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The government in two semi-presidential systems: France and Portugal in a

comparative perspective

Article  in  French Politics · December 2010

DOI: 10.1057/fp.2010.21 · Source: OAI

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Original Article

The government in two semi-presidential systems:

France and Portugal in a comparative perspective

Gianluca Passarelli
Dipartimento di Scienza Politica, University of Bologna, via dei Bersaglieri, 6/c, Bologna 40125,
Italy.

Abstract France and Portugal have the same form of semi-presidential

government. Even though the powers of their respective presidents and their
political systems have been extensively investigated, the literature on the role of
government operations is less comprehensive. This article analyses the organization
of the government, focusing on how semi-presidential governments function
and highlighting the recruitment and background of ministers, as well as the role
of the president and prime minister. Semi-presidential governments function
differently according to the degree of concordance between the presidential and the
parliamentary majorities – in other words, whether or not there is cohabitation.
The organization of government can be hierarchical or collegial, depending on the
balance of power between the two heads of the executive.
French Politics (2010) 8, 402–428. doi:10.1057/fp.2010.21

Keywords: semi-presidentialism; government; president; prime minister; France;

Portugal

Introduction

According to Blondel (1982, p. 21), ‘[y] the boundaries of government are

unclear; it is not even always the case that governments are sufficiently
coherent internally to deserve being given a collective label. The idea of
government is more an abstract concept than a universal reality’. This implies
that the best way to highlight and explain the similarities and differences
between the organization of two semi-presidential governments is to compare
them (Blondel, 2005).
In a semi-presidential government, the president is directly elected and
coexists with a prime minister (PM) who is accountable to the parliament
(Sartori, 1994; Elgie, 1999a). The direct popular election of the head of state
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www.palgrave-journals.com/fp/
 The government in two semi-presidential systems

gives him or her additional legitimacy, although it is the internal balance of

power within the political system that determines the actual capacities for,
and the effectiveness of, his or her intervention in political and institutional
dynamics.
In this article, I will analyse the organizational structure of governments,
including ministers’ duties and governmental structures and/or actors lato
sensu. The article focuses on the analysis of whether a government func-
tions hierarchically or collegially (Blondel and Manning, 2002); whether its
structure is divided or unified; the number of its members (Huseby, 1998);
the system by which its members are recruited; and the role of the PM and
the president. The distinction between the professional politician and the
professional bureaucrat remains important partly on normative grounds and
partly as a framework for approaching the study of the relationship between
politics and administration in specific contexts (Suleiman, 1984, p. 107).
Finally, I will refer to the main socio-political characteristics of ministers
(political/parties/technical/intellectuals) (Cotta, 1991) who are appointed by
the president and/or the PM.
A government can have a hierarchical or collegial structure, with varying
levels of decision-making centralization. The spectrum may range from
maximum centralization – led by a president who heads a parliamentary
majority – to maximum collegiality – headed by a PM who governs with other
ministers. Nevertheless, the two types of systems can combine in a sort of
‘hierarchical collegiality’, in which both a parliamentary model and a style of
prime ministerial leadership that is based on the principle of a weak collective
government in favour of a strong and effective head of government can exist
simultaneously.
Therefore, it matters whether the president has a majority in parliament
because this factor affects his or her ability to act (to some extent, and with
peculiar differences between the two cases) in the same manner as a president in
a presidential regime. The level of the president’s or PM’s power affects the
government’s organization; first, it can amplify or weaken the role of ministers;
second, inevitably, it determines his or her style of leadership, choosing either
to centralize the government’s organization and the decision-making process or
to govern together in a (more) collegial manner (Elgie, 2005).
In France, Charles de Gaulle’s presidency was highly centralized with little
autonomy granted to ministers. Mitterrand followed de Gaulle’s precedent, to
some extent, although the government assumed a more collegial form during
two periods of cohabitation. In Portugal, Eanes attempted to achieve a
hierarchical and centralized government, yet the PM and his ministers retained
some relevance. Since 1985/1987, the government has progressively lost its
relatively high level of collegiality, as the PM has tried to implement a more
hierarchical dynamic.
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 Passarelli

Semi-presidential government: Differences with presidential and parliamentary

systems

A basic, but effective, definition states that the government is ‘the group of
men and women who are in charge of the different sectors of the public
services’ (Blondel, 1982, p. 14). In semi-presidential regimes, two actors com-
pete for leadership of the executive, resulting in a ‘dual executive’, or diarchy
(Duverger, 1980; Sartori, 1994; Elgie, 1999b). The government is subject to
‘dual responsibility’, meaning it must be supported or accepted by parliament,
as in parliamentary systems, and also by the president (formally or not). But
apart from the institutional aspects, it is relevant to examine and explain
peculiarities and similarities to try to establish whether semi-presidentialism
‘produces’ a specific mode of government operation.
In France, this particular constellation of power emerged in 1962, when the
introduction of direct presidential elections made the president the most
important and legitimate representative in the eyes of voters. In Portugal, the
dual nature of the government’s political responsibility formally ceased in
1982, when the Council of the Revolution was abolished. In a semi-presidential
system, the president can be considered a governmental actor even if he or she
is not the formal head of the government. The latter position formally is held
by the PM whose appointment requires the support of a parliamentary
majority through a vote of confidence, either explicitly, as in Portugal, or not,
as in France. The PM (Jones, 1991) serves as chief of government, but that
role can be modified depending on the political system, day-to-day govern-
ment operation and the president’s power. In some cases, the president may
intervene directly as a de facto chief of government, particularly if at least
one of the coalition government’s parties contributed to his or her election.
Presidential powers are important in examining the government’s operation.
Particularly significant are those related to governmental power-sharing,
such as the appointment and dismissal of the PM and other ministers, or the
dismissal of parliament.
The main independent variable is the concordance or discordance between
the president and the political majority in parliament. Given the political
equilibrium between the two affects both the government’s operation and
organization, the hypotheses that follow are: first, that cohabitation tends to
favour a more collegial governmental operation, and second that two
congruent majorities tend to push towards a more hierarchical governmental
organization. Two additional elements are helpful in illustrating the govern-
ment’s operation. The presence or absence of so-called ‘junior ministers’ is a
sign of the PM’s power, or, specifically, access to resources, to enact policies.
Second, the socio-political background of ministers supplies data on the level
of their independence from the influence of political parties and from the head
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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

