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Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria

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Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012
Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria
Ayse Tekdal Fildis
Dr. Fildis is assistant professor in the Department of Political Sciences at
Halic University in Istanbul.
A
fter World War I, the victori-
ous allies, Britain and France,
divided the Arab provinces of
the Ottoman Empire to suit
their particular interests. The south, Pal-
estine, was assigned to Great Britain; the
north, Syria and Lebanon, was assigned
to France. Syria was subdivided into five
parts: Lebanon, including its principal
towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre;
Syria, with the main towns of Aleppo,
Hama, Homs and Damascus; the moun-
tainous region of Jabal al-Druze, with the
principal town of Suaida; the Sanjak of
Latakia, with Latakia, its principal town;
and the Sanjak of Alexandretta, in theory
part of Syria, but subject to a special au-
tonomous form of government.1 During the
period of the French mandate (1920-46),
sectarian divisions were deliberately in-
cited in order to suppress Arab nationalism
and stifle the national independence move-
ment. Separatism and the particularism of
religious and national minorities — poli-
tique minoritaire — were encouraged by
the granting of autonomous status to areas
where such minorities formed a majority.
Arab nationalism, developed mainly
by the Sunni Muslim community, was
perceived as a threat by the French as well
as by the Christians and the heterodox
Muslim communities (Druzes, Ismailis and
© 2012, The Author
148
Alawites).2 Therefore, the French man-
date administration cultivated a friendly
relationship with the Druze, Alawites and
some smaller communities. The mandate
administration thus granted autonomy to
Syria’s two regionally compact minority
groups, the Druze and the Alawites, and
to the multicommunal regions of Alexan-
dretta and the Jazirah.3
In 1922, the Jabal al-Druze region,
located in an area of Druze concentration
south of Damascus, was proclaimed a
separate unit under French protection, with
its own governor and elected congress. The
mountain district behind Latakia, with its
large Alawite population, became a special
administrative regime under heavy French
protection and was proclaimed a sepa-
rate state. Later, in 1922, all but the Jabal
al-Druze were united in a Syrian Federa-
tion that was dissolved at the end of 1924
and replaced by a Syrian state comprising
the states of Aleppo and Damascus and
a separate Sanjak of Alexandretta. The
Alawite state was, however, excluded from
this new arrangement. Except for a brief
period, from 1936 to 1939, Alawite and
Druze states were administratively sepa-
rate from Syria until 1942.
During much of the Mandate era,
France’s divide-and-rule strategy helped to
define the extent of the nationalist move-
Middle East Policy © 2012, Middle East Policy Council
 Fildis: Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria

ment and prevent it from infecting minori- contrast, the Circassians were overrepre-
ty-inhabited areas. The French also cut the sented in the army, but poorly represented
ties between the urban nationalist opposi- in parliament and the police. The Alawites
tion and the peripheral regions. Due to this were overrepresented among the soldiers,
strategy, the Syrian nationalist movement but poorly represented in politics, the offi-
encountered great difficulty in expanding cer corps, the gendarmerie and the police.7
its activities beyond Damascus, Aleppo, The pattern set during the French man-
Hama and Homs. date and carried over into the independence
Arab nationalists did regard France era was the Syrian nationalist leadership’s
as a friendly nation — as defined by the rejection of Arab unity as its principal po-
mandate, to help and guide them towards litical goal. Nationalists faced an awkward
independence contradiction
and state- French mandate policies prevented the between pan-
hood4 — but
as a colonial,
development of any cohesive or definable Arab unity
and local self-
Christian, loyalty to a Syrian nation-state. Arab interest.8 Arab
Western and identity was stronger than Syrian identity. nationalism’s
anti-Muslim highest ideal
power that denied their national aspira- — the creation of a single independent
tions and threatened their religion, culture political unit including all who shared the
and language.5 The French administration Arabic language and cultural heritage —
consciously neglected to train an efficient was pitted against a tendency to focus on
and dedicated administrative elite and local ambitions and concerns.
quietly aggravated relations between the Most nationalist leaders failed to
Sunni Arab majority and minorities. The transcend their narrow town-based ideolo-
numerous divisions and re-divisions of gies and did not share a broad vision of the
Syria during the mandate6 obstructed the future. Political life in Syria was character-
development of such an elite. When the last ized by chaotic rivalries within the political
French troops withdrew in April 1946, one elite itself, in single towns or between lead-
of the greatest obstacles to political integra- ers in rival towns, or between the urban-na-
tion after independence was regionalism. tionalist elite and the rural-based leadership
The French policy of divide and rule of the compact minorities. The Alawites
eroded the ties among Syria’s religious and and Druze had enjoyed a certain degree of
ethnic groups, forging factions within each autonomy during the French mandate. Fol-
group and against the others. The French lowing independence in 1946, the Syrian
balanced ethnic representation by placing nationalist leadership had the tremendous
separate ethnicities at the head of differ- task of integrating the compact minorities
ent institutional branches of government, and the scattered minorities (such as Kurds,
allowing one ethnic or religious group to Circassians and Armenians).
be strongly represented in an institution. After independence, pan-Arab,
As a consequence, the Sunni Arabs were Baathist, Greater Syrian and Palestinian
dominant in politics, the officer corps, the slogans were the main rallying points for
gendarmerie and the police, but underrep- many political movements, but local and
resented in the military’s rank and file. By regional loyalties still influenced political

