Article

Risk Assessment System for Oil and Gas Pipelines

Laid in One Ditch Based on Quantitative Risk
Analysis
Peng Zhang 1, Guojin Qin 2,* and Yihuan Wang 2
1 School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu 610500, China;
zp_swpi@sina.com
2 School of Mechatronic Engineering, Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu 610500, China;

yihuan.wang@stu.swpu.edu.cn
* Correspondence: guojin.qin@stu.swpu.edu.cn; Tel.: +86-028-83032748

Received: 28 December 2018; Accepted: 12 March 2019; Published: 13 March 2019

Abstract: In view of the vegetation reduction caused by the continuous construction of oil and gas
pipelines, the pipelines have been designed to be laid in one ditch to reduce land occupation.
However, owing to the small spacing between the pipelines, the fault correlation between pipelines
has been proven to increase the potential hazard of adjacent pipelines and routing environments.
The neglect of failure correlation in existing risk assessment methods leads to inaccurate results,
which will lead to errors in maintenance decisions. Therefore, this paper proposed a risk
assessment system for pipelines using this laying method. In the risk assessment, pipelines laid in
one ditch (PLOD) were regarded as a series system relative to the routing environment. Therefore,
the functional relationship between the total risk of the pipeline system and the risk of each
pipeline was obtained by combining the engineering system reliability theory with the
mathematical induction method. In addition, fuzzy set theory combined with fault tree analysis
was used to calculate the failure probability of each pipeline in the system. Event tree analysis was
used to sort out all the possible consequences of pipeline failure, and then the consequences were
unified into monetary units to evaluate the severity of failure consequences. Finally, the two parts
were merged into a bow-tie diagram to realize the risk management and control of the pipeline.
Meanwhile, risk acceptance criteria were formulated to analyze risks and to guide pipeline
maintenance. This system provides a complete risk assessment system for the pipeline system laid
in one ditch, including the methods of risk identification, risk assessment, and risk analysis, which
are of great significance to ensure the safety of the pipeline and the surrounding environment using
this laying method.

Keywords: oil and gas pipelines laid in one ditch; risk assessment analysis; bow-tie model; risk
acceptance criteria; fuzzy set theory

1. Introduction
In light of global economic development, the demand for petroleum resources and energy in
various countries is increasing [1,2]. To solve the problem of imbalance between supply and
demand, oil and gas pipelines have been built in large quantities owing to their economic and high
efficiency in oil and gas transportation. However, since plants cannot be grown around the
pipelines, the construction of numerous pipelines seriously affects the ecological environment.
Therefore, operators lay two or more new pipelines in one ditch or lay the new pipelines along other
existing pipelines in one ditch to reduce the occupation of land and to follow the principle of
sustainable development [3].
Energies 2019, 12, 981; doi:10.3390/en12060981 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies
Energies 2019, 12, 981 2 of 21

Owing to the large span of the pipelines, it is inevitable that pipelines will be routed through
areas with complex geological environments. There are many uncertainties and risks involved in the
use of pipeline transportation, such as natural factors and human factors. According to reports,
every year, there are numerous accidents caused by soil corrosion, landslides, floods, collapses,
mudslides, and earthquakes [4–9]. In addition, pipeline safety is simultaneously threatened by
human factors, such as third-party damage, terrorist attacks, incorrect operation, and design flaws
[10,11]. Since the oil and gas pipelines are flammable, explosive, and toxic, any pipeline leakage can
cause catastrophic consequences, such as fire, explosions, and environmental pollution [12–14].
Hence, risk assessment is used to identify the risk factors relating to uncertainty in pipeline
operation, to evaluate the possibility and consequences of accidents, as well as to comprehensively
calculate the risk value. The results can be used to guide pipeline maintenance [15]. In 1992,
Muhlbauer proposed an integrated and continuously improving quantitative pipeline risk
assessment framework, which has become the guiding principle for pipeline risk assessment [16].
The methodology for calculating failure probability has gradually developed from qualitative to
quantitative methods [17], which includes two types of methods. One is the estimation of failure
probability based on failure databases, such as the database of Pipeline and Dangerous Goods Safety
Administration (PHMSA) in the USA and the database of European Gas Pipeline Incident Data
Group (EGIG) in Europe [18]. However, in situations where the data is insufficient to support
quantitative risk assessment, then the low data-dependent failure probability determination
methods can be adopted. Consequently, methods have been developed in this field, such as fuzzy
mathematics, expert scoring, and fault tree analysis [19–22]. However, in terms of the evaluation of
failure consequences, event tree analysis has proven to be the most effective tool [23,24].
From a risk perspective, the PLOD are subject not only to the failure factors of a single pipeline,
but also to the effects of adjacent pipeline failures, which has been proven by numerical simulations
and experiments by scholars. Studies show that jet fire and explosion shock waves caused by
pipeline failure will affect adjacent pipelines, that is to say, there is a failure correlation between
pipelines [25–28]. Therefore, the potential danger of the pipelines and the routing environment can
be upgraded. However, the existing risk assessment methods do not account for the impact of failure
correlation, which leads to results that do not reflect the true value of risk, resulting in inadequate
maintenance [29]. To avoid the uncertainty caused by the underestimation of risk, this paper
presented a quantitative risk assessment method that is suitable for PLOD.
The following work was carried out in this paper. The relationship among routing environment
risk and pipelines was deduced. A risk assessment method suitable for pipelines with failure
correlation was proposed. Moreover, to evaluate the results of risk assessment to guide risk
reduction, the curve method and as low as reasonable practical (ALARP) principle were used to
formulate risk acceptance criteria. Thus, the three parts form a risk assessment system.

2. Risk Assessment Method for Pipeline Systems Laid in One Ditch

Pipeline risk assessment is used to comprehensively evaluate the internal and external factors
affecting pipeline failure and the severity of the failure consequences, enabling the risk level of each
segment to be determined as the basis of maintenance works. When pipelines are laid in one ditch,
each pipeline can be affected by the failure of the adjacent pipelines owing to the small spacing
between them, thus it is more susceptible to failure than a single pipeline laying method. Therefore,
the potential danger to the routing environment affected by pipeline failure is also increased. Thus,
to guide operators using this laying method to manage and control pipeline risk, the risk assessment
method is discussed in this section.

2.1. Risk Assessment of Pipeline System

Given the small spacing between the pipelines, the pipelines can be regarded as an engineering
system (PLOD system) related to the routing environment, where the double-pipeline system is
used as an example (Figure 1). Pipeline A or B failure in this system will have a certain impact on the
routing environment. From the point of view of reliability engineering, this system can be regarded
Energies 2019, 12, 981 3 of 21

as a series system related to the routing environment, and the failure of any unit (pipeline) will affect
the routing environment. Therefore, the calculation method of the series system can be used to
calculate the risk of this system.

Figure 1. The diagram of the pipelines laid in one ditch (PLOD) system.

