was enacted on 1 May 1916.
However, the contract on which the complaint was founded was executed
on 30 December 1915. The Supreme Court reversed their conviction.
A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a

new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It is
an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the time the contract
was made must govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be
construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its
inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that
were permitted then the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which is
prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are
prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before
the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action, is an ex post facto law.
In the present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done
before the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to make said Act applicable
to the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation. The
Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done
before its adoption a crime. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil
action, providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto laws are
absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the
defendant.

People v. Villaraza
81 SCRA 95 (1978)
Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on 25 October 1975,

amended and increased the penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Caesar Puerto was charged with estafa for issuing two
bouncing checks on 16 October 1974.
The Supreme Court held that the increased penalty does not apply to
the estafa committed by Puerto on 16 October 1974. To apply it to Puerto
would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its retroactive application is
prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12,
Article IV of the Constitution.

Bill of attainder

Bill of attainder
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling
legislative usurpation of the judicial function. [People v.
Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)]

People v. Ferrer
48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag were charged with violation of Republic

Act No. 1700 (1957) entitled “An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the
Philippines and Similar Associations and Penalizing Membership Therein, and
For Other Purposes”.
Co and Tayag assailed the constitutionality of constitutionality of the

Anti-Subversion Act, which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines
and other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization. They
argued, among others, that it was a bill of attainder.

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination
of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement
the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making
and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
The Supreme Court held that the Anti-Subversion Act is not a bill of
attainder. When the law is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that
it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members
thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in
the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is
used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having
the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be
totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without
more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that
their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to
prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and
with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.

Other Constitutional
and statutory limitations
and the rights of the
accused

Const. (1987), Art. III, sec. 1
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.

1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as
well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition

of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself.

1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political

beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.

No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-

payment of a poll tax.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by
a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.

Rights of the Accused at the trial
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may,
however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail,
unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification.
The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice
shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under
custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all
subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused
may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters
covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party
may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or
can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable
to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. [Rules of Court,
Rule 115]

Characteristics of
Criminal Law

Characteristics of Criminal Law
1
1. Generality
2
2. Territoriality
3
3. Prospectivity

1
1. Generality
2

Generality
Criminal law is general as it is binding on all persons

who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. [CIV. CODE, art. 14]
Penal laws and those of public security and safety

shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations. [CIV. CODE, art. 14]

Exceptions to the general
application of Criminal Law
1. Treaties or treaty stipulations [CIV. CODE, art. 14, and Rev.

Pen. Code, art. 2]
2. Laws of preferential application [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 2]
3. Principles of public international law [CIV. CODE, art. 14]

Treaty
A treaty may be defined as a compact made between

two or more independent nations with a view to the
public welfare. [Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of Zambales, 34 SCRA
166, 169 (1970)]

Treaty and Executive agreements
International agreements involving political issues or changes of

national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form
of executive agreements. [Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of Zambales, 34
SCRA 166, 169 (1970), citing Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading,
3 SCRA 351, 355-356 (1961)]

Senate ratification of a treaty
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid

and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate. [CONST., art. VII, sec. 21]

Examples of treaties
1. Formerly the Military Bases Agreement entered into by and
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America on 14 March 1947 (which expired on 16 September
1991)
2. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines and the Government of the United States of America
Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the
Philippines dated 10 February 1998 (Visiting Forces Agreement)

US personnel in the VFA
United States personnel means United States military and civilian
personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved
by the Philippine Government. [Article I, VFA]
Military personnel refers to military members of the United States

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard. Civilian personnel
refers to individuals who are neither nationals of nor ordinarily resident in the
Philippines and who are employed by the United States armed forces or who
are accompanying the United States armed forces, such as employees of the
American Red Cross and the United Services Organization. [Article I(1) and (2),
VFA]

Characteristics of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica
Criminal jurisdiction granted to the US
under the VFA
1. United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by
the military law of the United States over United States personnel in the
Philippines [Article V(1)(b), VFA]
2. United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the United

States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the
security of the United States, punishable under the laws of the United
States, but not under the laws of the Philippines; [Article V(2)(b), VFA]

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the
following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise

jurisdiction over all offenses committed by United States
personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2 (b)
and 3 (b) of Article V on Criminal Jurisdiction.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the
military law of the United States in relation to:

i. offenses solely against the property or security of the
United States or offenses solely against the property or
person of United States personnel; and
ii. offenses arising out of any act or omission done in
performance of official duty. [Article V(3)(b), VFA]