149
Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012
and social commitments. French mandate
policies prevented the development of any
cohesive or definable loyalty to a Syrian
nation-state. Arab identity was stronger
than Syrian identity, and borders were only
technically respected. Moreover, the lack
of any shared loyalty meant that regional
political conflicts were projected into the
national political arena.9 As Maoz points
out, “When Syria became independent in
1946, she was then by no means a nation-
state nor had she a coherent political com-
munity to rely upon.”10 Habib Kahalah, a
member of the Syrian parliament in 1947,
describes the characteristics of the parlia-
ment: “I look around me and see only a
bundle of contradictions.... Men whom
nothing united, sharing no principles . . . ;
some were illiterate, others distinguished
men of letters; some spoke only Kurdish or
Armenian, others only Turkish; some wore
a tarbush, others a kafiyeh....”11
Before independence, Syrian national-
ists were represented in the National Bloc
(al-Kutla al-Wataniya), a confederation
of veterans of various backgrounds and
interests who were united in the struggle
for independence. When the mandate
ended, the urban Sunni elite inherited the
Syrian government. After independence,
the Syrian government’s major goal was to
reduce, and gradually to abolish, regional
and communal representation in the parlia-
ment, where those who had benefited from
French rule were mainly the compact mi-
norities. A major step in this direction was
to abolish certain jurisdictional rights that
were granted to the Alawites and the Druze
by the French mandate. The abolition of
jurisdictional rights in order to establish a
centralized rule in Damascus ignited con-
frontation among the minorities. The Sunni
rulers in Damascus integrated Latakia into
Syria and abolished the Alawite state. The
150
Alawite seats in parliament and the courts
that applied Alawite laws of personal status
also were abolished. The Alawites became
reconciled to common Syrian citizenship
and gave up the dream of a separate Ala-
wite state. This change of outlook, which
seemed to be of minor importance at the
time, actually led to a new era in Syrian
politics: the political rise of the Alawites.12
THE ALAWITE COMMUNITY
Until 1920, the Alawites were known
to the outside world as the Nusayris or
Ansaris. The name change was imposed
by the French when they seized control in
Syria. “Nusayri” emphasizes the group’s
different approach to mainstream Islam,
whereas “Alawi” suggests an adherent of
Ali (the son-in-law of the Prophet Mu-
hammad) and accentuates the religion’s
similarities to Shii Islam.13 The Alawites
benefited from the mandate more than any
other minority group, gaining political
autonomy and escaping Sunni control. The
French set up an Alawite state, “the state
of Latakia,” on July 1, 1922. The Alawites
also gained legal autonomy: in Arrete no.
623, September 15, 1922, a decision was
handed down that ended Sunni control of
court cases involving Alawites, transfer-
ring them to Alawite jurists.14
Another major instrument of French
influence on the Alawites was their recruit-
ment into the Troupes Spéciales du Levant,
a local military force formed in 1921 and
later developed into the Syrian and Leba-
nese armed forces. The French employed
the principle of divide and rule in the
Troupes recruitment too. The aim was to
prevent any of the communities from ob-
taining a position so powerful as to be able
to endanger the French administration.
Based on the French design, the army
developed a strong rural and minority rep-
 Fildis: Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria

resentation, with special detachments of battalions of the Troupes, serving as police