of government. A ministerial position may be prestigious, but ‘often it seems

also to be the result, to a very large extent at least, of “luck” and of “accident” ’
(Blondel, 1985, p. 11).
However, the presence or absence of ‘junior ministers’ is a controversial
point needing further and more focused analysis in order to establish a
correlation with the PM’s strength. This is because the president or PM may
also use junior ministers to ‘shadow’ senior ministers, which, thus, impedes
cohesive decision making. Conversely, ministerial backgrounds correlate with
prime ministerial independence. In this case, ‘background’ refers primarily to
ministers’ political experience rather than to sociological features (for example,
gender, age, income and so on). A strong party or parliamentary career
correlates weakly with a strong PM, and vice versa. The awareness of the
conceptual differences between the cabinet (Blondel and Müller-Rommel,
1997) and the government, the former a restricted, specialized political institu-
tion (as Bagehot wrote (1867), it is ‘[y] in a word, [y] a board of control
chosen by the legislature, out of persons whom it trusts and knows, to rule the
nation’), the latter a collectivity, including personnel of government and others
too, means that the term ‘government’ is a broader term. Despite the fact that
governments are ‘relatively small and very visible (having) a common goal and
(acting) as a team’, ‘they may well not be united and their differences may even
come out in the open’ (Blondel, 1990, p. 257).

The French Government and the Fifth Republic: de Gaulle’s Imprint and
the 1962 Reform

De Gaulle changed the structure of government not only by introducing the

direct election of the president, but also through the consequent (and still
ongoing) ‘presidentialization’ of the executive (Portelli, 1980; Clift, 2005).
Though not formally charged with leading the government, the president inter-
vened in policies, ministerial appointments and the organization of adminis-
trative structures. De Gaulle was directly engage´ in current political affairs, and
he considered his PM as a functionary playing a symbolic role primarily in
charge of coordinating ministers and deputies of the majority. De Gaulle’s
imprint can be found in his political attitude (the idea of the State, parties,
institutions) and vision, a personal political-institutional Weltanschauung, in
which the president has fundamentally three roles: he represents the nation; he
is the supreme judge both in conflict among institutions and on key decisions in
defence and foreign affairs; and he is in charge of the nation under exceptional
circumstances.
The 1958 Constitution tried to strengthen the government and the role of the
PM, who ‘shall direct the actions of the Government [and] be responsible for
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 Passarelli

national defence, [as well as] ensure the implementation of legislation.

[In addition], he shall have power to make regulations and shall make appoint-
ments to civil and military posts’ (Article 21). It is evident that the PM has
greater power than the head of government under the Fourth Republic and
occupies a higher position in the hierarchy with respect to ministers. The
current government includes the PM, the ministers and a number of junior
ministers known as Secretaries of State (Thiébault, 1997, p. 90). The roles of
these ministers are described below:
a. The ministres d’Etat manage ministerial departments, but the title is purely
honorific and has no legal standing.
b. The ministres head autonomous ministerial departments, which vary
according to the PM’s policy priorities.
c. The ministres de´le´gue´s are close collaborators of the PM. The PM can
choose to delegate certain issues to these ministers (Chagnollaud and
Quermonne, 1996, pp. 295–298).
The Council of Ministers (CM) is the decision-making body of the
government, comprising the president, the PM and the ministers. The president
presides over the CM (Article 9) and determines its agenda. Yet the PM may,
in exceptional cases, stand in for him or her as chairman of a CM session by
virtue of an express delegation of powers for a specific agenda (Article 21.4).
The PM leads the government’s affairs and coordinates its actions in the form
of a collective executive that determines and leads national politics. How-
ever, the PM’s authority over ministers has primarily a political basis rather
than a bureaucratic or a functional basis. Delegated ministers, instituted by
Mitterrand in 1993 to oversee certain policies (Passarelli, 2004), participate in
the CM, which meets every Wednesday at the Élyse´e Palace. Conversely, the
secre´taries d’e´tat, who are given responsibility for specific policies by the PM,
do not participate in the CM.
The CM is the central element of the decision-making process. Its delibera-
tions are an important and often a final stage in passing legislation. CM
sessions typically are divided into three parts:
1. Draft bills, ordinances and decrees may be discussed, but they are usually
agreed upon beforehand. However, the president may decide to let ministers
express their opinions on relevant and controversial issues.1
2. Appointments of a wide range of senior members of the judiciary and the
civil and military services are addressed.
3. Ministers make statements on various policies (Thiébault, 1997, p. 92).
The political and administrative system is highly centralized and is organized
on the ministerial model. The bureaucracy is selected through meritocratic
mechanisms impermeable to the incumbent government’s pressures; this
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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

framework was institutionalized with the creation of the grandes e´coles

(Stevens, 2003, p. 124). High-level managers are appointed as technical
ministers serving the presidentialized leadership.
Although the French case is often described in an idealized way, as an
entirely meritocratic bureaucracy impervious to political pressure, this is not
consistent with reality. For example, Wolfgang Müller’s analysis found that
France is characterized by a ‘medium level of party patronage’ (2006, p. 189),
with a ‘relevant [increase] from the 1980s’ that helped to ‘improve the govern-
ment parties’ policy-making capacity’ (Müller, 2000, p. 146). In fact, the
PM has at his or her disposal the civil service and the ministers. He or she
also has the discretion to appoint high-level ministerial management (heads
of department and ministerial heads) and the highest-level public senior
executives (about 7000 people). Each member of government manages a
ministerial cabinet – normally comprising 10–20 people for ministers and 5–10
for secre´taries d’e´tat – and selects personnel for a defined time span. The head
of the cabinet collaborates with ministers in the coordination of meetings, the
preparation of briefings and maintaining relationships with the press and the
electoral constituency. Most positions are held by civil servants of the grands
corps (Council of State, Court of Accounts) or, as in the case of Interior and
Foreign Affairs ministers, by civil servants with diplomatic and administrative
backgrounds. The National School of Administration (ENA) performs a
pivotal role in linking politics and administration. At the end of their training,
following the process of so-called pantouflage, functionaries are appointed
to a ministerial cabinet as a starting point for a career in government, state
enterprises or the private sector. The French bureaucracy therefore cannot
have simultaneously an administrative and a political role. Rather, it is made
to carry out administrative functions. This leads one to question the alleged
‘supremacy of bureaucrats’ (Fabbrini and Vassallo, 1999).
The administrative impartiality toward the incumbent government has been
facilitated by the long period of predominance of right-wing majorities.
During the 1980s, with the first Socialist (Passarelli, 2008b) government, things
changed with a turnover in the bureaucratic élite (Suleiman, 1984, p. 112).2
According to Rouban (1998, p. 80), the rate of the central administration
executive substitution was 33.9 per cent in 1958 and 35.5 per cent in 1962.
Following two alternations, the figures increased to 68.0 per cent by 1981
and 82.5 per cent by 1986. Nevertheless, the absolute number of public
functionaries is decreasing (ibid, pp. 235–236).
The role of ministerial cabinet members – a position that is incompatible
with the holding of any parliamentary office – is very important because
cabinet members tend to ‘blend these new policy-making functions with their
more traditional political role: thus is not is not easily distinguishable from the
divisions of ministries’ (Thiébault, 1997, p. 98). The policy and law-making
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 Passarelli

processes follow a ‘typical’ path: once drafted, proposals are submitted to other
ministers in inter-departmental committees, which are increasingly numerous
(1290 per year on average). This suggests that ‘there are transfers of whole
areas of ministerial powers to the PM’ (ibid, p. 98).