Laws of preferential application
Republic Act No. 75 or An Act to Penalize Acts
Which Would Impair The Proper Observance By the
Republic and Inhabitants of the Philippines of the
Immunities, Rights and Privileges of Duly Accredited
Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Agents in the Philippines
is considered as a law of preferential application in favor of
diplomatic representatives and their domestic servants

Some relevant rules in the VFA
• The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings. [VFA, art. V, par. 6]
• United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the

Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to
those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating
to the offense with which the person has been charged. [VFA, art. V, par. 6]

• In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one
year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this
paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to
appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which
scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities,
after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence
of the accused, fail to do so. [VFA, art. V, par. 6]
• The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States

personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate
Philippine and United States authorities. [VFA, art. V, par. 10]

Rep. Act No. 75 declares as void any writ or process sued
out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Philippines,
or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any
ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized
and received as such by the President, or any domestic or
domestic servant or any such ambassador or public minister is
arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained,
seized or attached. [REP. ACT NO. 75, sec. 4]

Rep. Act No. 75 also penalizes every person by whom the
above writ or process is obtained or prosecuted, whether
as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in
executing it. [REP. ACT NO. 75, sec. 4]

Who are covered by RA 75?
1. Ambassador or public minister of any foreign

State [REP. ACT NO. 75, sec. 4]
2.Domestic or domestic servant of any such
ambassador or minister of a foreign State [REP. ACT
NO. 75, sec. 4]

Requisites for application of preferential
treatment to ambassadors
1. It applies only to ambassadors and public ministers of a
foreign State
2. The ambassador or public minister has been authorized
and received as such by the Philippine President
3. Such foreign State must provide similar protection to
duly accredited diplomatic or consular representatives of
the Republic of the Philippines [REP. ACT NO. 75, secs. 4
and 7]

Requisites for preferential treatment to domestic
servants of ambassadors
1. Person involved is a domestic or domestic servant of an ambassador
or public minister of a foreign State
2. The name of the servant has been registered with the Department of
Foreign Affairs
3. The name of the servant has been transmitted by the Department of
Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of Manila
4. Chief of Police of Manila, upon receipt of transmittal, posted the
name in some public place in his office. [REP. ACT NO. 75, secs. 4 and
5]

When will Sec. 4 of RA 75 not apply?
The provisions of section four of Rep. Act No. 75 shall not

apply to any case where the person against whom the process is
issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic of the
Philippines, in the service of an ambassador or a public minister,
and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he
entered upon such service. [REP. ACT NO. 75, sec. 5]

Exemptions by virtue of the general principles of
public international law
1. Sovereigns and other chiefs of state

2. Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident,
and charges d’affaires
3. Foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country
or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or
sovereign [Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1945)]

Philippines has adopted the general principles of
public international law
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations. [CONST., art. II, sec. 2]

Sovereign
Sovereign is a title which can be applied to the highest leader in

various categories. The word is borrowed from Old French soverain,
which is ultimately derived from the Latin word superānus, meaning
"above".
The roles of a sovereign vary from Monarch or Head of state to

head of municipal government or head of a chivalric order. As a result,
the word sovereign has more recently also come to mean
independence or autonomy. [Wikipedia]

Head of state or chief of state
A head of state or chief of state is the public persona who
officially represents the national unity and legitimacy of a sovereign
state. Depending on the country's form of government and separation
of powers, the head of state may be a ceremonial figurehead or
concurrently the head of government. In a parliamentary system, the
head of state usually has mostly ceremonial powers, with a separate
head of government. In presidential systems, the head of state is also
the head of government. [Wikipedia]

Ambassador
A public officer clothed with high diplomatic powers,
commissioned by a government to transact the
international business of his government with a foreign
government. [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990, p. 79]

Public minister
A general term comprehending all the higher classes
of diplomatic representatives– as ambassadors, envoys,
residents,- but not including the commercial
representatives, such as consuls. [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, 1990, p. 996]

Minister plenipotentiary
A principal diplomatic agent ranking below an
ambassador but possessing full power and authority as the
representative of his government at a foreign court or seat
of government [Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p.
1439]

Plenipotentiary
One who has full power to do a thing; a person fully

commissioned to act for another. A term applied in
international law to ministers and envoys of the second
rank of public ministers. [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition,
1990, p. 1154]

