2h Gallant Election Law Case Digest Final

ELECTION
LAW
Case Digests Compilation

BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF
ATTY. GALLANT D. SORIANO, MNSA

2H (A.Y. 2019-‐‑2020)
SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY-‐‑
MANILA
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
· dela Rama ··[Type
Francisco
Endona · Lim · Lontoc
· Francisco
text] · Gilo· ·Malecdan · Manresa
Lim · Lontoc ·[Type ·
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Manresa · Palanog
· Mendoza · Pascual
· Palanog · Senga
· Pascual · Tinoco
· Senga · Usita· ·Usita
· Tinoco Yang· ·Yang
Yasto· Yasto
Doctrine: In democracies the people, combined, represent the sovereign power of the State. Their
sovereign authority is exercise through the ballot, of the qualified voters, in duly appointed elections
held from time to time, by means of which they choose their officials for definite and fixed periods,
and to whom they entrust, for the time being, as their representatives, the exercise of the powers of
government.

1. ANDRES GARCHITORENA, vs. MANUEL CRESCINI and ENGRACIO
IMPERIAL
Keywords: Suffrage, Election Returns/Protest
G.R. No. L-‐‑14514 December 18, 1918 JOHNSON, J.:
Facts: On the 6th day of June, 1916, an election was held in the Province of Ambos Camarines for
governor, and other provincial and municipal officers. At said election, Andres Garchitorena, Manuel
Crescini, Engracio Imperial, and Francisco Botor were candidates for the position of governor. After an
examination of election returns, Andres Garchitorena had received 2,468 votes; Manuel Crescini had
received 3,198 votes; Engracio Imperial had received 1,954 votes and Francisco Botor had received 692
votes. As a result, Manuel Crescini was declared as Governor, and issued to him a certificate to that
effect.
Immediately upon notice of said proclamation, Andres Garchitorena filed a protest, alleging that many
frauds and irregularities had been committed in various municipalities of said province, and that he
had, in fact, received a majority of all legal votes cast.
[Judge Maximino Mina] Court of First Instance (CFI): Declared that Andres Garchitorena had, in fact,
received a majority of the legal votes cast, and ordered the provincial board of inspectors to correct its
report theretofore made, accordingly.
[Judge Isidro Paredes] New Trial CFI: Reached the same conclusion with Judge Mina. Election results
in the municipalities of Minalabac, Sagnay, Bato, Iriga, and Lagonoy were annulled due to fraud and
irregularities.
From that decision, Manuel Crescini and Engracio Imperial appealed to this Court, briefs were
presented, and the cause was finally submitted for decision on the 16th day of December, 1918
Issue: WON Petitioner Garchitorena had in fact received a majority of the legal votes cast? YES
Held: Yes, petitioner received a majority of the legal votes cast after the election returns in some
municipalities were rejected due to frauds and irregularities. A reading of the evidence adduced
during the trial of the cause, in relation with the facts stated in connection therewith, in said
municipalities (Minalabac, Sagnay, Bato, Iriga, and Lagonoy), shows an unmistakable intention and
design on the part not only of the election inspectors but of many of the voters, to defeat, by the
methods adopted, the true expression of opinion, through the ballot, of the people of said
municipalities. The presumption is that an election is honestly conducted, and the burden of proof to
show it otherwise is on the party assailing the return. But when the return is clearly shown to be
wilfully, and corruptly false, the whole of it becomes worthless as proof. When the election has been
conducted so irregularly and fraudulently that the true result cannot be ascertained, the whole return
must be rejected. It is impossible to make a list of all the frauds which will invalidate an election. Each
case must rest upon its own evidence.

Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
The record of the frauds and irregularities committed in the said municipalities in which Judges Mina
and Paredes annulled the entire vote, not only shows that legal voters were prevented from voting, but
in some instances, legal ballots were tampered with and destroyed after they had been cast, to such an
extent that no confidence can be placed in the return. The return in no sense discloses the expressed
will of the voters.
When two able, impartial, independent and conscientious judges, such as Judges Mina and Paredes,
each examine in detail the proof adduced in the trial of the cause and in an extended and carefully
prepared opinion, each reach the same conclusion, there is little left to be added
In democracies the people, combined, represent the sovereign power of the State. Their sovereign
authority is exercise through the ballot, of the qualified voters, in duly appointed elections held from
time to time, by means of which they choose their officials for definite and fixed periods, and to whom
they entrust, for the time being, as their representatives, the exercise of the powers of government.
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
Doctrine: Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to
determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the
primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed
for the intelligent exercise of such birthright.

2. GMA NETWORK vs. COMELEC
Keyword: Airtime
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014 PERALTA, J.
Facts: Five petitions were filed before the Court questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 9(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. Petitioners contend that the regulation
violates the freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect.
Issue: Whether Sec. 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 is unconstitutional
Held: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
In the instant case, there is no compelling state interest which would validate a substantial restriction on
the freedom of the candidates.

The assailed rule also violates the people’s right to suffrage. Fundamental to the idea of a democratic
and republican state is the right of the people to determine their own destiny through the choice of
leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the
concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright.
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto

Doctrine: The effect of said RA 4421 is to impose property qualifications in order that a person could
run for a public office, which property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of a
Republican system ordained in the Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the
same. Consequently, RA 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and void.

3. MAQUERA v BORRA
Keyword: Property qualifications
G.R. No. L-‐‑24761 September 7, 1965 -‐‑
Facts: The COMELEC, in compliance with Republic Act 4421, required all candidates for President,
Vice President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, to file a surety bond equivalent
to one-‐‑year salary of the position to which he is a candidate and to pay the premium charged and/or
offer their properties for counter-‐‑bond. Failure to comply will result to disqualification from running
for public office notwithstanding possession of qualifications prescribed by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not imposing property qualifications in order that a candidate can run for public
office is constitutional.
Held: No. The Court held that said property qualifications are inconsistent nature and essence of
Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice. The right to vote
and be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual. Further, no person shall be
denied the chance to be elected to public office by reason of poverty.
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
Doctrine: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as
well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The intent of the Constitutional
Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The
qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement.

4. MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
Keywords: Qualification for Suffrage, OFW Voting
G.R. No. 157013 July 3, 2003 Austria-‐‑Martinez, J.
Facts: Atty. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provision of RA No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity.

He posits three different questions, one of which concerns Sec. 5(d) of the law which disqualifies an
immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in his host country from voting, unless
he executes an affidavit prepared for the purpose declaring that he shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from the approval of his registration.

According to him, Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.

He also argues that the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be
allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a
condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a
Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on
the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by the Constitution.

The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the phrase, "ʺqualified citizens of
the Philippines abroad"ʺ as it appears in R.A. No. 9189.
COMELEC: refrained from commenting on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
Held: NO. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised
by: (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of
age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.

Sec. 2, Article V of the Constitution states that the Congress shall provide a system for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos
abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally
ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.

R.A. No. 9189 was enacted based on the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must
be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority
in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the "ʺqualified citizen of the Philippines abroad"ʺ is not physically present in the
country.

The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting
established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to
have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his
physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his
host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile
of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express
that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit
required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

Petitioner’s speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d) would affect the
credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is to ensure that all those who possess
the qualifications to vote on the date of the election are given the opportunity and permitted to freely
do so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs have enough resources and talents to
ensure the integrity and credibility of any election conducted pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.

As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to return to the
Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would suffice to
serve as deterrence to non-‐‑compliance with his/her undertaking under the affidavit.
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
Doctrine: There is no provision in the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring "ʺduals"ʺ
to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
"ʺduals"ʺ are most likely non-‐‑residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage
as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

5. LOIDA NICOLAS-‐‑LEWIS, ET. AL. VS. COMELEC
Keywords: Qualification for Suffrage; Dual Citizen; Absentee Voting
G.R. No. 162759 August 4 2006 Garcia, J:
Facts: Petitioners (dual citizens) are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 which accords them the right of suffrage, among others. Long
before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and
certification as “overseas absentee voter” only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the
US, per a COMELEC letter to the DFA, that they have yet no right to vote in such elections
owing to their lack of the 1-‐‑year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
Petitioner prodded for a clarification, in light of the Macalintal ruling, to which the
COMELEC said that petitioners still cannot exercise their right to vote because the OAVL was
not enacted for them. Hence, Filipinos who have merely reacquired their citizenship on
September 18 2003 at the earliest are considered regular voters who have to meet the
requirements of residency under the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that they be included in the National Registry
of Absentee Voters.
COMELEC: filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected,
petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
OSG: (in lieu of Comment) filed a Manifestation stating that “all qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so”
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA
9189
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
Held: Yes. Under Article V of the Constitution, Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a
general eligibility factor for the right to vote while in Section 2, it authorizes the Congress to
devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-‐‑resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In
response to this, RA 9189 was enacted identifying who can and cannot vote under it. Soon after
Sec. 5 (d) of RA 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, RA 9225 was enacted.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA 9225) requiring “duals”
to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals”
are most likely non-‐‑ residents, grants under Sec. 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted
an absentee voter under RA 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that RA 9189 aims, in essence,
to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipino who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
Doctrine: The Election Law makes use of the terms "ʺqualified voter in his municipality,"ʺ and
"ʺqualified elector therein."ʺ To be a qualified voter, does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter.

6. YRA V. ABAÑO

G.R. No. 30187 November 15, 1928 Malcolm, J:
Facts: A quo warranto proceeding was instituted by petitioner Yra, the vice-‐‑president elect of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against respondent Abaño, president elect of Meycauayan on the ground that
respondent is ineligible. Abaño was a registered voter in Manila since he temporarily resided there to
complete his education. He then returned to Meycauayan after qualifying as a member of the bar. He
made an application for cancellation of registration in Manila but was rejected by the city officials for
the reason that it was not deposited in the mail on time. Nevertheless, he ran for municipal president
and was elected by popular vote. The Administrative Code in section 2174, in giving the qualifications
of elective municipal officers, provides that "ʺAn elective municipal officer must, at the time of the
election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one
year ..."ʺ
Issue/s: Whether or not Abaño is non-‐‑eligible because he was not a qualified voter in his municipality,
therefore, not a “qualified elector therein”
Held: Section 431 of the Election Law prescribes the qualifications for voters, section 432 the
disqualifications. According to Senator Jose P. Laurel, "ʺOne of the qualifications required by law of a
person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau
has held that the term 'ʹqualified'ʹ when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must
be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate, a person does not need to register as an elector.
It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the
disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the
municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate and to be voted for."ʺ

The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified
elector and the respondent is such although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Alvaro
Alvaro
[Type · Almhijem
· Almhijem
text] · Chung
· Chung · Endona
Francisco
· Francisco
Malecdan
text]
Mendoza
· Palanog · Senga
Yasto· Yasto
Doctrine: Registration as a voter is not a condition essential to be a “qualified voter”. Registration is
essential to the exercise of the right of suffrage, not to the possession thereof. Indeed, only those who
have such right may be registered. In other words, the right must be possessed before the registration.
The latter does not confer it.
7. ABELARDO APORTADERA (Petitioner-appellant) VS. MANUEL SOTTO

(respondent-appellee)
Keywords: Registration, Qualified Voter
G.R. No. L-‐‑16876 Date: November 30, 1961 Ponente: Concepcion, J.
Facts: Petitioner Abelardo Aportadera and respondent Manuel Sotto were vying for the position of
Vice-‐‑Governor of the province of Davao, where respondent Sotto was eventually proclaimed as the
candidate elected for said office. In due time, petitioner Aportadera instituted a quo warranto
proceedings, upon the ground that, at the time of said election, respondent was not a qualified voter of
the Province of Davao, for he was a voter duly registered in a Precinct in the fourth legislative district
of Manila. The respondent Sotto allegedly registered as a new voter in a Precinct in Davao City without
first “securing the transfer to Davao Province or City or the cancellation of his registration as a voter”
in said Precinct of Manila. Thus, the belated application for such cancellation should be considered
illegal and void.

Respondent moved to dismiss the petition for the reason that it does not state a cause of action.
RTC: It granted the motion and, accordingly, dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Sotto is a qualified voter of Davao Province
Held: YES. Respondent Sotto is a qualified voter of Davao Province because registration as a voter is
not a condition essential to be a “qualified voter”.

Registration is essential to the exercise of the right of suffrage, not to the possession thereof. Indeed,
only those who have such right may be registered. In other words, the right must be possessed before
the registration. The latter does not confer it.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the validity of respondent’s registration in Davao, owing to his failure to
seasonably apply for the cancellation of his registration in Manila, for even if he had not been
registered at all in Davao, this could not decisively affect the question whether or not he is a “qualified
voter,” if he meets the conditions prescribed in the Constitution.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Mendoza · Palanog · Pascual · Senga · Tinoco · Usita · Yang · Yasto
Doctrine: No voters registration shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election or 90 days before
a special election.

8. AKBAYAN YOUTH V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001 Buena, J.
Facts: Petitioners representing the youth sector seek to direct the Commission on Elections to conduct a
special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around 4 million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by
the respondent COMELEC. Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms,
Suffrage, and People’s Participation invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of
discussing the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to
register before the COMELEC deadline.

On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, which denies the request to conduct a
two-‐‑day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 since Section 8 of R.A. 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-‐‑election activities.
Petitioners then filed for certiorari and mandamus arguing their constitutional right to vote on the May
14, 2001 general elections was undermined and caused the disenfranchisement of around four 4 million
Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC is wrong in denying the claim of petitioners that a special 2-‐‑day
registration be granted.
Held: NO. The Comelec resolution is UPHELD. In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of
suffrage, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must
properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature. The State undoubtedly, in the
exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.

Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC
Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that
no registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election. Due to
the rigorous schedule of pre-‐‑election activities, the Comelec will have roughly a month that will act as a
buffer against any number of unforeseen occurrences that might delay the elections. This is the logic
and the wisdom behind setting the 120-‐‑day prohibitive period. After all, preparing for an election is no
easy task.


Doctrine: Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. -‐‑ The Municipal and Metropolitan
Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of
voters from the list in their respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Courts within
five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory.
The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is received, and
the decision shall become final and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained [As
amended by Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189].

9. VELASCO VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Not Registered Voter
G.R. No. 180051 Dec. 24, 2008 Brion, J.
Facts: Velasco was born in Sasmuan, Pampanga and married Evelyn D. Castillo. In 1983, he moved to
and worked in the United States of America where he subsequently became a citizen. Sometime in
2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-‐‑Acquisition Act of 2003. His application was approved on July 31, 2006.
On the same day, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006 and has not
left since, except for a 3-‐‑day Hongkong trip from September 26, 2006 to September 29, 2009. Soon
thereafter or on October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga.
The Election Registration Board (ERB): denied his application.

MTC: reversed the ERB'ʹs decision and ordered Velasco'ʹs inclusion in the List of Voters of Sasmuan.
RTC: reversed the MTC decision because Velasco lost his domicile of origin [Sasmuan, Pampanga]
when he became a US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay in the Philippines
as a visitor or as a resident alien. He, according to the RTC, only regained or reacquired his Philippine
residency on July 31, 2006 when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship. It found that he failed to comply
with the residency requirement under the Constitution, making him ineligible to vote in the May 14,
2007 elections. Velasco appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan which contained,
contains, among others, the required information that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-‐‑A of
Sasmuan, Pampanga. He executed on even date an Affidavit renouncing, abandoning, and
relinquishing his American citizenship.

The next day, private respondent Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui), who also filed his COC for the position
of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco'ʹs COC,
claiming:


a. He is not a registered voter;
b. RTC had already rendered a decision denying Velasco’s petition for inclusion as voter;
c. Velasco does not possess the constitutional requirement of legal residency; and
d. He is not eligible to run for office since he is not a qualified voter.

Velasco garnered the most votes for the mayoral position in the said election, and was declared Mayor
when COMELEC failed to resolve Panlaqui’s petition prior to the election.

COMELEC: On the basis of SEC 138 of OEC, his COC was cancelled and his proclamation as Mayor
was held null and void.
COMELEC EN BANC: affirmed the COMELEC’s second division'ʹs ruling
Court of Appeals: initially granted Velasco'ʹs appeal However, upon MR, it reversed its earlier ruling
that it has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, explicitly stating that the jurisprudence it cited to
support its appellate jurisdiction in voters'ʹ inclusion/exclusion proceeding is no longer good law
because of the amendments to the election law on which its cited jurisprudence was based. It declared
that "ʺSection 138 of the OEC being explicit that the decision on appeal by the RTC in inclusion and
exclusion cases is immediately final and executory appears to be a clear mandate for this Court (the
CA) not to entertain instant petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling Velasco'ʹs COC?
2. Whether or not COMELEC erred in relying on the RTC ruling in canceling his COC?
Held:
1. No. Velasco was not a registered voter of Sasmuan at the time he filed his COC. Velasco could not
have registered as a regular voter because he did not possess the residency requirement of one-‐‑year
stay in the Philippines and six-‐‑months stay in the municipality where he proposed to vote at the time
of the election. The records show that he arrived in the Philippines only on September 14, 2006 and
applied for registration on October 13 of that year for the election to be held in May of the following
year (2007). Velasco made a material misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his
qualification. For these violations, he must pay the ultimate price -‐‑ the nullification of his election
victory. Other than his active misrepresentation, Velasco likewise was inexplicably silent about, and
thus knowingly omitted any mention of, the denial of his registration. He deliberately concealed the
existence of the final and executory RTC ruling when he filed his COC. He could not disclose this fact
as the unavoidable consequence of disclosure was to render him unqualified to be a candidate.


2. No. That the COMELEC relied on the RTC ruling in canceling the COC of Velasco cannot likewise be
a legal error as Section 138 of the OEC is clear and categorical in its terms: "ʺDecisions of the Municipal
or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Courts
within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and
executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time the appeal was
received, and its decision shall be final and executory."ʺ We note that when Velasco sought recourse
with the Court of Appeals, he did so by way of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court -‐‑ a recourse
that was not available to him because an RTC ruling in an inclusion/exclusion is final and executory.
This led the appellate court to recognize in its Amended Decision of August 19, 2008, albeit on motion
for reconsideration, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Velasco'ʹs appeal.


Doctrine: The residency requirement is settled to mean domicile. Domicile is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of
domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. The change must be voluntary and the new
domicile must be actual.

10. ASISTIO VS. AGUIRRE

Keywords: Residence, Domicile
G.R. No. 191124 April 27, 2010 Nachura, J.:
Facts: Private respondent Enrico Echiverri filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio a petition for Exlusion
of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City. He alleged that Asistio is not a resident of
123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City as stated in his Certificate of Candidacy. Asistio
claims that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan City and he mistakenly relied on the
address stated in the contract of lease which was 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Caloocan. The Election
Registration Board, Caloocan directed to remove the name of Asistio from the list of permanent voters
of Caloocan City. Echiverri, then, filed with the COMELEC for a Petition for Disqualification anchored
on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City.
Issue/s: Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan
City for failure to comply with the residency required by law?
Held: No, Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City and his family is known to be among
the prominent political families in Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established
domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in
Caloocan City.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated February 15, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 129, Caloocan City in SCA No. 997 and the decision dated February 5, 2010 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan City in SCA No. 10-‐‑582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Luis A. Asistio remains a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on February 23, 2010 is MADE PERMANENT.


Doctrines: Whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are asserted, the proper course of action is an
election protest; Where the respondent had already been proclaimed as the elected representative of
the contested congressional district, and has long assumed office and has been exercising the powers,
functions, and duties appurtenant to said office, the remedy of the petitioner lies with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The pre-‐‑proclamation controversy becomes moot and academic.

11. UTUTALUM VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Pre – proclamation Controversy
G.R. No. 84843-‐‑44 January 22, 1990 Melencio-‐‑Herrera, J.
Facts: Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the
last May 1987 Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. On 4 June 1987, during the
canvass of votes, Petitioner Ututalum, without availing of verbal objections, filed written objections to
the returns from Siasi on the ground that they "ʺappear to be tampered with or falsified"ʺ owing to the
"ʺgreat excess of votes"ʺ appearing in said returns. He then prayed for the exclusion from the canvass of
any election returns from Siasi. On the same day, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu dismissed
petitioner'ʹs objections because they had been "ʺfiled out of time or only after the Certificate of Canvass
had already been canvassed by the Board and because the grounds for the objection were not one of
those enumerated in Section 243 of the Election Code"ʺ On 5 June 1987, petitioner filed his first Petition
with the COMELEC seeking a declaration of failure of elections in the Municipality of Siasi and other
mentioned municipalities; that the COMELEC annul the elections in Siasi and conduct another election
thereat; and order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to desist from proclaiming any candidate
pending a final determination of the Petition. On 14 June 1987, the Sulu Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed respondent Anni as the winner. He subsequently took his oath of office and entered upon
the discharge of its functions in July 1987. On 16 June 1987, petitioner filed a second Petition with the
COMELEC praying for the annulment of Respondent Anni'ʹs proclamation and for his own
proclamation as Congressman for the Second District of Sulu. On 16 January 1988, the COMELEC
issued, in said SPC 87-‐‑624, a Resolution annulling the Siasi List of Voters "ʺon the ground of massive
irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being statistically improbable"ʺ, and ordering a
new registration of voters for the local elections of 15 February 1988 immediately after having been
notified of the annulment of the previous Siasi List of Voters, Petitioner Ututalum filed a supplemental
pleading with the COMELEC entreating that such annulment be considered and applied by the
Commission in resolving his two Petitions against Respondent Anni.
Admin Agency: COMELEC denied Petitioner Ututalum'ʹs two Petitions declaring that: While we
believe that there was padding of the registry list of voters in Siasi, yet to annul all the votes in this
municipality for purposes of the May 30, 1987 elections would disenfranchise the good or valid votes.
As held in Espaldon vs. Comelec, this Commission is not the proper forum nor is it a proper ground in
a pre-‐‑proclamation controversy, to wit: Padded voter'ʹs list, massive fraud and terrorism is clearly not
among the issues that may be raised in a pre-‐‑proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds for an
election protest.
Issue: Whether or not the annulment of list of voters is a ground for the filing of a pre – proclamation
contest?

Held: Petitioner'ʹs cause of action is the padding of the Siasi List of Voters, which, indeed, is not a listed
ground for a pre-‐‑ proclamation controversy. Sec. 243 provides that Issues that may be raised in pre-‐‑
proclamation controversy.—The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-‐‑proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies
thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
As pointed out in Espaldon vs. COMELEC: Padded voters'ʹ list, massive fraud, and terrorism are clearly
not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-‐‑proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds
for an election protest. Such irregularities as fraud, vote-‐‑buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an
election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise
the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a relative few. Otherwise,
elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the
losers will always cry fraud and terrorism. Finally, this Petition has to fail if only on the basis of the
equally important doctrine enunciated in Padilla vs. COMELEC that: Where the respondent had already
been proclaimed as the elected representative of the contested congressional district, and has long
assumed office and has been exercising the powers, functions, and duties appurtenant to said office,
the remedy of the petitioner lies with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The pre-‐‑
proclamation controversy becomes moot and academic. Petition is dismissed.


Doctrine: Labo is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of
the Philippines. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Sec. 42 of
the Local Government Code which provides, “An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines...” These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.

