Josephine Domagsang vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and People of The Philippines

G.R. NO. 139292.
December 5, 2000
JOSEPHINE DOMAGSANG vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati,

Branch 63, of having violated Batas Pambansa ("B.P.") Blg. 22
(Anti-Bouncing Check Law), on eighteen (18) counts, and
sentenced to "suffer the penalty of One (1) Year imprisonment
for each count (eighteen [18] counts)." Petitioner was likewise
“ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of
P573,800.00.” The judgment, when appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 18497), was affirmed in toto by the
appellate court.
It would appear that petitioner approached complainant

Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice President of METROBANK, to
ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner
and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In
exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant
18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the
checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all
dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason: “Account
closed.” The complainant demanded payment allegedly by
calling up petitioner at her office. Failing to receive any
payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the
complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly
wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored
the demand.
On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged

against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Makati. The Information read:
"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1991, in the

Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make out, draw and issue to complainant Ignacio
H. Garcia, Jr., to apply on account or for value the dated
check/described below:
"Check No. : 149900
Drawn Against : Traders Royal Bank
In the Amount of : P50,000.00
Dated/Postdated : June 24, 1991
Payable to : Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr.
"said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof,

she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
`ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount
of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Subsequent Informations, docketed Criminal Cases No. 92-

4466 to No. 92-4482, inclusive, similarly worded as in
Criminal Case No. 92-4465 except as to the dates, the
number, and the amounts of the checks hereunder itemized -
"Check Number Dated/Postdated

Amount
TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991

P6,000.00
TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991

3,000.00
No. 182074 July 30, 1991

29,700.00
No. 182084 August 30, 1991

9,300.00
No. 182078 September 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 161183 September 18, 1991

6,000.00
No. 161177 September 18, 1991

100,000.00
No. 182085 September 30, 1991

9,000.00
No. 182079 October 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 182086 October 30, 1991

10,500.00
No. 182080 November 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 182087 November 30, 1991

11,400.00
No. 182081 December 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 182082 December 15, 1991

100,000.00
No. 182088 December 30, 1991

12,000.00
No. 182089 December 30, 1991

100,000.00
No. 182090 December 30, 1991

100,000.00"
were also filed against petitioner. The cases were later

consolidated and jointly tried following the "not guilty" plea of
petitioner when arraigned on 02 November 1992.
On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed a demurrer to the

evidence, with leave of court, premised on the absence of a
demand letter and that the checks were not issued as payment
but as evidence of indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals
of the loans obtained by petitioner. Opposed by the
prosecution, the demurrer was denied by the trial court. In
the hearing of 17 February 1994, petitioner, through counsel,
waived her right to present evidence in her defense. Relying
solely then on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the
lower court rendered judgment convicting petitioner. The
decision, as heretofore stated, was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision of 15 February 1999. Reconsideration
was also denied in the resolution, dated 09 July 1999, of the
appellate court.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner raised the

following issues for resolution by the Court -
"1. Whether or not an alleged verbal demand to pay sufficient

to convict herein petitioner for the crime of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22;
"2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed

reversible error when it affirmed the judgment of conviction
rendered by the trial court, on the ground that a written notice
of dishonor is not necessary in a prosecution for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, contrary to the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572;
(and)
"3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in

considering the alleged written demand letter, despite failure
of the prosecution to formally offer the same."
The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 "Bouncing Checks

Law," provide:
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person

who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who

having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when
he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or

entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
"SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The

making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
"SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. – It shall be the

duty of the drawee of any check, when refusing to pay the
same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be
written, printed or stamped in plain language thereon, or
attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal
to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall
always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal.
In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence
of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's
refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto,
with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie
evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor
thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the
reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such
dishonored check.
"Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the

drawee shall state in the notice that there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of
such check, if such be the fact." (Underscoring supplied.)
The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the

making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer,
or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on

the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of
funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if
the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the
date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon
or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that
purpose. The statute has created the prima facie presumption
evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind
would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold,
however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes
arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such
check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee bank.
In Lao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court explained:
“x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this

presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making
and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that,
within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor,
such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the
amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment
in full by the drawee of such check.
“It has been observed that the State, under this statute,
actually offers the violator `a compromise by allowing him to
perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal
action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated.’ This
was also compared `to certain laws allowing illegal possessors
of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally
possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any
criminal liability.’ In this light, the full payment of the amount
appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a `complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and
the basic postulates of fairness require – that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.”
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals predicated the

conviction of petitioner on the supposed fact that petitioner
was informed of the dishonor of the checks through verbal
notice when the complainant had called her up by telephone
informing her of the dishonor of the checks and demanding
payment therefor. The appellate court said:
"The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is

legally presumed from the dishonor of his check (People vs.
Laggui, 171 Phil. 305). The law does not require a written
notice of the dishonor of such check.
"In the instant case, appellant had knowledge that her checks
were dishonored by the bank when complainant Garcia made
several oral demands upon her to pay the value of the checks
in the amount of P573,800.00. Despite said demands,
appellant failed and refused to pay the same. Moreover,
complaining witness further testified that his lawyer made a
written demand upon appellant but the latter ignored said
demand (tsn., May 27, 1993, pp. 13-14). In this connection,
appellant waived her right to present evidence or rebut
complainant's testimony that he made oral demands upon
appellant to make good the dishonored checks and his lawyer
wrote her a demand letter.
"Likewise, appellant did not object to the admission of the

complainant's testimony with regard to the written demand by
moving that it be stricken off the record for being hearsay,
hence, the same is admissible evidence. In the case of People
vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440, the Supreme court ruled:
"`x x x (It) must be noted that neither the defendant nor his
counsel below objected to the admission of the testimonies
which are now being assailed as hearsay. This is fatal to
defendant-appellant's present posture since the failure to
object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the x x right
to cross-examine the actual witness to the occurrence,
rendering the evidence admissible.'"
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor

is fatal. The Court agrees.
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the
notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,
however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such
fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor
or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear
to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is
convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing
Checks Law would require for the act to be punished
thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is
dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been
notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule
is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence
to the assertion that a demand letter was sent by a counsel of
the complainant because of the failure of the prosecution to
formally offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to consider as
part of the evidence only those which are formally
offered[14]for judges must base their findings strictly on the
evidence submitted by the parties at the trial.[15] Without the
written notice of dishonor, there can be no basis, considering
what has heretofore been said, for establishing the presence of
"actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds."
The prosecution may have failed to sufficiently establish a case

to warrant conviction, however, it has clearly proved
petitioner's failure to pay a just debt owing to the private
complainant. The total face value of the dishonored checks, to
wit-
Check Number Dated/Postdated

Amount
TRB – No. 149900 June 24, 1991

P50,000.00
TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991

6,000.00
TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991

3,000.00
No. 182074 July 30, 1991

29,700.00
No. 182084 August 30, 1991

1,300.00
No. 182078 September 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 161183 September 18, 1991

6,000.00
No. 161171 September 18, 1991

100,000.00
No. 182085 September 30, 1991

9,900.00
No. 182079 October 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 182086 October 30, 1991

10,500.00
No. 182080 November 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 182087 November 30, 1991

11,400.00
No. 182081 December 15, 1991

6,000.00
No. 182082 December 15, 1991

100,000.00
No. 182088 December 30, 1991

12,000.00
No. 182089 December 30, 1991

100,000.00
No. 182090 December 30, 1991

100,000.00"
or the sum of P563,800, has yet to be made good by petitioner.