Meanwhile, given that the pipeline spacing is small, the failure correlation between pipeline A
and B has been proven. From a risk perspective, when the failure probability of pipeline A in the
system is evaluated, in addition to the failure factors of the single pipeline, the influence of the
adjacent pipeline B’s failure on pipeline A should also be considered.
That is, the failure probability PfA is

PfA  (I1,I2 ,...,IBA ,In ) (1)

where Ii is the failure factor, i = 1, 2, 3,…, n; IBA is the influence of the adjacent pipeline B on A.
When the failure consequences of pipeline A are evaluated, in addition to the failure
consequences of the single pipeline, the influence of A’s failure on the adjacent pipeline B should be
considered. That is, the failure consequences CA are
C A  (C1 ,C 2 ,...,C AB ,Cn ) (2)
where Cj is the possible consequence of failure, j = 1, 2, 3,…, n; CAB is the influence of pipeline A’s
failure on the adjacent pipeline B.
On this basis, a risk assessment system that is suitable for the PLOD system will be deduced.

2.1.1. Double-Pipeline System

The PLOD system consists of A and B. According to the theory of the series system, there are
three situations of system failure: ① A fails but B does not, the failure probability of the system is
PfA (1- PfB ) ; ② B fails but A does not, the failure probability of the system is PfB (1- PfA ) ; ③ A and B
fail at the same time, the failure probability of the system is PfA PfB . Correspondingly, each of the
three failure situations will bring three consequences: ① Failure consequences of the A; ② Failure
consequences of the B; ③ Sum of the failure consequences of A and B. Therefore, the total risk of the
system can be calculated as follows:

RAB  PfA (1- PfB )CA  PfB (1- PfA )CB  PfA PfB (CA  CB ) (3)

where RAB is the total risk of double-pipeline system; PfA is the failure probability of A; PfB is the
failure probability of B; CA is failure consequences of A; CB is failure consequences of B.
Expand Equation (3):
RAB  PfACA  PfBCB - PfA PfBCA  PfA PfBCB  PfA PfB (CA  CB ) (4)

Collate

RAB  PfACA  PfBCB (5)

Energies 2019, 12, 981 4 of 21

Therefore, the risk of the double-pipeline system is equal to the sum of the risks of the two
pipelines.

2.1.2. Triple-Pipeline System

In many pipeline projects, new pipelines have been laid beside the existing double-pipeline
system, forming a triple-pipeline system, which undoubtedly increases the possibility of damages to
the surrounding environment.
The PLOD system consists of A, B, and C, where there are seven situations of system failure:
① A fails but B and C do not, PfA (1- PfB )(1- PfC ) ;
② B fails but A and C do not;
③ C fails but A and B do not;
④ A and B fail at the same time, but C does not;
⑤ A and C fail at the same time, but B does not;
⑥ B and C fail at the same time, but A does not;
⑦ A, B, and C fail at the same time. The failure probability of the system is PfA (1- PfB )(1- PfC ) ,
PfB (1- PfA )(1- PfC ) , PfC (1- PfA )(1- PfB ) , PfA PfB (1- PfC ) , PfA PfC (1- PfB ) , PfB PfC (1- PfA ) and PfA PfB PfC ,
respectively.
Correspondingly, each of the seven failure modes will bring seven consequences: ① failure
consequences of A; ② failure consequences of B; ③ failure consequences of C; ④ sum of the
failure consequences of A and B; ⑤ sum of the failure consequences of A and C; ⑥ sum of the
failure consequences of B and C; ⑦ sum of the failure consequences of A, B, and C.
Therefore, the total risk of the system can be calculated as follows:
RABC  PfA (1- PfB )(1- PfC )CA  PfB (1- PfA )(1- PfC )CB  PfC (1- PfA )(1- PfB )CC
 PfA PfB (1- PfC )(CA  CB )  PfA PfC (1- PfB )(CA  CC )  PfB PfC (1- PfA )(CB  CC ) (6)
 PfA PfB PfC (CA  CB  CC )

where RABC is the total risk of the triple-pipeline system; PfC is the failure probability of C; CC is failure
consequences of C.
Expand Equation (6):

RABC  PfACA  PfBCB  PfCCC (7)

Therefore, the risk of the triple-pipeline system is equal to the sum of the risks of the three pipelines.

2.1.3. Multi-Pipeline System

In the previous sections, the double-pipeline system and triple-pipeline system are discussed,
where the total risk of these systems are equal to the sum of the risks of each pipeline. Owing to the
continuous construction of pipelines, that is, four pipelines, five pipelines, or other multi-pipelines
may be laid in one ditch in the future. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the risk
assessment method for a multi-pipeline system laid in one ditch.
Based on Equation (3) and Equation (4):
The total risk of a double-pipeline system R2 is
2
R2  Pf 1  C1  Pf 2  C2  ∑Pfi  Ci
i 1

The total risk of a triple-pipeline system R3 is

3
R3  Pf 1  C1  Pf 2  C2  Pf 3  C3  ∑Pfi  Ci
i 1

Let i = m, the equation still holds:

m
Rm  Pf 1  C1  Pf 2  C2  Pf 3  C3    Pfm  Cm  ∑Pfi  Ci
i 1
Energies 2019, 12, 981 5 of 21

Item m+1 is added to the left and right sides of the equation:
m m 1
Pf 1  C1    Pfm  Cm  Pf ( m1)  Cm1 ∑Pfi  Ci  Pf ( m1)  Cm1 ∑Pfi  Ci  Rm1 (8)
i 1 i 1

According to mathematical induction, for any n  N * , there is

n
Rn  ∑Pfi  Ci (9)
i 1

where Rn is the total system risk of n pipelines; Pfi is the failure probability of the ith pipeline; Ci is
failure consequences of the ith pipeline.
Therefore, the risk of the PLOD system is equal to the sum of the risks of each pipeline, and the
routing environment risk equals the sum of the pipeline risks in the system.
Currently, single-pipeline risk assessment methods underestimate the risk of pipelines in the
PLOD system [30,31]. Based on Equation (9), the risk of the routing environment will be also
underestimated. Therefore, a quantitative risk assessment method for pipelines considering the
failures correlation among the pipelines will be studied in the next section.

2.2. Quantitative Risk Assessment for Pipelines Considering Failure Correlation Among Pipelines
Since the number of pipelines in the ditch is increased, the entire engineering system is more
complicated, and the probability of damage to the surrounding environment is increased.
Therefore, a method with characteristics of visual, communication, and display convenience is
needed to guide maintenance personnel to reduce the occurrence and spread of accidents. The
development of the pipeline risk assessment method has gradually developed to include the main
contents of the risk assessment process in a model. The bow-tie model uses intuitive graphics to
express the possible causes and consequences of an accident. Measures to prevent the occurrence of
accidents and to mitigate consequences can be clearly marked on the graphics by setting barriers, so
that dynamic management can be achieved, which meets the development goals of risk assessment
methods in oil and gas engineering [32]. Therefore, the bow-tie model has become a hotspot in the
application and research of risk assessment methods [33]. The center of the bow-tie diagram is an
undesired event. The left side is the cause of the event and the preventive control measures, and the
right side is the potential consequences of the event and the measures to mitigate the consequences.
The bow-tie diagram is used to systematically identify hazards, assess and control risks, and to
facilitate team communication discussions to reduce risk to an acceptable level by taking
appropriate control mitigation measures at the appropriate locations [34].
In the bow-tie model, fault tree analysis (FTA) is a logic deductive analysis tool that can be used to
analyze the causes and outcomes of all basic events leading to pipeline failure and their combinations
[35]. When FTA is used to analyze pipeline failure factors, in addition to third-party damage, corrosion,
pipeline quality defects, incorrect operation, and unreasonable design, the failure effects of the adjacent
pipelines should also be considered, which can be determined as a basic event affecting the pipeline
under evaluation. The consequences of pipeline failure in the PLOD system are complex and uncertain.
Event tree analysis (ETA) can be used to sort out all the possible consequences of pipeline failures,
ascertain the main causes of the accidents, and provide a reliable basis for determining safety
countermeasures, so as to achieve the goal of predicting and preventing accidents. Moreover, to assess
the overall failure consequences, this paper proposed a new approach which can unite the various
consequences of pipeline failure, and finally express the consequences in the form of currency.
In summary, the bow-tie model of pipeline failure accidents is shown in Figure 2.
Energies 2019, 12, 981 6 of 21