Alawites, Druze, Kurds and Circassians. and supplying intelligence.18 The French
Alawites served under French officers made every effort to keep the Troupes im-
along with the other “reliable” minori- mune from the Syrian ferment in the towns
ties15 in local forces. The French favored by using the Alawites and other minorities
recruiting rural minorities because they to suppress urban nationalist disorder.
were far from the urban-dominant political The Alawites constituted some 12
ideology, Arab nationalism. The French percent of the Syrian population. From
policy of military recruitment involved the Ottoman period, they were the most
weakening numerous and
the forces of From the Ottoman period, [the Alawites] the poorest
nationalism peasants in
that Arab were the most numerous and the poorest Syria, work-
Sunnis used peasants in Syria, working for Sunni ing for Sunni
to challenge and Christian landlords in the mountain and Christian
the French landlords in
over the fu-
regions and in Latakia, at the foot of the the mountain
ture of Syria. Alawite mountains. regions and
As a result, in in Latakia,
the mid-1940s, when that struggle was at at the foot of the Alawite mountains. The
its height, Arab Sunni representation in the political effects of poverty were worsened
army was much lower than their numbers by the geographic and communal divisions.
in the population. 16
The Sunnis who lived in towns enjoyed
The Troupes Spéciales du Levant were much greater wealth and dominated the
used to maintain order and suppress local Alawite peasants. According to Jacques
rebellions. Largely composed of minori- Weulersse, the Alawites were “a numerical
ties, their activities generated resentment majority but a political minority.”19 Their
among Sunnis. By the end of the mandate, condition was scarcely improved under the
several infantry battalions were composed mandate. The average daily income of a
almost entirely of Alawites. Not one bat- peasant in 1938 was only about 22 piastres,
talion was composed entirely of Sunni while the cost of living was approximately
Arabs. Even those few battalions with 50 piastres. This drove great numbers of
significant Sunni Arab components were Alawites to enrol in the Troupes.20
filled mostly with men from rural areas Depressed economic conditions made
and far-off towns. The wealthy Sunni Arab the army a vehicle for social mobility. For
landowning and commercial families, who the first time, Alawite youth benefited from
led the Arab nationalist movement during a small, but secure, income and became
the mandate, indirectly reinforced the trend disciplined, trained and exposed to new
towards strong representation of minori- ideas. As Seale states, “Service with the
ties in the Troupes by refusing to send their French established the beginning of an
sons for military training, even as officers, Alawi military tradition central to the com-
in a force which they viewed as serving munity’s later ascent.”21 Socioeconomic
France’s imperial interests. The Alawites
17
factors heightened the strong representa-
formed about half of the eight infantry tion of Alawites in the army. This incentive

