Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PHILOSOPHY
Claire Wolfteich
Boston University
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Had I not been commissioned to review this book, I would have given
up on it before reaching the end of the Preface. However, that would
have been a great pity, because Boesel has an interesting and important
contribution to make to the encounter of Judaism with Christian the-
ology. The book should be persevered with for the sake of the final two
pages which, although Boesel accepts they offer no ‘argument [the
reader] cannot refuse’, do leave the reader with a kind of Kierkegaar-
dian predicament, except that no leap of faith is to be faced, since it is
God ‘who does the initial and decisive leaping’, and who promises to
be with us in ‘our problematic, creaturely reality’ (p. 272). But to reach
that point the reader has to face long and convoluted sentences, often
containing a number of asides in parentheses, taking as many as eight
lines of text. In most cases the parenthetical material can be omitted
without in any way detracting from the argument. The text appears to
have been dictated, or even to be transcribed lectures (since it certainly
makes more sense when read aloud), and, without having been rewrit-
ten to be read rather than heard, it is less than helpful to the reader
attempting to concentrate on the argument. Now, I consider it good
practice when reviewing to read the book through at least twice, in
order to be as fair as possible to the author, and I was relieved to find
the second reading of this book less problematic. In this case, however,
the second reading had to come before the writing of a first draft of the
review rather than, as is my usual practice, after.
Boesel describes the book as an attempt ‘to address the issue of
theological reformation in response to self-examination and repentance
with regard to the Church’s past and present relation to the Jewish
neighbor’ (p. ix). However, having been convinced by others of the
need for such a response, he has been less than convinced by their
suggested remedies.
Boesel came to the study of theology from the kind of evangelicalism
that considers Barth to be a dangerous liberal. Fortunately, liberation
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 403
spells this out in detail, showing how the affirmation of Abraham ‘in
the Jewish flesh of Jesus Christ’, while it is a displacement of Abraham
(thanks to Barth’s Christology), is not a replacement (in supercessionist
terms) (p. 86).
Having spelled out ‘the problem’ in ways both familiar and, I suspect,
unfamiliar to the informed reader, in the final two parts Boesel seeks to
find a remedy. He begins with Rosemary Radford Reuther’s attempt to
find in the Christian faith good news that is not bad news for anyone
else, contending that in diminishing the gospel so as to recognize it as
good news for some, Reuther undermines its very nature as ‘news’. An
historical review that includes Lessing’s ‘great ugly ditch’ between
historical and religious truth, and Kantian universal ethics, heralds
Boesel’s critique of Reuther as rooted in certain modern Western
assumptions amounting to an interpretative imperialism that casts ‘a
particular shadow over the Jewish neighbor’ (p. 178). Indeed, he
believes her ethical intentions toward the Jewish neighbor to be doubly
compromised.
In the later chapters Boesel, having taken Reuther to be representa-
tive of ‘the extent to which our best remedies of Christian faith are
both grounded in a modern ethical desire and its assumptions regard-
ing faith and the ethical, and are thereby undermined in their ethical
intention’ (p. 197), seeks to make explicit this representative function.
In the final part (IV) he brings in the postmodern thought of Levinas
and Derrida to provide possible criteria for the interpretation of the
predicament. In the penultimate chapter he then returns to the
possibility that the remedy might be contained in the problem itself,
and proposes ‘an [alternative] interpretative imperialism “without
weapons” ’ (p. 222f). He focuses on the four ‘marks of Christian
speech’ as determined by Barth’s understanding of revelation, Chris-
tology and election, namely: prayer (‘the doxological response to the
divine address’), personal address (Christian speaking to the neigh-
bor), news (addressing the neighbor as witness and testimony), and
the particular piece of news (prophetic and apostolic witness to the
‘Jesus event’). However, Barth also lays down strict conditions under
which this Christian speech can be understood to be true, since ‘only
God Himself can provide the proof that we are really talking about
Him when we are allegedly doing so’ (p. 248). This then undermines
all interpretive imperialism, freeing the church for a much more
modest, much less presumptuous self-understanding with respect to
its neighbors. Rather than claiming and competing for ‘superiority’
among the religions, ‘it cannot even claim the partial and provisional
relation to and capacity for truth conceived as symbolic (or analogical,
or metaphorical) expression of religious experience. Of itself, it pre-
tends to nothing but a repetition of a particular piece of news’ (p. 251).
As such, therefore, it has nothing of its own with which to browbeat
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 405
Michael A. Chester
The North East Institute for Theological Education
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the view and emphasizes the fact that other religions also see the divine
working through human beings and their bodies. ‘The graced body is in
fact a recurring theme across religions’ (p. 13).
Brown sees certain key moments in Christian history and theology
when the sacramentality of the body was emphasized. The Renaissance
revived the Greek view of beautiful bodies being graced by the divine.
Such embodied beauty was ‘used as a metaphor for divinity and for
humanity’s ultimate triumph over sin and death’ (p. 186). The potential
‘of sexuality as a religious metaphor’ is studied in the art of Bernini and
Caravaggio. The Baroque era understood sexuality as ‘an important
religious metaphor’ which spoke of ‘the fruitfulness of relationships
with the divine in intimate generosity and giving’ (p. 14). The beauty of
the created world is a reflection of the Creator who has put part of
himself in his creation. Brown is concerned that there has been a mis-
understanding which has led to a rejection of beautiful and sexual
religious art. Brown believes this is a result of Christianity’s failure to
have a ‘serious engagement with symbolism’ (p. 57).
Dance is one of the bodily expressions which Brown believes reflects
communication between the divine and the human. Though some see
dance as a human attempt to fly from the earth to God, religious dance
at its heart waits for God’s gracious initiative, often in the form of a
divine trance. Even today dance is described as graceful. And those
who dance well are often described as being gifted (graced) rather than
succeeding through hard work.
Brown examines dance separately since it involves the ‘total integra-
tion of of body and mind’ and of ‘divine gift and human pursuit’ (p. 15).
Dance also receives attention since Brown believes that dance has been
improperly relegated by the church to the secular realm (p. 119). Brown
sees modern dance and ballet as having a more sacramental and graced
nature even though both are viewed as secular.
For Christians a sacramental eating and drinking exists in the
Lord’s Supper. Brown stresses the life-giving symbolism of bread,
water, and wine. Brown also sees divine sacramentality for eating and
drinking in other contexts. Brown decries the fact that many Chris-
tians no longer say grace at meals. This bespeaks a failure to see God’s
gracious giving and the gratitude that should follow his giving of
material gifts. Feasting involves a communal aspect of life, a life open
to others, and an understanding of interdependence with God and
other human beings. This contrasts with the excessive individualism
of the modern age.