Figure 2. Bow-tie model of pipeline failure accidents.

2.2.1. Calculation of the Failure Probability

There are two types of pipeline failures, fractures and perforations [36], and these two forms of
failure can lead to leakage. Therefore, the top event of the bow-tie model is media leakage. To assess
the occurrence probability of the top event, the occurrence probabilities of all basic events must be
known. The determination of occurrence probabilities of basic events can refer to the historical
failure data. However, owing to insufficient failure information regarding pipelines, it is difficult
for all pipeline operators to utilize a quantitative risk assessment [37], as such the judgment and
estimation of experts becomes the primary data source. However, given that the occurrence of basic
events in the pipeline fault tree is ambiguous and random, even experts cannot accurately estimate
the probability of each event. Therefore, fuzzy mathematics is introduced to quantify expert
judgment opinions to obtain the occurrence probability of basic events [38].
In the process of expert judgment, an exact number may not be directly provided, but some
language indicating the occurrence possibility of the event is used. Combined with pipeline
engineering, the natural language values can be divided into seven levels: very small (VS), small (S),
relatively small (RS), medium (M), relatively large (RL), large (L), and very large (VL) [24]. In
practice, to achieve the estimated data trend objective, it is necessary to select experts from different
fields in pipeline engineering. However, different experts have different strengths and knowledge
gaps owing to differences in their personal experiences and knowledge level. Therefore, the ability
of experts to provide estimates is also different. It is not appropriate to combine mathematical
averages or geometric mean values as expert estimates. In order to obtain more reliable results, it is
necessary to assess the personal ability of the experts before providing the judgement. Therefore, an
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is used to evaluate the ability of experts to improve the objectivity
of the expert judgment [39].
In AHP, factors affecting expert competence are used to determine the weight of the expert’s
competence (Figure 3). The overall target is personal ability (PA), which is the first layer of the
model. Factors affecting expert competence include personal knowledge (PK), information source
(IS), unbiased (UB), and personal experience (PE), which make up the second layer of the model [40].
The third layer is the expert involved in the assessment.

PA

PK IS UB PE …

Expert 1 Expert 2 … Expert N

Figure 3. Expert ability assessment analytic model.

The possibility of a basic event (Xi) can be calculated as follows:

Energies 2019, 12, 981 7 of 21

 The evaluation team composed of experts makes subjective judgments on Xi

Experts from different fields, such as pipeline design, construction, installation, maintenance,
and management are invited to form an evaluation group. The pipeline manager reports the basic
status of the pipelines to the experts and invites the experts to inspect the pipelines. Then the experts
are organized to discuss the occurrence possibility of the basic event Xi.
 Linguistic value is transformed into fuzzy numbers
Fuzzy set theory is used to process these linguistic values with uncertainty. There are many
expressions of the membership function, such as triangular fuzzy number membership function,
trapezoidal fuzzy number membership function, and Gauss fuzzy number membership function.
Triangle and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are widely used in linear fuzzy computations owing to
their high efficiency and simplicity. They are used to provide more accurate descriptions and more
accurate solutions, which are widely used in real-time systems [41]. Therefore, triangle fuzzy
numbers (Equation (10)) and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (Equation (11)) are used to replace these
linguistic values (Figure 4).
0 （x  a)
xa
 ( a  x  b)
b  a
f ( x)   (10)
 c  x (b  x  c)
c  b
0 ( x  c)


0 （x  a )
xa
 ( a  x  b)
b  a

f ( x)  1 (b  x  c) (11)
d  x
 (c  x  d )
d c
0 (x  d )

where a, b, c and d are the upper and lower limits of the fuzzy numbers representing the natural
language, respectively.
Membership function f(x)

1.0 VS S RS M RL L VL
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Fuzzy number x

Figure 4. Fuzzy numbers represent linguistic value.

Therefore, Equations 12a–g represent the membership functions of different levels:

1.0 （0  x  0.1)
 0.2  x

f VS ( x)   (0.1  x  0.2) (12a)
 0.1
0 (otherwise)
Energies 2019, 12, 981 8 of 21

 x  0.1
 0.1 (0.1  x  0.2)

 0.3  x (0.2  x  0.3)
fS ( x)   (12b)
 0.1

0 (otherwise)


 x  0.2
 0.1 （0.2  x  0.3)

1.0 （0.3  x  0.4)
f RS ( x)   (12c)
 0.5  x
（0.4  x  0.5)
 0.1
0 (otherwise)


 x  0.4
 0.1 （0.4  x  0.5)

 0.6  x（0.5  x  0.6)
f M ( x)   (12d)
 0.1

0 (otherwise)


 x  0.5
 0.1 (0.5  x  0.6)

1.0 (0.6  x  0.7)
f RL ( x)   (12e)
 0.8  x
(0.7  x  0.8)
 0.1
0 (otherwise)


 x  0.7
 0.1 (0.7  x  0.8)

 0.9  x (0.8  x  0.9)
f L ( x)   (12f)
 0.1

0 (otherwise)


 0.8  x
 0.1 (0.8  x  0.9)

f VL ( x)  1.0 (0.9  x  1.0) (12g)


0 (otherwise)