12. LABO V. COMELEC

Keywords: Qualifications and disqualifications of candidates; Citizenship
G.R. No. 86564 1 August 1989 Cruz, J.
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo was proclaimed mayor-‐‑elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. The
Court finds that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner'ʹs citizenship.
The first was rendered by the COMELEC on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of
the Philippines. The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. The petitioner'ʹs
contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of
Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as
such through a formal and positive process when he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made
the Affirmation of Allegiance.
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the
reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines eligible to be the Mayor of Baguio
City?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of
the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified
voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate
for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code. In the case at bar, the
citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the
first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Only citizens of the Philippines have privilege over their countrymen.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE
his office and surrender the same to the Vice-‐‑ Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final
and executory.


Doctrine: The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor. Philippine citizenship is
an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. The citizenship
requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of
the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected.

13. FRIVALDO V COMELEC

Keywords: citizenship; repatriation; PD 725; qualifications of an elective official
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 -‐‑
Facts: On March 20, 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his CoC for the office of governor of Sorsogon in the May
8, 1995 elections. Raul Lee, another candidate, filed a petition on Mar. 23, 1995 to the Comelec praying
that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
being a citizen of the Philippines and that his CoC be cancelled.
Second division of Comelec granted Lee’s petition, declaring that Frivaldo is disqualiffied to run for
office. Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsidertaion which remained unacted until after May 8, 1995
elections, so his candidacy continued. May 11, 1995 comelec en banc affirmed the resolution of the
second division. May 27, 1997, the completed canvass of the election was issued showing the Frivaldo
garnered the most votes and Lee was second highest. June 21 1995, Comelec En Banc directed
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to proclaim Raul Lee as the winning candidate.
July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of the Lee’s
proclamation on June 30, 1995 as the governor. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 pm, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under PD 275 had
been granted.

Hence this petition to annul resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Frivaldo from running for
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines and the other resolution
of Comelec En banc of affirming the former.
Take note: This case is consolidated with GR No 123755 wherein Raul Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec En Banc and he filed another petition on February
26, 1996 because of the resolution of Comelec First Division on Dec. 19, 1995 which held that Lee not
having garnered the highest number of votes was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as the governor
and Frivaldo having garnered the highest number of votes and having reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 is qualified to hold the office of governor.
Issue: Whether or not the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal.

Held: Yes, repatriation of Frivaldo is legal.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government code which states the requirements of an elective official; a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. In addition, candidates
for the position of governor must be at least 23 years of age on election day.

The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence. Frivaldo re-‐‑assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 – the very day the term
of office of governor bean – he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and
to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of qualification of elective officials, not of candidates.

Moreover, by reason of the (1) remedial or curative nature of the law (PD 725) granting him a new right
to resume his political status and the (2) legislative intent behind it, as well as his (3) unique situation of
having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping the
Martial Law administration, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application which is on August 17, 1994, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having
given up his US nationality.

Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start
of the term of office of governor and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Moreover, his
registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of the said date.


Doctrine: So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

14. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Facts: On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "ʺPetition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"ʺ with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution'ʹs one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record and in her
Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "ʺan order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy."ʺ

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "ʺseven"ʺ months to "ʺsince childhood"ʺ in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. On the same day,
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte denied petitioner’s amended Certificate of Candidacy for
being filed out of time.

Petitioner averred that the entry of the word "ʺseven"ʺ in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "ʺhonest misinterpretation"ʺ which she sought to rectify by adding the words "ʺsince
childhood"ʺ in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "ʺshe has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
COMELEC: On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a
vote of 2 to 1, came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent'ʹs Petition for Disqualification in
SPA 95-‐‑009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner'ʹs Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of
March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy.

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner'ʹs Motion for Reconsideration of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner'ʹs proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections
in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a
second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes.
Issue: Whether petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period
of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held: Yes. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person'ʹs intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person
can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in
favor of another domicile of choice.

As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the
fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated
that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in
different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband'ʹs presidency, at the height
of the Marcos Regime'ʹs powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-‐‑publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either
through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required
to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner'ʹs former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.

Doctrine: The place "ʺwhere a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"ʺ where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law.

15. AGAPITO A. AQUINO VS. COMELEC

Keywords: residence, domicile, lease agreement, condominium
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995 Kapunan, J.
Facts: Petitioner Aquino filed his COC for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative
District of Makati City. Thereafter, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (private respondents) filed a
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.

Subsequently, petitioner amended his COC and stated that he had resided in the constituency for 1
year and 13 days on the ground that he has an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the
area. COMELEC dismissed the petition to disqualify.

On May 8, 1995, petitioner garnered the most number of votes. Private respondents then filed an
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. The Second Division of
COMELEC suspended petitioner’s proclamation.
COMELEC En Banc: Subsequently, the suspension was made permanent by the COMELEC En Banc
and further declared the petitioner ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of
Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of
the constitutional qualification of residence based on the following findings: (a) petitioner indicated in
his COC for 1992 elections not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but
that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election; (b) he was a
registered voter of the same district; (c) his birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace
of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
Issue/s: WON the petitioner proved his residence in Makati by alleging that he has a leased condo
unit in the area?
Held: NO. In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City the latter "ʺmust prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice."ʺ The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the HOR should be a resident of the
district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the elections. The Court
held in one case that the term "ʺresidence"ʺ has always been understood as synonymous with
"ʺdomicile."ʺ


Clearly, the place "ʺwhere a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"ʺ where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of respondent'ʹs
intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one'ʹs original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2)
years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (1) year
because he has other "ʺresidences"ʺ in Manila or Quezon City.

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the
fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) “indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his
physical residence” is not to acquire a new residence or domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate
for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.”

The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the
conditions stated above, the lack of identification -‐‑ sentimental, actual or otherwise -‐‑ with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner'ʹs claim
of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.


Doctrine: Where a former elective official transfers residence in order to continue his public service in
another political unit, the character of the new residence cannot be considered in isolation and
separately from the circumstances of the transfer of residence, such as the official'ʹs significant
relationship with, and intimate knowledge of, the constituency he wishes to serve.

16. MITRA VS COMELEC

Keyword: Residency
G.R. No. 191938 July 2, 2010 Brion, J
Facts: Petitioner Abraham Kahlil Mitra, a resident of Puerto Princesa City, was its representative for
three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010. On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra'ʹs
second term), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "ʺhighly urbanized city"ʺ and ceased to be a
component city of Palawan. As a result, the Puerto Princesa City residents were ineligible to vote for
candidates for elective provincial officials. On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the
position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter'ʹs Registration Record from Precinct
No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of
Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan
as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Mitra'ʹs COC. They argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto
Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for
Governor of Palawan. Mitra responded that he has successfully abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his
domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008.

Comelec First Division: Cancelled petitioner'ʹs COC; Citing Nuval v. Guray: "ʺDomicile imports not only
the intent to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of this
intention."ʺ

To acquire a new domicile, the following must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in a new
locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. The intent to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time and the acts of the person
must be consistent with this intent.

The First Division focused their criticism solely on the Maligaya Feedmill building petitioner leased in
Aborlan, ruling that it could not have been Mitra'ʹs residence because it was "ʺcold and utterly devoid of
any indication of Mitra'ʹs personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home to make
it one'ʹs residence."ʺ
COMELEC En Banc: Affirmed First Division ruling, on the following grounds:
1. Registration as a voter of Aborlan is not sufficient evidence that Mitra has successfully abandoned
his domicile of origin.
2. Mere intent cannot supplant the express requirement of the law; the "ʺphysical presence"ʺ required to
establish domicile connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence in a given locality.


Issue: W/N Mitra established his residence in Aborlan.
Held: Yes.
1. Mitra'ʹs feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of
his transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto
Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in
early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home;
and the construction of a house in this lot that is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the
completion of his house. These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the
COMELEC'ʹs highly subjective non-‐‑legal standards do.

2. Even before his (Mitra) transfer of residence, he already had intimate knowledge of the Province of
Palawan, particularly of the whole 2nd legislative district that he represented for three terms. For that
matter, even the respondents themselves impliedly acknowledged that the Mitras, as a family, have
been identified with elective public service and politics in the Province of Palawan. This means to us
that Mitra grew up in the politics of Palawan.

We can reasonably conclude from all these that Mitra is not oblivious to the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potential for growth and development, and all matters vital to the common welfare of the
constituency he intends to serve. Mitra who is no stranger to Palawan has merely been compelled -‐‑
after serving three terms as representative of the congressional district that includes Puerto Princesa
City and Aborlan -‐‑ by legal developments to transfer his residence to Aborlan to qualify as a Province
of Palawan voter. To put it differently, were it not for the reclassification of Puerto Princesa City from a
component city to a highly urbanized city, Mitra would not have encountered any legal obstacle to his
intended gubernatorial bid based on his knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the Palawan
electorate.


Doctrine: There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency
requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time.

17. JALOSJOS V. COMELEC

Keywords: Residency requirement, establishment of domicile
G.R. No. 191970 Date: April 24, 2012 Ponente: Abad, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City, later on migrating to Australia and acquiring
Australian Citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with
his brother in Brgy. Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

Petitioner acquired residential property in the same village where he lived, and later applied for
registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Brgy. Captain of
Veterans Village, but was eventually granted by the ERB, whose decision was upheld by the MCTC
and the RTC.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Governor of the Province of
Zamboanga Sibugay, but his CoC was opposed on the ground inter alia of failure to comply with the
one-‐‑year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC: Both the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc ruled that, while Jalosjos
had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements of RA 9225, he failed to prove
the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof of a bona
fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, and he had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his
brother’s house.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has complied with the one-‐‑year residency requirement.
Held: YES. The LGC requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of
the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement
of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a
particular place, but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since
the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. It is
inevitable under these guidelines that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement.

First, it is clear that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. However, he has
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there, acquired
Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. When he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that he did so with intent
to change his domicile for good. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

Second, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community
to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even
if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the
house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.


Doctrine: Ownership of a house or some other property does not establish domicile.

18. SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, vs. COMELEC, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and

RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA
Keyword: One-‐‑year residency, Domicile
G.R. No. 193314 February 26, 2013 SERENO, J.:
Facts: On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth
and residence as Barangay Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her place of
birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally
abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City. On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had
established her residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of
land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the
former was overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error in
her place of birth was committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in a CoC, an error in the declaration of
the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to disqualification, because it is
not one of the qualifications provided by law.

The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the
day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected
municipal mayor.
COMELEC Second Division: DISQUALIFIED Jalosjos from running for the position of mayor in the
Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for this coming May 10, 2010 election. Hence, Petitioner
appeal to COMELEC En Banc On Appeal, COMELEC En Banc denied her MR for lack of merit and
affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due course to or cancelling her CoC.

COMELEC En Banc: Denied Petitioner MR for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the
Second Division denying due course to or cancelling her CoC. Petitioner never acquired a new
domicile in Baliangao, because she failed to prove her bodily presence at that place, her intention to
remain there, and her intention never to return to her domicile of origin. Hence, respondent COMELEC
disqualified her from running for the position of mayor of Baliangao, pursuant to Section 78 in relation
to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, this appeal to SC.
Issue/s: WON Petitioner complied with the one-‐‑year residency requirement for local elective officials.

Held: No. Petitioner failed to comply with the one-‐‑year residency requirement for local elective
officials.Petitioner’s uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is whether she was
able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections. The term ‘residence’ as so used, is
synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First, residence or bodily
presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the
old domicile. These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held in
Romualdez-‐‑Marcos v. COMELEC and subsequently in Dumpit-‐‑ Michelena v. Boado:

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Moreover, even if
these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of
choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections
using the same standard of evidence. In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by
clear and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10
May 2010 elections.

Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v. COMELEC has
established that the ownership of a house or some other property does not establish domicile. This
principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the
locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before the elections, to wit: To use ownership of
property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies
that the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in
effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement
would be unconstitutional.


Doctrine: Fencing involves moral turpitude.

19. DELA TORRE VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Fencing; Moral Turpitude.
G.R. No. 121592 July 5, 1996 FRANCISCO, J.
Facts: Petitioner Dela Torre was disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna
on the ground that he was convicted of violation of PD 1612 (Anti-‐‑Fencing Law). Dela Torre assailed
the disqualification, claiming that pursuant to Sec. 40(a) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991),
a candidate is disqualified from running if he has been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within
two (2) years after serving sentence. Maintaining that the offense of fencing does not involve moral
turpitude, Dela Torre seeks to nullify his disqualification.
Issue: Whether the offense of fencing is one that involves moral turpitude
Held: The elements of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in
any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the
said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

It could be deduced from the third element that there exists moral turpitude. Actual knowledge by the
"ʺfence"ʺ of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of
one'ʹs rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are
crimes of moral turpitude. The same underlying reason holds even if the "ʺfence"ʺ did not have actual
knowledge, but merely "ʺshould have known"ʺ the origin of the property received. Hence, the
disqualification of Dela Torre was valid.


Doctrine: A drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes
his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals. Violation of BP 22 involves moral turpitude.

20. VILLABER V COMELEC

Keywords: Disqualifications; Moral turpitude; Section 12 of OEC
G.R. No. 148326 November 15, 2001 Sandoval-‐‑Gutierrez, J.
Facts: Respondent Cagas, petitioner’s rival candidate for the position of Congressman in the First
District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, filed a disqualification suit
against petitioner Villaber on the ground of the latter’s conviction for violation of BP 22.

Respondent’s arguments: Since conviction for violation of BP 22 involves moral turpitude, petitioner is
disqualified to run for any public office pursuant to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner’s arguments: Conviction has not become final and executory. Assuming arguendo that the
judgment has become final and executory, he cannot be disqualified since violation of BP 22 does not
involve moral turpitude.
Issue: Whether or not violation of BP 22 involves moral turpitude.
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the determination of whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude
is a question of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute. At any rate, this can be resolved by analyzing the elements of the crime alone.
In the instant case, the presence of second element of BP 22, that is, “the accused knows the accused knows
at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment;” manifests moral turpitude. A conviction for violation of
BP 22 imports deceit and relates to and affects the good moral character of a person.


Doctrine: The Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code.
Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation should not be
disqualified from running for a local elective office because the 2-‐‑year period of ineligibility under
Sec. 40(a) of the LGC does not even begin to run.

21. MORENO v. COMELEC

Keywords: Disqualifications under the Local Government Code
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006 Tinga, J.
Facts: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation, and that following jurisprudence, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment,
as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law of 1976, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to
him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in
the July 15, 2002 elections.
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor: The Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be
disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.

COMELEC First Division: They adopted this earlier recommendation.

COMELEC en banc: Sec. 40(a) of the LGC provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment,
within 2 years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on
this date and end 2 years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of
his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
Issue: Whether or not Moreno is disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.

Held: NO. The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the
letter. Sec. 40(a) of the LGC unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more, within 2 years after serving
sentence.

Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate,
should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running
for a local elective office because the 2-‐‑year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the LGC does
not even begin to run.

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position.
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "ʺ[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted."ʺ Thus, when Moreno
was finally discharged upon the court’s finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the LGC covers offenses punishable
by 1 year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this,
the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This
omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a
distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.


Doctrine: The penalty of prision mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification which
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.

22. DOMINADOR JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Disqualifications under the LGC; Final judgment for an offense punishable by 1 year or
more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence
G.R. No. 193237 October 9 2012 Carpio, J.
Facts: Petitioners in both cases, Jalosjos and Cardino, were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term.

Cardino filed a petition under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. He asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been
convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prision mayor by the RTC and that Jalosjos
had not yet served his sentence.

Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation to which
Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation. Jalosjos refuted and stated that the RTC
has declared Jalosjos to have duly complied with the order of probation.

Further, Jalosjos stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for
disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.

COMELEC en banc narrated the circumstances:
Jalosjos and 3 others were found guilty of robbery. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the CA but his
appeal was dismissed. It was only after a lapse of several years that Jalosjos filed a Petition for
Probation before the RTC which was granted by the court. However, on motion filed by his Probation
Officer, Jalosjos’ probation was revoked. Surprisingly, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio
Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions
of his probation. This Certification was the one used by Jalosjos to secure dismissal of the
disqualification case filed against him in 2004. The Sandiganbayan then found Gregorio Bacolod
(former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration) guilty of violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA
3019 for issuing a falsified Certification attesting to the fact that Jalosjos had fully complied with the
terms and conditions of his probation.
COMELEC First Division: Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy is cancelled. It held that Jalosjos had indeed
committed material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for
the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal
case, the sentence of which has not yet been served by him. It ruled that Jalosjos “is not eligible by
reason of his disqualification as provided for in Sec. 40 (a) of RA 7160.”
COMELEC en banc: Jalosjos’ Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

Issue/s: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy on the ground that he
committed a false material misrepresentation.
Held: No. The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by
final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Sec.
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was
not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his COC. Jalosjos was never a candidate at
any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ COC being void ab initio,
Cardino actually garnered the highest number of votes for Mayor.

A sentence of prison mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code and under Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving
the eligibility of a candidate under Secs. 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can
file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.

Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government Code provide: “The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position: (a) those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence; xxx”

The penalty of prision mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the
Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "ʺdeprivation of the
right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office."ʺ The duration
of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. Under Article 32
of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "ʺthe offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,"ʺ which is perpetually.

Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities
to hold elective public office.

In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office
from the time his judgment of conviction became final.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos'ʹ certificate of candidacy.


Doctrine: Absolute pardon restores the civil and political rights of the pardonee. This includes the
right to seek public elective office.

23. RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015 Leonardo-‐‑de castro, J:
Facts: In 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada (Erap) for the crime of plunder.
He was pardoned by former President GMA. Included in the text were the preambular (whereas)
clause that “Erap has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office” and the
actual grant which stated that “He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.” On October 26,
2009, Erap filed a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of President. Petitions were filed
before the COMELEC but they were all dismissed on the ground that the Constitutional proscription
on re-‐‑election applies to a sitting president and the pardon granted to him restored his right to vote and
be voted for a public office. He only managed to garner second highest number of votes. In 2012, he
again filed a CoC vying for Mayor of Manila. Herein petitioner filed a disqualification case against Erap
before the COMELEC relying on Sec. 40 of the LGC which disqualifies those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of
imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence , in relation to Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) which provides that any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. COMELEC dismissed the petition and denied
the MR of petitioner. Hence, this petition. Petitioner raised that Erap has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office. Hence, his filing of CoCs for President and Mayor of Manila
breached the condition of the pardon. Petitioner contended that Sec. 12 of the OEC does not apply since
his pardon being merely conditional and not absolute or plenary. Petitioner further averred that Arts.
36 and 41 of the RPC provide that it is not enough that pardon makes a general statement with regard
to restoration of civil and political rights. The restoration of such rights must be specifically and
particularly expressed in the pardon.
Issue: Whether or not Erap is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by GMA.
Held: Erap was granted absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights. The
wording of the pardon extended to Erap is complete, unambiguous and unqualified. The pardoning
power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. This doctrine of non-‐‑diminution or
non-‐‑impairment of the President'ʹs power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through
legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987
Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power
of the President in the form of "ʺoffenses involving graft and corruption"ʺ that would be enumerated and

defined by Congress through the enactment of a law. The disqualification of Erap under Sec. 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him. The pardon conforms to Arts 36 and 41 of the RPC. A rigid and inflexible reading of
the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-‐‑Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat
or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive clemency. The preambular clause of
the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional. The preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.


Doctrine: The disqualification under the Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code, that is, those who
are removed from office as a result of an administrative case, applies only to those who are removed
from office on or after January 1, 1992.

24. WILMER GREGO VS. COMELEC AND HUMBERTO BASCO

Keywords: Disqualification, Prospective
G.R. No. 125955 Date: June 19, 1997 Ponente: Romero, J.
Facts: In October 1981, respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff
by the Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain
Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, during the January 1988 local elections, respondent Basco ran as a
candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila. In fact, he also won during the
May 1992 synchronized national elections and even the May 1995 local election. However, in the midst
of his successful re-‐‑election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who
wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner Grego argues that respondent Basco should be disqualified from running far any elective
position since he had been “removed from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to the
Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code, which took effect on January 1, 1992.

Respondent Basco thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. One of the reasons he
stated is that the Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code may not be validly applied to persons
who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and
retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights.
Issue/s: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code apply retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. -‐‑ The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position: xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
Held: No. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively. It, therefore, follows that Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to
the present case.

Respondent Basco is not subject to any disqualification at all under Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government
Code which applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. Basco was removed
In October 1981, which is prior to the effectivity of the Local Government Code.


Doctrine: Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from
holding local elective offices.

25. RENATO REYES V. COMELEC AND ROGELIO DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 120905 07 March 1996 Mendoza, J.
Facts: Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan alleging that petitioner collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the
Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and
Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the
books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle
dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months. In its decision,
dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and
ordered his removal from office.

When the TRO granted by the RTC of Oriental Mindoro on the said decision expired without any
further injunctions, the decision of the Sangguinang Panlalawigan was served to the petitioner on
February 3, 1995 and he was asked to vacate the said position but he repeatedly refused to accept the
same. Petitioner then submitted his COC for the upcoming elections in Bongabong. Private Respondent
Rogelio De Castro sought his disqualification on the ground that petitioner was already removed from
office as a result of an administrative case. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order
from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995. The next day
or on May 9, 1995, COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying the petitioner because he was
previously removed from office because of an administrative case. Unaware of the disqualification, the
board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected mayor.

On July 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC'ʹs
Second Division, but his motion was denied. The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly
disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor of
Bongabong.
Issue: Whether or not Renato Reyes was already disqualified to hold the office of Mayor.
Held: Yes. Petitioner claims that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering him removed
from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof. (Syempre tigas ng mukha mo
ayaw mo tanggapin eh) In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision.
Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken
an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, But petitioner did not do so.
Accordingly, the decision became final on April 3, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.
The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had already become final and executory.


Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining
order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner
and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the
President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to Section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.


Doctrine: “Dual citizenship"ʺ in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to "ʺdual allegiance” as discussed in the sessions of the Constitutional Commissions.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

26. MERCADO VS. MANZANO

Keyword: Dual Citizenship
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 Mendoza, J.
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were among the
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano’s proclamation,
garnering 103,853 [the most number], was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
COMELEC: granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position.

COMELEC EN BANC: reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent "ʺeffectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law,"ʺ so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, Manzano was eventually proclaimed vice-‐‑mayor.

Petitioner challenges the ruling of the COMELEC en Banc and argues that merely taking part in
Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged
renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it
should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
Issue: Whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is
disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City?
Held: Yes, Manzano possesses duel citizenship. However, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on
the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual'ʹs volition. “Dual citizenship"ʺ in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be
understood as referring to "ʺdual allegiance” as discussed in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commissions. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Until the filing of his certificate
of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered
simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.

In declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent'ʹs oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.


Doctrine: A Filipino-‐‑American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time
of filing the certificate of candidacy

27. LOPEZ VS COMELEC AND VILLANUEVA

Keywords: Dual citizen, citizenship
G.R. No. 182701 July 23, 2008 Reyes, R.T., J.:
Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo
City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007. The
respondent filed a petition before the provincial election supervisor of the province of Iloilo, praying
for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from
running for any public office. Petitioner claims that he is a dual citizen and has returned to the
Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay, thus, possessing all qualifications to run for Barangay
Chairman. Petitioner won the said election but COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. Petitioner filed a petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.
Issue/s: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from
running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman?
Held: No, while Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue o the Dual Citizenship
Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public
one. The law (R.A. 9225) mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must take a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.