These first chapters look at beauty and giftedness. But not everything
in life is beautiful or very gifted. So Brown examines what is ugly,
tattered, and torn. Christianity has throughout its history struggled
with suffering and issues of the body, at times rejecting the fleshly and
material by encouraging fasting, celibacy, and asceticism. Brown brings
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 407
Armand J. Boehme
Trinity Lutheran Church
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
408 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
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Bradford McCall
Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA
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Bradford McCall
Regent University
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© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
412 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
Briefly: Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, David Mills Daniel, SCM
Press, 2007 (ISBN 978-0-334-04122-1), viii + 130 pp., pb £7.99
Briefly: Moore’s Principia Ethica, David Mills Daniel, SCM Press, 2007
(ISBN 978-0-334-04040-8), viii + 120 pp., pb £7.99
Perhaps no one took up the analytic crusade with more vigor than A.
J. Ayer (1910–1989), whose Language, Truth and Logic quickly became a
manifesto for the ‘trial and execution’ of metaphysics. Encouraged by
Isaiah Berlin to write down all he had absorbed from the Vienna Circle,
Ayer wrote this book as a passionate appeal for philosophy to confine
itself to analysis and avoid metaphysical and theological speculation.
The weapon of choice was the verification principle: anything that
could not be verified empirically had to be dismissed as meaningless.
This principle was to undergo several revisions in subsequent years,
though Ayer humbly admitted that none of its formulations proved
entirely satisfactory. The venture of subordinating philosophy to the
rigorous discipline of empirical science, however, never veered off
course. Mills Daniel gives a lucid summary of Ayer’s argument that
sentences can only express genuine propositions about matters of fact if
the facts themselves are empirically verifiable: that is, if it is known
what observations are relevant for determining whether the proposition
is true or false. In Ayer’s estimation, this reduces a priori statements to
tautologies and ethical statements to mere expressions of emotion.
These four volumes live up to the ‘Briefly’ series promise to provide
clear, readable, compact summaries, but they also exemplify the seri-
ousness of Mills Daniel’s recommendation to engage the original works
directly before, during, and after one’s enjoyment of the summary. With
regard to the analytic school, the three respective summaries confirm
both the truth and the naiveté of Thomas Reid’s remark that ‘there is
no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the
ambiguity of words’.
Daniel B. Gallagher
Sacred Heart Major Seminary
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Aimée U. Light
Duquesne University
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© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 417
Derek Nelson
Greenville, PA
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beautifully told stories of patients and their lives. Garrett narrates the
individuals he encounters, he and his feelings about their lives in rich,
lucid ways. One is left haunted by his characters.
Yet, that literary strength makes the theological part of the book
seem all the less artful. Sometimes, one wishes that Garrett could
simply have left the reader with these moving narratives. However, he
attempts to move from narrative to theology in somewhat uneven
fashion. At points Garrett connects the two insightfully at others it is
clear that he is awkwardly ‘popularizing’ insights found on any basic
theology and pastoral care class. While Garrett talks mainly about his
experiences as a hospital chaplain, he undertakes unhelpful autobio-
graphical detours into his own journey with depression. The conflation
of his story and those of his patients seems grants neither very much
justice. Suffering from depression is different than suffering from a
another illness. For those with chaplaincy experience, the book will
probably not offer much insight. It recounts experiences and feelings
that those who have done hospital chaplaincy or pastoral work wrestle
with. For those who are looking for an accessable introduction to suf-
fering and the Christian life this book has moments of real insight
amid beautifully crafted stories. All ask the central question, ‘Where is
God in the midst of the sorrow?’ Garett makes one wade through some
rather unhelpful autobiography and clumsy theology to get there, but
there are moments of artfully crafted wisdom in this work, which
makes it worth reading.
Aaron Klink
Duke University
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husband. This present book, edited by the same team, contains twenty-
five articles and brings an enormous amount of unpublished materials
kept in Anscombe’s files into the public realm. The technical apparatus
provided by the editors is very helpful, including the almost Herculean
feat of trying to establish the context in which each article was deliv-
ered. The collection also contains some previously published essays
included for thematic coverage. This book will be of great interest to
philosophers, ethicists, and theologians, and Anscombe is always chal-
lenging and tends to swim against the tides of modernity and fashion.
She covers a wide range of topics: the nature of faith, miracles, tran-
substantiation, the soul, the nature of authority in morals and the nature
of morality itself, sin, contraception and chastity and wisdom and
usury – to name only some. What becomes clear from these essays is
Anscombe’s deep Thomist orientation, and her profound fidelity to the
Roman Catholic Church, not in any unthinking manner, but in a con-
stant attempt to explicate Catholic doctrine against shallow misunder-
standing (often by Catholics). So she is happy to criticize Catholics for
abandoning their teachings on usury which had been formally con-
demned as late as 1745, as well as chide those Catholic missionaries in
Africa who request money as a mark of commitment and upkeep for
the new growing church to those who are to be baptized. Not that
Anscombe fails to see the reasons for why they did these actions, but
she is equally clear that under no conditions can salvation be predicated
upon payment for profoundly theological reasons.
What is also interesting is the way intentionality, drawing on
Anscombe’s early groundbreaking work, illuminates topic after topic.
For example, in defending Humanae Vitae she explains the difference
between contraceptive intercourse (the use of the pill) and noncontra-
ceptive intercourse (the use of the rhythm method) in terms of inten-
tionality. The description of the first is that it is an act of sexual
intercourse deliberately rendered infertile and the second is the perfor-
mance of a generate act in which the couple have done nothing to
change it from that. It is a shame that the editors excluded the brief
philosophically astute and somewhat irate criticisms of this position by
Peter Winch and Bernard Williams with Michael Tanner when it was
first published, along with Anscombe’s terse reply. This would have
helped the student grasp Anscombe’s singular concern as well as her
refusal to engage with what she considered polemics. Anscombe in
these essays also interestingly comments that once artificial contracep-
tion is permitted then logically, any form of sexual activity might be
permitted. This shows both her ability to lack balance as well as see the
wood for the trees! I recommend this collection highly.
Gavin D’Costa
University of Bristol
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 421
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Peter Frick
University of Waterloo
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© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
424 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
makes explicit what has been present (if sometimes veiled) in the Chris-
tian tradition from the beginning: that human agency is involved in the
engagement with the sources of Christian faith, and that judgment and
interpretation are inextricably bound up with that. In shedding this
light, performance as a metaphor allows for closer and more careful
consideration of the judgments and interpretations made and the
reasons for doing so, even if it does not in itself clear away the future
need for making further contingent judgments.