151
Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012
was less significant for people from the
larger cities, mainly Sunnis. Urban dwell-
ers frequently found it easier than their
rural counterparts to avoid military service
by paying a redemption fee.22
It is understandable that many mem-
bers of Alawite communities were among
the military and that, especially after 1949,
when the first of a long series of military
coups took place, they started to domi-
nate Syrian political life. A military report
describing the situation of the Syrian Army
in 1949 stated that “all units of any impor-
tance as well as the important parts stood
under the command of persons originating
from religious minorities.”23 However,
Batatu notes,
...on the level of the officer corps
the Alawis, contrary to a widespread
impression, were not as important
numerically as the Sunnis prior to
1963. They derived much of their real
strength from the lower ranks of the
army. In an arithmetical sense, they
had a plurality among the common
soldiers and a clear preponderance
among the non-commissioned of-
ficers. As early as 1955... Colonel
Abd al-Hamid al- Sarraj, Chief of the
Intelligence Bureau, discovered to his
surprise that no fewer than 65 percent
or so of the non-commissioned of-
ficers belonged to the Alawi sect.24
As opposed to the Alawites, who saw
the Military Academy of Homs as a place
for the ambitious and talented, the wealthy
Sunni Arab families often despised the
army as a profession: They regarded the
Academy as “a place for the lazy, the
rebellious, the academically backward, or
the socially undistinguished.”25 As Seale
states, “this was the historic mistake of the
leading families and of the mercantile and
152
landowning class to which they belonged:
scorning the army as a profession, they
allowed it to be captured by their class
enemies, who then went on to capture the
state itself.”26
The Alawites, although excessively
represented in the army, were just the cor-
porals, sergeants and junior officers before
the takeover by the Baath party in 1963. On
the other hand, the most important group,
which undertook politically and strategi-
cally important military functions, was the
senior Sunni officer corps. Sunni leaders
apparently believed that reserving the top
positions for themselves would suffice
to control the military. The leaders of the
first three military coups between 1949
and 1954 were all Sunnis. In the period
between 1954 and 1958, when the Syrian-
Egyptian union (the United Arab Repub-
lic) was established, the officer corps was
strongly divided into rival factions. The
“union pledge,” which was made in Janu-
ary 1958, was led mainly by Sunni officers;
in September 1961, another coup, which
separated Syria from the union, was also
led by Sunni officers.27 The struggle among
the senior Sunni officers greatly weakened
Sunni representation in the officer corps
and strengthened the minorities, mainly the
Alawite officer corps. “As Sunni officers
eliminated each other, Alawites inherited
their positions and became increasingly se-
nior; as one Alawi rose through the ranks,
he brought his kinsmen along.”28 The two
national institutions that played major roles
in the Alawites’ rise to power and eventual
control of political life in Syria were the
military and the Baath party.
THE BAATH PARTY
Pan-Arabism aimed at the political
resurrection of the Arabs as one nation. In
contrast to the nationalist movements in
 Fildis: Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria

neighboring countries like Turkey and Iran, Aflaq and Bitar had supported this pan-Ar-
pan-Arab nationalists were not working ab nationalist ideology since their school
within the boundaries of an internationally days. In 1942, they devoted themselves to
recognized country. Arab nationalists had the creation of a movement dedicated “to
to struggle against the artificial political achieving freedom (hurriyah) from for-
divisions imposed by France and Britain. eign control and the unity (wihdah) of all
Pan-Arabism had to compete with “a deep- Arabs in a single state. To these goals, the
rooted and almost instinctive commitment Baathists added socialism (ishtirakiyah),
to Islam.” In the past, Arab nationalism
29
which they interpreted as social justice for
had been associated with Sunni Islamism, the poor and underprivileged.”31
and it continued to be so. All non-Sunni In July 1946, shortly after French
Arabs, heterodox Muslims and Christians troops left Syria, Aflaq and Bitar published
were allotted the journal
a second- Al-Baath;
ary place
The religious minorities supported the and, in
and seen as Baath’s nationalistic ideology, in which all April 1947,
“imperfect Arabs were equal, whether Sunni Muslims, the found-
Arabs.” The Alawites or members of other heterodox ing Baath
religious mi- Congress
norities also
Muslim communities or Christians. was held in
“tended to Damascus.
suspect Arab nationalism as a disguise for During the congress, a different group
unrestrained Sunni ascendancy.”30 Baath emerged: some were from Latakia, and
nationalism was different from Sunni Arab the majority of them were Alawites. They
nationalism in that Baathis wanted a united shared the Baath goals of Arab inde-
secular Arab society. Although pan-Arab pendence and unity but differed in their
nationalists made an effort to amalgam- approach to social issues. They were the
ate Islam into their ideology by stressing followers of Zaki Arsuzi, an influential
its central role in Arab culture and history, Alawite intellectual, himself a follower of
for too many Sunni Muslims it was not another Alawite, Dr. Wahib al-Ghanim,
a solution; pan-Arabism placed Islam in a socialist who blamed the ruling elite
a less important position. The religious for the miserable conditions of the rural
minorities supported the Baath’s nation- population. While Aflaq’s main concerns
alistic ideology, in which all Arabs were were unity and nationalism, Ghanim’s was
equal, whether Sunni Muslims, Alawites or social justice. In 1947, he insisted on the
members of other heterodox Muslim com- inclusion of “the limitation of agricultural
munities or Christians. holdings, worker participation in man-
The Baath (Resurrection) party was agement, and state ownership of heavy
founded in 1940 in Syria by two Paris- industry, natural resources, and public
educated intellectuals: Michel Aflaq, an utilities”32 to the party’s constitution. Al-
Orthodox Christian, and Salah al-Din Bi- though Aflaq refused to accept Ghanim’s
tar, a Sunni Muslim. The Baath party was insistence on including a socialist ap-
the product of the growth of secular ideas proach or social justice goals, Bitar agreed
and of pan-Arab nationalist sentiment. to unite the Baath with Akram al-Haw-

