COMPILED CASES

Criminal Procedure
Title G.R. No. Date Page

Miranda v Tuliao 158763 March 31, 2006 1

People v Argel L-45975 May 25, 1981 8

Villanueva v Ortiz L-15344 May 30, 1960 13

Uy v CA 119000 July 28, 1997 14

Union Bank v People 192565 February 28, 2012 18

Serana v 162059 January 22, 2008 23

Sandiganbayan
Natividad v Felix 111616 February 4, 1994 31

Poblete v Sandoval 150610 March 25, 2004 33

Ivler v San Pedro 172716 November 17, 2010 38

People v Acol 106288-89 May 17, 1994 46

People v Gerente 95847-48 March 10, 1993 49

Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 1968 52

People v Chua 136066-67 February 4, 2003 53

People v Aminnudin 74869 July 6, 1998 59

People v Molina 133917 February 19, 2001 62

Abelita v Doria 170672 August 14, 2009 66

People v Uyboco 178039 January 19, 2011 70

Pestilos v Generoso 182601 November 10, 2014 81

Western Leyte College – School of Law

Juris Doctor (Non-Thesis)

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
Criminal Procedure
List of Cases
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO,
and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order
dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16,
2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001
dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued
by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated
June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued
by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal
cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago
City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is
DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for
the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe"
Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B.
Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in
Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1
Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben
B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal,
and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April
1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except
SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time,
being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted
the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was
arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a
certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder
against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25
June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan
issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to
complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and
to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a
Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground
that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of
State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio
D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order
reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant
of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise
applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an
Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the
inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16
October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in
a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

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On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court,
with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking
to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of
Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001,
16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution
resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining
order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with
the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution,
Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against
petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note
of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the
temporary restraining order while referring the petition to
the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite
Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt
of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion
to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to
it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago
City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied
in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring
forth to this Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order
of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001,
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14,
2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-
3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating
the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule
that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does
not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court
of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued
therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest
requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the
petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired either through compulsory process, such as
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance,
such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It
is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes
of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an
accused must first be placed in the custody of the law
before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial
reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek
any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or
otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed
their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash
warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by
arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over
their person is required before the court can act on their
motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such
jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the
court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required
only in the adjudication of applications for bail,
petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar
Herrera:

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Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the
court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The
outright dismissal of the case even before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno
(232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the
accused for lack of probable cause without the accused
having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold
the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending
review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered
the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC
which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack
of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their
person was already acquired by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement,
through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as
by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring
the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the court can
act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver
of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of
the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash
the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who
is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody
of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused.
It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by
the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from
the issue in that case, which is the application for
admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the
law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A
person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that
court. Respondent Judge should have diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he
indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico
insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general
rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we
held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the
special requirement of the applicant being in the custody
of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he
purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is
the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind this
special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents
resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the
accused could just send another in his stead to post his
bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by
his personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s
person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case
of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance
of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a
special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack

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of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3)
motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that
it is the very legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused that is the very
issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal
cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of
the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to
the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance,
the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this,
there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the
law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where
we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their
persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none
of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a
motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction
over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in
a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable
cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the
respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the
case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they
filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice,
we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist
from further proceeding with the criminal case and to
defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the
accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the
accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we
directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases
4|L ex C ircle | Criminal Pro cedure
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require
custody of the law in applications for bail are not present
in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the
granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it
is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail
will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer
for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven
guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of
warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law,
it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled
to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the
same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will
decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny
the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause
after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of
official functions, the warrant continues in force and
effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced
on any day and at any time of the day and
night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused
can be taken against him in the determination of probable
cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to
surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights
enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than
property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not
after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based
on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed
a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against
the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of
arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently
filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his
doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the
political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed
the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court
in another case with different accused, doing so two days
after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of
petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant

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prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the
warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to
Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because
of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is
inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in
prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the
warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the
petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant
prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But
even if the petition for review was filed before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s
resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein
cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in
court against them on the ground that they still have the
right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to
the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not
have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the
quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation
of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and
resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or
adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription,
which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a),
Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-
cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep
perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its]
regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of
herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of
the Constitution as having been violated by Judge
Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the
case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution
of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause,
we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan,
for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face
of the order itself, which clearly stated that the
determination of probable cause was based on the
certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate
determination personally made by the Judge. No
presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order
since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based
only on the fiscal’s certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint
Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on
the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even
indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the
prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the
existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the
records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s
certification was accompanied by supporting documents,
following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix 30 and
People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the
following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo
S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor
Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-
160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel
Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao
and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no
violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however,
focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable
cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2
Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was
given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who
rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for
five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious
reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was

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given during the election period amidst a "politically
charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted
against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on
one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and
allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on
the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and
found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause
of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the
credibility of a witness is not within the province of the
determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in
Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence
which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of
this Court in another case with different accused
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the
ground, among other things, that there was a petition for
review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the
Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases
against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs.
Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and
based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr.
Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the other
police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9,
2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five
cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a
"narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the
decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise
falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal
made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value." This Court
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A. Bonifacio Street
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agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is
Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected
the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is
supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but
with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the
probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused
Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the
summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view
of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of
the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No.
13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect
disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution
in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for]
murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad
had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the
discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when
the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was
presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the
dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the
same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was
based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that
the crime did not happen; we just found that there was
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein,
since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial
evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in
the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as
there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused
in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent
Tuliao’s son, whereas petitioners herein had been
implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding
of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable
value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of
our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of
reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the
prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such
probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable
cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal
of the informations two days after we resolved to issue,
upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order

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prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case.
The bond was filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat
the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order,
such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this
Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad)
creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge
Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it
the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that
the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead
directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants
of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for
the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal
determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the
issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the
slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect
the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case
where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point
to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had
reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge
Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the
proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly,
the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be
deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order
quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed
unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the
issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been
legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the
preliminary investigation had been available to the Court
of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing
both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the
certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado
v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of probable cause does not rest on a
subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to
overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges
therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the
same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge
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reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a
criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that
the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal
issued therein had become final and executory. According
to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint
Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT
ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the
Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first
page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders
issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private
respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of
Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the
list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court
of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or
nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was
filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court.
The Court of Appeals decided the case because we
referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001,
around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.
Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however,
respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a
Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001
the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we
referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of
the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite
Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November
2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the
Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad
committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14

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November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to
Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse
of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the
14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001,
antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November
2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution,
we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a
bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had
filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad
in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a
court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect
contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be
heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public
respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises should be construed to
include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November
2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has
not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that
the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original
petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for
contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of
instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge
Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People
v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila,
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12
June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled
in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this
connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive
Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is
directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10)
days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from
transfer of these cases;
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3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall
proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days
from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance with the order
to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled
is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue
forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo
B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably
with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court
dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against
Petitioners. SO ORDERED.
JURISDICTION
G.R. No. L-45975 May 25, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch
XXXV, and ROLANDO VENTURA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This case is about the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of Appeals over a
criminal case decided by the city court of Caloocan City.
On September 30, 1975 Rolando Venture was charged by
an assistant fiscal in the Caloocan City court
with frustrated qualified theft of a tin can of edible oil
valued at five pesos, belonging to his employer, Plame
Manufacturing Corporation (Criminal Case No. 102175).
After trial, the city court convicted Venture of simple theft
and imposed upon him a penalty of three months and one
day of arresto mayor and ordered him to pay an indemnity
of five pesos.
He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The
case was assigned to its Caloocan Branch XXXV,
presided over by Judge Manuel A. Argel.
The fiscal in a manifestation dated February 18, 1977
contended that the Court of First Instance had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case because it was allegedly within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the Court
of First Instance. He prayed that the appeal should be
forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

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Judge Argel denied the fiscal's prayer. ln a decision
promulgated on March 23, 1977 he acquitted Venture on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
On April 14, 1977, the fiscal and the private prosecutor
filed in this Court the instant petition for certiorari,
praying that the said judgment be declared void on the
ground of lack of appellate jurisdiction and that Ventura's
appeal be transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
The issue is whether the city court's judgment of
conviction should be reviewed by the Court of First
Instance or by the Court of Appeals.
We hold that the Court of First Instance has no appellate
Jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, its decision is
void. The proceeding in that court was coram non judice.
The Court of First Instance has no appellate jurisdiction
because frustrated qualified theft of an object valued at
five pesos is penalized with arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional minimum or four months and one
day to two years and four months (Arts. 309[6] and 310,
Revised Penal Code).
That crime falls within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the city court and the Court of First
Instance. A municipal or city court
has original jurisdiction over theft (larceny) cases where
the amount of money or property stolen does not exceed
the sum or value of two hundred pesos [Sec. 87(b) (3),
Judiciary Act of 1948, Republic Act No. 296 as amended
by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828].
But that original jurisdiction of the inferior court is not
exclusive. lt is concurent with the Court of First Instance
in case the penalty for the theft or larceny exceeds
imprisonment for six months or is a fine of more than two
hundred pesos.
That is the settled ruling which is based on the following
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Republic Act No.
296: 1äwphï1.ñët
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. – Courts of First Instance
shall have original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine
of more than two hundred pesos:
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 45. Appellate jurisdiction. – Courts of First Instance
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in
city and municipal courts, in their respective provinces,
except over appeals from cases tried by municipal judges
of provincial capitals or city judges pursuant to the
authority granted under the last paragraph of section 87 of
this Act. (As amended by Republic Act No. 2613 which
took effect on August l, 1959).
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Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases
on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from
the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties
may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument
if so requested: Provided however, That if the case was
tried in a city or municipal court before the latter became
a court of record, then on appeal the case shall proceed by
trial de novo.
In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts which are appealed to the courts
of first instance, the decision of the latter shall be
final: Provided, That the findings of facts contained in
said decision are supported' by substantial evidence as
basis thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly against
the law and jurisprudence; in cases falling under the
concurrent jurisdictions of the municipal and city courts
with the courts of first instance, the appeal shall be made
directly to the court of appeals whose decision shall be
final Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law,
upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and
under rules and conditions that it may prescribe, require
by certiorari that the case be certified to it for review and
determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal. (As amended by Republic Act No. 6031 which
took effect on August l, 1969).
SEC. 87. Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.
– Municipal judges and judges of city courts of chartered
cities shall have original jurisdiction over:
(a) All violations of municipal or city ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions;
(b) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:
(1) Gambling and management or operation of lotteries;
(2) Assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or
evident upon the trial;
(3) Larceny embezzlement and estafa where the amount
of money or property stolen, embezzled, or otherwise
involved, does not exceed the sum or value of two
hundred pesos;
(4) Sale of intoxicating liquors:
(5) Falsely impersonating an officer;
(6) Malicious mischief;
(7) Trespass on Government or private property;
(8) Threatening to take human life;
(9) Illegal possession of firearms, explosives and
ammunition;
(10) Illegal use of aliases; and
(11) Concealment of deadly weapons.
(c) Except violations of election laws all other offenses in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for

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not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment.
Said municipal judges and judges of city courts may also
conduct preliminary investigation for any offense alleged
to have been committed within their respective
municipalities and cities which are cognizable by Courts
of First Instance and the information filed with their
courts without regard to the limits of punishment, and may
release, or commit and bind over any person charged with
such offense to secure his appearance before the proper
court.
No warrant of arrest snail be issued by any municipal
judge in any criminal case filed with him unless he first
examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the
examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in
the form of searching questions and answers.
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-
provinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties
charged with an offense committed within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does
not exceed prision correcional or imprisonment for not
more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand
pesos or both, and in the absence of the district judge,
shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the
Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.
All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with
municipal judges of capitals and city court judges shall be
tried and decided on the merits by the respective
municipal judges or city judges. Proceedings had shall be
recorded and decisions therein shall be appealable direct
to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case
may be. (As amended by Republic Act No. 2613 which
took effect on August l, 1959 and Republic Act No. 3828
which took effect on June 22, 1963).
In the instant case, the frustrated qualified theft falls
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior
court and the Court of First Instance because of the
aforecited provision of section 44(f) of the Judiciary Law
that Courts of First Instance have original Jurisdiction "in
an criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more
than two hundred pesos".
Stated in other words, the original jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance over criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months or a fine of more than two hundred pesos is
not exclusive
It is not exclusive because there are criminal cases falling
within the original jurisdiction of the municipal and city
courts, as provided in section 87, wherein the imposable
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penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment or two hundred
pesos' fine. It should be repeated that those criminal cases
are within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
inferior court and the Court of First Instance.
Thus, simple theft of an object valued at five pesos which
is penalized by arresto mayor minimum and medium or
one month and one day to four months, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal or city
court.
But frustrated qualified theft of the same object, which, as
already noted, is penalized by imprisonment for four
months and one day to two years and four months, falls
within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance as well as within the original jurisdiction of the
municipal or city court because of sections 44(f) and 87(b)
(3). Consequently, and as already noted, the jurisdiction
of the inferior court and the Court of First Instance over
the said frustrated theft of an article valued at five pesos
is concurrent.
The concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior court
and the Court of First Instance over the said frustrated
theft case is also sanctioned by the penultimate paragraph
of section 87 as amended [not by paragraph (c) as held in
Tan vs. People, L-47482, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 207].
That penultimate paragraph provides that "municipal
judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and
judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in
which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more
than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or
both".
So, paragraph (b) and the penultimate paragraph of
section 87 both justify the concurrent jurisdiction of the
inferior court and the Court of First Instance over the
instant frustrated theft case. ln that sense, the two
paragraphs overlap.
As noted in People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30,
1976, 70 SCRA 531, the concurrent original jurisdiction
of municipal courts of provincial capitals and city courts
and the Courts of First Instance over certain criminal
cases, as provided in the penultimate paragraph of section
87, overlaps or co-exists with their concurrent original
jurisdiction over certain offenses mentioned in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of section 87.
Now if, as shown above the instant frustrated theft case
falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
Caloocan city court and the Court of First Instance of
Rizal at Caloocan City, then it follows that the Court of
First Instance has no appellate jurisdiction over that case.

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In other words, the decision of the Caloocan city court
was not appealable to the Court of First Instance but
should have been appealed to the Court of Appeals. (Sec.
5, Republic Act No. 5967)
The basis of that holding is found in two separate and
distinct provisions of the aforequoted section 45. ln
the third paragraph of section 45, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6031, it is clearly provided that "in
cases falling under the concurrent jurisdiction of the
municipal and city courts with the Courts of First
Instance, the appeal shall be made directly to the Court of
Appeals whose decision shall be final".
Another provision of section 45, dealing with the same
subject matter, is the first paragraph thereof which
provides that "Courts of First Instance shall be appellate
jurisdiction over all cases arising in city and municipal
courts, in their respective provinces, except over appeals
from cases tried by municipal judges of provincial
capitals or city judges pursuant to the authority granted
under the last paragraph of section 87".
And the last paragraph of section 87 provides that all
criminal cases in which the penalty does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more
than six years or a fine not exceeding six thousand pesos,
or both, which are filed with municipal judges of
provincials capitals and city court judges, shall be tried
and decided on the merits by the said judges. The
"proceedings had shall be recorded and decisions therein
shall be appealable direct(ly) to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court, as the case may be", depending on
whether factual issues or pure legal issues are involved.
Considering the above-cited legal provisions, it is clear
that respondent Judge Argel of the Court of First Instance
at Caloocan City erred in exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the frustrated qualified theft case decided by the city
court.
Note that the appeal from the inferior court to the Court
of First Instance, as provided in the first paragraph of
section 45 of the Judiciary Law and in section l, Rule 40
and section 5, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court is
the general rule.
As shown in the preceding discussion, the exception to
that general rule in criminal cases is found in section 45
itself and in the last paragraph of section 87.
In People vs. Maceren, L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79
SCRA 450, the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
dismissed a complaint for electro-fishing, an offense
penalized by a fine up to five hundred pesos which falls
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the inferior courts
and the Court of First instance.
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From the order of dismissal, the prosecution appealed to
the Court of First Instance which affirmed the order of
dismissal. The prosecution filed in this Court a petition for
the review of that order under Republic Act No. 5440.
It was held that the Court of First Instance had no
appellate jurisdiction to review the municipal court's order
of dismissal and that the said order was directly,
appealable from the municipal court to this Court
pursuant to section 45 and the last paragraph of section 87
of the judiciary Law.
In Esperat vs. Avila, L-25922, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
596, it was held that the judgment of the city court of
Cotabato City convicting the petitioner of grave coercion
was appealable directly to the Court of Appeals and not to
the Court of First Instance.
The fact that the city court found that the crime committed
by Venture is simple theft falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the city court is of no moment
because the court's jurisdiction in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information and not by the findings which the court may
make after the trial (People vs. Mission, 87 Phil. 641;
People vs. Co Hiok 62 Phil. 501; U.S. vs. Mallari and
Cueson 24 Phil. 366; U.S. vs. Jimenez, 41 Phil. 1).
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. When
jurisdiction over an offense has not been conferred by law,
the accused cannot confer it by express waiver or
otherwise. A conviction or acquittal rendered by a court
having no jurisdiction is absolutely void (U.S. vs. Jayme,
24 Phil. 90).
Judge Argel, in support of his contention that he has
appellate jurisdiction, cites the ruling that the Court of
First Instance has appellate jurisdiction over a criminal
case which is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
ordinary municipal court and the Court of First Instance
(People vs. Valencia, L-29396, August 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 252).
The facts and the law involved in the Valencia case are
different from those involved in this case.
The Valencia case refers to the judgment of a municipal
court, not a city court. ln that case, the municipal court of
San Luis, Aurora Sub-province in 1964 convicted
Florencio Daguman of illegal possession of firearms, a
crime falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
municipal court and the Court of First Instance by reason
of section 45(fl and section 87(b) (9), as amended by
Republic Act No. 2613.
Daguman appealed to the Court of First Instance. Later,
he moved for the dismissal of his appeal He contended
that the case was appealable to the Court of Appeals, as