Prime ministerial resources

Article 37 of the Constitution granted the government the power to act through
decrees in all matters not indicated in Article 34, which limits the subjects
in which parliament may legislate. The government can avoid the usual
second reading of a bill in each house of parliament (navette) by invoking the
Declaration of Urgency set out in Article 45.2. This power has been used, on
average, 85 times per legislature. However, the Seventh (1981–1986) and
Ninth (1988–1993) legislatures invoked it more often, probably because of the
presence of left-wing governments facing a hostile majority in the Senate.
Article 38 allows the government to legislate through ordinances, for a limited
time, within issue areas that normally require laws to be debated by parliament.
This protects deputies from, for example, voting for unpopular laws. In the last
decade (1998–2008), this tool has been ‘discovered’ by governments; it has
been used on average 28 times per year, as opposed to 13 times in the period
1978–2008. This has occurred not only thanks to the compliance of presidents,
who in the past were more ‘hostile’ to it (especially during the two first
cohabitations), but because of the need to transpose many European directives
into French national law. The package vote (vote bloque´) in Article 44.3 states
that government can require a house of parliament to decide, by a single vote,
on all or part of the text under discussion, retaining only the amendments
proposed or accepted by the government. Its use began to grow in the 1980s,
but now is declining (on average, 25 per legislature) because of the presence of
one-party majority governments (Figure 1).
The most important ‘weapon of the weak’ is the so-called ‘guillotine’, with
which a government can declare a bill to be an issue of confidence. The
bill is considered adopted unless the parliament succeeds in passing a motion
of censure. (After a 2008 revision, this device is now limited to one use per
parliamentary session, except for finance and social security bills). Contrary
to common misperception, Article 49.3 has been adopted in relatively few
cases – only 9.4 per session on average – supposedly in order to conceal internal
divisions within the majority. This is more often the case for one-party
governments (Rocard, Mauroy, Raffarin) than for coalitions, even during
cohabitation. For example, Jospin never used Article 49.3, probably to avoid
being blackmailed by allies. After the Fourth Republic, a rationalized parlia-
ment (Huber, 1996) was meant to redesign executive–legislative relations in

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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

250 70
Package Vote Declaration of Urgency
60
200
50

150
40

30
100

20
50
10

0 0

XI (1997-2002)
VIII (1986- 88)
VII (1981-86)

XII (2002-07)
IV (1968-73)

VI (1978-81)

IX (1988-93)
III (1967-68)

V (1973-78)

X (1993-97)
II (1962-67)
I (1959-62)

Mean
Legislatures
Figure 1: Rationalized parliament tools in France (1958–2007).
Source: Elaboration from Assemblée National.

favour of executive power, while alternative accounts emphasize the

importance of the combined impact of the presidential and legislative elections
and the importance of party discipline in strengthening the executive (Sauger,
2009).
The PM has both organizational and operational resources at his or her
disposal (Elgie and Machin, 1991, p. 67; Elgie, 1993). The organization of the
PM’s office is deliberately oriented to the coordination and supervision of the
government’s actions. A good example comes from the current government
(Fillon II): it is organized on the basis of almost 40 offices with a staff of
about 5000 people. Among the main instruments available to the PM are the
cabinet of the PM and the Secre´taire ge´ne´ral du Gouvernement (SGG). The
cabinet comprises 25–50 people, including ‘personal advisors’. It has significant
powers of arbitration and decision making, and it helps solve conflicts among
ministers (or ministries) (Di Virgilio, 2005). It is led by a directeur du cabinet,
but both its composition and mission are determined by the PM, who
establishes and defines the limits of ministerial competencies. The cabinet
oversees ministers’ activities and maintains relationships with the central admi-
nistration department heads. The SGG is composed of nearly 100 high-level
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 Passarelli

public functionaries and is a sort of ‘hinge institution, which intervenes at the

government’s procedural decision-making level’ (Fournier, 1987, p. 145). It
organizes the decision-making process of the government, from the selection of
issues to include on the CM’s agenda to the publication of such decisions in the
Journal Officiel (Fabbrini and Vassallo, 1999, pp. 164–165). The SGG is the key
administrative service under the PM’s authority (Elgie and Machin, 1991, p. 68).3
During a period of cohabitation, the political dynamic tends to change.
Although the PM cannot neutralize the presidential power of an early
dissolution of parliament, he or she can strongly reduce the president’s
influence in the role of president of the CM. In 1986, the PM ‘discovered’ the
Council of the Cabinet, an organ not mentioned in the Constitution but
inherited from the Fourth Republic. It is composed of the head of the executive
and its ministers, and has the role of preparing the CM sessions (Elgie and
Machin, 1991, p. 69; Fabbrini and Vassallo, 1999, p. 163). The number of
ministers – who mostly come from public administration or political parties –
has varied slightly but averages 15.6. Exceptions may occur when there is a
reshuffle or problems among the coalition’s allies. The presence of women
became prevalent only in the mid-1980s, when they made up 5.8 per cent of
ministers, but that rate has risen to 35.7 per cent with Jospin’s government and

100%
8.5 8.5
15.3 15.7 13.2
17.1
25.0 22.6 23.4 23.5 23.7
29.0

80%

60%

91.5 91.5
84.7 84.3 86.8
82.9
40% 75.0 77.4 76.6 76.5 76.3
71.0

20%

0%
I (1959-62)

II (1962-67)

III (1967-68)

IV (1968-73)

V (1973-78)

VI (1978-81)

VII (1981-86)

VIII (1986- 88)

IX (1988-93)

X (1993-97)

XI (1997-2002)

XII (2002-07)

Legislatures
Projects de loi (Government) Propositions de loi (Parliament)
Figure 2: Legislative outcomes in France (1958–2007).
Source: Elaboration from Assemblée National.