The α-cut set theory is used to comprehensively address the expert assessments. The α-cut for
the fuzzy numbers W can be described as:
W  {x, x R, fW  }  [z2 , z2 ]
Let the α-cut set of each formula in Equations (12) be W [z1, z2 ] , where z1 and z2 represent the
upper and lower limits of each α-cut set, respectively. Thus, the upper and lower limits and the α
values of the cut set in the Equations (12) are as follows:
0.2  vs2
When VS  [vs1, vs2 ] , vs1  0 , vs2  0.2  0.1 ;   [0, ];
0.1
s  0.1 0.3  s2
When S  [s1, s2 ] , s1  0.1  0.1 , s2  0.3  0.1 ,   [ 1 , ];
0.1 0.1
Energies 2019, 12, 981 9 of 21

rs1  0.2 0.5  rs2

When RS [rs1, rs2 ] , rs1  0.1  0.2 , rs2  0.5  0.1 ,   [ ， ];
0.1 0.1
m  0.4 0.6  m2
When M  [m1, m2 ] , m1  0.1  0.4 , m2  0.6  0.1 ,   [ 1 , ];
0.1 0.1
rl  0.5 0.8  rl2
When RL  [rl1, rl2 ] , rl1  0.1  0.5 , rl2  0.8  0.1 ,   [ 1 , ];
0.1 0.1
l  0.7 0.9  l2
When L  [l1, l2 ] , l1  0.1  0.7 , l 2  0.9  0.1 ,   [ 1 , ];
0.1 0.1
vl  0.8
When VL [vl1, vl2 ] , vl1  0.1  0.8 , rl2  1 ,   [ 1 ,1] .
0.1
According to the trapezoidal fuzzy number theory, the relationship function (S, RS, M, RL, L) of
the fuzzy numbers W corresponding to each fuzzy language can be derived by

xa
 0.1 (a  x  a  0.1)

 b  x (b  0.1  x  b)
fW ( x)   (13a)
 0.1
1 (a  0.1  x  b  0.1)
0 (otherwise）

According to the triangle fuzzy number theory, the relationship function of the fuzzy numbers
W corresponding to VS and VL can be derived by

1.0 （0  vs  0.1)
 0.2  vs

fW (vs )   (0.1  vs  0.2) (13b)
 0.1
0 (otherwise）

 0.8  vl
 0.1 （0.8  vl  0.9)

fW (vl )  1.0 （0.9  vl  1.0) (13c)


0 （otherwise)

The basic operations of fuzzy numbers can be expressed by their α-cut as in Reference [42]:
W1 W2  W1 W2  [(W1Z W2Z ),(W1Z W2 Z )]
1 1 2 2

W1 W2  W1 W2  [(W1Z W2Z ),(W1Z W2 Z )] .

1 1 2 2

Different experts often have different opinions on a basic event; therefore, it is necessary to
integrate their opinions into a single opinion. There are many ways to aggregate fuzzy numbers, the
linear opinion pool is recommended in this paper as described in Reference [43]:
n
f (x)  N AXi N (14)
N 1

where AXi N is the linguistic value of basic event Xi given by expert N;  N is the weight of expert N.
 Convert fuzzy numbers to fuzzy possibility values
Based on the left and right fuzzy ordering method proposed by Chen and Hwang [44], the
fuzzy number is transformed into fuzzy possibility scores (FPST). This method defines the maximum
fuzzy set and the minimum fuzzy set as:
 x (0  x  1) 1  x (0  x  1)
f max ( x )   ; f min ( x )   (15)
0 (otherwise) 0 (otherwise)
Then the left fuzzy probability scores (FPSL) and right fuzzy probability scores (FPSR) are
Energies 2019, 12, 981 10 of 21

FPSL  sup[ fW ( x)  f min ( x)] (16)

x

FPSR  sup[ fW ( x)  f max ( x)] (17)

x

Then, the FPST is defined as

FPST  [FPSR  1  FPSL ] / 2 (18)
 Convert FPST to fuzzy failure possibility as in Reference [45]
The fuzzy possibility value (F) can be converted to a failure probability as follows:

 1
 (FPS  0)
F  10k (19)
0 (FPS  0)
1/3
1  FPST 
where k  2.301   .
 FPST 

2.2.2. Monetary Quantification of Pipeline Failure Consequences

ETA is used to sort out all the possible consequences of pipeline failure according to the
development of an accident and then to identify the hazard source. Finally, barriers will be set up to
mitigate the consequences. To comprehensively assess the severity of the failure consequences,
quantitative analysis should be conducted.
Typically, the consequences of pipeline failure are considered from three aspects: casualties (n),
environmental damage (v), and property loss (c). Casualties (persons) refer to the burning,
explosions, or poisoning accidents caused by pipeline failure that may cause damage to the
surrounding population. Environmental damage (m3) is used to determine the severity of the
consequences by assessing the volume of pollutants. Environmental damage often attracts great
attention from the media and the public, which to a corporation’s reputation is much more serious
than the direct economic loss. Economic loss ($) includes maintenance costs, reinstallation costs for
damaged equipment, and shutdown losses. Moreover, the impact of pipeline failure on adjacent
pipelines should be assessed, which includes pipe loss, media loss, and downtime loss.
However, given that the dimensions of the three failure consequences are inconsistent, it is
difficult to comprehensively evaluate the loss caused by pipeline failure. In fact, after a pipeline
failure accident, for the pipeline operators, it is accompanied by economic losses, such as
compensation and maintenance. According to this idea, this study unified the dimension of loss by
currency quantification, which requires investigating market prices, drawing lessons from various
methods of property statistics, life safety, and environmental value assessment, combined with the
specific conditions of pipelines. These are recorded as life loss c1 ($), environmental loss c2 ($),
property loss c3 ($), and adjacent pipelines loss c4 ($), respectively. The factors that should be
considered in the currency quantification of the failure of pipeline systems laid in one ditch are
shown in Table 1 [46–48]. In a specific assessment, it should depend on the situation.

Table 1. Factors considered in monetary quantification.

Type Assessment index Type Assessment index

Construction
property; Repair cost;
Death; Property
Life loss c1 Medium loss;
Injury; loss c3
Equipment property
loss; Downtime loss
Air pollution; Water
Adjacent
Environmental pollution; Soil Pipe loss; Medium
pipelines
loss c2 pollution; Forest loss; Downtime loss
loss c4
resources
Energies 2019, 12, 981 11 of 21

The consequences of different failure modes are different. Therefore, the consequences C1 and
C2 of the fractures and perforations of the pipelines can be expressed as:
C1  F (c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 ) ; C 2  G (c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 ) (20)

Then the risk of a pipeline in the PLOD system can be calculated by the following:
2
R   Pi  Ci P1 F (c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 )  P2G(c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 ) (21)
i 1

where R ($) is the risk of a pipeline in the PLOD system; P1 is the probability of fracture; P2 is the
probability of perforation.

2.3. Risk Acceptability Criteria

The bow-tie model has a good effect in preventing the occurrence and spread of adverse events.
However, there is a limitation that quantitative conclusions cannot be obtained to guide risk
decision-making. A guideline for guiding risk decisions is needed. Hence, risk acceptability was
introduced to further assess risk and to guide the implementation of risk reduction measures.
The sociological concept of risk acceptability was introduced into engineering decision analysis
to address “how safe is safe enough” in the 1960s [49]. Risk acceptance criteria have been studied by
scholars since the 1970s as a bridge between risk assessment and risk decision-making. In the book
Acceptable Risk, risk is acceptable only when the benefits obtained can compensate for the loss of risk,
thus risk acceptance criteria were proposed to protect the interests of all parties [50]. Pipeline risk
acceptance criteria can be divided into two categories: one is the risk acceptance criteria for pipeline
operators formulated from the perspective of economic interests. In order to seek benefits, operators
need to seek a balance between safety and efficiency [51]. The ALARP principle and cost–benefit
analysis are used to formulate the risk acceptance criteria [52]. The second is the risk acceptance
criteria for society formulated from the perspective of protecting the lives and environment of
surrounding residents [53]. Historical data on the deaths and environmental pollution caused by
pipeline failure are used as the reference values, and social risk acceptance criteria are formulated in
consultation with relevant departments and trade unions.
In this paper, to facilitate communication with field managers, the curve method was used to
illustrate risk acceptability criteria. Given that the consequences of pipeline failures are uniformly
quantified as money, the function image of pipeline failure probability (P) and property loss (L)
combined with the ALARP principle was used to formulate economic loss risk acceptable criteria.
The two boundaries of ALARP (negligible value at risk (NVAR) and intolerable value (IRV)) divide
risk into three regions: unacceptable region, negligible region, and the ALARP region (Figure 5). The
maintenance decision-making ideas of each region are different [52].