This amount, with 12% legal interest per annum from the
filing of the information until the finality of this decision, must
be forthwith settled.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

MODIFIED. Petitioner Josephine Domagsang is acquitted of
the crime charged on reasonable doubt. She is ordered,
however, to pay to the offended party the face value of the
checks in the total amount of P563,800.00 with 12% legal
interest, per annum, from the filing of the informations until
the finality of this decision, the sum of which, inclusive of the
interest, shall be subject thereafter to 12%, per annum,
interest until the due amount is paid. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
VICTOR TING "SENG DEE" and EMILY CHAN-AZAJAR,

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. 2000 November 13 3rd
Division G.R. No. 140665
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the

reversal of the February 12, 1999 decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region (Manila, Branch 45) finding
petitioners guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
Petitioners’ version of the background events is as follows:
From 1991 to 1992, Juliet Ting "Chan Sioc Hiu" obtained

loans, in the aggregate amount of P2,750,000.00, from private
complainant Josefina K. Tagle for use in Juliet’s furniture
business. As payment thereof, Juliet issued eleven (11) post-
dated checks which, upon maturity, were dishonored for
reasons of "Closed Account" or "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds." Juliet was subsequently prosecuted for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Due to her financial difficulties, Juliet requested her husband

Victor Ting "Seng Dee" and her sister Emily Chan-Azajar
(petitioners herein) to take over her furniture business,
including the obligations appurtenant thereto. Agreeing to
Juliet’s request, petitioners issued nineteen (19) checks in
replacement of the eleven (11) checks earlier issued by Juliet.
The planned take-over, however, never materialized since the
Naga Hope Christian School, petitioner Emily Chan-Azajar’s
employer in Naga, refused to let her resign to attend to her
sister’s business. Since the planned take-over did not take
place, petitioners requested Juliet to reassume her obligation
to private complainant Tagle by replacing the checks they had
previously issued to the latter. Thus, Juliet replaced the
nineteen (19) checks issued by petitioners with twenty-three
(23) Far East Bank checks in favor of Tagle. Petitioners then
requested private complainant Tagle to return the nineteen
(19) checks they had issued to her. Instead of returning the
checks, Tagle deposited seven of the checks with MetroBank
where they were dishonored for being "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds."
On the other hand, private complainant Tagle alleged that

sometime in April 1993, petitioners obtained a loan of
P950,000.00 from her, issuing several post-dated checks in
payment thereof. When the checks were deposited by Tagle
with MetroBank, they were dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Tagle alleged that despite verbal
and written demands, petitioners failed to pay her the value of
the dishonored checks.
Consequently, seven informations for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against petitioners. Said
informations are similarly worded except with respect to the
check number, the amount involved, and the date the check
was issued. The information in Criminal Case No. 94-131945
(the other cases are Criminal Case No. 94-131946, Criminal
Case No. 94-131947, Criminal Case No. 94-131948, Criminal
Case No. 94-131949, Criminal Case No. 94-131950, and
Criminal Case No. 94-131951) charged:
That sometime prior to May 27, 1993, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
JOSEPHINE K. TAGLE, to apply on account or for value
Producers Bank of the Philippines, Check No. 946072 dated
May 27, 1993 payable to CASH in the amount of P250,000.00
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they did
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days
from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
said JOSEFINA K. TAGLE the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
(p. 2, Original Records.)
Criminal Cases No. 94-131945 to 94-131951 were

consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned, petitioners,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. During trial, the
prosecution presented only one witness, the private
complainant, the testimony of Producer’s Bank representative
Ferdinand Lazo being dispensed with after counsel for
petitioners admitted the dishonor of the checks subject matter
of the action.
On March 16, 1995, the trial court found petitioners guilty of

violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in each of the seven cases,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused VICTOR TING

and EMILY CHAN AZAJAR are hereby found "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of all the charges contained in Criminal Case
Nos. 94-131945; 94-131946; 94-131947; 94-131948; 94-
131949; 94-131950 and 94-131951 and for each count, they
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment; to pay Josefina K. Tagle the total amount of
P950,000.00; and to pay the cost.
(p. 294, Rollo.)
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals

which was docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. 18054. However,
the appellate court, on February 12, 1999, affirmed.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied
for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court, given the absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt or in the presence of facts creating
reasonable doubt.
The petition has merit.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the

Bouncing Checks Law, provides:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who

makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or
for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity,

the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf
of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be committed,

the following elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the

time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon is
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank

for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment (Sycip, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 125059,
March 17, 2000).
An analysis of the evidence presented, however, shows that

not all the aforementioned elements have been established by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
That the seven checks in question were issued by petitioners

is beyond dispute. Not only were the dishonored checks
presented in court, but petitioners even admitted signing the
checks and issuing them to private complainant. From the
evidence on record, it is clear that petitioners signed and
issued the seven checks in question.
That the checks were dishonored is also clearly established.

Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides that "the
introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check,
having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon,
or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid,
shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said
check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment
and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly
dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or attached by the
drawee on such dishonored check." In the instant case, the
fact of the checks’ dishonor is sufficiently shown by the return
slips issued by MetroBank, the depository bank, stating that
the checks had been returned for the reason "DAIF - Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds." Not only are these check return
slips prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored
the checks, but the defense did not present any evidence to
rebut these documents. In fact, counsel for petitioners even
admitted the fact of the checks’ dishonor, agreeing to dispense
with the presentation of the bank representative who was
supposed to prove the fact of dishonor of said checks (p. 162,
Rollo.).
However, for liability to attach under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,

it is not enough that the prosecution establishes that a check
was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored.
The prosecution must also prove the second element, that is, it
must further show that the issuer, at the time of the check’s
issuance, had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or
credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment.
Since the second element involves a state of mind which is
difficult to verify, Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 creates
a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima
facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are
present (Magno v. People, 210 SCRA 471 [1992]). Section 2
provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The

making, drawing, and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge
of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In truth, this Court declared in King v. People (G.R. No.

131540, December 2, 1999) that "the prima facie presumption
arises when the check is issued. But the law also provides
that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the
amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment
‘within five banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.’ Verily, BP 22 gives the
accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the
check and thus avert prosecution" This opportunity, however,
can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of
dishonor. Thus, the presumption that the issuer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into
existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for its payment.
King v. People, decided by this Division, involves a set of facts

similar to the case at bar. In said case, the accused therein
was proven to have issued eleven checks, all of which were
duly filled up and signed by her. It was also clearly
established that these eleven checks were dishonored, as
shown by the checks themselves which were stamped
"ACCOUNT CLOSED" and further supported by the return
tickets issued by PCI Bank stating that the checks had been
dishonored. Yet, even if the prosecution had already
established the issuance of the checks and their subsequent
dishonor, this Court still required the prosecution to show
that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds by proving
that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five
banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the
check or make arrangement for its payment.
Moreover, in Lina Lim Lao v. CA (274 SCRA 572 [1997]), we

emphasized that "the full payment of the amount appearing in
the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a
‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process
clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic
postulate of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22."
To prove that petitioners received a notice of dishonor, the
prosecution presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly
sent to petitioners through registered mail and its
corresponding registry receipt. Private complainant Josefina
Tagle, the sole witness for the prosecution, testified thus:
Q: Now, when these seven (7) checks bounced for

insufficiency of funds, what step did you take?
A: I demanded the return of my money from them.
Q: Now, what was the reply of the two accused?
A: They kept on promising that they will pay but up to now

they have not paid any single centavo.
Q: What other step did you take?
A: I requested my lawyer to write a demand letter.
Q: And that demand letter was sent to the accused?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: In what manner?
A: By registered mail.
Q: Now, was that demand letter received by the two

accused?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What is your evidence?
A: The return card.
Q: If you are shown anew the copy of the demand letter

which is already marked as Exhibit B, would you be able to
recognize the same?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Is that the one that you are referring to?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How about the return card, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir, this is the one.
Q: Now, upon receipt of this letter by the two accused, did

the two accused pay the amount of the said check?
A: No, Sir.
Q: So what did you do next?
A: I told my lawyer to file charges against them.
Q: You mean the present charge?
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. Acuesta:
That is all, Your Honor.
(TSN, Aug. 24, 1994, p. 8-9.)
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made

to the demand letter by the prosecution. As can be noticed
from the above exchange, the prosecution alleged that the
demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove mailing, it
presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry
return receipt. However, no attempt was made to show that
the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail nor
was the signature on the registry return receipt authenticated
or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony of
private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and
when the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to
have presumed that the registry return receipt was proof
enough that the demand letter was sent through registered
mail and that the same was actually received by petitioners or
their agents.
As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the
issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule
that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that
the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am
Jur 2d, Notice, § 45). The burden of proving notice rests upon
the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In
criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover,
it is a general rule that, when service of a notice is sought to
be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on
which the validity of such service depends had existence,
otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of
service (C.J.S., Notice, § 18). In the instant case, the
prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was
sent through registered mail, relying as it did only on the
registry return receipt. In civil cases, service made through
registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts
showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13,
Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the
registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of
mailing as proof of service be presented, then with more
reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt
alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant case,
the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the
affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter
was sent.
Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having
received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo.). Given petitioners’
denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the
prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was
indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was
received by petitioners. This, the prosecution miserably failed
to do. Instead, it merely presented the demand letter and
registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the same was
equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received
by petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters
(Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580).
Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was
served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the
addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides
that "[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but
the addressee, or upon the addressee’s written order, in which
case the authorized agent must write the addressee’s name on
the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature
below it." In the case at bar, no effort was made to show that
the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent.
All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the
registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter.
As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners or
of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry
receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized
agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however,
cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being
insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their
checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew
of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.
As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11,