Minister resident
A diplomatic agent resident at a foreign court

or seat of government and ranking below a minister
plenipotentiary [Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, p. 1439]

Charges d’ affaires
One charged with affairs. A lower ranking

member of the diplomatic corps who directs
diplomatic affairs during the absence of the
ambassador or minister [Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, p. 377]

Consul
An officer of a commercial character, appointed by the different
nations to watch over the mercantile and tourist interests of the
appointing nation and of its subjects in foreign countries. There are
usually a number of consuls in every maritime country, and they are
usually subject to a chief consul, who is called a “consul general.” A
public official residing in a foreign country responsible for developing and
protecting the economic interests of his government and looking after the
welfare of his government’s citizens who may be traveling or residing
within his jurisdiction. United States consuls form a part of the Foreign
Service and are of various grades; consul general, consul, vice consul, and
consular agent. [Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990, p. 316]

Consuls not exempt from criminal prosecution
It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the
privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister but
is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to
which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from
criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the
country where he resides. [Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil.
249, 251 (1936)]

Schneckenburger v. Moran
63 Phil. 249, 251 (1936)
This case involves a duly accredited honorary consul of
Uruguay at Manila, Philippines who was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document.
He argued that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the
case under the Constitution of the United States and the Philippines.
The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. It held that the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls is not exclusive and is shared with the Court of
First Instance.

The Supreme Court also made it perfectly clear that
the case involves no question of diplomatic immunity as it is
well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to
the laws and regulations of the country to which he is
accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where
he resides.

Liang v. People
G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000
Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the

communication from the Department of Foreign Affairs (“DFA”) that
Jeffrey Liang, an economist working with the Asian Development Bank
(“ADB”), is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a
certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts.
The immunity granted under the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government to ADB employees is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity."

It is therefore necessary to determine if Liang's case falls within the ambit
of Section 45(a) of the Agreement.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

Foreign army permitted to march
It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to

march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from
the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. [Raquiza v.
Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1945)]

Only diplomatic agents are given immunity under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions
to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,
(b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states;
and (c) charges d’ affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.
Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic
staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only
the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff,
excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff
of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. [Khosrow v. Minucher, G.R.
No. 142396, 11 February 2003]

Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does
so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively
applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention,
are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits.
The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of

missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding
the same privileges from all others. [Khosrow v. Minucher, G.R. No. 142396, 11
February 2003]

It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their
respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform
certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of
passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of
oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities
and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are
not charged with the duty of representing their states in political
matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is
a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not
he performs duties of diplomatic nature. [Khosrow v. Minucher, G.R. No.
142396, 11 February 2003]

Minucher v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142396, 11 February 2003
This is a civil action for damages filed against Arthur Scalzo, an

agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, for causing the
arrest of an Iranian national, Abbas Torabian. Scalzo invoked
diplomatic immunity.
Scalzo is not a diplomatic official. He worked for the US DEA
and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities
within the country. However, if it should be ascertained that Scalzo was
acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts
alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be
resolved under the related doctrine of State immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court ruled that Scalzo is an agent of the US
DEA allowed by the Philippine government to conduct
activities in the country to help contain the problem on the
drug traffic and that he is entitled to the defense of State
immunity from suit.

Is the President Yes, he is covered by
not covered by Philippine penal laws. He is
Philippine however immune from suit
penal laws? while in office or during his
tenure.

Presidential immunity from suit
Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit
or from being brought to court during the period
of their incumbency and tenure. [In re Saturnino
Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, 24 October 1986]

The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the
president’s incumbency. [In the matter of the petition for the writ of
amparo and writ of habeas data in favor of Francis Saez v. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183533, 25 September 2012]

In Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 2 March
2001, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President
does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our
ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon
the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right. [In the matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Writ of
Habeas Data in favor of Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,
G.R. No. 191805 and 193160, 15 November 2012]

Officials removable through impeachment
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. [CONST., art. XI, sec. 2]

Parliamentary immunity
A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof. [CONST., art. VI, sec. 11]

Jurisdiction of courts not affected by military
character of the accused
The Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of

civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before it for trial. [United
States v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901)]

Republic Act No. 7055 repealed PD 1850
Rep. Act No. 7055 (1991) repealed Presidential Decree No.