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held in Esperat vs. Avila, L- 25922, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 596.
It was held that appeal should be made to the Court of
First Instance. The proceedings in the municipal court
were not recorded. Consequently, a direct appeal to the
Court of Appeals would not be practicable. There was
then no statutory authority for a direct appeal to the Court
of Appeals from a judgment rendered by an ordinary
municipal court in a criminal case falling within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the municipal court and the
Court of First Instance.
At the time the Valencia case was decided, the only
statutory authority for a direct appeal to the Court of
Appeals was from the judgment of the municipal court of
the provincial capital and the city court in criminal cases,
as contemplated in the first paragraph of section 45 and
the penultimate and last paragraphs of section 87 as
amended by Republic Act No. 2613. The proceedings in
the inferior court in such cases have to be recorded
(Aquino and Pirante vs. Estenzo, 121 Phil. 794).
Judge Argel also invoked Paringit vs. Masakayan, ll2
Phil. 861. That case does not involve any direct appeal to
the Court of Appeals from the judgment of a city court. It
has no relevancy to this case.
On the other hand, the accused contends that in theft and
estafa cases the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court
and the Court of First Instance arises only when the
amount involved exceeds two hundred pesos. Hence, the
accused contends that, inasmuch as the amount involved
in the instant frustrated theft case is only five pesos, the
case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
city court and the appeal from its judgment of conviction
should be made to the Court of First Instance.
That contention is flagrantly wrong. lt is manifestly
contrary to the ruling of this Court in Tan vs. People, L-
47482, August l, 1978, 84 SCRA 207 and People vs.
Nazareno, L40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the
cases cited therein, that where the penalty for the offense
over which the inferior court has jurisdiction exceeds
imprisonment for six months or a fine of two hundred
pesos, the inferior court's original jurisdiction is
concurrent with the original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance to try such offenses.
Section 44(f) of the Judiciary Law. in providing that the
Court of First Instance has original jurisdiction "in all
criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more
than two hundred pesos" clearly implies that criminal
cases in which the penalty is Imprisonment for more than
six months or a fine of not more than six months, or a fine
of not more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine and
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imprisonment for not more than six months or a fine of
not more than two hundred pesos fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the municipal city courts.
In fact, section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as originally
enacted in 1948, contained a paragraph (b) which
provides that the justice of the peace and municipal courts
later designated municipal and city courts respectively
had original jurisdiction over "all offenses in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more
than six months or a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment".
That jurisdiction was exclusive. lt complemented
paragraph (f) of section 45 which paragraph (f) has not
been amended since it was enacted in 1948.
The original paragraph (b) of section 87 was amended by
Republic Act No. 3828, which took effect on June 22,
1963, and was replaced by what is now paragraph (c)
which provides that, except for violations of election
laws, municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over
offenses wherein the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of
not more than three thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment.
The original jurisdiction of inferior courts prescribed in
paragraph is in addition to the jurisdiction of city and
municipal courts to try violations of ordinances
[paragraph(a)] and the eleven classes of offenses
mentioned in what is now paragraph (b) of section 87.
It should always be borne in mind that
the original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts to try
offenses enumerated in paragraphs (b) and (c) and the
penultimate paragraph of section 87
becomes concurrent with the original jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance to try the same offenses when the
imposable penalty exceeds imprisonment for six months
or a fine of two hundred pesos.
WHEREFORE, the decision of Judge Argel dated
February 4, 1977, acquitting Rolando Venture, is set aside
for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The record of Criminal
Case No. 8030 (76) of the lower court, formerly Criminal
Case No. 102175 of the city court, should be elevated to
the Court of Appeals for review of the city court's
decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
G.R. No. L-15344 May 30, 1960
JOSE R. VILLANUEVA, City Attorney of the City of
Butuan, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. MONTANO A. ORTIZ, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Agusan, ANTONIO
MORDENO and MALAQUIAS
FORTUN, respondents.
City Attorney Jose R. Villanueva for petitioner.
Marcos M. Calo, Francisco Ro. Cupin and Tranquilino
O. Calo, Jr. for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
On December 9, 1953, the City Attorney of Butuan filed
with the Municipal Court of that city Criminal Case No.
607 against Antonio Mordeno and Malaquias Fortun, and
Criminal Case No. 608 against Antonio Mordeno,
charging the accused in each case with assault upon a
person in authority with disturbance of public order. For
quick reference, the informations in the said criminal
cases are reproduced, to wit:
That on or about November 10, 1953, in barrio Ba-an,
Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, and while the board of election
inspectors were in session performing their duties as such
inspectors and poll clerk in Precinct 36-A in the last
general election held on November 10, 1953, the said
accused confederating, cooperating and helping one
another, entered one of the rooms of Ba-an Elementary
School where Precinct 36-A was then located and where
inspectors and poll clerk of said precinct was then holding
their meeting to canvass the result of the election in said
precinct, and once there, the accused Antonio Mondeno
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of Narciso Medrano, a duly appointed and qualified
inspectors of said precinct 36-A and while performing his
official duties as such inspectors and on the occasion of
such performance by then and there boxing him and the
accused Malaquias Fortun, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of Apolinario Lupos, a
duly appointed watcher in said precinct and while
performing his duties as such watcher thereby causing
serious disturbance and interrupting or disturbing public
performance and functions of said precinct 36-A and 35-
A which was then in the adjacent room in the same
building.
That on or about the evening of November 10, 1953, in
barrio Ba-an Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and while the Board
of Inspectors were in session performing their duties as
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such Inspectors and Poll clerk in Precinct No. 35 of the
last general election held on November 10, 1953, the said
accused entered the rooms of the Ba-an Public Elementary
School where Precinct No. 35 was then located and where
inspectors and poll clerk of said precinct were then
holding its meeting to canvass the result of the election in
said precinct, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of Simeon Loquinte, a duly appointed and
qualified election inspector of said Precinct No. 35 and
while performing his official duties as such inspector and
on the occasion of such performance by then and there
boxing him and Pablo Remoneda, a duly appointed
watcher in the said precinct and while performing his
duties as such watcher thereby causing serious
disturbance and interrupting or disturbing public
performances and functions of the Board of Inspectors of
said Precinct No. 35 and Precinct No. 35-A which was in
the adjacent room.
The corresponding warrants of arrest were issued by the
Municipal Court, and the accused having waived their
right to the second stage of preliminary investigation, the
case were forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Agusan for trial on the merits.
New informations for the same charge were thus filed
with the Court of First Instance. Upon arraignment, the
accused pleaded "not guilty", and after a joint trial, during
which evidence was adduced by the parties, the cases
were submitted for decision. The Court of First Instance,
however, instance of deciding the cases upon their merits,
issued, on September 30, 1958, a resolution remanding
them to the Municipal Court for lack of jurisdiction. This
on the theory that the accused by boxing the election
inspectors and watchers as charged in the information
committed the crime of assault without intent to kill, one
of the offenses enumerated in section 87(c) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, which is within the concurrent
Municipal Court, but which falls, in these cases, under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court because it
was the first to take cognizance thereof.
Motion for reconsideration of that resolution having been
denied, the City Attorney, alleging that the lower court
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, now petitions us to declare null and void the
said resolution, and to order the judge to render judgment
in the said cases in accordance with the evidence
presented during the trial held before him.
The petition is well taken.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of courts in criminal
cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information (People vs. Mission, 87 Phil., 641; 48 Off.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
Gaz., 1330). A careful scrutiny of the allegations in the
informations aforequoted shows that the accused are
charged to have committed not only the crime of assault
upon a person in authority defined in Article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code but also that of disturbance of public
order defined in Article 153 of the same Code. For it is
alleged therein that the accused by laying hands upon
election inspectors and watchers in public places, had
caused serious disturbance and interrupted or disturbed
public performances and functions. The accused are thus
charged with the complex crime of assault upon a person
in authority with disturbance of public order.
The Revised Penal Code (Article 148) imposes the
penalty of imprisonment of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos upon anyone who commits the crime of direct
assault when, as in these cases, the offender lays hands
upon a person in authority. And Article 153 of the same
Code imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period and
a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos for any serious
disturbance in a public place, office or establishment, or
interruption of disturbance of public performances,
functions or gathering of peaceful meetings. Each
separate crime charged in the information is, therefore,
punishable with imprisonment of more than six months
and a fine of more than two hundred pesos. Consequently,
they are, according to section 44, paragraph (f) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act 296), within the
original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
The lower court in remanding the case to the Municipal
Court has taken the position that there is only one crime
charged, that of direct assault, or, more specifically,
assault upon a person in authority. Granting that only the
crime of assault upon a person in authority is charged, still
the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction over
the cases. While the said section of the Judiciary Act
provides that the Justice of the Peace Court and Municipal
Court have original jurisdiction over cases of "assault
where the intent to kill is not charged and evident upon
trial", this does not include direct assaults defined and
penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident
upon trial" apparently refers to crimes against persons,
under Title Eight of the Code. Direct assaults defined
under Article 148, on the other hand, are crimes against
public order falling under Title Three of the Code. In
direct assaults, the victim is a person in authority or his
agent, and the attack, employment of force or intimidation
is committed on the occasion of the performance of
official duties or by reason of such performance of official
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duties or by reason of such performance. Also punishable
as direct assault is the employment of force or
intimidation without a public uprising for the attainment
of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes
of rebellion and sedition. The principal object of Article
148 is to penalize the commission of acts against public
order as may be indicated by its classification in the
Revised Penal Code.
In any event, even assuming that the offenses charged in
the cases at bar come within the meaning of the "assaults"
mentioned in section 87(c), subparagraph 2 of the
Judiciary Act, it has already been held that the jurisdiction
of Municipal Courts and Justices of the Peace over the
specific offenses mentioned in said section 87(c) of the
Judiciary Act is concurrent with Court of First Instance
when the penalty to be imposed exceed six months
imprisonment or a fine of more than two hundred pesos
(Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil., 834; People vs. Colicio,
88 Phil., 196; People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; 47 Off.
Gaz., Supp. December 1951, p. 29). And it clearly
appearing that the informations filed with the Municipal
Court of Butuan City, contrary to the holding of the court
below, were just for purposes of preliminary investigation
— not to mention the fact that the Court of First Instance
of Agusan had already tried them on the merits — it was
error for the latter court to still remand the cases to the
Municipal Court. Where two or more courts have
concurrent jurisdiction, the first to validly acquire it takes
it to the exclusion of the other or the rest (Alimajen vs.
Valera, et al., 107 Phil., 244; 57 Off.; Gaz. [28] 5095;
citing Valdez vs. Lucero, 76 Phil., 356; 42 Off. Gaz. No.
11, 2835; People vs. Livera, 94 Phil., 771; and Lumpay et
al vs. Moscoso, 105 Phil., 968.)
In view of the foregoing, the resolution complained of is
declared null and void, and the Court of First Instance of
Agusan is hereby ordered to render judgment in the
criminal cases above-mentioned in consonance with law
and the evidence presented before it during the trial. No
costs.
G.R. No. 119000 July 28, 1997
ROSA UY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
 A. Bonifacio Street
WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE 6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
School of Law | Remedial Law

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals 1 which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br.
32, 2 finding the accused ROSA UY guilty of violating
B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340,
inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa under Art. 315, par.
2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. Case No. 84-
32334.
Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim
Shipping Company owned by the husband of complaining
witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosa's employment
she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and
hardworking employee. On 15 March 1982, a few months
before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the
meantime, she helped her husband manage their lumber
business. The friendly relations between Rosa and
Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to form a
partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional
capital for the expansion of Rosa's lumber business and
the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of money
amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been
given by Consolacion for the business; however, because
of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever
issued.
Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed
in Bulacan, Bulacan, with the funds contributed by
Consolacion evidence by various receipts. But,
unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and
Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were
never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the
return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for
the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a
complaint for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa 3 and
several other Informations 4 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
were filed against petitioner. The offenses were
subsequently consolidated and tried jointly.
Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. Bangit the
prosecution tried to establish that petitioner Rosa Uy
employed deceit in obtaining the amount of P500,000.00
from complainant with respect to Crim. Case No. 84-
32334. As regards Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-
32340, Alexander D. Bangit, manager of the Commercial
Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch, where Rosa Uy
maintained an account, testified on the following
transactions with respect to the six (6) checks referred to
in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were
dishonored:
CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR
DISHONOR
(1) 068604 16 December 1983 Drawn Against
Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "G")
(2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against
Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "H")
(3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against
Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "F")
(4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against
Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "E")
(5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient
Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "A")
(6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient
Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "I")
For her part, petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad
and Antonio Sy maintained that no misrepresentation was
committed and that the funds were utilized to construct
the building in Bulacan, Bulacan. With respect to the
issuance of the subject checks, petitioner did not deny
their existence but averred that these were issued to
evidence the investment of complainant in the proposed
partnership between them.
After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court
acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted her of the
charges under B.P. Bldg. 22. 5 On appeal, respondent
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this
petition for review on certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of
Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the
Bouncing Checks Law, and (b) whether the checks had
been issued on account or for value. 6
As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under
B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument
that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal
to respondent appellate court, still she cannot be estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired
by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been

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committed or any one of its essential ingredients took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. 7 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information.8 And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 9
In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various
charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the
essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila.
She maintains that the evidence presented established that
(a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner
was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business
of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the
drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks
were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken
altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence
would only show that none of the essential elements of
B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of
the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one
hand argues that even if there is no showing of any
evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the
offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the
fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa
case because the same is the principal or main case and
that the cases for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law
are merely incidental to the estafa case.
We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2)
different offenses having different elements and,
necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the
essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.
In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential
elements of the offense and have to be established with
satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction. 10 For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law,
on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are
neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P.
Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker,
drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does
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not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment. 11 Hence, it is incorrect for
respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the
Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over
the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate
offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each
offense have to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business
dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where
sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the
estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla
of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that
the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of
Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that
the principal place of business of the alleged partnership
is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise
located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were
deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has
been offered that the checks were issued, delivered,
dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in Manila, which are essential elements
necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction
over the offense.
Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the
part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing
eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or
another, the same is still without merit. It may be true that
B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such
being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a
transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction
where the offense was in part committed. We note
however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the
fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or
of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance
of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the
records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant
was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in
upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
offense.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila
had jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22,
respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by
estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5)
years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of
jurisdiction.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule
117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash
the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of
the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it
is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a
motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for
in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule. 12
After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that
petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court
in a memorandum 13 before the Regional Trial Court and
thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone,
we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by
the court. Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can see
that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may
still question the jurisdiction of the court later on.
Moreover, these objections may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal. 14
Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to
question the jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the
basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
case 15 in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner
should be estopped. We nonetheless find the
jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 16 the Court held that the ruling
in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule
that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated
further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches. The Court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance
and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action
is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
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ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but
rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether
the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel. 17
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the
court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be
barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction
having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling
had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised
for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches
is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert
it. 18
The circumstances of the present case are very different
from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been
rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact,
as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional
defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate
motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the
trial court in a memorandum before the lower court.
Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent,
we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not
control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule
that the question of jurisdiction of a court maybe raised at
any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is
therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the trial court. 19
WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Br. 32, to have no jurisdiction over Crim. Case
Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed
decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the
filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the
court of competent jurisdiction when warranted.
SO ORDERED.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-
Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition
seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of
petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank)
and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC
found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63,
Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash
the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false
narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union
Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s
two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza
Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the
RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The
second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000,
was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC,
Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that
Tomas executed and signed the Certification against
Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the
same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First,
she argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-
Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the
perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of
perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood
– was not alleged with particularity without specifying
what the other action or proceeding commenced involving
the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there
was no other action or proceeding pending in another
court when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she
was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while
the allegations in the Information make out perjury by
making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash,
ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in
Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas
with perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently
denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration.6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-
Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the
rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v.
Bildner8 which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be
in the place where the false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati
City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the
more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos.
174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms
what has been the long standing view on the venue with
respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high
court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed, or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare
that since the subject document[,] the execution of which
was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn

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to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the
matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court of Makati
City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury
inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which
constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells
solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On
the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case
of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-
affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the
questioned documents but rather the introduction of the
false evidence through the subject documents before the
court of Makati City.9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City
did not commit grave abuse of discretion since the order
denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence
later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed
that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the
present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the
Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can
later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-
Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City
decision and quash the Information for perjury against
Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is
more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the facts in
Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court
containing the false statements was the essential
ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the
perjurious statements were made in a General Information
Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz
shared the petitioners’ view. In his Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the
Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied
on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false
evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The
Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to
assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before
the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue
of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be –
Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum
19 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City
is the proper venue and the proper court to take
cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal
cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal
action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this
rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is
limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court
can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed
within its territorial jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the
venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity
and justice of having an accused on trial in the
municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in
criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In
determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10,
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where
it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and
jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court
where the offense was committed, but also where any of
its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently
alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at
a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, contains the requirement for a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum

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Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in
the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or
relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to
the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the
affiant is required to execute a statement under oath
before a duly commissioned notary public or any
competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a)
he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or
her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c)
if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall
report that fact within five days therefrom to the court
wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury,
the material matter in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is
designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous
remedies in different fora.14
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury
under Article 183 of the RPC for making a false
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of
perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.15(emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a
criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the
allegations in the complaint and information must be
examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis,
we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed
by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-
Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of
the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was
alleged in the Information to have been committed in
Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements,
requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be
under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati
City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer oath which the law requires to wit: said
accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
x x x.16
We also find that the third element of willful and
deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have
been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as
indicated in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union
Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood
was allegedly shown when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping
before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed
and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the
proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court
to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the
crime of perjury were committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to
address the seeming conflict between the division rulings
of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of
this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of
the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio
involved false statements contained in verified petitions
filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified
petitions containing the false statements were subscribed
and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City
and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court