2000), "penal statutes must be strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused." Likewise, the
prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the evidence for
the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an
offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the offense,
petitioners may not thus be convicted for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
That petitioners are civilly liable to private complainant is also

doubtful. Private complainant claims that petitioners
borrowed Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00) Pesos
from her on or about the end of April 1993, in payment of
which petitioners issued several post-dated checks in her
favor. The seven checks issued by petitioners as payment for
the amount borrowed add up to P950,000.00. If private
complainant is the businesswoman that she claims to be, she
should be collecting interest on the loan she granted to
petitioners. In other words, the amount to be repaid by
petitioners should be more than P950,000.00, to account for
interest on the loan. The checks issued by petitioners,
however, do not provide for interest. It is thus more credible
that the seven checks involved in this case form part of
nineteen checks issued to replace the checks issued by Juliet
Ting to private complainant. This conclusion is bolstered by
private complainant’s admission in her reply-affidavit that
more than seven checks were issued by petitioners (p. 11,
Original Records). In said reply-affidavit, private complainant
states that "respondents issued and delivered to me in Manila
several checks, which partially include their seven (7)
bouncing checks herein. I say ‘partially’ because I will have to
file additional bouncing check cases against them, as these
other checks likewise bounced." Furthermore, in the same
reply-affidavit, private complainant claims that the checks in
question were not replaced, allegedly because the replacement
checks must first be cleared, which did not happen in this
case. By implication, had the 23 Far East Bank checks issued
by Juliet Ting to replace the nineteen checks issued by
petitioners been cleared, then private complainant would have
considered the checks in question as having been replaced.
This only supports our conclusion that it was Juliet Ting who
owed money to private complainant, not petitioners.
Moreover, the original debtor Juliet Ting was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Cases 93-126581-
91 for eleven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
These eleven bouncing check cases involved the same
obligation being sued upon by private complainant Tagle
herein. The trial court expressly acknowledged in said cases
that nineteen (19) checks were issued by petitioners as
payment for Juliet Ting’s obligation. In its August 7, 1997
decision convicting Juliet Ting for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, the trial court declared that "to cover the additional
loans, accused (Juliet Ting) delivered 19 post-dated checks
issued by Victor Ting and Emily Azajar (p. 55, Rollo.)." The
trial court’s decision further provides:
Since she could not fund the other checks (Exhs. B to K), she
replaced the same with 19 post-dated checks of her husband
Victor Ting and her sister Emily Azajar totaling P2,450,000.00.
They issued the checks as they would take over her furniture
business. The intended partnership of Victor and Emily was
aborted as the latter was not allowed to resign from her
teaching post in Naga City. She then replaced the checks
issued by Victor and Emily with her own checks - 23 FEB
post-dated checks per list (Exh. 9) prepared by Suzanne
Azajar.
Despite receipt of the replacement checks, complainant

refused to return the checks of Victor and Emily and even filed
cases against them.
(p. 56, Rollo.)
Not having borrowed the amount of Nine Hundred Fifty

Thousand (P950,000.00) from private complainant, petitioners
may not thus be held liable therefor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 12, 1999 REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Victor Ting “Seng Dee” and Emily Chan-Azajar are
hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against them for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to
prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No
special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL NAGRAMPA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.2002 August 61st DivisionG.R.
No. 146211
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails his

conviction for estafa in Criminal Case No. Q-90-15797 and for
two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-15798 and Q-90-
15799.
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case

No. Q-90-15797 for estafa reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of July 1989 in Quezon City,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain by means
of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
FEDCOR TRADING CORPORATION represented by FEDERICO
A. SANTANDER by then and there making, drawing and
issuing in favor of the latter the following checks, to wit:
CHECK NOS. AMOUNT POSTDATED
473477 P75,000.00 August 31, 1989
473478 P75,000.00 September 30, 1989
drawn against the SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY in

payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of
issue that he did not have any funds in the bank or his funds
deposited therein was not sufficient to cover the amount of the
checks that upon presentation of said checks to the said bank
for payment, the same were dishonored for the reason that the
drawer thereof, accused MANUEL NAGRAMPA did not have
any funds therein and despite notice of dishonor thereof,
accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem
or make good said checks, to the damage and prejudice of the
said FEDCOR TRADING CORPORATION in such amount as
may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case

No. Q-90-15798 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of July, 1989 in Quezon City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of
FEDCOR TRADING CORPORATION represented by FEDERICO
A. SANTANDER a check numbered 473478 drawn against the
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Escolta Branch, a
duly established domestic banking institution, in the amount
of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, postdated September 30,
1989 in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well that at
the time of issue that she/he did not have ANY funds in the
drawee bank for the payment of such check; that upon
presentation of said check to said bank for payment, the same
was dishonored for the reason that the drawee bank of
accused MANUEL NAGRAMPA did not have ANY funds therein
and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good said
check, to the damage and prejudice of the said FEDCOR
TRADING CORPORATION in the amount aforementioned and
in such other amount as may be awarded under the provisions
of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law.[2]
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-90-15799 is similarly

worded as in Criminal Case No. Q-90-15798 except as to the
date and number of the check.
Upon his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty in

each case.
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented Federico

Santander, President of Fedcor Trading Corporation (hereafter
FEDCOR), and Felix Mirano, signature verifier of the Escolta
Branch of the Security Bank and Trust Company.
Federico Santander testified that on 28 July 1989, Corseno

Bote, FEDCOR’s Sales Manager, brought to FEDCOR
petitioner Manuel Nagrampa (hereafter NAGRAMPA), General
Manager of the Nagrampa Asphalt Plant in Montalban, Rizal.
NAGRAMPA purchased a Yutani Poclain Backhoe Excavator
Equipment for P200,000 from FEDCOR and paid in cash the
down payment of P50,000. To cover the balance of P150,000,
he issued Check No. 473477[3] postdated 31 August 1989 and
Check No. 473478[4] postdated 30 September 1989 in the
amount of P75,000 each. The checks were drawn against the
Security Bank and Trust Company. Upon the assurance of
FEDCOR’s salesman that the checks were good, FEDCOR
delivered to petitioner the equipment.[5]
Santander further testified that FEDCOR presented the checks

for payment on 22 February 1990; however, they were
dishonored on the ground that petitioner’s account with the
drawee bank, Security Bank, had already been closed. In a
letter[6] dated 19 March 1990, sent through registered mail,
FEDCOR demanded payment from petitioner; but the latter
failed to pay. Hence, the above cases were filed against
petitioner with the trial court.[7] During his cross-
examination, Santander denied that the equipment was
returned to FEDCOR. Ronnie Bote, son of Corseno Bote, was
not an employee of FEDCOR but was merely its sales agent
with no authority to receive returned equipment.[8]
Felix Mirano, the second prosecution witness, testified that he

had been a signature verifier of Security Bank for twelve years.
His duty was to verify the signatures of the clients of the bank.
He brought with him the signature card for Account No. 0110-
4048-19, petitioner’s account against which the subject
checks were drawn. He identified the signatures appearing on
Checks Nos. 473477 and 473478 to be those of the petitioner.
When asked about the status of said account, he answered
that the account had been closed in May 1985 yet.[9]
For his part, petitioner testified that on 28 July 1989, he

bought from Corseno Bote a backhoe and paid P50,000 cash,
as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt[10] signed by
Corseno Bote. In addition, he issued and handed to Corseno
Bote two checks in the amount of P75,000 each, dated 31
August 1989[11] and 30 September 1989.[12] The agreement
with Corseno Bote was that petitioner would replace the two
checks with cash if the backhoe would be in good running
condition. The backhoe was delivered at petitioner’s jobsite on
29 July 1989. After five to seven days of use, the backhoe
broke down. Such fact was reported to Ronnie Bote, and the
backhoe was thus repaired. After one day of using it, the
backhoe broke down again. Petitioner again reported the
matter to Ronnie Bote, who told him that the equipment
should be brought to the latter’s office for repair. As evidence
of the return of the equipment, petitioner presented a letter
dated 3 October 1989[13] addressed to Electrobus
Consolidated, Inc., requesting the release of the backhoe to
Ronnie Bote for repair, with the alleged signature[14] of
Ronnie Bote appearing at the bottom thereof to attest to his
receipt of the equipment. After a week, petitioner demanded
from Ronnie Bote the return of the backhoe, the P50,000 cash
and the two postdated checks, but to no avail.[15] On cross-
examination, he admitted that during the pendency of the case
he paid, upon the advice of his counsel, the amount of
P15,000, which he handed to FEDCOR’s counsel Atty. Orlando
Paray.[16]
On 30 September 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[17]
finding petitioner guilty of two counts of violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for two years and pay FEDCOR P150,000, with
legal interest thereon from 9 October 1990 up to the time of
full payment.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The

appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 18082. Upon noticing
that the 30 September 1993 Decision of the trial court did not
resolve the issue of petitioner’s liability for estafa, the Court of
Appeals issued on 19 May 1998 a resolution[18] ordering the
return of the entire records of the case to the trial court for the
latter to decide the estafa case against petitioner.
On 8 February 1999, the trial court rendered a decision[19]

finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of seven years and four
months of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and six
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. As might be
expected, petitioner also appealed said decision to the Court of
Appeals.
On 21 July 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[20]

affirming in toto the decision of the trial court finding
petitioner guilty of estafa and violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law. It also denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the decision.[21] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that he is not guilty of estafa because no

damage was caused to FEDCOR, considering that the backhoe
became unserviceable a few days after delivery and was
eventually returned to FEDCOR through the latter’s sales
agent Ronnie Bote. He also asserts that he did not violate B.P.
Blg. 22 either. The two checks issued by him were presented
for payment only on 22 February 1990, or after more than five
months from the date of the checks. Under Sections 1 and 2 of
B.P. Blg. 22 FEDCOR, as payee, had the duty or obligation to
encash or deposit the checks issued in its favor within ninety
days from the date of issue. Since FEDCOR deposited the
checks after this period, he cannot be faulted for their
subsequent dishonor.
Alternatively, petitioner prays that in the event that his

conviction for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 is sustained, the
rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[22] and Lim v. People[23]
should be given retroactive effect in his favor so that only a
fine may be imposed on him as penalty.
In arguing that petitioner’s conviction for two counts of

violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is correct, the Office of the Solicitor
General relies heavily on the testimony of Felix Mirano that the
account of petitioner had been closed way back in May 1985,
or four years prior to the issuance of the subject checks to
FEDCOR. The date when the checks were encashed or
deposited is immaterial because there was no more existing
bank account against which they were drawn, and their
dishonor was therefore certain even if the checks were
presented for payment within the 90-day period from their
issuance. With respect to petitioner’s plea to impose on him
the penalty of fine in the event that his conviction is affirmed,
the OSG maintains that the penalty of imprisonment is
appropriate considering petitioner’s act of issuing worthless
checks which showed his culpable violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner’s argument that the element of damage to private

complainant FEDCOR is lacking is disputed by the OSG by
pointing out petitioner’s failure to prove the return of the
backhoe to FEDCOR. Ronnie Bote, the person to whom the
backhoe was allegedly returned, was not presented as a
witness to corroborate petitioner’s testimony. But even
granting arguendo that the backhoe was indeed received by
Ronnie Bote, there is no showing that he acted for, and on
behalf of, FEDCOR in doing so considering that he was not an
employee of FEDCOR.
The petition is without merit.

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. -- Any person

than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who,

sufficient funds or to maintain a credit or to cover the full
Two distinct acts are punished under the above-quoted

provision:
(1)The making or drawing and issuance of any check to apply

on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the
drawer does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank; and
(2)The failure to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit

to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.[24]
In the first situation, the drawer knows of the insufficiency of
funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance; while in
the second situation, the drawer has sufficient funds at the
time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain
credit within ninety days from the date appearing on the
check. The check involved in the first offense is worthless at
the time of issuance, since the drawer has neither sufficient
funds in, nor credit with, the drawee bank at the time; while
that involved in the second offense is good when issued, as the
drawer has sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank
when issued. In both instances, the offense is consummated
by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or
credit.[25]
It can be gleaned from the allegations in the information that

petitioner is charged with the first type of offense under B.P.
Blg. 22.
The elements of the first type of offense are as follows:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply

for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.[26]
Petitioner admitted that he issued the two postdated checks

worth P75,000 each. He did not deny that the same were
dishonored on the ground that the account from which they
were to be drawn was already closed at the time the checks
were presented for payment. Neither did he rebut the
prosecution’s evidence that the account against which he drew
his two postdated checks had been closed in May 1985 yet, or
more than four years prior to the drawing and delivery of the
checks.
The fact that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day
period provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 is of no moment.
We held in Wong v. Court of Appeals[27] that the 90-day
period is not an element of the offense but merely a condition
for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds; thus:
That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is

simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the
offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to
maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable
time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, “a check must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay.” By current banking practice, a check becomes stale
after more than six (6) months, or 180 days.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,[28] we ruled that such prima

facie presumption is intended to facilitate proof of knowledge,
and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may
also prove such knowledge; thus, the only consequence of the
failure to present the check for payment within the 90-day
period is that there arises no prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds.[29] The prosecution may
still prove such knowledge through other evidence.
In this case, FEDCOR presented the checks for encashment on

22 February 1990, or within the six-month period from the
date of issuance of the checks, and would not therefore have
been considered stale had petitioner’s account been existing.
Although the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds did not arise, such knowledge was sufficiently proved by
the unrebutted testimony of Mirano to the effect that
petitioner’s account with the Security Bank was closed as
early as May 1985, or more than four years prior to the
issuance of the two checks in question.
Thus, we find no error in the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of

the trial court’s decision convicting petitioner of violations of
B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner’s alternative prayer for the modification of penalty

by retroactively applying Vaca v. Court of Appeals[30] and Lim
v. People[31] must likewise be denied. We quote Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001 clarifying Administrative Circular No.
12-2000; thus:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No.

12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application
of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the

possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22.
Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule

of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P.
Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense
and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake
of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
In this case, when petitioner issued the subject postdated

checks even though he had no more account with the drawee
bank, having closed it more than four years before he drew
and delivered the checks, he manifested utter lack of good
faith or wanton bad faith. Hence, he cannot avail himself of
the benefits under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.
We likewise sustain petitioner’s conviction for the crime of
estafa.
The crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended, has the following elements:
(1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to
the payee thereof.[32]
Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of

postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
must be the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it
should be either prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of
fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property
from the offended party because of the issuance of the check,
or the person to whom the check was delivered would not have
parted with his money or property had there been no check
issued to him. Stated otherwise, the check should have been
issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party
deceived of his money or property, and not in payment of a
pre-existing obligation.[33]
The existence of the first two elements in the case at bar is not
disputed. Petitioner maintains that the third element is not
present.
Damage as an element of estafa may consist in (1) the offended

party being deprived of his money or property as a result of
the defraudation; (2) disturbance in property right; or (3)
temporary prejudice.[34]
In this case, the deprivation of the property of FEDCOR is

apparent. Undoubtedly, the reason why FEDCOR delivered the
backhoe to petitioner was that the latter paid the P50,000
down payment and issued two postdated checks in the
amount of P75,000 each.
Petitioner’s claim that he returned the equipment was not duly
proved; he never presented as witness the agent who allegedly
received the equipment from him. Moreover, he admitted that
he never wrote FEDCOR about the return of the allegedly
defective backhoe to Ronnie Bote; neither did he go to
FEDCOR to claim the return of the equipment or of the cash
down payment and the two checks.[35] Such admissions belie
his allegation that he returned the equipment to FEDCOR.
Besides, on cross-examination he admitted that during the
pendency of the case, he paid Santander, through FEDCOR’s
lawyer, on two separate occasions in the total amount of
P15,000 upon the advice of his own lawyer that he had to pay
because he was guilty; thus:
Q During the pendency of this case you paid Engr. Santander

cash, is that correct?
A I paid the amount of P10,000.00 and then another
P5,000.00 because according to my first lawyer I have to pay
this because I am guilty and this is B.P. case [sic].
Q You delivered the money to Engr. Federico Santander?

A To you Atty. Paray.
Q And I was the lawyer of Engr. Federico Santander?