Doctrine: Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective
public office.

28. SOBEJANA-CONDON. VS. COMELEC

Keyword: Citizenship
G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012 Reyes, J.
Facts: The petitioner is a natural-‐‑born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-‐‑acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the "ʺCitizenship Retention and Re-‐‑Acquisition Act of 2003."ʺThe application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December
5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be
an Australian citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time
for the position of Vice-‐‑Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She then took her oath of office. Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V.
Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista, all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate
petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions
similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she
is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "ʺpersonal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath"ʺ as imposed by Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that
her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
RTC: The trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial,
the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly
mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before
any public officer authorized to administer oath. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC.
Admin Agency: The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC.
Issue/s: (1) Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the
petitioner; and (2) For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office,
whether the "ʺsworn renunciation of foreign citizenship"ʺ in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-‐‑
forma requirement.

Held: (1) The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of
candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto
before the RTC. Under the Omnibus Election Code, there are two instances where a petition
questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-‐‑five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election; and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten
days after the proclamation of the results of the election. Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to
disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-‐‑five day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him
completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within ten days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as
provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The above remedies were both available to
the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot
serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section 253.
2. The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands
natural-‐‑born Filipinos who re-‐‑acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to
or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.The rule applies to all those who have re-‐‑acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner,
without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-‐‑requisite imposed for the
exercise of the right to run for public office. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared that on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal
terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. We find no reason to depart from the mandatory
nature infused by the above ruling to the phrase "ʺsworn renunciation"ʺ. The language of the provision is
plain and unambiguous.


Doctrine: The use of foreign passport after renouncing one'ʹs foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one'ʹs nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position.

29. MAQUILING V. COMELEC

Keywords: Qualifications and disqualifications of candidates; Dual Citizenship
G.R. No. 195649 16 April 2013 SERENO, C.J.
Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under RA No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.
On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in
his favor. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.
Respondent Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte contending that Arnado is
not a resident of Kauswagan and that he is a foreigner – "ʺUSA-‐‑American."ʺ Balua presented a travel
record indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines.
In the 2010 Election, Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed
as the winning candidate for Mayor.
Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor, and who garnered the second highest number of
votes, intervened in the case and argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado'ʹs candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION: Balua'ʹs contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was
dismissed upon the finding that "ʺBalua failed to present any evidence to support his contention."ʺ In the
matter of the issue of citizenship, the First Division disagreed with Arnado'ʹs claim that he is a Filipino
citizen. The First Division held that, “We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado'ʹs act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. “

COMELEC EN BANC: The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division
and granted Arnado'ʹs Motion for Reconsideration. The use of a US passport does not operate to revert
back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "ʺun-‐‑renounce"ʺ what he has earlier on
renounced.

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT: Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety
of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for
ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one'ʹs
qualifications to run for public office.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one'ʹs foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
of representation as to one'ʹs nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for
an elective position. Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office.
He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-‐‑acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he
applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco and again on
03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado reacquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.


Doctrine: A person of dual citizenship is disqualified from running for a public office in the
Philippines. A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualification for elective office. Even if it made no finding that he
had deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy, the Comelec could still declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility
under the Local Government Code.

30. AGUSTIN V COMELEC

Keywords: disqualification; dual citizenship; section 40 (d)
G.R. No. 207105 November 10, 2015 Ponente: Bersamin
Facts: Petitioner, Arsenio Agustin, was a naturalized citizen of the USA. On Oct. 5, 202 he filed his
certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in May 13,2013 local
elections. He declares in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to, that he was a
natural born Filipino citizen and that he had been a resident of the said municipality for 25 years.
Respondent, Salvador Pillos, filed in the Comelec a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the
CoC of the petitioner on the ground that the latter made a material misrepresentation in his CoC,
which states that he had been a resident for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only
on May 31, 2012. Petitioner argued that the one-‐‑year requirement referred to residency, not to voter
registration; that residency was not dependent on citizenship and that he attached his Affidavit of
Renunciation of American Citizenship.
Comelec: On Jan. 28, 2013, the Comelec issued a resolution stating that the requirement that a
candidate must be a registered voter does not carry with it the requirement that he must be so one year
before the elections because this refers to the residency qualification. It could not be said that
respondents falsely represented the length of their residency. As far as registration as a voter is
concerned, it should suffice that they are duly registered upon the filing of their COCs or within the
period prescribed by law for such registration. Pillos allegation that Agustin were unable to vote
because they are residents of other countries, the records are bereft of any evidence that would
substantiate such allegation.
Comelec En Banc: Pillos moved for the reconsideration with Comelec En Banc. He argued that Agustin
still used his USA passport, when he travelled to Hawaii on October 6, 2012, despite his renunciation of
his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012 in which he declared
he was a resident of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. On April 23, 2013 the Comelec En Banc cancelled and denied
due course to Agustin’s Certificate of Candidacy.
Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioner is eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
Held: No, the petitioner is not eligible to run for public office. At first he was eligible when he expressly
renounced his USA citizenship. He took his oath of allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his
affidavit of renunciation on October 2, 2012. These acts of Agustin reverted his status on an exclusively
Filipino citizen. Therefore, on October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was exclusively a Filipino
Citizen, making him eligible for public office. His CoC was valid because he did not make any material
misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as mayor of the municipality.

But the Comelec En Banc ruled that the petitioner repudiated his oath of renunciation when he used his
USA passport on October 6, 2012 when he travelled. He continued his USA passport, thereby
representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He was only an exclusively Filipino citizen only for four
days, from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. The act of continued exercise of his rights as a citizen
of the USA by using his USA passport reverted him to his earlier status as a USA citizen. Such
reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Sec. 40 (d)
of the Local Government Code. Even if it made no finding that the petitioner had deliberately
attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the Comelec could still
declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under LGC.


Doctrine: The definition of “fugitive from justice” indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates one'ʹs flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

31. RODRIGUEZ VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996 Francisco, J.
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez
and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May
1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-‐‑elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez'ʹ victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC (EPC No.
92-‐‑28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12,
1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance
claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "ʺfugitive
from justice"ʺ which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez'ʹ quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-‐‑28) in a resolution of February 2,
1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-‐‑28 before this Court via petition
for certiorari. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez, is a "ʺfugitive from justice"ʺ as contemplated
by Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge
against him (as previously mentioned).
In resolving that Marquez petition, the Court in "ʺMarquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC"ʺ'ʹ promulgated on April
18, 1995, and hereinafter referred to as the MARQUEZ Decision, declared that:
. . . , "ʺfugitive from justice"ʺ includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of
governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez'ʹ candidacy via petition for disqualification before
the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "ʺfugitive from justice."ʺ This
petition for disqualification (SPA No. 95-‐‑089) was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez'ʹ

petition for certiorari (112889) — from where the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung — was still
then pending before the Court.
On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision, the COMELEC promulgated a
Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-‐‑28 (quo warranto case) and SPA NO. 95-‐‑089 (disqualification
case) declaring Rodriguez as a fugitive from justice and to immediately vacate such office.
On December 26, 1995, a report entitled "ʺ'ʹEVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'ʹS
EVALUATION"ʺ wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties'ʹ evidence, declared that
Rodriguez is NOT a "ʺfugitive from justice"ʺ as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision,
thus making a 180-‐‑degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at
this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ
Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez'ʹ case because evidence has established
that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted
in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).
Issue/s: Whether Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice”.
Held: No. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates
one'ʹs flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to
evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez'ʹ case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines
from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27
and June 26 of 1995, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November
12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five
(5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and
arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much
less conviction — to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez
deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "ʺfugitive
from justice"ʺ under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances
of Rodriguez.


Doctrine: To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country.” Therefore, the act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of one’s status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States.

32. MATEO CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS

Keywords: residence, green card, mayor
G.R. No. 88831 November 08, 1990 Grino-‐‑Aquino, J.
Facts: The consolidated petitions herein seek for the disqualification of Merito Miguel as municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that the latter is a green card holder, hence: a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that
he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in
order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and had voted in all
previous elections.
COMELEC: Denied the petitions and ruled that the possession of a green card by the respondent
(Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. Further,
respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his
having voted in successive elections in said municipality.
Issue/s:
1) WON by virtue of Miguel’s green card in the United States, he has already abandoned his
residence in the Philippines?
2) WON his filing of COC in the PH effectively abandoned his status as a permanent resident of
US thus eligible to run for elective office in the PH?

Held:
1) YES.
Sec.68, B.P. 881 provides that, “Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.”

In the case at bar, Miguel answered that he intended to stay “Permanently” in the US as evidenced by
his Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration. On its face, the green card that was
subsequently issued x x x to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a
RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion the following information is printed:
"ʺAlien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel'ʹs immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there: he entered the United States with the intention to live
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant’s (not a visitor'ʹs or tourist'ʹs) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.

2) NO.
To be "ʺqualified to run for elective office"ʺ in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is
a green card holder must have "ʺwaived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country."ʺ Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did
not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
"ʺdisqualified to run for any elective office"ʺ (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).

Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office,
hence, his election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan
is hereby ANNULLED.


Doctrine: To prove that a violation of Sec. 80 of the OEC occured, clear and convincing proof must
exist and be presented. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of
campaigning outside the campaign period.

33. PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Campaigning, Sec. 80, OEC, Solicit Votes
G.R. No. 148075 February 4, 2002 Buena, J.
Facts: On 30 January 2001, private respondent Teresita Lazaro succeeded Jose D. Lina, Jr. as the
Governor of Laguna after the latter was appointed as Secretary of Interior and Local Government.
Thereafter on 28 February 2001, respondent Lazaro filed her certificate of candidacy for the
gubernatorial position of Laguna. On 04 May 2001, petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered
political party, sought to disqualify Lazaro as candidate in the gubernatorial race. In their petition, the
petitioner claimed that Lazaro violated Section 80 (Election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period) of the Omnibus Election Code.

The petitioner alleged that on February 7, 2001, Lazaro ordered the purchase of 14,513 items such as
trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-‐‑shirts, allegedly worth Four Million Five
Hundred Fifty Six Thousand and Five Pesos (P4,556,005.00) serving no public purpose but to promote
her popularity as a candidate.

The petitioner further alleged that on February 8, 2001, Lazaro purchased and distributed 1,760 medals
and pins valued at One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P110,000.00) to various schools in Laguna,
serving no meaningful public purpose but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy.

According to petitioner, the abovementioned acts, in effect, constituted premature campaigning
inasmuch as the same were done prior to the start of the campaign period on 30 March 2001. Petitioner
adds that these acts constitute a ground for disqualification under Section 68, in relation to Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC Second Division: Granted petition to disqualify Lazaro.

COMELEC En Banc: Reversed and set aside 2nd Division Ruling
Issue/s: Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute a violation of Section 80 of the OEC.

Held: No. Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered campaigning. In
accordance with COMELEC Resolution 3636, only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes
will be covered by the definition and enumeration.

To prove that a violation of Sec. 80 of the OEC occured, clear and convincing proof must exist and be
presented. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense. There has to be
concrete and direct evidence, or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that
respondent was indeed engaged in campaigning.

In this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes.
Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which
duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor of the Province of Laguna. Respondent has
satisfactorily shown the regularity of the implementation of the questioned sports and education
programs.

The number of items purchased and the amount involved were within the regular purchases of the
provincial government. How the funds were sourced and how the program was implemented, as
correctly pointed out by respondent, (are) not for us to resolve for such issue is way beyond our
constitutionally mandated jurisdiction.

The petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the questioned purchase and
distribution of the aforesaid items were perpetrated for the purpose of promoting the candidacy of
respondent Lazaro or were calculated to directly or indirectly solicit votes on behalf or in favor of
respondent. Similarly, the records are bereft of any clear and convincing proof that the purchase and
distribution of the items were deliberately or consciously done to influence and induce the constituents
of Laguna to vote for respondent, in direct violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.


Doctrine: In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101 and 103 of the OEC, it can be said that
the intent of our lawmakers has been consistently to regulate not just the election expenses of the
candidate, but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor, as well as by including in the aggregate
limit of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter.

34. EJERCITO V. COMELEC

Keywords: disqualifications, election campaign, spending an amount in excess of that allowed
G.R. No. 212398 Date: November 25, 2014 Ponente: Peralta, J.
Facts: Three days prior to the May 2013 elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by private
respondent Egay San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon Ejercito, a fellow gubernatorial
candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. San Luis alleged that
Ejercito distributed “orange cards” that could be used in any public hospital within Laguna for medical
needs to influence voters in his favor, and that based on his advertising contracts, Ejercito exceeded the
amount of expenditures necessary pursuant to Section 5(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
implementing the Fair Election Act, spending a total amount of P16,611,549 instead of the expenses
amounting to P4,576,566 allowed for gubernatorial candidates in Laguna.

While said petition was pending, Ejercito was proclaimed Governor. Ejercito prayed for the dismissal
of the petition, alleging that the “orange card” was a priority project of his administration as incumbent
Governor of Laguna and was not intended to influence the electorate during the May 2013 elections,
and that the accusation of having exceeded the total allowable election expenditures deserves no
consideration for being speculative, self-‐‑serving, and uncorroborated by other substantial evidence. He
argued that the advertising contracts for political ads presented by San Luis showing the excessive
expenditure were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent, and that his
signature thereon was obviously forged. Moreover, he asserted that the limit set by law, as appearing
in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to
campaign donations, as he claims the advertisements are.
COMELEC: Both the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc ruled for the disqualification
of Ejercito pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not Ejercito should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount
in excess of that allowed by the Omnibus Election Code.
Held: YES. The Court refused to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-‐‑CBN Corp. and
Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As
found by the COMELEC, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those
in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising
contracts is actually a must because non-‐‑compliance is considered an election offense.

Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall
not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising
contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned, or by the duly-‐‑authorized
representative of the political party. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it
shall be unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person
or broadcast entity to a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they
bear and be identified by the words “airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by”
followed by the true and correct name and address of the donor.

Likewise, the Court finds that the argument of Ejercito that the prescribed limit as to amount of
expenses found in COMELEC Resolution 9615 applies only to election expenditures of candidates is
untenable. In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101 and 103 of the OEC, it can be said that
the intent of our lawmakers has been consistently to regulate not just the election expenses of the
candidate, but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor, as well as by including in the aggregate
limit of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase “those incurred or
caused to be incurred by the candidate” is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are
contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution
or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor
certainly qualifies as “any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer.” Ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguere debemus.


Doctrine: The question of whether the time to file these (disqualification or quo warranto) petitions or
protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.

35. BENJAMIN T. LOONG V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURHUSSEIN

UTUTALUM AND ALIM BASHIR EDRIS
Keywords: 25 day period, Procedural Gap, Disqualification
G.R. No. 93986 December 22, 1992 PADILLA, J.:
Facts: On 15 January 1990 (last day for filing of certificate of candidacy), petitioner filed with the
respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-‐‑Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. Private respondents (Ututalum and
Edris) who were also candidates for the same position filed a petition on 5 March 1990 (16 days after
the election) seeking the disqualification of petitioner Loong before COMELEC 2nd Division (docketed
as SPA Case No. 90-‐‑006) on the ground of false representation as to the age of Petitioner Loong. On 19
March 1990, petitioner Loong filed in SPA No. 90-‐‑006 his answer to the petition, seeking the dismissal
of the petition, and alleging the following:

1. That it has not been the practice among the Muslim people in the community where respondent was
born to record the birth of a child with the Office of the Civil Registry; that following such practice,
respondent'ʹs parents did not also record his birth with the said office; that, to be sure of his age
qualification, respondent, before filing his certificate of candidacy consulted his mother and other
persons who have personal knowledge of his date of birth and all assured respondent that his correct
date of birth is July 4, 1954.

2. That respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction because such petition is actually one which is to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy which, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), as amended by Election Reforms Law of 1987, should have been filed within 5 days
following the last day for filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-‐‑006 was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-‐‑
day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, private
respondent Ututalum alleges that SPA No. 90-‐‑006, though filed only on 5 March 1990, was filed when
no proclamation of winner had as yet been made and that the petition is deemed filed on time as
Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure states that the petition to disqualify a candidate
on grounds of ineligibility "ʺshall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date of proclamation.

COMELEC 2nd Division Ruling; SPA No. 90-‐‑006 was timely filed, applying Sections 6 and 7 of
Republic Act No. 6646, 9 and Section 2, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which states that the
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed within five (5) days
following the last day for the filing of a certificate of candidacy, both read in the light of the Frivaldo
ruling of this Court. Petitioner MR was denied.

On 3 July 1990, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Vice-‐‑Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari filed by petitioner on 9 July 1990 to
annul the aforesaid resolutions of respondent Commission
Issue/s: WON a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong was filed within the
period prescribed by law.
Held: No. it was not filed on time. It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material
facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only
after the lapse of the 25-‐‑day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person
who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate
committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between
the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-‐‑day period
under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election
is made. During this so-‐‑called "ʺgap"ʺ the would-‐‑be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of
the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he
could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo
warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "ʺgap"ʺ in what it calls a procedural gap which,
according to it, it unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the
government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates
for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Section 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission
may have seen the need to remedy this so-‐‑called "ʺprocedural gap"ʺ, but it is not for it to prescribed what
the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file
these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.

In sum, SPA No. 90-‐‑006 was filed by private respondent Ututalum beyond the 25-‐‑day period (from the
filing by petitioner Loong of the questioned certificate of candidacy) prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code. It follows that the dismissal of said petition for disqualification is warranted. Further it would
appear that we cannot treat SPA NO. 90-‐‑006 as a petition for quo warranto (Section 253 of the Code) for
when it was filed with the respondent Commission, no proclamation of election results had as yet been
made, it was premature.


Doctrine: Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) begins.

36. GONZALEZ VS. COMELEC

Keywords: COMELEC jurisdiction over winner.
G.R. No. 192856 March 8, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Facts: Petitioner Gonzalez and Private Respondent Lim both filed certificates of candidacy (COC) for
the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay. A petition for
disqualification and cancellation of COC was filed by Bichara on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish
national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of CA 625.
Hence, COMELEC disqualified Gonzalez.

Later on, Lim petitioned the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to consider the votes cast for
Gonzales as stray or not counted. The PBOC, however, dismissed the petition stating that the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution has not yet lapsed. Hence, the same is
not yet final and executor.

Based on the results of the counting and canvassing of votes, Gonzalez emerged as winner. Gonzalez
filed a motion for reconsideration.
COMELEC: Denied the motion for reconsideration.

SOLICITOR GENERAL: No grave abuse of discretion committed by COMELEC.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a representative who was officially proclaimed as a
winner
Held: NO. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) begins.


Doctrine: For the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer to apply, the following conditions must
concur: (1) the decision on disqualification remained pending on the election day; and (2) the decision
on disqualification became final only after the elections.

37. CAYAT V COMELEC

Keywords: Doctrine on the rejection of second placer
G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007 Carpio, J.
Facts: Palileng, petitioner Cayat’s only rival for mayoralty position in Buguias, Benguet, filed on
January 26, 2004 a petition for disqualification against Cayat on the ground of material representation
in the latter’s certificate of candidacy. Respondent Palileng alleges that at the time of Cayat’s filing of
certificate of candidacy, Cayat was convicted by final judgment for the crime of forcible acts of
lasciviousness, hence he is ineligible to run as Mayor.

The Comelec declared Cayat disqualified from running as Mayor, as he was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, pursuant to Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. In its Resolution
dated 12 April 2004, Comelec ordered the cancellation of Cayat’s certificate of candidacy.

Notwithstanding, Cayat was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor in the local elections held on 10 May
2004. Aggrieved, Palileng filed a motion for execution of judgment of the COMELEC Resolution dated
12 April 2004, which was granted by the Comelec first division thus ordering the cancellation of
certificate of candidacy of Cayat and the immediate proclamation of Palileng as the duly elected
Mayor.

Bayacsan, the elected Vice-‐‑Mayor of Baguias, Benguet, filed his petition-‐‑in-‐‑intervention and prayed
that the Comelec’s order be nullified and that he be declared as the rightful mayor.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec’s order cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy and declaring
Palileng as Mayor was valid.
Ruling: Yes. In the first place, Palileng was the ONLY candidate for Mayor in the 10 May 2004
elections. The Comelec’s resolution dated 12 April 2004 became final and executory on 17 April 2004
when Cayat failed to pay the filing fees. 23 days before the local elections, Cayat was already
disqualified by final judgment from running for the office of Mayor, his candidacy was already
legally non-‐‑existent. Thus, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. In this regard, the
doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, finds no
application because Palileng is not a second-‐‑placer.

For the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer to apply, the following conditions must concur: (1)
the decision on disqualification remained pending on the election day; and (2) the decision on
disqualification became final only after the elections. Such conditions were not obtained in the case at
bar. Thus, Bayacsan’s petition-‐‑in-‐‑intervention was denied because the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer does not apply in this case.


The Court also had the occasion to rule that Labo Jr. v Comelec and other cases applying the doctrine on
the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the
candidate had not become final before the elections. In the present case, Cayat was already disqualified
23 days before the election day.
Section 6 of RA 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 expressly declares that a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. Consequently, the 8,164 voters in favor of Cayat are deemed by law to have deliberately
voted for a non-‐‑candidate, and thus their votes are considered stray and shall not be counted.


Doctrine: The certificate of candidacy must be sworn in. This is mandatory and non-‐‑compliance
therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of the candidate.
But after the people have expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by
the fact that the respondent who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for
the office of provincial governor, has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.

38. DE GUZMAN V. BOARD OF CANVASSERS

Keywords: Certificate of Candidacy
G.R. No. L-‐‑24721 November 3, 1925 Villamor, J.
Facts: The Board of Canvassers met on June 22, 1925, for the purpose of counting the votes cast in the
election for provincial officers and certifying the result of the count. After gathering all the election
returns, it found that the De Guzman had obtained 7,662 votes and the respondent Lucero, 8,771 votes.
The certificate of candidacy submitted by respondent Lucero was not duly sworn to, as required by
law, while the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner De Guzman, was prepared and filed in
accordance with the requirements of the law. Notwithstanding that Lucero did not file a certificate of
candidacy duly sworn to, as provided in section 404 of the Election Law, the Board of Canvassers
willfully and illegally adjudicated the 8,771 votes to the him, and afterwards illegally proclaimed and
certified him as governor-‐‑elect of the Province of La Union.
In view of these facts, it has been alleged that Lucero has not, and could not have, been a legal
candidate for the office in question, and should not have been certified elected for the Office of
Provincial Governor.
De Guzman filed a petition for the court to issue a mandamus addressed to the Board of Canvassers,
ordering it to meet and reject and annul all the votes adjudicated to Lucero, and after correcting the
election return, to proclaim and certify him as elected governor of La Union.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondent has filed a certificate of candidacy in accordance with the law,
2. In case he has not, whether or not the writ applied for should be issued.
Held: 1. NO. Section 41 of Act No. 3030 provides that the Provincial Board of Canvassers or the
Governor-‐‑General, as the case may be, shall certify elected for the offices of senator or member of the
House of Representatives and for provincial officers only those who shall have obtained the highest
number of votes, and filed their certificates of candidacy in accordance with the provisions of section
404 of this law. The law provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of senator, representative
or any provincial office, unless within the time fixed by the law, he shall file a certificate of candidacy
duly verified. The meaning of the phrase "ʺa certificate of candidacy duly verified,"ʺ is explained to the
effect that "ʺ. . . only when the corresponding receipt has been issued and the certificate filed can it be
presumed that it has been duly verified and filed."ʺ

In the instant case, Lucero filed his certificate of candidacy, the provincial secretary having issued the
proper receipt for the filing of said certificate, together with a statement of the expenses attached
thereto It therefore seems clear that the respondent filed his certificate in accordance with the Spanish
text of section 404 of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of act No. 3030.