The collection falls into three sections. The first dwells on the possi-
bilities of theological appropriation of metaphors related to dramatic
performance. Each of these chapters finds great potential in this appro-
priation, and in various ways pushes earlier theological uses of theatre
to go further; the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Kevin Vanhoozer
are particularly queried here. Ben Quash examines von Balthasar’s use
of drama in his theology, highlighting its promise while also pointing
up some ways in which, in von Balthasar’s work, this promise is not
always fulfilled. Ivan Khovacs then picks up the baton, cautioning that if
theologians are to make use of drama, they cannot do so for mere
ornamentation, but must be willing to learn from drama as a discourse
with its own integrity. Joshua Edelman continues this theme as he
critiques Vanhoozer’s use of drama, claiming it does not go far enough
in its engagement with contemporary drama and therefore misses
important resources.
The second section turns to broader questions of how the scriptures
or Christian tradition might be ‘performed’. Michael Partridge exam-
ines the everyday nature of ‘performance’ of religious traditions, with
special consideration of issues of inculturation. The intrinsically embod-
ied and kinetic aspects of worship practices are looked at by Steven
Guthrie in his essay. Cardinal Cajetan’s exegesis of scripture and the
broadly literary (as well as historical-critical) character of it is presented
by Michael O’Connor. Of immediately practical concern, Jolyon Mitch-
ell explores how Christians might reframe the presentation of violence
in the world by the news media. Sam Wells discusses improvisational
theatre in his chapter, and the section closes with a chapter by Trevor
Hart in which he investigates the relationship between the shape of
dramatic performance and life.
Finally, the third section considers how various forms of art ‘may also
constitute a set of Christian practices in which the tradition is, as it
were, authentically “performed” ’ (p. 87). In this section, Patrick Sherry
looks at what he calls the ‘arts of redemption’, works of art which show
the fallenness of the world without filter, but in doing so intimate the
possibility of salvation. Malcolm Guite turns to serious considerations
of playfulness, arguing against the commonplace notion that fiction is
unconcerned with truth. William Dyrness’ chapter examines the devel-
opment of the Protestant imagination. An essay by Rosemary Muir
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
426 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
Wright and another by David Brown close out the volume by taking up
the possibility that art might not only be used by theology for its own
ends, but itself be a generative conversation partner for theology.
Interestingly, the chapters by Hart and (especially) Wells somewhat
push at the boundaries of the metaphor of dramatic performance of
texts, as they each commend improvisation as a particularly fruitful
analogy for ecclesial ethics. Hart suggests that, because no ‘precise
script’ exists for life, a musical improvisational cadenza might be a
better metaphor for life than following a script (p. 185). Where Hart
leaves off, Wells picks up, endeavoring to give an account of the Chris-
tian life in terms of improvisational theatre. This essay anticipates his
book, Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics (Brazos, 2004).
In a final coda, Jeremy Begbie draws together several strands of
commonality he finds running through the collection, namely a com-
mitment to theological realism (the notion that the subject of theology
precedes and exceeds thought), as well as a commitment to the integ-
rity of the arts (rather than employing them crudely as mere ornamen-
tation or to illustrate truths arrived at on entirely unrelated grounds).
He also notes the growing sense among theologians of the heuristic
potential of the arts, that engagement with them may well bring to light
insights which might not otherwise be had. With these observations, he
has hit upon the greatest value of this work considered as a collection.
In closing, he highlights a challenge, partly anticipated by the essays, for
the development of an ‘appropriate rigour when working with the arts in
theology’ which can maintain the dialectical tension of the two dis-
courses’ integrities, slipping neither into ‘anti-aesthetic rationalism’ nor
‘undisciplined aestheticism’ (p. 278).
Because the original articles were composed between 2001 and 2004
– as I write in 2009, between five and eight years ago – some of the
articles seem slightly dated. For example, the essay by Wells might
serve for some readers more as review of his later, more substantial
work than anything. But other readers, unfamiliar with his book, might
find this chapter to be a helpful introduction, and a spur to deeper
engagement.
On the whole, this is a welcome, well-balanced volume of essays on
a topic of emerging interest in theology that would be of interest to
those working in aesthetics, art, theological ethics or ecclesiology.
Ashgate’s decision to issue this volume in hardback rather than paper-
back most likely ensures that it will be found primarily on the shelves of
theological libraries. Nevertheless, one hopes that the issues and ideas
raised in this collection receive a wide hearing within this emerging
conversation.
Jason A. Fout
Selwyn College, University of Cambridge
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 427
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vehicle of passage for this world through time’ (p. 286). The church
must therefore resist the temptation to imitate the all-encompassing
modern nation-state and instead content itself with being a ‘particular
community and tradition’ (p. 35) no matter how much such a ‘scandal
of particularity’ may rankle modern sensibilities. Here MacIntyre’s
influence is obvious.
Harvey has clearly joined Hauerwas’s company of the ‘ecclesially
homeless’. This is of course evident in the subtitle (‘Catholic Baptist
engagement . . . ’) but even more so in the wide sources upon which
he draws. There are more and more such people today (the Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life released a survey early in 2008
showing that more than a quarter of adult Americans were raised
in one religious tradition but have migrated toward another), and
Harvey and Hauerwas stand alongside such as Catherine Pickstock
and John Milbank, both Anglicans who have done more insightful and
important work on Catholic themes and sources than many Catholic
theologians can bestir themselves to do. Any Protestants feeling
homeless in their own ecclesial tradition may very well and possibly
gratefully come to appreciate Harvey’s peregrinations and all the
permutations of his argument.
It is not, however, an easy argument to follow. Homeless status, it
must be said, is at once a liberation and a burden. It liberates Harvey to
follow his argument into all sorts of interesting places, but it also makes
‘discerning’ (a favored verb of Harvey) both the purpose of this book,
and also the coherence of his argument, very difficult. I am still not clear
why he wrote this book, which reads in its looser moments like an
omnium gatherum masquerading as a monograph. Are we to regard this
book as prolegomena to his own move toward entering full communion
with the Catholic Church? Is this book, in other words, an apologia pro
vita sua, and should we stay tuned for news of Harvey’s conversion? Or
is this book an essay in wider ecumenism and so a contribution to a
Catholic-Baptist rapprochement leading hopefully and eventually to full
union between those two bodies? Or perhaps it has a different purpose
altogether? Both the purpose and the intended audience of this book
remain unclear.
Homeless status means that such questions as these are never satis-
factorily resolved, which is not necessarily fatal. As MacIntyre notes in
his most recent book Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913–1922
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), Stein’s life is still of great
philosophical interest not for her answers – many of which she did not
live long enough to give – but precisely because she left us with philo-
sophical and theological questions that continue to merit attention. So
questioning and exploring are of course very good but usually only if
one is clear about the significance, the worth, of asking the questions in
the first place.
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 429
Adam A. J. DeVille
University of Saint Francis
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From a book with such a wide title, the only thing one can be certain
of from the start is that a large number of topics will be considered
from the point of view of Thomas Aquinas, who serves as the lens
through which Thomas Hibbs surveys the philosophical landscape.