A Yes, sir.[36]
If indeed petitioner returned the backhoe to Ronnie Bote and

yet the latter did not heed his demands for the return of his
cash payment and the checks, he (petitioner) should have, at
the very least, gone to or written FEDCOR itself about the
matter. Instead, he again paid FEDCOR the amount of
P15,000 during the pendency of the case. Such payment to
FEDCOR negates his claim that he returned the backhoe; it
may even be tantamount to an offer of compromise. Under
Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, an offer of
compromise in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt.
Finally, by appealing his conviction, petitioner has thrown the

whole case open for review. It becomes the duty of this Court
to correct any error as may be found in the appealed
judgment, even though it was not made the subject of
assignment of errors.[37] This Court finds to be erroneous the
penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime of estafa, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which is seven years and
four months of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and
six months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The penalty for
estafa committed by means of bouncing checks has been
increased by Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on
22 October 1975. Section 1 thereof provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means

of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph
2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the

fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case
exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua.
Petitioner NAGRAMPA defrauded FEDCOR in the amount of

P135,000 (P150,000 [value of the checks] minus P15,000
[payment made by petitioner during the pendency of these
cases]). Applying P.D. No. 818 and the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, plus one year for each additional P10,000 of
the amount of the fraud; and the minimum shall be prision
mayor, which is the penalty next lower to that prescribed for
the offense without first considering any modifying
circumstances or the incremental penalty for the amount of
fraud in excess of P22,000.[38]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals upholding the decisions of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-90-15797, Q-90-15798 and Q-90-15799 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner Manuel
Nagrampa is hereby sentenced to suffer (1) an imprisonment
of one year for each of the two counts of violation of B. P. Blg.
22, and (2) an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one
day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-eight years, four
months and one day of reclusion perpetua as maximum for
the crime of estafa; and to pay private complainant Fedcor
Trading Corporation the amount of P135,000, plus legal
interest thereon from 9 October 1990 up to the time of full
payment.
SO ORDERED.
CLARO E. NARTE and WINSTON TOMAS L. CADHIT,

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.2004 Jul
142nd DivisionG.R. No. 132552
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the Decision[1] of the

Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1998 which dismissed the
petition filed by Claro E. Narte and Winston Tomas L. Cadhit
(hereinafter, the petitioners) and affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)[2] convicting the petitioners of nine
(9) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22)
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in each
case.[3]
The facts are not disputed. As summarized by the MeTC and

adopted by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, they are as
follows:[4]
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Claro Narte is the
General Manager of Norphil Transport Corporation while
accused Winston Tomas Cadhit is the maintenance and
purchasing manager of Norphil Transport Corporation; that
spouses Delia and Emilio Cabrera sold three (3) air
conditioned buses to Norphil Transport Corporation at 712
Earnshaw St., Sampaloc, Manila, on May 12, 1994 for
P2,220,000.00 cash upon delivery by virtue of which a deed of
absolute sale was executed; that the buses were delivered; that
payment for the buses was made in postdated checks issued
by accused Claro Narte and Winston Tomas L. Cadhit, to wit:
Check No. 738006 (Exhibit E), Check No. 738007 (Exhibit F),
Check No. 738022 (Exhibit G), Check No. 738024 (Exhibit H),
Check No. 738025 (Exhibit I), Check No. 738026 (Exhibit J),
Check No. 738018 (Exhibit K), Check No. 738019 (Exh. L),
Check No. 738020 (Exhibit M), Check No. 738021 (Exhibit N),
at their office at 712 Earnshaw St., Sampaloc, Manila, all of
which are payable to Emilio Cabrera, that the checks are
marked Exhibits E, F, H, J, K, L, were deposited on August 18,
1994 with Solid Bank, Paco Branch; that the checks marked
Exhibit G and Exhibit I were presented for payment with PNB
on July 5, 1994 and September 2, 1994, respectively; that the
checks marked Exhibit M and N were deposited with Solid
Bank on August 31, 1994 and September 18, 1994,
respectively; that the check marked Exhibit G was dishonored
for being drawn against insufficient funds while the rest of the
checks marked Exhibits E to F and H to N were dishonored by
reason of account closed as per corresponding letter advice
from the banks concerned; that the spouses accepted check
payments upon the request of accused; that they informed
accused that the checks had bounced; that the accused
promised to pay the bank upon return of their boss who was
then in Canada; that the boss arrived without any payment
being made; that she consulted a lawyer, Atty. Gaudencio
Lagua, who sent demand letters; that despite their promise
and receipt of the demand letters, accused failed to settle the
obligation.
Evidence for the defense shows that in the transaction for the
sale of the buses in favor of Norphil Transport Corporation,
one Emilio Cabrera, Jr. represented to be the owner of the
buses; that upon delivery of the three buses, which was made
one after the other, postdated checks were issued and made
payable to Emilio Cabrera, referred to as Emilio Cabrera, Jr.
and not Emilio Cabrera, Sr., for the agreed total consideration
of P2,220,000.00, but no deed of absolute sale was given; that
when accused repeatedly requested for the deed of absolute
sale so that the corporation could effect transfer of the line
and operate the buses, it was discovered that buses were in
the name of Delia Cabrera, and not Emilio Cabrera, Jr. to
whom the accused issued the checks; that accused requested
the return of the checks mistakenly issued to Emilio Cabrera,
Jr. for a replacement in the name of Delia Cabrera, but the
checks were given to Emilio Cabrera, Sr. who is not the
intended payee; and that the name and signature of Emilio
Cabrera, Sr. were merely inserted in the deed of absolute sale
to make it appear that he was a party to the sale.
The MeTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the
elements of the offense, namely: that a person makes or draws
and issues any check; that the check is made or drawn and
issued to apply on account or for value; that the person who
makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of
issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and that the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.[5]
According to the MeTC, “the accused issued and signed the

subject checks as payment for the three (3) buses sold to
Norphil Transport Corporation and knew that at the time of
issuance they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment in full upon presentment.”[6]
Consequently, the MeTC convicted the petitioners of ten (10)
counts of violation of B.P. 22 and imposed the penalty of fine
for each count with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. However, only nine (9) of the ten (10) convictions
were appealed to the RTC. Correspondingly, only nine (9)
convictions were affirmed.[7]
The petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals by way

of a petition for review[8] raising the following issues: (a) that
the trial court erred in convicting them despite the fact that
the complainant is not the intended payee of the checks; (b)
that the trial court erred in finding that all the elements of the
offense have been established; and (c) that the trial court erred
in ordering subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment
of fine.
The appellate court dismissed the petition, ruling that all the
elements of the offense have been established by the
prosecution. Citing the RTC’s decision favorably, the Court of
Appeals also held that, pursuant to the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), there may be subsidiary imprisonment when the only
penalty imposed is fine.
Thus, the petitioners filed the instant Petition[9] dated March

27, 1998 which is essentially a replica of the petition they
earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. In fact, except for
pages 1, 2, 7, 13 and 14 which were purposely amended to
reflect the pertinent dates, the instant petition merely
reproduced the allegations and assignment of errors already
raised before and passed upon by the RTC and the appellate
court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment[10]

dated September 15, 1998, arguing that the mere issuance of
a check which is subsequently dishonored is prohibited.
Countering the petitioners’ claim that there was no valid
consideration for the issuance of the checks, the OSG points
out that the petitioners themselves admitted that the checks
were issued in payment of the buses purchased from Delia
and Emilio Cabrera. Finally, the OSG avers that the RPC has
supplementary application to special laws such as B.P. 22.
Hence, as the RPC provides for subsidiary imprisonment in
case of non-payment of fine, subsidiary imprisonment may be
imposed in the instant case.
The petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated August 27, 1999
reiterating the arguments in their Petition. Thereupon, the
Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.[12] In compliance with
the Court’s directive, the petitioners filed their
Memorandum[13] dated December 27, 1999 on December 28,
1999, while the OSG submitted its Memorandum[14] dated
December 18, 1999 on December 24, 1999. Thereafter, the
case was considered submitted for decision.
As previously intimated, the instant petition presents exactly

the same arguments raised by the petitioners in their petition
for review with the Court of Appeals. The same issues were
raised before and exhaustively passed upon by the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, which resulted in the affirmance of the
MeTC’s decision finding that all the elements of a violation of
B.P. 22 have been established and that subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency may be imposed in
accordance with the RPC.
These issues need no longer be belabored. Well-settled is the

rule that the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court
are binding on this Court when supported by substantial
evidence on record and carries more weight when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. [15] There are no matters of weight or
significance presented in this petition that would impair the
correctness and validity of the decision of the MeTC affirmed,
as it is, by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.[16]
At any rate, we have pronounced that the clear intention of the

framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum. The agreement
surrounding the issuance of the checks need not be first
looked into since the law itself provides that regardless of the
intent of the parties, the mere issuance of any kind of check
which is subsequently dishonored makes the person who
issued the check liable.[17]
Finally, this Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-
2001 dated February 14, 2001 that there is no legal obstacle
to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused
be unable to pay the fine. This should finally dispel the
petitioners’ importunate claim that the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment in this case is improper.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision of

the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1998, the instant
petition for review is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153451. May 26, 2005