But the petitioner argues that section 404 of the Election Law, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 3030,
is mandatory in its terms, and therefore must be complied with the provincial board, respondent
herein. Granting that the English text of the law in this case makes clear the Spanish text "ʺCertificado de
candidatura debidamente acreditado"ʺ (certificate of candidacy duly verified), it will be seen that said
section 3 of Act No. 3030 requires the candidate to file a "ʺcertificate of candidacy duly verified,"ʺ
indicating by these two words that the certificate of candidacy must be sworn to.

2. YES. Lucero’s certificate was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity might have
justified the elimination of Lucero as a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, if an
objection on the part of the petitioner De Guzman had been made in due time.

This irregularity does not invalidate the election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by
the count of the votes that Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people
cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been
properly sworn to.


Doctrine: It may be gleaned from the provisions of the Local Government Code that the law does not
specifically require that the candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number
and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a
voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running
for office.

39. EUGENIO JURILLA VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Certificate of Candidacy
G.R. No. 105436 June 2 1994 Bellosillo, J.
Facts: Respondent Antonio Hernandez filed with the COMELEC his Certificate of Candidacy. In Item
No. 6, he gave his address “B 26 L 1 New Capitol Estates QC”. However, in Item No. 12, he did not
indicate his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. His biodata
and his Certificate of Candidacy stated his address as “Acacia Street Mariana QC” which is part of the
Fourth District of QC.
In other words, his Certificate of Candidacy and his biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly
state that he was a registered voter of QC or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof within
the purview of Sec. 39 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1992

In view of the seeming deficiency in the certificate of candidacy of private respondent, petitioners
herein challenged his qualification before public respondent COMELEC.
COMELEC: denied the petition for disqualification for being filed outside the reglementary period
under Sec. 5 of RA 6646, which pertains to nuisance candidates.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be disqualified for failure to indicate his Precinct Number
and the Barangay where he is a registered voter
Held: No. It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his
Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually
registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where
he is running for office.

In the case at bench, respondent satisfactorily explained his failure to state in his certificate of
candidacy his Precinct Number, that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a
particular Precinct Number in the Second District of QC.

Formerly a registered voter of Manila but for the past two years prior to the elections he was already a
resident of “B 26 L 1 New Capitol Estates,” admittedly within the Second District of QC.


Doctrine: A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or
lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of mayor. The distinction between a petition
for disqualification and the formal requirement in Section 73 of the OEC that a COC be under oath is
not simply a question of semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate.

40. AMORA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192280 January 25, 2011 Nachura, J:
Facts: In December 1 2009, petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Mayor of
Candijay, Bohol. He was the incumbent mayor and had been twice elected to the post, in 2004 and
2007. Private respondent Olandria was one of the candidates for councilor of the opposing party in the
same municipality. Private respondent filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification
against petitioner alleging that his CoC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Private respondent pointed
that petitioner merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty.
Granada, instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Petitioner countered that the CoC is
valid and effective because he is personally known to the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom
he took his oath in filing the document. COMELEC disqualified petitioner. Posthaste, petitioner filed
MR before COMELEC en banc. During this time, petitioner was proclaimed as the winner for the
position. A week after, COMELEC en banc denied MR and affirmed COMELEC second division
resolution. Petitioner maintained that Sec. 78 of the Election Code governs the petition: a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC which is grounded on a statement of a material representation in
the certificate that is false. However, the COMELEC noted that it was invoking Sec. 73 of the Election
Code, which prescribes the mandatory requirement of filing a sworn certificate of candidacy.
Issue/s: Whether or not an improperly sworn CoC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification – No, because the statutes list down the grounds for disqualification and CoC was
properly sworn because they personally knew each other (petitioner and notary public).
Held: Section 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC list down the disqualifications. Private
respondent’s petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification. Nowhere therein does it
specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. The proper
characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the pertinent provisions of laws cannot
be made dependent on the designation, correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd
interpretation of private respondent is not controlling; the COMELEC should have dismissed his
petition outright. We have had occasion to distinguish the various petitions for disqualification and
clarify the grounds therefor as provided in the OEC and the LGC. We declared, thus: To emphasize, a
petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section
40 of the LGC.

On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have
different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue
as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made
the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Sec. 68 can validly be substituted under
Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC
has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate.


Doctrine: The rule that persons holding appointive position shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon filing his certificate of candidacy applies to officers and employees in
government-‐‑owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on
incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall
under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, the rule constitutes just cause
for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

41. PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND MARCELINO

TONGCO. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND MANUEL S.
PINEDA
G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993 Narvasa, C.J.
Facts: While holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and
Construction Department at Tongonan Geothermal Project, private respondent Manuel Pineda decided
to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. He filed the corresponding certificate of
candidacy for the position, and later won the election. Pineda took his oath of office as councilor-‐‑elect
of the Municipality of Kananga, Leye. Despite so qualifying as councilor, and assuming his duties as
such, he continued working for PNOC-‐‑EDC as the latter’s Geothermal Construction Secretary,
Engineering and Construction Department.

Petitioner Marcelino Tongco of the PNOC-‐‑EDC addressed an inquiry to the latter’s Legal Department
regarding the status of Manuel Pineda as employee in view of his candidacy for the office of municipal
councilor. In response, the Legal Department rendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel Pineda
should be considered ipso facto resigned upon filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.

Pineda filed an illegal dismissal complaint against PNOC-‐‑EDC. Then, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of Pineda. The Labor Arbiter ruled that in light of Section 2(1) , Article IX-‐‑B of the 1987 Constitution,
the governing principle laid down has been that government-‐‑owned or controlled corporations
incorporated under the Corporation Code, the general law -‐‑ as distinguished from those created by
special charter -‐‑ are not deemed to be within the coverage of the Civil Service Law, and consequently
their employees, like those of PNOC-‐‑EDC, are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code rather than
the Civil Service Law. In other words, an employee in a government-‐‑owned or controlled corporations
without an original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) does not fall within the
scope of the Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

PNOC-‐‑EDC filed an appeal with the NLRC but the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Hence
the special civil action for certiorari was filed by PNOC-‐‑EDC before the Court.

PNOC-‐‑EDC contended that the respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that
Pineda was not covered by the Civil Service Rules when he filed his candidacy for the 1988 local
government elections, and when it ruled that Pineda could occupy a local government position and be
simultaneously employed in a government-‐‑owned or controlled corporation, a situation patently
violative of the constitutional prohibition on additional compensation.

Issue: Whether an employee in a government-‐‑owned or controlled corporations without an original
charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.— Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-‐‑owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Held: YES. Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-‐‑owned or controlled
corporation does not lose its character as such because not possessed of an original charter but
organized under the general law. If a corporation'ʹs capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is
operated and managed by officers charged with the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which
it has been organized, it is a government-‐‑owned or controlled corporation even if organized under the
Corporation Code and not under a special statute; and employees thereof, even if not covered by the
Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless "ʺemployees in government-‐‑owned or controlled
corporations,"ʺ and come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them
"ʺipso facto resigned from . . . office upon the filing of . . . (their) certificate of candidacy."ʺ
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees
in government-‐‑owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on
incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall
under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause
for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.
Hence, the applicability to private respondent Manuel Pineda of Section 66 of the Election Code is
without a doubt. Respondent Pineda is considered resigned upon filing of his certificate of candidacy.


Doctrine: Any elective official may run for another office without forfeiting his seat.

42. ELEAZAR QUINTO AND GERINO TOLENTINO JR. V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 22 February 2010 Puno, J.
Facts: In the case of Quinto v. COMELEC, December 01, 2009, the Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that officials holding appointive
offices . . . shall be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of their COC on the ground that they
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed
Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers,
prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.

This case, Quinto v. COMELEC, February 22, 2010, is a motion for reconsideration.

The COMELEC argued that the assailed provision do not violate the equal protection clause when they
accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment
rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by COMELEC should be granted.
Held: Yes. The MR is granted. The decision of the same case on December 01, 2009 is reversed, the
assailed provision is now constitutional.

Pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436, an elected official is not deemed to have
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected
office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the
two sets of officials is that appointed officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote
while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Basically, in this case, previously under sec. 67 of the omnibus election code, any elective official
whether national or local running for any officer other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his COC. Sec. 67 of the
omnibus election code has been repealed by Sec. 14 of the Fair Election Act (RA No. 9006). Therefore,
any elective official whether national or local who files his COC for the same or different office is NOT
considered resigned. This issue was touched upon because in the earlier decision of the same case, it
held that the distinction between appointive and elective officials violates equal protection, however, in
this more recent case, SC reversed its earlier decision because clearly, there are substantial distinctions
between the two classification of offices, all discussed above.


Doctrine: The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period. A person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.

43. LANOT VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Candidate
G.R. No. 164858 Nov. 16, 2006 Carpio, J.
Facts: On 19 March 2004, Lanot, Obispo, Peralta, Dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz (collectively, "ʺpetitioners"ʺ),
filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against
Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for Pasig City Mayor,
while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May 2004
elections.
Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions
outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a
medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against
Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards,
streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes
to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him.
COMELEC: adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Ladra disqualifying Vicente P.
Eusebio for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On election day itself, Chairman Abalos issued the first of the three questioned COMELEC issuances.
In a memorandum, Chairman Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the COMELEC
resolution due to Eusebio'ʹs motion for reconsideration.

On 21 May 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued the second questioned issuance. The order quoted
from the motion for advisory opinion of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers which reported that 98% of
the total returns of Pasig City had been canvassed and that there were only 32 uncanvassed returns
involving 6,225 registered voters. Eusebio had 119,693 votes while Lanot had 108,941 votes. Thus, the
remaining returns would not affect Eusebio'ʹs lead over Lanot. The COMELEC En Banc stated its
"ʺestablished policy"ʺ to "ʺexpedite the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates to ease
the post-‐‑election tension and without prejudice to its action in the x x x case"ʺ and resolved to declare
Eusebio as Pasig City Mayor. Eusebio was proclaimed as Pasig City Mayor on 23 May 2004 based on
the 21 May 2004 Order.


On 20 August 2004, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated the third questioned issuance. The
COMELEC En Banc invoked Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 and this Court'ʹs rulings in
Albaña v. COMELEC, Lonzanida v. COMELEC, and Sunga v. COMELEC in justifying the annulment
of the order to disqualify Eusebio and the referral of the case to the Law Department for preliminary
investigation.
Issue: Whether or not Eusebio’s questioned acts engaged in an election campaign in various forms on
various occasions outside of the designated campaign period constitutes violation of Sec. 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Held: No. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its 20 August 2004 resolution.
There is no basis to disqualify Eusebio. What Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is "ʺan
election campaign or partisan political activity"ʺ by a "ʺcandidate"ʺ "ʺoutside"ʺ of the campaign period. The
essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in
an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "ʺcandidate."ʺ Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who
"ʺhas filed a certificate of candidacy"ʺ to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of
candidacy, he is not a "ʺcandidate."ʺ The third element requires that the campaign period has not started
when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed. Eusebio'ʹs acts of election
campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside of the campaign period.

Although, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("ʺRA 8436"ʺ) moved the deadline for the filing of
certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day, the only purpose for the early filing of
certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the
following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots,
Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the
filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become
immediately a "ʺcandidate"ʺ for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent
prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet
the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "ʺelection periods as x x x fixed
by existing law"ʺ prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "ʺwill still not be
considered as a candidate."ʺ


Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the applicable law prior to RA 8436, the campaign
period for local officials commences 45 days before election day. For the 2004 local elections, this puts
the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. This also puts the last day for the filing of certificate
of candidacy, under the law prior to RA 8436, on 23 March 2004. Eusebio is deemed to have filed his
certificate of candidacy on this date for purposes other than the printing of ballots because this is the
interpretation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code most favorable to one charged of its
violation. Since Section 80 defines a criminal offense, its provisions must be construed liberally in favor
of one charged of its violation. Thus, Eusebio became a "ʺcandidate"ʺ only on 23 March 2004 for purposes
other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a "ʺcandidate"ʺ on 23
March 2004, even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are protected as part of freedom of
expression of a citizen before he becomes a candidate for elective public office. Acts committed
by Eusebio on or after 24 March 2004, or during the campaign period, are not covered by
Section 80 which punishes only acts outside the campaign period. Based on the findings of Director
Ladra, the questioned acts attributed to Eusebio all occurred before the start of the campaign period on
24 March 2004, to which he is not yet a candidate.


Doctrine: The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when
the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful. A person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaigning period.

44. PENERA VS COMELEC AND ANDANAR
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009 Carpio, J.:
Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration of Penera for the decision of the COMELEC disqualifying
Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte and declared that the
Vice-‐‑Mayor should succeed Penera. She filed her candidacy on March 29, 2007 while the campaign
period for local officials began on March 30, 2007. She claims that she was not yet a candidate at the
time of the incident and that participation in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in
premature election campaigning.
Issue/s: Whether or not Penera was guilty of engaging in premature election campaigning
Held: No, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period. The court ruled in line of Lanot Doctrine stating that she was not a candidate other than the
purposes of printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to March 30 are not punishable under
section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Any election offense that may be committed by a candidate
under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET
ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the
Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-‐‑224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.


Doctrine: Nothing in Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates that the affidavit of
withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was
filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional
election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which
the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality.

45. LORETO-GO VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy
G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001 Pardo, J.
Facts: Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of
office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001. On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal
election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay,
Leyte.On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of
Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an
affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested
that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of
Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. At that later hour, with only
minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and
considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send
her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to
the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.On the same day, at 1:15
p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal. On 05
March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City
a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner.7 Respondent
Antoni filed a similar petitions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of
Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.
COMELEC EN BANC: The COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director, Law
Department and adopted the resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision
which states that the COMELEC must give due course to the petition of Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and
Atty. Arvin V. Antonio against the certificates of candidacy of Catalina Loreto-‐‑Go for Governor of
Leyte; and to direct the Provincial Election Suprevisor of Leyte and the Election Officer to delete/cancel
the name of CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-‐‑GO from the certified list of candidates for Governor of
Leyte and Mayoralty candidates of Baybay, Leyte, and to accordingly notify the parties and the above-‐‑
named Comelec Officials.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of
Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions?

Held: The Supreme Court granted the petition. They annulled the COMELEC resolution declaring
petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of
Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at
12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The Supreme
Court held that petitioner'ʹs withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was
effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor. Section 73,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:
"ʺSEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. -‐‑ No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files
a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
"ʺA person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by
submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
"ʺNo person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file
more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be
eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."ʺ
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the
same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly
with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office
of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the
office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality. While it may be true that Section 12 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-‐‑A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be
filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such
requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional.


Doctrine: An election candidate’s letter to the COEMELEC, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of
his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having
been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted under the law, which
expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at least sixty days before the election.

46. MONSALE V. NICO

Keywords: Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy
G.R. No. L-‐‑2539 28 May 1949 OZAETA, J:
Facts: Protestant Jose Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but, on
November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The COMELEC, however, ruled
on November 8 that the protestant could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his
withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee Paulino Nico received 2,291
votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao, 126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none,
evidently because the votes cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was not a
registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
Issue: Whether or not a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive it, either
by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filing a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline
provided by law for the filing of such certificate?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Section 36 of the Revised Election Code (RA 180)
provides that "ʺat least sixty days before a regular election, and thirty days at least before a special
election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with the municipal
secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling places concerned, to the secretary of
the provincial board, and to the Commission on Elections."ʺ
In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and
requested the Commission on Elections that it "ʺbe considered as though it has never been filed at all."ʺ
There is no question as to the right of a candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of
candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or
thirty-‐‑one days before the election, the protestant ceased to be a candidate by his own voluntary act,
and as a matter of fact the boards of election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao were duly
notified of his withdrawal. His letter to the Commission on Elections dated November 6, 1947, which
he subscribed and swore to before a notary public on November 7, whereby he withdrew his
withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy
which, having been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted under the
law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at least sixty days before the election.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time
limit therefor are (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before a regular election, the
candidates among whom, they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in
the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the
duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there were voters, and votes
might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a
candidate for another office in the same election.
The only instance wherein the law permits the filing of a certificate of candidacy after the expiration of
the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed dies or becomes
disqualified.


Doctrine: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code allows the substitution of candidates who may have
been disqualified after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. The substitution may be on
or before mid-‐‑day of the day of election. Section 186 of same code provides that decision or ruling of
the Comelec cancelling a certificate or candidacy shall be immediately executor.

47. PONTAWE V COMELEC

Keywords: Disqualification; Substitution; Sec. 28 and Sec. 186 of 1978 Election Code
G.R. No. L -‐‑ 59343 April 24, 1985 Relova, J.
Facts: Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were the candidates for the positions of Mayor and
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively of Nacionalista Party during the elections of January
30, 1980 in Star. Barbara, Pangasinan. On January 24, 1980, Comelec disqualified them on the ground of
turncoatism or the change of political party affiliation. Upon the receipt of notice on the Comelec of
said disqualification on January 29, 1980, Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez were nominated by the
Nacionalista Party to substitute for Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez, respectively. On the same
day, the disqualified candidates filed petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Comelec
ordering their disqualification, but they abandoned their appeal. On January 31, 1980, Carlos Pontawe
and Louie Lopez were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and member of Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively. The other candidates who lost in the election filed an election protest in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.
CFI: The court declared the election of Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez as null and void and
proclaimed Rosario Cabangon and Alfredo Flores as the duly elected Mayor and member of
Sangguniang Bayan, respectively. The court ruled that Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were
still candidates on January 30, 1980 because of the appeal taken by them to the Supreme Court
disputing the order of disqualification by the Comelec which they did not consider as final and
executory. COMELEC: On November 3, 1981, the Comelec affirmed the decision of trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were still candidates on election day.
Held: No, Federico Pontawe and Wilfredo Lopez were no longer candidates on election day, Jan. 30,
1980. Sec. 28 of the 1978 Election Code allows the substitution of candidates who may have been
disqualified after the last day for filing the certificates of candidacy. The substitution may be on or
before mid-‐‑day of the day of the election. If the disqualification is not immediately executory, there
would be no need of nominating a substitute. Having been disqualified before election day, the votes
“Pontawe” and “Lopez” could not be counted for Federico and Wilfredo but should be credited as they
were by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in favor of Carlos and Louie.

Sec. 186 of the 1978 Election Code states that any decision, order or ruling of the Commission canceling
a certificate of candidacy shall be immediately executory. In the case at bar, the order of disqualification
by the Comelec took place before the election. What matters is, a disqualification was ordered and, as a
consequence, a substitution was in order. The petition for certiorari filed by Federico and Wilfredo does
not mean that the Comelec ruling was not immediately executory but it is an exercise of their right to
ask for a review of a Comelec ruling. Hence, Carlos Pontawe and Louie Lopez are the duly elected to
the said positions.

Doctrine: The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy
had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-‐‑compliance therewith
before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the
people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the
candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy.

48. VILLANUEVA VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-‐‑54718 December 4, 1985 Teehankee, J.
Facts: Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for
the office of vice-‐‑mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same day,
Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy
"ʺfor personal reasons."ʺ Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his
companion Mendoza'ʹs withdrawal, filed his own sworn "ʺCertificate of Candidacy in substitution"ʺ of
Mendoza'ʹs for the said office of vice mayor as a one-‐‑man independent ticket. ... The results showed
petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his
opponent respondent Lirio'ʹs 2,660 votes). But the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes
cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer'ʹs erroneous
opinion that since petitioner'ʹs name does not appear in the Comelec'ʹs certified list of candidates for that
municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec so that
his votes could not be "ʺlegally counted. "ʺ ... The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent
Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of the
municipality of Dolores.
COMELEC: Issued its resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two grounds, citing
Section 27 and 28 of the 1973 Election Code. First, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for
Candidate Mendoza on the strength of Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one
thing, Mendoza'ʹs withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath, as required under Section 27 of the
Code; hence it produces no legal effect. Second, said withdrawal was made not after the last day
(January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy, as contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code, but
on that very same day.
Issue/s: Whether petitioner should be proclaimed as the election winner despite ng COMELEC’s
decision that petitioner did not comply with Section 27 and 28 of the 1973 Election Code.

Held: Yes. Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which
would respect the will of the electorate instead of defeating the same through the invocation of formal
or technical defects.

The fact that Mendoza'ʹs withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to
frustrate the people'ʹs will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of
Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "ʺ(T)he will of the
people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly
sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-‐‑compliance therewith before the election would
be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their
will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his
certificate or candidacy."ʺ As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal
requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza'ʹs failure
to observe the requirement should be "ʺconsidered a harmless irregularity."ʺ

The Comelec'ʹs post-‐‑election act of denying petitioner'ʹs substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to
be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides
for such substitute candidates in case of death. withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-‐‑day of the
very day of the elections. Mendoza'ʹs withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular
filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and
purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in
truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.


Doctrine: A person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at
all. Thus, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in
the first place. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code.

49. JOEL G. MIRANDA VS. ANTONIO M. ABAYA AND COMELEC

Keywords: substitute his father, cancelled COC, mayoralty post
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999 Melo, J.
Facts: Jose “Pempe” Miranda filed his COC for mayoralty post. Subsequently, respondent Abaya filed
a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Pempe. The COMELEC
granted such petition and further ruled to disqualify Pempe Miranda.

Thereafter, way beyond the deadline of filing a COC, the petitioner, son of Pempe, filed a COC for
mayoralty post supposedly to substitute his father Pempe. During the election, petitioner garnered
1,666 more votes than private respondent Abaya. Thus, the latter filed a petition praying for the
nullification of petitioner'ʹs COC for being void ab initio because the COC of petitioner’s father Pempe
whom he was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.

Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides that: “x x x If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.”
COMELEC En Banc: Granted the nullification of the substitution by petitioner of his father as
candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City.
Issue/s: WON the substitution by petitioner of his father was proper?
Held: NO. The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the
annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner. Under Section 77 of the Code, not just
any person, but only "ʺan official candidate of a registered or accredited political party"ʺ may be
substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec, this Court explicitly ruled that "ʺa cancelled certificate does not
give rise to a valid candidacy."ʺ A person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due
course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.

A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first
place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be
substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-‐‑called "ʺsubstitute"ʺ to file a
"ʺnew"ʺ and "ʺoriginal"ʺ certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a
crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.


To include those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due
course and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section 77 leads to the absurdity
where a substitute is allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a candidate in the first
place-‐‑-‐‑a person who did not have a valid certificate of candidacy prior to substitution. Nemo dat quod
non habet. What right can a non-‐‑candidate pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no
one can give what he does not have.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the COMELEC ruling to ANNUL the
election and proclamation of petitioner is being AFFIRMED.