And indeed, the book lives up to its all-embracing title, covering such
topics as virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, practice and tradition-
based rationality, metaphysics and the nature of philosophy, aesthetics
and literary critique. Add to this that issues within these broader
themes are tackled from historical, analytic and continental perspec-
tives alike and you have an idea of the scope of this book. However,
if it sometimes reads as a series of independent articles – and some of
the material has been published in article form – let me hasten to add
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
430 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
Andreas Nordlander
Lund University
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© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
432 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
their products at prices which insured that they remained luxury items
for the rich, which were then mass-reproduced in factories anyway.’
And as Gill put it, ‘that was the main result of the Arts and Crafts
Exhibition Society – to supply beautiful hand-made things to the rich,
and imitation ditto to the not-so-rich. But as for wrecking commercial
industrialism and resuscitating a human world – not a hint of it’ (p.
185). Nothing in Hughes’s thesis really gets us past this problem. And
I think the difficulty lies in Hughes’s opening words above: ‘Unable to
escape . . . the surrounding society’.
Is it not the case that the virus which is capitalism, quite rightly
addressed throughout this book as the problem to be overcome, has
nonetheless, at certain times, been perceived as the solution to other
problems – most notably, as a system which allows economic inter-
course among a society of strangers? Might it not also be the case that
the virus has run out of control, at least in part, because a retreat from
a society of strangers (Hayek’s ‘Great Society’) can no more be engi-
neered than (say) the knowledge to make H-bombs can be unlearned.
The question of plurality, with which capitalism and market economics
at least attempt to wrestle, however inadequately, seems to be missing
from a great deal of contemporary political theology. Yet, when the
theologian turns to examine questions of work and economics, the gap
between the vision of beauty and truth embodied in human activity,
and the question of which humans we are actually talking about, yawns
rather wide. The living out of a liturgical practice of work seems, on the
face of it, to demand isolation, or at least a distancing, from the stranger
and from incompatible belief systems which may be no less traditional
or transcendent but which cannot share the Christian vocabulary. In his
chapter on Weber, Hughes is hard on the mercantilists for their con-
ception of a spirit of capitalism which was value-free, unbound by
tradition and deemed to resemble the physical sciences. Of course that
was a dehumanizing process of which we are still reaping the conse-
quences. But was not mercantilism grounded upon the encounter with
the otherness of rival rationalities and traditions? One can see the pro-
cesses of globalization as continuing exponentially from that point and,
although the poverty of Enlightenment liberalism as the project of
finding a common basis for moral as well as material encounters with
otherness has been only too thoroughly revealed, the problem it sought
to address remains.
This difficulty surely translates into other aspects of the Catholic–
Romantic synthesis. Like Demant or D. Stephen Long, and like Gill
also, Hughes is attracted to the idea of the Guilds, or perhaps Unions,
as safeguarding the subordination of human work to beauty and truth.
But the Guilds and later the Unions exhibited a tendency toward the
closed shop, and thus to the stifling of aspiration among nonmembers
who might have concurred happily with their stated aims. How can the
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 435
good be secured, not only for those who perceive it now, but as a
properly evangelical virtue to be shared in all the world? In his discus-
sion of Gill, Hughes notes that: ‘Capitalism is to be condemned not
because the majority of people are dissatisfied with it . . . ’ (p. 191). So no
democratic mandate there, then. Hughes would doubtless argue, not
without justice, that theology and democracy are by no means comfort-
able bed-fellows, but it is the lack of any hint of a political program
(in the broadest possible sense) which disturbs me. The world is not
lacking visionaries who can see a better way, and often they ground
their vision, to a greater or lesser extent, in theological tradition. But
visionaries who get their hands on the levers of change often turn out
to be monsters.
The current economic crisis will throw up too many visionary mon-
sters, and some will no doubt come dressed as prophets of an old faith.
Since Hughes wrote his book, the capitalist world has been transfixed
by its own failures and it is not, perhaps, too extreme to say that it
teeters between a sort of hell and an inchoate hope of something more
heavenly. Somehow, from the treasure house of Christian theology
there must emerge not just a critique but a program to lead us toward
the one and not the other. Whether Hughes’s magisterial thesis has the
capacity to become a program, I am not sure. But it is, nonetheless, an
unparalleled excursion into precisely that treasure house. It should be
read, not only for its central thesis, but for its intricate dissection of
Weber, Marx, and all its main sources. Hughes has set a new criterion
for what a theology of work ought to be about.
Malcolm Brown
The Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England
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the strengths and weakness of earlier tradition from this plot. There is
a slight party line: the Spirit loves bodies and works through them to
be the ‘giver of Life’.
I will briefly outline the scope of the collection making minor com-
ments. Any unified analysis is not appropriate given the wide range of
topics covered and the varying uses of the Spirit. Jensen provides a
historical introduction to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, emphasizing
throughout the ‘Spirit seeks bodies’. The tour is necessarily short, but
Aquinas and Orthodox pneumatologies are sadly missing as these
might have added uniquely to Jensen’s concerns. The next two essays
by Amy Plantinga Pauw and Molly T. Marshall are on the role of the
Spirit in biblical interpretation and show the necessity of the Spirit for
proper interpretation. In this sense they are both welcome balances to
the emphasis on historical-critical exegesis, but it would be helpful
to relate the Spirit to other exegetical strategies currently in fashion and
to premodern approaches. The next two essays address the question of
religious pluralism and the way the doctrine of the Holy Spirit might
help uncover fresh ground. Roger Haight develops an allegedly neo-
Rahnerian trajectory, following Croewe’s reading of Lonergan,
emphasizing the Spirit at work prior to the incarnation and as the
prime modality of the incarnation itself. Haight sometimes seems to
veer toward binitarianism, but he does so to avoid the Christological
impasse that he perceives as locking the debate into a form of exclusiv-
ism or triumphalism. The Spirit is at work in other religions and Chris-
tians should rejoice in this reality. Amos Yong addresses the question
from an evangelical perspective, but also wishes to push forward the
debate to emphasize practices that are usually said to accompany plu-
ralism in the theological typologies of exclusivism, inclusivism, and
pluralism. With a theological emphasis on the first two of the three,
Yong argues that the practices enjoined by pluralists can be fully inte-
grated by alternative positions through the theme of ‘hospitality’. This
essay is fascinating and would have been enriched by Luke Bretherton’s
remarkable book on ‘hospitality’. I am not entirely convinced by the
typologies of practices assumed in the essay and Yong is in danger of
pandering to the maps drawn by pluralists.