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(Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had
jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City
and Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions
were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon
filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found
relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential
authority the case of United States. v. Cañet18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and
sworn, so long as it appears from the information that the
defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and
knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense
charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but
the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such
affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS
which was subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled
that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in
Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We
held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where
the false statement was made. As supporting
jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v.
Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva that –
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well
may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a
tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath
constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete
when a witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court,
a look at the historical background of how the crime of
perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in
our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The
first is false testimony for and against the defendant in a
criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is
false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the
third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).
Based on the Information filed, the present case involves
the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a
material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases
of the rulings cited by the parties in their respective
arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by
this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which
was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took
21 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that
cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United
States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly,
unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings
rendered after the present RPC took effect.22
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information
charging perjury through the presentation in court of a
motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the
time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on
perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses
were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General
Order No. 5823 for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in
which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath
to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is
guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for
not more than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter
be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such
time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from
Sections 539224 and 539325 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States.26 Act No. 1697 was intended to make the
mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our
jurisdiction.27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58
provided that the venue shall be the court of the place
where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury
was committed by the act of representing a false
document in a judicial proceeding.28 The venue of action
was held by the Court to be at the place where the false
document was presented since the presentation was the act
that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in
their textbook on the RPC29 interestingly explains the
history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and
traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the
present Code. To quote these authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code
and art. 154 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code,
while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal
Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional

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Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the
old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the
Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn
was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of
1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697,
arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed
revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and
4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code
repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718
includes false testimony, whereas, under the Revised
Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on
false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on
perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived
from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal
Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in
court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as
defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false
affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
false testimony "are more severe and strict than those of
Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article
183 of the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes
untruthful statements and not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify
under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis
supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely
testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal
or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material
matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183
of the RPC – essentially involved perjured statements
made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila
and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the
case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual
testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil.
From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place
where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense
was committed. By implication, the proper venue would
have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC
– had the charge involved an actual testimony made
before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a
motion supported and accompanied by an affidavit that
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as
basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit
in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act
No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction
between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same
time separately penalized the making of false statements
under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals
with false testimony in criminal, civil and other
proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing the
making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the
court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the
place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because
this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority,
in a situation where the sworn petitions filed in court for
the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were
allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support
the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn
petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be
the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the
courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether new owner’s duplicate
copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and
[Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the Court,
"whether the perjurious statements contained in the four
petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is
immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement,"32citing Cañet as
authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the
present confusion on venue because of its very categorical
tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the
determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the
place where the oath was taken is not at all a material
consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC
clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the
RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had
the basis for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on
the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false
testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling would then
have been completely applicable as the sworn statement
is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was
made under Cañet because the applicable law at the time
(Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact
appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the
article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have

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been applicable as the other portion refers to false
testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition
for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a
Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a
civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the
making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is
the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where
the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been
subject to various changes from the time General Order
No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of
Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions
and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place
where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place.1âwphi1 This change was followed by the
passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,34 and the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940
Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of
criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not
only in the place where the offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum
Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against
the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit
against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As
alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act
charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit
that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed
the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the basis of this article which
penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires."
The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an
affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the
statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn
before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in
Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC
and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the
Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed
through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183
of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes
and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time
that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed.
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
When the crime is committed through false testimony
under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath
is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal
nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue
may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the
oath and the submission are both material ingredients of
the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue
shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY
the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government
scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling
government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang
iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for
certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s
motion to quash the information and her motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student
of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a
state university is known as a government scholar. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on
December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a
one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex
in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with
her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

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One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance
of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. 6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation,
found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother
Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office
of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of
the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under
Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent
to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the
Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which
purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office
of the President, and the latter relying and believing on
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on
October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal
use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said
accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime
of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by
Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by
Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes
Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was
not a public officer since she merely represented her
peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their
positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was
a simple student and did not receive any salary as a
student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority
to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with
the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not
alleged in the information that it was among her functions
or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed
in connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the
case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed
petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered
that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It
should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the
BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and
exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on
Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s stance
that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer,

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is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of
public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been
interpreted to include allowances. By this definition,
petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of
merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of
this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation
to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his
office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in
representation of the student body, she was never a public
officer since she never received any compensation nor
does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in
view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the
Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection
(g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the
primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials
is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated
provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive
and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as
may be provided by law for the support of the university;
2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact
for the government of the university such general
ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To
appoint, on recommendation of the President of the
University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other
employees of the University; to fix their compensation,
hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as
it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave
of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate,
any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of directors, or
board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.
The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the
governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being
a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly
falls within the category of public officials upon whom
this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention
that the same of P15 Million was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the
government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case. 16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in
a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING
THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument
below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction

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over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the
offense charged was not committed in relation to her
office; (d) the funds in question personally came from
President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition
for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in
their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are
frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason
for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the
Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until
final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41).
The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to
file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The
same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash,
except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered
and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the
court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense
of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if
the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is
made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.
The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the
general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of
a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the
case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of
a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the
offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and
enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in
the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial
of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of
a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the
respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted
the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based
on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and
ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal
case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the
motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this
Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers
to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25She repeats the reference in the instant
petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere
clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that
petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections
made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief
legislative history of the statute creating the

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Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based
on the concept that public officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No.
1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on
March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995
made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise
in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative

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to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with
the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with
it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing such civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the
civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred
to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case
may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall
be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute
approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019,
all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the
cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In
fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by
petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall
be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or
exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from
any other person having some business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the government, in
which such public official has to intervene. Family
relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The
word "close personal relation" shall include close
personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which
assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and
corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner
contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this
argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that
statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio
talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging
mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at
the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention
of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text
of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into
view.35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in
direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan
sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na
interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public

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officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section
4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those
other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the
twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to
explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
indictment for estafa versus a director of the National
Parks Development Committee, a government
instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created
originally as an Executive Committee on January 14,
1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial,
Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30).
It was later designated as the National Parks Development
Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69).
On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro
F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to
transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975
(Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD
No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has
remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709,
dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees
listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the
Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance
and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh.
10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was
reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in
Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s
cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason
that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the
offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the
Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and
those of the government employees separately charged for
the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses
charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by
penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
committed by government employees in conspiracy with
private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance
of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if
the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer.
She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP
student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time
that We will be called upon to define a public officer.
In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it
is difficult to pin down the definition of a public
officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are
public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by
him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices
and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office
under our political system is therefore not a natural right.
It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue
of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even
an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition
of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.
1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the

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first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes
other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision
of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate
of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not
an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes
one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in
line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a
legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts,
and giving professional and technical
training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is not a
corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is
a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed
in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to
act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was
no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her
to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts
were not ratified by the governing body of the state
university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
averments in the information.51 More than that,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set
30 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to
dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims
of defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no
uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent
of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office
and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud the government x x x."
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President
Estrada’s private funds and not from the government
coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand
on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds
came from the Office of the President and not its then
occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and
the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused
Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation
that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense
that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of
the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela
Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.
A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition
for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer
shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan
v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name
Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case.
The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by

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using a name different from that with which he was
authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or
disbarment.56
We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and
accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the
court should be characterized by candor and
fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely
suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
honesty before the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111616 February 4, 1994
MAYOR ARNULFO NATIVIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO N. FELIX, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 64, Tarlac, Tarlac and HON. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR OF TARLAC, respondents.
Villareal Law Offices and Mauricio Law Office for
petitioner.
ROMERO, J.:
The threshold issue confronting us is whether or not the
provincial prosecutor of Tarlac has authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the offense allegedly
committed by herein petitioner who is a Municipal
Mayor.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
The Philippine National Police (PNP), responding to a
letter dated July 19, 1993 written by Mrs. Lourdes
Aquino, wife of deceased Severino L. Aquino, requested
the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate petitioner,
the Municipal Mayor of Ramos, Tarlac, for the death of
Severino Aquino at the Ramos Police Station on the night
of February 20, 1989. (I.S. 93-1038). Consequently, a
subpoena was issued requiring petitioner to submit a
counter-affidavit.
During the pendency of I.S. 93-1038, the PNP filed
another complaint on July 26, 1993 with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Gerona-Ramos Tarlac (MCTC
Criminal Case No. 4923). On the same day, the MCTC
directed petitioner's arrest with bail fixed at
P250,000.00.1 On July 28, 1993, he forthwith posted bail
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 27 which thereafter
issued an order recalling warrant.2
After conducting the requisite preliminary investigation,
the MCTC, through a resolution dated July 29, 1993
31 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
opining that there was probable cause to hold accused for
murder, recommended bail at P250,000.00. 3 On the same
date, the Provincial Prosecutor approved the filing of an
information for murder but with no bail
recommended.4Consequently, an information against
petitioner and Sesinando "Boy" Llerina was filed before
the sala of Judge Augusto Felix of Regional Trial Court
of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 64 (Criminal Case No. 7717).
Warrant of Arrest, dated July 30, 1993, was issued on
August 2, 1993.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withhold
the issuance of the warrant of arrest and to dismiss the
case. In the alternative, petitioner asked that the case be
remanded for further preliminary investigation
proceedings. In an order dated August 9, 1993, the trial
court, observing that the Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court failed to conduct the second stage of the
preliminary investigation, recalled the warrant of arrest
and remanded the case for further preliminary
investigation.5
Sensing an alleged partiality on the part of the provincial
prosecutor, petitioner wrote the Secretary of Justice
requesting that his preliminary investigation be conducted
in Manila. This request was denied subsequently on
August 18, 1993.
On August 16, 1993, petitioner was ordered to file his
counter-affidavit. On August 25, 1993, a resolution was
issued by a panel of prosecutors holding that probable
cause exists. They also attached an amended information
charging Jun Cabaong, Sesinando "Boy" Llerina and
Vicente Millado6 as additional defendants. The same day,
respondent judge admitted the amended information and
directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest without bail on
petitioner.7
The next day, August 26, 1993, petitioner moved to
remand his case for preliminary investigation8 with
motion to quash warrant alleging that there was no
preliminary investigation and contending that respondent
judge had no jurisdiction over the case because it was the
Ombudsman and not the Provincial Prosecutor who had
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioner vigorously contended that the proper court
which had jurisdiction over the case was the
Sandiganbayan and not respondent judge.
On September 6, 1993, respondent judge denied
petitioner's motion to remand and committed petitioner to
the Tarlac Penal Colony where petitioner is now detained.
Hence, this petition.
The issue is whether or not the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
amended information filed by the provincial fiscal and in

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directing petitioner's arrest. Based on Section 15(1) of
Republic Act
No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), petitioner
contends that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial
fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation over his case for the alleged murder of
Severino Aquino. Section 15 states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases. (Emphasis ours)
Citing Deloso v. Domingo9 where, in determining the
power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation, we relied principally on Sections 12 and 13,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 15 (1) of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989. In the Deloso case, we said
that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public
official," 10 is broad enough to encompass any crime
committed by a public official. We continued: "The law
does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission
of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman
may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from,
the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we." On this aforequoted
pronouncement is anchored petitioner's contentions.
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two
cases, namely Aguinaldo v. Domagas 11 and Sanchez
v.Demetriou. 12 However, by way of amplification, we
feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation
relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the
Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the
cases cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law,
with reference to the subject matter, has been in a state of
flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a)
Pres. Decree No. 1486, 13 — the first law on the
Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 14 which
expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; 15 (d) Pres. Decree No.
16
1860; and (e) Pres. Decree
17
No. 1861.
32 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres.
Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is
hereby amended to reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(Emphasis provided)
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two
requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an
offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction,
namely: the offense committed by the public officer must
be in relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that
although the second requirement has been met, 18 the first
requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential
Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal
that the crime committed by public officers or employees
must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is
traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1486, has been retained by
Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the
Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power
to investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari
materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as
earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate
is dependent on the cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when they
relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of
persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or
particular subject matter. 19
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must
be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but
also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject

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School of Law | Remedial Law
matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare
et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. 20Thus, in the application and
interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the
1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres.
Decree No. 1861 must be taken into consideration. It must
be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written,
its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal
or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with
existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.
Now we cannot accept petitioner's specious argument that
the alleged offense was committed in performance of the
mayor's responsibility to maintain peace and order on the
pretext that the victim, a robbery and NPA suspect, was
under investigation at the time when he was allegedly
killed at the police
21
station. By no stretch of the imagination or logic, can
we construe that the alleged act falls under any of the
functions of the municipal mayor as enumerated under
Sec. 444 of the Local Government Code of 1991 or
implied therefrom. 22 Thus, petitioner cannot disregard the
authority of the provincial prosecutor in conducting a
preliminary investigation of his alleged criminal acts.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner's act satisfied the
requirement that the same must be in performance of
official functions, still it cannot be overlooked that the
Ombudsman has only primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not exclusive original
jurisdiction as specified under Section 15 (1) of Rep. Act
No. 6770 aforecited. As we held in Aguinaldo
v. Domagas 23 and recently, Sanchez v. Demetriou, 24 such
authority of the Ombudsman "is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged," in other words,
concurrent with similarly authorized agencies of the
government. 25 Accordingly, the Ombudsman may take
over the investigation of such case at any stage from any
investigative agency of the Government.
A careful scrutiny of Sec. 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 will reveal that the word "may" is used in regard
to the Ombudsman's assumption of its primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
The word "may," being generally permissive and since it
operates to confer discretion, 26 it follows that the
Ombudsman's investigatory powers are but directory in
nature.
33 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Finally, petitioner contends that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he denied
petitioner the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit after
the latter was subpoenaed. His thesis is that the filing of
the amended information was null and void because it
violated his right to a preliminary investigation since it
was filed before the lapse of the ten-day period for filing
a counter-affidavit under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
We see no denial of due process against petitioner for he
has been afforded every opportunity to present his
counter-affidavit. It appears from the records that the
accused was duly notified to submit his counter-affidavit
on August 19, 1993. However, he did not personally
appear and instead filed a manifestation with motion
asking for a cancellation of the August 19 hearing and
requested an extension of fifteen (15) days. The fifteen-
day period requested by him was denied but he was given
an additional period of five (5) days. The extended period
elapsed without the accused submitting his counter-
affidavit. There being no counter-affidavit submitted as of
August 25, 1993 by the petitioner, the prosecution filed
the corresponding amended information with the trial
court. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Case REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
AMENDMENT VS. SUBSTITUTION
G.R. No. 150610 March 25, 2004
FEDERICO A. POBLETE, BIENVENIDO C.
POBRE, JUANITO GALANG, RICARDO FLORES,
SALVADOR OLAES, LEO V. PADILLA AND
PEDRO PATERNO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUSTICES EDILBERTO G.
SANDOVAL, GODOFREDO L. LEGASPI and
RAOUL V. VICTORINO, in their capacity as
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, Second
Division, HEDLIZA C. ANTHONY, ROSALINDA M.
ESPIRITU, ANDREA D. VIASON, JOSEPHINE N.
RANCE, and MARITES C. MIRAFLOR,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for certiorari are the Sandiganbayan
October 10, 2001 Resolution1 denying petitioners’ Motion
to Quash the first amended information filed against them,
and November 8, 2001 Resolution2 granting the
prosecution’s Motion to Admit the second amended
information.