410 r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 8, 4, 402–428
 The government in two semi-presidential systems

46.7 per cent with Sarkozy’s cabinet. Although Article 20 states that the
Government shall determine and conduct the policy of the Nation, the president
strongly influences the decision-making process. The consequence has been a
trend of presidential hierarchization, although according to Carcassonne (1994,
p. 42), ‘Si le Premier ministre n’a pas toujours le pouvoir de de´cider, il a celui d’agir
[y] Matignon, même en dehors de la cohabitation, fait toujours à peu pre`s tout’.
As suggested in the work of J.-L. Thiébault, the government’s operation and its
hierarchical versus collegial internal dynamics arise from its decision-making
ability, and, in particular, its legislative output.
Figure 2 shows legislative production, taking into account the rate of
government-sponsored approved bills vis-à-vis those initiated by parliament. The
number of projets de loi has always been higher than propositions de loi, with an
average of 81.2 per cent (only during the long cohabitation did it drop to
71 per cent). The number of decrees adopted in the CM, rather than in the Conseil
d’État, supplies an indicator of the government’s attitude towards the legislative
process; CM decrees average 4.7 per cent and have never reached 7 per cent.

The president, parliamentary majority and government: A few

cases of cohabitation

Given limited formal and material resources,4 the president depends on the
support of a legislative majority and the wide powers wielded by the PM and
the government. This process may be interpreted as ‘presidentialization’
(Poguntke and Webb, 2005). This phenomenon appears to be the consequence
of a rise in partisan logic, uniting parties in favour of or against the incumbent
or future president, at the expense of the president-as-arbiter (Grossman and
Sauger, 2009).
In periods of cohabitation, the president is forced back to a more limited role
as the PM takes over effective political leadership. But cohabitation continues
to be seen as an anomaly, and in fact since 1958 there have been only 9 years of
divided majorities (1986–1988; 1993–1995; 1997–2002). During these periods,
there has been a sort of ‘on-the-job competition’ between the president and the
PM. On the other hand, with homogenous majorities, the two political actors
have applied a ‘division of labour’ approach (Fabbrini and Vassallo, 1999,
p. 161). During cohabitation the president appoints – volens nolens – the leader
of the parliamentary majority who won the general election. Presidential powers
are not formally reduced, but the head of the state has to use them parsimo-
niously owing to the parliamentary equilibrium. In particular, the power to
dissolve parliament – and thus the government and PM – becomes difficult to
exercise without risking electoral defeat or popular discredit. Political and
institutional equilibrium are the prerogative of the PM/government axis.

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 Passarelli

This reinforces the PM hierarchy over ministers by unifying the government

behind him or her vis-à-vis the president.
With the exception of periods of cohabitation, the de facto leader of the
party in parliament is the president and not the PM. However, during Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing’s presidency, control of the right-wing majority did not rest
entirely in the president’s hands. Similarly, Mitterrand faced the challenge of a
socialist competitor in Rocard and Chirac with Pasqua. Moreover, party
factionalism that affects the Socialists in particular (Cole, 1989; Passarelli, 2008b)
demonstrated that relations between the president and the PM have sometimes
been difficult even in periods of congruent majorities (for example, 1974–1981;
1981–1986). In some cases, a divided party strengthens the president; in others,
the PM. Presidential candidates have been partisan candidates, at least since de
Gaulle left the political arena: see the cases of Mitterrand, Chirac and Sarkozy
(Passarelli, 2008a). Under the partisan logic of the Fifth Republic, the
president becomes in some cases (but not during cohabitation) a kind of super-
PM, although protected against any form of censure and who governs
effectively. Presidential influence on government activities varies considerably
for two reasons. First, governments have three types of skills for addressing
problems – policy coordination, policymaking and decision making. Second,
tasks that governments must fulfil often tend to diverge from their formal
duties (Blondel, 1990, pp. 26–27; 1993).
With divided majorities, the PM has greater freedom to choose ministers
(though the approval of other coalition party leaders, if any, is required). His
or her duration in office is perhaps the most obvious or the most striking
indicator of the nature of the ministerial ‘condition’ (Blondel, 1985, p. 21).
Otherwise, the president politically, de facto, chooses ministers from among
the majority party – that is, his or her party (Cole, 1993). The PM may appoint
several junior ministers, and staff members are chosen for their loyalty
and competence. Inter-ministerial groups are crucial because all important
government bills pass through them, and these groups inform the CM and the
inter-departmental councils. The ministerial cabinets are involved, drawing up,
proposing and pursuing with varying degrees of emphasis virtually all
written and other forms of political information (Gaffney, 1991, pp. 7–8).
All ministerial cabinet nominations are at the discretion of the minister
concerned, and are drawn from a network of people among, or connected to,
the minister’s personal followers (Suleiman, 1984, p. 119). There are two
essential reasons for this dominance: (1) The budget of the ministerial cabinet is
very limited, and therefore its members must be paid from outside the
government, and (2) The civil service institutions turn out a uniform product.
Whereas during the early Fifth Republic, the majority of cabinet members were
compagnons of de Gaulle, by the end of his presidency, the high-level civil
service had increased its rate of representation (Gaffney, 1991, pp. 8–9).
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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

The sociological background of government personnel features a low

proportion of women. One quarter of ministers reach office before they are
45 years old. The incidence of higher education graduates is 82 per cent
(Thiébault, 1991, pp. 24–25). In France, the government personnel come
mostly from an iron triangle of parties, notables and technocrats. Roughly 20
per cent of ministers have no political experience, including a few cases of
cumul des mandats (Knapp, 1991; Foucault, 2006), and the presence of pure or
mixed bureaucratic background experience is significant. ‘The relative weak-
ness of parties leaves a greater space for the recruitment of ministers from lesser
political institutions’ (Cotta, 1991, p. 188). Thus, the chance to become part of
the government is greater for grande e´cole alumni and ministers’ executive
managers (Aberbach et al, 1981). However, the ‘recruitment pool for ministers
remains dominated by parliamentarians’, and ‘60–75 per cent of them have
prior experience as deputy or senator’ (Kan and Indradason, 2009, p. 47). But
in some cases, the president’s increasing power, and his or her control of the
presidential party, has allowed him or her to appoint independents among his
or her ministers and yet continue to ‘whip them’ (Brossolette, 2007).
The approval level of the PM or president can influence his or her choice
whether to proceed to a reshuffle, encourage participation from government
members or centralize governance. Looking at the possible correlations
between different types of measures of popularity, Grossman has shown
that ‘[A]n increase in net support for the president helps to reduce the size of
government and the other way round. Strong support [y] diminishes the
danger of government reshuffles. This is also true for the PM. The impact is
almost nil for changing the PM, even if both often go together’ (Grossman,
2009, pp. 276–277). The popularity of the PM, which is ‘the best indicator
of the ambiguity of his/her role’, has regularly been ‘dominated’ by that of
the president (Parodi, 1997, p. 89). This has had important consequences in
confirming the concept of the head of the government as fusible (dispensable or
replaceable) (ibid, p. 90). The president continues to use the PM as a scapegoat
when his own popularity is low, for example by dismissing him or other
ministers (remaniements), to the point that ‘[y] du Premier ministre aux
secrétaires d’Etat, l’attelage de l’exécutif semble réduit à l’état de zombie’
(Le Point, 19 March 2009, p. 5).
Nevertheless, part of the motivation to change the government stems not
from bad poll ratings, but from the prospect of better ratings after a change. Some
analyses show that reducing the size of government by firing ministers appears to
have beneficial effects on presidential support and reputation (Grossman, 2009,
pp. 277–278). Another somewhat counterintuitive result indicates that in terms
of popularity, presidents do not really benefit from government reshuffles;
rather the contrary, on average, reshuffling the government or changing the
PM does in fact lead to lower popularity. Yet this does not appear to stop
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 Passarelli