Doctrine: A petition for disqualification must clearly demonstrate that the candidate’s ineligibility is
so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote.

50. PAPANDAYAN VS COMELEC

Keyword: Disqualification
G.R. No. 147909 April 16, 2002 Mendoza, J.
Facts: Petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. was a mayoral candidate in the May 14, 2001 elections for
the Municipality of Tubaran, Province of Lanao del Sur. Private respondent Fahida P. Balt, the
incumbent mayor seeking reelection, sought the disqualification of petitioner, alleging that petitioner
was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

To support of her allegation, respondent submitted the affidavits from the Barangay Chairman
Sangguniang Barangay (SB) of Tangcal, Tubaran stating that petitioner never resided there; that
petitioner omitted to own nor lease any house in Tangcal; and that petitioner’s father and his family
were permanent residents of Bayang, Lanao del Sur. Respondent also submitted an affidavit averring
that petitioner did not state in his Voter Registration Record the number of years and months he had
been a resident of the Municipality of Tubaran.

In response, petitioner claimed that he was a resident of No. 13 Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran; that his
father'ʹs clan was from Tangcal, while his mother'ʹs clan were from Tubaran Bayang; that in 1990, he
transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, whose family and
relatives were residents and natives of Tangcal; that he managed an agricultural land in Tubaran which
he co-‐‑owned with his family; and that he filed in 1998 his certificate of candidacy for the position of
municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdrew.

COMELEC (Second Division): Disqualified petitioner and ordered his name to be stricken off the list
of candidates and all votes cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes.

Fact of petitioner’s residence, not the statement in his certificate of candidacy, which determines whether or not he
had satisfied the residency requirement of one (1) year preceding the May 14, 2001 elections.

COMELEC (First Division): Suspended proclamation of petitioner as mayor of Tubaran pending the
resolution of present petition; Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran proceed with the
proclamation of petitioner despite suspension.

COMELEC (En Banc): Sustain annulment of the proclamation of petitioner


Issue/s: Whether or not the alleged lack of residence qualification is sufficient to disqualify petitioner as
mayoral candidate.
Held: No. When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective
position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be
thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. To
successfully challenge petitioner’s disqualification, respondent must clearly demonstrate that
petitioner’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. Respondent failed to substantiate her claim that petitioner is
ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.

The record shows that when petitioner and his wife married in 1990, they resided in Tangca. From then
on, there was manifest intention on the part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran. The fact that he and his
wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former
place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his place of domicile. Although
petitioner worked as a private secretary of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday
after work. This is proof of animus manendi.

On the other hand, in citing the joint affidavit of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori
Buat, the COMELEC overlooked the fact that Ayonga subsequently repudiated his affidavit on the
ground that the same had not been explained to him and he did not know that it would be used to
disqualify petitioner. Hadji Bashir Ayonga affirmed that petitioner was a resident of Tubaran.


Doctrine: If the COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger’s CoC after the proper proceedings, then he is no
candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose CoC has been cancelled or denied
due course. However, Hans Roger’s CoC was never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC.
Therefore, Hans Roger’s CoC was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.

51. LUNA V. COMELEC

Keywords: substitution, no substitution if CoC was cancelled or denied due course
G.R. No. 165983 April 24, 2007 Carpio, J.
Facts: On January 15, 2004, petitioner Joy Chrisma Luna (Luna) filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for the position of Vice-‐‑Mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his
certificate of candidacy on the same date. The election officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of
Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.

Later, private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of Luna’s CoC, arguing inter alia that
Luna’s CoC was not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid. They
alleged that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election day and, therefore, he was disqualified to
run for vice-‐‑mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna.
COMELEC: Both the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc ruled for the private
respondents, stating that while Luna complied with the procedural requirements for substitution, Hans
Roger was not a valid candidate for Vice-‐‑Mayor. Hans Roger, being underage, did not file a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus, he was not a valid candidate for Vice-‐‑Mayor who could be
substituted by Luna.
Issue/s: Whether or not there was valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.
Held: YES. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge its receipt, pursuant to Section 76 of the OEC. Moreover, Section 77 of the
Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party
who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of CoC. Since Hans
Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the
procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.

The Court further ruled that the COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the Court
ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-‐‑age is beyond the usual and
proper recognizance of COMELEC.


If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his CoC, his eligibility
may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC. In this case, however, there was no such petition. The
COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid CoC and, thus, was not a valid candidate.
In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s CoC and declared
the substitution by Luna invalid.

It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Roger’s CoC.
For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger’s CoC after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate
at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose CoC has been cancelled or denied due course.
However, Hans Roger’s CoC was never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC. Therefore,
Hans Roger’s CoC was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.


Doctrine: While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as
a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

52. SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO VS. HRET AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ

Keywords: Richard Gomez, Substitution, One (1) Year-‐‑Residency Rule
G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013 PERLAS-‐‑BERNABE, J.:
Facts: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009,
one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila,
misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-‐‑adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard,
Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be
denied due course and/or cancelled.
COMELEC First Division Ruling: Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a
candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
Richard Gomez appealed to COMELEC En Banc but it was denied. Thereafter, Richard accepted the
resolution with finality "ʺin order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary
documents for substitution. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-‐‑Gomez (private respondent) filed her
CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as
the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. On
May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent. On May 10, 2010 election, Richards, whose name remained on the
ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes. Thus, Lucy Torres-‐‑Gomez as substitute was declared as winner for
congressional seat. On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in
order to oust private respondent from her congressional seat due to failure to comply with one (1)-‐‑year
residency rule and invalid substitution.

HRET Ruling: After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision which
dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate
for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). Hence, petitioner appeal to SC
Issue/s: WON the substitution of Lucy Torres-‐‑Gomez is valid in view of one (1) year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

Held: No. There is no valid substitution in the instant case. While a person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. In
this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his
failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the
use of the word "ʺdisqualified"ʺ in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,
which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and
even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that
Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled –
would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her
candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the
COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s substitution. Records clearly
show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte
due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla’s petition prayed for
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted
the foregoing petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts alone, the
HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc’s erroneous finding that the COMELEC First
Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution "ʺspeaks only of "ʺdisqualification and not of cancellation of
Richard’s CoC"ʺ and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private respondent.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to
the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by
COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate be circumvented and rendered nugatory.


Doctrine: Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of BP 881, not just any person, but only "ʺan official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party"ʺ may be substituted.

53. CERAFICA VS. COMELEC

Keyword: Substitution
G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014 PEREZ, J.
Facts: Kimberly Cerafica (Kimberly) filed her COC for Councilor of Taguig City for the 2013 Elections.
Her COC stated that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of
the requirement that one must be at least twenty-‐‑three (23) years of age on the day of the elections as
set out in Sec. 9(c) of RA 8487. Hence, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing. Instead of
attending the hearing, Kimberly filed a sworn statement of withdrawal. Simultaneously, Olivia
Cerafica (Olivia) filed her own COC as a substitute for Kimberly. The clarificatory hearing no longer
pushed through.

In a memorandum, Director Amora-‐‑Ladra of the COMELEC Law Department recommended the
cancellation of Kimberly’s COC as well as the subsitution. The COMELEC adopted the
recommendation on the ground that since Kimberly was never an official candidate, she cannot be
substituted by Olivia.

Olivia, on the other hand, maintained that there was a valid substitution as there were no material
misrepresentations on her part.

Court of Appeals: Ruled against petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid substitution.
Held: YES. Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course or to
cancel COCs under Sec. 77 of BP 881, the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of COCs. Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of BP 881, not just any person, but
only "ʺan official candidate of a registered or accredited political party"ʺ may be substituted. In the case
at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be validly substituted. There
was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs and Olivia belongs
to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs.


Doctrine: COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course to a certificate of candidacy. It
only has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

54. ABCEDE V IMPERIAL

Keywords: Ministerial duty
G.R. No. L-‐‑13001 March 18, 1958 Concepcion, J.
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President for the
1957 elections. After being summoned and after due hearing, the COMELEC issued a resolution
ordering petitioner’s certificate of candidacy not be given due course. In justifying its actions, the
COMELEC contends that Section 37 of the Revised Election Code leaves the Commission a measure of
discretion on whether to give due course to a certificate of candidacy in case of a finding that the
certificate is not bona fide. Since petitioner was banned from the use of Philippine mail on matters in
relation to Japanese war notes, his main program for candidacy, the Commission believes that
petitioner is engaged in a fraudulent scheme to obtain money from the public, thus, his certificate of
candidacy is not bona fide.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred when it ordered petitioner’s certificate of candidacy not be
given due course.
Held: Yes. Sections 36 and 37 of the Revised Election Code give the Commission no discretion to give
or not to give due course to a certificate of candidacy. It merely imposes upon the Commission the
ministerial duty to receive certificates of candidacy and immediately prepare and distribute copies
thereof to the offices mentioned in Section 36.

Also, the power of decision of the Commission, in the exercise of its power of enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to conduct of elections, is limited to purely administrattive questions.
Thus, it has no authority to decide on matters involving the right to vote.

Based on the foregoing, the action of the Commission in relation to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy
is beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction, hence, void.


Doctrine: The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form
is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it
may not go into matters not appearing on their face.

55. CIPRIANO V. COMELEC

Keywords: Duty of the COMELEC
G.R. No. 158830 August 10, 2004 Puno, J.
Facts: Cipriano filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.
On the date of the elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation
of the Commission’s Law Department to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of
several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioner’s. The ruling was based on the findings of
the Law Department that petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not
registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run.
Cipriano, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the SK elections and her name was not deleted from the
official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay
Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City. She took her oath of
office on August 14, 2002.
After learning of Resolution No. 5363, Cipriano filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration
of said resolution. She argued that a certificate of candidacy may only be denied due course or
cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any registered candidate for the same position under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sections 5 and 7 of RA No. 6646. The report of
the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition under the law, and the COMELEC
cannot, by itself, deny due course to or cancel one’s certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due process when her certificate of candidacy was
cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing. Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC
en banc did not have jurisdiction to act on the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first
instance because it is the Division of the Commission that has authority to decide election-‐‑related cases,
including pre-‐‑proclamation controversies. Finally, she contended that she may only be removed by a
petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as duly-‐‑elected SK Chairman.
COMELEC: It issued Resolution No. 5781, resolving petitioner’s MR. It cited its previous resolution,
Resolution No. 5584, in relation to Resolution No. 4801. The Commission stated in Resolution No. 5584
its policy on proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place
where they were elected.
It defends its resolution by invoking its administrative power to enforce and administer election laws.
Thus, in the exercise of such power, it may motu proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of
candidates who are found to be unqualified for the position they are seeking. The Commission further

contends that the publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing the conduct of the
Barangay and SK elections in two newspapers of general circulation is sufficient notice to the
candidates regarding the Commission’s administrative inquiry into their certificates of candidacy.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC, on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer
election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law.
Held: NO. The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to govern the conduct of
elections and to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated
to "ʺenforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall."ʺ10 As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with
the three powers of government -‐‑ executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-‐‑judicial powers.

Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other powers
expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course
to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority, however, must be in
accordance with the conditions set by law.

The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of
candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent
defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said
body.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is
of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred
upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-‐‑judicial.

The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or
the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right to hold public
office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him
and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it
is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commission’s
inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed
to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.

Doctrine: The Certificate of Candidacy of a candidate for the SK must be cancelled on the ground that
he/she had exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK. Section 428 of the
LGC requires that an elective official of the SK must be 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on
the day of his/her election. If the candidate lacks the age on the day of the election, he must be
declared ineligible to run for office; The jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy
lies with the COMELEC in Division and not with the COMELEC en banc.

56. LYNETTE GARVIDA VS. SALES

Keywords: Denial/Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; SK Elections; Age qualifications
G.R. No. 124893 April 18 1997 Puno, J.
Facts: Petitioner applied for registration as a member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Brgy.
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. However, the Board of Election Tellers denied her application on
the ground that she exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down
in Sec. 3 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner then filed a “Petition for Inclusion as
Registered Kabataang Member and Voter” with the MCTC, who found petitioner qualified and
ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
On appeal by the Board of Election Tellers, the presiding judge of the RTC inhibited himself from
acting on the appeal.

Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of SK Chairman in Brgy. San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Respondent Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advice of Provincial Election
Supervisor, disapproved the petitioner'ʹs certificate of candidacy due to her age again. Petitioner
appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who set aside the order and allowed the petitioner
to run.

Respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility. Earlier and
without the knowledge of COMELEC officials, respondent Florencio Sales, Jr, a rival candidate of
petitioner as SK Chairman, filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation
of Certificate of Candidacy” against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in
her certificate of candidacy.

The COMELEC en banc also issued on the same day an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and
Board of Canvassers of Brgy. San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she
won in the election. Come election day, petitioner won against respondent Sales. However, in
accordance with the order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim
petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue/s: (1) Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or
cancel petitioner’s certificate of candidacy; (2) Whether or not the denial/cancellation of petitioner’s
candidacy is proper on the ground of her age limit.

Held: 1. No. Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK
elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election
Code. In Section 78 of Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code and in relation to Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies
with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by
the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore
the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of
the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and rendered a decision.

2. Yes. For the May 6 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the
qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the SK.

A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a
member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official.
Sec. 424 sets a member’s maximum age at 21 year only. No further provision as to when the member
shall have turned 21.
Sec. 428, on the other hand, provides the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old “on the
day of his election.” (There is an additional qualification.)

The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on
the day of election.

The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is
understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently
deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In computing
years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day
of the second 365-‐‑day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years
old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st
365-‐‑day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-‐‑day cycles.
After this birthday, the 365-‐‑day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first
day of the next 365-‐‑day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.

The phrase "ʺnot more than 21 years of age"ʺ means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21
365-‐‑day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that
would be more than 21 365-‐‑day cycles. "ʺNot more than 21 years old"ʺ is not equivalent to "ʺless than 22
years old,"ʺ contrary to petitioner'ʹs claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22

years on election day.

The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he
lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate
is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible.

Thus, petitioner Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
candidacy in the SK elections.


Doctrine: The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. Guiding Principle: clean elections
control the appropriateness of the remedy.

57. LOONG V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133676 April 14, 1999 Puno, J:
Facts: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8536 prescribing the adoption of an
automated election system. The system was used in regular elections held in the ARMM. The problem
started during the automated counting of votes for the local officials of Sulu. There were discrepancies
between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of
Pata. Atty. Tolentino, the COMELEC Task Force in charge of oversight in Sulu, suspended the
automated counting of ballots in Pata. Atty. Tolentino called for an emergency meeting of the local
candidates and the military-‐‑police officials. Included in the meeting were Petitioner Loong and private
respondent Tan (opposing candidates). The meeting discussed how the ballots should be counted.
There was lack of agreement. Petitioner insisted automated count, while Tan recommended manual
count. In view of the disagreement, Atty. Tolentino requested the parties to submit their written
position papers. COMELEC resolved and ordered that the counting of votes be done manually in Pata.
However, Atty. Tolentino recommended that it be done in the entire province of Sulu. Moreover, to
prevent political tensions since some wanted to continue with the automation process, counting
machines from Jolo, Sulu were transported back to Manila for automated and manual operations.

Petitioner filed his objection to a Resolution by COMELEC en banc laying down the rules for manual
count. Said Resolution ordered the manual counting of the local ballots of the automated election
system; the creation of the Special Board of Inspectors; and the authority of those political parties and
the candidates in Sulu as well as the Party-‐‑List Candidates to appoint their own watchers.

Petitioner stated that such resolution violates R.A. No. 8536 providing for an automated counting of
ballots in the ARMM. According to petitioner, the automated counting is mandatory and could not be
substituted by a manual counting. Where the machines are allegedly defective, the only remedy
provided for by law is to replace the machine. Manual counting is prohibited by law. He also stated
that counting machines in other municipalities are in order. There is no legal basis for the parallel
manual counting ordained in the disputed Resolution. Nonetheless, COMELEC started manual count
which urged petitioner to file petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner also stated that he was denied prior notice and hearing with the COMELEC
Resolutions. Later on, private respondent was proclaimed the governor-‐‑elect of Sulu on the basis of
manual count. Petitioner came in third. Yusop Jikiri, who placed second, filed motion for intervention.
Issue/s: Whether or not the manual count is allowed in light of R.A. No. 8436 – allowed

Held: An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty
of the sovereignty of the electorate. Its aftermath could have been a bloodbath. COMELEC avoided this
imminent probability by ordering a manual count of the votes. It would be the height of irony if the
Court condemns COMELEC for aborting violence in the Sulu elections.
The ballot boxes were accompanied by escorts/watchers from Sulu venue to Manila venue until the
ballots were counted. Petitioner himself submitted the names of his representatives who would
accompany the ballot boxes. Hence, it is evidenced that the integrity of the local ballots was
safeguarded.

In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting
is not machine-‐‑related for human foresight is not all-‐‑seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the
law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of
the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "ʺto enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."ʺ
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of
COMELEC in the conduct of our elections.

Thus, we held in Sumulong v. COMELEC: "ʺPolitics is a practical matter, and political questions must
be dealt with realistically — not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections,
because of its fact-‐‑finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived
from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position
to decide complex political questions . . . . There are no ready-‐‑made formulas for solving public
problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good
government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of election, . . . we must
not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belong to it.”


Doctrine: Only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes will be covered by the
definition and enumeration of election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign
period.

58. PANGKAT LAGUNA COMELEC AND TERESITA “NINGNING” LAZARO
G.R. No. 148075 February 4, 2002 Romero, J.
Facts: On January 2001, respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed by
succession the office of the Governor, when then Laguna Governor Jose Lina, was appointed Secretary
of Interior and Local Government by President Gloria Macapagal-‐‑Arroyo. On February 2001,
respondent Lazaro filed her certificate of candidacy for the gubernatorial position of Laguna.

On May 2001, petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed with the COMELEC a
petition which sought to disqualify respondent Lazaro as candidate in the gubernatorial race. In its
petition for disqualification, petitioner Pangkat Laguna specifically alleged that private respondent
Lazaro, upon assuming -‐‑ by succession -‐‑ the Office of the Governor, “publicly declared her intention to
run for governor” in the May 2001 elections. Thus, according to petitioner, respondent Lazaro ordered
the purchase of 14, 513 items such as trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-‐‑shirts,
allegedly worth Php 4,556,005 “serving no public purpose but to promote her popularity as a
candidate.” In addition, petitioner also alleged that respondent Lazaro directed the purchase and
distribution of “1,760 medals and pins valued at Php 110,000 to various schools in Laguna, serving no
meaningful public purpose but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy. According to petitioner,
the abovementioned acts, in effect, constituted “premature campaigning” inasmuch as the same were
done prior to the start of the campaign period.
Issue/s: Whether or not respondent Lazaro committed premature campaigning
Held: No. The act of respondent Lazaro -‐‑ as Chief Executive of the Province of Laguna -‐‑ in ordering the
purchase of various items and the consequent distribution thereof to the constituents of Laguna, in line
with the local government unit’s sports and education program, is -‐‑ to our mind -‐‑ not constitutive of
the act of election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and and explicitly proscribed
under the Omnibus Election Code.
"ʺNot every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered ‘campaigning.’ The term
‘campaigning’ should not be made to apply to any and every act which may influence a person to vote
for a candidate, for that would be stretching too far the meaning of the term. Examining the definition
and enumeration of election campaign and partisan political activity, the COMELEC is convinced that
only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes will be covered by the definition and
enumeration.
"ʺIn this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes.
Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which
duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor of the Province of Laguna.

Doctrine: Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a “candidate”, even if constituting partisan
political activities are not punishable under Sec. 80. Such acts are considered protected as part of
freedom of expression.
59. HENRY P. LANOT V. COMELEC AND VICENTE P. EUSEBIO
G.R. No. 164858 16 November 2006 Carpio, J.
Facts: Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various
occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people
during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements
against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing
billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5)
distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him. In
his Answer filed on 29 March 2004, Eusebio denied petitioners’ allegations and branded the petition as
a harassment case. Eusebio further stated that petitioners’ evidence are merely fabricated.

Director Ladra of the COMELEC NCR Division conducted hearings on the matter. Subsequently,
COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying candidate Vicente Eusebio. Due to the motion for
reconsideration filed by the latter, COMELEC Chief Abalos issued another resolution which enjoined
the comelec officials from enforcing the first resolution which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by Vicente Eusebio is considered partisan political activity.
Held: Yes. However, the real question in this case is whether Vicente Eusebio violated section 80 of the
omnibus election code which states that:

SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. — It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign
period:...x

What Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is "ʺan election campaign or partisan political
activity"ʺ by a "ʺcandidate"ʺ "ʺoutside"ʺ of the campaign period. Thus, the essential elements for violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan
political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "ʺcandidate."ʺ Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who
"ʺhas filed a certificate of candidacy"ʺ to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of
candidacy, he is not a "ʺcandidate."ʺ The third element requires that the campaign period has not started
when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.

Therefore, acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a “candidate”, even if constituting partisan
political activities are not punishable under Sec. 80. Such acts are considered protected as part of
freedom of expression of a citizen before he becomes a candidate for elective public office.

Doctrine: “Any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start
of the campaign period.” The plain meaning of this provision (Section 15 of RA 8436) is that the
effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign
period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
60. PENERA VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Partisan Political Acts
G.R. No. 181613 Nov. 25, 2009 Carpio, J.
Facts: Rosalinda A. Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty
candidates in Sta. Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the
Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for
Disqualificationagainst Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-‐‑Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who
belonged to her political partyfor unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political
activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 -‐‑
a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007 -‐‑ Penera and her partymates
went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the
people to vote for them on the day of the elections.
COMELEC: disqualified Penera, for engaging in premature campaigning, in violation of Sections 80

and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC EN BANC: denied MR because Penera did not specifically deny the material averments
that the motorcade "ʺwent as far as Barangay Mabini, announcing their candidacy and requesting the
people to vote for them on Election Day,"ʺ despite the fact that the same were clearly propounded by
Andanar in his Petition for Disqualification and Position Paper.
SC: issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the
assailed Resolutions, on the condition that Penera post a bond in the amount of P5,000.00.
1st Decision of the Supreme Court: ruled that a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her
becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political
activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the
campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the
campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a
candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to
begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning
already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy. In short, the Decision considers a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "ʺcandidate"ʺ even before the start of the campaign
period.

Penera filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 11, 2009 Supreme Court’s decision.

Issue/s: Whether or not a person after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate, can
already commit the acts of election campaign or partisan political activity proscribed under the
Held: No. The 1st Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who files a certificate
of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the
ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the
provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated election system. There was no
express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of
the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The 1st Decision cannot reverse Lanot without
repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second
sentence.

Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "ʺcandidate"ʺ as "ʺany person aspiring for or seeking
an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x."ʺ The second sentence, third
paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "ʺ[a]ny person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."ʺ The
immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "ʺunlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period."ʺ

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these
provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or
prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says
is "ʺany unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period."ʺ The plain meaning of this provision (Section 15 of RA 8436) is that the effective date
when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts.
Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.


Doctrine: The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does
not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such
activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen’s right of free speech and expression.

61. ADIONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992 Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
Facts: Petitioner, a senatorial candidate, assails the COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 which prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him
such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic
Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television, and print
political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with this prohibition.
Issue/s: Whether or not the COMLEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”
places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that
it fixes?
Held: No, (1) the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of
restriction involved in the case, (2) The questioned prohibition premised on the statue and as
couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth – it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms, (3) The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidate is not impaired by posting
decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles compared to the paramount interest of the
State in guaranteeing freedom of expression.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347
of the Commission on Elections providing that "ʺdecals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof"ʺ is DECLARED NULL and
VOID.


Doctrine: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media
constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban
them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.

62. ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Conducting exit polls
G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000 Panganiban, J.
Facts: Respondent issued Resolution No. 98-‐‑14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll
body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-‐‑CBN or any other groups,
its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable
Chairman to issue the same.The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "ʺinformation
from a reliable source that ABS-‐‑CBN has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-‐‑TV
coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national
officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcast
immediately."ʺThe electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec
count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections. It also noted
that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-‐‑CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9,
1998, the Supreme Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We
directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the
petitioner or any other group, its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the May
11 elections.
Held: An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of
individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking
randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their
ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give
an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate
voted. Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court enunciated that at the very least,
free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
interest without prior restraint. There is no showing, that exit polls or the means to interview voters
cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of
exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. The absolute
ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative
channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. Petition
Granted.


Doctrine: Section 5.4 of RA 9006 is invalid and unconstitutional because (1) it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.

63. SWS VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Prohibited Election Propaganda
G.R. No. 147571 5 May 2001 MENDOZA, J:
Facts: Petitioners, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, brought
this action for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 or Fair
Election Act, which provides: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15)
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election.” Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger
to justify such restraint. Respondent COMELEC justifies the restrictions in Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and
erroneous surveys just before the election.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 is constitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court hold that Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The
grant of power to the COMELEC is limited to ensuring "ʺequal opportunity, time, space, and the right to
reply"ʺ as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for "ʺpublic
information campaigns and forums among candidates.
The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O'ʹBrien: “A
government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms of speech, expression and press is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.” This is known as the O'ʹBrien test.
First, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O'ʹBrien test because the causal connection of expression to
the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "ʺnot unrelated to the suppression of free
expression."ʺ By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, Section 5.4 actually suppresses a whole
class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. The
prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute,
and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech.

Second, Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of
speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, Section 5.4 nonetheless fails to
meet criterion [4] of the O'ʹBrien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to
further the governmental interest. As already stated, it aims at the prevention of last-‐‑minute pressure
on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "ʺjunking"ʺ of weak or "ʺlosing"ʺ candidates, and resort to the
form of election cheating called "ʺdagdag-‐‑bawas."ʺ Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might
be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can
be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension
that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is GRANTED and Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is declared
unconstitutional.


Doctrine: Prohibiting premature campaigning aims to level the playing field for candidates of public
office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-‐‑known or
poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.

64. CHAVEZ V COMELEC

Keywords: election propaganda; premature campaigning; election campaign;
G.R. No. 162777 August 31, 2004 Azcuna, J.
Facts: Petitioner Chavez entered and signed with certain establishment to endorse their products
namely, 96° North, Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and G-‐‑Box which
authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and image. Pursuant to these agreements, three
billboards were set up along North Expressway and Roxas Boulevard. On December 30, 2003,
petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-‐‑asa. On
January 6, 2004, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 6520 which contained Section 32 which
states that: “All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and
other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in
radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by
said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of
these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be
presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.”
COMELEC: January 21, 2004, Comelec directed the petitioner to comply with Sec. 32 of the said
resolution. The petitioner replied that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsement and
cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules. The Comelec
answered wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards or to cover them
from public view.
Issue/s: Whether or not Sec. 32 of Comelec Resolution No. 6520 is an invalid exercise of police power.
Held: No, it is a valid exercise of police power. The primary objective of the assailed provision is to
prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-‐‑known or poorer
candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and
publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Under the Omnibus Election Code, directly or
indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate is included in the definition of
election campaign or partisan political activity. When Chaves filed his CoC for Senator, the billboards
featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the Comelec was acting well within its scope of powers when it
required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. Also, under Art. IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution expressly authorized the Comelec to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time and space which aimed at
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Doctrine: The requirement for a written acceptance by a candidate of donated advertisements is a
safeguard provided by law against the danger of publishing or broadcasting election propaganda
beyond the required frequency, size and other limitations imposed by law without the candidate’s
express agreement, since the violation of such requirements results in the prosecution of the candidate
for an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the
65. GARCIA VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 170256 January 25, 2010 Ponente: Peralta, J.
Facts: On May 6, 2004, private respondent Tomas R. Osmeña, then mayoral candidate in the 2004
national and local elections in Cebu City, filed an election offense case against his rival, petitioner Alvin
B. Garcia, for the publication of political advertisements that allegedly violated the thrice-‐‑a-‐‑week
publication requirement and failed to indicate the name and address of the party or candidate for
whose benefit the advertisements were published. He averred that the publication of the political
advertisements was in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No. 9006 and Sections 11 and 13 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520.
Private respondent averred that "ʺMAYOR SA KATAWHAN"ʺ was published four times, that is, on
April 27 and 29, 2004 and May 1 and 2, 2004, all one-‐‑half page in size, in the Sun Star tabloid.
Moreover, the "ʺIT’S A NO-‐‑CONTEST"ʺ political advertisement was printed daily, or seven times in Sun
Star, all one-‐‑half page in size, from April 26 to May 2, 2004. The "ʺNO TO TOM TAX OSMEÑA"ʺ
advertisement appeared thrice, or on April 28 and 29, 2004 and May 1, 2004, also one-‐‑half page in size,
in the same tabloid. The "ʺMayor Alvin Garcia"ʺ advertisement was published once. Private respondent
alleged that all the political advertisements did not indicate the true and correct name and address of
the party or candidate for whose benefit the advertisements were published.
In his Answer, petitioner denied private respondent’s allegations. He contended that the political
advertisements had been made not for a single candidate, but for the entire slate of his party, Kusug-‐‑
KNP Party, consisting of 20 local candidates, plus presidential and vice-‐‑presidential candidates
Fernando Poe, Jr. and Loren Legarda, respectively. Petitioner asserted that "ʺ 22 candidates x 3 a week
results to 66 times a week publication for all the candidates"ʺ of the Kusug-‐‑KNP Party. Thus, the
publication of the political advertisements, may it be seven or 15 times, was way below the allowable
limit of 66 times for the 22 political candidates of the Kusug-‐‑KNP Party. Consequently, the political
advertisements in question had not exceeded the legal limit provided by R.A. No. 9006, as
implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6520.
Further, petitioner stated that the political advertisements in question reflected that they were really
campaigns for the benefit of the candidates of the Kusug-‐‑KNP Party, as in fact, they contained the
pictures and names of the party’s political candidates. Hence, he contended that the political
advertisements substantially complied with the requirement provided by the Fair Elections Act that the
advertisement shall contain the true and correct name and address of the party or candidate for whose
benefit the election propaganda was printed.

Office of the Regional Investigation and Prosecution Committee (Office of the Regional Director,
Region VII, Cebu City): Recommended the dismissal of the Complaint stating that the respondent did
not violate the thrice-‐‑a-‐‑week rule laid down by Sec. 6 of RA 9006 as implemented by Sec. 13 of Comelec
Resolution 6520. There is also no violation of Sec. 4 of RA 9006 because although respondent'ʹs political
advertisement did not literally contain the requirement of indicating the true and correct name and
address for whose benefit the election propaganda was published, this requirement is substantially met
by the respondent because it can be glean[ed] [from the] said ads for whose benefit the same was made
as shown by the pictures and names of the candidates and who paid for it.

COMELEC: On its April 28, 2005, the COMELEC disagreed with the recommendation of the
investigating officer. Ruling that insofar as the political propaganda, "ʺit’s a no-‐‑contest,"ʺ is concerned,
respondent does not deny that the same was published in Sun Star for seven (7) consecutive times –
from 26 April 2004 to 02 May 2004 – or for a period of one week, straight. An inspection of the said
advertisement reveals that it refers only to respondent; there is no mention of his political party or
party-‐‑mates, making it clear that it was his advertisement alone. The computation thus made by
respondent and so adopted by the investigating officer, assuming this to be true and valid, would not
and cannot apply in this instance. The provisions of law violated need no further interpretation as they
are very plain and unambiguous.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and, thereafter, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution, contending that there was lack of probable cause to hold him liable
for an election offense in violation of R.A. No. 9006 and its IRR, because he was neither the author of
the questioned advertisement nor the one who caused its publication. He stated that Orlando P.
Carvajal, the General Manager of Sun Star Publishing, Inc., attested in an Affidavit dated May 23, 2005
that an organization named Friends of Alvin Garcia caused the publication of the said advertisement.
In its Resolution dated October 5, 2005, the COMELEC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Issue/s: Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated April 28, 2005 and October 5, 2005.
Petitioner contended that since he did not cause the publication of the advertisement in question, and
absent any competent proof against him, there was no probable cause warranting the filing of an
Information against him for violation of R.A. No. 9006, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No.
6520.

Held: No. To emphasize, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 requires that print advertisements donated to a
candidate shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate, which written
acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the COMELEC.
The requirement for a written acceptance by a candidate of donated advertisements is a safeguard

provided by law against the danger of publishing or broadcasting election propaganda beyond the
required frequency, size and other limitations imposed by law without the candidate’s express
agreement, since the violation of such requirements results in the prosecution of the candidate for an
election offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
In this case, the COMELEC did not question petitioner’s averment that the advertisement in question
was paid for by the organization named Friends of Alvin Garcia. The advertisement may be considered
as a donation to petitioner under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 and its IRR. Paragraph 4.3, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 9006 explicitly requires that "ʺprint x x x advertisements donated to the candidate or political party
shall not be printed, published x x x without the written acceptance by the said candidate."ʺ Since the
advertisement in question was published by the Sun Star, there arises a presumption that there was
written acceptance by petitioner of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence
of evidence to the contrary. Under the Rules on Evidence, it is presumed that the law has been obeyed,
and that private transactions have been fair and regular.


Doctrine: It is unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any
person or broadcast entity to a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate and
unless they bear and be identified by the words “airtime for this broadcast was provided free of
charge by” followed by the true and correct name and address of the donor. Election propaganda
materials donated to a candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written
acceptance of said candidate.

66. EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO VS. COMELEC AND EDGAR “EGAY” S.
SAN LUIS
Keywords: donated advertisements, consent of candidate, prohibited propaganda
G.R. No. 212398 November 25, 2014 Peralta, J.
Facts: Ejercito and San Luis were both gubernatorial candidates. The former being the incumbent
Governor of Laguna before the elections at that time. Three days before the National Elections, San Luis
then filed a Petition for Disqualification against Ejercito on the following grounds:

First cause of action: Ejercito during the campaign period, distributed to electorates an “Orange Card”
which could be could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical
needs with the intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor.

Second cause of action: Ejercito exceeded the authorized aggregate amount allowed for his election
campaign which is Php4,576,566.00 when for his television campaign commercials alone, he already
spent the sum of PhP23,730.784.

The Petition went unheeded and Ejercito was proclaimed Governor of Province of Laguna. Eventually,
Ejercito filed his Verified Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the petition due to procedural and
substantive irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Provincial Governor. He argued
that the acts complained of are unfounded, baseless and totally speculative.
COMELEC First Division: Granted the Petition for Disqualification against Ejercito and declared a
permanent vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna. It further found that Ejercito
accepted the Php20m donation in the form of TV ads (advertising contracts) to be aired on ABS-‐‑
CBN.

COMELEC En Banc: Agreed with the findings of its First Division.

Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-‐‑CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept
International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent and
his signature was forged. That even assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he
should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent.
He believes that an advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge
and consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail against the laws
suppressing it.
Issue/s: WON the donated TV ads were aired without Ejercito’s consent?

Held: NO. We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-‐‑CBN Corporation and
Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. His
express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because non-‐‑compliance is
considered as an election offense. Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast
advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of
the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the
COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate
concerned or by the duly-‐‑authorized representative of the political party.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated to a candidate
shall not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it shall be unlawful to broadcast any
election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate
without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the
words “airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by” followed by the true and correct
name and address of the donor.

Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent,
and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no
place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not equipped to receive evidence and
determine the truth of factual allegations. Instead, the findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by any
other administrative agency exercising expertise in its particular field of competence, are binding on the
Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.


Doctrine: As Section 14 of RA 7166 makes no distinction or qualification as to whether a candidate
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "ʺevery candidate"ʺ must be deemed to refer not
only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

67. PILAR VS COMELEC

Keywords: Sec. 14, RA 7166; Every Candidate
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995 QUIASON, J.
Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela, and withdrew his CoC after three
days. Later, respondent COMELEC imposed a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on the
petitioner for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "ʺnon-‐‑candidate,"ʺ having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy.
Petitioner posits that "ʺit is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest,
and should have either won or lost"ʺ.
COMELEC: Denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner

COMELEC (En Banc): Petition denied
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner may be penalized for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures, despite having withdrawn his CoC.
Held: Yes. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "ʺevery candidate"ʺ has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-‐‑recognized is the rule that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No
distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "ʺevery candidate"ʺ must be deemed to refer not
only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "ʺshall."ʺ As a general rule, the use of the word "ʺshall"ʺ
in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced ,
particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved.


Doctrine: A ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or
thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI, and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. It is
only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject
to rejection.

68. LIBANAN V. HRET

Keywords: ballots, valid and genuine
G.R. No. 129783 Date: December 22, 1997 Ponente: Vitug, J.
Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan (Libanan) and private respondent Jose Ramirez (Ramirez) were
among the candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections.
Ramirez was declared the winner, leading by 654 votes over Libanan.

Libanan then filed an election protest before the HRET, claiming inter alia that the May 1995 elections in
Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral irregularities perpetrated or instigated by Ramirez,
specifically that some of the ballots were not signed by the BEI Chairman and hence such ballots were
not those issued to the voters during the elections. He claimed that the law would require the
Chairman of BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.
HRET: The HRET recounted the votes cast on the valid ballots and declared Ramirez as the winner of
the election in Eastern Samar. As regards the absence of the BEI Chairman’s signature at the back of the
ballots, the HRET stated that such absence is not fatal to the validity of the ballots, and is, at best, a
prima facie evidence that the BEI Chairmen concerned were derelict in their duty of authenticating the
ballots.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of the BEI Chairman’s signature at the back of the ballots makes the
same invalid.
Held: NO. The pertinent provision of the law, Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides: Sec. 24. Signature
of the Chairman at the back of Every Ballot. – In every case before delivering an official ballot to the
voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspector shall, in the presence of the voter, affix his
signature at the back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the Board of
Election Inspectors and shall constitute an election offense punishable under Section 293 and 294 of the

There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so authenticated shall
thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure.
What should be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered
valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the
COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI, and
(c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked
eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears
extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

Doctrine: Every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify
its rejection. Election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.
69. ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN VS. COMELEC AND FERDINAND D. MENESES

Keywords: Ballots, Signature
G.R. No. 126669 April 27, 1998 KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts: On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as
the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas'ʹ 9,317 votes
and Ernesto Punzalan'ʹs 8,612 votes. On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest before
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in the
municipality'ʹs forty-‐‑seven (47) precincts. Ferdinand Meneses filed his answer with counter protest
impugning the results in twenty-‐‑one (21) precincts of the 47 protested by Manalastas. On June 2, 1995,
Ernesto Punzalan filed also his own election protest also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga,
questioning the results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts. Meneses, on his
part, filed an answer with counter-‐‑protest with respect to ninety-‐‑six (96) precincts of the 157 protested
by Punzalan.

Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were ordered
consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44. The election
contests sought the nullification of the election of Meneses allegedly due to massive fraud,
irregularities and other illegal electoral practices during the registration and the voting as well as
during the counting of votes.
RTC (San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44) Ruling: After hearing the election protests, the trial court
rendered judgment on September 23, 1996 with the following findings, viz: that massive fraud, illegal
electoral practices and serious anomalies marred the May 8, 1995 elections; that ballots, election returns
and tally sheets pertaining to Precinct Nos. 8, 20, 41, 53, 68, 68-‐‑A and 70 "ʺdisappeared under mysterious
circumstances;"ʺ and that filled-‐‑up ballots with undetached lower stubs and groups of ballots with stubs
cut out with scissors were found inside ballot boxes. Because of these irregularities, the trial court was
constrained to examine the contested ballots and the handwritings appearing thereon and came up
with the declaration that Punzalan was the winner in the elections. Immediately thereafter, Meneses
filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor of
Mexico, Pampanga. On the other hand, Manalastas did not appeal from the decision of the RTC.

COMELEC Ruling: Setting aside the trial court'ʹs decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses
by the MBC as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Petitioner Punzalan filed MR but it was
denied. Hence, this appeal to SC.
Issue/s: WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited
to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof.

Held: NO. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the instant case. While Section 24
of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as "ʺAn Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms,"ʺ requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the
ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an election
offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state that the votes
contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-‐‑settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of
the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing,
authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement,
thereby frustrating the will of the people.

What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is
considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a)
the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI;
and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the
naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears
extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection. Similarly, Section 211 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the "ʺOmnibus Election Code of the Philippines"ʺ provides that
in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a
clear and good reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to
affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the
rejection of a ballot.

In closing, we would like to stress a well-‐‑founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and
statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.


Doctrine: The distinction should always be between marks that were apparently carelessly or
innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter
with a view to possible future identification, which invalidates it. The marks which shall be
considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on
his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter.

70. VILLAGRACIA VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Marked ballots
G.R. No. 168296 January 31, 2007 PUNO, CJ
Facts: Petitioner Villagracia was proclaimed as winning candidate for the position of Punong Barangay
in Barangay Caawigan, Talisay, Camarines Norte, by a margin of six (6) votes. Private Respondent De
La Punta filed a protest with the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay. After the revision of the ballots, the
trial court invalidated thirty-‐‑four (34) of the ballots for being marked. All 34 ballots were deducted
from the votes of Villagracia.

The Trial Court adjudged De La Punta as the true winner and nullified the proclamation of Villagracia.

Villagracia appealed with the COMELEC on the ground that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over election
protest for failure of De La Punta to pay the correct filing fees. It was found that the words “JOKER”,
“QUEEN”, “ALAS”, and “KAMATIS” were used in more than one ballot.
COMELEC: Set aside the decision of MTC.
Issue: Whether the use of the words “JOKER”, “QUEEN”, “ALAS”, and “KAMATIS” in more than one
ballot constituted marked ballots
Held: YES. It was ruled that the distinction should always be between marks that were apparently
carelessly or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon
by the voter with a view to possible future identification, which invalidates it. The marks which shall
be considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on
his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter. In the case at bar, the marks indicate no other
intention than to identify the ballots. The observation of public respondent on the appearance of the
marks on the questioned ballots is apropos.

Further, the marks were all written in the number 7 slot of the list of Kagawad for Sangguniang
Barangay. These marks appear only in ballots wherein the Punong Barangay voted thereon is
Villagracia. It is therefore indubitable that the ballots are indeed marked ballots.


Doctrine: The summary nature of canvas proceedings requires that the written objections must be
submitted during the actual canvassing of the election returns, as it only in this stage of proceeding
that the board determines the inclusion or exclusion of the returns by opening and examining the
returns to verify the authenticity and genuineness of the same.

71. GUIAO V COMELEC

Keywords: Summary nature of canvass proceedings
G.R. No. L-‐‑68056 July 5, 1985 Alampay, J.
Facts: On May 14, 1984, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (Board) assembled to canvass the election
returns from the voting centers in Pampanga. On May 16, 1984, the canvass of all election returns had
been completed without any objection. Thereafter, the Board proceeded with the tallying of the total
number of votes received by each candidate and the tabulation disclosed that petitioner Bren Z. Guiao
lost the elections garnering only fifth place. At about 12:50AM of May 17, 1984, after the canvass was
completed, petitioner submitted to the Board his written objections in the canvass of election returns.
However, petitioner’s objections were dismissed by the Board for failure to substantiate the same. The
proclamation of winning candidates, including respondent Canlas, was held at 6:00PM of May 17, 1984.
Subsequently, petitioner filed petition for annulment of the proceedings of the Board and the
annulment proclamation of Aber Canlas based on Section 54 of BP 697, which was dismissed by
COMELEC’s first division. The COMELEC en bac, in its resolution, upheld the validity of the
proclamation of Canlas and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission en banc erred in denying petitioner’s motion for declaration of
nullity of the proclamation of Canlas as Assemblyman of Pampanga.
Ruling: No. Based on the provisions of Section 54 of BP 697, it can be inferred that any written
objections must be submitted during the actual canvassing of the election returns, as it only in this
stage of proceeding (second stage) that the board determines the inclusion or exclusion of the returns by
opening and examining the returns to verify the authenticity and genuineness of the same. The reason
for this is to enable the Board to decide whether to defer the canvass of the contested returns and make
no ruling regarding the same until after the canvass of the uncontested returns, as prescribed in Section
54 of BP 697, or to continue with it.
In this case, however, petitioner belatedly filed his written objections as it was submitted only during
the third stage of its proceedings, that is, when the Board was already tallying the votes received by the
candidates. It must be noted that during the third stage, the inclusion or exclusion of any election
return is no longer an issue; Rather, it is the correctness or incorrectness of the mathematical
computation and tabulation of the total votes received by the candidates as a result of the canvass.
After the canvass of the returns, that is, the fourth stage of its proceedings, the Board has its legal
obligation to proclaim the elected candidates.
To accept the belated filing of petitioner would be to require the Board to reopen the canvass of election
returns all over again, which would not be in keeping with the summary nature of the canvass
proceedings.


Doctrine: Where there exists uniformity of tallies in favor of candidates belonging to one party and the
systematic blanking out of the opposing candidates as when all the candidates of one party received
all the votes, each of whom exactly the same number, and the opposing candidates got zero votes, the
election returns are obviously manufactured, contrary to all statistical improbabilities.
72. LAGGUMBAY V. COMELEC

Keywords: Pre-‐‑Proclamation Controversy
G.R. No. L-‐‑25444 January 31, 1966 Bengzon, C.J.
Facts: The petition prays for revision of the COMELEC’s order declining to reject the returns of certain
precincts in some municipalities in Mindanao.
In each precinct the number of registered voters equaled the number of ballots and the number of votes
reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power,
whereas, all the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero.
All the reported votes were for the candidates of the Liberal Party, all whom were credited with exactly
the same number of votes in each precinct, whereas all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were
given exactly zero in all said precincts.
This is not an instance wherein one return gives to one candidate all the votes in the precinct, even as it
gives exactly zero to the other. This is not a case where some senatorial candidates obtain zero exactly,
while some others receive a few scattered votes. Here, all the eight candidates of one party garnered all
the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other
party got precisely nothing.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC’s order rejecting election returns should be revised.
Held: NO. Denying prima facie recognition to such returns on the ground that they are manifestly
fabricated or falsified, would constitute a practical approach to the Commission'ʹs mission to insure free
and honest elections.