Unacceptable region Intolerable risk

IRV
ALARP region

Acceptable risk

NARV
Acceptable risk region Negligible risk

Figure 5. Level of risk and the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) region.
Energies 2019, 12, 981 12 of 21

The risk boundary P-L curve is expressed as follows, as in Reference [54]:

B
Pf ( x )  1  FL ( x)  (22)
xn

where Pf ( x) is the probability of accidents; x is the loss caused by the accident; FL ( x ) is the
probability distribution function of the annual economic loss from an accident; B is a constant to
determine the position of the P-L curve, referring to the risk acceptability criteria for dangerous
goods transportation (HSE), the B of the IRV line is 10−4, and the B of NVAR is 10−6 [55,56]; n is the
slope of the P-L curve, the value of n is based on the acceptable risk level and the degree of risk
control. The level of accident property loss is classified as shown in Table 2 [57].

Table 2. Ranking criteria of consequences.

No. Amount of loss (thousand $) Level

1 <1.6 Very low
2 1.6–16 Low
3 16–160 Medium
4 160–1600 High
5 >1600 Extremely high

Therefore, the pipeline property loss risk acceptable criterion is shown in Figure 6.
After the risk assessment, the probability of pipeline failure and the possible losses are
represented by points on the P-L diagram. When the point falls into a negligible region, the risk is
considered negligible and there is no need to reduce the risk. When the point falls into an
unacceptable region, the risk is considered unacceptable and measures must be taken at all costs to
reduce the risk below the IRV line. When the point falls in the ALARP region, a cost–benefit analysis
should be conducted to determine whether to take measures.

IRV
Unacceptable region
Pf (x)

NAVR

Negligible region

Property loss (thousand $)

Figure 6. Pipeline property loss risk acceptable criteria.

In summary, this section proposed the following risk assessment system for the PLOD (Figure 7):
(1) Identifying risk factors to determine the basic events, and carding the possible failure
consequences of each pipeline;
(2) Calculating the probability and consequences of each pipeline failure to obtain the total risk
of the PLOD system;
(3) Judging the risk acceptability to determine whether to maintain the system.
Energies 2019, 12, 981 13 of 21

Figure 7. Assessment process of the PLOD system.

3. Case Study
A natural gas pipeline (A) operated by China Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation and a
product pipeline (B) operated by the Yunnan Product Pipeline Engineering Company are laid in one
ditch up to 10.16 km from Nanhua County, Chuxiong City to Fumin County, Kunming City, China.
One of the segments was selected for risk assessment. In this segment, the pipeline spacing is 1.2 m
and the length is 1 km. Pipeline A is made from X80 steel with a diameter of 1016 mm and designed
with an internal pressure of 10 MPa. Pipeline B is made from X52 steel with a diameter of 406.4 mm
and designed with an internal pressure of 13.2 MPa. Ravines, collapses, landslides, debris flows, and
earthquakes often erupt in the routing areas of the pipelines. In addition, there are several homes
and groves in the affected area (Figure 8). Once the pipelines fail, the surrounding environment will
be badly affected. Pipeline A was taken as an example, and the bow-tie model was used for
quantitative risk assessment.

Figure 8. Trend map of the evaluated pipeline segment.

Energies 2019, 12, 981 14 of 21

3.1. Failure Probability

3.1.1. Fault Tree Analysis

In order to construct a fault tree that conforms to the actual situation of the pipeline segment,
experts need to refer to the records of the pipeline design, construction, operation, and maintenance. In
addition, all factors that may affect the safe operation of the pipeline should be considered, such as the
quality of the medium and the surrounding geographical environment. In this case, gas release is
identified as the top event. Corrosion, pipeline quality defects, third-party damage, unreasonable design,
incorrect operation, and adjacent pipeline failure are identified as the major influencing factors. After
determining the top event and the major influencing factors, combined with the actual situation of the
pipeline segment, an in-depth analysis is carried out until all the basic events influencing the various
failure events are identified [58]. The natural gas pipeline leakage fault tree in one ditch laying system is
established (Figure 9), with a total of 42 basic events identified (Table 3).

Table 3. Basic events of natural gas pipeline leakage.

NO. Description NO. Description

X1 Soil containing bacteria X22 Poor cleaning effect
X2 Low soil pH X23 Pipe defects
X3 High soil moisture content X24 Transport damage
X4 Soil containing sulfide X25 Welding defects
X5 High soil oxidation-reduction potential X26 Adjacent pipelines failure
X6 High soil salt X27 Existence of stress concentration
X7 Impressed current protection failure X28 Existence of residual stress
X8 Sacrificial anode protection failure X29 Large internal stress
X9 Anti-corrosion insulation coating is too thin X30 Inadequate corrosion detection
Anti-corrosion insulation coating has low
X10 X31 Poor patrol effect
adhesion
Anti-corrosion insulation coating is too
X11 X32 Improper construction
brittle
X12 Corrosion-proof insulation coating damage X33 Illegal occupation of pipeline
Anti-corrosion insulation coating aging
X13 X34 Landslide
stripping
X14 Coating repair is not timely X35 Debris flow
X15 H2S content is too high X36 Collapse
X16 CO2 content is too high X37 Karst collapse
X17 O2 content is too high X38 Earthquake
X18 H2O content is too high. X39 Pipe design safety factor is small
X19 Lining shedding X40 Insufficient designer level
X20 Thinner inner coating X41 Incorrect operation
X21 Corrosion inhibitor failure X42 Incorrect maintenance operation
Energies 2019, 12, 981 15 of 21

Gas release T1

Perforation A1 Rupture A2

X26 Third-party Unreasonable Misoperation

B1 Defects B2 SCC B3 B2 X26
damage B4 design B5 B6

X23 X24 X25 Excessive X30

tensile stress C3
X39 X40 X41 X42
X31 X32 X33 Geological
disaster C4
B1 Corrosion X27 X28 X29
Legend
Or gate
X34 X35 X36 X37 X38
X30 And gate

External Basic event

External Internal D2 anti-corrosion
corrosion C1 corrosion C2 Combinatorial
failure
event
Unexpanded
Soil corrosion event
D2 Medium Internal coating Cathodic Protection External coating
D1
corrosion D3 failure D4 failure E1 failure E2

X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6
Acid X19 X20 X21 X22
X18 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14
medium E3

X15 X16 X17

Figure 9. Fault tree of the natural gas pipeline in the same ditch laying system.