1850 (1982) which earlier subjected members of the Philippine
National Police to the jurisdiction of courts martial. This is in line with
Section 6, Article XVI (General Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that the State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character. Police
personnel are thus under the jurisdiction of civil courts.

Service-connected offenses
Service-connected crimes or offenses are
limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or the
Articles of War. [REP. ACT NO. 7055, sec. 1]

Service-connected offenses
Service-connected crimes under the Articles of War include,
among others: Fraudulent and Unlawful Enlistment (Arts. 54 to 55), False
Muster (Art. 56), False Returns (Art. 57), Desertion, Aiding a Deserter,
and Entertaining a Deserter (Arts. 58-61), Absence Without Leave (Art.
62), Disrespect and Insubordination (Arts. 63 to 66), Mutiny or Sedition
and Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition (Arts. 67 to 68), Quarrels,
Frays, Disorders (Art. 69), Offenses involving Prisoners (Arts. 72 to 75),
War Offenses (Arts. 76 to 83), Miscellaneous Crimes and Offenses, e.g.
involving Military Property, Drunkenness on Duty, Dueling (Arts. 84 to
95), and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman (Art. 96).

Service- connected offenses
(Articles 54-70)
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment. Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful President, Congress of the Philippines, or
Enlistment. Secretary of National Defense.
Art. 56. False Muster. Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 57. False Returns. Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Superior Officer.
Constitute Desertion. Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-
Art. 59. Desertion. Commissioned Officer.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Another to Desert. Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter. Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave. Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

(Articles 72-92)
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Prisoners. Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without or Wrongful Disposition.
Authority. Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Issued to Soldiers.
Authorities. Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Enemy. Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
Commander to Surrender. Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Art. 92. Dueling.
Secured for Public Service.

(Articles 95-97)
Art. 95. Frauds Against the

Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97 General Article.

Prerogative of the President
In the same law, the President may, in the interest of
justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that
any such crime or offense be tried by the proper civil
courts even though the offense is service-connected. [REP.
ACT NO. 7055, sec. 1]

Rapsing v. Ables
G.R. No. 171855, 15 October 2012
Petitioners are widows of the persons killed by

respondents, who are members of the Philippine Army,
allegedly in an encounter. Respondents were charged with
multiple murder as no encountered allegedly occurred. Judge
Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) filed motion asking that the
cases be transferred to the military tribunal. RTC initially
denied but, on MR, granted the motion.

The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The crime committed is not service-connected under
Republic Act No. 7055. Service-connected crimes or
offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to
70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

Navales v. Abaya
G.R. Nos. 162318 and 162341, 25 October 2004
These involved two petitions essentially assailing the

jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial to conduct the court-
martial proceedings involving several junior officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with
violations of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended) in connection with their participation in the take-over
of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati
City on July 27, 2003.

321 solders who participated in the Oakwood mutiny were
charged with coup d’etat in the RTC, but only 31 of them were
included in the Information for coup d’etat. The military wanted to
conduct court martial proceedings and RTC held that the offenses
were not service-connected and absorbed in coup d’etat.
Court martial still proceeded to schedule arraignment, thus,
these petitions.
The Supreme Court held that the sweeping declaration made
by the RTC (Branch 148) that all charges before the court-martial
against the accused were not service-connected but absorbed and in
furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect.

It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the
military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to
70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that
these shall be tried by the court-martial.
In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch
148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those
charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64
(Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the
Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected offenses
or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the
military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.

Gonzales v. Abaya
G.R. No. 164007,10 August 2006
The Supreme Court held that the offense for violation of Article
96 of the Articles of War is service-connected.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not
divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving
violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97
of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected
crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by
the court-martial.

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by
holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of
coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to
criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both
offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the
Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not
applicable to this case.

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus,
SSgt. Edgardo Osorio
G.R. No. 223227, 26 February 2018
Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan (Major
General Palparan), SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations for
allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño
(Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan). Ssgt. Osorio was subsequently
arrested.
Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt.
Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA arguing that courts-
martial, not a civil court such as the Regional Trial Court, had jurisdiction to
try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that
the offense charged was allegedly "service-connected.”

He also added that he could not be charged with the felony of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention because under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the
felony may only be committed by a private individual, not a ranking officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review stating that Republic Act No.
7055, Section 1 provides that if the accused is a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the crime involved is one punished under the Revised Penal Code, civil
courts shall have the authority to hear, try, and decide the case.
Furthermore, the SC held that kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier.
Even if a public officer has the legal duty to detain a person, the public officer must be
able to show the existence of legal grounds for the detention. Without these legal
grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private capacity and is
considered a "private individual." The public officer becomes liable for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary detention
punished with significantly lower penalties.