presidents from trying to shift blame to their ministers (Kan and Indradason,
2009, p. 43). Though during the Fifth Republic the PM’s satisfaction index has
been 9 points lower (on average) than that of the president (5 points higher in
terms of mistrust) (Parodi, 1997, p. 95), the Sarkozy presidency has shown
different results: his popularity is lower, on average, by 10 points compared
with that of his PM. Furthermore, data seem to indicate a public sanction of
the president’s active engagement in policies, and most remarkably (et pour
cause), a shift toward a hierarchical government structure.

(Unstable) presidentialized diarchy?

Grossman and Sauger (2009, pp. 427–435) interpret presidentialization as the

end of a political and institutional process comprising four phases: (1) the
Gaullist Republic (1958–1965); (2) the politicization of the Fifth Republic
(1965–1981); (3) political fragmentation and institutional challenges (1981–2002);
and (4) a new political system (2002–?) with a bipolar (or even a two-party)
schema (Grunberg and Haegel, 2007). An important cause of this tendency is the
2000–2002 reforms, which reduced the length of the presidential term and
inverted the electoral calendar. These changes underscored the president’s role as
partisan leader and the true head of the executive, and strongly limited the
possibility of divided government (Elgie, 2001). Therefore, [y] La pre´sidentia-
lisation ne fait pas de doute. [y] au détriment du Premier ministre. [y] Sarkozy
agit en chef du gouvernement. Il arrive que Franc¸ois Fillon apprenne par la presse
une de´cision gouvernementale. Aucun pre´sident de la Ve´ Re´publique n’avait
auparavant poussé les choses aussi loin (Duhamel, 2009, pp. 34–35).

The Government in Portugal

Portugal’s 1976 Constitution established the government as ‘the organ for the
conduct of the general policy of the country and the superior organ of public
administration’. The government comprises the PM, ministers and (Under)
Secretaries of State. It also may include Secretários de Estado ( junior
ministers), which report to their respective minister and are forced to resign
with him or her. They also occasionally may participate in cabinet meetings as
substitutes for their ministers. The role of Secretário de Estado has also ‘been
an important step in the rise to the rank of cabinet minister’ (Pinto and
Tavares, 2009, p. 152). The number of ministries and Secretariats of State,
their titles and powers and the mode of coordinating them are laid down, as
appropriate to the case, in the decrees appointing the officeholders or by decree
law. In order to ensure loyalty, ministers have tended to appoint indepen-
dent Secretaries of State. This is not the case for the PM’s offices. The PM’s
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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

independence from his or her political party derives from a genetic feature of
parties that emphasizes leadership (the central office) over membership
(Panebianco, 1982; van Biezen, 2003). Two good indicators of this autonomy
are the number of independent ministers appointed as well as the number of
reshuffles (remodelac¸ões), particularly since 1987 (Passarelli, 2005). Never-
theless, it must be stressed that in the majoritarian period (from 1987 onwards),
the choice of ministers has been based on personal trust much more than in the
past (Portas and Valente, 1990, p. 335). The number of technical/independent
ministers has increased since the 1980s, whereas the number of politicians has
decreased (1/3 versus 2/3, on average).
The main institution of the executive is the CM; it comprises the PM, Deputy
PMs (if any) and ministers. Along with the president, the Secretaries and
Under-Secretaries of State may be invited to attend meetings of the CM. Thus,
even the government agenda has become – at least in terms of meeting
participation – a much more collegial element of the system, whereas in the
past (1976–1983) it was ‘purely individual, without any political-partisan
coordination’ (ibid, p. 335), as one would expect owing to coalitions sustaining
governments. The CM determines the general direction of governmental policy
and oversees its implementation. From a political point of view, this organ
decides whether to seek a vote of confidence in the Assembly, and has the
power to accept and approve bills and draft resolutions. In addition, it can
admit decree laws and international agreements that are not submitted to
parliament.
The CM’s role is particularly significant in terms of its engagement in financial
issues, as it can approve the government’s actions resulting in increases or
decreases in public revenue or expenditure. In the first decade (1976–1985),
ministers neither gave information to their colleagues on their activities during
the CM, nor did the PM ask for such explanations (Portas and Valente, 1990,
pp. 344–345). During the majoritarian period, Cavaco Silva’s modifications
increased the number of cabinet divisions and staff (Lobo, 2005a; Passarelli,
2005).5 In particular, Cavaco institutionalized the Monday meeting attended by
the SE-PCM (State secretary) and the department heads of various ministries.
He also pushed strongly toward a new governmental hierarchy supported by two
vice-ministers.
The nature of the CM has varied according to the type of government in
charge:

a. With coalitions, debate was private, in a kind of informal meeting between

the chiefs of parties supporting the government.
b. During the so-called ‘presidential governments’ (1978–1979), the ‘true’
debate was between the president and the PM (with the exceptional presence
of ministers). The main function of the CM was purely technical.
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 Passarelli

