Glenn Kirby A.

German
Liceo de Cagayan University
Legal Counseling
Wednesdays, 07:00-09:00 PM

Case Digests

G.R. No. 167886 October 25, 2005.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

PAMINTUAN DEVELOPMENT CO., represented by MARIANO PAMINTUAN, JR.,
respondents.

Doctrines:

a) The presumption in favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a

strong one. A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the
client.

b) Absent a formal notice of substitution, all lawyers who appeared before the court or filed
pleadings in behalf of the client are considered counsels of the latter. All acts performed
by them are deemed to be with the client’s consent.

c) The new counsel who filed the motion for reconsideration in behalf of the client is
presumed to be authorized even if he filed no formal notice of entry of appearance.

Facts:

Legal counsels of Landbank, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a
notice of entry of appearance, in behalf of the petitioner, before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

DARAB, however, denied due course to the said notices, contending that Attys.
Montarde and Mesa failed to show that their appearance was duly authorized by
Landbank, despite already having a Special Power of Attorney executed by Landbank’s
Vice President.

DARAB added that the said counsels failed to effect a valid substitution of the former
counsels of Landbank.

The petitioner files a motion for reconsideration appending two memoranda, signed by
the petitioner’s department head, thereby confirming the authority of said counsels.
DARAB, however, still denied their motion for reconsideration.
 A motion for certiorari was filed by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals but the
latter sustained DARAB’s findings that the said counsels did not have the authority to file
notice of appeal in behalf of Landbank. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether an evidence of proper substitution is necessary before Attys. Montarde
and Mesa may be considered authorized representatives of Landbank.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

It found that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in holding that Attys. Montarde
and Mesa lacked the authority to file a notice of appeal in behalf of petitioner.

Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to
appear.—An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear
in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to
appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and
may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in
court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished
for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
The presumption in favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a
strong one. A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the
client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate
the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, the court, on its own
initiative or on motion of the other party require a lawyer to adduce authorization from
the client.

It is evident that the above provision neither requires the concerned counsels to present an
evidence of authority nor an evidence of substitution. There is no need to resort to
determination and interpretation, but only to its application because the provision is clear
and unambiguous. Meanwhile, the appearance of second attorney would not even mean
that the authority of the first attorney is withdrawn.

G.R. No. 192649 June 22, 2011.

HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

R-II BUILDERS INC. and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

Doctrine:
 Only the lead counsel is entitled to service of court processes.
Facts:

Before the Court, among others, is the Entry of Appearance filed by Atty. Lope E. Feble
of the Toquero Exconde Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating counsel for
respondent R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders), with prayer to be furnished all pleadings,
notices and other court processes at its given address.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Lope E. Feble’s prayer is meritorious.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative holding such prayer as bereft of merit.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to, in toto:

(a) NOTE the Entry of Appearance of Atty. Lope E. Feble of Tuquero Exconde
Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating counsel for respondent R-II Builders, Inc.;
and DENY counsel’s prayer to be furnished with all pleadings notices and other court
processes at Unit 2704-A, West Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Centre, Exchange
Road, Ortigas Center Pasig, since only the lead counsel is entitled to service of court
processes.

G.R. No. 229288 August 1, 2018.

SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

Doctrine:

a) Appeal from Decisions of the Ombudsman in Administrative Cases; The Supreme

Court (SC) held that “appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals (CA)
under the provisions of Rule 43.

b) In Kuizon v. Desierto, 354 SCRA 158 (2001), the Supreme Court (SC) stressed that
the ruling in Fabian was limited only to administrative cases, and added that it is the
SC which has jurisdiction when the assailed decision, resolution, or order was an
incident of a criminal action.

c) Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 was declared unconstitutional because it
trampled on the rulemaking powers of the Supreme Court (SC) by 1) prescribing
the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for all cases
 whether final or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals (CA) over incidents arising from administrative cases.

d) It is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the same.

Facts:

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian of the following: (a) one
count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, (b) one count of malversation of public
funds, and (c) one count of violation of Section X126.2(C) (1) and (2) of MORB in
relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653.

The respondents in the Ombudsman cases, including Gatchalian, filed separate motions
for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution. However, on April 4, 2016, the Ombudsman
issued a Joint Order denying the motions for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and sought to annul the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order of the
Ombudsman for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 for its alleged lack of jurisdiction over the said case.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

A thorough reading of the Morales v. Court of Appeals decision, therefore, would reveal
that it was limited in its application — that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less
categorically stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the
distinction made therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that
Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read
to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative or criminal
cases.

Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary

cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Kuizon v. Desierto and Mendoza-
Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, we held that this Court has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. For
administrative cases, however, we declared in the case of Dagan v. Office of the
Ombudsman (Visavas) that the petition should be filed with the Court of Appeals in
observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Dagan ruling homogenized the
procedural rule with respect to administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman — first enunciated in Fabian v. Desierto — that is, all remedies involving
the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, whether by
an appeal under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, must be filed with the
Court of Appeals.

The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause may only be assailed through

certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, therefore, did not necessarily have an
effect over the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases
precisely because the said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section.