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School of Law | Remedial Law
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 27, 1999, the officers of Samahan ng
Lahing Mandaragat ng Pulborista, Inc., a non-stock, non-
profit, non-government organization based in Barangay
Pulborista, Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite, filed a
complaint3 before the Office of the Ombudsman against
the following municipal officials of Kawit for 1995 to
2001: Mayor Federico Poblete, Vice-Mayor Rodrigo
Caimol, and Sanggunuang Bayan (SB) Members
Bienvenido C. Pobre, Juanito Galang, Ricardo Flores,
Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Cherry Rosario Nolasco,
Doe Padilla (who was later identified as Leo Padilla), and
Peter Doe (who was later identified as Hernan Jamir).
The complaint alleged that the officials caused the
registration of foreshore land located in Barangay
Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the Municipality of
Kawit and subsequently sold the same to a corporation,
FJI Property Developers, Inc., notwithstanding that under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, specifically, Title III,
Chapter [8], Section 594 in relation to Section 61,5 the land
is inalienable and cannot be disposed by any mode or
transfer, except by lease.
The complaint further averred that the sale of the land
caused undue prejudice and injury to poor people,
especially the indigent families who claimed it as
communal fishing grounds since time immemorial, and
gave private parties unwarranted benefits, the contract or
transaction being manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government and the public.
The respondents to the complaint jointly filed a Counter-
affidavit6 and a Memorandum7 contending that the land
was legally and validly reclaimed; that the certificate of
title was obtained in accordance with existing laws and
regulations; that the sale and transfer were approved by
the Commission on Audit; that there is no communal
fishing ground in Kawit; and that Commonwealth Act No
141 is inapplicable to the case.
In a related move, the Senate Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and
on Environment and Natural Resources conducted on
February 7 and 14, 2000 an inquiry in aid of legislation
following a September 27, 1999 privilege speech of
Senator Ramon B. Revilla entitled "Cavite Land Scam"
bearing on the questioned sale of the land. 8
The Senate subsequently approved the above-said
Committees’ Report No. 2279 disclosing that the
questioned lot is foreshore, and that bad faith attended its
registration and titling with the use of falsified documents,
and thus recommending the prosecution of the municipal
officials.
34 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
By Order10 of March 30, 2000, the Ombudsman directed
the filing of an information against the mayor and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Kawit for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).
The necessary information11 was thus filed against said
officials including herein petitioners, which was raffled to
herein public respondent, 2nd Division, Sandiganbayan.
All the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation12 which
the Sandiganbayan denied by Order13 of April 28, 2000 on
the ground that it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
their persons as they had not yet posted bonds nor
surrendered.
Except for Hernan Jamir, the rest of the accused filed
anew a Motion for Reinvestigation,14 averring that they
voluntarily surrendered on May 2, 2000 before the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite and posted cash
bonds of twenty thousand each15 .
The Ombudsman Prosecutor, by
Comment/Opposition16 to the Motion for Reinvestigation,
contended that the motion was filed out of time and the
grounds relied thereon are evidentiary in nature which
could be resolved during trial. To this Comment, the
accused filed their Reply.17
In an Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended
Information18 to which the accused filed their Comment19 ,
the Ombudsman Prosecutor sought to amend the
information by inserting the number of the lot under
controversy, Lot 4431, and the amount of
P123,123,123.00 representing the price paid by FJI
Property Developers Inc. for it.
By Resolution20 of October 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Information on the ground that the
Motion to Admit it was presented before arraignment and
the amendments were mere matters of form. In the same
resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for
Reinvestigation on the ground that it was filed out of time,
and the matters raised therein could hardly be considered
as newly discovered evidence and would be better
ventilated during the trial of the case as defense evidence.
All the accused, except Hernan Jamir and Rosario
"Cherry" Nolasco, filed an Omnibus Motion21 (for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated October 17, 2000
and/or to Quash the Amended Information), to which the
prosecution filed its Comment and
Opposition.22 Thereafter, the accused filed their Reply23 to
the Prosecution’s Comment and Opposition.
By Resolution of July 6, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied
the accused’s Omnibus Motion.24

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School of Law | Remedial Law
In the meantime or on July 12, 2001, the accused-herein
petitioner Bienvenido C. Pobre was arraigned and pleaded
"not guilty."25
On July 23, 2001, the accused filed a Motion to
Quash26 the Amended Information on the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, and the
information contained averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification.
As the Ombudsman approved on August 31, 2001 a
Memorandum27 recommending further amendments to
the information, the prosecution filed on September 14,
2001 a Motion to Admit Amended Information28 (second
Amended Information).
For lack of merit, the Sandiganbayan, by Resolution29 of
October 10, 2001, denied the Motion to Quash the first
amended information.
By a subsequent Resolution30 issued on November 8,
2001, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Admit the
second Amended Information.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
In determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolution of
October 10, 2001, it is necessary to re-examine the
grounds invoked by petitioners in their Motion to Quash
the first Amended Information.
Petitioners’ Motion to Quash is anchored on Sections 3(a)
and 3(h) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds. - The accused may move
to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
xxx
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification;
The test for the correctness of the ground under Section
3(a) of Rule 117 is the sufficiency of the averments in the
information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the offense as defined by law31 without
considering matters aliunde.
The information sought to be quashed is hereinbelow
quoted verbatim:
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosector, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses Federico Poblete,
Rodrigo Caimol, Bienvenido Pobre, Juanito Galang,
Ricardo Flores, Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Rosario
Nolasco, Leo Padilla and Hernan Jamir, of Violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
35 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
That on or about 28 January 1995 to 28 November 1997
or prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, FEDERICO POBLETE, then Municipal Mayor,
in conspiracy with then Vice Mayor, RODRIGO
CAIMOL and SB Members BIENVENIDO POBRE,
JUANITO GALANG, RICARDO FLORES, PEDRO
PATERNO, SALVADOR OLAES, ROSARIO
"CHERRY" NOLASCO, LEO PADILLA and HERNAN
JAMIR, taking advantage of their official positions, with
evident bad faith, and manifest partiality to FJI Property
Developers, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally give unwarranted benefits to FJI Property
Developers, Inc. and cause undue injury to the local
fishermen and the government sold a foreshore land, Lot
4431 through the passage of SB Resolution No. 3-97,
Series of 1997 authorizing the sale of the land situated in
Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite in favor of FJI Property
Developers, Inc. in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE PESOS (P123,123,123.00) with the
Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, represented by then mayor
FEDERICO POBLETE as vendor, despite full
knowledge, and in complete disregard, of the legal
prohibition under Sections 159 and 61, Commonwealth
Act No. 141, against the disposition through sale of
foreshore, and notwithstanding the warning of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) on the prohibition against the lease of foreshore
lands along Manila Bay towards Cavite and
Bataan.32(Underscoring supplied).
The information thus charges petitioners with violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, to wit:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. – In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practice of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxx
(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices of government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
Under settled jurisprudence, the following elements need
to be proven in order to constitute a violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act 3019, viz:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during
the performance of his official duty in relation to his
public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or
any private party, or gave any party unwarranted benefit,
advantage or reference to such parties.33
Contrary to petitioners’ position, the information need not
state the manner by which the injury to the local fisherfolk
or the government came about or the extent by which they
exhibited partiality, bad faith or negligence in the
enactment of SB Resolution 3-9734 authorizing the sale of
foreshore land, it being sufficient that the information
alleges that petitioners acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, and took advantage of their public
positions by passing SB Resolution No. 3-97 despite the
legal prohibition provided under the law, thereby causing
undue injury to the local fishermen and the government.
Anent the second ground of the Motion to Quash, it is
erroneous for petitioners to argue that the payment of the
amount of P123,123,123.00 by FJI Property Developers,
Inc. for the lot in question, which enriched the coffers of
the government,35 was a legal excuse and justification to
free them from criminal liability. For if the elements of
the offense — violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019 — are proven, the proffered excuse is immaterial.
The grounds – bases of petitioners in the Motion to Quash
the first Amended Information being unwarranted, the
Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the Resolution of October 10, 2001 denying the
same.
Contending that the Sandiganbayan also committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution of November
8, 2001, petitioners argue that it failed to consider Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused,
their co-accused co-petitioner Bienvenido C. Pobre
having already been arraigned36 under the first Amended
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6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Information and cannot thus be made to re-plead to the
second Amended Information without his constitutional
right to double jeopardy being violated. Petitioners
moreover argue that they and their co-accused having
been charged of acting in concert, they cannot be
convicted on the basis of different informations.
The crux of the issue therefore hinges on whether the
amendments in the second Amended Information are
mere matters of form which do not prejudice the rights of
the accused.
The second Amended Information is hereinbelow
quoted verbatim:
That on or about 28 January 1995 to 28 November 1997
or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused public officials, Federico Poblete,
then Municipal Mayor, Rodrigo Caimol, then Vice Mayor
and Bienvenido Pobre, Juanito Galang, Ricardo Flores,
Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes, Rosario "Cherry"
Nolasco, Leo Padilla and Hernan Jamir, then
Sangguniang Bayan Members, all of the Municipality of
Kawit, Cavite, while in the performance of their official
functions, committing the offense in relation to their
office, conspiring and confederating with each other, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, cause undue
injury to the Government and local fishermen of the
Municipality of Kawit, Cavite in the following manner:
the said accused public officials maliciously sold a
foreshore land described as Lot 4431 through the passage
of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 3-97, Series of
1997 authorizing the sale said land situated in Binakayan,
Kawit, Cavite in favor of FJI Property Developers, Inc. in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE
PESOS (P123,123,123.00) Philippine Currency, despite
their full knowledge, and in complete disregard, of the
legal prohibition under Sections 159 in relation to Section
61, Commonwealth Act No. 141, prohibiting the
disposition through sale of foreshore land thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to FJI Property Developers, Inc. to
the damage and injury to the Government in the
aforementioned amount. (Underscoring in the original)
While petitioners cite People v. Casey37 which laid down
the test in determining whether an amendment is a matter
of form or substance, to wit:
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by an
amendment has been said to be whether a defense under
the information as it originally stood would be available

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the new form as in the other. A look into
Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment
to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded
not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the
crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a
charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not
affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance – not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore,
not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 (now Section 14)
of the Revised Rules of Court,
they fail to show how or why the amendments may be
considered as matters of substance which will prejudice
their rights as accused.
An objective appraisal, however, of the second Amended
Information shows that the amendments are merely
formal for they do not touch upon the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged nor on the determination
of the jurisdiction of the court. Instead, the amendments
merely involve deletions, transpositions and re-phrasings,
thereby raising the same issue and the same operative
facts already found in the first Amended Information.
As laid down by this Court, an amendment is only in form
when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness
in the information and not to introduce new and material
facts38 , and merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original
information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential
for conviction for the crime charged.39
The second Amended Information, while adding the word
"public officers," does not introduce a new and material
fact as the accused in the first Amended Information were
referred to as either the Mayor, Vice-Mayor or Members
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Likewise, in the second Amended Information, the phrase
"while in the performance of their official functions,
committing the offense in relation to their office,
conspiring and confederating with each other" is but a
clearer restatement of the phrase "in conspiracy and
taking advantage of their official positions" found in the
first Amended Information.
Section 14, Rule 110 moreover provides that in allowing
formal amendments in cases where the accused have
already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do
not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced
by the amendment of a compliant or information is
whether a defense under the complaint or information, as
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it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused
might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information.40
The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the
second Amended Information which are also alleged in
the first Amended Information does not change the basic
theory of the prosecution, thus creating no material
change or modification in the defenses of the accused.
Contrary to petitioners’ position, it having been
established that the questioned amendments are merely
formal, there is no longer any need for accused
Bienvenido Pobre to be re-arraigned on the second
Amended Information.41
Petitioners additionally argue that the Sandiganbayan
failed to consider the irregularity in the preliminary
investigation which they have been harping upon, the
particulars of which were stated in their Motion for
Reinvestigation — that Lot No, 4431 covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-3115 was no longer foreshore as
it had already evolved into a landmass and was ripe for
titling, and that a portion of OCT No. 0-3115 was
alienated in accordance with law.
Clearly, petitioners’ allegations are factual and
evidentiary in nature which may best be considered as
matters of defense to be ventilated in a full-blown trial.
Lack of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation is not one of the grounds for a motion to
quash. A motion to quash should be based on a defect in
the information, which is evident on its face. The guilt or
innocence of the accused, and their degree of
participation, which should be appreciated, are properly
the subject of trial on the merits rather than on a motion
to quash.42
As for the propriety or impropriety of the filing of the
information by the Ombudsman, this Court may not pass.
Neither may it independently make a factual finding of
whether there was indeed irregularity in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation. For petitioners are not, in the
present petition, assailing the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of their Motion for Reinvestigation.
Petitioners having failed to substantiate the grounds they
invoked in their Motion to Quash the first Amended
Information, and it having been established that the
amendments introduced in the second Amended
Information are mere matters of form, the Sandiganbayan
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Resolutions of October 10, 2001 and November 8, 2001.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
DUPLICITY: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical injuries
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71,
Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio
a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double
Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the
second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner
Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71
(MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted
bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the
charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
(S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the
MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
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petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the
filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent
Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803
for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed
S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No.
2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of
S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved
unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition
in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC
was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of
his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No.
82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits
that the multiple consequences of such crime are material
only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb
the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits,
respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave
felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was
obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366
for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No.
82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office
of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to
the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a
nominal party and private respondent is represented by
counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether
petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A.
2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest
him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803;
and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution
shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape
from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit
to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action
for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary
question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to
bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no
basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The
RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the
cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court
granted review to an appeal by an accused who was
sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even
though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried
and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated
the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic
Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-
appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No.
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82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more
evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s
treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s
absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable
on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman
fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will
be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to
produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s
status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided
"no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days
before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension
of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the
order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be
"twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense"13protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that
petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether
Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the
affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern
the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC
ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same
facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-
five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall
be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall
exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to
or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs
of this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation
of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
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employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in those cases in which the damage impending
to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in
this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails
to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may
be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into
four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to
the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence"
(paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either
or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual
features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century,
we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting
in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three
points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses
(as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different
penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it and merely determines
a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure
cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth,
criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated
as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the
commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed
willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor
maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful
act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that
the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears
no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege
quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon
without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to
Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction
being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an
intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the
element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry
of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The
contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v.
Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself
x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has
long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the
Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-
crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and
not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of
lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional
crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which,
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as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging
one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a
quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising
from the same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365
is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There,
a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the
same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the
same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had
been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for
both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently
answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by
the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc,
per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in
1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C.
J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982
by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City
Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First
Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred
the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the
constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr.

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Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of
the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on
the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence
is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the
reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going
against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by
more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in
November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of
an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation
of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was
based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz
chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At
any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982
in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’
conviction of an accused for "damage to property for
reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for
"slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the
second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied
on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the
ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs.
Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the
case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29,
1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
held that –
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the
Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in
the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had
effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in
a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with
the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s
attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in
his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page
82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in
not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and
submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28,
1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-
and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost
as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with
any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising
from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the
lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the

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mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored
to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with
"Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the
Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied
relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its
analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny
People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order
of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the
doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v.
Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose
Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision
between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case
No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been
dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal
complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace
court, in connection with the same collision one for
damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles
involved in the collision, and another for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the
accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against
Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88.
Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers,
contending that the case was just a duplication of the one
filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been
acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial
Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case
for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed
by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the
collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of
the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in
a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order
of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of
Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police
constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for
multiple physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom.
March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal
court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not
guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of
the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter
the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage
to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the
damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things
we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the
first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the
offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence
charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the
tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether
the evidence which proves one would prove the other that
is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an
ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also
disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that
the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been joined with the charge
for homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions
of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was
the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for

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slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior
court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva
to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the
invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in
dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy,
upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP
court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless
Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the
Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar,
fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations
for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application.
We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of
which are analogous or similar to those in the present
case, will yield no practical advantage to the government.
On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the
Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has
reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April
30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this
petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural
rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing
of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48
is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of
multiple felonies falling under either of two categories:
(1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means
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6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum
of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly.
Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution
multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article
365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human
interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling
under either models – that of a single criminal negligence
resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and
property with varying penalties corresponding to light,
less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial
dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to
"complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-
criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to
light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should
the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
collectively alleging all the consequences of the single
quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the
scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of
rulings (none of which involved the issue of double
jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-
crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case
charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing
the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing
the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is
the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and
respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under
Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not
arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article
365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution

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of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light
offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less
grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to
apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or
less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and
sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the
quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless
of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a
charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as
follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damage to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is
only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there
should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical
injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x
x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the
penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are
irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing
one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the
"complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its
resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its
present framing under Article 365, discard its conception
under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the
multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II
under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts
regardless of their number and severity, separately
penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted
under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to
double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of
government denying it the power to make laws constrains
us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between
quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal
code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for
a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting
two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we
rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double
jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined
with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the
complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the
case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither
was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior
court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this
appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the
Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By
prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,

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irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting
acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to
proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365
should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed
in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article
365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by
the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that
only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized
as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile,
the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
G.R. Nos. 106288-89 May 17, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL and PIO BOSES Y
DOLFO, defendants, PIO BOSES, appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Two passengers who were apprehended after they
supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney
on September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the
felonious asportation, but for possession of the two
unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them
which were instrumental in the commission of
the robo (pp. 7-8, Rollo.)
Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an
appeal from the trial court's judgment (p. 23, Rollo)
inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from
incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p.
60, Rollo ) thereby abating any review of his culpability
for the misdeed.
The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial
were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the morning of
September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his
jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When
they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with
two other companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan
was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes
interchange where the other passengers were divested of
their personal belongings, including the jacket of
passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted
at the Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial
Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went
to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team
was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim
Rene Araneta who went with the responding police
officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was
wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort
Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost said
persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced
themselves, the four men scampered to different
directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio
Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol
and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an
unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After the
arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and
were identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who
ganged up on the accused.
To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of
firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification (Exhibit I)