c. With majority governments, there emerged a ‘political cabinet, in which

ministers and secretaries participate’. The political cabinet debated the
political and social consequences of policies to be implemented (Portas and
Valente, 1990, pp. 344–345).
The president appoints the PM after considering the results of the general
election and the opinion of the parties represented in the Assembly. The PM
will then intervene in the appointment of other members of the Government
by recommending them to the president. He or she is the political and admini-
strative guide of the government, who has at his or her disposal a relevant
organizational feature – the CETAL, then reorganized as CEJUR (for judicial
and legal support).6 This body is particularly relevant in analysing and drafting
legislative proposals, evaluating the judicial impact of governmental action,
and responding to any of the administrative tribunal’s concerns on bills.
The PM’s growing power – both political and administrative – must be seen
as a consequence of the position’s greater political and electoral autonomy, but
certainly also of the tools it has. In 1977, the PM’s cabinet was created to
support the chief of government’s policies. At the time, the cabinet had only 14
staff members. During the Cavaco Silva governments, there was an increase in
the number of both functionaries and counsellors (Cavaco had 22) recruited
to advise the PM in policy areas. The powers of the head of the State
have changed since 1976 both in a formal manner and, more importantly, in
a political and practical way (Passarelli, 2008a). This is particularly true
following the constitutional amendment of 1982 that reduced, through time
limitations, his or her discretion in dissolving parliament. In some ways, he or
she was no longer ‘constrained’ by the Revolutionary Council in using this
power. However, having been used in 2004, the power of dissolution is not
a dormant one, and this has implications on the relationship between the
president and PM (Jalali, 2007; Neto and Lobo, 2009; Passarelli, 2010).
According to Article 133, the president may dismiss the Government only to
safeguard the proper operation of democratic institutions, and may remove the
PM from office (by appointing and installing a replacement), but can appoint
and remove government officeholders only at the suggestion of the PM.

Government operation: The relevant absence of a presidential party

The significance of being the first democratically elected president, also thanks
to his (quasi-)charismatic stature deriving from his role during the Revolution,
conferred on Ramalho Eanes’ government a more centralized function. At that
time, the president could appoint the PM that he or she preferred. He did so,
1978–1979, primarily thanks to a highly fragmented party system that allowed
the formation of so-called presidential cabinets (Nobre da Costa, Mota
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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

Pinto and Pintasilgo). The presidential appointment did not lead to those
governments’ survival; in fact, the three PMs that he appointed lasted only a
short time in parliament. The almost-constant political cohabitation of the
president with a different parliamentary majority prevented the achievement of a
completely hierarchical structure. The coabitac¸ão was (and remains) an almost
continuous fact of political and institutional life, due essentially to differing elec-
toral calendars. However, it should be stressed that Portuguese cohabitation – at
least in the case of Eanes’ presidency – differs significantly from that which
occurs in France.7 Political elections are first-order, whereas presidential elections
are second-order (Freire, 2005). Thus, the president cannot influence the parlia-
mentary majority by taking advantage of the honeymoon effect. The (in)ability of
the president to act effectively in the institutional and political contexts stems
essentially from purely political causes. The president has never been the leader of
a parliamentary party, a useful tool for applying political and institutional
pressure on the government. The only exception to this ‘rule’ – neither Soares and
Sampaio for the Socialist, nor Cavaco Silva for the Social Democrats have been
able to manage parties as ‘theirs’ – was Eanes’ PRD, which had a very short life.8
Neither Soares nor Sampaio for the Socialists, nor Cavaco Silva for the Social
Democrats, was able to manage parties as ‘their own’. Soares and Sampaio were
each unable to fully control the congruent presidential and parliamentary
majorities (contra the ‘archetypal’ French case) because they neither led the party
in a ‘presidential’ manner (Cole, 1993), nor acted in a presidentialized way in
terms of PM appointment or parliamentary dismissal. In fact, the ongoing
process of political presidentialization has been in favour of the PM rather than
the president (Lobo, 2005a, b).9 The consequences of this evolution have been
visible and effective, particularly on the governmental side. The significant
absence of the president in government affairs excluded both a possible evo-
lution to a more hierarchical and centralized operation and an evolution to a
personalized style of leadership, or rather of government operation, at least not
in favour of the president. Nevertheless, during cohabitation the president –
contrary to what occurred in France – became the leader of the opposition to
the majority and tried to take advantage of the government’s divisions, for
example by vetoing bills or dismissing the parliament early. Conversely, the
PM, facing presidential incursions, can strengthen his or her in role in the
government.

Administration and bureaucracy

The government also has some authority to supervise indirect and autonomous
administrations, as well as to perform its own administrative functions, such as
preparing plans on the basis of the laws relating to the major options,

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 Passarelli

implementing the State budget, making regulations necessary for the proper
enforcement of laws and managing the State’s services and administration.
In Portugal, one of the most highly centralized democracies, the public
administration strongly depends on the State’s central bureaucracy (Barreto,
1984), and the government disposes of a body of functionaries that make up
the national bureaucracy. Similar to France, Portugal is also a case of medium-
level patronage (Müller, 2006, p. 189): it has been estimated that after the
1995 elections, ‘approximately 6000 political appointments were made by the
incoming government of the Socialist party at the top of various ministries and
public agencies’ (Oliveira Rocha, 1998, p. 225). Similar change occurred in
1986–1987 ‘when the Social Democratic party formed a majoritarian govern-
ment, and in 1974–76, at the fall of the authoritarian regime’ (Sotiropoulos,
2004, p. 409).
The government–bureaucracy relationship and the loyal staff (recruited from
the rank-and-file of the ruling party or parties) compete with the general
directors and high-ranking officials (Lucas, 1988), while the presence of ad hoc
structures of the ministers including those with documentation functions is a
product of the 1990s (Portas and Valente, 1990, p. 341). The most relevant
institution in this field is the General Secretary of the CM (SG-PCM), created
in 1976 following the French SGG model. In 1993, through a decree law, the
PSD government granted the SG-PCM some functions that have yet to be
exercised, such as the supervision of the legislative process of the government.
The SG-PCM offers administrative support for inter-ministerial coordination.
Before the 1993 reform, it led three main areas: (1) coordination and technical
supervision; (2) data gathering and public relations; (3) administration. Finally,
abandoning any political attitudes in favour of a ‘pure’ administrative focus, it
allowed the SG-PCM to concentrate much more power than before. The SE-
PCM – appointed together with the ministers – is the administrative body
charged with the coordination of the PCM’s meetings. Since the mid-1980s, it
has become strongly politicized, in an attempt to secure its ability to effectively
deal with members of government, and represents a sort of bridge institution
(Lobo, 2005a, p. 105) between the juridical and political processes. In spite of
its small cabinet, the SE-PCM plays a crucial role in all governmental activities
because of the important political figures associated with it. Particularly since
1982, the partisan nature of the SE-PCM has allowed for better coordination
of the governmental team.
A look at the social background of ministers (Freire, 2001) reveals several
important characteristics relevant to this analysis of government dynamics.
First, cabinet members tend to be younger, on average, than their counterparts
in Western Europe. Approximately 23 per cent are in the age group of
30–39 years. Moreover, the median age of ministers in the last 30 years, as
noted by Tavares de Almeida and Costa Pinto (2003), is the lowest in Western
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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