OFELIA MARIGOMEN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20510 affirming the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, in Criminal Case Nos. 13012 to 13014 convicting
Ofelia Marigomen and John V. Dalao for violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.
The Antecedents
Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) is engaged in the sale of

gasoline and oil products to its customers, one of which was
the Industrial Sugar Resources, Inc. (INSURECO), with offices
at the Bacolod Murcia Milling Corporation Compound in
Bacolod City. Caltex had granted a credit line to INSURECO,
and the latter purchased gasoline and lubricants from Caltex
through its sales representative in Negros Occidental and
Bacolod City.[3] The finance officer of INSURECO was Ofelia
Marigomen, while John V. Dalao was the assistant to the
general manager.[4] They were authorized to draw and sign
checks against the account of INSURECO at the Far East
Bank and Trust Company, Bacolod City Branch. Caltex had
agreed for INSURECO to pay its purchases via postdated
checks, which were delivered to Caltex upon the release of the
purchased oil products.[5]
As evidenced by separate delivery receipts, INSURECO bought

and took delivery of oil products from Caltex. In payment
thereof, the following postdated checks, drawn and signed by
Marigomen and Dalao against its account with the Far East
Bank and Trust Company, Bacolod City Branch, were issued
in favor of Caltex:
INVOICE NO.
DATE OF SALE
CHECK NO.
AMOUNT
BA 87060[6]
March 13, 1992
3357283[7]
P 44,988.56
BA 87464[8]
March 17, 1992
3357348[9]
P148,656.10
BA 87987[10]
March 30, 1992
3357543[11]
P130,782.70
BA 87988[12]
-do-
-do-
P28,000.00
BA 88290[13]
April 3, 1992
3357619[14]
P205,489.50
BA 88291[15]
-do-
-do-
P 82,193.30
BA 88292[16]
-do-
-do-
-do-
On due dates, Caltex presented the said checks for payment.

However, Check Nos. 3357283, 3357348 and 3357619 were
dishonored by the drawee bank, for the reason that they were
“drawn against insufficient funds.” Check No. 3357543 was,
likewise, dishonored with the notation “account closed.”[17]
Hence, Caltex, through Dalao, made verbal demands to
INSURECO for the replacement of the dishonored checks with
either manager’s checks or cash, to no avail.[18] On May 6,
1992, Caltex sent a confirmation telegram informing
INSURECO of the dishonor of the said checks, and again
demanded their replacement, but received no reply.[19]
On July 6, 1992, Caltex filed criminal complaints for violation

of B.P. Blg. 22 against Marigomen and Dalao with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City.[20] They were,
thereafter, charged with three counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 in three separate Informations filed with the RTC of
Bacolod City, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 13012 to
13014. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal
Case No. 13012 reads:
That on or about the 30th day of March 1992, in the City of

Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused being then the Finance
Officer and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of
Industrial Sugar Resources Company, Inc. (INSURECO) did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out,
issue and deliver Far East Bank and Trust Company, Bacolod
Branch, Bacolod, City Check No. 3357348 postdated to April
24, 1992, in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX PESOS and TEN
CENTAVOS (P148,656.10), Philippine Currency, in favor of
Caltex Philippines, Inc. a corporation duly organized and
existing under the Philippine Laws, represented in this case by
its Sales Representative, Norman Lee Riego, Jr., in payment of
a pre-existing obligation knowing at the time of issue of said
check that they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment and which check after presentment, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason of
insufficient funds; that, despite notice of dishonor and
repeated demands, accused failed and refused and still fails
and refuses to make good the full value of their check or
redeem the same to the damage and prejudice of said Caltex
Philippines, Inc., in the aforementioned amount.
Contrary to law.[21]
Except for the dates of the commission of the crimes charged

and the contents of the postdated checks subject matter
thereof, the accusatory portions of the two other Informations
are similarly worded.
When she testified, Marigomen admitted to having drawn and

signed the postdated checks subject matter of the cases, along
with Dalao, and that these were issued in payment for the
gasoline and oil products purchased by INSURECO. She
declared that she was employed by INSURECO as finance
officer on September 15, 1991, and that she resigned on
March 31, 1992.[22] As of June 5, 1992 she was residing at
No. 40 Malaspina St., Villamonte, Bacolod City.[23] She
claimed that she had no participation whatsoever in the
purchase of Caltex oil products by INSURECO,[24] which had
been granted a credit line with a 30 to 40-day payment term.
[25] She had no knowledge that Caltex had sent confirmation
telegrams demanding payment from INSURECO, because by
then she was no longer employed therein. Moreover, she never
received any written notice or telegram from Caltex demanding
payment of the amounts of the dishonored checks.[26] It was
only when she received a subpoena from the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City that she discovered that the checks
had been dishonored, and that she had been charged in
connection therewith. She insisted that she was not aware
that the funds of INSURECO in its account with the Far East
Bank and Trust Company were insufficient at the time she
issued the subject checks.[27]
On October 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment

convicting Marigomen and Dalao of the crimes charged. The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby

ACQUITS the accused, John Dalao for the crime of Estafa in
Crim. Case No.12311 for insufficiency of evidence. The Court,
however, finds the accused Ofelia Marigomen and John Dalao
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and hereby sentences them as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 13012:
One (1) year imprisonment and to jointly and solidarily pay the
complainant, by way of civil indemnity the amount of
P148,656.10, representing the value of the check.
complainant the sum of P124,855.75 by way of civil
indemnity.
complainant the amount of P44,988.55, by way of civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Marigomen appealed the decision to the CA, asserting in her

brief, as appellant therein, that the following errors were
committed by the trial court:
1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS A

DEMAND MADE TO THE ACCUSED OFELIA MARIGOMEN.
2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A PRIVATE

PROSECUTOR TO CONDUCT THE DIRECT EXAMINATION.
3 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ACCUSED OFELIA MARIGOMEN IS CIVILLY LIABLE.
4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS A

VALID OFFER OF EXHIBITS MADE BY THE PROSECUTION.
5 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY

OF THE WITNESS MR. NORMAN RIEGO WITHOUT
REQUIRING HIS AUTHORITY OR BOARD RESOLUTION FROM
CALTEX, PHILIPPINES.
6 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING

THE FACT THAT THERE IS A CREDIT LINE GRANTED BY
CALTEX, PHILIPPINES TO INDUSTRIAL SUGAR RESOURCES,
INC. (INSURECO).[29]
On April 19, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the

decision of the RTC, with the modification that Marigomen and
Dalao pay fines, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, in lieu of imprisonment. The appellate court ruled
that they were civilly liable for the amounts of the checks,
conformably with Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and
the ruling of this Court in Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.[30] It also held
that the notices of demand sent by Caltex for INSURECO to
pay the amount of the checks were sufficient notice to
Marigomen and Dalao. The CA also declared that whether or
not Caltex granted a credit line or accommodation to
INSURECO was irrelevant to the issue of whether they were
criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration of the said

decision, Marigomen filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS IS RIGHT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN FINDING THE ACCUSED MRS.
MARIGOMEN GUILTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22 INSPITE
OF THE FACT THAT NO NOTICE OF DEMAND HAS EVER
BEEN SENT TO THE PETITIONER.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE

PROSECUTOR IS PROPER OR NOT.
3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE HELD CIVILLY

LIABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID OFFER OF

EXHIBITS AS AGAINST THE CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS
FILED AGAINST ACCUSED MARIGOMEN.[31]
The petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove a

condition sine qua non to her prosecution and conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, that is, written notice informing her
that the subject checks had been dishonored. She alleges that
the respondent failed to prove that a copy of the telegram
dated May 6, 1992 addressed to INSURECO was sent to and
received by her. Thus, even if the telegram had been received
by INSURECO, such receipt was not binding on her because
she was no longer employed with INSURECO by then.
The petitioner insists that she had no participation whatsoever
in the purchase of the oil products by her former employer.
She maintains that it is shocking to the conscience that she, a
mere employee of INSURECO, should be held civilly liable for
the said purchases. She asserts that if she had issued the
checks in her personal capacity, indubitably, she would be
liable for the dishonor of the checks; in this case, however, she
drew and signed the checks as a mere employee of INSURECO
and did not even receive a single centavo of its proceeds. She
cites the ruling of this Court in Banque Generale Belge v.
Walter Bull & Co., Inc.[32]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part,

maintains that the petitioner was notified verbally and in
writing of the dishonor of the subject checks, as shown by the
aforementioned telegram sent by Caltex via PT&T to
INSURECO. The OSG argues that the petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of the said telegram since she was the assigned
finance officer of INSURECO. The petitioner even failed to
prove that March 31, 1992 was the last day of her employment
with INSURECO; and even if it were the case, it was unusual
that the petitioner still signed checks due and demandable at
a time when she would no longer be connected with
INSURECO, and that the latter allowed such a situation. The
OSG posits that the petitioner cannot even rely on the ruling
of this Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals,[33] because the
factual backdrop in this case is substantially different.
The threshold issue is whether or not the respondent adduced

proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the petitioner for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The petition is granted.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who

makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or
for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
For violation of B.P. Blg. 22 to be committed, the prosecution

must prove the following essential elements:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to

apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at

the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee

bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.[34]
It is difficult for the prosecution to prove the second element of

the crime because the knowledge on the part of the maker,
drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such checks in full upon its presentation is a state
of the mind. However, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that if
the prosecution proves that the making, drawing and issuing
of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee bank
because of insufficiency of funds or credit with the said bank
within 90 days from the date of the check, such shall be prima
facie evidence of the second element of the crime. The drawee
or maker of the check may overcome the prima facie evidence,
either by paying the amount of the check, or by making
arrangements for its payment in full within five banking days
after receipt of notice that such check was not paid by the
drawee bank.[35]
Contrary, to the respondent’s contention, the ruling of the

Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals[36] is applicable in this case.
In acquitting the petitioner therein, the Court explained:
It has been observed that the State, under this statute,

actually offers the violator “a compromise by allowing him to
perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal
action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated.” This
was also compared to certain laws allowing illegal possessors
of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally
possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any
criminal liability. In this light, the full payment of the amount
appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a “complete defense.” The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and
the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, the notice of dishonor must be in writing; a verbal

notice is not enough. The rationale for this was explained by
the Court in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals,[37] to wit:
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor

is fatal. The Court agrees.
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the
notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,
however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., “that where there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such
fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor
or refusal,” a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear
to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is
convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing
Checks Law would require for the act to be punished
thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is
dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been
notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule
is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.
Thus, if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the

notice of dishonor to the said corporation is not notice to the
employee or officer who drew or issued the check for and in its
behalf. The Court explained in Lao v. Court of Appeals,[38] to
wit:
In this light, the postulate of Respondent Court of Appeals that

“(d)emand on the Corporation constitutes demand on
appellant (herein petitioner),” is erroneous. Premiere has no
obligation to forward the notice addressed to it to the employee
concerned, especially because the corporation itself incurs no
criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 for the issuance of a
bouncing check. Responsibility under B.P. Blg. 22 is personal
to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to
the corporation is not enough to satisfy due process.
Moreover, it is petitioner, as an officer of the corporation, who
is the latter’s agent for purposes of receiving notices and other
documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic
that notice to the corporation, which has a personality distinct
and separate from the petitioner, does not constitute notice to
the latter.
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any employee of

the PT&T to prove that the telegrams from the offended party
were in fact transmitted to INSURECO and that the latter
received the same. Furthermore, there is no evidence on
record that the petitioner ever received the said telegrams from
INSURECO, or that separate copies thereof were transmitted
to and received by the petitioner.
In fine, the respondent failed to prove the second element of

the crime. Hence, the petitioner should be acquitted of the
crimes charged.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20510
dated April 19, 2001 and its Resolution dated April 11, 2002
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ofelia Marigomen
is ACQUITTED of all the charges. The bonds posted for her
provisional liberty are hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75954 October 22, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID
G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Manila, and K.T. LIM alias MARIANO LIM, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Failing in his argument that B.P. 22, otherwise known as the

"Bouncing Check Law", is unconstitutional, 1 private
respondent now argues that the check he issued, a
memorandum check, is in the nature of a promissory note,
hence, outside the purview of the statute. Here, his argument
must also fail.
The facts are simple. Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged
before respondent court with violation of B.P. 22 in an
Information alleging ––
That on . . . January 10, 1985, in the City of Manila . . . the

said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki . .
. Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383 dated February
9, 1985 . . . in the amount of P143,000.00, . . . well knowing
that at the time of issue he . . . did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check . . . was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Fatima Cortez Sasaki the amount of
said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. 2
On 18 July 1986, private respondent moved to quash the

Information of the ground that the facts charged did not
constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that
the check he issued was a memorandum check which was in
the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. On 1
September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on
which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued
the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in
behalf of the government.
Since the constitutionality of the "Bouncing Check Law" has

already been sustained by this Court in Lozano v. Martinez 3
and the seven (7) other cases decided jointly with it, 4 the
remaining issue, as aptly stated by private respondent in his
Memorandum, is whether a memorandum check issued
postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation is
within the coverage of B.P. 22.
Citing U.S. v. Isham, 5 private respondent contends that

although a memorandum check may not differ in form and
appearance from an ordinary check, such a check is given by
the drawer to the payee more in the nature of memorandum of
indebtedness and, should be sued upon in a civil action.
We are not persuaded.
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check,

with the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written
across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to
pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition
concerning its presentment. 6 Such a check is an evidence of
debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to
be presented, 7 has the same effect as an ordinary check, 8
and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands
like any other check. 9
From the above definition, it is clear that a memorandum

check, which is in the form of an ordinary check, is still drawn
on a bank and should therefore be distinguished from a
promissory note, which is but a mere promise to pay. If private
respondent seeks to equate memorandum check with
promissory note, as he does to skirt the provisions of B.P. 22,
he could very well have issued a promissory note, and this
would be have exempted him form the coverage of the law. In
the business community a promissory note, certainly, has less
impact and persuadability than a check.
Verily, a memorandum check comes within the meaning of

Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which defines a
check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand." A check is also defined as " [a] written order or
request to a bank or persons carrying on the business of
banking, by a party having money in their hands, desiring
them to pay, on presentment, to a person therein named or
bearer, or to such person or order, a named sum of money,"
citing 2 Dan. Neg. Inst. 528; Blair v. Wilson, 28 Gratt. (Va.)
170; Deener v. Brown, 1 MacArth. (D.C.) 350; In re Brown, 2
Sto. 502, Fed. Cas. No. 1,985. See Chapman v. White, 6 N.Y.
412, 57 Am. Dec 464. 10 Another definition of check is that is
"[a] draft drawn upon a bank and payable on demand, signed
by the maker or drawer, containing an unconditional promise
to pay a sum certain in money to the order of the payee," citing
State v. Perrigoue, 81 Wash, 2d 640, 503 p. 2d 1063, 1066. 11
A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of

B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that
"[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is
subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by
imprisonment . . ." (Emphasis supplied ). 12 Ubi lex no
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
But even if We retrace the enactment of the "Bouncing Check

Law" to determine the parameters of the concept of "check",
We can easily glean that the members of the then Batasang
Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to include all
checks drawn against banks. This was particularly the
ratiocination of Mar. Estelito P. Mendoza, co-sponsor of
Cabinet Bill No. 9 which later became B.P. 22, when in
response to the interpellation of Mr. Januario T. Seño, Mr.
Mendoza explained that the draft or order must be addressed
to a bank or depository, 13 and accepted the proposed
amendment of Messrs. Antonio P. Roman and Arturo M.
Tolentino that the words "draft or order", and certain terms
which technically meant promissory notes, wherever they were
found in the text of the bill, should be deleted since the bill
was mainly directed against the pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient or no funds, and not to drafts which
were not drawn against banks. 14
A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally

accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the
check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of
indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a
pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the
issuance itself of a bouncing check 15 and not the purpose for
which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an
evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum. 16
We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry

with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the
bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the
loan fall due. This understanding may be manifested by
writing across the check "Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem."
However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such
understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail
to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To
require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check
be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from
the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such
agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose
for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of
unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the
incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country
will once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing
checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will
be considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is
common practice in commercial transactions to require
debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as
guarantee of payment. To determine the reasons for which
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public responses in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking
communities. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order of

respondent Judge of 1 September 1986 is SET ASIDE.
Consequently, respondent Judge, or whoever presides over the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, is hereby directed
forthwith to proceed with the hearing of the case until
terminated.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175381 February 26, 2008

JAMES SVENDSEN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of

Appeals Decision1 of November 16, 2006 denying petitioner’s
appeal from the December 22, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 14 which affirmed the
December 17, 2003 Judgment3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila, Branch 5, finding James Svendsen
(petitioner) guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.
Blg.) 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law.
In October 1997, Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to

petitioner in the amount of P200,000, to bear interest at 10%
a month. After petitioner had partially paid his obligation, he
failed to settle the balance thereof which had reached
P380,000 inclusive of interest.4
Cristina thus filed a collection suit against petitioner, which

was eventually settled when petitioner paid her P200,0005
and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check
postdated February 2, 1999 (the check) in the amount of
P160,000 representing interest.6 The check was co-signed by
one Wilhelm Bolton.
When the check was presented for payment on February 9,