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issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that
the accused are not licensed firearm holders.
On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded
innocent to the charges levelled against them, proferring
a general denial.
Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness
stand that after establishing his residence at Pasay City for
about six months, he engaged in the business of vending
"balut". During the incident in question, he recalled that
while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly
acosted him, took his money, "balut" and "penoy", and
that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was
forced to confess ownership of one gun which was shown
to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the hold up.
For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having
resided in Metro Manila for about two months, recollected
that he spent the night at his cousin's house in Parañaque
on September 28, 1990, and that he left Parañaque at
around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990.
According to him, the jeepney he was then riding
developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was
arrested for no apparent reason. When he was brought to
the cell, he was allegedly coerced into admiting
possession of the other gun. Just like his co-accused, he
too, denied knowledge of the hold up.
The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general
denials, observing:
As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of the
accused, the line of defense they have adopted is one of
denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms and
ammunition in question were found in their persons in the
early morning of September 29, 1989. They also denied
the truth of the testimonies of Sgt. Faltado, Percival Tan,
and Rene Araneta. The defense however did not cite any
valid reasons for the Court not to give credence to the
testimonies. In the circumstance, the Court is constrained
to consider the testimonies of the accused to be self-
serving. In the face of the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the Court can only take their
denials with the proverbial grain of salt. Verily, it is
simply hard for the Court to believe that the accused are
simple provincial who are lost in the big city; that accused
Pio Boses who is a resident of Pasay City, does not know
well-known places in Metro Manila such as the South
Super Highway and the Fort Bonifacio-Nichols
interchange; that he did not know the streets where he
plied his trade as a balut vendor. Indeed, how can this be
true when he himself admitted that from 7:00 p.m. of
September 28, 1989, he spent his time walking in the
street in the area and yet he never claimed he had ever lost
his way.
47 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is
convinced that he lied on the witness stand. He claimed
that he was in the place where he was arrested because he
had just come from the residence of his cousin, Genny
Acol, and the passenger jeepney he had boarded on his
way home just happened to break down at that place. In
the mind of the Court this alibi of the accused is too much
of a coincidence, and too convenient an excuse, for the
Court to believe. In this connection, the Court notes his
testimony on cross examination that he was unable to get
in touch with his relatives, including Genny Acol, for
possible assistance and to get Genny Acol to corroborate
his testimony, because the latter had already left for the
province and that none of his other relatives knew that he
had been charged in this case. But when queried how he
was able to say this, he testified that he had written to his
uncle and that he received a reply letter from him and that
it was from this reply letter of his uncle that he learned
that Genny Acol had already left for the province. This
testimony of accused Tirso Acol, if it accomplished
anything, helped convinced the Court that he is given to
lying. For sure, if he had written to his uncle and that the
latter had replied to him, it is plain that he must have
informed his uncle about the case and that the latter knew
about the case and the fact that he was in jail and needed
help. In any event, established jurisprudence dictates that
between the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and the denials of the accused the Court must place its
reliance on the former. As a matter of fact, jurisprudence
also indicates that greater weight must be given to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when they are
officers of the law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124 SCRA
906; People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from
detention during the trial below, thus obviating any
review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had
appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be considered
as having abandoned his appeal (People vs. Quinitan, 197
SCRA 32 [1991]; Section 8, Rule 124, Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure).
With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his
protestation of innocence by claiming that the trial court
below erred:
I
. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT
MOTION OF ACCUSED PIO BOSES TO REOPEN
THE CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT
HIS WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES WOULD
HAVE BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS DEFENSE

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School of Law | Remedial Law
THEREBY AMOUNTING TO A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
II
. . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF BOTH ACCUSED PIO BOSES
AND TIRSO ACOL; INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY
ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION'S
WITNESSES.
III
. . . IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EXHIBITS "E", "F", "F-
1" TO "F-5", "G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", SINCE THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS ADMITTED THEY WERE
NOT ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR
A SEARCH WARRANT WHEN THEY CHASED AND
FRISKED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND
PROCEEDED TO ARREST THEM.
IV
. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE
WAS NOT CLEAR SHOWING THAT EXHIBITS "F",
"F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G-1" TO "G-4" WERE THE ONES
USED BY THE ROBBERS IN COMMITTING THE
CRIME OF ROBBERY/HOLD UP.
(p. 1, Appellant's Brief; p. 60, Rollo.)
But the appeal leaves much to be desired.
It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein
accused- appellant can not feign denial of due process
where he had the opportunity to present his defense,
through his own narration on the witness stand (Domingo
vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766
[1992]; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595
[1992]. Withal, and as correctly pointed out by the People,
the omission of a party to present witnesses to corroborate
the principal basis for exculpation, on account of the
witnesses' admitted tardiness in arriving in court, is a
puerile proposition to support re-opening of the case.
In regard to the second ascription aired by the accused-
appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the court
a quoshould have relied more on the explanation offered
by the defense rather than giving credence to the
testimony of the People's witnesses. For one thing,
accused- appellant asseverates that they could not have
been positively identified by Percival Tan and Rene
Araneta considering that it was then still dark when the
accused boarded the jeep, up to the time they were
apprehended. But counsel for accused-appellant concedes
that the jeep was lighted subject to the caveat that it was
not well lighted (p. 12, Brief for Accused-Appellant)
which does not entirely foreclose positive identification
of the culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their
victims and were thus seated within the closed quarters of
48 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
the jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the
prosecution that Rene Araneta's jacket was one of the
items which was asported, that it was worn by one of the
felons, and that the jacket was recognized by Rene
Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters (p. 7, Brief for
Accused-Appellant). To lessen the impact of the
affirmative statements uttered against accused- appellant,
it is argued that the immediate propensity of a criminal is
to move out from the scene of the locus criminis and not
merely to walk casually within the vicinity. We said
in People vs. Ocampo (G.R. No. 80262, September 1,
1993) that indeed, there can be no legal dispute to the legal
proposition that flight from the scene of the felony is one
of the indicia of a guilty conscience, but it is equally true,
we proceeded to say, that culprits, in exceptional cases,
have become bolder by returning to the scene of the crime
to feign innocence. At any rate, it has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the factual findings of the trial
court and the conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded
utmost respect since the magistrate at the court of origin
had the first hand impression of the demeanor and
deportment of witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176
[1992]; People vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).
With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of
accused--appellant, we are of the view that the search falls
within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which
serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to
arrest:
When an offense has in fact been committed, and the has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;
inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched
to look for the persons responsible for the crime on
account of the information related by Percival Tan and
Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed (People vs.
Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr.,
205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And since accused-appellant's
arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made
incidental thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221
SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms
were found when the police team apprehended the
accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition (People vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA
135 [1988]). The principle imparted by Justice Padilla
in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia
vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the
commission of a criminal offense, the offending police
officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not precluded
from performing their duties as police officers for the

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apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the corpus delicti.
Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the lower court
must be modified to read only as reclusion perpetua, as
provided by Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed with the slight modification that the proper
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Further, the
court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other
incidental paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine
National Police to be disposed of in accordance with law.
No pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN
ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE
ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE
AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some
three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and
when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found
the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him
to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported
the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If
they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN
WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN
INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. —
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise
lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
49 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12.
Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and
search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be
arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is
first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited
in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991
Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being
arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may
be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful
articles found his person, or within his immediate control
may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF
CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — There is
no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred
in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated
with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the
testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the
back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one
person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere
possibility that only one person dropped the concrete
hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That
circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two
co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a
conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator
is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she
overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to
kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim
with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his
death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the
principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence,
the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna
Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH;
INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General
correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award
of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito
Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance
with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

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School of Law | Remedial Law
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which
found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him
guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive
portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds
the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-
V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day
as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of
twelve thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the
accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating
circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral
expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused Gabriel
Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his
preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with
Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The
Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without justification, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in
foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag
which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo
Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with
Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an
information of the same date and signed by the same
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused together with two (2) others who
50 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
are still at large and against whom the preliminary
investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another,
armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and
with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with
the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito
B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which
directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of
April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with
Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking
liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the
appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the
house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on
that day. She overheard the three men talking about their
intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard
Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si
Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded
Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan
mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin
natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their
plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same
day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren
struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by
Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice
with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head.
Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind
the house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime
Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report
from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling
incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital
where the victim was brought. He was informed by the
hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause
of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard
and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia,
together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and
Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where
the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece
of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two
roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the
prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the
killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the
three men who killed Clarito.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant
who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the
house and they introduced themselves as policemen.
Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped
in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic
Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by
the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against
him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and
for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded
not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases
was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered
a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of
R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are
ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana
leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-
appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence of
evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of
his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search
and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized
from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police
officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the
marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because
they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours
after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They
saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which
the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to
the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as
one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others
had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without
a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could
obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the
accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after
he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was
held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us
in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without
a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at
the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise
lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest
was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about
to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless
he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143,
cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law,
1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual
being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that
may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful
articles found in his person, or within his immediate
control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial
court erred in convicting him of having conspired and
cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace
despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the
fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been
inflicted by one person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only
one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head
of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true,

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does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the
murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit
a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The
conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of
Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and
his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in
concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood
and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is
no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did
not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk)
is no indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the
appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in
People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is
hereby increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Terry v. Ohio
No. 67
Argued December 12, 1967
Decided June 10, 1968
392 U.S. 1
Syllabus
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat
which he had been patrolling for many years, observed
two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a
street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and
forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same
store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times.
Each completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of which
they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly.
Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the
officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man
a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer
approached the three, identified himself as a policeman,
and asked their names. The men "mumbled something,"
whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat
pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer
ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's
overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face
the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer
clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from
Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his
hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he
discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have
been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer
garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to
the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged
with carrying
Page 392 U. S. 2
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the
weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution
theory that the guns had been seized during a search
incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to
suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the
ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner
and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his
own protection, had the right to pat down their outer
clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they
might be armed. The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk"
of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search
for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found
guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the
State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places,"
and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets
as well as at home or elsewhere. Pp. 392 U. S. 8-9.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the
police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of
the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. P.392
U. S. 12.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to
exclude the products of legitimate and restrained police
investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of such
techniques should not discourage remedies other than the
exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is
not an effective sanction. Pp. 392 U. S. 13-15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk"
procedures such as those followed here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16-
20.

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School of Law | Remedial Law
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
P.392 U. S. 16.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a
"search" under that Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the
circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety
or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable
search for weapons of the person believed by him to be
armed and dangerous
Page 392 U. S. 3
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that
individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the
individual is armed. Pp. 392 U. S. 20-27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure
a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure
cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-
spot observations of the officer on the beat is required.
P. 392 U. S. 20.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and
seizure must be assessed in light of the particular
circumstances against the standard of whether a man of
reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the
action taken was appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S. 21-22.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function
of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to
approach petitioner and his companions. P. 392 U. S. 22.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close
range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical
harm, take necessary measures to determine whether that
person is carrying a weapon. P.392 U. S. 24.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause
to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
of the situation. Pp. 392 U. S. 25-26.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where
he has reasonable apprehension of danger before being
possessed of information justifying arrest. Pp.392 U. S.
26-27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his
companions and the limited search which he made were
reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted.
Pp.392 U. S. 27-30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were
consistent with the officer's hypothesis that they were
contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P. 392
U. S. 28.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was
minimally necessary to determine whether the men were
53 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole
purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was
confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Pp. 392
U. S. 29-30.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly
admitted into evidence against him, since the search
which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 392 U. S. 30-31.
Affirmed.
G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of
ammunitions in two separate Informations which read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-5071
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the
City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags
containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU)
weighing more or less two (2) kilos and one (1) small
plastic bag containing Methamphetamine Hydrocloride
weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a
regulated drug, without any authority whatsoever.
Criminal Case No. 96-5132
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the
City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces
of live .22 cal. ammunitions, without first having obtained
a license or permit to possess or carry the same.
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on
arraignment.1awphi1.nét The two cases were then jointly
tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all
members of the police force of Angeles City. Their
testimonies can be synthesized as follows:
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening,
SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received
a report from their confidential informant that accused-

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The
informer further reported that accused-appellant
distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in
Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of
Angeles City, Col. Neopito Gutierrez, immediately
formed a team of operatives composed of Major
Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02
Emmeraldo Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian
assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team investigator. The
group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian
informer positioned themselves across McArthur
Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn
Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to
a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and
parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After
accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly
accosted him and introduced themselves as police
officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a
small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance
protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded
twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from
his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the
contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a
crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated
the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the
twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the
car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud
and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene
brought the confiscated items to the office of Col.
Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito,
Angeles City.3
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box,
he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline
substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2
Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the
siezed items contained shabu.4 Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud
together with accused-appellant brought these items for
further laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due
testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded
that the crystalline substances yielded positive results for
shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while
the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms of
shabu.5
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation
against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.
54 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question,
he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his
son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old
route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a
small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles
City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he
noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car.
When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man
immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him
face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified
himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest,
the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to
open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car
keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the
police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two
cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him
away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others
searched his car.1awphi1.nét
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station
and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes
until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call
the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez
opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold
the box while pictures were being taken.6
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-
appellant in its material points. He testified that he
witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine
security check around the premises of the Guess Building,
near Thunder Inn Hotel.7
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision,8 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of
Ammunitions, the accused is hereby acquitted of the
crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of
1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused Binad Sy Chua is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charge and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised
the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS
FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD
SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE
SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF SHABU
ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED
IN A LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER;
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE CRIME CHARGED IS SUFICIENT TO PROVE
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BEYOND REAONABLE DOUBT.10
Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest
and search made by the police operatives was unlawful;
that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior
to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two years,
there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste
within which the arresting officers sought to arrest and
search him without a warrant; that the police officers had
sufficient information about him and could have easily
arrested him. Accused-appellant further argues that since
his arrest was null an void, the drugs that were seized
should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they
were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellant’s argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is
not a hard and fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial
court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves
the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the
trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges,
of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course
of their testimonies. The only exception is if there is a
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the case.11
In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of
weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which
casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An appeal
in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this
includes the review of the penalty and indemnity imposed
by the trial court.12 We are clothed with ample authority
to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we
find that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor
of the accused shall be considered.13 This is in keeping
with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall
be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
55 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent
search and seizure made upon accused-appellant, the
court a quo made the following findings:
Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of
regulated drugs (shabu). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects x
x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
xxxx
While it is true that the police officers were not armed
with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present case, the police received information that
the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the
Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer
had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a
search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a "stop
and frisk".14
A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the
findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused the
two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a "stop-and-frisk."
In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,15 we distinguished the
concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest, to wit:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the
concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be arrest before a search can be
made—the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy,
and seize any money or property found which was used in
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or
that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.
xxxxxxxxx

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable
scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry,
thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable
cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a "stop-and-frisk". A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-
frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2)
the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.16 (Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the
"stop and frisk" principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure
made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence
of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the
fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a
lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings.17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
56 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.18
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the
case at bar. The record reveals that when accused-
appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he
merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway,
alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the
entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For
all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation
that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act
strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the group of
SPO2 Nulud "hurriedly accosted"19 accused-appellant and
later on "introduced themselves as police
officers."20Accused-appellant was arrested before the
alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this
case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have
been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in
light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of
accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was
committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As
applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest.21Hence, in People v.
Aminudin,22 we ruled that "the accused-appellant was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension" (Emphasis
supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben23 to
justify the police’s actions is misplaced. In the said case,
based on the information supplied by informers, police
officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner
Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against
persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on
those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous
drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a
person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting
suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the
policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police
officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the
night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already
had prior knowledge from the very same informant of
accused-appellant’s activities. No less than SPO2 Mario
Nulud, the team leader of the arresting operatives,
admitted that their informant has been telling them about
the activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to
his actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the
testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of
the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:
Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you
the name of this chinese drug pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.
Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even
before September 21, 1996?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling
you about the activities of this chinese drug pusher
reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996?
A. That was about two years already.
Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge
which you gained from the civilian informant that this
chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing drugs
here in Angeles City, you did not think of applying for a
search warrant for this chinese drug pusher?
A. No, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually
walking along the road near the Thunder Inn Hotel, is that
right?
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is
the chinese drug pusher that will deliver to him also.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad
Chua the accused in this case he alighted with a Corolla
car with plate number 999, I think, he just alighted when
you saw him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked
towards near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel
but he was pinpointed already by the civilian informer.
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the
Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.
xxxxxxxxx
57 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag
pounced on him as you used pounced on him in your
affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that
alleged small plastic bag, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice
box?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline
substance is shabu?
A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have
been tailing the accused that he is really a drug pusher.
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long
time that you are very sure that what was brought by him
was shabu?
A. Yes, sir.24
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the
alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant.
Considering that the identity, address and activities of the
suspected culprit was already ascertained two years
previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason
why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial
warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching
his person. Whatever information their civilian asset
relayed to them hours before accused-appellant’s arrest
was not a product of an "on-the-spot" tip which may
excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest.
Accordingly, the arresting team’s contention that their
arrest of accused-appellant was a product of an "on-the-
spot" tip is untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk"
in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s)25 or contraband. The
police officer should properly introduce himself and make
initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons.26 The apprehending police officer must have a
genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him.27 It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.28
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by
the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals.29 In said case,

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish
eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to
be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the
search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v.
Solayao,30 we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-
frisk" the accused after considering the following
circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and
his companions, the fact that his companions fled when
they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace
officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to
verify reports that armed persons where roaming the
vicinity.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of
accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was
first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged
illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending
police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into
accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the
contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves
when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did
not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure
outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was,
therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the
immediacy of accused-appellant’s arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly
depended on the information given to them by their
confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during
that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs
actually occurred, accused-appellant’s warrantless arrest
and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid
"stop-and frisk". For a valid "stop-and-frisk" the search
and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this
case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the
information about the illegal activities of accused-
appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers.
Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs
cannot be deemed as a valid "stop-and-frisk".
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the
basis of the seized items found in accused-appellant’s
possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O juice
box which contained crystalline substances later on
identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
58 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not
inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested
accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person
and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they
were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline
substance was shabu. There was no clear showing that the
sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried
contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic
bags which allegedly contained crystalline substance and
the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible. These
prohibited substances were not in plain view of the
arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits
of the poisonous tree.
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a
search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under
exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at
hand is bereft of any such showing.1a\^/phi1.net
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the
arresting team cannot simply validate, much more cure,
the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless
search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption
of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an
officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify
an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution.31 In People v. Nubla,32 we clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant’s conviction because, first, the
presumption is precisely just that – a mere presumption.
Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it]
cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items
allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very
same items presented at the trial of this case. The record
shows that the initial field test where the items seized were
identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP
headquarters of Angeles City.33 The items were therefore
not marked at the place where they were taken. In People
v. Casimiro,34 we struck down with disbelief the reliability
of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not
marked at the place where they were seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the
seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at
the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office.
There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick

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of marijuana marked by the policemen in their
headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory.
The government’s drive against illegal drugs needs the
support of every citizen. But it should not undermine the
fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as
overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do.
Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees
should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good
intentions will remain as such simply because they have
blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. 35
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting
accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section
16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered
forthwith released from custody, unless he is being
lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-
appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling
watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found
guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court,
disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away
and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of
P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly
after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30
in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were
in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his
bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took
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6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
him to their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When
they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against
him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include
Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him
that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on
the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier
received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-
appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and
was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by
name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had
pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag
he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on
them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana,
averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of
pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without
a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not
even know what marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified
and could have been any of several bundles kept in the
stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own
examination of the accused that he claimed to have come
to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches
at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and
spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two
watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely,

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they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by
the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of
his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although
the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a
friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The
trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment,
observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings,
considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate
access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the
opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand.
Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and
hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may
reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the
impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this,
discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial
court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not
really beaten up because he did not complain about it later
nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly
fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the
PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he
was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has
been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination,
however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested
and searched without warrant, making the marijuana
allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence
against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not
even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General
dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the
arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule
113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a
lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC
officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no
warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they
had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer
who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in
Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to
the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days
before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third
"weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer
the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
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Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with
respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25,
1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by
reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and
the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we
received this information from that particular informer,
prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the
particular operation which was being participated by Idel
Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days
before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon
9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this
intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not
pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report
of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said
two days before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily
report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the
activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required
sheet of information, maybe for security reason and we
cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure
that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's
coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you
many days before you received the intelligence report in
writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but
his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984
two days before?
A Yes, sir.