The next two essays by Eugene Rogers and Barbara Holmes turn to
the physicality of the Spirit’s work. Rogers focuses on the transgressive
nature of the Spirit’s physicalist economy, transgressive because always
excessive. Holmes meditates on folk piety: the Spirit’s work in the
normal, rather than traditional liturgical contexts. There is a chapter on
the environment, with Sallie McFague developing her ecological theol-
ogy, emphasizing not humans or nature as such, but the power of God’s
Spirit as the basis of hope. There is also a chapter on how the Spirit is
conceptualized in terms of the socioeconomic context of ‘Empire’ by
Joerg Rieger which is a kind of political theology that shows that while
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 437
Gavin D’Costa
University of Bristol
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Nijay K. Gupta
University of Durham
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440 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
not all are equal)? Similarly, despite his neat distinction between ontol-
ogy and the ontic, Heidegger cannot elaborate the former (the inquiry
into Being) without recourse to the latter (the inquiry into entities and
facts about them). Indeed, he freely and constantly moves back and
forth between the two. The discussion of authenticity, for example,
understood as the ownership of one’s being-unto-death, forces Heideg-
ger to make an excursus into the ontic to complete his ontology.
McGrath also critiques Being and Time from an axiological standpoint,
showing that, despite Heidegger claims to the contrary, the book is not
free of ethical and political considerations. To the contrary, it spells out
an ontology entirely consistent with Heidegger’s politics. ‘Inauthentic
concern’, for example, is defined by Heidegger as a ‘leaping into’ the
lives of others, whereas what is really needed is an ‘authentic concern’
that ‘leaps ahead’ and allows them to shoulder their own being.
McGrath points out that nothing could be more diametrically opposed
to Christ’s enjoinder to lay down one’s life for others. Moreover, in his
description of the authentic life, we find Heidegger once again needing
to take a detour into the ontic. Beyond the philosophical arguments,
McGrath states that Heidegger’s refusal to recant his political views
proves that ‘his political actions had an essential relationship to his
philosophy’ (p. 93).
Unsurprisingly, despite his admiration for much of what Heidegger
tried to accomplish, McGrath is not a Heideggerian. He acknowledges
a token indebtedness for awakening him ‘to the urgency of an ever-
present need to review, reappraise, repeat, or reject’ his deepest
convictions (p. 123), but he is convinced that Heidegger is guilty of
transgressing the ontological/ontic distinction on at least three counts:
‘by interpreting Dasein’s average everydayness through the lens of an
unnamed but sovereign “ontic ideal” ’, ‘by privileging a radical Prot-
estantism over his native Catholicism through foreclosing theological
options’, and ‘by political ventures, which only proved, in a humiliating
way, how far from the purity of a neutral ontological investigation he
was’ (p. 124). All of this paved the way to an antihumanism impelling
Heidegger to reject a priori any notion of human dignity.
The word ‘Introduction’ in the title must be read with a grain of salt.
McGrath admits that the book is not necessarily meant to be a compre-
hensive guide to Heidegger. Such resources are already in good supply.
Rather, bearing in mind that the best way to engage phenomenology is
through immersion rather than systematic linear progression, McGrath
aims to draw the reader into the thick of Heidegger’s philosophiz-
ing from several different directions. Accordingly, the chapters –
‘phenomenology’, ‘ontology’, ‘axiology’, and ‘theology’ – are not indi-
vidual, discreet building blocks, but complimentary profiles that lay
bear the central themes and main flaws in Heidegger’s work. McGrath
not only respects and parenthetically cites the German philosopher’s
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
442 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
highly specialized, if not arcane, vocabulary, but also notes how this
idiosyncratic language makes it quite difficult to critique Heidegger
from ‘outside’. The book pries open several doors to get ‘inside’ the
mind of a twentieth-century genius, though what we encounter is
frighteningly dark.
Daniel B. Gallagher
Sacred Heart Major Seminary
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Tarmo Toom
The Catholic University of America
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The teachers I remember from school are the ones who loved their
subject and taught it with enthusiasm. Scot McKnight comes over
rather like that. Indeed, his book often reads as if it were the transcript
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 445
of a spoken word. If so, his students (for he is a teacher) must have been
sometimes thrilled, sometimes furious, but never bored. His key point
is in the title: atonement has to do with community. Each of us is an icon
of God – but a damaged one. McKnight calls us ‘cracked Eikons’.
Restoration necessarily involves community.
His thesis is briefly set out in a preamble which centers round a
moving story of a nurse kneeling to wash a beggar’s suppurating feet.
The bulk of the book then follows in four parts, and opens up his
understanding.
The first part opens with his thesis: ‘atonement is only understood
when it is understood as the restoration of humans – in all directions –
so that they form a society (the ecclesia, the church) wherein God’s will
is lived out and given freedom to transform all of life’ (p. 9). What this
means (he says) depends on where you begin: for instance, with God’s
wrath, with death, or (McKnight’s preference) with the kingdom – a
place of perichoresis, which he understands primarily as the mutual
interdependence and reciprocal interiority of the Holy Trinity. Before
this mystery stand human beings, the imago Dei – whence McKnight
gets his use of the word Eikon. (It is not clear why he always gives us a
capital E, created and ‘cracked’ as we are.) He discuses various descrip-
tions of the nature of sin and comes down in favor of ‘hyperrelational’:
disrupted connections in four dimensions – ‘Godward, selfward, oth-
erward and worldward’ (p. 23).
Part Two really forms the core of the book and discusses different
images of atonement. Most likely readers will be familiar with
McKnight’s starting points, but probably stimulated by the lively style
of his discussion. (Of course, not all will agree with all. But then, we
never have.) He opens by recapitulating the main traditional ‘theories’
of atonement before considering key ‘atoning moments’: the incarna-
tion of the second Adam, the crucifixion of Christ at the center of
history, and the empowering of the ‘cracked Eikons’ at Easter and
Pentecost.
Part Three asks whose is the story of the atonement? First, he considers
it as the story of Jesus. ‘I ask two simple questions: How did Jesus
interpret his own death? Which of Israel’s scriptural stories did his
interpretation reflect?’ (p. 83). (I noted the word ‘simple’ with interest.
But it fitted McKnight’s enthusiastic style.) Second, he discusses the
story of Paul; third, the patristic stories of Irenaeus and Athanasius. In
the last chapter in this section, he draws out key themes – identification,
incorporation, recapitulation, satisfaction, and so on. He discusses and
accepts penal substitution – with caveats.
The final part of the book moves into topics more recently empha-
sized – atonement as ‘missional praxis’. (Some of his words are unfa-
miliar to English ears and grate a little. I think ‘missional’ almost means
‘missionary’.) ‘Missional praxis’ is then considered under headings of
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
446 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
John Armson
Herefordshire
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Progress on the topic of theology, animals, and diet has stalled in recent
years, but this collection of essays should get it going again. Like any
social movement that is trying to save the world and change the way we
think about it at the same time, vegetarianism can become old and stale,
with the same arguments being recycled by the same group of people.