2
2. Territoriality
3

Territoriality
Philippine criminal law is territorial in character because
it is obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine
territory. [CIV. CODE, art. 14]
The principle of territoriality means that, as a rule, penal
laws of the Philippines are enforceable only with its territory.
[Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 19th Edition, 2017, p. 13]
Philippine criminal law is enforceable within the

Philippine archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 2]
Philippine territory
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it shall be enforced
within the Philippine Archipelago, its atmosphere, its interior waters and
maritime zone. The 1987 Constitution has adopted a broader definition of
Philippine national territory.
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the
islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and
aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. [Const., art. I]

Philippine territory
1. Philippine archipelago
2. All other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
[CONST., art I]

Archipelago
An archipelago is a group of islands, including parts of
islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features
which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters
and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical,
economic and political entity, or which historically have
been regarded as such. [UNCLOS, art. 46(b)]

Archipelagic doctrine re: internal waters
The Philippines adopted the archipelagic doctrine in defining its
internal waters as incorporated in the second sentence of Section 1,
Article I of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “[t]he waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines”.
This is a departure from accepted International Law Rule which

provides that, when a strait within a country has a width of more than
six (6) miles, the center lane in excess of the three (3) miles on both
sides is considered international waters.
Territorial sea
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), which took effect on 16 November 1994,
mandated a uniform breadth of twelve nautical miles from
the low water mark of the coasts for the territorial sea.

Contiguous zone
Twenty four (24) nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. [UNCLOS, art. 33]

Rights within the contiguous zone
The State may exercise the control necessary to:
1. Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory or territorial sea
2. Punish infringement of the above laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea
[UNCLOS, art. 33]

Exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend
beyond two hundred (200) nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured. [UNCLOS, art. 57]

Rights, jurisdiction, and duties within EEZ
1. Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources
and for economic exploitation and exploration
2. Jurisdiction with regard to: (a) the establishment and
use of artificial islands, installations and structures, (b)
marine scientific research, and (c) the protection and
preservation of the marine environment [UNCLOS, art.
56]

High seas
All parts of the sea that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea
or internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic
waters of a State [UNCLOS, art. 86]

Exceptions to the territoriality principle
1. Treaties or treaty stipulations [CIV.
CODE, art. 14, and REV. PEN. CODE, art. 2]
2. Laws of preferential application [REV.
PEN. CODE, art. 2]
3. Principles of public international law
[CIV. CODE, art. 14]

Miquibias v. Commanding General
80 Phil. 262 (1948)
The Supreme Court held that the Philippines, being a

sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses
committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by
agreement, consent that the United States or any other
foreign nation shall exercise jurisdiction over offenses
committed within certain portions of said territory.

Extraterritorial application of
Philippine penal laws
The Revised Penal Code shall be enforced outside of the Philippine
jurisdiction against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the

Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the Republic of the
Philippines;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into the Philippines of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should

commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national

security and the law of nations, defined in Title One, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 2]
Offense committed on board a
Philippine ship or airship
Any person who commits a crime on board a Philippine ship or
airship even if the same is outside the Philippine territory can be tried
before Philippine courts, except when the Philippine vessel or aircraft
is in the territory of a foreign country.
A ship or airship is considered a Philippine ship or airship if it is

registered in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

Foreign warships
For the purposes of this Convention, "warship" means a ship
belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external
marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of
the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list
or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular
armed forces discipline. [UNCLOS, Art. 29]

Foreign warships
With regard to foreign warships, they have been
accorded the privilege of extraterritoriality on the
basis of comity and convenience. [United States v.
Bull, 15 Phil. 7 (1910)]

Rules pertaining to merchant vessels
English Rule French Rule
Crimes committed aboard Crimes committed aboard a
foreign merchant vessels are foreign merchant vessel should
triable in the country within not be prosecuted in the courts
whose territory they were of the country within whose
committed [People v. Wong territorial jurisdiction they were
Cheng, 1922] committed, unless their
commission affects the peace
and security of the territory
[People v. Wong Cheng, 1922]