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Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know
that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know
that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time
when I received the information that he was coming.
Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports
that he was already consummated the act of selling and
shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under
surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel
Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on
June 23, 1984, you had already gathered information to
the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on
June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the
seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your
intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will
yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield
positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially
as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The
Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement.
This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by
him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was
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not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense
with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan
v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and
aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures
for violation of the customs law because these vehicles
may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the
law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the
PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant
was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-
handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust"
operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the
accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive
finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the
officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in
our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will,
detained without charges and punished without trial, we
will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of
arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its

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disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its
Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is
innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is
lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is
guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is
innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is
weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized
from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall.
That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have
been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is
that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the
poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase.
The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest
did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules
of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal
and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who
would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially
the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign
may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every
individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection
the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high- handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not
justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized
marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he
must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he
is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is
REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
It is so ordered.
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ BOBONG
and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
BOBOY, accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution
in the name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is
to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those
values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty
depend.[1]
For automatic review is the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario
Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y
Malagura alias Boboy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 8,[3] of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659,[4] and sentencing them to suffer the
supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grams of
dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
them.[6] Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented
Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as
witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then
a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at
Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an
information regarding the presence of an alleged
marijuana pusher in Davao City.[7] The first time he came
to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the
first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with
his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer
pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula,
as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the
arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused-
appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon
only after they were arrested.[8]

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At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the alleged
pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City any
time that morning.[9] Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M.
of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP,
Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team
leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the
house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would
wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.[10]
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while
the team were positioned in the house of SPO1
Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to
the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the
team boarded their vehicle and overtook the
trisikad.[11] SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty
meters from where the accused-appellants were
accosted.[12]
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At
that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a
black bag handed the same to accused-appellant
Molina.Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced
himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant
Molina to open the bag.[13] Molina replied, Boss, if
possible we will settle this.[14]SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves
inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina
were handcuffed by the police officers. [15]
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through
counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[16] The demurrer was denied by the
trial court.[17] A motion for reconsideration was filed by
accused-appellants, but this was likewise
denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of
evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed
decision,[18] the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution
alone without any evidence from both accused who
waived presentation of their own evidence through their
counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both
accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659,
accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA,
are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act
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8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided
for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to
immediately elevate the entire records of this case with
the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the
automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and
its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule
122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was
elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-
appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT
OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS
BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF
SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.[20]
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion
(In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of
both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches
and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is,
by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated
upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent
provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.[21]
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the
exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,

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paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.[22] Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of
words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this
Courts high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.[23]
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not
without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures;[24] and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search).[25]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant
to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede
the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the
process cannot be reversed.[26] As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes
permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when
an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners).[27]
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment
of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted
by the peace officers, are valid because accused-
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appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession
of prohibited drugs.[28] This brings us to the issue of
whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure
in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,[29] the Court held that in cases
of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,[30]probable cause
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that
reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
Aminnudin,[31] it was held that the accused-appellant was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,[32] the Court did not
consider eyes... darting from side to side ... [while]
holding ... [ones] abdomen, in a crowded street at 11:30
in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient
to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable
cause. According to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts
that an offense had just been committed, or was actually
being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the

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arresting officers] presence. So also, in People v.
Encinada,[33] the Court ruled that no probable cause is
gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding
two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[34] the trial
court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit
a crime as he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda
and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to
them.[35] In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal,
the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was
being committed or was going to be committed.[36]
It went on to state that -
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast -
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and
his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and
his companions were merely standing at the corner and
were not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise,
to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline
of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming
that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not
have been visible to Yu.[37]
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. [38]
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants
could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit
or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-
appellant Molina responded Boss, if possible we will
settle this to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the
bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the
suspicion of the arresting officers that accused-appellants
were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect
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6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the
arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the
arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer
conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula,
SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only
learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. What is
more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed
recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note
that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person
only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they
were on the side of the road. These circumstances could
not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at
accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was
then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught
a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant
Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never
seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the
name of accused-appellants even before the arrest, to wit
-
Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag
to another person and how did you know that it was Mula
who handed the black bag to another person?
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon,
regarding Mula and Molina, when they pass by through
the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that
the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin
one is Nazario Molina[39]
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is
entirely baseless. SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned
the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon
because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted
the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-
appellants name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of
the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accused-
appellants identity, and were, from all indications, merely
fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in
the said case knew appellant Encinada even before the
arrest because of the latters illegal gambling activities,
thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest
effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court
declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the
consequent search were illegal, holding that [t]he
prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious
behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or

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while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating
a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under
such bare circumstances.[40]
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants
waived their right against unreasonable searches and
seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.[41]
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by
the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by
the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence
against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with
no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the
government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive,
all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must
not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-
96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence
to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and
Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, are
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless they are validly detained for other
offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III, G.R. No. 170672
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA Promulgated:
and SPO3 CESAR RAMIREZ,
Respondents. August 14, 2009
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6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 10
July 2004 Decision[2] and 18 October 2004 Order[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217 (trial
court), in Civil Case No. Q-98-33442 for Damages.
The Antecedent Facts
Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint
for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil
Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria)
and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner
alleged in his complaint that on 24 March 1996, at around
12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house
in Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt. Doria
and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents), accompanied by 10
unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to
the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano,
Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the
request and told respondents that he would proceed to the
PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife
home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in
front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly
took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the
vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant. The
search resulted to the seizure of a licensed
shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotguns license to
respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his
search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he
allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested
petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate
charge, at the PNP special detention cell.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone
call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident
in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by
SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez
later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded
while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and
his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria

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looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed
him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested
petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters as he
was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to
his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased
petitioner. Upon reaching petitioners residence, they
caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards
his house. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat
of the vehicle beside the drivers seat as petitioner opened
the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the
drivers seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms
and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men
also arrested other persons who were identified to be with
petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated
murder. An administrative case was also filed against
petitioner before this Court.[4]
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 10 July 2004 Decision, the trial court dismissed
petitioners complaint.
The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the
shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court
ruled that the police officers who conducted the search
were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that
petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm
used in the commission of the offense was in his
possession. The trial court ruled that petitioners
warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the
firearms were valid and legal. The trial court gave more
credence to the testimonies of respondents who were
presumed to have performed their duties in accordance
with law. The trial court rejected petitioners claim of
frame-up as weak and insufficient to overthrow the
positive testimonies of the police officers who conducted
the arrest and the incidental search. The trial court
concluded that petitioners claim for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code is not warranted under the
circumstances.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
In its 18 October 2004 Order, the trial court denied the
motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
The Issues
The issues in this case are the following:
1. Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search
and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
2. Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages
under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the findings in the administrative case
against petitioner are conclusive in this case.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Application of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Petitioner alleges that his arrest and the search were
unlawful under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Petitioner alleges that for the
warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must
have personal knowledge of facts that the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner alleges that
the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the
arresting officers, and thus they have no personal
knowledge of facts as required by the Rules.
We do not agree.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his

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case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just
committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer
or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.[5]
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion.[6] The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested.[7] A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest.[8]
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to
personally witness the commission of the offense with
their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a
report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez
investigated the report and learned from witnesses that
petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to
track down petitioner, but when invited to the police
headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner
initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the
police authorities to give chase. Petitioners act of trying
to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on
the part of the police authorities as to the existence of
probable cause.
Plain View Doctrine
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain
view doctrine.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.[9] The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
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a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[10]
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because
that was where they caught up with petitioner after the
chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when
petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just
took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved
in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that
the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were
justified in seizing the firearms.
Civil Liability Under Article 32 of the Civil Code
Petitioner alleges that respondents are civilly liable under
paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code
respectively state:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxxx
In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully
arrested without a warrant and that firearms were validly
seized from his possession. The trial court found that
petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and frustrated murder. We agree with the trial court in
rejecting petitioners allegation that he was merely framed-
up. We also agree with the trial court that respondents
were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be
held civilly liable for their actions.
Res Judicata Does Not Apply

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Respondents raise the defense of res judicata against
petitioners claim for damages.
Res judicata has two aspects: bar by prior judgment and
conclusiveness of judgment provided under Section 47(b)
and (c), Rule 39, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure[11] which provide:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of
a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
Bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment
differ as follows:
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first
case where the judgment was rendered and the second
case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of
the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as
their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or
other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res
judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated
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differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination
of an action before a competent court in which judgment
is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is
the same.[12]
For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be
present:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
(c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are
substantially between the same parties.[13]
While the present case and the administrative case are
based on the same essential facts and circumstances, the
doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An administrative
case deals with the administrative liability which may be
incurred by the respondent for the commission of the acts
complained of.[14] The case before us deals with the civil
liability for damages of the police authorities. There is no
identity of causes of action in the cases. While identity of
causes of action is not required in the application of res
judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment,[15] it is required that there must always be
identity of parties in the first and second cases.
There is no identity of parties between the present case
and the administrative case. The administrative case was
filed by Benjamin Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against petitioner. Sia
Lao is not a party to this case. Respondents in the present
case were not parties to the administrative case between
Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present case, petitioner is
the complainant against respondents. Hence, while res
judicata is not a defense to petitioners complaint for
damages, respondents nevertheless cannot be held liable
for damages as discussed above.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
petition. We AFFIRM the 10 July 2004 Decision and 18
 A. Bonifacio Street
WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE 6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
School of Law | Remedial Law

October 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which
Quezon City, Branch 217, in Civil Case No. Q-98-33442. after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in
cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry,
SO ORDERED. including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a
total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused
PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 178039 between and/or among themselves to the damage and
PHILIPPINES, prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. [3]
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson In Criminal Case No. 93-132606:
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for
-versus- CASTRO, sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the
DEL CASTILLO, and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
PEREZ, JJ. accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor,
ERNESTO UYBOCO y Promulgated: JESON KIRBY DICHAVES, two (2) years old, against
RAMOS, his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for
Defendant-Appellant. January 19, 2011 the purpose of extorting ransom for his release, which
after payment thereof in the amount of P1,320,000.00 in
x------------------------------------------------------------------- cash and P175,000.00 worth of assorted jewelry,
---------------------x including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with SN 14836 or a
total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
DECISION PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by said accused
between and/or among themselves to the damage and
PEREZ, J.: prejudice of the aforementioned victim/or his parents. [4]

Subject of this appeal is the 27 September 2006
Decision[1] promulgated by the Court of
Appeals, affirming the Regional Trial Courts (RTC)
Judgment[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-
132606, and 93-132607, finding Ernesto Uyboco y
Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3) counts of kidnapping
for ransom.
Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo
Macias (Macias) and several John Does were charged in
three separate Informations, which read as follow:
In Criminal Case No. 93-130980:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for
sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain the minor,
JESON KEVIN DICHAVES, five (5) years old, against
his will and consent, thus depriving him of his liberty, for
In Criminal Case No. 93-132607:
That in the morning of December 20, 1993 and for
sometime subsequent thereto in Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain NIMFA
CELIZ, against her will and consent, thus depriving her
of liberty, for the purpose of extorting ransom for her
release, which after payment thereof in the amount
of P1,320,000.00 in cash and P175,000.00 worth of
assorted jewelry, including a Colt .45 Caliber Pistol with
SN 14836 or a total of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,500,000.00) was divided by
said accused between and/or among themselves to the
damage and prejudice of the aforementioned victim.[5]
The arraignment was held in abeyance twice.[6] Finally,
the arraignment was set on 22 October 1996. Appellant
and Macias, with the assistance of their counsels, however

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refused to enter a plea. This prompted the RTC to enter a
plea of Not Guilty for each of them. Trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Nimfa Celiz (Nimfa), Jepson Dichaves (Jepson), Police
Superintendent Gilbert Cruz (P/Supt. Cruz), Police
Superintendent Mario Chan (P/Supt. Chan), Police
Inspector Cesar Escandor (P/Insp. Escandor) and Carolina
Alejo, whose version of facts are summarized as follows:
At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and
her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves
were riding in the Isuzu car of the Dichaves family,
together with Yusan Dichaves (Yusan). Driver Pepito
Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank in Claro
M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for Yusan,
Acon drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the
vehicle passed by in front of San Sebastian Church, a
stainless jeep with two men and one woman described as
a tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way. One of the
men, who was in police uniform accosted Acon and
accused him of hitting the son of a Presidential Security
Group (PSG) General apparently with a stone when the
vehicle ran over it. Acon denied the charges but he was
transferred to the stainless jeep while the man in police
uniform drove the Isuzu car. The tomboy sat next to Nimfa
who then had Jeson Kirby sit on her lap while Jeson Kevin
was sitting on the tomboys lap. They were brought to a
house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque.[7]
While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak
out of the car and place a call to the secretary of her
employer to inform the latter that they were in Merville
Subdivision. She came back to the car undetected and
after a while, she and her wards were asked to alight from
the car and they were locked inside the comfort room.[8]
Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December
1993. He received a call from his wife asking him if
Nimfa or Acon called up, as she had been waiting for them
at Metrobank where she was dropped off earlier. After 15
minutes, Yusan called again and was already hysterical
because she could not find the car when she roamed
around the area. Jepson immediately called up his brother
Jaime and some police officers to inform them that his
sons were missing. When Jepson arrived at Metrobank at
around 11:30 a.m., he received a call from his secretary
informing him that Nimfa called about their
whereabouts. When Jepson got back to his office, his
secretary informed him that an unidentified man called to
71 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
inform them that he has custody of the children and
demanded P26 Million.[9]
Meanwhile in Merville Subdivision, the man in police
uniform introduced himself to Nimfa as Sarge. He asked
Nimfa for information regarding her name and her
employers telephone number. She feigned ignorance of
those information. She even claimed that she was merely
a new employee.[10] Sarge informed Nimfa that they were
in Fairview and that she was asked if she knew how to go
home. Nimfa chose to stay with her wards. When the
phone rang, Sarge went out of the house and Nimfa again
sneaked a phone call to her employer informing them that
they were being held up in Merville Subdivision. [11]
Jepson, through Jaimes help, went to the house of then
Vice-President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President Estrada) at
8:00 p.m. Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen.
Canson), General Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson) and
Major Ray Aquino (Major Aquino). Vice-President
Estrada ordered the police generals to rescue Jepsons sons
and arrest the kidnappers.[12]
At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced
the ransom to P10 Million.[13] That night, Nimfa was able
to speak to Jepson when two men handed the telephone to
her. She recognized one of them as appellant, because she
had seen the latter in her employers office sometime in the
first week of December 1993.[14]
On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the
kidnappers called up Jepson numerous times to negotiate
for the ransom. In one of those calls, Jepson was able to
recognize the voice of appellant because he had several
business transactions with the latter and they have talked
for at least a hundred times during a span of two to four
years.[15]
On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a
ransom of P1.5 Million. Jepson offered P1.3 Million in
cash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry
and a pistol.[16] Appellant asked Jepson to bring the
ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes
Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen. Canson and
Gen. Lacson to inform them of the pay-off.[17]
At around 1:00 p.m. of even date, Nimfa was able to talk
to Jepson and the latter informed her that they would be
released that afternoon.[18] At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his
white Toyota Corolla car and proceeded to Pancake
House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He placed the