Part of the problem is that advocacy is not fertile ground for self-
reflection and critical thinking. Action precludes thought – or at least
the thinking that second guesses the possibilities of moral transforma-
tion. Anyone who has been to an animal rights conference knows the
tireless spectacle of dietary pronouncements followed by stories of
conversion (to veganism) and confessions of fault (of meat eating).
Fortunately, a new generation of primarily English scholars is bringing
a renewed sophistication to these conversations, and Muers and
Grumett should be congratulated for gathering in one volume some of
the best of this recent work. These essays are probably a bit too diverse
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 447
(p. 258). I too would regret that loss of animal husbandry if the whole
world were to go vegetarian, but the peaceful kingdom is not an oblit-
eration of hierarchical and managerial relations between humans and
animals. Rather, it is the proper fulfillment of human responsibility and
authority. Peace and order are not opposites.
There are too many fine essays here to summarize, but let me
mention some highlights. David Grumett’s analysis of Irish Christianity
is especially illuminating. Anyone interested in the crucial but hidden
role that the dietary restrictions of the Jerusalem Council (Acts 15: 29)
played in Christian history, as well as the perplexing ongoing influence
of the Noachide laws, should read this essay. Teresa Shaw adds to her
important research on diet by demonstrating just how tangled heretical
and orthodox dietary practices and their correlative justifications could
become. She recommends that ‘we need to find other ways to talk about
food piety that do not replicate the discourse of heresy or the theologi-
cal debates about antiquity’ (p. 87). That is an interesting suggestion,
but her position itself is symptomatic of the decline of theological
tradition in the modern world. Some theologians want to rehabilitate
vegetarian practices by overcoming orthodoxy, while others want to
demonstrate that orthodox theology can in itself sustain compassion for
animals. Personally, I think that any genealogy of vegetarianism will
show that battles over the ideas represented by various ancient heresies
are still very much alive and well in the church today. John Wilkins has
a helpful essay about the connection between vegetarianism and social
and economic privilege in the ancient world. One of the best essays is
by Nigel Pleasants, who tries to draw parallels between animal rights
and the antislavery movements. He concludes that economic practices
propel social change, not ideas. That might seem to be a bit one-sided in
its reading of history, but he draws this very pointed lesson. ‘The
historical irony is that the very social system that has turned animals
into a massively exploited resource has also generated feasible, plau-
sible and attractive alternatives to that exploitation’ (pp. 211–12). Only
capitalism can save us from capitalism.
Finally, there are two good essays on feminist issues. Erika Cudworth
rejects the idea that food production and consumption have gone
beyond gender stereotypes. This is a hard argument to make, since food
in the West today is such a luxury that it no longer needs to be tied to
production and consumption practices that are typically associated
with gender differences. Rachel Muers takes on the work of Kathryn
Paxton George, which should be better known in the vegetarian com-
munity. George argues that the universal message of vegetarianism
reproduces masculine gender bias and actually contradicts the embod-
ied (particular, pluralistic, personal) morality that feminism ordinarily
defends. That Muers is willing to engage such tough objections to
vegetarianism – indeed, the very existence of this book – is evidence
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 449
Stephen H. Webb
Wabash College
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Aimée U. Light
Duquesne University
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In trying to think that which exceeds the human realm – the realm of
politics – Nancy is not turning to Christianity as a sinner to his savior,
but instead as a resource that may dis-enclose that which it seemed to
have enclosed so securely: ‘There remains the question of knowing
whether “God” or “the holy” can or do represent names (and on what
grounds) for this alterity of reason’ (p. 26). Nancy is not looking for a
god to save us, but for a means of thinking that which cannot be
thought in order to find the basis of politics.
In ‘A Deconstruction of Monotheism’ Nancy turns to the operation
of deconstruction:
I will call ‘deconstruction of monotheism’ the operation consisting in
disassembling the elements that constitute it, in order to attempt to
discern, among these elements and as if behind them, behind and set back
from the construction, that which made their assembly possible and
which, perhaps, still it remains, paradoxically, for us to discover and to
think as the beyond of monotheism, in that it has become globalized and
atheized. (p. 32)
Bradley Onishi
University of California Santa Barbara
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God does not exist, but that the order of the universe gives no evidence
for God’s existence.
Section four, ‘Evil and Design’, considers a variety of skeptical argu-
ments regarding the problem of evil. William Rowe and Paul Draper
are called upon in order to present skeptical against the existence of
God, the gist of the matter being that since we have no inkling of how
evil could be justified, it is plausible that it cannot be justified, and thus
it is plausible that a good God does not exist. O’Connor, however,
points out that the skeptical stance can actually be deployed against
Rowe and Draper’s conclusions. Peter van Inwagen, for example, sug-
gests that we simply do not how to delineate precisely how much evil
would be incompatible with God’s existence given various free-will
defenses and that such ignorance prohibits us from drawing any skep-
tical conclusions about the probability of God’s nonexistence. Likewise,
Steven Wykstra (in his ‘noseeum’ defense) argues that our perspective
is too limited to make judgments about what may or may not be
justified – behind the scenes, invisible to our finite perceptions, may be
a myriad of operations in the light of which the evil we suffer is not
done away with, but rather takes on a different character and meaning.
O’Connor, however, argues that these skeptical defenses end up
placing God at such a remove from our religious intuitions that they
finally destroying the very faith they seek to preserve. Once again,
O’Connor concludes, the case for theism remains unlikely.
Finally, in section five, O’Connor considers various greater good
defenses, such as those put forth by Richard Swinburne, on the one
hand, and John Hick, on the other. According to this sort of argument,
evil in our world is explained (but not explained away) by its role in
promoting some greater good, chiefly our moral education and ascent
to maturity. In other words, the world is a vale of soul-making, as Keats
held; ‘pathei mathos’, says Aeschylus: one learns through suffering. But,
as O’Connor points out, this seems to work only for creatures like
ourselves that learn and achieve moral independence. What about the
countless sufferings of animals, or the suffering of children who never
achieve maturity? The verdict against God’s likely existence remains.
Such, in brief, is the substance of the book and as an introduction to
various key players and arguments in the field of philosophy of religion
it should be of great interest, especially to undergraduates and nonspe-
cialists who will welcome O’Connor’s knack for explanation and his
able use of ordinary language. Nevertheless, one ought to be careful
with the book, for the entire veil-of-ignorance method is immensely
controversial and, in this reviewer’s judgment, ill-conceived to boot.