United States v. Look Chaw
18 Phil. 573
The Supreme Court held that, although the mere possession of a
thing of prohibited use in the Philippines, aboard a foreign vessel in transit,
in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by
the Philippine courts, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

United States v. Ah Sing
36 Phil. 978 (1917)
The Supreme Court distinguished the Look Chaw case and this one. In the
Look Chaw case, the charge was illegal possession and sale of opium, in the
present case the charge is illegal importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the
foreign vessel was in transit, in the present case the foreign vessel was not in
transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon
Philippine soil, in the present case the opium was not landed by the accused.
The Supreme Court took note of the obiter in United States v. Jose [34 Phil.
840 (1916), where it stated that the importation was completed when the ship
carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be
discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was
brought into the waters of the Philippine islands on a boat destined for a
Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.

People v. Wong Cheng
46 Phil. 729 (1922)
The Philippines has adopted the English rule in determining jurisdiction over
crimes committed aboard foreign merchant vessels in Philippine territorial waters.
The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which
disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with
exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the
public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the
proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine to which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs.
Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local
jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the
regular way the consul has no right to prevent it.
Criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign
merchant ship
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or
to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed onboard
the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good
order of the territorial sea;
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of
the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs or psychotropic substances. [UNCLOS, Art.27(1)]

Criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign
merchant ship
The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to take any
steps authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board
a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters.
[UNCLOS, Art. 27(2)]
Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to violations of laws and

regulations adopted in accordance with Part V, the coastal State may not take
any steps on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any
person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed
before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign
port, is only passing through the territorial sea without entering internal waters.
[UNCLOS, Art. 27(5)]

Crimes against the law of nations
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high
seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy is a
crime not against a particular State but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other
crimes has no territorial limits. [People v. Lo-lo and Saraw
43 Phil. 19 (1922)]
3
3. Prospectivity

Prospectivity
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. [CIV. CODE, art. 4]
Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary

is expressly provided. [Exec. Order No. 292, sec. 19]

Prospectivity characteristic
One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is
prospectivity. This general principle of criminal law is embodied in
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “no felony
shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission,” and was applied by the Supreme Court in two early
cases to mean that no act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor
its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the
act was committed. [People v. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633, 662-663 (1997)]

Effectivity of the Revised Penal Code
The Revised Penal Code shall take effect

on 1 January 1932. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 1]

Penalties that may be imposed
No felony shall be punishable by any
penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 21.]

People v. Ringor
320 SCRA 342 (1999)
The Supreme Court noted that, at the time Ringor, Jr. perpetrated the offense, the
unlicensed character of a firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet an
aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder.
Thus, before RA 8294 made the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating

circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty for the murder committed by Ringor, Jr. on
23 June 1994 was not death, as erroneously imposed by the trial court. There was yet no
such aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm to raise the penalty for murder
from reclusion perpetua to death, at the time of the commission of the crime.
The amendatory law making the “use of unlicensed firearm” as an aggravating

circumstance in murder or homicide cannot be applied here because the said provision of
RA 8294 is not favorable to Ringor, Jr., the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.

Exception to the prospectivity rule
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal as defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same. [REV. PEN.
CODE, art. 22]

Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima
G.R. Nos. 212719 & 214637, 25 June 2019
The legality of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations

(IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592 was questioned.
“SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new procedures
and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of
Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee
(MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under
Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance for
loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to the
management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.”

The Supreme Court, in granting the petition and declaring the rule invalid,
stated:
“While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a penalty as it
addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions have the purpose
and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on the length
of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted
prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the
disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the
penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more
onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they
are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their
punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.”

Habitual delinquent
A person shall be deemed to be a habitual
delinquent, if within a period of ten (10) years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of
serious or less serious physical injuries, robo (robbery),
hurto (theft), estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of
any of said crimes a third time or oftener. [REV. PEN. CODE,
art. 62(5)]

Requisites of habitual delinquency
1. That the offender has been convicted of any of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa or falsification
2. That after that conviction or after serving his sentence,
he again committed, and, within ten (10) years from
his release or first conviction, he was again convicted
of any of the said crimes for the second time

3. That after his conviction of, or after serving sentence
for, the second offense, he again committed, and,
within 10 years from his last release or last conviction,
he was again convicted of any of said offense, the
third time or oftener [Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Book One, 19th Edition, 2017, p. 729]