3.1.2. Occurrence Probability of Basic Events

This section takes the probability of "lining shedding" as an example to illustrate the method
proposed in Section 2.2.1. Four experts (E1, E2, E3, and E4) from the fields of pipeline design,
construction, installation, maintenance, and management were invited to form an evaluation team to
make judgments on the possibility of the basic event "lining shedding" (X19). AHP was used to
define the weights  N (N = 1, 2, 3, 4) of E1, E2, E3, and E4, which were 0.224, 0.27, 0.188, and 0.318,
respectively.
To calculate the weighted average ambiguity of the event by the four experts, as shown in
Equation (14), the integrated fuzzy number can be expressed as follows:

f ( x)  max 1 f VS ( x)  2 fS ( x)  3 f M ( x)  4 f RS ( x)   0.0776  0.1658, 0.3976  0.0552 

According to the extension theory of fuzzy sets, W is a fuzzy set:

W   x1 , x2    0.0776  0.1658,0.3976  0.0552 

x  0.1658 0.3976  x
Therefore,   [ , ].
0.0776 0.0552
Then the relation function of W is

 x  0.1658
 0.0776 (0.1658  x  0.2434)

1 (0.2434  x  0.2976)
fW ( x )  
 0.3976  x (0.2976  x  0.3976)
 0.0552
0 (otherwise)

Energies 2019, 12, 981 16 of 21

Calculated by Equation (15), f max ( x )  0.3641 (x = 0.3641); f min ( x )  0.7741 (x = 0.2259). Point 1
and 2 are the left and right fuzzy probability values (Figure 10), respectively. Thereafter, the left and
right fuzzy probability values of the fuzzy numbers are calculated by Equation (16) and Equation
(17), respectively, FPS L  0.7741 , FPS R  0.3351 , then the results are substituted into Equation (18)
1/3
1  0.2805 
to calculate FPST  0.2805 . Subsequently, k  2.301    3.1498 . Finally, using Equation
 0.2805 
(19), the FFR of X19 is 7.08 104 .
The occurrence probability of other basic events can be obtained by calculations using this
method, where the occurrence probability of the top event is 1.258 × 10−4 according to the calculation
method of the top event.

1
Membership function f(x)

fmax (x)
Point 1

fW (x)
fmin (x)
Point 2

Figure 10. Left and right fuzzy possibility values of fuzzy numbers.

3.2. Failure Consequences

3.2.1. Event Tree Analysis

Natural gas is toxic and flammable. Once an accident occurs, it may spread or cause jet fire and
steam cloud explosion accidents, thereby endangering the surrounding population, buildings, and
trees. Meanwhile, the adjacent pipeline B will also be affected by the leakage accident of A. In the
event of an accident, if it is not repaired in time, it may even cause B’s failure. There are two aspects
as described in Reference [59]:
(1) When A fails, a shock wave will be formed, and the ground pressure transmitted through
the surrounding soil may lead to the failure of the adjacent pipeline B owing to radial buckling.
(2) When A ruptures, the jet air may blow off the surrounding backfill soil to form craters.
When the jet gas is ignited to form a jet fire, the adjacent pipeline B will be directly subject to thermal
radiation without cover protection (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Failure of the adjacent pipeline caused by thermal radiation.

Energies 2019, 12, 981 17 of 21

Therefore, the event tree of A’s failure in one ditch laying system was established (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Natural gas pipeline failure event tree.

3.2.2. Monetary Quantification of the Consequences

According to the method in Section 2.2.2, by investigating the surrounding environment of the
pipeline section, that is, the environmental media, equipment, and buildings in the influence area,
we estimated that the possible loss due to pipeline failure is around $140,000, and combined with the
local environmental pollution damage compensation, the failure consequence is around $145,000.

3.3. Pipeline Failure Prevention Measures and Emergency Measures

After determining the probability and consequences of the natural gas pipeline failure,
according to the risk acceptance criteria formulated in Section 2.3, the risk was considered to be in
the unacceptable region. Therefore, immediate measures should be taken to reduce the risk below
the IRV line. In addition, the failure probability and failure consequences of the product pipeline B
can be calculated using this method, and the risk of the PLOD system can be calculated using
Equation (8).
Events with a high probability of occurrence should be controlled. For the failure of adjacent
pipelines, a safety early warning system should be installed to monitor the pipeline operation in real
time. In addition, the strength of the pipelines should be increased to withstand the load caused by
the explosion of adjacent pipelines. Radiation heat dissipation coatings should be applied on the
surface of the pipe to reduce the effects of heat radiation caused by the jet. Controlling measures for
third-party damage should be based on patrolling and real-time monitoring. Given the frequent
occurrence of geological disasters around the area, the monitoring of disaster points should be
carried out. In addition, obvious signs should be erected in the areas where the depth of the pipeline
cannot be guaranteed. Corrosion inspection and pigging should be carried out regularly to ensure
that the pipeline will not fail. Pipeline operators and designers should be regularly trained to reduce
the possibility of them making mistakes.
The consequences of a natural gas leak depend on whether it is ignited immediately; therefore,
it is necessary to control the source of the fire around the source of the accident to mitigate against
further development of the accident [60,61]. After the accident, the leak should be plugged and
evacuated urgently, which requires the training of the rescue team during peacetime.
In summary, the entire preventive control process for the top event is shown in Figure 13.
Energies 2019, 12, 981 18 of 21

Figure 13. Bow-tie diagram of natural gas pipeline leakage for the PLOD system.

4. Conclusion
In this paper, risk analysis of the PLOD system was carried out and a risk assessment system
was proposed. Some conclusions were subsequently drawn. The pipelines that use this laying mode
can be regarded as a series engineering system relative to the routing environment. In the pipeline
system, the failure probability of the pipeline is affected by the adjacent pipelines. Meanwhile, the
pipeline failure will affect the adjacent pipelines. Combining the engineering system reliability
analysis and mathematical induction, the risk of the pipeline system is equal to the sum of the risks
of the pipelines with failure correlation. Subsequently, the fuzzy bow-tie model combined with the
risk acceptance criteria was used to obtain a quantitative risk assessment result, which can directly
guide operators in making risk decisions. In pipeline maintenance, to prevent the influence of
adjacent pipelines, the strength of the pipelines should be increased and fireproof coatings should be
applied on the surfaces of the pipelines. In addition, the frequency of monitoring and patrolling
should be increased to avoid accidents.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, G.Q. and P.Z.; methodology, P.Z.; software, G.Q.; writing—original
draft preparation, G.Q. and Y.W.; scene researching G.Q.; writing—review and editing, G.Q. and Y.W.;
supervision, P.Z.