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
money inside a gray bag and put it on the backseat. Jepson
received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered
him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked,
and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning
back. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag
was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his
sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station
along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to
the place and found his sons and helper seated at the
corner of the gas station.[19]
P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes
Commercial Center, together with two other police
officers. They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and
positioned themselves in front of the Maranao Arcade
located at Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a
camera to cover the supposed pay-off. He took a total of
24 shots.[20] He identified Macias together with appellant
in Magallanes Commercial Center and the latter as the one
who took the ransom.[21]
P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched also
at Magallanes Commercial Center in Makati on 22
December 1993 to take a video coverage on the supposed
pay-off. He witnessed the pay-off and identified appellant
as the one who took the bag containing the ransom money
from the car trunk of Jepson.[22]
P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat and one of
the team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized
on 22 December 1993 with the primary task of
apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves children and
helper. His group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await
instructions from the overall Field Command Officer
Gen. Lacson. They had been waiting from 4:00 p.m. until
6:00 p.m. when they received information that the kidnap
victims were released unharmed. They were further asked
to maintain their position in Fort Bonifacio. At around
7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspects
vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their
direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and
tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in
Makati. They continuously followed the car inside the
village. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and
immediately approached the vehicle.[23]
They introduced themselves as police officers and
accosted the suspect, who turned out to be
appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber
revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was
requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was
found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun
inside the bag. Appellant was then brought to Camp
Crame for questioning.[24]
At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson
asking him to go to Camp Crame. He and Nimfa went to
Camp Crame where he saw appellant alone in the office
of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag containing the
ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the
table. Photographs were taken and Jepson was asked to
identify them.[25]
A written inventory was prepared on the contents of the
bag.[26] It was found out that a portion of the ransom
money was missing. It was then that appellant revealed
that the missing money was in the possession of
Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his
team to the residence of Macias in Camp
Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m.
on the following day and placed him under arrest.Macias
was asked where the rest of the ransom money was and
Macias went inside the house and retrieved a red bag
inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of
the seized property from Macias. Macias placed his
signature on the receipt.[27]
Carolina Alejo was the owner of the house in Merville
Subdivision where the kidnap victims were detained. She
stated that she leased the house to appellant. On 23
December 1993, it came to her knowledge that said house
was used in the kidnapping. She noticed that the lock of
the comfort room was reversed so that it could only be
locked from the outside. She considered this unusual
because she personally caused the door knob to be
installed.[28]
The defense, on its part, presented appellant, Florinda
Sese Barcelona (Ms. Sese), Dr. Jaime Leal (Dr. Leal), and
retired Colonel Ramon Navarro (Col. Navarro).
Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he
was introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989 as the
importer of police equipment and accessories. Jepson
wanted to buy revolving lights, police sirens and paging
system. Through Navarro, appellant also met Macias who
was then selling his security agency in July 1993. He
admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since
1990 and his total borrowings amounted to P8.5 Million
in December 1993. Appellant also knew Nimfa since

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
1990 and had met her five (5) times in the office of Jepson
where Nimfa usually served him coffee. [29]
In December 1993, he rented a house in Merville
Subdivision for his mother. He was given the key to the
house in 15 December 1993 but he denied going to said
place on 20, 21, 22, 23 of December 1993.
At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call
from Jepson asking for P1 Million, as partial payment of
his loan. Jepson informed appellant that his sons were
kidnapped and he requested appellant to negotiate with
the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of pity,
appellant agreed. He actively participated in the
negotiations between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where
he successfully negotiated a lower ransom of P1.5
Million.
On 11:30 a.m. of 22 December 1993, Jepson again
requested appellant to deliver the ransom money to the
kidnappers. Appellant acceded to the request. He asked
Macias, who was in his office that day, to accompany
him. The kidnappers asked appellant to proceed to the
Makati area and wait for further instructions. Appellant
called up Jepson who told him that he would deliver the
money to appellant once instructions were given by the
kidnappers. The kidnappers finally called and asked
appellant to proceed to Shell Gasoline Station-
Magallanes. He informed Jepson of this fact and the latter
asked appellant to meet him in Magallanes Commercial
Center where he would just put the money inside the car
trunk and leave it unlocked. Appellant took the money
from Jepsons car and put it inside his car trunk and
proceeded to Shell Gasoline station. [30] Appellant and
Macias did not see the kidnappers and Jepsons children at
the station. He tried calling Jepson but failed to
communicate with him. They then decided to go back to
the office in Cubao, Quezon City. At 7:00 p.m., he
received a call from the kidnappers who were cursing him
because they apparently went to the Shell Gasoline
Station and noticed that there were many policemen
stationed in the area, which prompted them to release the
victims. Appellant left his office at around 7:20 p.m. to go
home in Dasmarias Village, Makati. When he was about
ten (10) meters away from the gate of his house, a car
blocked his path. He saw P/Supt. Cruz, a certain Lt.
Rodica and two other men alight from the car and were
heavily armed. They pulled him out of the car and hit him
with their firearms.[31]
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
Ms. Sese was at the office of appellant on 22 December
1993 when she was told by the secretary, who appeared
shaken, that a caller was looking for appellant. She saw
appellant arrive at the office with Macias.[32]
Dr. Leal, the medico-legal officer at Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, presented the medico-
legal certificate of appellant and testified that the injuries
of appellant could have been sustained during the
scuffle.[33]
Col. Navarro introduced appellant to Jepson. He was
privy to the loan transactions between appellant and
Jepson where the former asked loans from the latter. He
even served as guarantor of some of the obligations of
appellant. When the checks issued by appellant were
dishonored by the bank, Jepson filed a case against
Navarro for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
wherein the latter was eventually acquitted.[34]
While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias
died. Consequently, his criminal liability is totally
extinguished under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code.[35]
On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused
Ernesto Ramos Uyboco is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
penalized by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 1084. He is hereby ordered to suffer the
prison term of reclusion perpetua for three (3) counts
together with the accessory penalties provided by law. He
should pay private complainant Jepson Dichaves the
amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages.
The above-described .45 Caliber Colt Pistol and 12-gauge
Remington shotgun as well as the Nissan Sentra 4-Door
Sedan are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
The Warden of Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center,
Camp Ricardo R. Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila is
hereby ordered to immediately transfer the said accused
to the Bureau of Corrections, National Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City. The Jail Director of said bureau is
ordered to inform this court in writing soonest as to when
the said official took custody of the accused.[36]
 A. Bonifacio Street
WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE 6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
School of Law | Remedial Law

The trial court held that the prosecution had established III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
with the required quantum of evidence that the elements PRESUMING REGULARITY IN THE
of kidnapping for ransom were present and that appellant PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OVER
was the author of said crime. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED UYBOCO.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court. Conformably to People v. Mateo,[37] this Court in a IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
Resolution dated 6 September 2004, referred the case to ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF JEPSON
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and DICHAVEZ NOTWITHSTANDING HIS DISPLAYED
disposition.[38] PROPENSITY FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS.

On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
toto the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of ADMITTING MOST OF THE OBJECT EVIDENCE
which reads: PRESENTED AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT SINCE THEY WERE PROCURED IN
WHEREFORE, the August 30, 2002 Decision of the VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Regional Trial Court, national Capital Judicial Region,
Br. 18, Manila, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-130980, 93- VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
132606, and 93-132607, in convicting Ernesto Uyboco of OF FACT THAT THE MERVILLE PROPERTY
three (3) counts of Kidnapping for Ransom is hereby LEASED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT FROM MS.
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[39] CAROLINA ALEJO WAS THE VERY SAME HOUSE
WHERE NIMFA CELIZ AND HER WARDS WERE
A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant but ALLEGEDLY DETAINED.
the same was denied in a Resolution dated 22 December
2006. Hence, this appeal. VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT ACCUSED UYBOCO AS HAVING
On 3 September 2007, this Court required the parties to PARTICIPATED IN THE ABDUCTION OF JESON
file their respective supplemental briefs. On 25 October KEVIN, JESON KIRBY, AND NIMFA CELIZ AS NOT
2007, appellants counsel filed a withdrawal of A SINGLE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SUPPORTS THE
appearance. Appellee manifested that it is no longer filing SAME.
a Supplemental Brief.[40] Meanwhile, this Court appointed
the Public Attorneys Office as counsel de oficio for VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
appellant. Appellee also filed a manifestation that it is ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED CONSIDERING
merely adopting all the arguments in the appellants brief THAT ABDUCTION, AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT
submitted before the Court of Appeals.[41] OF THE CRIME, WAS NEVER ESTABLISHED
AGAINST HIM.
Appellant prays for a reversal of his conviction on three
(3) counts of kidnapping for ransom based on the IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
following assignment of errors: THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITHOUT DISCUSSING THE
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED MACIAS
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE WAS FOR
DESPITE THE DISTURBING WHISPERS OF DOUBT CONSPIRACY.[42]
REPLETE IN THE PROSECUTIONS THEORY.
The ultimate issue in every criminal case is whether
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
CREDENCE TO NIMFA CELIZ TESTIMONY doubt. Guided by the law and jurisprudential precepts,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCREDIBILITY OF this Court is unerringly led to resolve this issue in the
HER STORY. affirmative, as we shall hereinafter discuss.

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WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely:
(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of
the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping
or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the
person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the
victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose
of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is
immaterial.[43]
We are in full accord with the findings of the trial court
that these elements were proven by the prosecution, thus:
1) Accused Uyboco is a private individual;
2) Accused Uyboco together with the unidentified
persons/companions of accused Uyboco, referred to as
John Does, forcibly abducted the two sons of private
complainant Jepson Dichaves, namely: then five-year-old
Jeson Kevin and two-year old Jeson Kirby as well as their
maid or yaya Nimfa Celiz. Their abduction occurred at
about 10:30 in the morning of December 20, 1993. The
three victims were on board Jepsons Isuzu pick-up driven
by Jepsons driver Pepito Acon.The moving pick-up was
in front of San Sebastian Church, Legarda, Manila when
its path was blocked by a stainless jeep. A man in white t-
shirt and brown vest accosted driver Pepito for having
allegedly ran over a stone that hit a son of a general
working at the Presidential Security Group. Pepito was
made to ride in a jeep. The same man drove the pick-up to
a house in Merville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro
Manila, where the victims were illegally detained from
December 20 to 23, 1993.
xxxx
3) The act of the detention or kidnapping of the
three victims was indubitably illegal. Their detention was
not ordered by any competent authority but by the private
individual whose mind and heart were focused to illegally
amassed huge amount of money thru force and coercion
for personal gain;
75 | L e x C i r c l e | C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e
A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
xxxx
5) Both accused Uyboco and Macias had
successfully extorted ransom by compelling the parents of
the minors to give in to their unreasonable demands to get
the huge amount of money, a gun, and pieces of jewelry x
x x.[44]
These facts were based on the narrations of the
prosecutions witnesses, particularly that of Nimfa, the
victim herself and Jepson, the father of the two children
abducted and the person from whom ransom was extorted.
Nimfa recounted how she and her wards were abducted in
the morning of 20 December 2003 and detained in a house
in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque, thus:
A: When we arrived at the office after awhile we boarded
the pick-up and then we left, Sir.
xxxx
A: Those who boarded the pick-up, the driver Pepito
Acon, Mrs. Yusan Dichavez, the two (2) children and
myself, Sir.
xxxx
A: We proceeded to Metrobank Recto, Sir.
xxxx
Q: And when you stopped there, what happened?
A: Mrs. Yusan Dichavez alighted in order to cross the
street to go to Metrobank, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next?
A: The driver, Jeson Kirvy, Jeson Kervin and myself
made a right turn and we entered an alley, Sir.
xxxx
Q: Before reaching Legarda, do you know of any
untowards incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: What?
A: When we were already in front of the San Sebastian
Church and Sta. Rita College there was a stainless jeep
that block our path, Sir.
Q: How many persons were inside that stainless jeep, if
you know?
A: I have not notice, but there were many, Sir.
Q: How did that stainless jeep stop your vehicle?
A: Our driver Pepito Acon was signaled by the persons on
the stainless jeep to stay on the side, sir.
Q: What did your driver Pepito Acon do when the sign
was made to him?
A: The driver stopped the pick-up and set on the side, Sir.
Q: And then what followed next after he stopped?

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
xxxx
A: The man told us that we will be brought to the precinct
because when we then make a turn at Kentucky a stone
was ran and hit the son of the General of PSG from
Malacaang, Sir.
xxxx
Q: What did Pepito Acon do? When told to alight?
A: Pepito Acon alighted, Sir.
Q: Then what followed next?
A: After that Pepito alighted and the man who came from
the stainless jeep boarded and he was the one who drove,
Sir.
xxxx
A: When that man boarded the pick-up there was a T-bird
who also boarded on the passengers side, Sir.
xxxx
Q: When you entered the gate of Merville Subdivision,
where did you proceed?
A: When we entered the gate there was a street which I do
not know and when we went straight as to my estimate we
were going back to the main gate, Sir.
xxxx
A: The pick-up stopped in front of a low house near the
gate, Sir.
Q: When you stopped in front of the gate, that house
which is low, what happened?
A: The tomboy alighted and opened the gate of that low
house, Sir.
Q: What followed next after the tomboy opened the gate?
A: After the tomboy opened the gate, the driver entered
the pick-up inside, Sir.
xxxx
Q: And when you entered the house, what happened?
A: When we entered the house we were confined at the
comfort room, Sir.[45]
Jepson gave an account how appellant demanded ransom
from him and eventually got hold of the money, thus:
A: Then Macias offered the release of the two (2) boys for
1.5 Million each, Sir.
A: Then I started begging and bargaining with them and
then suddenly Uyboco was again the one continuing the
conversation, Sir.
Q: What did you say?
A: After some bargaining and beggings he reduced the
demand to 1.7 million, and he asked for my wife to talk to
because according to him I was very hard to talk too, Sir.
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: You said he, to whom are you referring?
A: To Mr. Uyboco, Sir.
Q: What followed?
A: After some more bargaining and begins he further
reduced their demand to1.5 million x x x.
xxxx
Q: And after that what followed?
A: I offered them to fill up the different (sic) in kind, Sir.
Q: Why to offer the different (sic) in kind?
A: To fill up the different (sic) between 1.3 million to 1.5
million, Sir.
Q: So in short, how much cash did you offer?
A: I offered it for 1.3 million, Sir.
Q: How about the different (sic), what will it be?
A: At this point, he asked me to include my gun, Sir.
Q: How about the other balance?
A: My jewelry, Sir.[46]
xxxx
Q: And what did you do after you were in possession of
the money, the jewelries, the gun and the bag?
A: I returned to my office and put the cash in the bag.
Q: In short, what were those inside the bag?
A: The P1.325 million money, the gun and the assorted
jewelries.
Q: And after placing them inside the bag, what happened?
A: I left my office at 3:00 PM to proceed to the Pancake
House at the
Magallanes Commercial Center.

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
Q: Where did you place that bag?
A: That bag, at that time, was placed at the back seat when
I was going to the Pancake House.
xxxx
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: x x x He told me to put the ransom bag x x x inside my
trunk compartment, leave it and lock the car, and walk
away without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q: After that instruction, what happened, or what did you
do?
A: After few minutes, he called again. He told me to drive
and park the car beside the car Mitsubishi Colt Mirage
with Plate NO. NRZ-863.
Q: Did he tell you where was that Colt Mirage car parked?
A: Yes, in front of the Mercury Drug Store.
Q: And then, what did you do?
A: I followed his instruction.
Q: And what followed next?
A: After few more minutes, he called again and asked if I
am in front of the Mercury Drug Store already.
Q: And what was your answer?
A: I told him yes and he again gave me the final
arrangement, but he uttered I walk back towards the
Pancake House without looking back for ten (10) minutes.
Q: And?
A: And informing me the whereabouts of my sons.
ATTY. PAMARAN:
Q: Did you comply with that instruction?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do?
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A. Bonifacio Street
6541 Ormoc City, Leyte
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking
back for more than ten (10) minutes.
Q: That car that you parked near the Mitsubishi Colt, how
far was your car the parked form that Colt Mirage?
A: Beside the Colt Mirage, Sir.
Q: And after you parked the car, what followed?
A: I walked towards the Pancake House without looking
back and then I turned to the back of the supermarket and
I checked my trunk and saw that the bag is gone already.
Q: And what followed thereafter?
A: A few minutes, Uyboco called up and told me that my
sons were at the shell station after the Magallanes
Commercial Center inside the Bibingkahan.[47]
Now, appellant seeks to destroy the credibility of these
witnesses by imputing inconsistencies, untruthfulness and
incredibility in their testimonies.
Appellant harps on the supposed inconsistencies in the
testimony of Nimfa, namely: First, Nimfa stated that on
the day they were to be released, they, together with
Macias, left Merville Subdivision at 4:00 p.m. while
appellant stayed behind. However, P/Insp. Escandor
testified that at around 4:00 p.m., he saw Macias and
appellant at Magallanes Commercial Center. Second,
Nimfa could not properly identify the number of
kidnappers. Third, Nimfa failed to state in her affidavit
and during the direct examination that Sarge had a gun,
but later on cross-examination, she intimated that Sarge
had a gun. Fourth, it was incredible that Nimfa was able
to identify the route taken by the kidnappers to the safe
house because she was not allegedly blindfolded. Fifth, it
was strange for Nimfa to say that two persons, Macias and
appellant, were holding the receiver and the dialing
mechanism whenever they hand the phone to her. Sixth,
it was impossible for Nimfa to have access to an
operational telephone while in captivity.[48] The Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed these inconsistencies as
immaterial, in this wise:
The purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve
estimations of time or number; hence, the reference
thereto would understandably vary. The rule is that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not