Europe (2003, pp. 20–29). The number of women still remains very low (4.9 per
cent), and there has only been one female PM, Maria de Lourdes Pinstasilgo.
The level of education has reached a high standard (almost all ministers have a
university degree), even if the most important political pathway to the cabinet
has become a parliamentary career (ibid, pp. 35–36; Magone, 1990). Most
ministers do not come from parties or the State administration. The constantly
increasing number of technical and independent ministers – between 1976–2005
‘around 44 per cent of all first-time ministers had never been members of
national party bodies’ (Pinto and Tavares, 2009, p. 152) – demonstrates the
PM’s freedom in appointing some non-party staff. In addition, the power of
local notables, the so-called ‘barons’ – especially in the case of the PSD (Lopes,
1988), but also of the PS (Canas, 2005), and in a general trend of party
factionalism (Corkill, 1995) – who use the party label for the elections but are
independent from them because of their personal electoral strength. In this
context, the political dynamics have been determined by the relationship
between the PM and its parliamentary majority, the president intervening only
when fights have led to a government crisis.

Dynamics: Hierarchical or collegial, unified or divided

The government’s operation has changed considerably since 1976 when power
was shared between the head of the state and the PM in a collegial manner,
essentially because of the coalitional nature of governments and party
fragmentation. The formal features of the SG-PCM and the political/electoral
evolution of 1985–1987 have given rise to a more hierarchical government.
Ever since, it is the PM, through the PCM, who decides and is accountable for
policy decisions. Ministers are included in a team, but it is ultimately the PM
(the leader of the parliamentary majority as well as of the party) who leads the
cabinet and decides on a host of issues. As party leader, the PM can exert
control over the ministers, who are mostly technicians (Pinto and Tavares,
2009, pp. 153–154). Data on legislative outcomes confirm that the government
and the CM serve a central role. In the last 30 years, the number of decree laws
approved has decreased most likely owing to the presence of (more) cohesive
governments (see Figure 3). The rate of governmental legislative initiative has
no clear and continuous trend, but rather the number of legislative proposals
approved depends on the presence of a majority government or a coalition,
showing that parliament and parties still have an important role in legislative
process (see Figure 4).
The absolute majority, both of votes and seats, won by the PSD in 1987 not
only reinforced certain tendencies in the political system, but also in the
government’s operation. The PM has played a pivotal role – both politically
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 Passarelli

900 871

800

707
700
658 651
614
600 591
573
Number of Decrees

551 540 549

508
500 486 479 470
469 457
446 432 431 440
424
394 402
400 378 377 367
347 342
316 328 334
300 277 257 257 259
244
200

101
100

76-87
88-09
Mean
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Years

Figure 3: The exercise of decrees in Portugal (1976–2009).

Source: Elaboration from www.parlamento.pt.

and administratively – in the process of centralization and presidentialization,

which has strongly limited presidential intervention. Thus, the Portuguese
government seems to adopt elements of both the team and the prime mini-
sterial models. There is not enough data to confirm the trend, but there are
obvious elements of both approaches: (1) (Team): there are ‘ministers with
common aims’ in a system in which ‘much work is delegated to ministers,
committees, or to the Prime Minister, but there is a spirit of understanding’,
and (2) (Hierarchical): frequent cases in which ‘ministers are noticeably
dependent on the head of the government, for instance because he or she has
considerable popularity’ and/or repeated election victories (Blondel, 1990,
pp. 263–264).
Finally, it is relevant to highlight one clear indication of this change, and its
effectiveness: the opinion polls on ‘governing institutions’. From 1978 to 1993,
the number of people who consider the PM to be the main governing actor
doubled (to 50 per cent), while those who judged the president as the main
governing institution declined from almost 40 to 25 per cent (Lobo, 2005a,
p. 45). Data on the president’s and the PM’s popularity show that the former
has always enjoyed a higher rate of positive opinions than the PM (Veiga and
Veiga, 2004).10 These results confirm the idea that higher direct engagement in
politics, and policies, may affect the head of government’s popularity. Thus, as

420 r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 8, 4, 402–428
 The government in two semi-presidential systems

100%
12.2 12.5
22.2 25.0 23.9 22.9

80% 37.5

59.4
68,4 66.2

60% 82.7
86.5

87.8 87.5
40% 77.8 75.0 76.1 77.1

62.5

20% 33.8
40.6
31.6

17.3
13.5

0%

VIII (1999-2002)
VII (1995-99)
IV (1983-85)

VI (1991-95)

IX (2002-05)
III (1980-83)

V (1987-91)

X (2005-08)
V(1985-87)
I (1976-79)

II (1979)

Mean
Legislatures

Propostas de lei (Government) Projectos de lei (Parliament)

Figure 4: The legislative outcomes in Portugal (1976–2008).

Source: Elaboration from www.parlamento.pt.

the PM is the main actor in the political arena and is accountable for politics,
the president has a ‘better’ reputation among citizens, stemming from the
‘neutral’, super partes, honorific role that he or she plays. However, this is not
true in the case of adversarial parliamentary and presidential majorities
(Passarelli, 2008a).

Conclusion

Institutions matter, but only to some extent (Keeler, 1993). Political and
institutional theories tell us that Portugal and France have similar formal insti-
tutional frameworks, with analogous government structures, even if the Fifth
Republic seems not to be an archetype of semi-presidentialism (Elgie, 2009).
The two systems have consolidated different modes of governments operation
owing to changes in the political equilibrium, institutional trends and the fact
that if ‘one examines the characteristics of national executives, then differences
among these appear to be as large as differences among groups, parties or legis-
latures’ (Blondel, 1990, p. 257). Fifth Republic institutions have strengthened
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 Passarelli