Rawlsian proceduralism of this sort rests on the dubious assumption
that there is a body of public rationality that all philosophers (should)
accept and that good argument stems from the wedding of these prin-
ciples to public facts (e.g. the certainties of the natural sciences). But few
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
458 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
philosophers, even from within the analytic tradition, are very per-
suaded by such classical foundationalism any longer. Philosophers do
not retreat behind a veil of ignorance but tend rather to employ what-
ever sources they find true, compelling, and relevant, without first
submitting these to the litmus test of Rawlsian rationality.
It is all the worse when we apply such methods to religion. The veil
of ignorance approach effectively handicaps the inquiry from the begin-
ning by forcing the reader to consider theistic concepts detached from
their occurrence in a web of other beliefs, practices, communities, and
traditions. We never really meet with religion as believers understand it
but only in the abstraction of a thought-experiment. Evil, however, of
all things, demands that we confront it with the whole of who we are,
even if we happen to be philosophers. Likewise, the beauty and the
order of the universe demand not just inference but reverence. As an
account of much current literature in the field, O’Connor’s book is
admirable, but as a model for philosophy it remains finally all too
bloodless.
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modern world because we take our visual context for granted. Some
works of fine art may receive greater attention, but most physical
objects remain unappreciated. This need not and ought not be.
Images have the potential to reflect the deepest realities of human
existence, to express ideas and ideals, and to hint at realities beyond the
strictly material. Western culture has prioritized linguistic expressions
of meaning and Western religions have tended to be wary of visual
depictions of the divine. Nonetheless, images possess great power.
Their individual histories, contexts, functions, and attributes shape
their potential to influence viewers.
Despite their power, objects created by humans are at the bottom
of the hierarchy of perceived importance in the Western world, far
beneath humans, animals, and plants, and even beneath naturally
occurring physical objects. Without decrying the significance of any
of these things, Pattison questions the hierarchy as such, noting the
blurred boundaries between humans and objects in some non-Western
and noncontemporary contexts. Gone are the days when the faithful,
such as St. Francis, might hear Jesus speak from a crucifix without being
marginalized by mainstream culture.
Moving beyond mere description, Pattison advocates communication
between humans and objects. We should strive to understand each
object’s significance and purpose, the meanings which it conveys, just
as we would for a person. ‘Maybe objects and artefacts will never be
human. Perhaps they will never originate their own words or articulate
their intentions in language. But the baleful record of people in con-
demning humans and nonhumans alike to mute objecthood suggests
that we should perhaps be more open to considering whether person-
like attributes and qualities might be discerned in things’ (p. 184).
In ways different from humans, objects do nonetheless speak. We can
listen by opening our eyes, our minds, and our hearts. The benefits of
listening to objects are manifold. Some might object that by entering
into deeper relationships with objects we will compromise our intellec-
tual advances; yet this betrays an outdated cultural imperialism. Others
might object that we would cheapen our relationships with other
humans, but the opposite is likely true: those who love the objects
around them better love their fellow humans. By loving the objects they
make, humans can fully celebrate their creativity.
By grounding his vision in general experience, Pattison appeals to a
broad, interdisciplinary audience. However, this lack of a specific target
audience creates vagueness in the text. Pattison renders himself a man
without a methodological country. The evidence he cites is largely
anecdotal, rather than rooted in the discourse of any particular disci-
pline. This is a significant flaw, given Pattison’s near-unattainable goal
of eliciting a paradigm shift in his readers. In order to do so, he has
presented a synthesis of Western history vis-à-vis relations between
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
460 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
seeing, humans, and the objects they make. His treatise is conceptually
rich, as any attempted intellectual leap forward should be.
However, what Pattison possesses in concept he often lacks in execu-
tion. Leaps of logic abound, such as the assertion that, because African
slaves were not treated as humans, inanimate objects should be consid-
ered for potential personhood. One significant historical inaccuracy is
that the Reformation discarded ‘the book of nature’, when in fact
Luther, Calvin, and most of the Puritan tradition valued nature and its
ability to reveal God highly, albeit not on the level of scripture (p. 160).
Pattison makes an argument from silence that because the New Testa-
ment writers do not exclude inanimate objects from the scheme of
redemption, they must thus be included. Pattison could have made a
stronger case with the same goal by drawing on traditions of restora-
tionist eschatology in Christianity, which speak of God’s renewal of the
entire created world and of humankind’s continued work in the new
heaven and new earth.
As an object, this edition of Pattison’s work has its visible flaws. There
is a bewildering combination of footnotes and parenthetical references.
The header ‘Book Title’ tops p. 262, while ‘Chapter Title’ tops p. 157,
evidence that Pattison’s manuscript did not receive the editorial atten-
tion it deserved. Pattison’s early advice to readers to seek out images for
themselves on Google, to supplement this image-centered text’s paltry
two illustrations and nine plates, presents further evidence of the same.
In its grand scope, Pattison’s argument was a difficult one to make
and, as an argument, it has failed. He is not entirely convincing.
However, as a visionary he succeeds. Though he consistently cautions
that a re-enchantment of the world is not necessary, he provides some
of the very tools by which such a re-enchantment might be possible. For
those hoping to reclaim a sacramental vision for the entirety of creation,
natural and human-made, Pattison’s work is a step in the right direc-
tion, however small and faltering.
George Faithful
Saint Louis University
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Michael Barram
St. Mary’s College of California
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God’s Gift Giving: In Christ and through the Spirit, R. Kevin Seasoltz,
Continuum, 2007 (ISBN 0-8264-2816-9), 256 pp., pb £18.99/$29.95, hb
£65.00/$114.00
Jason A. Fout
Selwyn College, University of Cambridge
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Although this is not made explicit, the ‘gift’ in the subtitle of the book
I like to think may refer to the fact that Rose, with her Jewish background,
received Christian baptism on her death bed. That it was only then, but
that it was then, Shanks sees as her making her philosophical work a ‘gift’
to the church. This observation is made in no triumphalist way.
In his book, Shanks has provided a commentary on Gillian Rose’s
works. The main six chapters are bracketed by his opening and closing
chapters. The opening one is primarily, and importantly, biographical
and contextual. Rose was descended from Polish Jews. Her grandpar-
ents perished in the Shoah. Her own parents survived, but divorced.
When she was sixteen, she took the surname Rose by deep poll. She
went up to Oxford, and ‘began to look beyond [her parents’] shared
disaffection from religion’. Shanks quotes at length a piece she wrote
sometime after Oxford in which she describes watching a wedding
party, and being surprised by a deep howling which, she discovered,
was coming from within herself. ‘In a sense’, writes Shanks, ‘all of her
thinking is a sublation of that howl’ (p. 5). Without repeating him here,
suffice it to say that when we read that Rose – I almost want to call her
Gillian, such affection does he raise – we are reminded powerfully of
the dictum, that we are so often right in what we affirm, and wrong in
what we deny. So Shanks’ review of Rose’s works deals with a crucially
important subject: the conscience of the individual versus the norms of
society – secular or religious.