1999, it was dishonored for having been Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds (DAIF).7
Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by

registered mail informing him that the check was dishonored
by the drawee bank, and demanding that he make it good
within five (5) days from receipt thereof.8
No settlement having been made by petitioner, Cristina filed a

complaint dated March 1, 1999 against him and his co-
signatory to the check, Bolton, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. No counter-
affidavit was submitted by petitioner and his co-respondent.
An Information dated April 13, 1999 for violation of B.P. Blg.
No. 22 was thus filed on April 29, 1999 before the MeTC of
Manila against the two, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That sometime in December 1998 the said accused did then

and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and jointly
make or draw and issue to CRISTINA C. REYES to apply on
account or for value INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK
check no. 0000009118 dated February 2, 1999 payable to
CRISTINA REYES in the amount of P160,000.00 said accused
well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not
have sufficient funds and/or credit with the drawee bank for
check after having been deposited in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and upon being presented for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for INSUFFICIENCY OF
FUNDS and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said CRISTINA C. REYES the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
Bolton having remained at large, the trial court never acquired

jurisdiction over his person.10
By Judgment of December 17, 2003, Branch 5 of the Manila

MeTC found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused James Robert

Svendson [sic] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of a violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and
imposes upon him to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P160,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused is also made liable to pay private complainant

Cristina C. Reyes civil indemnity in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P160,000.00)
representing his civil obligation covered by subject check.
Meantime, considering that other accused Wilhelm Bolton

remains at large, let a warrant of arrest against him ISSUE.
Pending his apprehension, let the case against him be sent to
the ARCHIVES. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
As priorly stated, the RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment and

the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in finding that

the first element of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 – the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check "to apply on account or for
value" – was present, as the obligation to pay interest is void,
the same not being in writing and the 10% monthly interest is
unconscionable; in holding him civilly liable in the amount of
P160,000 to private complainant, notwithstanding the
invalidity of the interest stipulation; and in violating his right
to due process when it convicted him, notwithstanding the
absence of proof of receipt by him of a written notice of
dishonor.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law reads:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person

than one (1) year or by fine of not less than but not more than
exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who,

dishonored by the drawee bank. Where the check is drawn by
a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be
liable under this Act.
For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P.

Blg. 22, the following requisites must thus concur: (1) the
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer,
or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.11
Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to

Cristina. The check, however, was dishonored when deposited
for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF. Hence, the first and
the third elements obtain in the case.
As for the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides

that
[t]he making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of

which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in
or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence
of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
In Rico v. People of the Philippines,12 this Court held:
x x x [I]f x x x notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not

sent to the maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no
proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then
the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P.
22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial five-day period.
x x x In recent cases, we had the occasion to emphasize that

not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand
letters actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check,
but there must also be proof of receipt thereof that is properly
authenticated, and not mere registered receipt and/or return
receipt.
Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, while

Section 2 of B.P. 22 indeed does not state that the notice of
dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in conjunction with
Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall
always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal".
A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be
insufficient for conviction under the law. In our view, both the
spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law require for the
act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused
issued a check that is dishonored, but also that the accused
has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.
This is consistent with the rule that penal statues must be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused. x x x
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence

and receipt by petitioner of the requisite written notice of
dishonor and that he was given at least five banking days
within which to settle his account constitutes sufficient
ground for his acquittal.13 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second

element. While the registry receipt,14 which is said to cover
the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner,
was presented, there is no proof that he or a duly authorized
agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters
including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they
must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of
the letters.15 Thus in Ting v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court
observed:
x x x All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the

registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter.
As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners or
of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry
receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized
agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however,
cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.17
For failure then to prove all the elements of violation of B.P.

Blg. 22, petitioner’s acquittal is in order.
Petitioner is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case, the

social injury is sought to be repaired through the imposition of
the corresponding penalty, whereas with respect to the
personal injury of the victim, it is sought to be compensated
through indemnity, which is civil in nature.18
The decision of the MeTC, which was affirmed on appeal by

the RTC and the appellate court, ordering petitioner "to pay
private complainant Cristina C. Reyes civil indemnity in the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P160,000) representing his civil obligation covered by subject
check," deserves circumspect examination, however, given that
the obligation of petitioner to pay 10% interest per month on
the loan is unconscionable and against public policy.
The P160,000 check petitioner issued to Cristina admittedly

represented unpaid interest. By Cristina’s information, the
interest was computed at a fixed rate of 10% per month.19
While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by

Central Bank Circular No. 905, nothing therein grants lenders
carte blanche to raise interest rates to levels which will either
enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their
assets.20 Stipulations authorizing such interest are contra
bonos mores, if not against the law. They are, under Article
140921 of the New Civil Code, inexistent and void from the
beginning.22
The interest rate of 10% per month agreed upon by the parties
in this case being clearly excessive, iniquitous and
unconscionable cannot thus be sustained. In Macalalag v.
People,23 Diño v. Jardines,24 and in Cuaton v. Salud,25 this
Court, finding the 10% per month interest rate to be
unconscionable, reduced it to 12% per annum. And in other
cases26 where the interest rates stipulated were even less
than that involved herein, the Court equitably reduced them.
This Court deems it fair and reasonable then, consistent with

existing jurisprudence, to adjust the civil indemnity to
P16,000, the equivalent of petitioner’s unpaid interest on the
P200,000 loan at 12% percent per annum as of February 2,
1999, the date of the check, plus 12% per annum interest to
be computed from April 29, 1999, the date of judicial demand
(date of the filing of the Information) up to the finality of this
judgment. After the judgment becomes final and executory
until the obligation is satisfied, the total amount due shall
bear interest at 12% per annum.27
Respecting petitioner’s claim that since the promissory note

incorporating the stipulated 10% interest per month was not
presented, there is no written proof thereof, hence, his
obligation to pay the same must be void, the same fails. As
reflected above, Cristina admitted such stipulation.
In any event, the presentation of the promissory note may be

dispensed with in a prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as
the purpose for the issuance of such check is irrelevant in the
determination of the accused’s criminal liability. It is for the
purpose of determining his civil liability that the document
bears significance. Notably, however, Section 24 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law provides that "Every negotiable
instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a
valuable consideration, and every person whose signature
appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value." It
was incumbent then on petitioner to prove that the check was
not for a valuable consideration. This he failed to discharge.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of November 16,

2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner, James Svendsen, is acquitted of the crime charged

for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
He is, however, ordered to pay private complainant, Cristina C.

Reyes, the amount of SIXTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P16,000)
representing civil indemnity, plus 12% interest per annum
computed from April 29, 1999 up to the finality of this
judgment. After the judgment becomes final and executory
until the obligation is satisfied, the total amount due shall
earn interest at 12% per annum.
SO ORDERED.

Josephine Domagsang vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and People of The Philippines

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Josephine Domagsang vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and People of The Philippines

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G.R. NO. 139292.

Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati,

It would appear that petitioner approached complainant

On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged

"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1991, in the

"Check No. : 149900

Drawn Against : Traders Royal Bank

In the Amount of : P50,000.00

Dated/Postdated : June 24, 1991

Payable to : Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr.

"said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof,

Subsequent Informations, docketed Criminal Cases No. 92-

"Check Number Dated/Postdated

TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991

TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991

No. 182074 July 30, 1991

No. 182084 August 30, 1991

No. 182078 September 15, 1991

No. 161183 September 18, 1991

No. 161177 September 18, 1991

No. 182085 September 30, 1991

No. 182079 October 15, 1991

No. 182086 October 30, 1991

No. 182080 November 15, 1991

No. 182087 November 30, 1991

No. 182081 December 15, 1991

No. 182082 December 15, 1991

No. 182088 December 30, 1991

No. 182089 December 30, 1991

No. 182090 December 30, 1991

were also filed against petitioner. The cases were later

On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed a demurrer to the

Hence, the instant petition where petitioner raised the

"1. Whether or not an alleged verbal demand to pay sufficient

"2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed

"3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in

The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 "Bouncing Checks

"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who

"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or

"SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The

"SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. – It shall be the

"Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the

The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the

There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on

In Lao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court explained:

“x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this

In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals predicated the

"The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is

"Likewise, appellant did not object to the admission of the

Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor

The prosecution may have failed to sufficiently establish a case

Check Number Dated/Postdated

TRB – No. 149900 June 24, 1991

TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991

TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991

No. 182074 July 30, 1991

No. 182084 August 30, 1991

No. 182078 September 15, 1991

No. 161183 September 18, 1991

No. 161171 September 18, 1991

No. 182085 September 30, 1991

No. 182079 October 15, 1991