governments through changes to executive power and policymaking (increasing

stability and control of the legislative power) but they did not completely
remove the influence of the head of state. He or she continues to intervene in
the government’s affairs thanks to a consolidated praxis built on the basis of
profoundly modified political and party systems, particularly evident with the
Sarkozy’s consular presidency (Duhamel, 2009).
In Portugal, the president does not play a relevant role in the government
affairs. The PM, a sort of primus super pares, is the key political actor in
leading a classic collegial government, which is slowly but constantly moving
closer to the pure ideal type of a cabinet. Despite increased PM resources,
the cabinet ‘has not been the preferred venue for strategic political co-
ordination’ (Neto and Lobo, 2009, pp. 244–245). Rather, decisions are made
by an inner circle of mostly senior party members (and not allowing the
technical ones).
Comparing the operation of governments does not provide particular
evidence to support the thesis that semi-presidentialism has its own structure of
government. Results underscore that differences in government’s functioning
arise from political conjunctures, political culture, administrative legacy and so
on. The nature of the government, the style of the cabinet, the dynamics of
decision-making, policymaking and coordination depend more on extra-
institutional variables. The government as an organization is not the lieu of
power in se, but the two cases are examples of ‘government by cabinet, and not
government directed by an individual, be he or she Monarch or president: this
means that the ministers – in different ways in the two countries – are
implicated in general problems as well as in specific matters; this also means
that they are involved politically as well as administratively in governmental
life’ although less than the PM (Blondel, 1991, p. 5).
In France, the government is the core of the system mostly in the case of
cohabitation. The president centralizes the policymaking and decision-making
processes, while the PM serves as a sort of secretary that coordinates deputies
and ministers. In normal periods, the nearly direct link between the
bureaucracy and the presidency – although mediated by the government –
strengthens the trend toward presidential intervention, even if Mitterrand
(1985), perhaps ironically, claimed that ‘[he was] not the government. [and he
had in his power [only] to bring certain matters to the attention of the
government and if need be to give it advice’. Thus, the influence of presidents
has been at odds with their constitutionally granted powers. De Gaulle,
Pompidou, Mitterrand, Chirac and Sarkozy managed to dominate the
executive branch well beyond the rules of the Constitution, affecting the
collegial nature of the government (Chagnollaud and Quermonne, 1996,
pp. 293–294). This translates into a move towards a more centralized and
hierarchical structure.
422 r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 8, 4, 402–428
 The government in two semi-presidential systems

In Portugal, a similar tendency towards hierarchization, or rather presiden-

tialization (Lobo, 2005b), has involved the government, but in a persistently
solid collegial organization form. It may sound contradictory, but it is only an
apparent inconsistency. The two movements can meld together, meaning that
the PM’s role in the government can be strengthened relative to the ministers
but in a parliamentary, collegial government. The PM is the key actor
particularly when he or she leads a one-party majority (Passarelli, 2005), as
ministers are not very relevant, nor is the bureaucracy. The president can only
intervene effectively if the parliamentary coalition supporting the PM increases
conflicts among parties or creates a crisis (for example, the case of Santana
Lopes government in 2004). The government is (mostly) hierarchical, agents
are clearly subordinates to specific principles, and there are few horizontal
checks and balances. Within each ministerial branch, the department head
(typically a cabinet minister) is solely responsible for decisions, and the PM sits
at the apex of government, exercising a prevalent role in the process of
governmental coordination (King, 1994, p. 153; Lijphart, 1999, p. 114), to the
extent that someone has referred to a ‘presidentialism of the Prime Minister’
(Moreira, 1989, p. 36). The Lusitanian path of a parliamentary-collegial
government, and the president’s incapacity to strengthen his or her role à la de
Gaulle, show a sort of ‘hierarchical collegiality’. It is collegial because of its
parliamentary consolidation model and operation, even in a formally
established semi-presidential system. It is hierarchical because the PM governs
as a primus super pares rather a primus inter pares, in practice markedly eroding
Hierarchical

France (2002-)

P o rt u g a l (1 9 8 7 - )
France (cohabitation)
Collegial

P ortugal (coh a bitation )

Unified Divided
Figure 5: The functioning of government in France and Portugal.
Source: After Elgie (1999b, p. 286); Elgie (2005); Passarelli (2008a).

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 Passarelli

+ Hyper-presidentialism (1) Collapse or stalemate (3)

France
President

P o r t u g a l ( c o h a b i t a ti o n )
France (cohabitation)

Portugal

- Balanced institutions (2) Parliamentarism (4)

- Prime minister/Parliament +
Figure 6: Majorities, presidential-prime ministerial relations and government leadership styles in
France and Portugal.

the principles of collective and egalitarian government. Hence, cohabitation is

the fundamental interpretative key of the shift towards a more hierarchical
or collegial governmental operation that differentiates the two systems
(Figures 5 and 6).

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Jean Blondel for his invaluable comments on a preliminary

version of the essay, which was presented at the 2009 IPSA World Congress
held in Santiago, Chile. I had the fortune there to receive input from Carlos
Huneeus and other participants on the panel. I thank Salvatore Vassallo for
reading the first draft and providing thorough comments, as well as Piero
Ignazi for important suggestions on method. I also thank Jean-Luis Thiébault
for his insight into French government, as well as two anonymous referees
for their comments. Finally, but certainly not the least, I thank Giancarlo
Gasperoni, Erik Jones, Amy Hamblin, and Courtney McCarty for their
dedication and cooperation. Still, only the author is accountable for content.

Notes

1 Under the Sarkozy presidency, each minister can only talk for 2 min. The exception is the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, who is allowed to talk for 15 min.

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 The government in two semi-presidential systems

2 In 1981, 70 of the 129 general managers of central administration were transferred or

substituted, and at the same time, more than 50 per cent of ministerial executive managers were
appointed .
3 There exist two other General Secretariats under the responsibility of the PM: the National
Defence (SGND), and the Interministerial Committee on European Economic Cooperation
(SGCI).
4 There were 7000 people during the Chirac presidency but only 50 under his direct control.
5 Between 1991 and 1995, the cabinet was composed of 25 people, who tried to ‘defend’ the
government from many political demands.
6 Until 1987, it was the GATL (Gabinete de Apoio Técnico e Legislativo), then substituted by the
CETAL (Centro de Estudos Técnico e Apoio Legislativo) jurists appointed by the PM. In 1992,
it changed its denomination in CEJUR (Centro Juridico).
7 Eanes’ first presidential bid in 1976 was supported by PS, PSD and CDS – all of which were
parties that were in government subsequently. The only clear period of cohabitation under
Eanes was from 1981 to 1983, when the government was led by PSD-CDS coalition that
supported a rival presidential candidate in the 1980 presidential elections.
8 Partido Renovador Democrático (Renewal Democratic Party). In the 1985 elections, it
obtained 45 seats and 17.9 per cent of votes, but in 1987 it had only seven seats and 4.9 per cent
of votes, and thus can be considered a ‘flash party’ (Morlino, 1995, p. 321).
9 In 1994, the National Convention of the PS confirmed the leadership of Guterres, after the
latter in 1992 had defeated Sampaio who was given the consolation prize of the party’s
presidential candidacy in 1996.
10 The President’s popularity has always been higher than the PM’s, except in 1986.

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