WESTERN LEYTE COLLEGE
School of Law | Remedial Law
affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or
the weight of their testimonies. The inconsistencies and
discrepancies of the testimonies, in the case at bar, are not
of such nature as would warrant the reversal of the
decision appealed from. On the contrary, such trivial
inconsistencies strengthen, rather than diminish, Celiz
testimony as they erase suspicion that the same was
rehearsed.
The fact that Uyboco and his companions neither donned
masks to hide their faces nor blindfolded or tied up their
victims goes to show their brazenness in perpetrating the
crime. Besides, familiarity with the victims or their
families has never rendered the commission of the crime
improbable, but has in fact at times even facilitated its
commission. Moreover, the fact that there was a usable
phone in the house where Celiz and the kids were held
captive only proves that, in this real world, mistakes or
blunders are made and there is no such thing as a perfect
crime. On a different view, it may even be posited that the
incredible happenings narrated by Celiz only highlights
the brilliance of Uyboco and his companions. Verily, in
committing the crime of kidnapping with ransom, they
adopted and pursued unfamiliar strategies to confuse the
police authorities, the victim, and the family of the
victims.[49]
Appellant then zeroes in on Jepson and accuses him of
lying under oath when he claimed that appellant owed him
only P2.3 Million when in fact, appellant owed him P8.5
Million. Appellant charges Jepson of downplaying his
closeness to him when in fact they had several business
deals and Jepson would address appellant as
Ernie. Moreover, it was unbelievable for Jepson to be able
to identify with utmost certainty that the kidnapper he was
supposedly talking to was appellant. Finally, appellant
claims that Jepsons motive to maliciously impute a false
kidnapping charge against him boils down to
money. Among the businesses that Jepson owns was
along the same line of business as that of appellant, which
is the supply of police equipment to the PNP. To eliminate
competition and possibly procure all contracts from the
PNP and considering his brothers close association to then
Vice-President Estrada, Jepson crafted and executed a
frame up of appellant.
And the Court of Appeals had this to say:
For one, the strategy used, which is the use of
unconventional or not so commonly used strategy, to
apprehend the kidnappers of Celiz and the Dichaves
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children is, by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise, the police operatives call or
prerogative. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence
that said agents falsely testified against Uyboco, We shall
presume regularity in their performance of official duties
and disregard Uybocos unsubstantiated claim that he was
framed up.
Secondly, matters of presentation of witnesses by the
prosecution and the determination of which evidence to
present are not for Uyboco or even the trial court to
decide, but the same rests upon the prosecution. This is so
since Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
expressly vests in the prosecution the direction and
control over the prosecution of a case. As the prosecution
had other witnesses who it believes could sufficiently
prove the case against Uyboco, its non-presentation of
other witnesses cannot be taken against the same.[50]
Time and again, this court has invariably viewed the
defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense
of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.[51]
We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the
ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to the
positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing
to appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses
testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by
efforts of the defense to discredit them. As a rule, the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude.[52] While it is true that the trial judge who
conducted the hearing would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the
witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who
was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot
render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very
well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken
during the trial as the basis of his decision.[53]
Appellant raises questions which purportedly tend to
instill doubt on the prosecutions theory, thus:
If Uyboco is really the mastermind of the kidnapping
syndicate, why would he demand only P1.325M x x x as
ransom? Why would he be the one to personally pick-up
the ransom money using his own car registered in his sons
name? Why did he not open the bag containing the ransom

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to check its contents? Why would he be the one to
personally hand the phone to Nimfa Celiz without any
mask covering his face x x x. Why would he go back to
his family residence x x x with the ransom money still
intact in the trunk of his car?
If Nimfa Celiz and her wards were indeed kidnapped, why
were they not blindfolded x x x? Why were they not tied
x x x?
xxxx
If it is true that the house at Merville, Paraaque was used
by accused-appellant Uyboco as the place of the alleged
detention x x x how come Uyboco signed the lease
contract under his own name? x x x Certainly, any person
with the education attainment of at least high school
degree, much more so an established businessman like
accused-appellant would know that the lease contract and
the post-dated checks are incriminating evidence.
x x x (h)ow come no effort was exerted in apprehending
Uyboco during day 1 of the kidnapping? x x x Why is their
story focused only on the day of the ransom
payment? Why did they not apply for a warrant of arrest
against accused-appellant Uyboco when they supposedly
knew that from day 1, he was the kidnapper?
Why were there no tapes presented in evidence which
recorded the conversations between the kidnappers x x
x.[54]
Furthermore, appellant stresses that his financial status as
an established and well-off businessman negates any
motive on his part to resort to kidnapping.
If we indulge appellants speculations, we could readily
provide for the answers to all these questions that
appellant originally demanded P26 Million but this had
been substantially reduced due to aggressive bargaining
and negotiations; that appellant personally picked up the
ransom money because he could not trust anybody to do
the work for him; that appellant did not open the bag
containing the money because he trusted Jepson, who then
out of fear, would deliver as instructed; that appellant did
not cover his face in front of Nimfa because he thought
Nimfa would not recognize him; that appellant went back
to his family residence because he never thought that
Jepson would recognize him as the voice behind one of
the kidnappers; that the victims were not blindfolded or
tied because Nimfa, who appeared to be ignorant to the
kidnappers and the two children barely 5 years old would
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be emboldened to escape; that appellant never thought
that the police would discover the place of detention; that
the police employed a different strategy, which is to first
secure the victims before they apprehend the kidnappers;
that to secure a warrant would be futile as the police then
did not have sufficient evidence to pin down appellant to
the crime of kidnapping; that there were no actual record
of the telephone conversations between Jepson and the
kidnappers.
However, to individually address each and every question
would be tantamount to engaging in a battle of endless
speculations, which do not have a place in a court of law
where proof or hard evidence takes precedence. On the
other hand, the prosecution presented testimonies and
evidence to prove that kidnapping occurred and that
appellant is the author thereof.
Appellant seeks to pierce the presumption of regularity
enjoyed by police officers to anchor his argument that he
has been framed up. He belittles the efforts of the police
officers who participated in the operation. Appellant
claims that despite knowledge of the place of alleged
detention, the police did not try to rescue the kidnap
victims. Appellant also notes that while P/Supt. Chan
denies installing any listening device to record the
conversations of the kidnappers and Jepson, the interview
made by a reporter for a television network shows that
Major Aquino admitted to taped conversations of
appellants alleged negotiations for the ransom with
Jepson. Appellant insists that these taped conversations
do exist.
Appellant cannot rely on a vague mention of an interview,
if it indeed exists, to discredit the testimony of P/Supt.
Chan. The truth of the matter is appellant failed to prove
the existence of the alleged taped conversations. The
matters of failure of the police officer to properly
document the alleged pay-off, the non-production of the
master copy of the video tape, and the chain of custody
supposedly broken are not semblance of neglect so as to
debunk the presumption of regularity. In the absence of
proof of motive on the part of the police officers to falsely
ascribe a serious crime against the accused, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the trial court's assessment on the
credibility of the apprehending officers, shall prevail over
the accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
frame-up.[55]

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Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the
search conducted inside his car in absence of a
warrant. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to
Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (Emphasis supplied)
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered
by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.[56]
Records show that both requirements are present in the
instant case. The police officers present in Magallanes
Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off
which effectively consummates the crime of
kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from
the car trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed
to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio
where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,
therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers
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to personally witness the commission of the offense with
their own eyes.[57]
It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were
monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough
for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who
was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal
knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant
was legal because the latter consented to such search as
testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that appellant
did not give his consent for the police to search the car,
they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident
to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof
in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of
the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search
not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise
stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means
the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.[58] Therefore, it is only
but expected and legally so for the police to search his car
as he was driving it when he was arrested.
Appellant avers that it was not proven that appellant was
present and in fact participated in the abduction of the
victims. Lacking this element, appellant should have been
acquitted. In a related argument, appellant contends that
conspiracy was not proven in the execution of the crime,
therefore, appellants participation was not sufficiently
established.
The Court of Appeal effectively addressed these issues, to
wit:
The prosecution was able to prove that: 1) At the time of
the kidnapping, the house where Celiz and the Dichaves
children were kept was being leased by Uyboco; 2)
Uyboco was present in the said house at the time when
Celiz and the Dichaves children were being kept thereat;

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3) there being no evidence to the contrary, Uybocos
presence in the same is voluntary; 4) that Uyboco has in
his possession some of the ransom payment; and, 5) that
Uyboco was the one who told them that the balance of the
ransom payment is with Macias. All these circumstances
clearly point out that Uyboco, together with several
unidentified persons, agreed or decided and conspired, to
commit kidnapping for ransom.
xxxx
x x x Uybocos claim, that since it was not proven that he
was one of the passengers of the jeep which waylaid the
Dichaves vehicle on December 20, 1993, he could not be
convicted of kidnapping for ransom considering that his
participation, if any, was merely to provide the house
where the victims were kept, is misplaced.
Moreover, to Our mind, it is inconceivable that members
of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the performance
of an essential and sensitive phase of their criminal
scheme, i.e. possession of the ransom payment, to people
not in cahoots with them, and who had no knowledge
whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan. [59]
The testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson sufficiently point to
the participation of appellant. While he was not present
during the abduction, he was present in the house where
the victims were detained, oftentimes giving the phone to
Nimfa to talk to Jepson. He also actively demanded
ransom from Jepson. The conspiracy was likewise proven
by the above testimonies. Appellant conspired with
Macias and other John Does in committing the
crime. Therefore, even with the absence of appellant in
the abduction stage, he is still liable for kidnapping for
ransom because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all.[60]
Based on the foregoing, we sustain appellants conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in
Criminal Case Nos. 93-130980, 93-132606, and 93-
132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila, finding Ernesto Uyboco
y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for ransom, and the
Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC,
are AFFIRMED.
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G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS,
MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and
RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated
April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R.
SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March
16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96,
Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight
Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald
Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005,
at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued
between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty.
Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station
6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl
Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02
Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the
crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier, together with
augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano
Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of
the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those
who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to
"invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the
police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the
inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a
bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the
attack.10

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In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners
were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of
Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing
one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a
bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform
all the acts of execution which would produce the crime
of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said
complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage
and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that
they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers
had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators
of the crime. They also claimed that they were just
"invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the
petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before
the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for
preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA ruled
that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed
by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The
arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to
answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid
warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called
for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
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The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the
order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts
and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found
that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for
the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE
VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE
LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE
MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND
THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not
lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they
went to the police station only as a response to the
arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit
of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest
took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2)
hours before the police officers actually arrived at the
crime scene. The police officers could not have
undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no
personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors
of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the
RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the
petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners
filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought
is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to
delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition
has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more
than compensated by fully examining in this case the

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legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and
establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the
guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have
evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the
opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the
current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the
Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to
be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The
Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir
Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of
England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by
King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor,
England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum
limited the King of England's powers and required the
Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal
vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter
29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the
foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor
will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by
lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land,
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any
man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme
Court held that this constitutional provision does not
prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial
warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.32 With
regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must
also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have
acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The
Court based these rulings on the common law of America
and England that, according to the Court, were not
different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings
likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
provisions of separate laws then existing in the
Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v.
Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter
of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest
without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila
was concerned.
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In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that
in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local
ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as
those of the officers established under the common law of
England and America, also had the power to arrest
without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that
the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common
sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest
found support under the then Administrative
Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise
vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied
Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for the
Application of the Penal Code which were provisions
taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and
incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now
summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit"
arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b)
– the provision applicable in the present case. This
provision has undergone changes through the years not
just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our
jurisprudence.

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We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and
examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on
American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the
Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to
detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is
reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It
will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their
agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the
provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code
provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code
provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his
antecedents or the circumstances of the case would
warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply,
however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the
satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him,
and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear
whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to
try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the
preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal
complaint has been filed against him, provided the
following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to
believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had
been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason
to believe that the person arrested participated in the
commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7
of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain
officials, including police officers may, within the
territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without
warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under
suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that
such person has committed, or is about to commit any
crime or breach of the peace.
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In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which
ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in
the street at night when there is reasonable ground to
suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no
proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must
justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest
without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to
warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is
guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in
good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions
are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if
the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to
the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the
arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was
actually committed. What was necessary was the presence
of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence
of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the
same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated in it. In addition, it was also
established under the old court rulings that the phrase
"reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause
without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and
the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the
warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting
person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting
suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which
aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our
Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the
gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting
officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a
crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested
has participated in its commission. This principle left so
much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting
officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the
Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of
Court as follows:50

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SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in
his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he
has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule
113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and
1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the
Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of
the offense was not necessary in determining the validity
of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's
determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion)
applied both as to whether a crime has been committed
and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the
Rules required that there should be actual commission of
an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting
officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an
offense." Additionally, the determination of probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the
determination of whether the person to be arrested has
committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964
Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion
in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the
1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again
underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and re-
numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
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serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964
Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a
qualification that the commission of the offense should
not only have been "committed" but should have been
"just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time
frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of
gathering information indicating that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of
the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting
officer's determination on whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless
arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the
following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated
offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting
immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person
sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause
to be determined by the arresting officer based on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the
previously subjective determination of the arresting
officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2)
whether the person sought to be arrested committed the
crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to
minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are:
first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

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For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements
separately below, starting with the element of probable
cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just
been committed, and the arresting officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier"
or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall
proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his
personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether
the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless
arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such
arrests must be reasonable. According to State v.
Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was
discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation
of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v.
United States54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the
circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be
made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether
at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term
probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the
arresting officer should make a thorough investigation
and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for
evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest
situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a
judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a
warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not
on the information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty
is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities
similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday
life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is
a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light
of the particular circumstances and the particular offense
involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may
rely on all the information in his possession, his fair
inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere
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suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is
a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest on
reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal
knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime;
and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not
verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined
probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal
knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore,
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from
probable cause in preliminary investigations and the
judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the
crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda
de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence
of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence
of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was
based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the
respondent and his witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must
be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this
stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet

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tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during
the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he
personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable
cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of
probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual
belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual
facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining
"probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting
without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge
issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for
trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public
prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause,"
within the spheres of their respective functions, its
existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and
circumstance within their possession. In short, although
these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man,
they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances,
as set by the rules, upon which they must determine
probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the
arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge
must base their determination on the evidence submitted
by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis
of more limited facts, evidence or available information
that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
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Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent
limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless
arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these
instances. The Court held that one should not expect too
much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to
exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer.
Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper
investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to
prevent the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these
two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were
usually taken together in the Court's determination of the
validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant
to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis
Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on
December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the
NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to
arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three
(3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set
of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons
sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the
Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,
stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to
become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical
harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of
PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was
then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid
considering that the only information that the police
officers had in effecting the arrest was the information
from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that
there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the
requirement that an offense has just been committed
means that there must be a large measure of immediacy
between the time the offense was committed and the time
of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not
comply with these requirements because he was arrested
only a day after the commission of the crime and not

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immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting
officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses
to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense. They became aware of del
Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle
only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1)
day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of
information obtained from unnamed sources. The
unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days
after the commission of the crime was held invalid
because the crime had not just been committed.
Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the
gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon
which the police acted came from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the
accused was the gunman; another was able to take down
the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out
to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That
information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was
done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the
arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he
personally gathered in the course of his investigation,
indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente
only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held
valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came
immediately after the arresting officers received
information from the victim of the crime. The Court held
that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was
derived from the information supplied by the victim
herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her
at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless
arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting
incident. The policemen who were summoned to the
scene of the crime found the victim. The informants
pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after
the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers
acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of
the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the
assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
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In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a
jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the
report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons
walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was
wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the
policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming,
they ran in different directions. The Court held that the
arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police
concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to
the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to
verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they
reached the place, they met with the complainants who
initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers'
invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search
of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the
vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the
complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the
offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of
the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received
a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a
shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03
Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later
reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while
Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and
his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria
looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he
informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria
requested Abelita III to go with him to the police
headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the
incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt.
Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his
house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the
vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the
door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's
seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and
arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's
act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report
which they investigated, were enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities
as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these
discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the
elements that "the offense has just been committed" and
''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the

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particular circumstances of the case. However, we note
that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative,
circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or
accompanying facts, events or conditions. "
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of
the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even
though the police officer has not seen someone actually
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based
on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the
scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of
probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances
should be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police
officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to
base their probable cause finding on facts or
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as
the time gap from the commission of the crime to the
arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are
prone to become contaminated and subjected to external
factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand,
with the element of immediacy imposed under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable
cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they
were within a very limited period of time. The same
provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts
of circumstances before the police officer could effect a
valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold
that the following must be present for a valid warrantless
arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and
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2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited
by the standard of probable cause to be determined from
the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable
cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless
arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity
of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the
question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a
valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied
with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when
they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these
facts and circumstances that the arresting officer
possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the
attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by
the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA
because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.81From a review of the records, we conclude that
the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined
probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the
petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of
the facts in the present case is purely limited to the
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on
February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was
committed, the petitioners were brought in for
investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The
police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed
at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St.,
Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter
at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
already inside the police station, would connote that the
arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the
occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the
arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the
crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty.
Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the

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crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that
Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner
Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, 83 although
they asserted that they did it in self-defense against Atty.
Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the
Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by East
Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged
mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that
was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident,
showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma,
Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular
line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd
posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and
fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant.
Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible
abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P.
Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma,
periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of
the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his
alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the
scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community
where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the
petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the
same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they
did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty.
Generoso, although they narrated a different version of
what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers
gathered and which they have personally observed less
than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless
arrests. These circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the
time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the
police officers' personal observation, which are within
their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, 88 the police
officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his
sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively
identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him;
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however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson,
the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog,
Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with
the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the
present case even admitted to have been involved in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another
version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless
arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the
police officers have complied with the requirements set
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of
immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought to
be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident
occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the
arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal
assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the
petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the
police immediately responded and had personal
knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just
committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,
does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime
was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case)
and the police officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing,
particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion,
the personal circumstances of the parties, and the
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the
immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were
proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City
Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the
circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is
construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless
arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is
largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is
made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or
by his submission to the custody of the person making the
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arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary
touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal system would only prolong the proceedings, which was
declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the
the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for
belief and impression that submission is necessary.92 Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE,
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and
Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and
arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of
account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor
physical restraint when a simple directive to the of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the
petitioners to follow him to the police station would criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of SO ORDERED.
actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners
had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the
attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge
of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged
perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the
perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere
random act but was in connection with a particular
offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the
petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges
against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners
attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent
motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly
having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14
of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly
states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary
nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused.
Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court,
in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is
legally bound to pursue and hereby gives preference to the
speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of
discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the
motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the
record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the
RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of
the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the
trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides
that it is the decision that should state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In
resolving a motion, the court is only required to state

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