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons
37 SCRA 420 (1971)
In this case, petitioners’ argument has persuasive effect because their
continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum
length of imprisonment in accordance with controlling doctrine, when other similarly
situated have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection.
Petitioners likewise correctly relied on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code

which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. While reference in
the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts,
petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to
deny its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation.
The Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution, as well as legislation, forms part of our legal system. As such, both the
Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow for retroactive application.
People v. Canuto Bernal
G.R. No. L-44988, 31 October 1936
Recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element

which necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency.
For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his trial,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title. For the existence of habitual delinquency, it is
not enough that the accused shall have been convicted of any of the crimes
specified, and that the last conviction shall have taken place ten (10) years
before the commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes
previously committed be prior to the commission of the offense with which
the accused is charged a third time or oftener.

Construction and
Interpretation of
Penal Laws

Basic rules on the construction and
interpretation of penal laws
1. Doctrine of pro reo
2. Rule of lenity
3. Burden of proof and the equipoise rule
4. The Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code prevails over the
English translation
5. Penal laws apply prospectively but may be retroactively applied
if favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent
6. The absolute repeal of a penal law makes the act previously
punished as legal, such that the offense no longer exists.

In dubio pro reo
The Latin phrase “in dubio pro reo” is loosely
translated in English as “When in doubt, rule for the
accused”. [See Footnote No. 6 in Diño v. Olivares, G.R.
No. 170447, 4 December 2009]

In dubio pro reo
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal
laws, including the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule
for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed innocent until and
unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. [Separate
Opinion, J. Corona, People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 117
December 2008]

Rule of lenity
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the

rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that ‘a court, in construing an
ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more
lenient punishment.’” [Separate Opinion, J. Corona, People v.
Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 117 December 2008]

Constitutional presumption of innocence
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. [CONST.,
art. III, sec. 14(2)]

Proof beyond reasonable doubt
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [RULES OF COURT,
Rule 133, sec. 2]

Equipoise rule
The equipoise rule provides that, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
party having the burden of proof loses.
The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does
not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of
proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. [Abarquez
v. People, G.R. No. 150762, 20 January 2006]

People v. Garcia
85 Phil. 651 (1950)
The accused, a 17-year old minor, was convicted of robbery and was
not given by the lower court the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, which was allegedly
amended by Republic Act No. 47.
Rep. Act No. 47 amended Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by

reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be committed
to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable
institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison. The Solicitor
General believes that the amendment by implication also amended Article
68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that when the offender is
over fifteen and under eighteen years age, "The penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period."
The Supreme Court held that Rep. Act No. 47 did not amend Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code and a person over 16 and under 18 years old is
still entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Penal law is to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the State.

Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be
enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable
considerations. In other words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose
for which the statute was enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and
penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered
within the statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit
and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must
be resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all
questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty
is sought.
Abarquez v. People
G.R. No. 150762, 20 January 2006
Coverdale Abarquez was charged with homicide and attempted

homicide. He was convicted as an accomplice in the charge for homicide by
the lower court for aiding the principal in killing the victim. The Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed Abarquez’s conviction. Mere commission

of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough to make one an
accomplice. The evidence does not show that Abarquez concurred with the
criminal design of the offender when he held the shoulder of one of the
participants in the fight.
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be

resolved in his favor. Every person accused has the right to be presumed
innocent
Basic Principles of Criminal Lawuntil the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. TheDan P. Calica
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence
stands as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law.
Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact establishing
guilt.
The Supreme Court applied the equipoise rule in this case. Where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does
not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of
proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.
Spanish text of the RPC prevails over
English translation thereof
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the

word "filed" is not found in the Spanish text, which is
controlling, as it was the Spanish text of the Revised Penal
Code that was approved by the Legislature. [People v.
Manaba, 58 Phil. 665 (1933)]

Penal laws apply prospectively
Penal laws shall apply prospectively, except when it is

favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent.
[CIV. CODE, art. 4, REV. PEN. CODE, art. 22, EXEC. ORDER
NO. 292 (1987), sec. 19]

Two scenarios covered by Article 5 of
the Revised Penal Code
1. When the act charged before the court is not covered

by any law but the court believes it should be punished
2. When the penalty to be imposed is excessive

Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered
by the law
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem

proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. [REV.
PEN. CODE, art. 5]

Duty of the court in case of excessive penalties
When a strict enforcement of the provisions of the Revised

Penal Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed
proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence.
[REV. PEN. CODE, art. 5]