Funding: This research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, grant number
50974105 and the Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China, grant number
20105121110003

Acknowledgments: Authors express great thank to the financial support from National Natural Science
Foundation of China. Thanks for the valuable suggestions from Dr. Hanxi Wang from Northeast Normal
University. Many thanks go to the inspiration from Dr. Baojie He from University of New South Wales.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Nomenclature
PLOD Pipelines laid in one ditch
PLOD system Pipeline laid in one ditch system
PHMSA Pipeline and hazardous materials safety administration
Energies 2019, 12, 981 19 of 21

EGIG European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group

ALARP As low as reasonable practical
ETA Event tree analysis
FTA Fault tree analysis
AHP Analytic hierarchy process
NAVR Negligible value at risk
IRV Intolerable value

References
1. Hu, G.; Zhang, P.; Wang, G.; Zhang, M.; Li, M. The influence of rubber material on sealing performance of
packing element in compression packer. J. Nat. Gas. Sci. Eng. 2017, 38, 120–138,
doi:10.1016/j.jngse.2016.12.027.
2. Wang, H.; Xu, J.; Sheng, L.; Liu, X. Effect of addition of biogas slurry for anaerobic fermentation of deer
manure on biogas production. Energy 2018, 165, 411–418, doi:10.1016/j.energy.2018.09.196.
3. He, B.J.; Zhao, D.X.; Zhu, J.; Darko, A.; Gou, Z.H. Promoting and implementing urban sustainability in
China: An integration of sustainable initiatives at different urban scales. Habitat Int. 2018, 82, 83–93,
doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2018.10.001.
4. Liu, H.; Cheng, Y. Mechanism of microbiologically influenced corrosion of X52 pipeline steel in a wet soil
containing sulfate-reduced bacteria. Electrochim. Acta 2017, 253, 368–378,
doi:10.1016/j.electacta.2017.09.089.
5. Zhao, D.; Zhao, X.; Khongnawang, T.; Arshad, M.; Triantafilis, J. A Vis-NIR spectral library to predict clay
in Australian cotton growing soil. Soil Sci. Soc. Am. J. 2018, 82, 1347–1357, doi:10.2136/sssaj2018.03.0100.
6. Alvarado-Franco, J.P.; Castro, D.; Estrada, N. Quantitative-mechanistic model for assessing landslide
probability and pipeline failure probability due to landslides. Eng. Geol. 2017, 222, 212–224,
doi:10.1016/j.enggeo.2017.04.005.
7. Li; S.; Duan, Q.; Zhang, H.; Wang, J. Failure analysis of the floating pipeline with defect under flooding
load. Eng. Fail. Anal. 2017, 77, 65–75, doi:10.1016/j.engfailanal.2017.02.011.
8. Netto, T.A.; Ferraz, U.S.; Botto, A. On the effect of corrosion defects on the collapse pressure of pipelines.
Int. J. Solids Struct. 2007, 44, 7597–7614, doi:10.1016/j.ijsolstr.2007.04.028.
9. Psyrras, N.K.; Sextos, A.G. Safety of buried steel natural gas pipelines under earthquake—Induced
ground shaking: A review. Soil Dyn. Earthq. Eng. 2018, 106, 254–277.
10. Peng, X.; Yao, D.; Liang, G.; Yu, J.; He, S. Overall reliability analysis on oil/gas pipeline under typical
third-party actions based on fragility theory. J. Nat. Gas. Sci. Eng. 2016, 34, 993–1003,
doi:10.1016/j.jngse.2016.07.060.
11. Rezazadeh, A.; Talarico, L.; Reniers, G.; Cozzani, V.; Zhang, L. Applying game theory for securing oil and
gas pipelines against terrorism. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2018, doi:10.1016/j.ress.2018.04.021.
12. Tong, S.; Wu, Z.; Wang, R.; Wu, H. Fire Risk Study of Long-distance Oil and Gas Pipeline Based on QRA.
Procedia Eng. 2016, 135, 369–375, doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2016.01.144.
13. Zardasti, L.; Yahaya, N.; Valipour A Rashid, A. Noor, N. Review on the identification of reputation loss
indicators in an onshore pipeline explosion event. J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 2017, 48, 71–86,
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2017.03.024.
14. Bonvicini, S.; Antonioni, G.; Cozzani, V. Assessment of the risk related to environmental damage
following major accidents in onshore pipelines. J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 2018, 56, 505–516,
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2018.11.005.
15. Da Cunha, S.B. A review of quantitative risk assessment of onshore pipelines. J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 2016,
44, 282–298, doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2016.09.016.
16. Muhlbauer, W.K. Pipeline Risk Management Manual, 3rd ed.; Gulf Publishing Companies: Houston, TX,
USA, 2004; ISBN 978-0-7506-7579-6.
17. Shan, K.; Shuai, J.; Xu, K.; Zheng, W. Failure probability assessment of gas transmission pipelines based
on historical failure-related data and modification factors. J. Nat. Gas Sci. Eng. 2018, 52, 356–366,
doi:10.1016/j.jngse.2018.01.049.
18. Li, X.; Chen, G.; Zhu, H.; Zhang, R. Quantitative risk assessment of submarine pipeline instability. J. Loss
Prev. Proc. Ind. 2017, 45, 108–115, doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2016.12.001.
Energies 2019, 12, 981 20 of 21