The Court issued a short resolution upholding COMELEC’s power and duty to reject the returns of
about 50 precincts, having reached the conclusion that the returns were “obviously manufactured.” It is
not likely, in the ordinary course of things, that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote
for all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote to one of the eight
candidates of the Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary coincidence was quite impossible to believe,
knowing that the Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwide organization, with branches in every
province, and was, in previous years, the party in power in these islands. The main point to remember
was that there is no block-‐‑voting nowadays.


Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the election should be handled — and finally settled —
by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or
documentary evidence, is necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa
loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value.

At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately be ascertained before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal. All we hold now, is that the returns show "ʺprima facie"ʺ that they do not
reflect true and valid reports of regular voting.

The well-‐‑known delay in the adjudication of election protests often gave the successful contestant a
mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire, or has expired. And
so the notion has spread among candidates for public office that the "ʺimportant thing"ʺ is the
proclamation; and to win it, they or their partisans have tolerated or abetted the tampering or the
"ʺmanufacture"ʺ of election returns just to get the proclamation, and then let the victimized candidate to
file the protest, and spend his money to work for an empty triumph.

It is strongly urged that the results reported in these returns are quite "ʺpossible"ʺ, bearing in mind the
religious or political control of some leaders in the localities affected. We say, possible, not probable. It
is possible to win the sweepstakes ten times; but not probable. Anyway, judges are not disposed to
believe that such "ʺcontrol"ʺ has proved so powerful as to convert the electors into mere sheep or
robots voting as ordered. Their reason and conscience refuse to believe that 100% of the voters in
such precincts abjectly yet lawfully surrendered their precious freedom to choose the senators of
this Republic.


Doctrine: The ground of the illegal composition of the BOC filed against the proclamation of a
candidate may be properly raised in a pre-‐‑proclamation controversy. Under Sec. 5, par. (b) of Rule 27
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it requires that it must be filed immediately when the Board
begins to act as such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is
objected to if it comes after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately at the point where the
proceedings are or begin to be illegal.

73. VIRGINIO VILLAMOR VS COMELEC

Keywords: Pre-‐‑Proclamation Controversy
G.R. No. 169865 July 21 2006 Ynares-‐‑Santiago, J.
Facts: Petitioner Virginio Villamor was proclaimed as Mayor of Carmen, Cebu by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC) over his opponent, respondent Amytis De Dios-‐‑Batao. Respondent filed a petition
to annul the proclamation of petitioner alleging as grounds the illegal composition of the MBC and its
proceedings.

Subsequently, respondent filed an election protest with the RTC. In its Order, the trial court dismissed
the election protest for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed one day late.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondent which was granted by the trial court because
it found out that the election protest was actually filed on time because the last day to file the protest
fell on a Sunday, thus, under Sec. 1, Rule 22 of the ROC, the time should not run until the next working
day.

Petitioner appealed the Order granting the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

COMELEC Second Division: dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
COMELEC en banc: denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution dismissing the petition to annul
the petitioner’s proclamation for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue/s: Whether or not the trial court prematurely admitted respondent’s election protest pending a
pre-‐‑proclamation controversy.

Held: As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto.

The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-‐‑
proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier led, thus depriving the
COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case
itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.

Under Section 5 (b) of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, if the petition involves the illegal
composition of the board of canvassers, it must be led immediately when the board begins to act as
such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it
comes after the canvassing of the board, or immediately at the point where the proceedings are or
begin to be illegal. Thus, in Laodenio v. COMELEC it is held that when the issue involves the illegal
composition of the Board, the same cannot be questioned after the proclamation of the winner.

In the instant case, respondent'ʹs petition to annul the petitioner'ʹs proclamation based on the alleged
illegal composition of the board of canvassers is a pre-‐‑proclamation controversy which should have
been filed prior to petitioner'ʹs proclamation. However, the petition was filed only four days after
petitioner'ʹs proclamation. As such, the filing of the petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner did
not suspend the running of the reglementary period within which to file an election protest and
inevitably, it did not suspend the latter'ʹs period to file an Answer with Counter Protest.

Accordingly, the subsequent filing of the election protest, four days after the proclamation, by
respondent amounted to the abandonment of the pre-‐‑proclamation controversy earlier filed.


Doctrine: In the absence of grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in rendering its decision in
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices, said decision becomes final, executory and
not appealable.

74. GALIDO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 95346 January 18, 1991 Padilla, J:
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent Galeon were candidates for the position of Mayor of Garcia-‐‑
Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-‐‑elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election
protest before the RTC of Bohol. Court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor (majority of 11
votes). Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. COMELEC reversed the trial
court’s decision and declared private respondent Mayor (pluratiy of 5 votes). Petitioner filed MR.
Denied by COMELEC en banc. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a
restraining order.

Private respondent moves for dismissal of the petition citing Art. IX-‐‑C, Sec. 2(2), par. 2 of the 1987
Constitution which reads "ʺDecisions, final orders, or ruling of the COMELEC contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."ʺ

Petitioner replied citing Art. IX-‐‑A, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution which provides "ʺ...Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof."ʺ
Issue/s: Whether or not the COMELEC decision is appealable – in this case, not appealable because no
grave abuse of discretion
Held: Not appealable (Art. IX-‐‑C). However, this does not preclude recourse to this Court by way of a
special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

In this case, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering the decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an
inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Public respondent COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical
evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of
which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party.


Doctrine: Election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a special civil
action for certiorari. But this recourse is available only when the COMELEC’s factual determinations
are marred by grave abuse of discretion.
75. ARSENIO ALVAREZ VS. COMELEC AND LA RAINNE ABAD-SARMIENTO

Keywords: Election cases, special civil action for certiorari
G.R. No. 142527 March 1, 2001 Quisumbing, J.
Facts: Petitioner Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City.
Then private respondent Abad-‐‑Sarmiento filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e.
misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After petitioner Alvarez
answered and the issues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the reopening and
recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision that private
respondent Abad-‐‑Sarmiento won the election. On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled
that private respondent Abad-‐‑Sarmiento won over petitioner Alvarez. While the COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC.

Petitioner Alvarez filed a petition for Certiorari against the COMELEC for it allegedly did not
preferentially dispose of the case, and it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that “decisions,
final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay
officials shall be final, executory and not appealable.”
Issues: (1) Whether or not COMELEC violated its mandate on “preferential disposition of election
contests”; (2) Whether or not COMELEC violated the rule that it shall decide all election cases brought
before it within ninety days from the date of submission; and (3) Whether or not factual findings of the
COMELEC in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials may still be appealed
Held: (1) No. Preferential disposition applies to cases before the courts and not those before the
COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section of the Omnibus Election will readily show.

(2) No. Election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively. But considering further
the tribunal’s manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on
deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve
election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In the Court’s view, this is not what the
framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to
subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous
cases.

(3) Yes. Election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a special civil action
for certiorari. But this recourse is available only when the COMELEC’s factual determinations are
marred by grave abuse of discretion. In the present case, the petition of certiorari is dismissed and the
En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC is affirmed. No abuse of discretion is found. The active
participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-‐‑judicial
body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness
to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later impugning the court or the
body’s jurisdiction.


Doctrine: In an election protest setting aside the election returns in lieu of considering a physical
recount of the ballots, the integrity of the ballots must first be determined. Where a ballot box is found
in such a condition as would raise a reasonable suspicion that unauthorized persons could have
gained unlawful access to its contents, no evidentiary value can be given to the ballots in it and the
official count reflected in the election return must be upheld as the better and more reliable account of
how and for whom the electorate voted
76. MAYOR NOEL E. ROSAL V. COMELEC SECOND DIVISION AND

MICHAEL IMPERIAL
G.R. No. 168253 16 March 2007 Corona, J.
Facts: Petitioner Noel E. Rosal and private respondent Michael Victor C. Imperial were candidates for
mayor of Legaspi City in the May 10, 2004 elections. After the counting and canvassing of votes,
petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Legaspi City, having received 44,792 votes over
private respondent'ʹs 33,747.

On July 6, 2004, a petition for an election protest was filed by private respondent with the COMELEC
contesting the results of the election in all 520 precincts on the grounds of alleged irregularities which
was raffled to the Second Division of the Comelec which issued on November 17, 2004 an order
directing the collection of the ballot boxes from the contested precincts and their delivery to the
Comelec. On December 16, 2004, private respondent filed a manifestation apprising the Second
Division of the fact that out of the 520 ballot boxes retrieved for delivery to the Comelec, 95 had no
plastic seals, 346 had broken plastic seals and only 79 remained intact with whole plastic seals and
padlocks.

Recount of the contested ballots show that petitioner'ʹs vote count is reduced from 44,792 votes to 39,752
and an increase in that of private respondent from 22,474 to 39,184 votes. A set of hearings then
commenced. Petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari assailing orders of the Comelec'ʹs
Second Division for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion arguing that the Second
Division had, by these orders, denied him due process by effectively depriving him of a reasonable
opportunity to substantiate with competent evidence his contention that the revised ballots were not
the same ballots cast and counted during the elections.

The second division then proclaimed Michael Imperial as the winning candidate in a resolution.
Petitioner applied an MR of the resolution but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc, thus this case.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC Second Division acted arbitrarily.
Held: Yes. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected
by the board of canvassers is the true and lawful choice of the electorate. In a protest prosecuted on
such a theory, the protestant ordinarily prays that the official count as reflected in the election returns
be set aside in favor of a revision and recount of the ballots, the results of which should be made to
prevail over those reflected in the returns. It should never be forgotten, though, that the superior status
of the ballots as evidence of how the electorate voted presupposes that these were the very same ballots

actually cast and counted in the elections and that these ballots are intact and genuine.. Thus, it has
been held that before the ballots found in a box can be used to set aside the returns, the court must be
sure that it has before it the same ballots deposited by the voters.

We summarize the foregoing doctrines: (1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as
reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been
preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change,
abstraction or substitution; (2) the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved
in such a manner is on the protestant; (3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law,
proof must be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would
provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the
precise mode of achieving that end; (4) it is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance
with the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or
the likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee and (5) only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court or
Comelec that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the
recount and not as reflected in the election returns.

Therefore, the mode of preserving the ballots in this jurisdiction is for these to be stored safely in sealed
and padlocked ballot boxes which, once closed, shall remain unopened unless otherwise ordered by
the Comelec in cases allowed by law. Thus, it is incumbent on the protestant to prove, at the very least,
that the safety features meant to preserve the integrity of the ballot boxes and their contents were
installed and that these remained in place up to the time of their delivery to the Comelec for the
revision proceedings. However, where a ballot box is found in such a condition as would raise a
reasonable suspicion that unauthorized persons could have gained unlawful access to its contents, no
evidentiary value can be given to the ballots in it and the official count reflected in the election return
must be upheld as the better and more reliable account of how and for whom the electorate voted.

The COMELEC acted arbitrarily since it never considered the condition of the ballot boxes at the time
they were delivered to the Comelec for revision. It failed to recognize that, in view of reports that the
ballot boxes had been tampered with and allegations that their contents had been switched with
genuine but invalid ballots, the question of whether the revised ballots could be relied on as the same
ones cast and counted during the elections could not obviously be settled by an examination of the
ballots themselves.

Therefore, the COMELEC is directed to determine:
1. Which ballot boxes sufficiently retained their integrity as to justify the conclusion that the
ballots contained therein could be relied on as better evidence than the election returns.
2. Ascertain the precincts the ballot boxes of which were found in such a condition as would
afford a reasonable opportunity for unlawful access to their contents. The Commission on
Elections shall exclude from the recount the ballots from these precincts and shall rely instead
on the official count stated in the election returns.


Doctrine: The general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for
each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule
applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of
elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be
made to untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as evidence.

77. SEMA VS. HRET

Keywords: Untampered and unaltered election returns
G.R. No. 190734 Mar. 26, 2010 Ponente
Facts: On 12 June 2007, protestant Bai Sandra S.A. Sema, a congressional candidate of the Lakas-‐‑CMD
who obtained 87,237 votes or 18,345-‐‑vote difference from protestee Dilangalen, who obtained 105,582
votes, filed an election protest against the latter. Allegedly, it was on 1 June 2007, when the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Shariff Kabunsuan proclaimed protestee Didagen P. Dilangalen as
Representative of the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City (as no certified true copy
of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidate for Member of the
House of Representatives was attached to the protest).

Protestant Sema is protesting a total of 195 precincts of the Municipality of Datu Odin Sinsuat of the
Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, mainly based on fraudulent and irregular
counting of votes.

On July 19, 2007, protestee filed an Answer with Counter-‐‑Protest, counter-‐‑protesting 198
clustered/merged precincts in Sultan Kudarat and 50 precincts in Sultan Mastura based on fraud.

From September 16-‐‑29, 2008, the Tribunal conducted revision of ballots in all the contested precincts.
During the revision of ballots, it was discovered that only one (1) out of the 248 ballot boxes of the
counter-‐‑protested precincts contained ballots. The other 247 counter-‐‑protested ballots were totally
empty or did not contain ballots and election documents.

The results of revision of ballots in the 195 protested precincts and one (1) counter-‐‑protested precinct
are shown in the Table below.

Protestant Sema Protestee Dilangalen
Votes per election returns 2,238 33,707
Votes per physical count 2,794 32,603

Protestant seeks a resolution of her protest by way of appreciation of ballots, asserting that the spurious
ballots containing votes for protestee be rejected and be themselves considered as proof that the will of
the people was thwarted by election fraud in the protested 195 precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat.

On the other hand, to the protestee, the votes for him were cast by the voters themselves in official
ballots validly read for him, and the entries in the objected ballots were not written by the voters
themselves.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: dismissed the election protest of Sema and affirms
proclamation of protestee Dilangalen and declares the latter the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan of Cotabato City. It found that majority of the ballots in the 195
protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat were rejected as fake or spurious ballots since they did not
contain security features described by Commissioner Resurreccion Borra of the COMELEC -‐‑ no self-‐‑
locking metal seals.

On the other hand, only one (1) out of the 248 ballot boxes of the counter-‐‑protested precincts contained
ballots. Nevertheless, the HRET ruled that petitioner failed to prove by convincing evidence that the
election itself, conducted on May 14, 2007, was tainted by fraud and irregularities that frustrated the
will of the electorate. The HRET concluded that the ballots and/or ballot boxes must have been
tampered with after the elections and the counting and canvassing of votes. Thus, the HRET relied on
the election returns and other election documents to arrive at the number of votes validly cast for
petitioner and respondent Dilangalen.
Issue/s: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by relying on election returns and other election documents, instead of the ballots
themselves, in determining who actually won in the May 14, 2007 congressional elections for the Lone
District of Shariff Kabunsuan of Cotabato City.
Held: No. The Tribunal'ʹs reliance on election returns and/or tally sheets and other election documents
to arrive at the number of votes for each of the parties was well within its discretion and jurisdiction.
As concluded by the HRET, when said ballot boxes were opened for revision purposes, they could not
be said to be in the same condition as they were when closed by the Chairman and Members of the BEI
after the completion of the canvassing proceedings.

Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each
candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies
only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until
revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be made to
untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as evidence.

Nothing on record shows that the election returns, tally sheets and other election documents that the
HRET had on hand had been tampered or altered. Since it is undisputed that there are hardly any valid
or authentic ballots upon which the HRET could base its determination of the number of votes cast for
each of the parties, the HRET merely acted in accordance with settled jurisprudence when it resorted to
untampered and/or unaltered election returns and other election documents as evidence of such votes.


Doctrine: Elections use a paper-‐‑based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot
by shading the oval opposite the names of their candidates which is fed to the PCOS machine which
scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously. As established during the demo tests, the system
captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were
found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast.

78. VINZONS-CHATO V HRET AND PANOTES (HAHA)

Keywords: Election Protest, Picture images
G.R. No. 199149 January 22, 2013 Perlas-‐‑Bernabe, J.:
Facts: Petitioner renewed her bid as representative of the Second legislative District of Camarines
Norte, composed of seven municipalities. She lost to Panotes who was proclaimed the winner. Chato
filed an electoral protest before the HRET assailing the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four
municipalities. The initial revision of ballots showed a substantial discrepancy between the votes of the
parties per physical count vis-‐‑à-‐‑vis their votes per election returns in the Basud and Daet. Panotes then
lost no time in moving for the suspension of the proceedings in the case. He urged that should it be
shown during such hearing that the ballots and ballot boxes were not preserved, the HRET should
direct the printing of the picture images of the ballots of the questioned precincts stored in the data
storage devices for said precincts. HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots
relative to the protest. Chato filed an Urgent Motion to Prohibit reiterating the lack of legal basis for the
decryption and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary hearing had been conducted
showing that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved. HRET denied Chato’s
motion on the ground that she failed to show proof that the compact flash cards were violated. HRET
declared that although the actual ballots are the best evidence of the will of the voters, the picture
images of the ballots are regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Issue/s: Whether or not the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the “official ballots”
or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which the voters filled out?
Held: Yes, picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official
ballots” that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter as defined by Section
2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts there of are the functional equivalent of the paper
ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of votes in an electoral protest.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.


Doctrine: Ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the functional
equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election
protest.

79. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Compact Flash cards
G.R. No. 203302 March 12, 2013 Carpio, J.
Facts: Emmanuel L. Maliksi and Homer T. Saquilayan (private respondent) were both mayoralty
candidates for the Municipality of Imus, Cavite during the May 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan as the duly elected municipal.
Maliksi filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, questioning the results
of the elections in 209 clustered precincts. The case was docketed as Election Protest No. 009-‐‑10. In its
Decision, the trial court declared Maliksi as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite. The trial
court ruled Maliksi won over Saquilayan by a margin of 665 votes. Saquilayan filed an appeal before
the COMELEC, docketed as EAC No. A-‐‑22-‐‑2011. Meanwhile, in a Special Order dated 28 November
2011, the trial court granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal. On 2 December 2011,
Saquilayan also filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order or status quo order with prayer for early
consideration, docketed as SPR No. 106-‐‑2011, assailing the trial court’s Special Order of 28 November
2011 granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC First Division, after inspecting the ballot
boxes, ruled that it was apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised. To determine
the true will of the electorate, and since there was an allegation of ballot tampering, the COMELEC
First Division examined the digital images of the contested ballots stored in the Compact Flash cards.
COMELEC: In a Resolution promulgated on 15 August 2012, the COMELEC First Division nullified the
trial court’s decision and declared Saquilayan as the duly-‐‑elected Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
The COMELEC First Division noted that Maliksi attached a photocopy of an official ballot to his
election protest. The COMELEC First Division stated that unless one of the clustered precincts had a
photocopying machine, it could only mean that an official ballot was taken out of the polling place to
be photocopied, in violation of Section 30(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8786. In its 14 September
2012 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the
15 August 2012 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the
COMELEC First Division did not err in ordering the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot
images in the CF cards instead of recounting the physical ballots. The COMELEC En Banc stated that
when the case was elevated to it on appeal, it immediately noted an "ʺunprecedented number of double-‐‑
votes involving 8,387 ballots – exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and specifically affecting the
ballots for Saquilayan.

Issue/s:
1. Whether Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on appeal
the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards; and
2. Whether the ballot images in the CF cards are mere secondary evidence that should only be used
when the physical ballots are not available.
Held: 1. Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In addition, Maliksi raised his
objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. There is
no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings. It is settled that "ʺopportunity to be heard"ʺ does not only mean oral arguments in court but
also written arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party was heard on his motion for
reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due process. The Court has ruled that denial of
due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration
2. The Supreme Court have already ruled that the ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the printouts
of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and
may be used in an election protest. In the recent consolidated cases of Vinzons-‐‑Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Panotes and Panotes v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Vinzons-‐‑Chato, the Court ruled that "ʺthe picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes
cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369."ʺ In short, both the ballot images in the CF
cards and the printouts of such images have the same evidentiary value as the official physical ballots
filled up by the voters.


Doctrine: Jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners
challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a
petition to cancel respondent Daza'ʹs certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case
with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Daza'ʹs proclamation.

80. MONSALE V. NICO

Keywords: Jurisdiction of an election or a quo warranto case
G.R. No. 103903 11 September 1992 ROMERO, J:
Facts: Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar filed the instant
petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of
the same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground
that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October
16, 1974. Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as
permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Omnibus Election Code and Section 18, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot
and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that they
seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully
pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is
the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza,
the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza'ʹs certificate of
candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10)
days after Daza'ʹs proclamation. Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent
since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already
consummated. Fourth, as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds
disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover,
as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being MOOT and
ACADEMIC.


Doctrine: Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter, presumably including the
defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the eligibility (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is
the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the COMELEC an
incumbent'ʹs ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of
the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "ʺwithin ten days after
proclamation"ʺ of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility
may be taken cognizance of by the Commission.

81. FRIVALDO V COMELEC

Keywords: election contest; election protest; quo warranto;
G.R. No.120295 June 28, 1996 -‐‑
Facts: On March 20, 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his CoC for the office of governor of Sorsogon in the May
8, 1995 elections. Raul Lee, another candidate, filed a petition on Mar. 23, 1995 to the Comelec praying
that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
being a citizen of the Philippines and that his CoC be cancelled.
Second division of Comelec granted Lee’s petition, declaring that Frivaldo is disqualiffied to run for
office. Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsidertaion which remained unacted until after May 8, 1995
elections, so his candidacy continued. May 11, 1995 comelec en banc affirmed the resolution of the
second division. May 27, 1997, the completed canvass of the election was issued showing the Frivaldo
garnered the most votes and Lee was second highest. June 21 1995, Comelec En Banc directed
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to proclaim Raul Lee as the winning candidate.
July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with comelec a new petition (SPC No. 95-‐‑317), praying for the annulment of
the Lee’s proclamation on June 30, 1995 as the governor. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 pm,
he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under PD
275 had been granted. Which Lee argued that the Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain Frivaldo’s
petition because the only "ʺpossible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a
pre-‐‑proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"ʺ. Again, Lee reminds us that he was
proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-‐‑317 questioning his (Lee'ʹs) proclamation
only on July 6, 1995 — "ʺbeyond the 5-‐‑day reglementary period."ʺ Hence, according to him, Frivaldo'ʹs
"ʺrecourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."ʺ

Hence this petition to annul resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Frivaldo from running for
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines and the other resolution
of Comelec En banc of affirming the former.
Take note: this case is consolidated with GR No 123755 wherein Raul Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec En Banc and he filed another petition on February
26, 1996 because of the resolution of Comelec First Division on Dec. 19, 1995 which held that Lee not
having garnered the highest number of votes was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as the governor
and Frivaldo having garnered the highest number of votes and having reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 is qualified to hold the office of governor.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Comelec has jurisdiction to entertain the petition SPC No. 95-‐‑317 because
the only possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-‐‑proclamation
case, an election protest or a quo warranto case.
Held: Yes, the Comelec has jurisdiction to entertain Fivaldo’s petition.

Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the eligibility (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only
provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the COMELEC an
incumbent'ʹs ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "ʺwithin ten days after
proclamation"ʺ of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may
be taken cognizance of by the Commission.

Since, at the very moment of Lee'ʹs proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already
and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day,
then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number
of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous
"ʺjudicially-‐‑declared"ʺ alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible. The Court however
cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "ʺbe done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation."ʺ Inasmuch as Frivaldo'ʹs petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee'ʹs proclamation,
there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.