Two kinds of repeal
1. Express repeal
2. Implied repeal

Express and implied repeal
A repeal may be express or implied. An express repeal is one

wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed. An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a
substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the
absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed
as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws . [Javier v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 215847, 12 January 2016]

Effects of absolute repeal of a penal law
The absolute repeal of a penal law constitutes a

legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously
declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists
and it is as if the person who committed it never did so.
There being no criminal liability, there is likewise no civil
liability because the latter is rooted in the former. [Tuates
v. Bersamin, G.R. No. 138962, 4 October 2002]

Tuates v. Bersamin
G.R. No. 138962, 4 October 2002
Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz were charged with violation of

Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law. On appeal to the
Regional Trial Court, the RTC affirmed their conviction.
Pending their motion for reconsideration, Republic Act No. 8368 was
enacted which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 772.
The RTC ruled that only the criminal convictions were repealed by Rep.
Act No. 8368 but the civil aspect remained. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed. It held that both the criminal and civil
liabilities were extinguished by the absolute repeal of Pres. Decree No. 772.

The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit,
categorical, definite and absolute. As such, the act that was penalized by P.D.
772, i.e., squatting, ceases to be criminal under R.A. 8368, and the previous
offense is obliterated.
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of
depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of
the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal
law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously
declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the
person who committed it never did so. It was the clear intent of the law to
decriminalize or do away with the crime of squatting. Hence, there being no
criminal liability, there is likewise no civil liability because the latter is rooted
in the former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be
held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question.
No implied revival of repealed law
When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby
revived unless expressly so provided. [EXEC. ORDER NO.
292 (1987), sec. 21]

Revival of law impliedly repealed law
When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived,
unless the repealing law provides otherwise. [EXEC. ORDER
NO. 292 (1987), sec. 22]

When repeal will not extinguish crime or
prosecution thereof
1. When there is a saving clause
2. When there is reenactment of the punishable act

[Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, 4
September 2001]

Benedicto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125359, 4 September 2001
Roberto Benedicto, along with Imelda Marcos and Hector Rivera, were
charged with violation of Central Bank Circular No. 360 for not reporting
their foreign denominated deposits and transactions. Circular No. 360 was
issued by the Central Bank pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 265 or
the Central Bank Act.
During the pendency of the cases, the Central Bank revised its rules and
issued Circular No. 1318 and thereafter Circular No. 1353. Both circulars,
however, contained a saving clause, excepting from their coverage pending
criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of
Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No.
1318.
Republic Act No. 265 was also repealed by Republic Act No. 7653
which created the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Benedicto filed a motion to quash the Information against him as

Circular No. 360 and Rep. Act No. 265 have been repealed. This was denied
by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to quash.
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a

court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law
prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law
constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously
declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the
person who committed it never did so.

There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a
saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have
no effect on pending actions. Another exception is where the repealing act
reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under
the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment
continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not
affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more
favorable to the accused
Here, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 contained saving clauses, expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending
actions for violation of the latter Circular.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that, while Section 34 of

Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was nonetheless, simultaneously
reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653.

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Basic Principles of Criminal Law

DAN PERUELO CALICA

1. Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where

2. The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of

3. Police power is exercised by the legislative branch.

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

5. No ex post facto laws and bills of attainder shall be enacted.

6. Philippine criminal law is general, territorial and prospective in

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

1. Act No. 3815 (1932) or the Revised Penal Code and

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

1. When the act charged before the court is not covered

2. When the penalty to be imposed is excessive

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

When a strict enforcement of the provisions of the Revised

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Lito Corpus undertook to sell on commission the jewelries owned by

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Republic Act No. 10951 has drastically amended the

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Less Grave Light Felonies

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Afflictive Exceeds P6,000 Exceeds P1,200,000

Correctional P200 to P6,000 P40,000 to P1,200,000

Light Less than P200 Less than P40,000

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

This Act shall have retroactive effect to the extent that

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

For cases pending before the courts upon the

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Ophelia Hernan was charged and convicted of Malversation of public funds

The Sandiganbayan affirmed his conviction and modified his sentence to 6

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

While we must follow the rule of law, we must

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty.

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

The inherent powers of the State are: (a) Police

Police power is the most pervasive, the least limitable

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Local legislative power shall be exercised by the

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica

Basic Principles of Criminal Law Dan P. Calica