His final chapter is a short but very moving testimony to Rose’s
influence on himself. He uses a beautiful poem by the great thirteenth
century Sufi Muslim mystic, Jalāluddı̄n Rumi, by way of summary of
all that has gone before in his book: that ‘ “absolute knowing” over-
whelms “the understanding” . . . in the sense that the latter is a mode of
thinking entirely orientated towards abstract, propositional truth-as-
correctness. For . . . what such “knowing” knows is the absolute moral
priority, far outranking any scholarly or dogmatic interest in the pure
truth-as-correctness . . . ’ And that surely is the case. But being the case
– and this is the burden of Rose’s work and of Shanks’ urgent plea – we
find ourselves in a place where nothing can be neatly set down, and
written off. Rather we find ourselves in ‘the broken middle’ (Rose’s
term, indicating ‘the location of true wisdom’, p. 32) where things are
not neat and tidy. And it is the willingness to try and remain and live
there that is what matters.
The intervening chapters are a philosophical discussion of various
aspects of ‘the broken middle’. The temptation, frequently succumbed
to, is for those who cannot agree, to go their separate ways, at peace or
at war. The burden of Shanks’ exposition of Rose is, it is more ‘true’
when people struggle to hold things together; that the truth is to be
found, if it is to be found, in continuing joint search. This sounds right
to me, though it has to be said it is a line more likely to be taken by a
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
468 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
John Armson
Herefordshire
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© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 469
Gavin D’Costa
University of Bristol
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does not make the problem of natural evil go away too quickly by
affirming evolution as the means by which God created the world.
From an evolutionary perspective, natural evil is not evil at all, because
the suffering of individual creatures and the extinction of entire species
are simply the means by which nature is goaded into bountiful com-
plexity. In this sense, Darwinism is a theodicy without theology, but
Southgate adds to Darwinism the theological argument that God could
not have created the world in any other way. Far from resolving the
problem of natural evil, then, Southgate has merely shifted the locus of
explanation from God to natural selection. God’s hands are clean
because nature’s hands are so bloody, but nature is not to be blamed
because God had no choice but to deliver life in this gruesome manner.
What begins as a reflection on natural evil ends up as an apology for
Darwinism. Yet surely natural evil should be a problem for Darwinism,
and not just an opportunity for theologians to demonstrate how evo-
lution can be used to make God look good.
Crucial to Southgate’s position is his rejection of a cosmic fall. He
argues that there is ‘no scientific evidence that the biological world was
ever free of predation and violence’ (p. 5). This is true enough, but it
hardly exhausts the importance and nuance of various interpretations of
the doctrine of the fall. More importantly, Southgate argues that the
suffering of animals is instrumental to God’s purposes. Many other
theologians have taken this position in response to Darwinism, but
what sets Southgate apart is his candor about the magnitude of animal
suffering. He acknowledges that we frequently experience horror at
nature’s sheer waste of animal lives, and he acknowledges that the
evolutionary process targets the weak and less well adapted. He even
confesses that there is no single satisfactory response to the problem of
evolutionary suffering, which is why he calls his position a ‘compound
evolutionary theodicy’. His basic point is that, ‘The world is a package
deal’ (p. 12). Evolution, for Southgate, must have been the ‘only way’
that God could have created a complex, beautiful, sentient, and diverse
world; otherwise, God would be implicated in the involuntary and
unnecessary suffering that appears to be intrinsic to evolution.
Southgate is struck by the fact, to which he continually returns, that
the long record of biological struggle before the advent of humans
makes it hard (for Southgate, impossible) to believe that humans are the
cause of animal suffering (and he rejects out of hand the idea that fallen
angels could disrupt nature). The world for Southgate has always been
fallen; death is a thermodynamic necessity. He is not willing to consider
predation and disease as signs of cosmic disturbances not planned or
intended by God. Everything in nature, he insists, came to be by God’s
design, including the disruptions of natural order that, before Darwin,
seemed to serve no purpose. He admits that this means that ‘the God
who gave rise to this natural world . . . might not be a God worthy of
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
472 Theology, Ethics and Philosophy
worship’ (p. 35). Consequently, the task of theology is to prove that God
had no choice in the matter of how to create the world.
The heart of his argument is the development of what he calls
good-harm analysis (GHA for short). A developmental GHA is a good
that can be achieved only through a process that includes the possi-
bility or necessity of harm. A property-consequence GHA is a good
whose existence raises the possibility of causing harms, and a consti-
tutive GHA is a good that is inherently inseparable from the experi-
ence of a harm. The upshot of these distinctions is that the excessive
suffering of animals is a necessary restraint on God’s creativity. The
‘only way’ argument ends up proving that evolution is also the ‘best
way’ God could have created the world. This comes perilously close to
saying that this world is the best of all possible worlds. It also, inter-
estingly, contradicts the Darwinian Theory that Southgate sets out to
support, because, as he says, ‘The scheme I am developing here is a
strongly teleological one’ (p. 71). Since Southgate argues that evolu-
tion is the necessary means by which God created humanity, he is
forced to argue that teleology is found not only in theology but also
in biology (see p. 74). But if evolution is a goal-directed process,
why is suffering intrinsic to it? Can’t the goal be separated from the
means?
God has a plan that makes sense of animal suffering, but if that is so,
doesn’t the very goal of redemption suggest that the suffering of the
world is not strictly necessary? That is, if God can recreate the world by
redemptive activity that saves us from our suffering, then how was that
suffering necessary from the beginning? Southgate realizes the impor-
tance of this objection, which is why he rejects the plausibility of ‘any
scheme of eschatological compensation’ (p. 90). If God redeems the
whole world, Southgate admits, then his argument about the necessity
of evolution fails; therefore, God must not redeem the whole world. The
only redemption God offers is to humans, and here Southgate revises
kenotic Christology to argue that, rather than emptying the divine self
to make room for us, God actively shares our suffering. It follows, for
Southgate, that humans are special animals, called not just to steward-
ship but to an active reshaping of the world – a kingly as well as priestly
role. Yet if evolution is so unbending, how can humanity hope to make
a dent in it? Southgate ends this book criticizing Andrew Linzey’s
eschatological vegetarianism and defending instead ‘healthy methods
of farming (including genuinely humane killing)’ (p. 121). Far from
concluding on a tragic note, however, Southgate argues that humans
should, ‘through a blend of prudential wisdom and scientific ingenuity,
cut the rate of natural extinction’ (p. 125). Evolution, it turns out, is our
enemy after all, and to save ourselves, we have to put our backs against
its terrible tide. There are confusions here, but not any more than in any
other theology that deals with this perplexing topic, and Southgate is to
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Theology, Ethics and Philosophy 473
Stephen H. Webb
Wabash College
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Adam Kotsko
Catholic Theological Seminary