Doctrine: The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
82. MAQUILING VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 Sereno, J.
Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of
the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-‐‑acquisition
was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10
May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "ʺUSA-‐‑American."ʺ To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-‐‑generated travel record dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25
June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying
that the name "ʺArnado, Rommel Cagoco"ʺ appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger
manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010 as a US-‐‑American Citizen.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-‐‑parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer.

COMELEC 1st Division: Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for
disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon
the finding that "ʺBalua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"ʺ whereas the First
Division still could "ʺnot conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-‐‑year residency requirement under
the Local Government Code."ʺ
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that
he is a Filipino citizen; that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his
US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the
order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case.
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner.
COMELEC EN BANC: As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no
final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer,
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the
Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code to take effect.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration.
First, by renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April
3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
Second, the use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to
his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "ʺun-‐‑renounce"ʺ what he has earlier on renounced.The respondent presented a plausible
explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the
passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he
was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent
travels abroad.
Issue/s: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made and therefore disqualifying him from the election.

Held: While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from
3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his
American citizenship.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just
at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the
oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "ʺArnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "ʺAffidavit of Renunciation."ʺ This does not mean, that he
failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. The ballot cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When
the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed
by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one
even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the
highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the
very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write
off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed
worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.


Doctrine: An election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the
ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it
usually entails a full-‐‑blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is
beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the
offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding which
is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.

83. MANUEL SUNGA VS. COMELEC AND FERDINAND TRINIDAD

Keywords: criminal and electoral aspect
G.R. No. 125629 March 25, 1998 BELLOSILLO, J.
Facts: Sunga was one of the candidates for Mayor in Iguig, Cagayan. Trinidad, on the other hand, was
the incumbent mayor seeking re-‐‑election in the same municipality. Sunga filed with COMELEC a
complaint for disqualification against Trinidad on the following grounds: (a) using of local government
vehicles; (b) threats, intimidation, terrorism, or other forms of coercion; (c) vote buying. Meanwhile,
Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes while Sunga trailed second.

Sunga filed for suspension of proclamation which went unheeded then filed again a motion to suspend
the effects of the proclamation which was likewise not acted upon. But, COMELEC Law Department
submitted its Report recommending that Trinidad be charged in court for violations of the allegations
above (a,b,c).
COMELEC En Banc: Approved the findings of the Law Department and directed the filing of the
corresponding informations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. Accordingly, four (4)
informations for various elections offenses were filed in the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The
disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to the COMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.
COMELEC 2ND Division: Dismissed the petition for disqualification on the ground that any complaint
for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as a winner shall
be dismissed as a disqualification case.
Issue/s: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the disqualification
case against private respondent Trinidad?

Held: YES. Sec. 6 of RA 6646 provides that, “If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.” The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to
proceed with the disqualification case even after the election.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did
not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually
decide the disqualification case.

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect
involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any other
criminal case, it usually entails a full-‐‑blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a
conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of
whether the offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative
proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus,
under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "ʺshall be heard
summarily after due notice."ʺ It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an
erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.


Doctrine: The rule enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in an information has for its aim to
give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge to enable him to prepare his defense. The
State should not heap upon the defendant two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense.

84. PEOPLE VS FERRER
G.R. No. L-‐‑8957 April 29, 1957 Padilla, J.
Facts: Sometime before the elections on November 10, 1953, accused Andres G. Ferrer, an Officer in the
Department of Foreign Affairs, delivered a speech during a political rally of the Liberal Party in Barrio
Caloocan Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan, inducing the electors to vote for President Quirino and Speaker
Perez, as well as the other candidates of the Liberal Party. Ferrer also distributed pro-‐‑LP pamphlets and
cigarettes to the attendees. Prior to the elections, Ferrer also campaigned in the Barrio of Caloocan
Norte in the municipality of Binmaley, going from house to house distributing sample ballots of the
Liberal Party. For these actions, an information was filed alleging that Ferrer violated sections 51 and
54 in relation to Sections 183, 184 and 185 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180), as
amended. Ferrer moved to quash the information on the ground that it charges more than one offense
and that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of either section 51 or section
54 of the Revised Election Code.
Court of First Instance: Information filed is defective; Prosecution directed to amend the information
so as to allege sufficient facts constituting an offense under section 51 of Revised Election Code.
Issue/s: Whether the information filed is defective for charging two or more election offenses.
Held: Yes. The information is defective because it charges two violations of the Revised Election Code:
Sections 51 and 54.

Sec. 51. Prohibition regarding transportation, food and drinks. -‐‑ It is unlawful for any candidate, political
committee, voter or any other person to give or accept, free of charge, directly or indirectly, transportation, food,
or drinks during a public meeting in favor of any or several candidates and during the three hours before and after
such meeting, or on registration days, on the day preceding the voting and on the day of the voting; or to give or
contribute, directly or indirectly, money or things of value for such purpose.

Sec. 54. Active intervention of public officers and employees. -‐‑ No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of
any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural
police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid in any candidate, or exert influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a
peace officer.

Section 51, made punishable by section 183, cannot be deemed a necessary means to commit the lesser
violation of section 54 were the penalty attached to it taken into consideration. If the penalty provided
for violation of sections 51 and 54.

That a violation of Section 51 is distinct from that of section 54 is further shown by the fact that a
violation of the former may be committed by any candidate, political committee, voter or any other
person, whereas a violation of the latter may only be committed by a justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or
assessor of any province, officer or employee of the Army, member of the national, provincial, city,
municipal or rural police force, and classified civil service officer or employee.

Under the information in question, if the charges be proved, the defendant may be convicted and
sentenced under either section or both. The rule enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in
information has for aim to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge to enable him to
prepare his defense. The State should not heap upon the defendant two or more charges which might
confuse him in his defense.


Doctrine: To support a conviction of prohibition against carrying of deadly weapons (Section 261(p) of
the Omnibus Election Code), it is not necessary that the deadly weapon should have been seized from
the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that
the accused carried the deadly weapon "ʺin the polling place and within a radius of one hundred
meters thereof"ʺ during any of the specified days and hours.

85. MAPPALA V. NUÑEZ

Keywords: Election Offenses; Carrying of deadly weapons
A.M. No. RTJ-‐‑94-‐‑1208 January 26, 1995 Quiason, J.
Facts: This case is an administrative complaint filed by Jacinto Mappala against Judge Crispulo A.
Nuñez, the presiding judge of the RTC Cabagan, Isabela for gross inefficiency, serious misconduct and
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Accordingly, Mappala alleged that the respondent judge
committed serious misconduct for acquitting Alejandro Angoluan of Violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. In acquitting Alejandro, respondent justified that such acquittal is upon the ground that "ʺthe
firearm was not taken from his person within the precinct but was taken more than 50 meters away
from the precinct"ʺ. Furthermore, he claimed that what the law considered as a crime was the "ʺcarrying
of firearms within (50) or 100 meters away from the precinct. He further claimed that he firearm was
not taken from the accused within the 50 or 100 meters distance from the precinct because in truth and
in fact the said firearm was surrendered by the accused two (2) days after the elections. Hence,
according to him, the mistake in the distance is merely a clerical error.
Issue/s: Whether or not respondent judge is correct in acquitting Alejandro.
Held: No. In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant herein inside Precinct No.
2 located at the elementary school building in Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay elections on
March 28, 1989. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To
respondent, the surrender of the weapon was an implied admission that it was the one used by
Alejandro in shooting complainant. In spite of all these findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro of
illegally carrying a deadly weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him
while he was inside the precinct.

To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus Election Code, it is not necessary that the
deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a
radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused carried the deadly weapon "ʺin the polling
place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof"ʺ during any of the specified days and hours.
After respondent himself had found that the prosecution had established these facts, it is difficult to
understand why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus
Election Code.


Doctrine: The transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing
authority. It is necessary to meet the exigencies of public service sometimes too difficult to perceive
and predict. Without this inherent prerogative, the appointing authority may not be able to cope with
emergencies to the detriment of public service.

86. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. WILFREDO D. REYES AND

BUENAVENTURA C. MANIEGO
Keywords: Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service
G.R. No. 115022 August 14, 1995 PUNO, J
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 to annul and set aside the orders of
respondent Judge Wilfredo D. Reyes.

Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection District II, Bureau of Customs,
Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued an order assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs
Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special
Assistant.

Ebio filed with the COMELEC a letter-‐‑complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new
assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus
Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days before the May
11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections.
COMELEC: After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed an information with the RTC,
charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.

RTC: Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground
that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14,
1992 did not violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election
offense. It purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Petitioner, through the
COMELEC, opposed the motion to quash.

The trial court granted private respondent'ʹs motion to quash and dismissed the Criminal Case.
Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied. Petitioner forthwith elevated the case to this
Court on a pure question of law.
Issue/s: W/N the transfer ipso facto makes respondent Maniego liable for an election offense under
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.

Held: NO. The COMELEC passed Resolution No. 2333 which promulgated the necessary rules to
enforce Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881:

“SECTION 261. Prohibited acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. —
Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee
in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior
approval of the Commission.”

We start with the constitutional injunction that no officer or employee in the civil service shall
engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. This
prohibition is reiterated in the Administrative Code of 1987. Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881
implements this constitutional prohibition.

Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a government officer or
employee during the election period. To be sure, the transfer or detail of a public officer or
employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. Clearly then, the transfer or detail of a
government officer or employee will not be penalized by Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 if done to
promote efficiency in the government service. Hence, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2333 provides
that the COMELEC has to pass upon the reason for the proposed transfer or detail.

Two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz:
(1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the election period as fixed
by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the
COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations.

In the case at bench, respondent Maniego transferred Ebio, on January 14, 1992. On this date, the
election period for the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections had already been fixed to commence
January 12, 1992 until June 10, 1992. Nonetheless, it was only in Resolution No. 2333 which took
effect on January 15, 1992 that COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its
approval on the transfer or detail of public officers or employees during the election period.

Before the effectivity of these rules, it cannot be said that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal
provision, was already enforceable. Needless to state, respondent Maniego could not be charged
with failing to secure the approval of the COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14,
1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the subject were yet inexistent.


Doctrine: Airsoft guns are included in the term “firearm”, but their replicas/imitations are not
included for purposes of election gun ban.

87. ORCEO VS. COMELEC

Keywords: Election offenses
G.R. No. 190779 March 26, 2010 Peralta, J.
Facts: Petitioner questioned the validity of Resolution No. 8714, particularly on the term “firearm,” as it
included airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the election gun ban. Petitioner, an airsoft player,
contended that the resolution will make him liable for an election offense if caught in possession of an
airsoft gun going to and from the game site during the election period. He further asserted that playing
airsoft provides bonding moments among family members, and families are entitled to protection by
the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Pursuant thereto, they are
free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, according to petitioner, cannot be
abridged by the COMELEC and are not in accordance with the State policies. COMELEC defended that
constitutional freedoms are not absolute in a sense, and they may be abridged to some extent to serve
appropriate and important interests.
Issue/s: Whether or not airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are included in the term “firearm”.
Held: Airsoft guns are included in the term “firearm”, but their replicas/imitations are not included.
The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term "ʺfirearm"ʺ in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of
the gun ban during the election period is a reasonable restriction, the objective of which is to ensure the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. However, the Court excludes the
replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns from the term "ʺfirearm"ʺ under Resolution No. 8714,
because they are not subject to any regulation, unlike airsoft guns. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the
term “firearm” and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of
recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation, or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen
may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a
voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun which is sought to be
averted. When a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute
being implemented, the provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.


Doctrine: Transfer is defined in COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 as "ʺany personnel movement from one
government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a
government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment;"ʺ while detail as
defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to
another without the issuance of an appointment.

88. ELSIE S. CAUSING VS. COMELEC AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.

Keywords: Transfer; Detail; Reassignment
G.R. No. 199139 September 9, 2014 BERSAMIN, J
Facts: Petitioner assails the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dismissing her complaint-‐‑affidavit
charging Mayor Biron with violating COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261 (g), (h),
and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar. Mayor Biron issued Office Order No. 12,
detailing Causing to the Office of the Municipal Mayor to receive direct orders as to particular
functions the office may require.

Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series of 2010, and Memorandum No. 17-‐‑A,
Series of 2010, repealing Office Order No. 12. In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron,
Causing filed the complaint-‐‑affidavit in the Office of the Regional Election Director claiming that Office
Order No. 12 ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election
period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section 1,
Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009.

Mayor Biron countered in his counter-‐‑affidavit: (a) that there was no transfer or detail involved, and
any movement of Causing, if at all, was a purely physical transfer, that is, only a few steps from her
office to the Office of the Mayor, without any change in the present work, agency, position, rank and
compensation; and (b) that granting without admitting that the movement constituted reassignment,
the same was not covered by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, which expressly limited the prohibition
to either transfer or detail only. He emphasizes that Office Order No. 12 was issued by his office for the
purpose of closely supervising her in performing her functions after receiving complaints about her
behavior in dealing with her co-‐‑workers and with the public transacting business in her office.
Office of the Regional Election Director: The Provincial Election Supervisor (PES), recommended the
dismissal of the complaint-‐‑affidavit for lack of probable cause to charge Mayor Biron with the violation
of Section (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by Resolution No. 8737.

COMELEC: The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES. On its part,
the COMELEC, through OSG, defends its questioned resolution, stating that the words transfer and
detail should not be understood in their literal sense; that Causing was neither transferred nor detailed;
that she was not moved to a different office with the same rank, level and salary, or to another agency;
and that Mayor Biron'ʹs act of transferring the office space of Causing was intra vires, and found legal
support in the power of supervision and control accorded to local chief executives under the Local
Government Code.

Issue/s: W/N the relocation of the petitioner constituted a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election
Code and the relevant Resolution of the COMELEC
Held: NO. The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer
and detail. Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail
within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area
from its old location to the Office of the Mayor "ʺsome little steps"ʺ away. We cannot accept the
petitioner'ʹs argument,
therefore, that the phrase "ʺany transfer or detail whatsoever"ʺ encompassed "ʺany and all kinds and
manner of personnel movement,"ʺ including the mere change in office location.

Moreover, Causing'ʹs too-‐‑literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions
involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an election offense
punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.

Equally material is that Mayor Biron'ʹs act of transferring the office space of Causing was rooted in his
power of supervision and control over the officials and employees serving in his local government unit,
in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their duties and functions. Verily, she thereafter continued
to perform her tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar even
after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.

It is interesting to note that aside from the present election offense case, Causing initiated an
administrative case in the CSC where she referred to the personnel movement not as a transfer or
detail, but as a “reassignment” that constituted her constructive dismissal. The CSC Regional Office
No. 6 ruled that although Mayor Biron used the word detail in referring to the personnel movement
effected, the personnel action that actually took place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid reassignment.

Considering that reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code, there was no
probable cause to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code.


Doctrine: The Commission on Elections and the Regional Trial Courts, and not the Sandiganbayan
have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses committed by public
officers in relation to their office.

89. DE JESUS V. PEOPLE

Keywords: Jurisdiction of election offenses
G.R. No. L-‐‑61998 February 22, 1983 Escolin, J.
Facts: Ananias Hibo, the defeated mayoral candidate of the Nacionalista party, filed a complaint with
the COMELEC charging Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of
1978 Election Code. Noting that de Jesus was being charged in relation to his office, Asst. Fiscals
Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted
an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal Genova issued a resolution, finding the existence of a prima facie case
against petitioner for violation of section 89 and subsections of Section 178 of Election Code of 1978.
After approval by Tanodbayan, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a
motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has
the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction on election offenses committed by public
officers.
Held: None. The Commission on Elections and the Regional Trial Courts, and not the Sandiganbayan
have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses committed by public
officers in relation to their office.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to
the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is
not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result
in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and
duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair
its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, the Court
perceives neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the
authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to
their office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance (now RTC) under Sections 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.


Doctrine: A policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of election inspectors
for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms; The intention to
intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the
offense.

90. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. CORNELIO BAYONA

Keywords: Revolver; Police; Criminal Intent
G.R. No. 42288 February 16, 1935 VICKERS, J
Facts: This is an appeal from a decision finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of the
Election Law. The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows: Both Jose E. Desiderio, a
representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major Agdamag of the Philippine Constabulary,
who had been designated to supervise the elections in Capiz, testified positively that the defendant was
within the fence surrounding the polling place when Desiderio took possession of the revolver the
defendant was carrying at a distance of 27 meters from said polling place. It was argued that the
defendant was in a public road, where he had a right to be, when he was arrested; that if it be conceded
that the defendant went inside of the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election
Law, because he was called by a friend and merely approached him to find out what he wanted and
had no interest in the election; that there were many people in the public road in front of the
polling place, and the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile, which he himself was
driving, without running the risk of losing it and thereby incurring in a violation of the law.
Issue/s: W/N defendant is guilty of a violation of section 416 of the Election Law.
Held: YES. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he
violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector
or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver
inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he
committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to
intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the
offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.

If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not
proved that he tried to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell
intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.


Doctrine: The grant of the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the
COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment.

91. BANAT PARTY-LIST V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Keywords: Jurisdiction over election offenses
G.R. No. 177508 August 7, 2009 Carpio, J.
Facts: The petitioner, the BANAT party-‐‑list, assails Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369 and asks for
a temporary restraining order to be issued against COMELEC to prevent it from implementing the
statute. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity
for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. At the outset, both COMELEC and OSG
maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save for the prayer of the
COMELEC to declare Section 43 as unconstitutional.
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). According to petitioner,
under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-‐‑proclamation
cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concludes that in
entertaining pre-‐‑proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the
independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
Meanwhile, both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the
"ʺexclusive power"ʺ to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and the
COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the
government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.
Issue/s: Whether or not Sections 37, 38 and 43 is unconstitutional.
Held: No, it is constitutional. On the matter of Sections 37 and 38, Congress and the COMELEC did not
encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the
powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc and of the PET and the SET are exercised on different
occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President while the SET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. Their jurisdiction
can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc can determine
only the authenticity and due execution of the Certificates of Canvass and Congress and the COMELEC
en banc can exercise this power only before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice-‐‑
presidential, and senatorial candidates.

As to the validity of Sections 43, it is valid. The grant of the exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a
legislative enactment. As such, should the legislature see fit, it can freely amend the provisions of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the same act would not violate the Constitution.

Doctrine: The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous
exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a
complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-‐‑filing of substantially the
same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by
the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or
agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Keywords: Electoral Sabotage; Doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction
G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013 PERALTA, J
Facts: For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and Mike Arroyo praying that the Court take a second look at our Decision dismissing their
petitions against respondents Comelec, DOJ, Senator Pimentel, Joint DOJ-‐‑Comelec Preliminary
Investigation Committee and DOJ-‐‑Comelec Fact-‐‑Finding Team, et al.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-‐‑2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee
and Fact-‐‑Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral
fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the
Fact-‐‑Finding Team. The Fact-‐‑Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the purpose of
gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 7 of the Joint Order, the Joint
Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.
DOJ-‐‑Comelec: In its Initial Report, the Fact-‐‑Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results
in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. The Fact-‐‑Finding Team recommended, among others, that
petitioner Benjamin Abalos, Sr. be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for
conspiring to manipulate the election results; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another
preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo
be subjected to further investigation.

Meanwhile, Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint-‐‑Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
The Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion
for reconsideration.


COMELEC: The Comelec en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint Resolution
subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved that an information for electoral sabotage be filed
against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

The Comelec'ʹs Law Department filed with the RTC an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor
Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42 (b) (3) of RA 9369,
amending Section 27 (b) of RA 6646. The corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was
served on GMA on the same day.

RTC: The RTC, nonetheless, issued a Warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA was later
arraigned and she entered a plea of "ʺnot guilty."ʺ She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able
to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At present, she is again on hospital
arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case. The Court dismissed the petitions.
Issue/s: W/N the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.
Held: NO. Under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as
the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "ʺconcurrent jurisdiction"ʺ
authorized by the amendatory law.

The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction
jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two complaints — the
initial report of the Fact-‐‑Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel — both complaints were
filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary
investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this
case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary
investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ
for the prompt disposition of the cases.

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable
cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee
as an abdication of the Comelec'ʹs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Alvaro
Alvaro
· Almhijem
· Almhijem
· Chung
· Chung
· dela
· Endona
Rama ·· Endona
Francisco· Francisco
· Lim · Lontoc
· Gilo· ·Malecdan
Lim · Lontoc
· Manresa
· Malecdan
·
· Manresa
Mendoza
· Mendoza
· Palanog
· Palanog
· Pascual
· Pascual
· Senga
· Senga
· Tinoco
· Tinoco
· Usita· ·Usita
Yang· ·Yang
Yasto· Yasto

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ELECTION

G.R. No. L-­‐‑14514 December 18, 1918 JOHNSON, J.:

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014 PERALTA, J.

G.R. No. L-­‐‑24761 September 7, 1965 -­‐‑

G.R. No. 157013 July 3, 2003 Austria-­‐‑Martinez, J.

G.R. No. 162759 August 4 2006 Garcia, J:

6. YRA V. ABAÑO

7. ABELARDO APORTADERA (Petitioner-appellant) VS. MANUEL SOTTO

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

8. AKBAYAN YOUTH V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001 Buena, J.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

9. VELASCO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 180051 Dec. 24, 2008 Brion, J.

The Election Registration Board (ERB): denied his application.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

10. ASISTIO VS. AGUIRRE

G.R. No. 191124 April 27, 2010 Nachura, J.:

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

11. UTUTALUM VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 84843-­‐‑44 January 22, 1990 Melencio-­‐‑Herrera, J.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

12. LABO V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 86564 1 August 1989 Cruz, J.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

13. FRIVALDO V COMELEC

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 -­‐‑

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

14. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 Ponente: Kapunan, J.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

15. AGAPITO A. AQUINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995 Kapunan, J.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

16. MITRA VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 191938 July 2, 2010 Brion, J

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

17. JALOSJOS V. COMELEC

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

18. SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, vs. COMELEC, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and

G.R. No. 193314 February 26, 2013 SERENO, J.:

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

19. DELA TORRE VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 121592 July 5, 1996 FRANCISCO, J.

Held: The elements of fencing are:

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

20. VILLABER V COMELEC

G.R. No. 148326 November 15, 2001 Sandoval-­‐‑Gutierrez, J.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

21. MORENO v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006 Tinga, J.

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

Alvaro · Almhijem · Chung · Endona · Francisco · Lim · Lontoc · Malecdan · Manresa ·

22. DOMINADOR JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 193237 October 9 2012 Carpio, J.

G.R. No. L-‐‑14514 December 18, 1918 JOHNSON, J.:

G.R. No. L-‐‑24761 September 7, 1965 -‐‑

G.R. No. 157013 July 3, 2003 Austria-‐‑Martinez, J.

G.R. No. 84843-‐‑44 January 22, 1990 Melencio-‐‑Herrera, J.

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 -‐‑

G.R. No. 148326 November 15, 2001 Sandoval-‐‑Gutierrez, J.

G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015 Leonardo-‐‑de castro, J:

G.R. No. 88831 November 08, 1990 Grino-‐‑Aquino, J.

G.R. No. L-‐‑24721 November 3, 1925 Villamor, J.