19. Jamshidi, A.; Yazdani-Chamzini, A.; Yakhchali, S.H.; Khaleghi, S. Developing a new fuzzy inference
system for pipeline risk assessment. J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 2013, 26, 197–208, doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2012.10.010.
20. Wang, W.; Shen, K.; Wang, B.; Dong, C.; Khan, F.; Wang, Q. Failure probability analysis of the urban
buried gas pipelines using Bayesian networks. Process Saf. Environ. 2017, 111, 678–686,
doi:10.1016/j.psep.2017.08.040.
21. Tian, D.; Yang, B.; Chen, J.; Zhao, Y. A multi-experts and multi-criteria risk assessment model for safety
risks in oil and gas industry integrating risk attitudes. Knowl.-Based Syst. 2018, 156, 62–73,
doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2018.05.018.
22. Cheliyan, A.S.; Bhattacharyya, S.K. Fuzzy fault tree analysis of oil and gas leakage in subsea production
systems. J. Ocean. Eng. Sci. 2018, 3, 38–48, doi:10.1016/j.joes.2017.11.005.
23. Alileche, N.; Olivier, D.; Estel, L.; Cozzanic, V. Analysis of domino effect in the process industry using the
event tree method. Saf. Sci. 2017, 97, 10–19, doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2015.12.028.
24. Piadeh, F.; Ahmadi, M.; Behzadian, K. Reliability assessment for hybrid systems of advanced treatment
units of industrial wastewater reuse using combined event tree and fuzzy fault tree analyses. J. Clean.
Prod. 2018, 201, 958–973, doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.08.052.
25. Ramírez-Camacho, J.G.; Pastor, E.; Casal, J.; Amaya-Gómez, R.; Muñoz-Giraldo, F. Analysis of domino
effect in pipelines. J. Hazard. Mater. 2015, 298, 210–220, doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2015.05.033.
26. Guo, Y.; Liu, C.; Wang, D.; He, R. Numerical investigation of surface conduit parallel gas pipeline
explosive based on the TNT equivalent weight method. J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 2018, 168, 246–257,
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2016.10.006.
27. Silva, E.P.; Nele, M.; Melo, P.; Könözsyc, L. Underground parallel pipelines domino effect: An analysis
based on pipeline crater models and historical accidents. J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 2016, 43, 315–331,
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2016.05.031.
28. Yang, M. Exploring the explosion risks due to the share-layout long-distance high-pressure pipelines in
the same ditch-channel. J. Saf. Environ. 2018, 18, 1334–1338, doi:10.13637/j.issn.1009-6094.2018.04.017.
29. CCPS. Guidelines for Chemical Process. Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2nd ed.; Center for Chemical Process
Safety: New York, NY, USA, 2000; IBSN 0-8169-0720-X.
30. Mazzola, A. Thermal interaction analysis in pipeline systems a case study. J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind. 1999, 12,
495–505, doi:10.1016/S0950-4230(99)00022-4.
31. Uijt de Haag, P.A.M.; Ale, B.J.M. Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, 2nd ed.; The Netherlands
Organization (TNO): Delft, The Netherlands, 2005.
32. Chevreau, F.R.; Wybo, J.L.; Cauchois, D. Organizing learning processes on risks by using the bow-tie
representation. J. Hazard. Mater. 2006, 130, 276–283, doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2005.07.018.
33. Khakzad, N.; Khan, F.; Amyotte, P. Dynamic risk analysis using bow-tie approach. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.
2012, 104, 36–44, doi:10.1016/j.ress.2012.04.003.
34. Jia, M.; Yu, X.; Song, Q. Application of Bow-Tie Technology in the Risk Management of Urban Gas
Pipeline. Ind. Saf. Environ. Prot. 2014, 40, 14–18, doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-425X.2014.02.006.
35. Tang, Y.; Jing, J.; Zhang, Z.; Yang, Y. A Quantitative Risk Analysis Method for the High Hazard
Mechanical System in Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry. Energies 2018, 11, 14,
doi:10.3390/en11010014.
36. Chen, L. Study on Quantitative Risk Assessment for the Long-Distance Oil/Gas Pipelines in Service. Ph.D.
Thesis, Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu, China, 2004.
37. Zhang, P.; Qin, G.; Wang, Y. Optimal Maintenance Decision Method for Urban Gas Pipelines Based on as
Low as Reasonably Practicable Principle. Sustainability 2019, 11, 153, doi:10.3390/su11010153.
38. Shi, S.; Jiang, B.; Meng, X. Assessment of gas and dust explosion in coal mines by means of fuzzy fault
tree analysis. Int. J. Min. Sci. Technol. 2018, 28, 991–998, doi:10.1016/j.ijmst.2018.07.007.
39. Erdogan, S.A.; Šaparauskas, J.; Turskis, Z. Decision Making in Construction Management: AHP and
Expert Choice Approach. Proc. Eng. 2017, 172, 270–276, doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2017.02.111.
40. Zhang, Y.; Wang, F.; Zhang, S.; Lan, L. Dependability Assessment of Railway Time Synchronization
Network Based on Fuzzy Bayesian Network. J. China Rail. Soc. 2015, 37, 57–63,
doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-8361.2015.05.010.
41. Zhang, L.; Skibniewski, M.J.; Wu, X.; Chen, Y.; Deng, Q. A probabilistic approach for safety risk analysis
in metro construction. Saf. Sci. 2014, 63, 8–17, doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2013.10.016.
Energies 2019, 12, 981 21 of 21

42. Kabir, S.; Walker, M.; Papadopoulos, Y.; Rüde, E.; Securius, P. Fuzzy temporal fault tree analysis of
dynamic systems. Int. J. Approx. Reason. 2016, 77, 20–37, doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2016.05.006.
43. Clemen, R.T.; Winkler, R.L. Combining Probability Distributions from Experts in Risk Analysis. Risk Anal.
1999, 19, 187–203, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1999.tb00399.x.
44. Chen, S.J.; Hwang, C.L.; Hwang, F.P. Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Decision Making: Methods and Applications,
Springer: New York, NY, USA, 1992; pp. 138–150, IBSN 978-3-540-54998-7.
45. Onisawa, T. An application of fuzzy concepts to modelling of reliability analysis. Fuzzy Sets Syst. 1990, 37,
267–286, doi:10.1016/0165-0114(90)90026-3.
46. Jou, R.C.; Chen, T.Y. The willingness to pay of parties to traffic accidents for loss of productivity and
consolation compensation. Accident Anal. Prev. 2015, 85, 1–12, doi:10.1016/j.aap.2015.08.021.
47. Coent, P.L.; Préget, R.; Thoyer, S. Compensating Environmental Losses Versus Creating Environmental
Gains: Implications for Biodiversity Offsets. Ecol. Econ. 2017, 142, 120–129,
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.06.008.
48. Heinrich, H.W. Industrial Accident Prevention: A scientific Approach; McGraw-Hill Book Company: New
York, NY, USA; London, UK, 1931; pp. 1–10, IBSN 0-07-028061-4.
49. Starr, C. Social Benefit versus Technological Risk. Science 1969, 165, 1232–1238.
doi:10.1126/science.165.3899.1232.
50. Fischhoff, B. “Acceptable Risk”: The Case of Nuclear Power. J. Policy Anal. Manag. 2010, 2, 559–575,
doi:10.2307/3323574.
51. Vanem, E. Ethics and fundamental principles of risk acceptance criteria. Saf. Sci. 2012, 50, 958–967,
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.12.030.
52. Ale, B.J.M.; Hartford, D.N.D.; Slater, D. ALARP and CBA all in the same game. Saf. Sci. 2015, 76, 90–100,
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2015.02.012.
53. Pei, J.; Wang, G.; Luo, S.; Luo, Y. Societal risk acceptance criteria for pressure pipelines in China. Saf. Sci.
2018, 109, 20–26, doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2018.05.006.
54. Li, Y. Risk Analysis for Hydrocracking Cooler. Master’s Dissertation, Nanjing University of Technology,
Nanjing, China, 2006; pp. 69–71.
55. Duan, Z. Study on Acceptable Risk Criteria of Chemical Industry. Master’s Thesis, Southwest University
of Science and Technology, Mianyang, China, 2018.
56. Wang, H.; Xu, J.; Sheng, L. Study on the comprehensive utilization of city kitchen waste as a resource in
China. Energy 2019, 173, 263–277, doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2019.02.081.
57. Lu, L.; Liang, W.; Zhang, L.; Zhang, H.; Lu, Z.; Shan, J. A comprehensive risk evaluation method for
natural gas pipelines by combining a risk matrix with a bow-tie model. J. Nat. Gas Sci. Eng. 2015, 25, 124–
133, doi:10.1016/j.jngse.2015.04.029.
58. Qi, J.; Hu, X.; Gao, X. Quantitative risk analysis of subsea pipeline and riser: An experts’ assessment
approach using fuzzy fault tree. Int. J. Reliab. Saf. 2014, 8, 33–50, doi:10.1504/IJRS.2014.062639.
59. BEVI. BEVI Reference Manual Version 3.2; RVIM: Bilthoven, The Netherlands, 2009.
60. Ma, X.; Xu, Y.; Dong, H. Research on Protection Measures of Parallel Oil and Gas Pipelines. Petrol. Eng.
Constr. 2010, 36, 33–35, doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-2206.2010.06.009.
61. Mou, B.; He, B.J.; Zhao, D.X.; Chau, K. Numerical simulation of the effects of building dimensional
variation on wind pressure distribution. Eng. Appl. Comput. Fluid 2017, 11, 293–309,
doi:10.1080/19942060.2017.1281845.

© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).