153
Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012
rani’s (also transcribed as Hourani) Arab
Socialist Party, which shared Ghanim’s
concerns. Hawrani built a strong populist
movement in the Hama region among the
landless peasants, the most exploited rural
population in Syria. Hawrani became a
major influence among the rural religious-
minority cadets and young officers, mainly
the members of the Alawite community.
They saw him as a leader of the peasant
movement. As Hawrani and the Baath
leaders grew closer and eventually merged
their organizations in September 1953 to
form the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the
Baath gained a large following among the
officers.33 Baath ideology had an obvious
appeal for them because of its secularist,
populist and socialist components.
After the unification of the two par-
ties, original Baath doctrine “sought to
combine a secular formulation of pan-Arab
nationalism and a non-Marxist approach to
socialism and social reform.”34 The large,
mainly Sunni, urban petty bourgeoisie
considered the Baath ideology suspect for
its secularism and advocacy of socialism.
However, the religious minorities found it
strongly appealing. They hoped the party
“would help them to free themselves of
their minority status and the narrow social
frame of their sectarian, regional and tribal
ties.”35 Baath ideology promised minor-
ity communities equality on the basis of
being an Arab, not on being a Sunni. There
would be no political and socioeconomic
discrimination against non-Sunnis. It also
promised other aspects of social reform in
the needy rural areas. The overrepresenta-
tion of heterodox Muslims and Christians
in the ranks of the Baath party contrib-
uted to the resentment between the Baath
regime and the urban Sunni population.
During the Syrian-Egyptian union
(1958-61), all political parties, including
154
the Baath, were dissolved. But some Ala-
wite groups remained organized secretly
and maintained a measure of control in the
Latakia region. Following the secession of
Syria from the union in 1961, the earlier
dissolution of the Baath party proved to
be a major political gain for the Alawites.
They now were the strongest and most
organized force in the much-weakened
national organization.36
The dominance of a military faction
within the Baath party has its roots in the
period of Egyptian-Syrian unity. The pro-
Baath officers stationed in Egypt formed a
secret organization in 1959. The leaders of
the group — Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad,
Muhammad Umran — were Alawites, and
Hamad Ubayd was a Druze. The goal of
the organization was to restore the Syrian
army to Syrian control. The members of
this secret military organization, eventually
known as the military committee, were not
involved in the Baath’s traditional leader-
ship or party structure. They operated as
one of several politically active groups of
officers involved in the dissolution of the
union in 1961 and in the fight for political
control of Syria during the subsequent year
and a half.37
On March 8, 1963, a coup by a group
of officers, including the Military Commit-
tee, brought down the “separatist regime.”
Five of the 14 members of the Baathist
military committee were Alawites. After
the coup, the gaps in the army resulting
from purges of political opponents were
filled by Alawites. Even the graduating
Sunnis cadets were denied their commis-
sions: “The representation of Alewis [sic]
among the newly appointed officers was
as high as 90 percent.”38 As Batatu points
out, many Sunnis are still in the officer
corps, but, if they are important, they are
important not as a group but as individuals,
 Fildis: Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria

and more in the professional than in the
political sense.39
On July 18, 1963, the power struggle
between Sunni Baath officers and minor-
ity officers ended in a bloody takeover by
the minority officers. Control of the army
and political life passed to the heterodox
Muslim minority led by the Alawites. The
Sunni majority was put in a subordinate
position. Other heterodox Muslim groups
were eliminated as well: “In 1966 and
1968, the Alawi faction terminated the
other two minoritarian-sectarian factions
(the Druze and the Ismailis), and became
the masters of Syria.”40
Conclusion
The emergence of the Alawite Baathist
regime in the mid-1960s marked a crucial
turning point in Syria’s modern political
history. As a result, it engendered distrust
among many of the Sunni population of
the Alawites and the Baath party. Many
Sunnis regarded the Alawite Baathist
regime as illegitimate, oppressive and
anti-Islamic. According to Sunni Muslims,
the Alawite minority had seized power by
armed force, imposing harsh measures,
such as restricting religious education
and ulema (Muslim scholars). This se-
verely injured Sunnis’ religious feelings
and their socioeconomic interests. In a
country where two-thirds of the popula-
tion are Sunni, these facts severely alien-
ated the Alawite regime from its subjects.
Weulersse’s argument that “a minority
can dominate a majority if it has political,
military or economic superiority”41 became
the reality in Syria.

1
George Antonius, “Syria and the French Mandate,” International Affairs 13, no. 4 (July-August, 1934): 525.
2
The Alawites were members of the Nusayri sect, which had a strong Shi’a doctrinal strain, inhabited the
mountainous areas of northwest Syria even before the Ottomans took over. The Druze were an entirely
endogamous community, probably starting in Egypt, whose religion was an eclectic mix of Islamic, Chris-
tian, Greek and pagan concepts. They were another tough mountain group, which survived four centuries of
Turkish rule and were more or less left to themselves. See Albert H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World
(Oxford Univeristy Press, 1947).
3
On the French and the minorities, see Itamar Rabinovich, “The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State,
1918-45,” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 4 (1979). See also Itamar Rabinovich, The View from
Damascus: State, Political Community and Foreign Relations in Twentieth-Century Syria (Valentine Mitchell
Press, 2008), 95-109.
4
League of Nations Official Journal, August 1922, 1013-17.
5
Youssef Chaitani, Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 8.
6
For the mandate and partition, see Ayse Tekdal Fildis, “The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide
and Rule,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 129-39.
7
Philips S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (I. B.
Tauris, 1987), 622.
8
N. E. Bou-Nacklie, “Les Troupes Speciales: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916-46,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (November, 1993): 656.
9
Michael H. Van Dusen, “Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria,” Middle East Journal 26, no. 2
(Spring, 1972): 125.
10
Moshe Ma’oz, “ Attempts at Creating a Political Community in Modern Syria,” Middle East Journal 26,
no. 4 (Autumn, 1972): 398.

155
 Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012

11
Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-war Arab Politics (Oxford University Press, 1965),
32.
12
Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (Oct., 1989): 440.
13
Ibid., 430.
14
E. Rabbath, L’Évolution politique de la Syrie sous mandat (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1928), 185.
15
Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (University of California Press, 1989), 18.
16
Bou-Nacklie, Les Troupes, 655-56.
17
J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 153.
18
Pipes, “The Alawi,” 438.
19
Jaques Weulersse, Le Pays des Alaouites (Tours: Arrault, 1940), 199.
20
Hanna Batatu, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling, Military Group and the Causes
for Its Dominance,” Middle East Journal 35, no. 3 (Summer, 1981): 334.
21
Seale, Asad of Syria, 18.
22
Be’eri Eliezer, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (Fredrick A. Praegar, 1970), 336-7.
23
Nikolas Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Baath Party,
4th ed. (I.B. Tauris, 2011), 28.
24
Batatu, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling”: 340-41.
25
Seale, The Struggle for Syria, 37.
26
Seale, Asad of Syria, 39.
27
Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, 29.
28
Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (Oct., 1989): 441.
29
Stephen Humphreys, “The Strange Career of Pan-Arabism,” in The Modern Middle East, 2nd ed., ed. A.
Hourani, P. Khoury and M.C. Wilson (I.B. Tauris, 2009), 581.
30
Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, 17.
31
John F. Devlin, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis,” The American Historical Review 96, no. 5
(December, 1991): 1397.
32
Ibid., 1398.
33
John Galvani, “Syria and the Baath Party,” Pages 3-16 in MERIP Reports, no. 25 (February, 1974): 6.
34
Itamar Rabinovich, “Arab Political Parties: Ideology and Ethnicity,” in The View from Damascus: State,
Political Community and Foreign Relations in Twentieth-Century Syria (Vallentine Mitchell Press, 2008),
127.
35
Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, 17.
36
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